Module 4 “Meteorology for Safe Navigation”

Maritime Accident Report “Heavy Weather Damage”

MAIB Report No. 13/2009, June 2009,www.maib.gov.uk

1 Maersk Newport arrived at Le Havre at 0902 on 9 November 2008 for cargo operations
which extended throughout most of the day and evening. During the early evening the
master obtained a weather forecast for the English Channel from the Netherlands based
Ships Performance Optimisation System (SPOS) website. It reported that the forecast for the
English Channel, for 10 November 2008, was for south-westerly force 5 to 6 winds which
were expected to strengthen.
2 Pre-sailing checks were carried out between 2300 and midnight when the forward and aft
draughts were recorded as 9.7m and 10.7m respectively. No specific heavy weather checks
were made. The pilot embarked at about 2345. The bosun reported to the master that both
anchors were secured, on the brakes only, in readiness to let go in an emergency. The
master, both chief officers and pilot were on the bridge when Maersk Newport slipped from
her berth at 0001 on 10 November 2008.
3 The departure was uneventful, and after the pilot disembarked at 0056, the master ordered
full away on passage, which equated to a speed of approximately 18 knots. The master then
instructed the bosun to fully secure both anchors. The bosunsubsequently reported to the
master that the anchors were in their fully housed positions, that the lashing chains were
tight, the guillotines blocks were down, the brakes were on as tight as possible and that the
windlasses were out of gear. Neither of the two hinged hawse pipe covers or the two spurling
pipe coverswerefitted. The bosun then returned to the accommodation and reported to the
officer of the watch (OOW) that he was off the deck. At 0118 the master increased speed to
full sea speed (22 knots), before leaving the bridge to send business messages. The wind at
the time was recorded in the Deck Log as south-westerly force 4 to 5.
4 After sending his messages, the master briefly returned to the bridge to confirm with the
second officer that the speed was increasing, before going to bed.
5 Soon afterwards the weather began to steadily deteriorate. The wind speed increased to force
7 and the vessel was shipping water and spray as she pitched into the, now, rough seas. At
0340 the master was awakened by furniture moving in his cabin. He contacted the second
officer on the bridge and was advised of the weather conditions. As a result, the master
ordered the speed to be reduced to full ahead manoeuvring, which was about 15 knots.
6 Throughout the morning watch the weather continued to steadily worsen. At 0700 the ship’s
log recorded conditions as: “rough westerly seas and swell, overcast and misty with the ship
pitching moderately”
7 At 0800 the chief officer was sufficiently concerned about the weatherconditions that he made
 a broadcast advising that the deck was out of bounds. He also posted a sign to that effect on
the whiteboard outside the mess room. In addition, he advised the catering and engineering
teams to secure their departments for expected heavy weather. Because of the dangerous
conditions on deck it was not possible to carry out any checks of the cargo lashings, hatches
or anchor securing arrangements.
8 The master had continually assessed the deteriorating weather conditions and ship’s
movement throughout the forenoon watch. By 1200 the west-southwesterly wind had
increased to force 8 to 9 and the sea remained rough with a 0.8 knot east-north-easterly tide
running. However, the ship was recorded in the Deck Log as “pitching and rolling easily” and
the master decided that it was safe to continue the passage at full ahead manoeuvring speed.
At 1212 the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) recorded the vessel’s speed over
the ground (SOG) as
15.4 knots on a heading of 232º true (T).
9 At 1250 the bow thruster room fire alarm sounded on the bridge. The master went
immediately to the bridge. He reduced speed to slow ahead and altered course to provide
safe access across the deck, so that the cause of the bow thruster compartment fire alarm
could be investigated. At 1300 the SOG was 5.2 knots and the ship’s heading was 279ºT.
The master thenauthorisedthe chief engineer, the chief officer, fourth engineer, bosun and
electrician to go forward to the bow thruster room.
10 The chief engineer cautiously opened the bow thruster room hatch and, as there was no
evidence of a fire, he went down the ladders. He immediately noticed three, 150mm by
250mm, holes in the port side of the hull. As the vessel pitched, water was sprayed into the
compartment and over the electrical distribution and control panels. The chief engineer also
noticed that there were numerous hull indentations (Figure 1) and that the bilge was full of
water. He reported the damage to the master on the bridge and that he suspected that the port
anchor had been released, causing the damage. The bilge suction valvewas opened and the 5
ton/hour bilge pump was started in an attempt to lower the water level.

Figure 1: Hull indentation

11 The bosun was sent to get wooden wedges and neoprene rubber with which to stem the flow
of water. On his way he went to the forecastle head with the chief engineer and chief officer
to investigate the damage from the outside. On looking over the port side, the port anchor was
seen to be below the sea surface, and there were numerous indentations and splits in the
vicinity of the port side of the bow thruster room. As the bow pitched, water was seen
spraying out from more holes in the forepeak area.
12 Although it was clear that the anchor had caused the damage, the ship was still shipping seas,
making it unsafe to access the forecastle to recover and secure the anchor. The anchor was
well below the surface of the water and there were no reports of impact noise, and so the
master
 concluded that no further damage was occurring. Consequently he opted for his team to
continue to try to stem the water ingress. He also instructed them to take soundings of the
tanks around the bow thruster room, and to ballast the vessel using the after ballast tanks.
Meanwhile,he manoeuvred the ship clear of the shipping lanes, at slow speed and onto a safe
course to recover the anchor.
13 At 1307 the master e-mailed the technical superintendent in Copenhagen and the WOC with
a preliminary damage report. However, he did not alert the DPA to the vessel’s situation and
did not consider carrying out the “save” procedure for the ship’s Voyage Data Recorder
(VDR).

Figure 2: Senhouse slip securing pin in detached position

14 By about 1400 the team in the bow thruster room had managed to significantly reduce the
inflow of water. The bilge water at this point was about 1.25m deep and appeared constant.
15 At 1422 the master altered course to allow access on to the forecastle. The pitching was
minimal and the master gave permission for the chief officer and the bosun to go on to the
forecastle to recover the port anchor and to try to identify the cause of its release.
16 The forecastle team found that about ½ to ¾ shackle of the port anchor cable had been
released. The lashing chain Senhouse slip tapered securing pin (Figure 2) had become
detached from the slip and was hanging by its chainand that the lashing chain was hanging
loose. It was also found that the forward guillotine block was in the upright open position
while the after guillotine block was in the horizontal closed position. Before the anchor cable
was recovered, the chief officer checked the winch brake and managed to apply one full turn
of the brake handwheel. After the port anchor was fully secured, checks were made to confirm
that the starboard anchor was also fully secured.
17 The water level in the bow thruster room was constantly monitored throughout the
remainder of the day and night and was found to be slowly rising. At 0800 on 11 November
the bow thruster room water level had increased to the top of the bow thruster motor
pedestal. By 1200 it was at sea level, suggesting to the engineers that there was at least one
additional, undiscovered hole.
18 At 1348 the master submitted his casualty report, by e-mail attachment, to both the technical
superintendent and the DPA.
 19 The vessel continued her passage and arrived at Algeciras on 13 November for cargo
operations and repair.

