Republic of the Philippines signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by

SUPREME COURT the Constitution.

Manila
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the
EN BANC Senate which convened as an impeachment court the following
day, December 14, 2011.
G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner, complaint charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution,
vs. betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT committed as follows:
COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE
SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI ARTICLE I
AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS,
RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD
COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND
FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents. SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE
ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME
RESOLUTION OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF
JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order ARTICLE II
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief
Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE
impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR
House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE
respondent Senate of the Philippines. FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS
STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17,
of the HOR during which a verified complaint for impeachment ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the
Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same 2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI,
day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution that "a public officer
 or employee shall, upon constitutionally-required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of
assumption of office and as often the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and
thereafter as may be required by Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this
law, submit a declaration under acquisition sustained and duly supported by his
oath of his assets, liabilities, and income as a public official? Since his assumption
net worth. In the case of the as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has
President, the Vice-President, the he complied with this duty of public disclosure?
Members of the Cabinet, and other
constitutional offices, and officers ARTICLE III
of the armed forces with general or
flag rank, the declaration shall be RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE
disclosed to the public in the VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR
manner provided by law." BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING
TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3)
to the public his statement of OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES
assets, liabilities, and net worth as THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST
required by the Constitution. BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE,
INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE"
2.3. It is also reported that some of IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT
the properties of Respondent are ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL
not included in his declaration of WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-
his assets, liabilities, and net FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND
worth, in violation of the anti-graft EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN
and corrupt practices act. EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS.
ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF
2.4. Respondent is likewise HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING
suspected and accused of having WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES
accumulated ill-gotten wealth, PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
acquiring assets of high values
and keeping bank accounts with ARTICLE IV
huge deposits. It has been
reported that Respondent has, RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
among others, a 300-sq. meter TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE
apartment in a posh VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN HE
BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE
Mega World Property development at the Fort in OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A
Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY
CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO
OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO- FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN
GUTIERREZ. DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO
ARTICLE V IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC COURT’S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII
TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND
DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND
JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY
NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL
PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ)
PROVINCE. COLLECTIONS.1

ARTICLE VI On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the
"blitzkrieg" fashion by which the impeachment complaint was
signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
to the Senate. Citing previous instances when President Aquino
TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF,
openly expressed his rejection of petitioner’s appointment as
AND TO A COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE
Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO
leadership of petitioner for "derailing his administration’s
IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF
mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him
THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE
was the handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and
OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY
supporters, including"hidden forces" who will be benefited by his
AND JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY REPOSED
ouster. As to the charges against him, petitioner denied the same
BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF
but admitted having once served the Offices of the President and
REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
Vice-President during the term of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the request for courtesy call only
ARTICLE VII to Mr. Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr.
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC Jimenez without prior permission or invitation. Petitioner argued
TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were
GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper.
ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER He prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the
AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO
Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the to prove the allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some
articles of impeachment. properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and
failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in Taguig)
Representatives held a press conference revealing evidence under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner’s alleged failure to
which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. disclose to the public his SALN as required by the Constitution).
The following day, newspapers carried front page reports of high-
priced condominium units and other real properties in Fort On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a
Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, Resolution5 which states:
as disclosed by prosecutors led by respondent Rep. Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. The prosecution told the media that it is possible that IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:
these properties were not included by petitioner in his Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had not been 1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of
made available to the public. Reacting to this media campaign, Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the Articles of
Senators scolded the prosecutors reminding them that under the Impeachment;
Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials3 they are not
allowed to make any public disclosure or comment regarding the
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4
merits of a pending impeachment case.4 By this time, five petitions
of the Articles of Impeachment, with respect to which, this Court
have already been filed with this Court by different individuals
shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on
seeking to enjoin the impeachment trial on grounds of improperly
the nature of any property or asset which may be proven to
verified complaint and lack of due process.
belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided under
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines No. 1379.
acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings
against the petitioner.Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing
SO ORDERED.6
was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk
of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by
the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and submitted the In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the
SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s request for
witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where
previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records Custodian of petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar
Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of Deeds currencies, as follows:
of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds
of Quezon City). WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority
votes to grant the Prosecution’s Requests for Subpoenae to the
In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and
prosecution and defense submitted their respective memoranda Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI), for them to testify and bring
on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged bank
accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the 089-141-00712-9
instant impeachment proceedings, as follows:
089-141-00746-9
a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands,
Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV Building, 6758 089-14100814-5
Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before
the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original 089-121-01195-7
and certified true copies of the account opening
forms/documents for Bank Account no. 1445-8030-61 in
SO ORDERED.8
the name of Renato C. Corona and the bank statements
showing the balances of the said account as of December
31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and
December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the Impeachment
31, 2010. Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid
subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to
testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the
b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized
opening documents for petitioner’salleged foreign currency
representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan
accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the
Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City,
subpoenas including the bank statements showing the year-end
is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on
balances for the said accounts.
February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of
the account opening forms/documents for the following
bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the
Corona, and the documents showing the balances of the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion
said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded
2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010: to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent
Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and
defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the
089-19100037-3
charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from
being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute
089-13100282-6 allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on
suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention
089-121017358 of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to
retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence
089-121019593 under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its
earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing
089-121020122 no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of
evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained
089-121021681 wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process because
first, Art. II does not mention "graft and corruption" or unlawfully as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant
acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is thereto; and
clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft and
corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from "culpable (iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary
violation of the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and (4) injunction permanent.
issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged
bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.9
being the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree")
considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio
violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec.
and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the ground of partiality, citing
8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also
their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the
penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the
fact that they have been openly touted as the likely replacements
following reliefs:
in the event that petitioner is removed from office.10
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No.
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing the Resolution
injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the
and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the
Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation ofResolution
Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, both dated February 6,
dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives
2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
of BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting
the inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the absence of
documents on petitioner’s or his family’s bank accounts;
any applicable compulsory ground and of any voluntary inhibition
and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission of
from the Justices concerned."
evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment
Complaint;
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental
Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is being violated in
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render
the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-
judgment:
Judges have lost the coldneutrality of impartial judges by acting
as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the
void ab initio; Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further called attention to the
fact that despite the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and Resolution which disallowed the introduction of evidence in
admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for
of the Impeachment Complaint; reconsideration would be entertained, "the allies of President
Aquino in the Senate abused their authority and continued their
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s Resolution presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of
dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011 [sic], objection". In view of the persistent efforts of President Aquino’s
Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of Presiding Officer Juan ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is
Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims
paragraph 2.4 of Article II -- for which President Aquino even to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that
thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected,
could not"-- petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the
petition before this Court. impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed
that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti12 filed on behalf issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.
of the respondents, the Solicitor General argues that the instant
petition raises matters purely political in character which may be The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of
decided or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents arising
manifestation that the comment is being filed by the respondents from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for
"without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable alleged violations of right to due process of the person being tried
Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional and by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment
and of Impeachment and Judicial Review

