THE COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

The cognitive activity refers to the entire process through which we arrive at/obtain knowledge.
In the study of the cognitive activity, different sciences have come up with theories and
conclusion, about human knowledge and how we come to acquire it. Philosophy as an
independent science precisely philosophy of knowledge) has also come up with theories and
conclusion in its study of the cognitive activity.

The scientific study (from natural/positive sciences) about the cognitive activity cannot substitute
the philosophical reflection about the same. At the same time philosophical reflection about the
cognitive activity cannot do without the data from the scientific study about the same. Therefore,
in the study on the cognitive activity, science and philosophy complement each other. We can
then inquire about the cognitive activity from both scientific and philosophical perspective as
follows.

Philosophical Enquiry of the cognitive activity

Cognitive activity at sensual level (sense knowledge)

The cognitive activity is an imminent activity. That means, as an activity that involves the object
(known) and the subject (knower), it is confined in the subject. The principle of the cognitive
active is the form of the object. The form of the object (known) becomes the principle of the
immanent activity of knowing it in the subject (knower). The form of the cognitive activity at the
sensual level (sense knowledge) is the sensible form of things. The sensible form is that which
has the capacity to stimulate the sense organs. Sense knowledge is obtained through particular
body organs, that are locus of sensory faculties, which perceive in particular ways appropriate to
each organ, the cognitive forms in accordance with certain material conditions.

The difference between the cognitive activity at the sensual level (i.e. sense knowledge) and at
intellectual level (i.e. intellective knowledge) is the form. Whereas the principle of sense
knowledge is the sensible form (qualities) of things, the principle of intellective knowledge is the
form of things i.e. that which the things are (their essential forms). In other words, the faculty
sense knowledge (the senses) perceives the sensible qualities of things, while the faculty of
intellective knowledge (the intellect) comprehends what the things are i.e. that they are
something (that which
they are). The cognitive sense form is always individual and accidental, i.e. it refers to the
accidental aspect of reality. In order to have a complete understanding of sense knowledge, we
have to look at the following aspects; the faculties (sense organs) and the nature (division of
senses).

The faculties of sense knowledge (senses)

Sense knowledge comes about through an organ of the body i.e. sense knowledge is that which
we obtain through the senses. It is the knowledge of material things in their singularity. For
example, I see this tree, this color, or imagine this/that car but not the car. Thus, the faculty that
explains sense knowledge is the sense organ. The sense organs are the body parts specialized in
the functions necessary for knowledge. Thus, their material constitution implies some kind of
limitation in the activity that they are capable of performing, e.g. the material constitution of the
eye serves only to see and not to hear like the material constitution of the ear and vice versa. The
senses are divided into two groups, namely, external and internal senses.

The five external senses are distinguished by the organs through which they exercise their
activities and their objects. For example, the eye can only perceive light and will never taste the
sweetness or bitterness of something when it is placed on the eye. The internal senses include;
common sense, memory, imagination and cognitive power. They are called internal because the
physiological devices through which they carry out their activities are all situated at different
sites of the inside part of the brain.

The External Senses

The external senses include, sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch. They are called external
because the physiological devices (organs) through which they carry out their activities are found
outside the surface of the body. To understand the five external senses deeply, we need to focus
on three aspects; the nature of the knowledge of external senses, their object and the mechanisms
by which they work.

Nature of the knowledge external senses

The activity proper to the external senses (as faculties of sense knowledge) is sensation.
Sensation is a bio-psychic phenomenon. That means, it is not only a mechanical activity (as
claimed by some materialists), but also a vital activity. As an activity, it spontaneous in its origin
and immanent in its ending (that means its ending is confined within the organ/subject).
Sensation is an immediate knowledge of concrete objects. As such, it can also be referred to as
an intuition. Thus, the knowledge of external senses has two characteristics, namely, immediacy
and the presence of a material object. The presence is an intentional presence and not a really
presence; i.e. the object of sensation assumes intentional presence through representation. Sense
knowledge is characterized as immediate because it is produced without, reasoning or abstraction
(in other words without a meditating process).

Object of external sense knowledge

The object of external sense knowledge is the external aspect of material things like; color,
sound, length, texture, extension etc., and not the whatness (essence of things). Thus, the objects
of sensation are the qualities of bodily/material things that act on sense organs. We can divide
the object of sensation into two groups. The first group refers to the proper objects of sensation
i.e. that which is sensible in itself (per se). In that way they are perceived only by one particular
sense
e.g. color, smell, taste (sweetness, bitterness, sourness etc.). In fact, the proper objects of
sensation are the formal objects of particular sense. It is the object through which the different
senses are differentiated. The second group refers to the accidental objects of sensation i.e. those
that are perceived as a property of a certain thing e.g. color or figure of a man.