TASKS
1 Gaining familiarity – knowing what happened
1.1 What did Maersk Newport arrive at Le Havre for?
"Maersk Newport arrived at Le Havre at 0902 on 9 November 2008 for cargo operations which
extended throughout most of the day and evening."
1.2 What was the weather forecast for the English Channel for November 10, 2008?

During the early evening the master obtained a weather forecast for the English Channel from
the Netherlands based Ships Performance Optimisation System (SPOS) website. It reported that
the forecast for the English Channel, for 10 November 2008, was for south-westerly force 5 to 6
winds which were expected to strengthen."

So the weather forecast for the English Channel on November 10, 2008 was for south-westerly
winds of force 5 to 6, which were expected to increase in strength.

1.3 What pre-sailing checks were made?

Pre-sailing checks were carried out between 2300 and midnight when the forward and aft draughts
were recorded as 9.7m and 10.7m respectively. No specific heavy weather checks were made."

So the only pre-sailing checks mentioned were recording the forward and aft draft readings. It
explicitly states that no specific heavy weather checks were performed before sailing.
1.4 What was the bosun’s report to master about?
"both anchors were secured, on the brakes only, in readiness to let go in an emergency."

So the bosun's report to the master was specifically about the state of the anchors - that they
were secured on the brakes and ready to let go in an emergency situation.
1.5 Who did the bridge team consist of?
"The master, both chief officers and pilot were on the bridge when Maersk Newport slipped from
her berth at 0001 on 10 November 2008."

So the bridge team at that time consisted of the master, both chief officers, and the pilot.
1.6 What was the vessel’s speed after the pilot disembarked?
According to the report, after the pilot disembarked at 0056, the master ordered full away on
passage, which equated to a speed of approximately 18 knots.
The relevant quote is:

"After the pilot disembarked at 0056, the master ordered full away on passage, which
equated to a speed of approximately 18 knots."
1.7 What did the master order the bosun to do?
The report states that after ordering full away on passage at approximately 18 knots, "the
master then instructed the bosun to fully secure both anchors."

So the master ordered the bosun to fully secure both anchors after increasing speed to around 18
knots following the pilot's disembarkation.
1.8 Did the bosun follow the master’s instructions?
Based on the report, it's unclear if the bosun fully followed the master's instructions to fully secure
both anchors:

"The bosun subsequently reported to the master that the anchors were in their fully housed
positions, that the lashing chains were tight, the guillotines blocks were down, the brakes were
on as tight as possible and that the windlasses were out of gear. Neither of the two hinged
 hawse pipe covers or the two spurling pipe covers were fitted."

While the bosun reported taking steps to secure the anchors, the report notes that the hawse
pipe covers and spurling pipe covers were not fitted, which would be part of fully securing the
anchors for heavy weather. So the bosun's actions did not completely follow the master's
instructions.
1.9 Why did the master leave the bridge?
According to the report, the master left the bridge after increasing speed to full sea speed (22 knots)
in order to send business messages:
"At 0118 the master increased speed to full sea speed (22 knots), before leaving the bridge to
send business messages."
So the stated reason for the master leaving the bridge was to send some business messages after
ordering the speed increased to 22 knots.
1.10 What was the reason for the master to wake up at night?
The report states that the master was awakened at night by furniture moving in his cabin due to
the deteriorating weather conditions:
"At 0340 the master was awakened by furniture moving in his cabin. He contacted the
second officer on the bridge and was advised of the weather conditions."
So the reason the master woke up at night was because the heavy weather caused furniture to
move around in his cabin, prompting him to check on the conditions with the officer on
watch.
1.11 What was the weather like in the morning of November 10, 2008?
According to the report, the weather conditions on the morning of November 10, 2008 were
deteriorating and becoming rough. Specifically, the report states:
"Throughout the morning watch the weather continued to steadily worsen. At 0700 the
ship's log recorded conditions as: "rough westerly seas and swell, overcast and misty
with the ship pitching moderately""
And later at noon on November 10th:
"By 1200 the west-southwesterly wind had increased to force 8 to 9 and the sea remained
rough with a 0.8 knot east-north-easterly tide running."
So the weather started out rough in the morning with westerly seas and swell, overcast and
misty conditions, and the ship pitching moderately. It continued worsening through the
morning, with winds increasing to force 8-9 (34-47 knots) and rough seas by noon.
1.12 What were the chief officer’s actions due to deterioration of weather conditions?
According to the report, the chief officer took the following actions due to the deteriorating
weather conditions:
At 0800, when he was sufficiently concerned about the weather conditions, he:

Made a broadcast advising that the deck was out of bounds.

Posted a sign to that effect on the whiteboard outside the mess room.
Advised the catering and engineering teams to secure their departments for expected heavy
weather.

The report states:

"At 0800 the chief officer was sufficiently concerned about the weather conditions that he
made a broadcast advising that the deck was out of bounds. He also posted a sign to
that effect on the whiteboard outside the mess room. In addition, he advised the
catering and engineering teams to secure their departments for expected heavy
weather."

So the chief officer recognized the worsening weather posed risks, and took steps to restrict
access to the deck, post warnings, and have various departments secure for heavy weather
conditions.
1.13 What were the weather conditions at noon on November 10?
According to the report, the weather conditions at noon on November 10th were as follows:
"By 1200 the west-southwesterly wind had increased to force 8 to 9 and the sea remained
rough with a 0.8 knot east-north-easterly tide running."
Specifically:

Wind: West-southwesterly at Force 8 to 9 on the Beaufort wind scale

Force 8 = 39-46 knots (72-85 km/h)

Force 9 = 47-54 knots (87-102 km/h)

Sea state: Rough seas

Tide: 0.8 knot east-north-easterly tide

So at noon, the wind had increased to a strong gale or severe gale force from the west-southwest
direction, the seas were rough, and there was a tidal current of 0.8 knots setting to the east-north-
east.
1.14 What entry was made into the Deck Log at noon?
The report does not explicitly state what entry was made into the Deck Log at noon on November
10th. However, it does provide this detail:
"At 1212 the ship's Automatic Identification System (AIS) recorded the vessel's speed over
the ground (SOG) as 15.4 knots on a heading of 232º true (T)."
And shortly before that, it states:
"At 1200 the west-southwesterly wind had increased to force 8 to 9 and the sea remained
rough with a 0.8 knot east-north-easterly tide running. However, the ship was recorded in the
Deck Log as "pitching and rolling easily" and the master decided that it was safe to continue
the passage at full ahead manoeuvring speed."