the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the
the case of arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen as creating divisions,
partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with
Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend that to allow a the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more by
public official being impeached to raise before this Court any and the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint demonstrations of innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly
would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that political character, the precise role of the judiciary in
may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure
impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the the effective functioning of the separate branches while
Constitution intended. preserving the structure of checks and balance in our
government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch
Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally
the Impeachment Court did not commit any grave abuse of entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of
discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
judiciously. Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing
impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public
impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the
public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the
of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this United States (US) through the influence of English common law
case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the
from the US Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through the one-year bar provision.
mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he
claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to
complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner determine whether respondents committed a violation of the
likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of
said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or
Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures
during the hearings. from the Court.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in Mootness
the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain
Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with
that do not concern, or allege any violation of, the three express the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority
and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the
power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the
unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening
limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is
judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-
proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC.
sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been
entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and mooted by supervening events and his own acts. 1âwphi1

counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any

semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases
whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is
to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination
a political question that is not within this Court’s power of
thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In such cases,
expanded judicial review.
there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would
be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, petition.19
Jr. v.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on the ground of
Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of judicial review in this MOOTNESS.
jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House
No pronouncement as to costs.
of Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court resolved the
question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two
impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. ESTELA M. PERLAS-
REYES BERNABE
WE CONCUR: Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been

(No Part) TERESITA J. reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
PRESBITERO J. LEONARDO-DE writer of the opinion of the Court.
VELASCO, JR.* CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as
(On leave) DIOSDADO M. amended)
ARTURO D. BRION* PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL
Associate Justice CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL
ROBERTO A. ABAD
PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MARIA LOURDES P.A.

MENDOZA SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case
SUPREME COURT No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper
Manila any "intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco,
nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive
EN BANC pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition
Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's
A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988 intervention.

IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M
GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February
HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT 1988 of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled
ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT. "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which
Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by
complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of
RESOLUTION
merit. In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require
complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious
accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr.
PER CURIAM: Cueco, the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March
1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No.
1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special; 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the
Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter- Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By
complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied
Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.
telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here
Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the involved. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the
important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement. following terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is
required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, for the office held by him and who may be removed from office
an anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during
Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer,
for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before
Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which
about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty
Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where service of which would amount to removal from office.
Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February Sec. 2 The President, the
1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms: Members of the Supreme Court,
and the Members of the
There is another reason why the complaining for Constitutional Commissions shall
disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of be removed from office on
the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) impeachment for, and conviction
of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine of, culpable violation of the
Bar and may be removed from office only by Constitution, treason, bribery,
impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To other high crimes, or graft and
grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of corruption."
the Court during the Member's incumbency, would
in effect be to circumbent and hence to run afoul Thus, the above provision proscribes removal
of the constitutional mandate theat Members of from office of the aforementioned constitutional
the Court may be removed from office only by officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a
impeachment for and conviction of certain public officer who may be removed solely by
offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. impeachment to be charged criminally while
Precisely the same situation exists in respect of holding his office, would be violative of the clear
the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in mandate of the fundamental law.
relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the
members of the Commission on Elections (Article Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his
IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution,
members of the Commission on Audit who are not states that "judgement in cases of impeachment
certified public accountants (Article XI [D] shall be limited to removal from office and
[1][1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or
required to be members of the Philippine Bar. profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but
(Emphasis supplied) the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment,
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this in accordance with law. The above provision is a
matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said: reproduction of what was found in the 1935
Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit
The broad power of the New Constitution vests character of the above provision that the effect of
the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public impeachment is limited to the loss of position and
officers and employees, including those in disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or
government-owned or controlled corporations." profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest
There are exceptions, however, like constitutional that the party this convicted may be proceeded
officers, particularly those declared to be removed against, tried and thereafter punished in
by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the accordance with law. There can be no clearer
1973 Constitution provides: expression of the constitutional intent as to the
 scope of the impeachment process (The above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal
Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or
clear implication is, the party convicted in the other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that
impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be
liable and subject of prosecution, trial and observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A
punishment according to law; and that if the same Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office
does not result in a conviction and the official is via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and
not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the
"in accordance with law" may not prosper. 2 Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he
may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that
in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the independence and separation of powers. The rule is important
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of because judicial independence is important. Without the
the Constitutional Commissions, and the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting
employees may be removed from office as officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges
provided by law, but not by impeachment. brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person
with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.
extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Republic of the Philippines, but the party Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject Aquino, JJ., concur.
to prosecution, trial and punishment according to
law. Fernan, J., took no part.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that Guetierrez, J., J., is on leave.
it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to
 Republic of the Philippines BRITANICO and COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS
SUPREME COURT AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.
Manila
Napoleon J. Poblador for respondent R. Cayetano.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986

