Mathew Demme/ Vincent Cucciuffo

28 November 28, 2022

Narrative

On January 13, 2012, Costa Concordia struck her starboard side on an underwater reef
near the island of Isola del Giglio, close to the Italian coast of Tuscany in the Tyrrhenian Sea.
The ship immediately lost all propulsive power, and soon after, there was a complete blackout as
water reached the electrical panels, propulsion controls, and the engine room. The breach
resulted in a 60-meter-long gash in the ship’s hull. The Costa Concordia was a passenger cruise
ship (247 meters long, and 35 meters wide, with a passenger capacity of 3780) that was on a
regular run. Starting at Savona, making the port from which it departed before the accident,
Civitavecchia, the last port of call. The accident resulted in 32 people dead or missing and 157
people injured, 20 required hospital treatment. It appears that the master had given instructions
that the ship is to head for Giglio, maybe for the benefit of the Chief Purser, the Catering
Services Manager, and the ‘Meter’, and at 2103 the ship takes up a course of 279º towards the
island. At 2134 the Captain arrives on the bridge and instructs the helmsman to put the steering
into manual (from autopilot one assumes), and shortly afterward the 1st Officer gives
instructions in course headings to take the ship starboard. Although this is not specifically
expressed in the report one assumes that the alteration was to take the ship clear of the North end
of the island. 2139 with the ship on a heading of 290º the Captain takes over the watch, although
later narrative in the report seems to indicate some uncertainty in this area. The Captain orders an
increase in speed to 16 knots and for the course to be altered ‘easy’ to 310º. Only seven minutes
after the Captain’s arrival on the Bridge he begins to give a succession of helm instructions
firstly to turn the bow away from the island and then to port to stop the stern from hitting the
rocks. It appears that during every change of course the ship moved laterally towards the rocks,
and since the captain sent the Second Mate to the port wing, he was aware that there was a risk
of grounding. Finally, when giving orders to put the rudders to port the helmsman makes an error
and puts them to starboard, but corrects himself and goes hard a port, the correction taking eight
seconds. At 2145 the Second Officer warns that the ship has gone aground, and there is a loud
crash. Judging by the photographs and the description of the damage, the grinding of tortured
metal must have gone on for about ten seconds, and it would only be the distance from the
location of the impact and the enclosed design of the bridge which might have reduced the bridge
team’s understanding of the full extent of the disaster.

The ship continues to move northwards, and within a minute is blacked out. At 2146 the
emergency generator starts up and provides power for 41 seconds. Within a minute the ship is
blacked out, but during that time the master has given a number of helm orders ending up with
the rudders hard to starboard. And the ship continues to move northward, the speed gradually
decreasing. By 2152 it is evident that serious flooding of a number of compartments has taken
place and this has resulted in the failure of the main engines and almost all other systems. The
emergency generator which has operated briefly is attended by an Electrician who finds that the
automatic switch, which will start up the generator on main power failure, is disengaged, and
applies a screwdriver to the switch. But a cooling system failure, as far as I can tell the reason for
which has never been identified, results in the generator stops. At 2158 The Captain makes
telephone contact with the company Fleet Crisis Co-Ordinator and says according to the report
that the ship hit a rock with the left side towards the stern, reports the dynamics of the casualty,
adds that the propellers were not affected and being assessed for damages, also announces that
the ship is in blackout and that water is entering the stern that has reached the main electrical
panel. Obviously, this was an optimistic report and in no way really flagged up the level of the
crisis, and the technical staff back in the headquarters suggest that the ship be taken to anchor
using the bow thrusters. At 2207 there is a conversation between the Civitavecchia Harbor
Operations Room and the ship, which refers only to the blackout and that the situation is under
control. By this time it is evident to the 1st Officer and the Deputy Chief Engineer that there are
probably at least four compartments flooded. In addition, the Italian Search and Rescue services
have received several calls from the relatives of passengers on the ship who have been in contact
to tell them that there is something wrong. By 2212 with the rudders still hard to starboard the
ship’s forward motion has virtually ceased and maybe as a result, not explicitly stated in the
report, the list changes from ten degrees to port to a list to starboard. The staff in the emergency
generator room have found that they cannot maintain power using it due to the virtual failure of
the cooling system and that therefore there can be no provision of power to pumps, steering, or
other normally available systems powered from the emergency switchboard. At 2218 the Captain
communicates with the company Crisis Centre again to tell them that several compartments are
flooded and that there is no real power available from the emergency generator. The report
suggests that the captain believes that there are only two compartments flooded and that
therefore the ship can survive. Hence he has not made contact with the SAR services. Not only
that but at this point, the passengers have not been alerted to the emergency. It is evident that the
water level is still rising in the lower compartments of the ship, and by now some of the catering
areas have been flooded. At 2230 the Chief Engineer suggests to the Captain that the ship should
be abandoned. At 2233 the ‘General Alarm’ is raised, to reassure the passengers that all is under
control. Despite this reassurance, some passengers have apparently already got into the lifeboats.
Possibly the next really salient point in the report is that at 2240 the ship is resting on the bottom,
and at that time a distress message is broadcast using Inmarsat C. By 2247 a SAR patrol vessel
and a helicopter have been launched, and at that time the Captain orders the dropping of the
starboard anchor, and then when it stops the release of the port anchor. The Captain has also told
the Coastguard Operations Room that he is continuing to maneuver the ship towards an
anchorage, even though he has no engines, no rudders, and the ship is aground.