So while the specific noon log entry is not provided, it seems the Deck Log entry noted the ship
was "pitching and rolling easily" despite the force 8-9 winds and rough seas. This contrasts with
the factual conditions described of a strong gale or severe gale wind and rough seas.
1.15 Whom did the master send to the bow thruster room to examine why the fire alarm
had sounded?
According to the report, when the bow thruster room fire alarm sounded on the bridge at
1250, the master authorized the following people to go forward to the bow thruster room to
investigate:
The chief engineer
The chief officer
The fourth engineer
The bosun
The electrician
The relevant quote is:
"At 1300 the SOG was 5.2 knots and the ship's heading was 279ºT. The master then
authorised the chief engineer, the chief officer, fourth engineer, bosun and electrician
to go forward to the bow thruster room."
So the master sent a team consisting of the chief engineer, chief officer, fourth engineer,
bosun, and electrician to examine the cause of the bow thruster room fire alarm.
1.16 What did the chief engineer see in the bow thruster room? What was his conclusion?
The relevant quote is:
"He immediately noticed three, 150mm by 250mm, holes in the port side of the hull. As the
vessel pitched, water was sprayed into the compartment and over the electrical distribution
and control panels. The chief engineer also noticed that there were numerous hull
indentations (Figure 1) and that the bilge was full of water. He reported the damage to the
master on the bridge and that he suspected that the port anchor had been released, causing
the damage."
So the chief engineer saw clear hull breach damage and water ingress, leading him to suspect the
port anchor had come loose and struck the hull.
1.17 What damage did the bosun notice when looking over the port side?
The relevant quote is:
"On looking over the port side, the port anchor was seen to be below the sea surface, and
there were numerous indentations and splits in the vicinity of the port side of the bow
thruster room. As the bow pitched, water was seen spraying out from more holes in the
forepeak area."
So the bosun observed that the port anchor had indeed come out and was hanging below the water
line, and there was visible breach damage and water ingress on the port side bow area near the bow
thruster room and forepeak from which water was spraying with the ship's motions.
1.18 What were the master’s orders when he learnt about the damage?
According to the report, after learning about the damage to the hull from the released port anchor,
the master gave the following orders:
He maneuvered the ship clear of the shipping lanes, at slow speed and onto a safe course to recover
the anchor.
He instructed the team to continue trying to stem the water ingress into the bow thruster room.
He instructed them to take soundings of the tanks around the bow thruster room.
He ordered ballasting the vessel using the after ballast tanks.
The relevant quote is:
"Although it was clear that the anchor had caused the damage, the ship was still shipping
seas, making it unsafe to access the forecastle to recover and secure the anchor. The anchor
was well below the surface of the water and there were no reports of impact noise, and so the
master concluded that no further damage was occurring. Consequently he opted for his team
to continue to try to stem the water ingress. He also instructed them to take soundings of the
tanks around the bow thruster room, and to ballast the vessel using the after ballast tanks.
Meanwhile, he manoeuvered the ship clear of the shipping lanes, at slow speed and onto a
safe course to recover the anchor."
So his main priorities were getting the ship to a safe position, attempting to control the flooding,
checking surrounding tanks, and preparing to eventually recover the anchor once conditions
allowed.
1.19 Whom did the master inform about the damage?
The relevant quote is:
"At 1307 the master e-mailed the technical superintendent in Copenhagen and the WOC with
a preliminary damage report."
However, the report notes that at this point, the master did not yet alert the Designated Person
Ashore (DPA) about the vessel's situation.
The report states: "However, he did not alert the DPA to the vessel's situation and did not
consider carrying out the "save" procedure for the ship's Voyage Data Recorder (VDR)."
So initially the master only informed the technical superintendent and coastal traffic service about
the damage, but did not yet notify the company's designated person ashore who should be alerted to
such situations.
1.20 What did the bosun and the chief officer find out about the state of the port anchor?
The relevant quote is:
"The forecastle team found that about ½ to ¾ shackle of the port anchor cable had been
released. The lashing chain Senhouse slip tapered securing pin (Figure 2) had become
detached from the slip and was hanging by its chain and that the lashing chain was hanging
loose. It was also found that the forward guillotine block was in the upright open position
while the after guillotine block was in the horizontal closed position."
So they determined that a significant length of the anchor cable had run out, with the lashing
chain's securing components detached or dislodged, allowing the anchor to deploy and causing the
damage.
1.21 What happened with the water level in the bow thruster room?
The relevant quote is:
"The water level in the bow thruster room was constantly monitored throughout the
remainder of the day and night and was found to be slowly rising. At 0800 on 11 November
the bow thruster room water level had increased to the top of the bow thruster motor
pedestal. By 1200 it was at sea level, suggesting to the engineers that there was at least one
additional, undiscovered hole."
So despite initial efforts to stem the flooding, the water level in the bow thruster room continued
rising uncontrollably over the next day, indicating there was likely more hull breach damage
allowing uncontrolled ingress.
1.22 When did the master send his casualty report?
According to the report, the master sent his casualty report at 1348 on November 11th.
Specifically, it states:
"At 1348 the master submitted his casualty report, by e-mail attachment, to both the
technical superintendent and the DPA."
So while he had initially sent a preliminary damage report to just the technical superintendent and
coastal station on November 10th, the full casualty report was submitted via email attachment to
both the technical superintendent and the Designated Person Ashore (DPA) at 1348 (1:48 pm) on
November 11th.
2 Recognizing symptoms – critical understanding of facts (chain of misdoings)
2.1 Was Maersk Newport prepared for heavy weather?

Based on the details provided in the report, it does not seem that Maersk Newport was
adequately prepared for the heavy weather encountered:

1. No specific heavy weather checks were made before departure (para 2).
2. The hawse pipe covers and spurling pipe covers were not fitted (para 2), which are
protective covers that should be in place for heavy weather.
3. When increasing speed to full sea speed of 22 knots, the winds were only force 4-5 (para 3),
which may have been too fast for the developing conditions.
4. Proper procedures were not followed in securing the anchors - the bosun reported they were
secured per the master's orders, but this was later found to be incorrect (para 4, 16).
5. Despite the Chief Officer's concern over the deteriorating weather, the vessel continued at
excessive speed of 15 knots in rough seas and force 8-9 winds (para 8, 12).
6. Entries in the Deck Log did not accurately reflect the worsening conditions (para 8).

So while some preparations were made, such as the Chief Officer's precautions, there were several
lapses that suggest Maersk Newport's crew did not take all prudent measures to properly secure and
handle the vessel for the severe weather ultimately encountered. Better heavy weather precautions
and procedures were warranted.

2.2 Was it OK the master increased speed to 22 knots when the wind force was 4 to 5?

No, it was likely not okay for the master to increase speed to the full sea speed of 22 knots when
the wind force was only 4 to 5 on the Beaufort scale.

According to general heavy weather guidelines:

 Wind Force 4 (11-16 knots) is considered a moderate breeze

 Wind Force 5 (17-21 knots) is a fresh breeze

At these relatively low wind speeds, increasing to the vessel's full sea speed of 22 knots does not
seem prudent. High speeds can cause excessive pitching and slamming in rough seas, potentially
putting strain on the hull and making the vessel difficult to handle.

Most guidelines recommend moderating speed, ideally to something like half ahead or slower, once
winds reach Beaufort force 6 (22-27 knots) or higher. Pushing to full sea speed in anything above
moderate winds increases the risks substantially.

The report notes this was done shortly after departing at 0118, when the winds were still relatively
low at force 4-5. Given the forecast was for strengthening winds, maintaining a slower, more
economical speed may have been the safer approach until reaching open waters. Increasing to full
sea speed put unnecessary stress on the vessel prematurely.
So in summary, increasing to 22 knots in just force 4-5 wind conditions went against typical
heavy weather speed recommendations and may have contributed to the subsequent excessive
motions and damage when the weather worsened. It was likely too fast for the conditions at
that point.