Mechanism of external senses

Sense knowledge or the action of feeling of senses begins when the organ is stimulated by
physical or corporeal reality. This causes alteration which involves the reception of a specific
extra mental forms such as the color of things, the smell of things etc. Such extra mental form is
quantitatively and qualitatively “proportional” to the material capabilities of the sense organ
involved. In other words, it should be within its performance thresholds determined by the nature
of the sense organ e.g. the eye can see colors and the ear can hear sounds. However, the human
eye cannot see the chromatic range of infrared or that of ultraviolet. Just like the human ear
cannot hear very high or very low frequency sounds.

When the sense organ is physically stimulated, it receives a specific form in an immaterial and
purely passive way. In other words, it is “modified” by the act of a reality.
The sense faculty together with the sense organ then forms a single unit i.e. it receives the same
form but in a formal or intentional way. The cognitive faculty is an operative but not passive so it
does not receive a form in a material or merely passive way, Instead, the faculty itself actualizes
the form received and makes it known. There is a passage from natural form (in the things that
act of the senses) to the intentional sense form that follows three steps as follows: First, the
physical alteration or stimulation of the organ. Second, the unity between the organ and the
faculty (sense faculty), and third, the reception of the form in the faculty, which actualizes it.

Based on these three steps, we can make three important observations about the operation of
sense faculties and knowledge as follows: First, sense knowledge cannot be reduced to a
physiological process even though it requires such a process in order to come about. Second, the
immanence and immateriality of sense knowledge are not complete, which is principally evident
in the conditions of individuality and accidentality of sense forms. Third, the form received by
the faculty has the same form as what is perceived, which exists naturally outside in the material
object and intentionally in the mind. Aristotle observes that, “the activity of the sensible object
and that of the percipient sense is the one and the same activity.” It means that no act of
knowledge exists without an object like a kind of “pure thought”, because something is always
known, and, that known form is a single act in which the act of the knower (the faculty) and act
of the known (the real form) come together. Otherwise without these two acts, there cannot be
knowledge.

External sense faculties (experience)

As already noted, the external sense faculties are in more direct contact with reality. They
distinguish more specific, but at the same time more superficial aspects. Sense knowledge
distinguishes individual forms, which are accidents of the substance i.e. the accidental aspects of
that which exists. However not all accidents are capable of directly stimulating a sense organ e.g.
quantity, relationship and place. It is only the sense qualities that can stimulate the sense organs.
Thus, external senses, are divided according to the manner in which real qualities stimulate their
respective organs.

Traditionally there are five external senses, namely, sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. We
can still establish hierarchy among the five external senses depending on their degree of
immateriality and immanence. This is further divided by two factors; namely, the physical
alteration of the means by which the qualities enter in to contact with the organ. For example,
some senses such as touch and taste require direct contact with the object and even material
absorption of the qualities in order to perceive them at a distance from the object without
materially acquiring the qualities sensed.

Touch

The sense of touch is the most material and least immanent of all the external senses since it
requires direct physical contact with the object and a certain material participation in its qualities
e.g. we cannot feel heat or cold without heating or cooling ourselves. The sense of touch is more
developed in higher cognitive beings. Thus, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, man is the
creature that possesses the sense faculty of touch in the most perfect way. For the organic basis
of the sense of touch, it covers the entire body of the living beings although some areas are better
predisposed than others.

Taste

The sense of taste requires immediate contact with the object and a certain material acquisition of
the taste quality perceived. However, taste is more immaterial in respect to touch because it has
more localized peripheral organ (i.e. taste buds on the tongue) and because taste qualities are
more specific that tactile qualities. It is very interesting also to note that the tongue can clearly
differentiate between tactile sensation and taste sensations. This makes a definite distinction
between the two faculties.

Smell

The sense of smell has a great affinity with the sense of taste. However, the sense of smell has a
higher degree of immateriality and immanence in respect to the sense of taste because its organ
does not have to be in direct contact with the object, nor does it have to acquire real qualities
materially. With smell, sense form can be perceived at a distance from the thing that possesses
them. The greater the immanence of the known object is also evident in the vast diversity of
olfactory qualities and in the facility with which they can be linked to experience. It is a very
common experience to associate a smell with a person, a house, a specific event in the event in
the past etc. This is called “evocative capacity” of smells. It has great importance for animals in
them
search for food, reproduction and defense. In human, the sense of smell is not well developed
and inferior in comparison to that of many animals. Nonetheless, the olfactory capacity of human
beings is able to distinguish many qualities, which can be grouped in to precise categories.

Hearing

The sense of hearing has a higher level of immateriality and immanence. Like the sense of smell,
the sense of Hearing shares the characteristics of functioning at a distance from its object and not
having to acquire materially the qualities perceived. Hearing shares with the sense of sight in the
fact that, the material agency that interacts with the organ is not chemical, as in the case of touch.
Sound waves for hearing and light waves for sight. Together with the faculty of sight, hearing is
considered to be one of the higher external senses because of its greater degree of immateriality a
d immanence.

However, unlike sight, the sense of hearing requires a certain change in reality in order to
perceive sound qualities. The importance of the sense of hearing for human life is evident in both
the diversity of sound qualities (tone, intensity, rhythm, duration etc.) and in the fact that sound
provides special form of knowledge concerning the succession of phenomena. Hearing can then
be considered as the sense per excellence of time and duration. The peripheral organ of hearing
lies in the three parts of the ear namely; outer, madder and inner ear.

Sight

The sense of sight is the most immaterial and immanent of all the external sense faculties. Unlike
touch and taste, and in common with smell and hearing, the organ of sight, namely-the eye, does
not have to materially acquire the qualities perceived e.g. it does not have to become colored or
luminous in order to see. The organ of the sense of sight does not require a significant alteration
in reality in order to be stimulated. Today, science has proved that light is a physical medium and
that its waves are transmitted over time but such is their speed that they come close to being
simultaneous. Therefore, we can say that sight requires the simultaneity of phenomenon just as
hearing requires sequentially.

It is certain that a sense, the organ of which can interact with real qualities almost simultaneously
is a sense very near those faculties that enjoy complete immanence and
immateriality; hence the fact that words “vision” and “illumination” have often been used to
describe the activity of the mind. In conclusion, external senses are; sight, hearing, smell, taste,
and touch and tactile qualities respectively. These are called “proper” or “primary” sense objects
because each of them is perceived by just one sense and cannot be perceived by another because
in distinguishing them, the sense which functions correctly in the organic base cannot mistake
them.

Internal senses (internal sense experience)

Perceptions of the external senses are processed at a deeper level by the internal senses. External
sense experience is limited e.g. the object that they perceive is the particular and by specific
sense organ. That means, a given external sense cannot perceive the object of another sense and
therefore it cannot unify or distinguish phenomena. Secondly, no external sense can conserve its
sensations such that it can enable the intellect act on it in the absence of the physical reality.
Thirdly, no external sense can evaluate the reality it apprehends, thus cannot provide sufficient
reason for action. The limits of the external senses are overcome by the internal senses before the
sense experience transits to intellectual knowledge. The internal sense experience includes the
following;

Common sense (Sensus communis)

Common sense (Sensus communis) is the faculty of internal sense experience that unites the
operations and objects of the external senses. Otherwise, for knowledge to be possible, we must
be able to receive data from the external senses in a unitary but differentiated way. The external
senses apprehend particular and specific objects; and lack the capacity to perceive their own
objects from the objects of other external senses. For example, Sight apprehends the color of an
orange and in normal functioning condition, it distinguishes it from the green color of the leaves
of the orange tree, but it does not perceive the action of seeing and it does not distinguish the
orange color of the fruit from its sweet taste.

However, for knowledge about the reality to be possible (that means all aspects of the reality),
the sense aspects must be absorbed in a unitary, yet differentiated way; and therefore, in an
ordered fashion. The faculty that unites the different operations and objects of the external
senses, is the common sense (senses communis). The object of common sense is the objects of
the
individual external senses and their operations apprehended in a unitary fashion. Common sense
is therefore also referred to as “perceptive synthesis” and “sense awareness”. It can be
considered as the first level of self-knowledge. The action of common sense is then, a unification
of sensations, or a grouping of unified sensations, and given the name “perception”.

Hence, it can be said that common sense is the formal sense of the unity of sense experience i.e.
–the faculty that unifies, in perception, the plurality of external sensation. For example, in
knowing an orange, the common sense attributes the sensation of orange and that of sweetness to
the same reality, e.g. linking them both to nutrition. It should be noted that, the common sense
unifies but does not conserve the unified form perceived by the external senses. The task of
conserving is carried out by another internal sense called imagination. Thus, the common sense
is activated only in the presence of the reality concerned.

As for the organic foundation, neurophysiology holds that common sense is not highly localized
but is to be found throughout the cerebral cortex. In summary-the common sense I) apprehends
the objects of all the external senses ii) distinguishes them iii) unifies them in perception and iv)
apprehends the acts of the external senses in a kind of sense awareness.