At 2251 the Master informs the bridge to raise an abandon ship order and then urges it,
but when asked to make the announcement he points out that it should be said, "Let passengers
on shore." rather than that. You can see that there might be a bit of trouble interpreting the
content of the report just from this statement, even though we think we know what they mean. At
2257 there are lifeboats in the water, At 2311 the starboard list may be between 20 and 30
degrees and the Captain in his last call to the company crisis unit describes the situation as being
less serious than reality, but at 2332 even the Second Master who was left on the bridge to
coordinate the evacuation, has left. And at 2338 all control of the evacuation had been
abandoned, there were still 300 passengers and crew on board. They were still trying to escape,
or disembark if you were following the Captain’s view, and those who had jumped into the sea
were being picked up by SAR patrol boats. At 0042 with about 80 people still on board the
Captain reveals to the Coastguard Operations Room that he is on shore, and over time and after
further communications at 0146 the report says that the OR contacts the Master ordering him
again to go back on board, and provide a situation report.

Non-Conformities according to the TSES Safety Management Manual

5.1- Master’s Responsibility and Authority (3.6)

It was also found through a recorded phone call with Costa Crosier’s crisis coordinator, Roberto

Ferrarini, that captain Francesco Schettino tried to cover his actions. The Captain also did not

follow 5.1, 3.6 of the TSES SMM “The master has command of the vessel and possesses full

authority and responsibility over all phases of vessel operations both in port and at sea. The
Master is responsible for the safety of the vessel, all persons aboard the vessel, and all the

vessel’s equipment.” Captain Francesco Schettino did not take responsibility for his actions

instead he gave false information that the crash occurred due to the blackout instead of the other

way around (He had ordered the crew to steer the ship away from the designated course toward

the shore, known as tourist navigation, to give passengers and people onshore a good view). He

put the ship at risk to provide a better view of the island. He was also blamed for delaying rescue

as he did not immediately alert the Italian Coast guard and the Search and Rescue Authority.

7.4- Bridge watch standing, bridge Resource management, and pilotage (3.16 maneuvering

characteristics, 3.34, 3.34.4)

Concordia’s deviation course required it to stay at least 1500 ft away from the island. But as it

turned out, the ship landed around 659 meters closer to the coast. According to the TSES SMM

3.34.4, there should’ve been communication between both the master and the helmsmen about

the proper execution of steering orders, without this there was an error due to a series of

miscommunications between the captain, first officers, and the officer at the helm is reflected

later in the investigative report. By the time the captain realized the situation and started giving a

series of orders for rudder turns, it was too late as the ship was already too close and moving at a

high speed of 16 knots. If the Captain and watch officers of the Costa Concordia followed the

TSES SMM they should’ve been familiar with 3.16 maneuvering characteristics, “ the Master

and bridge officers should be fully familiar with the maneuvering characteristics of the vessel,

including the vessel speeds, the vessels turning capabilities and the vessel’s stopping

capabilities.” The erroneous executions of an order by the helmsman and delay in correcting

them ultimately left Concordia no chance to pass safely.

Even though the master had left his post on the bridge, as well did most of the officers. It was

said by passengers that there was no Abandoned ship signal sent out to the passengers to inform

them the ship was going down. Which violated the TSES 8.5 Emergency preparedness and

checklists, because the crew was under panic on the bridge because they went aground, they did

not follow a checklist which caused some passengers to die, and had more passengers at risk of

their safety.
 Corrective Action

5.1- Master’s Responsibility and Authority (3.6)

The master should never leave his post while the abandoned ship whistle and the general alarm is

going off. The master should also have direct and honest communication between both his crew

and the passengers of the ship. The captain should never deviate from the course unless knowing

the full maneuverability of the ship. Communication with the Captain and the Coast Guard

should be immediate and honest. It is the master’s responsibility to provide safety precautions

and actions aboard the vessel.

7.4- Bridge watch standing, bridge Resource management, and pilotage (3.16 maneuvering

characteristics, 3.34, 3.34.4)

The Captain should always make sure the crew and watch-standing officers are always in direct

communication with what actions they are doing. The captain and crew should be familiar with

the maneuverability of the vessel before making any course changes. The Captain should also

keep in mind the safety of his passengers and crew before deviating from the course, and be

aware of all the obstacles and hazards that could appear.

8.5 Emergency Preparedness and checklists (Abandoned Ship)

The communication between both the crew and passengers should be honest and apparent. A

checklist should be followed when the signal and general alarm of the ship go off for the

abandonment of the ship. The Captain and crew should help the passengers aboard get to their

muster stations, and help them get to safety.