2.3 The hawse pipe and the spurling pipe covers were not fitted. Was it necessary to be done?
Based on the report, it seems that not fitting the hawse pipe and spurling pipe covers was an
oversight and they should have been fitted before departure in preparation for heavy weather
conditions.
The report notes in paragraph 3:
"Neither of the two hinged hawse pipe covers or the two spurling pipe covers were fitted."
While it doesn't explicitly state they were required to be fitted, hawse pipe covers and spurling pipe
covers help prevent water ingress through the hawse pipes and spurling pipes when the vessel is
pitching heavily in rough seas. Fitting these covers is considered a standard heavy weather
precaution.
So not having them fitted likely left the vessel more vulnerable to water entering and accumulating,
which contributed to the eventual damage when the anchor was released. It was necessary for them
to have been fitted as part of properly securing and preparing the vessel for the forecasted heavy
weather conditions.
2.4 Was the speed of 15 knots adequate to the wind force 7?
No, a speed of 15 knots does not seem adequate given the wind force had increased to 7 on the
Beaufort scale.
According to the report:
"Soon afterwards the weather began to steadily deteriorate. The wind speed increased to
force 7 and the vessel was shipping water and spray as she pitched into the, now, rough seas.
At 0340 the master was awakened by furniture moving in his cabin. He contacted the second
officer on the bridge and was advised of the weather conditions. As a result, the master
ordered the speed to be reduced to full ahead manoeuvring, which was about 15 knots."
A wind force of 7 on the Beaufort scale corresponds to a near gale, with wind speeds of 28-33
knots (50-61 km/h). At this wind strength, sea conditions become very rough with high waves and
low visibility in blowing spray.
For harsh weather like this, a slower speed of around 10 knots or less is generally recommended to
reduce the slamming and pounding of the vessel against the waves. Maintaining 15 knots seems too
fast and put undue stress on the ship, increasing the likelihood of damage occurring.
So while reducing from full sea speed was prudent, dropping only to 15 knots was likely still too
fast for the severe wind and sea state at force 7 conditions. A further reduction in speed would have
been advisable.
2.5 Did the inadequate entry into the Deck Log have impact on anything?
Yes, the inadequate entry made in the Deck Log at 1200 suggesting the vessel was "pitching
and rolling easily" despite force 8-9 winds and rough seas seems to have had an impact on the
master's decision making.
From the report:
"At 1200 the west-south-westerly wind had increased to force 8 to 9 and the sea remained
rough with a 0.8 knot east-north-easterly tide running. However, the ship was recorded in the
Deck Log as "pitching and rolling easily" and the master decided that it was safe to continue
the passage at full ahead manoeuvring speed."
The entry downplayed the severity of the conditions, portraying them as more moderate than they
actually were. This inaccurate depiction in the official log appears to have influenced the master's
assessment.
Despite force 8-9 winds (34-47 knots) and rough seas, which should have called for reducing speed
significantly, the master decided to continue at the relatively fast "full ahead manoeuvring speed"
of around 15 knots based on the log entry.
Had the conditions been properly logged as extremely rough and severe, the master likely would
have recognized the situation as more hazardous and opted to slow down further to a more prudent
speed for those weather conditions.
So the inadequate deck log entry downplaying the circumstances had the impact of providing the
master with insufficient information, contributing to him maintaining an unsafe speed that made the
vessel more vulnerable when the anchor later broke free, causing damage.
2.6 Was it correct to stem the flow of water with wedges and rubber?
No, it was not correct or advisable to attempt to stem the flow of water into the bow thruster
room using just wedges and rubber.
According to the report:
"The bosun was sent to get wooden wedges and neoprene rubber with which to stem the flow
of water."
And:
"By about 1400 the team in the bow thruster room had managed to significantly reduce the
inflow of water."
While this temporary measure may have slowed the ingress somewhat, it was an improper way to
try to control significant hull breaches and water flooding.
Using just wedges and rubber was at best a very short-term patch that could not reliably stop water
from continuing to enter the vessel through the holes caused by the anchor damage. This put the
stability of the ship increasingly at risk as more water flooded in.
The proper action should have been to repair and properly seal the hull breaches from the outside
as soon as possible, and/or counterflood other compartments to reduce the angle of trim and heel
caused by the flooding. Simply trying to impede the water flow from inside was an ineffective
stopgap measure.
Relying solely on wedges and rubber shows the crew was ill-prepared to deal with major hull
breaches and flooding. It exposed poor training and lack of proper damage control
materials/equipment onboard to decisively handle such an emergency situation. This stopgap
measure could not sufficiently mitigate the worsening flooding condition.
2.7 The master didn’t send anybody to secure the anchor because of the heavy weather. Was
his decision justified?
No, the master's decision not to send anyone to try to secure the released and dangling
anchor due to the heavy weather conditions does not seem fully justified based on the
information provided in the report.
The report states:
"Although it was clear that the anchor had caused the damage, the ship was still shipping
seas, making it unsafe to access the forecastle to recover and secure the anchor. The
anchor was well below the surface of the water and there were no reports of impact noise,
and so the master concluded that no further damage was occurring."
While the heavy weather made working on the exposed forecastle area dangerous, the fact that
the anchor was dangling loose below the waterline posed an ongoing serious risk. Even if no
further impact noise was heard, the loose anchor could easily shift position and cause additional
hull damage with the severe rolling and pitching of the ship.
Rather than just accepting the anchor couldn't be secured, the prudent decision would have been
to make attempts to manually control or restrain the anchor's movement from inside, such as
using chain stoppers or other methods to prevent it from swinging freely and battering the hull
further.
Only after unsuccessful attempts from a safer position inside should the master have potentially
decided it was too hazardous to try to fully re-secure the anchor on the forecastle in those
conditions. But simply leaving it completely unrestrained seems an unjustified risk.
The damage and flooding had already occurred, so some measure of risk would have been
warranted to prevent the situation from potentially worsening if the anchor remained unchecked.
Proper damage control requires taking reasonable actions to mitigate and prevent escalating
circumstances when possible.
2.8 Under the circumstances, was the master obliged to inform about the damage?
Yes, under the circumstances described in the report, the master had an obligation to
properly inform relevant parties about the damage sustained by the vessel.
According to the report:
"At 1307 the master e-mailed the technical superintendent in Copenhagen and the WOC with
a preliminary damage report. However, he did not alert the DPA to the vessel's situation and
did not consider carrying out the 'save' procedure for the ship's Voyage Data Recorder
(VDR)."
While the master did send a preliminary report to some parties, he failed to alert the Designated
Person Ashore (DPA), who has a critical role in the safety management system.
The International Safety Management (ISM) Code requires the company to designate a person or
persons ashore having direct access to the highest level of management. The DPA's role includes
monitoring safety and pollution prevention aspects of vessel operations.
With a serious incident involving hull breaches, uncontrolled flooding, and damage from the
released anchor, the master had a clear obligation to promptly inform the DPA fully. This would
allow the DPA to support the response, provide guidance, arrange assistance, and fulfill their
oversight duties.
Additionally, the master did not initiate saving data from the Voyage Data Recorder, which could
have captured valuable information about the events and factors leading up to the casualty.
So while the master did make some notification, he fell short of his full informing obligations for
this major shipboard emergency situation. Comprehensive and timely informing of all relevant
parties is crucial for facilitating an effective coordinated response to a maritime casualty of this
nature.
3 Identifying goals – making assumptions
3.1 Why could the bosun give false information about the anchors?