PATAJO, J.:
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, JOSE B. LAUREL, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA, EDMUNDO B. CEA, Petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing
ANTONIO CUENCO, HOMOBONO ADAZA, CIRIACO Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in
ALFELOR, ROLANDO ANDAYA, HONORATO AQUINO, JOSE Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the
ATIENZA, JR., NATALIO BELTRAN, JR., CESAR V. Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
BOLANOS, DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, FERRER MIN A. CARAM, Government to recall from the archives and report out the
NENITA C. DALUZ, ARTHUR D. DEFENSOR, EMILIO N. DELA resolution together with the verified complaint for the
PAZ, HILARIO DE PEDRO, DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, impeachment of the President of the Philippines.
MANUEL C. DOMINGO, CARLOS C. FERNANDEZ, JOLLY T.
FERNANDEZ, JAIME N. FERRER, WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the
ROGELIO GARCIA, ROLLEO L. IGNACIO, EVA ESTRADA Batasan, filed with the Batasan on August 13, 1985 Resolution
KALAW, RAFAEL L. LAZATIN, EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, No. 644 calling for the impeachment of President Marcos together
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, JR., with a verified complaint for impeachment. Said resolution and
ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ, ANTONIO complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on
C. MARTINEZ, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, ROGACIANO M. Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee
MERCADO, RAMON V. MITRA, JR., JUANITA L. found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to
NEPOMUCENO, ROY B. PADILLA, HERNANDO B. PEREZ, warrant its further consideration and disapproved Resolution No.
GONZALO G. PUYAT, II, HIALMAR P. QUINTANA, ISIDRO E. 644 and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint
REAL, JR., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, attached thereto on August 14, 1985. It then submitted its report
AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, OSCAR F. SANTOS, FRANCISCO S. which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.
SUMULONG, EMIGDIO S. TANJUATCO, LUIS R.
VILLAFUERTE and VICTOR ZIGA, petitioners,
On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a
vs.
motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No.
HON. NICANOR E. YÑIGUEZ, MANUEL M. GARCIA,
644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was
GUARDSON R. LOOD, RENATO L. CAYETANO, ANTONIO M.
disapproved by the Batasan.
DIAZ, DAMIAN V. ALDABA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ADELINO
B. SITOY, LEONARDO PEREZ, ALEJANDRO ALMENDRAS,
SALACNIB F. BATERINA, LUIS S. ETCUBAÑEZ, CONCORDIO On September 7, 1985, the present petition was filed with this
C. DIEL, REGALADO E. MAAMBONG, TEODULO C. Court. In said petition, petitioners pray that after hearing this
NATIVIDAD, MACACUNA DIMAPORO, SALVADOR B. Court declare Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules on
Impeachment which was approved by the Batasan on August 16, the exercise of said power the Batasan acted wisely. There is no
1984 by a vote of 114 in favor and 58 against, unconstitutional, allegation in the petition for certiorari that in the exercise of its
and Committee Report No. 154 of the Batasan Committee on powers the Batasan had violated any provision of the
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government dismissing Constitution. The fact that the Committee on Justice dismissed
Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for impeachment attached the petition on the same day it was filed after deliberating on it for
thereto, null and void. They also pray that this Court issue a writ several hours as reported in the newspapers, radio and television
of preliminary injunction restraining respondents from enforcing (which must have been the basis of petitioners' claim that the
and questioned provisions of the aforementioned Rules and a Committee had acted with undue haste in unceremoniously
Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the dismissing the complaint for impeachment) does not provide
Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good basis for concluding that there had been a violation of any
Government to recall from the archives and report out the provision of the Constitution which would justify the Court's
resolution and complaint for impeachment in order that the intervention to ensure proper observance of constitutional norms
impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the Batasan as and conduct. Beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate
a body. impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its Members and
that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at
In G.R. No. L-71688 filed on August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de least two-thirds of all the members thereof, the Constitution says
Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, claiming to be members of no more. It does not lay down the procedure to be followed in
good standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and impeachment proceedings. It is up to the Batasan to enact its
taxpayers, filed a petition with this Court for certiorari to annul the own rules of procedure in said impeachment proceedings, which
resolution of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good it had already done, The interpretation and application of said
Government, the very same resolution subject of the present rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review. The powers
petition, dismissing the complaint for the impeachment of the of the Batasan to dismiss a petition for impeachment which in its
President of the Philippines signed by the petitioners in the judgment it finds not meritorious or defective in form and
present case, and mandamus to compel said Committee on substance are discretionary in nature and, therefore, not subject
Justice and the Batasan, represented by its Speaker, to give due to judicial compulsion.
course to said complaint for impeachment. In denying due course
to said petition and dismissing outright the same, We held: 2. The doctrine of separation of powers still exists under the 1973
Constitution though in a modified form made necessary because
1. The l973 Constitution has vested in the Batasan Pambansa the of the adoption of certain aspects of the parliamentary system in
exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of the amended 1973 Constitution. The major powers of the
impeachment. The action of the Committee on Justice of the Government have been distributed by the Constitution to the
Batasan to whom the complaint for the impeachment of the President, who is the head of the State and chief executive of the
President had been referred dismissing said petition for being Republic, the Batasan Pambansa and the Judiciary. Under the
insufficient in form and substance involves a political question not doctrine of separation of Powers as interpreted by the decisions
cognizable by the Courts. The dismissal of said petition is within of the Court, mandamus will not he from one branch of the
the ambit of the powers vested exclusively in the Batasan by government to a coordinate branch to compel performance of
express provision of Sec. 2, Article XIII of the Constitution and it duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. More specifically,
is not within the competence of this Court to inquire whether in this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan
to compel it to give due course to the complaint for hereunder. If the Committee finds that sufficient grounds for
impeachment. 1 impeachment exist, the Committee shall require the parties to
support their respective allegations by the submission of affidavits
We did not dismiss outright the present petition as We did G.R. and counter- affidavits, including duly authenticated documents
No. L-71688 but required respondents to comment thereto in view as may appear relevant. The Committee may, however, require
of the claim of petitioners that the provisions of the Rules of that instead of affidavits and counter-affidavits, oral testimony
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, more specifically shall be given. It may at all events examine and allow cross-
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 pursuant to which the Batasan Committee examination of the parties and their witnesses.
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had dismissed
Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for the impeachment After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the
attached thereto are unconstitutional, implying thereby that the submission of memoranda, after which the matter shall be
Batasan or the Committee thereof had, in the exercise of powers submitted for resolution.
vested upon it by the Constitution, transgressed or violated the
Constitution, certainly a justiciable question. SEC. 6. Report and Recommendations. —The
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
The provisions of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Government shall submit it a report of the Batasan
claimed by petitioners to be violative of the Constitution are the containing its findings and recommendations
following: within thirty (30) session days from submission of
the case for resolution.
SEC. 4. Notice to Complainant and Respondent.— Upon due
referral, the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good If the Committee finds by a vote of majority of all its members that
Government shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in probable cause has been established it shall submit with its report
form and substance. if it finds that the complaint is not sufficient in a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment on the basis
form and substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall of the evidence adduced before the Committee.
submit its report as provided hereunder. If it finds the complaint
sufficient in form and substance, it shall furnish the respondent If the Committee finds that probable cause has not been
with copy of the resolution and verified complaint with advise that established, the complaint shall be dismissed subject to Section 9
he may answer the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. of these Rules.
The answer may include affirmative defenses. With leave of the
Committee, the complainant may file a reply and the respondent, SEC. 8. Vote Required for Trial.—A majority vote of all the
a rejoinder. members of the Batasan is necessary for the approval of the
resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. If the
SEC. 5. Submission of Evidence and Memoranda. —After receipt resolution is approved by the required vote, it shall then be set for
of pleadings provided for in Section 4, or the expiration of the time trial on the merits by the Batasan. On the other hand, should the
within which they maybe filed, the Committee shall determine resolution fail to secure approval by the required vote, the same
whether sufficient grounds for impeachment exist. If it finds that shall result in the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment.
sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, the Committee
shall dismiss the complaint and submit the report requited
It is petitioners' contention that said provisions are Respondent Renato L. Cayetano on the other hand contends that
unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I I of the (1) the question involved is purely political; (2) the petitioners are
1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory not proper parties; (3) the petition is in reality a request for an
amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the advisory opinion made in the absence of an actual case or
Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and controversy; (4) prohibition and mandamus are not proper
overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisitive 1/5 remedies, and (5) preliminary mandatory injunction is not proper;
of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said while respondent Salacnib P. Baterina contends that the
questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at petitioners lack standing to sue and impeachment is a power
various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the lodged exclusively in the Batasan.
power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative
belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body. A closer look at the substance than the form of the petition would
reveal that resolution of the constitutionality of the questioned
Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is provisions of the Rules is not even necessary, What petitioners
unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional and are really seeking is for this Court to compel the Batasan to
illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for proceed with the hearing on the impeachment of the President
impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By since more than one-fifth of all the members of the Batasan had
requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the filed a resolution for the impeachment of the President and the
approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Batasan as a body is bound under the Constitution to conduct
Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required by the said trial and render judgment only after said trial and that the
Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the Committee on Justice has no authority to dismiss the complaint
endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the for impeachment on the ground that it is not sufficient in form and
Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the substance. Petitioners, therefore, ask that this Court order the
impeachment trial to proceed. Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to
recall from the Archives the Resolution No. 644 and the complaint
It is the contention of the respondents Speaker Nicanor Yniguez for impeachment "in order that the impeachment trial can be
and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan conducted forthwith by the Batasan as a body. (Prayer of the
Pambansa that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is Petition, subpar, (ii) of Par, 2).
a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no
jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) The question squarely presented before this Court is therefore:
the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Has this Court jurisdiction to order the Committee on Justice,
Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives
are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment?
complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign Can this court, assuming said resolution and complaint for
within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan
complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the to conduct a trial on the charges contained in said resolution and
Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due complaint for impeachment?
course to the impeachment complaint.
What is important to note is that when the Batasan denied the impeachment is of no moment. Aside from the fact that said
motion of MP Ramon Mitra for the recall from the Archives of Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and
Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for impeachment, it had in complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the
effect confirmed the action of the Committee on Justice, Human action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which
Rights and Good Government dismissing said resolution and of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee
complaint on impeachment. That the Batasan by even a majority is in no position to comply with any murder from this Court for
vote can dismiss a complaint for impeachment cannot be said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would
seriously disputed. Since the Constitution expressly provides that actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. Such in effect was
"no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least the ruling in Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil. 83, where this Court
two-thirds of all its members," a majority vote of all the members said:
of the Batasan confirming the action of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government disapproving the resolution It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with
calling for the impeachment of the President and dismissing all reference to the right of the Supreme Court to issue mandamus
the charges contained in the complaint attached thereto, makes directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in
mathematically impossible the required at least two-thirds vote of having our mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or
all members of the Batasan to support a judgment of conviction. against the President of the Philippine Senate and his fellow
What purpose would be served by proceeding further when it is Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, the
already obvious that the required two-thirds vote for conviction disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs the question. If we
cannot be obtained? Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no
would then be in order. authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting
under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-
A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the
complaint for impeachment (which is what the denial by the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body.
Batasan of MP Mitra's motion to recall from the Archives said Should the Court do as requested, we might have the spectacle
resolution and complaint for impeachment is tantamount to) presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-
makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do
Human Rights and Good Government had acted. The dismissal one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another
by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it
impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the
the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95
Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court Mich. 314; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.) (On page 94).
cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial
prayed for by petitioners. See also Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612, 636, where the Court
said:
The fact that petitioners are asking that it is the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, not the Batasan . . . While it has been decided in many cases that the courts will
itself, which shall be commanded by this Court to recall from the not interfere with the legislative department of the government in
Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for the performance of its duties, does that rule apply to the
committees duly appointed by the legislative department of the . . . in a case where jurisdiction is involved, no
government and its officers? The powers and duties conferred doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the
upon said committee by the Legislature granting the legality of the court to pronounce judgments which may be
object and purpose of said committee, and granting that the disregarded with impunity. . .
Legislature itself had the power to do and to perform the duties
imposed upon said committee, then an interference by the courts The admonition of Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra is of much
with the performance of those duties by it would be tantamount to relevance:
interfering with the workings and operations of the legislative
branch of the government itself. An interference by the judicial . . . But certainly mandamus should never issue
department of the government with the workings and operations from this court where it will not prove to be
of the committee of the legislative department would be effectual and beneficial. It should not be awarded
tantamount to an interference with the workings and operations of where it will create discord and confusion. It
the legislative department itself. And, again, we are called upon to should not be awarded where mischievous
say, that one branch of the government cannot encroach upon consequences are likely to follow. Judgment
the domain of another without danger. The safety of our should not be pronounced which might possibly
institutions depends in no small degree, on a strict observance of lead to unseemly conflicts or which might be
this salutary rule. (Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S., 700, 718; disregarded with impunity. This court should offer
Clough vs. Curtis, 134 U.S., 361, 37 1; Wise vs. Bigger, 79 Va., no means by a decision for any possible collision
269). between it as the highest court in the Philippines
and the Philippine Senate as a branch of a
Moreover, while in their petition petitioners merely asked for a writ coordinate department, or between the Court and
of preliminary mandatory injunction "commanding the Batasan the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to Legislature. (On page 95).
recall from the Archives and report out subject resolution and
verified complaint for the impeachment of President Ferdinand E. In any event, We find no basis for the contention of petitioners
Marcos," their ultimate objective is to have the Batasan as a body that Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Rules of Procedure in
proceed with the impeachment trial. Recall of the resolution and Impeachment are violative of the provisions of the Constitution on
complaint for impeachment would be meaningless unless the Impeachment. As We said in Arturo de Castro vs. Committee on
Batasan can also be compelled to conduct the impeachment Justice, et at (G.R. No. L-71688), "beyond saying that the
trial. Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth
of all its members and that no official shall be convicted without
For this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Committee on the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the members thereof,
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, would be but an the Constitution says no more." The Batasan pursuant to its
empty and meaningless gesture unless it would also order the power to adopt rules of its proceedings (Article VIII, Sec. 8[31,
Batasan to proceed to try the impeachment proceedings. This, of may adopt, as it did adopt, necessary rules of procedure to
course, the Court cannot do. Quoting Judge Cooley in Sutherland govern impeachment proceedings. The rules it adopted providing
us. Governor of Michigan 29 Mich. 320: for dismissal of a complaint for impeachment which is not
sufficient in form or substance, or when sufficient grounds for
impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has not been duly filed should be given due course or should be dismissed
established, or requiring a majority vote of all members of the outright.
Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles
of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with the provision of Section While the Batasan has assigned to the Committee on Justice,
3 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. Human Rights and Good Government the task of determining
whether the petition is sufficient in form or substance, or that
More specifically, the provision requiring concurrence of at least sufficient ground for impeachment exist or that probable cause
two-thirds votes of all members of the Batasan for conviction is has been established, said Committee is required to submit its
not violated by any provision of the Rules which authorizes report to the Batasan which has the ultimate decision whether to
dismissal of a petition by a majority vote of the Batasan since with approve or disapprove said report. If the Batasan approves the
such number of votes it is obvious that the two-thirds vote of all Committee report dismissing the complaint, said report is noted
members necessary for conviction can no longer be obtained. by the Batasan and sent to the Archives.
Such being the case, the Batasan can specify in its rules how and
when the impeachment proceedings can be terminated or That the Rules on Impeachment of the Interim Batasan in the
dismissed for Section 3, Article XIII merely provides for how a judgment of petitioners is better is no argument against the
judgment of conviction can be sustained but is respondent on validity or constitutionality of the Rules on Impeachment approved
how a complaint for impeachment can be dismissed when it by the Batasan. More importantly, said Rules are always within
becomes apparent that a judgment of conviction by the required the power of the Batasan to modify, change or replace any time.
number of votes is not possible. They do not have the force of law but are merely in the nature of
by-laws prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of
Neither is the Constitutional provision to the effect that proceedings before the Batasan. They are merely procedural and
impeachment may be initiated by a vote of at least one-fifth of the not substantive (43 C.J. 527). They may be waived or
members violated by the provision of the Rules authorizing the disregarded by the Batasan and with their observance the Courts
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to have no concern. (South Georgia Power Co. vs. Baumann 169
dismiss the complaint for impeachment which it finds not Ga. 649; 151 SE 513). As the Court said in State vs. Alt, 26 Mo.
sufficient in form and substance (Sec. 4), does not have sufficient A. 673, quoted in 46 C.J. 1383 Note 31:
grounds for impeachment (Sec. 5), or where probable cause has
not been established (Sec. 6). All of said actions of the The rules of public deliberative bodies, whether codified in the
Committee refer to the disposition of a complaint for form of a 'manual and formally adopted by the body, or whether
impeachment initiated by at least one-fifth of all the members of consisting of a body of unwritten customs or usages, preserved in
the Batasan. Their purpose is to determine whether or not a memory and by tradition are matters of which the judicial courts,
complaint for impeachment initiated by the required number of as a general rule, take no cognizance. It is a principle of the
members of the Batasan warrants being referred to the Batasan common law of England that the judicial courts have no
for trial. They are not properly part of the "initiation phase" of the conusance of what is termed the lex et consuetudo parliamentary
impeachment proceeding but of the "trial phase", or more And, although this doctrine is not acceded to, in this country, to
accurately the "preparatory to trial" phase. Such actions are liken the extent to which it has gone in England, where the judicial
to actions taken by this Court in determining whether a petition courts have held that they possess no jurisdiction to judge of the
powers of the House of Parliament, yet no authority is cited to us,
and we do not believe that respectable judicial authority exists, for be of assistance, in determining the effect of parliamentary law, to
the proposition that the judicial courts have power to compel consider the nature of the particular deliberative body.
legislative, or quasi-legislative bodies to proceed in the conduct of
their deliberations, or in the exercise of their powers, in Finally, in 'The present case, injunction to restrain the
accordance with their own rules If the Congress of the United enforcement of the particular provisions of the Rules will not lie
States disregards the constitution of the United States, or, if the (aside from the fact that the question involved is political)
legislature of one of the states disregards the constitution of the because the acts of the Committee sought to be restrained have
state, or of the United States, the power resides in the judicial already been consummated. They are fait accomplish. Prohibition
courts to declare its enactments void. If an inferior quasi- or injunction would not issue to restrain acts already performed or
legislative body, such as the council of a municipal corporation, consummated. Remonte us. Banto, 16 SCRA 257; Aragones us.
disregards its own organic law, that is, the charter of the Subido, 25 SCRA 95.
corporation, the judicial courts, for equal if not for stronger
reasons, the same power of annulling its ordinances. But we are IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
not aware of any judicial authority, or of any legal principle, which DISMISSING the petition for lack of merit, without pronouncement
will authorize the judicial courts to annul an act of the legislature, as to costs.
or an ordinance of a municipal council merely because the one or
the other was enacted in disregard of the rules which the
SO ORDERED.
legislature, or the municipal council or either house thereof, had
prescribed for its own government.
Aquino, CJ., Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
To the same effect is 67 Corpus Juris Secundun 870, where it
was said:
Abad Santos, J., I reserve my vote.
Rules of parliamentary practice are merely procedural and not
substantive. The rules of procedure adopted by deliberative Separate Opinions
bodies have not the force of a public law, but they are merely in
the nature of by-laws, prescribed for the orderly and convenient TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
conduct of their own proceedings. The rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or I reserve my vote. It may be observed, though, that this is one
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Where a petition that, following the Court's customary disposition, may well
deliberative body adopts rules of order for its parliamentary be dismissed for having become moot and academic, in view of
governance, the fact that it violates one of the rules so adopted the expiration of the term of the incumbent President upon the
may not invalidate a measure passed in compliance with statute. holding of the presidential elections scheduled on February 7,
The rules of procedure passed by one legislative body are not 1986, in which the charges brought in the impeachment
binding on a subsequent legislative body operating within the resolution and verified complaint may be duly submitted to the
same jurisdiction, and, where a body resolves that the rules of a people for their proper consideration and judgment.
prior body be adopted until a committee reports rules, the prior
rules cease to be in force on the report of the committee. It may
Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I reserve my vote. It may be observed, though, that this is one