Imagination

The faculty of imagination conserves the unity of perception of external senses performed by the
faculty of common sense. Otherwise, if the unity of perceptions performed by the common sense
is not conserved, knowledge then would be interrupted in the absence of the reality from which
they were apprehended. This would consequently lead to a discontinuity between various
perception about the reality. The degree of immanence in the faculty of imagination is higher
than that of the faculty of common sense because what is known “remains” in the cognizant
being (the knowing being) i.e. conserved by the faculty of imagination.

Consequently, imagination is not linked to the physical presence of reality, but works
independently of it. The activities of the faculty of imagination follows the action of the common
sense. Otherwise, we cannot imagine without having sensed and perceived. Thus, imagination is
the faculty that conserves perception and causes them to be present once again in the absence of
the reality from which the perceptions were obtained. Imagination can be defined as the formal
sense of continuity of external sense experience. Common sense unifies external sensations and
imagination; conserves the unified perceptions of common sense, adds to them other previously
conserved perceptions, and combines various perceptions to obtain more general images in order
for it to be able to extract universal concepts.

Cogitative power

It is the faculty that passes a judgement on an individual sensory reality, apprehending its
suitability or harmfulness. In other words, the cogitative power apprehends and conserves the
particular aspects of the sensory reality that concern the suitability or harmfulness of things;
provoking a certain movement in the will. Otherwise, a known reality does not attract or repel if
it is not considered as being either suitable or harmful. For example, a sheep does not flee from
the wolf because it is black and ugly but because the sheep recognizes the wolf as something
harmful. The action of the cogitative power contains some degree of anticipation of the future
because it implicitly distinguishes the end to which the individual is orientated.

On the basis of various evaluative perceptions, the faculty of cogitative power can orient activity
and enable the acquisition of experience. Thus, it is also called “intentional sense of the future”.
This faculty which apprehends the suitability or harmfulness of an individual sensory reality is
called “cogitative power” in humans “estimative power” in animals. In summary, the functions
of cogitative and estimative power are; appraising (evaluating) the individual aspects of the
sensory reality, directing activity on the basis of that evaluative perceptions, and acquiring
experience both of the individual aspects themselves and of the practical actions that concerns
them. It forms the basis of the ability to learn and to be trained.

Memory

The function of the faculty of memory is conserving and representing the evaluative perceptions
of the faculty of the cogitative power. For these reasons, memory may be called “the intentional
sense of the past”. It should be noted that, among the four faculty of internal sense experience
(internal senses) cogitative power and Memory have intentional character, and thus are the
intentional internal senses. The relationship between the two intentional internal senses
(cogitative power and memory) is analogous to which exists between the formal internal senses
(i.e. common sense, which apprehends form in unitary sense, and imagination, which conserves
the forms and represents them). Thus, the function of memory is similar to that imagination, the
difference is that the former concerns evaluations and not form.

Cognitive activity at the intellectual level (intellectual knowledge)

Apart from sense knowledge, humans are endowed with intellective knowledge. The faculty for
the intellective knowledge is the intellect, from which it draws its name. The object of
intellective knowledge is not the sensible, material, particular and concrete thing, but rather the
universal and abstract. For example, in intellective knowledge we do not only know this book,
this chair, this table, but we know book, chair and table as such. At the level of intellective
knowledge, we know ideas such as generosity, virtue, work etc. which do not refer to concrete-
material things, but rather to something universal and abstract. Intellective knowledge is marked
by the human capacity to judge and reason, through which we form judgments, universal
propositions and general laws. To understand more intellective knowledge, it is important to
examine its: origin, operation and characterization.

Origin of intellective knowledge

Basically, there are two positions about the origin of intellective knowledge. The first position
holds that, man receives intellective knowledge from a superior source, and thus intellective
knowledge is not the product of man. This position is held by; Plato, Augustine, Malebranche,
Leibniz, Rosmin, Gioberti etc.). In their attempt to give a sure foundation and absolute guarantee
to human knowledge, they attribute a divine origin to intellectual knowledge. Their main
argument is that, owing to the properties of universal ideas and eternal truth as absolute,
necessary, immutable and universal, human intellect, which is finite and mutable, cannot be the
origin of intellective knowledge. According to Augustine, eternal truth is infused into human
mind by illumination. This position is summarily held by Malebranche and Rosmini. While for
Plato, the human mind contemplates already universal ideas in the world of ideas before it
descends into the body, Descartes and Leibniz affirm that intellective knowledge is man is
innate.