The report does not provide any clear evidence or motive that the bosun intentionally gave
false information about the state of the anchors to the master. However, a few potential
reasons why the bosun's report may have been inaccurate or misleading can be speculated:

1. Negligence/Lack of thoroughness The bosun may have performed only a cursory visual
check and assumed the anchors were properly secured without verifying all the details and
components like the lashing chains, guillotine blocks, etc. This could be due to
complacency, haste, or lack of training on proper procedures.
2. Desire to avoid criticism If the bosun noticed any issues with the anchor securing
arrangements, he may have been reluctant to report problems to the master out of fear of
being criticized or reprimanded for not having them properly secured before departure.
3. Miscommunication There could have been some miscommunication or misunderstanding
between what the bosun reported and what the master interpreted about the state of the
anchor lashings.
4. Poor lighting/visibility If the anchor checks were performed at night or in poor
weather/visibility conditions, it may have been difficult for the bosun to get a clear
assessment.
5. Lack of experience/training An inexperienced or improperly trained bosun may not have
fully understood what constituted the anchors being completely and properly secured per
regulations.

Without concrete evidence, it would be speculative to accuse the bosun of intentionally providing
false information. More likely explanations are human errors, miscommunication, or oversights
rather than intentional deception. Proper procedures, training and oversight could help prevent such
potential discrepancies.

3.2 Whose responsibility could it be to fit the hawse pipe and the spurling pipe covers?
Why weren’t they fitted?

Based on typical shipboard practices, ensuring the hawse pipe and spurling pipe covers are
properly fitted before getting underway, especially when heavy weather is expected, would likely
be the responsibility of the bosun and deck crew under the supervision of the chief officer.

The report states:

"Neither of the two hinged hawse pipe covers or the two spurling pipe covers were fitted."
Fitting these covers is considered a standard heavy weather precaution to prevent water ingress and
damage. The fact that they were not fitted suggests an oversight or lack of proper preparation.

Some potential reasons why they may not have been fitted:

1. Lack of heavy weather awareness/preparedness If the crew did not thoroughly anticipate
and prepare for the deteriorating weather conditions, fitting the covers may have been an
overlook.
2. Complacency There may have been a complacent attitude that the covers were not
absolutely necessary, despite the forecast.
3. Time constraints If sailing schedules were tight, there may have been a lack of adequate
time set aside for proper heavy weather securing.
4. Insufficient training/procedures Lack of clear training and defined procedures could lead to
these precautionary measures being missed.

Ultimately, as the deck leader overseeing operations, it would fall under the chief officer's
responsibility to ensure the bosun and deck crew properly carried out all heavy weather securing
preparations per company policies and good seamanship practices before departure. Any lapses
likely stemmed from inadequate oversight and a failure of the deck team to follow recommended
precautions.

3.3 Why was it the chief officer who was concerned about the weather?

There are a few potential reasons why it was the chief officer who showed particular concern about
the deteriorating weather conditions, according to the report:

1. It is one of the chief officer's primary duties and responsibilities to monitor and respond to
changing weather conditions that may impact the safety of the vessel, crew, and cargo
operations.
2. As the head of the deck department, the chief officer is in charge of all deck operations,
including ensuring proper precautions and securing for heavy weather.
3. The chief officer assists the master in maintaining a navigation watch, so he would have
been closely monitoring the increasing winds and seas during his watch rotations.
4. The report notes the master was likely occupied sending business messages when the
weather began worsening. So the chief officer may have taken the initiative to act when he
noticed the conditions turning severe.
5. With his experience, the chief officer likely recognized the mounting risks the weather
posed to having the deck crew work outdoors on cargo operations or maintenance
evolutions.

So in this situation, it fell within the chief officer's standard responsibilities to raise awareness
about the hazardous weather, restrict deck access, and ensure all departments were properly
secured against the deteriorating conditions. As the deck manager, evaluating risks from the
environment and implementing safety measures is one of the chief officer's critical duties,
especially when the master may have been distracted. His concern aligns with the role's
requirements.

3.4 Why could an OOW make a wrong entry into the Deck Log?

There could be several potential reasons why an Officer of the Watch (OOW) might make an
inaccurate or misleading entry into the vessel's official Deck Log:

1. Lack of experience/training A relatively inexperienced or insufficiently trained OOW may

not fully appreciate the importance of precise and factual log entries, or may struggle to
objectively assess and document changing conditions.
 2. Complacency/Overconfidence The OOW could become complacent, especially if
conditions seem relatively benign, and fail to maintain a proper watch leading to inaccurate
log updates.
3. Fatigue If the OOW is overly fatigued due to factors like insufficient rest, long work hours,
or disruptions, their judgement and attention to detail when making log entries could be
impaired.
4. Poor visibility In conditions of extremely limited visibility due to weather, darkness, etc.,
the OOW may struggle to get an accurate assessment of the actual wind, sea state and other
environmental conditions to log.
5. Desire to downplay conditions In some cases, the OOW may intentionally downplay or
soften logged conditions to avoid alarming the master or other officers if they think
conditions are manageable.
6. Miscommunication There could also be a breakdown in communication when conditions
are conveyed verbally to the log writer, leading to inaccuracies being transcribed.

Ultimately, diligent and frequent monitoring combined with proper training on objective log
keeping procedures should prevent erroneous entries. But complacency, fatigue, environmental
factors and human fallibility can contribute to log inaccuracies that could impact decisions if not
caught. This highlights the importance of cross-validation by other bridge team members.

3.5 Why did the fire alarm sound with no fire aboard the vessel?

The report does not provide a definitive explanation for why the bow thruster room fire alarm
sounded when there was no actual fire present. However, there are a few potential reasons this
could have occurred:

1. Water ingress/damage triggering the alarm When the chief engineer investigated, he found
three holes in the hull allowing water to spray into the bow thruster room and over the
electrical equipment. This water intrusion and damage to electrical systems may have
triggered the fire detection system to go into alarm mode, even though there were no
flames.
2. Electrical fault/short circuit Related to the water ingress, if the flooding caused any short
circuits or electrical arcing in the systems and wiring of the bow thruster room, this could
potentially set off fire alarms designed to detect those conditions as precursors to fire.
3. System malfunction It's also possible there was simply a malfunction or fault in the fire
detection and alarm system itself in the bow thruster room that caused it to errantly signal a
non-existent fire.
4. Human error Though less likely, the alarm could have been accidentally activated by
someone working in or near the bow thruster room area.

Since the report notes the anchor damage had already occurred by this point, allowing water
ingress, the most probable cause seems to be that the flooding and/or resultant electrical issues in
that compartment falsely triggered the fire alarm system to activate, even without any actual flames
or smoke present to detect. But a system fault cannot be completely ruled out.

3.6 Could the master take risks and secure the released anchor?

Based on the information provided in the report, it does not seem justified for the master to have
taken significant risks in attempting to secure the released and dangling anchor in the severe
weather conditions described.

The report states:

"Although it was clear that the anchor had caused the damage, the ship was still shipping seas,
making it unsafe to access the forecastle to recover and secure the anchor. The anchor was well
below the surface of the water and there were no reports of impact noise, and so the master
concluded that no further damage was occurring. Consequently he opted for his team to continue to
try to stem the water ingress."

A few key points:

1. It explicitly notes it was unsafe to access the exposed forecastle deck area due to the ship
continuing to ship heavy seas in the rough weather.
2. With the anchor already below the water surface, any attempt to retrieve it from the exposed
forecastle would have put crew at significant risk of being washed overboard.
3. Since no further impact noises were heard, the master reasonably concluded the loose
anchor was not actively causing additional hull damage at that moment.

Given these factors, rather than risk additional injuries by having crew work on the precarious
forecastle trying to recover the anchor, the master's decision to first try to control the internal
flooding and get the ship onto a steadier course was prudent.

Once underway in less severe conditions, the report indicates the chief officer and bosun were
eventually able to go out and re-secure the anchor safely.

So while leaving the anchor loose carried some risk, the master made the appropriate call to first
stabilize the flooding situation from a safer position rather than compounding the emergency by
attempting an overly hazardous anchor retrieval in extreme conditions that could have put lives at
risk. Preserving crew safety had to take priority.

3.7 Why didn’t the master inform DPA about the vessel’s state?

The report does not provide a clear explanation for why the master did not inform the Designated
Person Ashore (DPA) about the vessel's damaged state after the anchor incident. However, some
potential reasons for this lapse can be inferred:

1. Prioritization error In the midst of dealing with the immediate flooding emergency, the
master may have prioritized operational concerns like trying to control the damage and
stabilize the vessel's condition first, while overlooking his obligation to promptly inform the
DPA. This could suggest poor training on contingency procedures.
2. Underestimating severity The master may have initially underestimated the severity of the
situation and deemed it not necessary to alert the DPA right away, before then losing
situation awareness as events unfolded.
3. Communication obstacles There's a possibility the master attempted to inform the DPA but
encountered communication difficulties or delays that prevented a timely notification.
4. Overconfidence The master may have been overconfident in the crew's ability to handle the
situation without shore assistance at that point, and failed to properly involve the DPA as
required.
5. Lack of clarity on DPA's role If not properly trained, the master may have lacked a clear
understanding of the DPA's role and importance in the safety management system in such
an event.

Ultimately, not notifying the DPA represented a procedural lapse and oversight on the part of the
master. Promptly informing the designated shore point of contact is a crucial step to ensure
appropriate resources and oversight are available to support the vessel during a casualty situation.
Improved contingency training likely could have prevented this communication failure.

4 Conducting analysis – opportunity for linking to theoretical readings

 4.1 What pre-sailing weather checks should be made?

According to good seamanship practices and guidance from maritime organizations, some key pre-
sailing weather checks that should be made include:

1. Obtain detailed weather forecasts and warnings for the intended voyage area from reliable
sources like national meteorological agencies, weather routing services, etc. This should
cover wind, wave, swell, precipitation, visibility and any developing storm systems.
2. Closely monitor real-time weather conditions and trends leading up to departure through
shore observations, weather radar, buoy data, etc.
3. Check the calculations for adequate vessel stability and strength to withstand the forecasted
weather conditions.
4. Ensure all heavy weather precautions and securing of equipment/supplies are completed
well before departure per the vessel's heavy weather plan.
5. Calculate any weather routing adjustments needed based on the forecasts to avoid the worst
weather or arrange contingencies.
6. Update the passage plan with the latest weather information and discuss risk mitigations
with the bridge team.
7. Inform the crew clearly of the expected weather conditions so they can make proper
preparations.
8. Obtain confirmation that all cargo, stores, hatches, lashings, etc. are properly secured for
heavy weather.
9. Plan ahead for any unique heavy weather procedures like securing anchors, taking sea
watches, rigging storm rails, etc.

The key is using all available weather forecasting resources to gain a comprehensive picture of the
anticipated conditions, planning accordingly, and completing all heavy weather preparatory checks
and procedures before letting go of the lines. Complacency can lead to critical oversights.

4.2 What vessels’ speed is recommended when the wind force is 5? 7? 9?

Unfortunately, the document does not explicitly state what vessel speeds are recommended for
wind forces 5, 7, and 9. However, based on the details provided in the report, some inferences can
be made:

1. When the forecast was for winds of force 5-6, the master initially proceeded at full away
speed of around 18 knots after departing Le Havre.
2. When the winds increased to force 7, the master reduced speed to full ahead maneuvering,
which was about 15 knots.
3. When the winds reached force 8-9 around noon, the master kept the speed at full ahead
maneuvering (15 knots) as the log entry stated the ship was "pitching and rolling easily".

While not explicitly stated, it seems that for force 5-6 winds, the master considered 18 knots an
acceptable speed initially. For force 7 winds, he reduced to around 15 knots. And for force 8-9
winds, he maintained 15 knots speed, judging the vessel's motion to be acceptable.

However, the report does not provide any definitive guidelines on recommended speeds for
different wind forces. Prudent seamanship would suggest reducing speed in higher wind conditions
to maintain better control over the vessel's motions.

4.3 Who is responsible for managing the ship in heavy weather?

The maritime accident report does not explicitly state who is responsible for managing the ship in
heavy weather conditions. However, based on the details provided and general principles of
maritime operations, some inferences can be made:
 1. The Master is ultimately responsible for the safe navigation and operation of the ship in all
weather conditions, including heavy weather.
2. The report mentions that the Master was continually assessing the deteriorating weather
conditions and the ship's movement throughout the incident (paragraph 8). This implies the
Master has the overarching responsibility.
3. The Officer on Watch (OOW) would be responsible for executing the Master's orders and
ensuring the vessel is properly handled per the Master's directions during their watch
period.
4. The Chief Officer is also highlighted taking specific precautionary actions like advising the
deck was out of bounds and instructing departments to secure for heavy weather (paragraph
7). This suggests the Chief Officer assists the Master in heavy weather preparedness.
5. The whole bridge team consisting of the Master, Chief Officers and any pilots on board
would contribute to monitoring conditions, risk assessment and decision-making under the
Master's oversight.

So while not explicitly stated, it can be inferred that the Master holds the overall responsibility for
managing the ship's operations and respecting all heavy weather precautions and procedures, with
support from the navigational watch team adhering to the Master's instructions. Effective teamwork
and communication is critical in such scenarios.

4.4 What should be done aboard the vessel in case of deteriorating weather conditions?

The report does not provide a comprehensive list of actions to be taken aboard a vessel in case of
deteriorating weather conditions. However, based on the details mentioned and general heavy
weather precautions, some key actions that should be taken include:

1. Closely monitor weather forecasts, barometer readings, and visual observations for any
signs of worsening conditions.
2. Reduce vessel speed as appropriate to maintain control and minimize excessive motions
that could cause damage or injuries.
3. Secure all hatches, covers, ventilators etc. to prevent water ingress.
4. Secure all loose gear, equipment and objects on deck and inside the accommodation to
prevent potential shifting and damages.
5. Consider taking a course favorable to the weather, avoiding beam seas that can cause
excessive rolling.
6. Advise all personnel to stay inside accommodations and restrict any non-essential outdoor
activities. Post appropriate warnings as done by the Chief Officer.
7. Instruct relevant departments like engineering and catering to properly secure machinery,
stores, and equipment for heavy seas.
8. Check all lashings, securings, and make any additional preparations for heavy weather (e.g.
rigging storm rails, extra lashings on deck cargo etc.)
9. Ensure all watertight openings like doors, portholes are closed and secured.
10. Make frequent rounds and inspections to identify any water ingress, working lashings,
developed cracks or damages at an early stage.
11. Maintain optimum vessel trim and stability condition through ballasting if required.

The key is extensive preparation, securing gear, restricting movements, and taking every precaution
to prevent accidents, injuries or damages due to the anticipated heavy weather.

4.5 What are the guidelines for making weather entries into the Deck Log?

Unfortunately, the maritime accident report does not provide specific guidelines for making
weather entries into the Deck Log. However, based on general practices, some key guidelines can
be inferred:
 1. Weather observations should be recorded in the Deck Log at regular intervals, typically
every 4 hours as per watch rotation cycles.
2. The entries should include factual observations of wind direction, wind force (Beaufort
scale), state of sea (wave height and periods), swell details, precipitation, visibility, cloud
cover, etc.
3. Any significant changes in weather conditions between the regular log entries should also
be recorded, especially if there is a marked deterioration.
4. Specific meteorological readings from instruments like barometers, anemometers, etc. can
be included to objectively support the observations.
5. The entries should be precise, concise and use standard meteorological terminology and
scales to describe the conditions.
6. Subjective impressions of ship's motions like rolling, pitching, etc. can be included but
should be quantified as much as possible.
7. Any forecasts or weather warnings received should also be documented in the log.
8. For maintained severe conditions over multiple log entries, phrases like "same weather
continued" can be used to avoid repetition.

The overall purpose is to create a factual record of the actual and anticipated weather situation that
can aid monitoring the conditions, highlight any worsening trends, and provide documented
evidence if required for investigations of any weather-related incidents or damage.

4.6 What are Deck Log entries used for?

Deck log entries serve several important purposes on a ship. Some of the main uses of deck log
entries are:

1. Record of Events: The deck log chronicles a factual record of all significant events,
observations, courses, speeds, weather conditions, etc. during a voyage. It provides a
chronological account that can be referred to.
2. Evidence: In case of incidents, accidents, groundings, collisions or any casualties, the deck
log serves as vital evidence and documentation of the sequence of events and actions taken
by the crew. This record can be crucial for investigations and legal proceedings.
3. Monitoring Trends: Regular log entries of parameters like weather, machinery performance,
etc. allow the crew to monitor gradual changes or developing trends that may require action.
4. Compliance: Many entries like musters, drills, inspections, etc. are recorded in the log to
ensure compliance with statutory regulations.
5. Crew Accountability: The deck log shows which crew members were on watch and
responsible at various times for navigation and operational decisions.
6. Cargo Operations: Details of cargo loading, discharging, ballasting, etc. are logged as a
record of such operations.
7. Ship's Position: Continuous recording of positions, courses, and speeds provides a track of
the ship's movement over the voyage.
8. Port Formalities: Logs are required to be presented to port authorities as part of
entry/clearance documentation.

So in essence, the deck log serves as an official chronological record of a ship's operations, making
it a critical document from safety, legal and operational perspectives for all merchant vessels.

4.7 What are regular weather conditions in the English Channel in late autumn?

The English Channel is an area known for its highly variable and rapidly changing weather
patterns, especially in the autumn and winter months, due to the frequent passage of low-pressure
systems and frontal boundaries.

Some typical weather conditions that can be expected in the late autumn months like November in
the English Channel include:
 1. Strong winds: Winds frequently reach Beaufort force 6-8 (22-47 knots or near gale to gale
force) from the west or southwest directions as low-pressure systems track across from the
Atlantic.
2. Rough seas: With the strong winds, rough sea states with wave heights of 3-6 meters are
common.
3. Heavy rain/showers: Frontal systems often bring periods of heavy rain or showers.
4. Poor visibility: Fog, mist or heavy precipitation can reduce visibility at times.
5. Large swell: With Atlantic low-pressure systems, a heavy swell from the west/southwest
directions frequently impacts the channel.
6. Rapidly changing conditions: Weather conditions can deteriorate quickly with the fast
progression of fronts and lows.

So in summary, late autumn is generally a period of increased storminess, strong winds, high seas,
swell and rapidly fluctuating weather in the English Channel, posing challenges for maritime
operations. Proper forecasting, heavy weather precautions and sustainable speeds become very
important during this season.

5 Making diagnosis / Problem statement

What problem does the emergency situation reveal?

The emergency situation revealed in this maritime accident report highlights the problem of
inadequate heavy weather preparedness and precautions on board the vessel M.V. Maersk
Newport.

Specifically, the key problems revealed are:

1. Insufficient securing of equipment: The port anchor was not properly secured with its
lashing chain and securing pin in place. This led to the anchor's accidental release, which
caused extensive hull damage.
2. Lack of heavy weather checks: No dedicated heavy weather checks were performed prior to
departure to ensure all equipment like anchors, hatches, vents etc. were properly secured for
the forecasted rough conditions.
3. Complacency towards worsening weather: Despite forecasts of strengthening winds, the
master continued at high speeds not adjusted for the deteriorating conditions, subjecting the
vessel to excessive motions.
4. Poor record keeping: The deck log entries did not accurately reflect the true severe nature of
the weather conditions, which could lead to a lack of prudence.
5. Inadequate communication: The master did not inform the designated person ashore (DPA)
about the emergency situation in a timely manner.
6. Procedural lapses: Vital procedures like securing hawse pipe covers were not followed, nor
were emergency measures like saving the voyage data recorder (VDR) data initiated
promptly.

In essence, the combination of overconfidence, oversight lapses, procedural violations and

inadequate preparatory actions for the forecasted heavy weather conditions led to this emergency
situation of uncontrolled anchor release and hull damage on M.V.

6 Analyzing case data

What were the major causes that made it possible for the problem to arise?