petition that, following the Court's customary disposition, may well
be dismissed for having become moot and academic, in view of
the expiration of the term of the incumbent President upon the
holding of the presidential elections scheduled on February 7,
1986, in which the charges brought in the impeachment
resolution and verified complaint may be duly submitted to the
people for their proper consideration and judgment.
 Republic of the Philippines Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an
SUPREME COURT impeachment complaint1 against petitioner, upon the
Manila endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and
Walden Bello.2
G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010,
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of
vs. Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.3 who, by Memorandum of
JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in
FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, the Order of Business.4
JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr.,
CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed
PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING another impeachment complaint5 against petitioner with a
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri
PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda
CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.6 On even date,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By
THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents. letter still of even date,7 the Secretary General transmitted the
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor. Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by
Memorandum of August 9, 2010,8 also directed the Committee on
DECISION Rules to include it in the Order of Business.

CARPIO MORALES, J.: On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II,
as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,9instructed Atty.
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations,
challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary
Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of
Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent). Business,10 which was complied with by their inclusion in the
Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26,
2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the
Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses complaints to public respondent.11
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective
2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of
of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. October 5, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to Under an Advisory15 issued by the Court, oral arguments were
reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioner’s
respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing
however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.
notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing
petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the
members of public respondent. Court shall first resolve.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari
2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in
in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was
the complaints by public respondent, which assumed exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,16 and that
hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary
whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. investigation.17
Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice
directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days. 13 These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of
Representatives. 18 The argument that impeachment proceedings
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this
September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present wise:
petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or
on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
the issuance of a status quo ante order14 and to require Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while
respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
Comment on the petition provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also
a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it
bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. held that the resolution of whether the House representation in
the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18,
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in
upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is
that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment subject to judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that
of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
perils of judicial willfulness and pride." exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of
the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by
the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of a member of the National Assembly.
of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the power of judicial review. the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
xxxx Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.19 (citations
in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within
omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty
prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction20 of this Court
reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
Government."21 prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one
certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari year.
and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-
within its power to determine whether public respondent And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two
could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim
require corrective measures from the Court. on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec.
1) and of the one-year bar provision(Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Constitution.
Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy
of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.22 Due process of law

Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites Petitioner alleges that public respondent’s chairperson,
for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an
petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo
petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation
remedy in the course of the proceedings before public of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office
the present petition23 on September 13, 2010, it had not gone against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings
beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and
substance of the two complaints. vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the
requisite of ripeness.24 The question of ripeness is especially The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and vindictiveness
relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere
the challenged conduct.25 In the present petition, there is no doubt suspicion of partiality does not suffice.26
that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as
mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell
Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present Telecommunications Phils.27 teaches:
constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.
requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the
commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident JUSTICE MORALES:
therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
resolution or decision.
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then
(interrupted)
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National
Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and
in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x JUSTICE MORALES:
x. 28
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be
not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when deprived of due process of law?
it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the
complaints.29 JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Even petitioner’s counsel conceded during the oral arguments No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a
that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas. client goes with the Ombudsman, which goes with the element of
due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of
JUSTICE CUEVAS: him.

Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to JUSTICE MORALES:

be a respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed. In
addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?
case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness
and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human JUSTICE CUEVAS:
we grant him that benefit.
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
JUSTICE CUEVAS: remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with
particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding
officer of the committee as in this case there were objections The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official
relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
there was objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis. contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The
JUSTICE MORALES: swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be
relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you regular performance of not just one but five state
can cite which makes it mandatory for the chair of the committee prosecutors.32 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for supplied)
violation of a law[?]
Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the
JUSTICE CUEVAS: determination of sufficiency of form and substance was
indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules,
however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioner’s counsel, the
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals
participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an
with the situation whereby with that background as the material or
answer.
pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of
the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing
if the judgment cannot come from an impartial JUSTICE MORALES:
adjudicator.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is
Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to file her
public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form answer (interrupted)
and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it
only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat. lawphi1
JUSTICE CUEVAS:

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se That is correct, Your Honor.
an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department
of Justice31 holds: JUSTICE MORALES:

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the
officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities?
performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be
another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do
statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a determination not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the
that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are
complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
asked, how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer there must be a "verified complaint or resolution,"36 and that the
is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts
(interrupted).33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the committee."37
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress
reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment
particularly Section 534 which denotes that petitioner’s initial Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance
participation in the impeachment proceedings – the opportunity to of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This
file an Answer – starts after the Committee on Justice finds the requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section
complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a
refused to accept petitioner’s motion for reconsideration from its "hearing."38 In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House
finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an
apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules. impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the
impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain Impeachment Rules.
the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the
basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts
Impeachment Rules.35 constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming
the allegations in the complaints.
The claim fails.
This the Court cannot do.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an
impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
Representatives which committed such determinative function to offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature.
exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the
respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively scope of its judicial power[.]"39 Worse, petitioner urges the Court
carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised,
the minimum constitutional guidelines. upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
complaints, which involve matters of defense.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or
process, questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the regulation to become known or obligatory.44 (emphasis supplied)
publication of the Impeachment Rules.
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication,"
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 there is a statutory difference in their usage.
or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the
Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12
published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, times.45 A number of those instances involves the promulgation of
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress,
in two newspapers of general circulation.40 this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
constitutional offices.
Citing Tañada v. Tuvera,41 petitioner contends that she was
deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms
published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
section." concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication."46
Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers
to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar
necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general provision directing Congress to "promulgate its rules for the
circulation."42 canvassing of the certificates" in the presidential and vice
presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May
Public Officers and Investigations43 which held that the 25, 2010, 47 it did not require the publication thereof for its
Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective
procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that upon its adoption.
the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to
effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of In the case of administrative agencies, "promulgation" and
Constitution. "publication" likewise take on different meanings as they are part
of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one
Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as case,48 the publication of implementing rules occurs after their
promulgation or adoption.
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or
obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules
generally understood—that is, to make known. Generalia verba published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the
sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri.
generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the Other than "promulgate," there is no other single formal term in
general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without
clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.49 need of it being published.

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in
"promulgation" to "publication," the former should be understood aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is
to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical
of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly
Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution’s directive,
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada
v. Tuvera.51 Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the
to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a Constitution’s intentions as expressed through the allowance of
specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the
dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the issuances.
Constitution.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado
circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to
rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that fill the gaps in the impeachment process.

x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in
specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to an additional section because, for instance, under Section 3 (2),
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for
On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this
Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE
courts may intervene.50 (italics in the original; emphasis and PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other procedural
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each
Congress.52(emphasis and underscoring supplied) Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the
provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would
circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the
mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in impeachment complaints pending the completion of the
designing even its details. publication requirement.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often the rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing]
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is and in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the
why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that — framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the
procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature,
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. "It is
self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the arise from, procedural laws."54 In the present case, petitioner fails
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely to allege any impairment of vested rights.
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.53 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of
legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved,
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a
does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.55
Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-
executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group,
inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing
doctrine or the parties’ interpretation, its impeachment complaint
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that
the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco58 states that the
witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are it.59 The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must
considered valid and effective.56 (emphasis and underscoring be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It
supplied) refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial
Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the
proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain complaint to the Committee on Justice.
provisions57 of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September
7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas,
present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due S.J. that "no second verified impeachment may be accepted and
process clause. referred to the Committee on Justice for action"60 which
contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint
The one-year bar rule had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted
as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
impeachment proceedings shall be initiatedagainst the same
official more than once within a period of one year." From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th action of said complaint.
Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no
second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
public respondent. and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group third61 of the members of the House of Representatives with the
and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion against the same official within a one year period.62 (emphasis
of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of and underscoring supplied)
The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of
the 12th Congress’ Rules of Procedure in Impeachment the legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we have
Proceedings ─ Sections 1663 and 1764 of Rule V thereof ─ "clearly here Section 3 (4) which reads:
contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term
‘initiate’ a meaning different from filing and referral."65 No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on
the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect,
Commissioner Maambong’s statements66 that the initiation starts disallow one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly to
with the filing of the complaint. revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary
Member.
Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word.
Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look
of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment proceeding.
House’s action on the committee report/resolution is not part of Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where
that initiation phase. we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the
signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the
Commissioner Maambong saw the need "to be very technical Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the
about this,"67 for certain exchanges in the Constitutional Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee
Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions
following exchanges. we would like to be discussed.

MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the
of impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-
the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution. half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature,
and that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House prohibited under Section 3 (4).
is required to initiate proceedings.
Another point, Madam President. x x x68 (emphasis and
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only underscoring supplied)
one-fifth vote of the membership of the Houseis required; for
conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required. An apparent effort to clarify the term "initiate" was made by
Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
xxxx
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?

MR. BENGZON. One-third.

MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House
impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to file the of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are
case before the Senate. with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with
me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of "initiative," we refer here already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on
to the Articles of Impeachment. record.

MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.70 (italics in the original;
when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Impeachment. That is my understanding.69 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied) [II]

Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration
Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two occasions: of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact
[I] formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18,
thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word
committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at
the one approved by the body. least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as
the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned,
the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct
rearranging the words because we have to be very technical filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits
amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco.
keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of
Representatives of the United States Congress. initiation because "something prior to that had already been
done,"73 apparently citing Bernas’ discussion.
Thank you, Madam President.71 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied) The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the
initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained House’s action on the committee report initiates the impeachment
that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step,
referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioner’s
the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the
out the material dates. endorsement by a member of the House – steps done prior to the
filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint,
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the what the Constitution mentions is impeachment "proceedings."
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint"74 to
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the and plural sense.75
Constitution.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick.
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there
within a one-year period.72 (emphasis, italics and underscoring should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that
supplied) once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that
both illusive and illusory. could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House
of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner’s stance impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing
suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint their endorsement.
exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an
exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an
resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the
ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment
the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas’
complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to disquisition76 in Francisco, a proceeding which "takes place not in
naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after the Senate but in the House"77 precedes the bringing of an
diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that
barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and
complaint. absolute control of the House of Representatives.78 Conscious of
the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an
impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other
laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of
without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private
is precisely intended to effectively weed out "worms" in high individual, should own up to its processes.
offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt
birds within the ultra-limited season. The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the
lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise be
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment
of the actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is
who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why
filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the
and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary
process. session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special
operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a
members of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse and patently unconstitutional complaint.
file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same
impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among
they would have already initiated a second impeachment those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any
proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute
second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of rule.79 Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a
motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited
debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the
propriety of the referral.80 With respect to complaints for collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been
impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise
subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer
where official records and further debate show that an through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable
officer has already been referred to the said committee and the But neither does the Court find merit in respondents’ alternative
one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings,
in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await,
proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public
a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the
in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3)
make the proper referral. of all the members of the House.82 To the Reyes group, initiation
means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating Senate.83 To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the
an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Committee on Justice’s recommendation to the House plenary.84
Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment
may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a
by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present
ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within case involving an impeachment proceeding against the
three session days thereafter." Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate
from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the
In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To
discretion on the allegedly "belated" referral of the first change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to
impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents
said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no does not sit well in a court of law.
session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26,
2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et
session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to
2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one
include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue
the said 10-day session period.81 should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of
policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin
moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
(recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining
set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner
of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that
decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases concurred with the Francisco ruling.89Justice Azcuna stated that
on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent undue
yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same or too frequentharassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its
judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a principal task [of] legislation," with main reference to the records
feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:
infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to
precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not
litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest
justice in the courts.85 category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to
do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the
initiated "when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else
to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has but that.90 (underscoring supplied)
already been done. The action of the House is already a further
step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in
the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow."86 only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be
precluded from performing his official functions and duties.
Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding
the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of
complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation
period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the
conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of constitutional provision.
one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for
impeachment or the overriding87 of a contrary resolution (as Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be
espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment
Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),88 or complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13
the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House session days between the date of the filing of the first
plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by impeachment complaint to the date of referral.
respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod
the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year As pointed out during the oral arguments91 by the counsel for
bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of
of steps operating in unison under one proceeding. protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements
or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification
of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely
sufficiency of form and substance – all these must be met before abused its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment
bothering a respondent to answer – already weigh heavily in favor Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.
of an impeachable officer.
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules
Aside from the probability of an early referral and the "to effectively carry out" the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment
11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), Rules, Section 16 of which provides that "the Rules
the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as
after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the
form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioner’s fear, a House."
complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the
stated preliminary requisites. Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the
application of additional adjective rules that Congress may
To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either
the deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough oppression. asserts or rejects two procedural devices.

Petitioner’s claim is based on the premise that the exertion of First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of
time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional to the reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner
number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint or information
arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a
qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on single punishment for various offenses." To petitioner, the two
the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance
the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that
charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
Constitution did not concern themselves with the media tolerance disregarded its own rules.
level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they
deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one
The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her
the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the
should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain
called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that
once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its
import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule. report within the deadline.

Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the "Articles of Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows that an
Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable
one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes offense.
the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure
since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision The second procedural matter deals with the rule on
required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains
grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint
which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as non- against her within one year.
justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that
impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution, Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate
during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that
information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to
impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later
People of the Philippines. on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance,"
and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions 92 outside the when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to
Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the issue. consolidate."95Petitioner’s petition, in fact, initially describes the
Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. consolidation as merely "contemplated."96
13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioner’s case falls under the
exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment – Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion,
removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office – did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to
even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature,
petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing conjectural or anticipatory.97
this issue during the oral arguments.
Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the
Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration. two impeachment complaints were deemedconsolidated,98 her
claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application theory obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint"
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant equation which the Court already brushed aside.
constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests
on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of
determination of which must be made by the House93 which has public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on
yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo
invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010
lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for is LIFTED.
multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an
article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL JOSE CATRAL
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PEREZ MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
CERTIFICATION

(No Part) Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
Associate Justice VELASCO, JR.* reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
Associate Justice writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
TERESITA J. Chief Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
LEONARDO-DE
B. NACHURA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. MARIANO C. DEL

PERALTA CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by
SUPREME COURT the Constitution.
Manila
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the
EN BANC Senate which convened as an impeachment court the following
day, December 14, 2011.
G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner, complaint charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution,
vs. betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT committed as follows:
COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE
SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI ARTICLE I
AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS,
RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD
COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND
FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents. SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE
ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME
RESOLUTION OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF
JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order ARTICLE II
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief
Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE
impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR
House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE
respondent Senate of the Philippines. FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS
STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17,
of the HOR during which a verified complaint for impeachment ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the
Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same 2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI,
day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution that "a public officer
 or employee shall, upon constitutionally-required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of
assumption of office and as often the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and
thereafter as may be required by Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this
law, submit a declaration under acquisition sustained and duly supported by his
oath of his assets, liabilities, and income as a public official? Since his assumption
net worth. In the case of the as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has
President, the Vice-President, the he complied with this duty of public disclosure?
Members of the Cabinet, and other
constitutional offices, and officers ARTICLE III
of the armed forces with general or
flag rank, the declaration shall be RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE
disclosed to the public in the VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR
manner provided by law." BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING
TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3)
to the public his statement of OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES
assets, liabilities, and net worth as THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST
required by the Constitution. BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE,
INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE"
2.3. It is also reported that some of IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT
the properties of Respondent are ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL
not included in his declaration of WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-
his assets, liabilities, and net FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND
worth, in violation of the anti-graft EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN
and corrupt practices act. EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS.
ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF
2.4. Respondent is likewise HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING
suspected and accused of having WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES
accumulated ill-gotten wealth, PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
acquiring assets of high values
and keeping bank accounts with ARTICLE IV
huge deposits. It has been
reported that Respondent has, RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
among others, a 300-sq. meter TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE
apartment in a posh VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN HE
BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE
Mega World Property development at the Fort in OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A
Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY
CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO
OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO- FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN
GUTIERREZ. DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO
ARTICLE V IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC COURT’S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII
TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND
DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND
JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY
NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL
PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ)
PROVINCE. COLLECTIONS.1