The second position is held by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and many of their followers. Their
position is that intellective knowledge is a product of the action of the intellect. Emmanuel Kant
shares these positions. It asserts the intellect as the source of intellective knowledge for two
reasons. First, that an external origin of intellective knowledge other than the human intellect
would not explain the defects and progressivity of intellective knowledge. Second, assigning a
source of intellective knowledge different from the human intellect means depriving man of that
which is his most noble and original activity (that distinguishes him from other animals). The
second position (Aristotelian – Thomistic) about the origin of intellective knowledge has been
more accepted among philosophers than the first position. If we accept that intellective
knowledge is irreducible to senses and excludes the possibility of explaining it with an a priori
origin, we can assert that, the source of intellective knowledge is the intellect itself.

The operations of the intellect

The intellect is the faculty through which man derives general ideas, concepts and universal
judgements from the data provided by the senses. This is achieved through three distinct
operations of the faculty of intellect, namely, apprehension (through which the intellect abstracts
universal ideas), judgement (through which the intellect associates and separates two or more
ideas), and reasoning (through which the intellect derives a new idea from preceding ideas).
Intellectual knowledge is the knowledge of forms and concepts. A concept represents always a
dis- individualized form. Yet our sense experience is always an experience of individual things.
How possible is it then that we can derive concepts from the experience of individual things?
Aristotle and St. Thomas answer this question by explaining the operation of the intellect.

St. Thomas offers an Aristotelian explanation of the process that leads to the knowledge of
concepts or forms from the experience of individual concrete things (sense knowledge). Aristotle
and the Scholastics distinguish between two functions of the intellect, namely, active and passive
intellect. The intellect that carries the active function is called the agent intellect. It elaborates
the universal ideas. While the passive intellect is called the possible intellect. It receives and
conserves the universal ideas.

The intellect that knows the intelligible form is the possible intellect. However, the intelligible
species does not exist as such in things perceived. The form of a thing known ought to be
rendered intelligible in act. For that reason, another faculty of the intellect is required, which is
capable of rendering intelligible in act the intelligible species that are as such only in potency.
The faculty that renders intelligible in act the intelligible species is the agent intellect.
In summary, the agent intellect renders intelligible in act the intelligible species, that otherwise
remain in potency. The possible intellect then receives the intelligible species from which it
produces concepts and judgement. To be able to form concepts and judgement, the possible
intellect should be put in activity by an intelligible species derived from things perceived by
senses. Since the intelligible species dis-individualized does not exist as such in the things
perceived, there ought to be faculty of the intellect that renders possible the abstraction of the
intelligible form from the sensible reality. Thus, whereas the senses apprehend individual aspects
of the things we have before us (color, size, smell etc.), the intellectual faculty knows what each
is, i.e. its essence (not the individual tree that I can see and touch, but what each tree is in itself).
The sense faculties know the particular, the intellectual faculty knows the universal i.e. the
concept or idea that is not circumscribed to this or that individual. The following are the three
operations in the process of intellective knowledge.

Abstraction

This is the passage from the level of sense knowledge to the level of intellective knowledge. It is
also called apprehension of essence. The intellect reaches the universal essence by liberating
sensual forms from the particularity through a more or less elaborate comparison between sense
images. In the process of abstraction, the mind is open to reality; reality not created but
illuminated by the intellect. The intellect seeks on one hand to actively illuminate that which is
intelligible and universal in the sense images. On the other hand, it acts as passive force that
receives and conserves the intellectual forms that are being extracted. The intellectual form is
intentional, that means, they not what the intellect knows but rather the means by which we
know reality. It means intellective knowledge is not limited to abstraction of concepts but always
refers back to the concreteness and individuality of the reality.

Judgement

Judgement is the second operation of the intellect. In order to gain a better knowledge of what an
individual being is, the intellect brings the various apprehensions together in the apprehension of
judgement. In judgment, the intellect affirms or derives a property of a certain subject. It’s an act
of the intellect by which it attributes a certain determination to somethings or by which it
negates a certain determination to something. To judge means to take a form as the
 form of something or conceiving something in certain way. Conceiving something as that thing
e.g. to judge that, John is a footballer means conceiving John as a footballer.

Reasoning

Reasoning is discursive intellective operation by which, it brings together previously formulated

In conclusion, there are two important and main points to be noted about intellectual knowledge.
First, though the intellective operation is divided into three distinct operations, the whole
intellective operation is not fragmented, but rather progressive, without any gap between one
operation and the other. Second, intellective knowledge can be an end into itself or it can be used
to arrive at some final purpose. When intellective knowledge is an end into itself, it is called
speculative or theoretical knowledge. Whereas, when intellective knowledge is arrived at some
final point, it is called theoretical knowledge