Based on the details provided in the maritime accident report, the major causes that made it
possible for the heavy weather damage problem to arise on M.V. Maersk Newport appear to be:

1. Improper securing of the port anchor

o The bosun did not follow the master's instructions to fully secure the port anchor
 o The Senhouse slip lashing chain pin was not properly secured, allowing the anchor
to release
2. Lack of dedicated heavy weather precaution checks
o No specific heavy weather checks were carried out before departure to verify all
equipment was properly secured
o Hawse pipe covers and spurling pipe covers were not fitted, against best practices
3. Complacency of the bridge team
o Speed was not adequately reduced from 22 knots to 15 knots despite winds reaching
Force 7
o Deck log entries did not accurately reflect the deteriorating weather severity
4. Poor communication and oversight
o Master did not promptly inform the designated person ashore about the emergency
o Procedures like saving the voyage data recorder were not initiated
5. Inadequate heavy weather planning and judgment
o Master continued at high speed of 15 knots when winds reached Force 8-9
o No contingencies made to secure the anchor once it released in extreme conditions
6. Lack of clear roles/responsibilities
o It was unclear whose duty it was to fit the hawse pipe and spurling pipe covers
o The reason for the chief officer's weather concern over the master's is not explained

So in summary, lapses in securing critical equipment, inadequate preparation, poor situation

awareness, deviations from prudent practices, and potential gaps in defined responsibilities and
communication workflows enabled an easily preventable accident to occur.

7 Generating and evaluating alternatives

A How should the Master/ bosun have acted?

Based on the details provided in the maritime accident report, there are several ways in which the
Master and Bosun should have acted differently to prevent this incident:

A) How the Master should have acted:

1. Ensure thorough heavy weather preparation checks are carried out before departure,
including verification that all Equipment like anchors, hatch covers, vents etc. are properly
secured.
2. Adjust the vessel's speed prudently as per the deteriorating weather conditions and
increasing wind forces, rather than maintaining higher speeds.
3. Issue clear heavy weather instructions and precautions to all crew members well in advance
based on weather forecasts.
4. Monitor the evolving weather closely and make appropriate course/speed/heading
alterations to minimize excessive ship motions.
5. Follow all required procedures such as informing the designated person ashore (DPA) about
the emergency situation promptly.
6. Initiate actions like saving the voyage data recorder (VDR) data when an
incident/emergency occurs.
7. Exercise good seamanship judgment by avoiding any non-essential exposure of crew to
extreme weather on open decks.

B) How the Bosun should have acted:

1. Carry out the Master's instructions to fully secure the anchors precisely and cross-verify the
work.
2. Ensure securing arrangements like lashing chains, Senhouse slip pins etc. are properly set
and double-checked.
 3. Fit the hawse pipe covers and spurling pipe covers as a standard heavy weather precaution
before departure.
4. Inform the Master immediately if any doubt about achieving full securing of equipment for
heavy weather.
5. Advise the bridge team if any defects or improperly secured items are noticed during
regular deck rounds.

Overall, following established procedures, heavy weather precautions, prudent seamanship

practices, and ensuring clear communication between the bridge team and deck crew could have
prevented this accident.

B What are the pros/cons of each alternative?

Based on the information provided in the accident report, here are some potential pros and cons of
the alternative actions that the Master and Bosun could have taken:

A) For the Master:

Alternative 1: Reduce speed more aggressively as weather worsened Pros: Lower speed reduces
motions/stresses on hull and equipment, reduces risk of damage/injury, maintains better control in
heavy weather Cons: Longer transit time, potential delays/costs, requires more fuel consumption

Alternative 2: Heave-to or seek shelter Pros: Avoids exposing the ship to extreme conditions,
enhances safety Cons: Significant delay to voyage, additional costs, may not be viable options
depending on location

Alternative 3: Inform DPA and follow emergency protocols promptly Pros: Ensures compliance,
activates support channels, preserves evidence Cons: None

B) For the Bosun:

Alternative 1: Follow Master's securing instructions precisely

Pros: Proper securing eliminates anchor's accidental release, prevents damage
Cons: None

Alternative 2: Conduct heavy weather checks and fittings thoroughly Pros: Ensures all precautions
taken, closes potential weak points like open covers Cons: Requires more time/effort, but critical
for safety

Alternative 3: Keep bridge team updated about deck conditions/securing Pros: Maintains
situational awareness, allows bridge team to make informed decisions Cons: None

The pros of following prudent practices like reducing speed, taking proper precautions and
following procedures far outweigh any potential cons related to delays or extra effort. Ensuring
safety of crew, vessel and environment should be the highest priority in extreme weather situations
for any vessel.

8 Developing an action plan

Develop an action plan to implement your alternative ideas

Here is a suggested action plan to implement the alternative ideas discussed for preventing heavy
weather incidents like the one that occurred on M.V. Maersk Newport:

Pre-Departure Checks and Briefings:

 Master to ensure thorough heavy weather checklist is completed prior to departure

  Verify all openings like hatches, vents, anchor pipes are properly secured and covered
 Bosun to personally inspect and confirm all lashings, securings are double-checked
 Bosun to brief deck crew on heavy weather duties/precautions
 Master conducts pre-departure briefing with bridge team on anticipated weather

Passage Planning:

 Chart optimum safe routes and courses to minimize exposure to extreme weather
 Identify contingencies and areas where shelter or heaving-to may be possible if required
 Determine prudent speed levels for expected wind force ranges as per regulations

Monitoring and Responses:

 Continuously monitor weather updates and adjust plans if conditions deteriorate

 Maintain prudent speed as per master's orders based on observed wind/sea state
 Log weather data and ship movements accurately in deck log books
 Conduct regular deck inspections and report any slippages/damages promptly
 Master ensures clear communication with DPA on situations requiring assistance
 Ensure all emergency and safety protocols like saving VDR data are executed

Post-Incident:

 Provide detailed reports on sequence of events, conditions, damage assessments

 Analyze lessons learned and any lapses in procedures/processes
 Update and reinforce heavy weather training, checklists, and best practices
 Ensure effective feedback loop between vessel staff and shore management

The key aspects are diligent preparation, continuous monitoring, clear communication protocols,
strong situation awareness, ensuring compliance with safety procedures, and a commitment to
prudent seamanship practices by all crew members during heavy weather situations.

Implementing this action plan in an organized manner can help prevent preventable heavy weather
casualties in the future.

NOTES TO PROPER NAMES

Algericas is a port city in the south of Spain and the largest city on the Bay of Gibraltar. The
Port of Algeciras is one of the largest ports in Europe and in the world in three categories:
container, cargo and transhipment.

Automatic Identification System (AIS)is an automatic tracking system used on ships and by
vessel traffic services (VTS) for identifying and locating vessels by electronically exchanging
data with other nearby ships and AIS Base stations. AIS information supplements marine radar,
which continues to be the primary method of collision avoidance for water transport.

English Channelis an arm of the Atlantic Ocean that separates southern England from northern
France, and joins the North Sea to the Atlantic.
Le Havre is a city in north-western France situated on the right bank of the mouth of the river
Seine on the English Channel. Its port is the second busiest in France (after that of Marseille).

The Netherlands is a country located mainly in North-West Europe and with some islands in the
Caribbean. Mainland Netherlands borders the North Sea to the north and west, Belgium to the
south, and Germany to the east, and shares maritime borders with Belgium, Germany and the
United Kingdom.
Ships Performance Optimisation System(SPOS) is the world’s leading onboard routing
system. SPOS has proven to be an accurate and reliable weather routing system and our high
quality weather updates ensure the crew is always aware of the weather ahead. With SPOS the
ship’s route can be optimised onboard, taking into account wind, waves, swell, current and other
elements. Today SPOS is installed on over 2500 vessels.