ARTICLE VI On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the
"blitzkrieg" fashion by which the impeachment complaint was
signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
to the Senate. Citing previous instances when President Aquino
TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF,
openly expressed his rejection of petitioner’s appointment as
AND TO A COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE
Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO
leadership of petitioner for "derailing his administration’s
IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF
mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him
THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE
was the handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and
OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY
supporters, including"hidden forces" who will be benefited by his
AND JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY REPOSED
ouster. As to the charges against him, petitioner denied the same
BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF
but admitted having once served the Offices of the President and
REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
Vice-President during the term of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the request for courtesy call only
ARTICLE VII to Mr. Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr.
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC Jimenez without prior permission or invitation. Petitioner argued
TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were
GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper.
ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER He prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the
AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO
Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the to prove the allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some
articles of impeachment. properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and
failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in Taguig)
Representatives held a press conference revealing evidence under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner’s alleged failure to
which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. disclose to the public his SALN as required by the Constitution).
The following day, newspapers carried front page reports of high-
priced condominium units and other real properties in Fort On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a
Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, Resolution5 which states:
as disclosed by prosecutors led by respondent Rep. Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. The prosecution told the media that it is possible that IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:
these properties were not included by petitioner in his Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had not been 1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of
made available to the public. Reacting to this media campaign, Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the Articles of
Senators scolded the prosecutors reminding them that under the Impeachment;
Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials3 they are not
allowed to make any public disclosure or comment regarding the
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4
merits of a pending impeachment case.4 By this time, five petitions
of the Articles of Impeachment, with respect to which, this Court
have already been filed with this Court by different individuals
shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on
seeking to enjoin the impeachment trial on grounds of improperly
the nature of any property or asset which may be proven to
verified complaint and lack of due process.
belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided under
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines No. 1379.
acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings
against the petitioner.Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing
SO ORDERED.6
was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk
of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by
the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and submitted the In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the
SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s request for
witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where
previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records Custodian of petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar
Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of Deeds currencies, as follows:
of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds
of Quezon City). WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority
votes to grant the Prosecution’s Requests for Subpoenae to the
In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and
prosecution and defense submitted their respective memoranda Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI), for them to testify and bring
on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged bank
accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the 089-141-00712-9
instant impeachment proceedings, as follows:
089-141-00746-9
a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands,
Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV Building, 6758 089-14100814-5
Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before
the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original 089-121-01195-7
and certified true copies of the account opening
forms/documents for Bank Account no. 1445-8030-61 in
SO ORDERED.8
the name of Renato C. Corona and the bank statements
showing the balances of the said account as of December
31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and
December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the Impeachment
31, 2010. Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid
subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to
testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the
b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized
opening documents for petitioner’salleged foreign currency
representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan
accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the
Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City,
subpoenas including the bank statements showing the year-end
is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on
balances for the said accounts.
February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of
the account opening forms/documents for the following
bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the
Corona, and the documents showing the balances of the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion
said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded
2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010: to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent
Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and
defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the
089-19100037-3
charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from
being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute
089-13100282-6 allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on
suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention
089-121017358 of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to
retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence
089-121019593 under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its
earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing
089-121020122 no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of
evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained
089-121021681 wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process because
first, Art. II does not mention "graft and corruption" or unlawfully as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant
acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is thereto; and
clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft and
corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from "culpable (iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary
violation of the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and (4) injunction permanent.
issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged
bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.9
being the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree")
considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio
violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec.
and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the ground of partiality, citing
8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also
their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the
penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the
fact that they have been openly touted as the likely replacements
following reliefs:
in the event that petitioner is removed from office.10
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No.
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing the Resolution
injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the
and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the
Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation ofResolution
Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, both dated February 6,
dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives
2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
of BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting
the inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the absence of
documents on petitioner’s or his family’s bank accounts;
any applicable compulsory ground and of any voluntary inhibition
and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission of
from the Justices concerned."
evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment
Complaint;
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental
Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is being violated in
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render
the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-
judgment:
Judges have lost the coldneutrality of impartial judges by acting
as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the
void ab initio; Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further called attention to the
fact that despite the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and Resolution which disallowed the introduction of evidence in
admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for
of the Impeachment Complaint; reconsideration would be entertained, "the allies of President
Aquino in the Senate abused their authority and continued their
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s Resolution presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of
dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011 [sic], objection". In view of the persistent efforts of President Aquino’s
Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of Presiding Officer Juan ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is
Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims
paragraph 2.4 of Article II -- for which President Aquino even to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that
thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected,
could not"-- petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the
petition before this Court. impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed
that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti12 filed on behalf issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.
of the respondents, the Solicitor General argues that the instant
petition raises matters purely political in character which may be The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of
decided or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents arising
manifestation that the comment is being filed by the respondents from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for
"without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable alleged violations of right to due process of the person being tried
Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional and by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment
and of Impeachment and Judicial Review

the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the
the case of arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen as creating divisions,
partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with
Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend that to allow a the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more by
public official being impeached to raise before this Court any and the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint demonstrations of innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly
would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that political character, the precise role of the judiciary in
may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure
impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the the effective functioning of the separate branches while
Constitution intended. preserving the structure of checks and balance in our
government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch
Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally
the Impeachment Court did not commit any grave abuse of entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of
discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
judiciously. Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing
impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public
impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the
public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the
of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this United States (US) through the influence of English common law
case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the
from the US Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through the one-year bar provision.
mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he
claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to
complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner determine whether respondents committed a violation of the
likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of
said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or
Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures
during the hearings. from the Court.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in Mootness
the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain
Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with
that do not concern, or allege any violation of, the three express the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority
and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the
power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the
unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening
limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is
judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-
proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC.
sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been
entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and mooted by supervening events and his own acts. 1âwphi1

counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any

semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases
whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is
to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination
a political question that is not within this Court’s power of
thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In such cases,
expanded judicial review.
there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would
be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, petition.19
Jr. v.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on the ground of
Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of judicial review in this MOOTNESS.
jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House
No pronouncement as to costs.
of Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court resolved the
question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two
impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. ESTELA M. PERLAS-
REYES BERNABE
WE CONCUR: Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been

(No Part) TERESITA J. reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
PRESBITERO J. LEONARDO-DE writer of the opinion of the Court.
VELASCO, JR.* CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as
(On leave) DIOSDADO M. amended)
ARTURO D. BRION* PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL
Associate Justice CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL
ROBERTO A. ABAD
PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MARIA LOURDES P.A.

MENDOZA SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice