1.) G.R. No.

200242 July 17, 2012 ARTICLE II

CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner, RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR
vs. BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN
TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES 2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer
(ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required
REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents. by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the
case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and other
RESOLUTION constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law."
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of worth as required by the Constitution.
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief
Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the 2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his
respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt
respondent Senate of the Philippines. practices act.

On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a 2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten
verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It
Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in has been reported that Respondent has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a
session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the posh
Constitution.
Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an constitutionally-required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and
impeachment court the following day, December 14, 2011. Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income
as a public official? Since his assumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable complied with this duty of public disclosure?
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed
as follows: ARTICLE III

ARTICLE I RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR

BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES
BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE,
ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO
JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-
THE PRESENT. FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE
ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE petitioner’s appointment as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of
THE SUPREME COURT. petitioner for "derailing his administration’s mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to
impeach him was the handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and supporters,
ARTICLE IV including"hidden forces" who will be benefited by his ouster. As to the charges against him,
petitioner denied the same but admitted having once served the Offices of the President and
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE Vice-President during the term of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr. Jimenez without prior
AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE CONCERNING THE permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed
IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ. to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the
outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that
the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.
ARTICLE V
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS
conference revealing evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner.
AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA
The following day, newspapers carried front page reports of high-priced condominium units and
IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF
other real properties in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, as
DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.
disclosed by prosecutors led by respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. The prosecution told the
media that it is possible that these properties were not included by petitioner in his Statement of
ARTICLE VI Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had not been made available to the public.
Reacting to this media campaign, Senators scolded the prosecutors reminding them that under
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials they are not allowed to make any public
3

TO A COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY disclosure or comment regarding the merits of a pending impeachment case. By this time, five
4

INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF petitions have already been filed with this Court by different individuals seeking to enjoin the
EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY REPOSED BY impeachment trial on grounds of improperly verified complaint and lack of due process.
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court,
ARTICLE VII commenced trial proceedings against the petitioner.Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing
was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and
A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution witnesses also
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records
THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS Custodian of Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of Deeds of Taguig and
OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).
EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII RESPONDENT In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense
BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN submitted their respective memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present
HE FAILED AND REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND evidence to prove the allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN)
(JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS. 1
and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with
huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2.
On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by which the
2
refers to petitioner’s alleged failure to disclose to the public his SALN as required by the
impeachment complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to Constitution).
the Senate. Citing previous instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution which states:
5
089-13100282-6

IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules: 089-121017358

1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article 089-121019593
II of the Articles of Impeachment;
089-121020122
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment,
with respect to which, this Court shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions 089-121021681
on the nature of any property or asset which may be proven to belong to the Respondent Chief
Justice as provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 089-141-00712-9
1379.
089-141-00746-9
SO ORDERED. 6

089-14100814-5
In a subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the
7

prosecution’s request for subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where petitioner
089-121-01195-7
allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies, as follows:
SO ORDERED. 8

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecution’s
Requests for Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and
Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238)
documents on the alleged bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the seeking to enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the
instant impeachment proceedings, as follows: aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring
the original and certified true copies of the opening documents for petitioner’salleged foreign
currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the
a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th
bank statements showing the year-end balances for the said accounts.
Floor, SGV Building, 6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the
Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the
account opening forms/documents for Bank Account no. 1445-8030-61 in the name of On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed
Renato C. Corona and the bank statements showing the balances of the said account as grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to
of December 31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is
December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010. constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges
discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a "hodge-podge" of multiple
charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on
b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank,
suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling
Katipunan Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to
of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under
bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true
Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a
copies of the account opening forms/documents for the following bank accounts
hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on
allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing the balances of
charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due
the said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009
process because first, Art. II does not mention "graft and corruption" or unlawfully acquired
and December 31, 2010:
wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the
Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from "culpable violation
089-19100037-3
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
of the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due
11

of petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being process is being violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-
the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents Judges have lost the coldneutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner
submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 particularly mentioned Senator-Judge Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the
of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further called attention to the fact that despite the
Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs: Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution which disallowed the introduction of evidence
in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for reconsideration would be
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of entertained, "the allies of President Aquino in the Senate abused their authority and continued
preliminary injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii) their presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of objection". In view of the
implementation ofResolution dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives persistent efforts of President Aquino’s Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of Presiding Officer
of BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting documents on petitioner’s or his Juan Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of Article II
family’s bank accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission of evidence -- for which President Aquino even thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution
on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint; could not"-- petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.

(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment: In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti filed on behalf of the respondents, the
12

Solicitor General argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio; may be decided or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the
comment is being filed by the respondents "without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional and exclusive power of
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on
the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of
paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing the case of
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6
February 2011 [sic], as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and
Nixon v. United States, respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to
13

raise before this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint
(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of
the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for. 9
Constitution intended.

Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not
Sereno on the ground of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside commit any grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings
from the fact that they have been openly touted as the likely replacements in the event that judiciously. Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial
petitioner is removed from office. 10
review defeats the very essence of impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command
of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his assets, liabilities and
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this
implementing the Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment
Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, both dated February 6, 2012. The Court further proceedings, which was initiated and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution,
resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for the inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that the transgressions of
absence of any applicable compulsory ground and of any voluntary inhibition from the Justices impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly
concerned." resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed that the
present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be
dismissed.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. we ruled that the
16

assail matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
for alleged violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee
Impeachment Court. on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two
17

impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the
Impeachment and Judicial Review due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.

Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy," was 14 On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents
foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their
the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would
parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given their concededly political
15 require corrective measures from the Court.
character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost
importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the Mootness
structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by
departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness. more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the
verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is
misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those
impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had
influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution. been mooted by supervening events and his own acts. 1âwphi1

Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such
18

that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which
lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. 19

the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were
apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings. WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s
is DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition
regarding the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are
issues that do not concern, or allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive
constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They
argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may
not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the
proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment
Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors
and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part
of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a
political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.

In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
2.) G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005 The Ombudsman immediately proceeded to the OMB-Visayas office in Cebu City to personally
deal with the office rebellion. Reaching Cebu, the Ombudsman was informed by Petitioner that
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioners, Petitioner wanted to proceed to Manila, apparently because of his alienation and the fear for
vs. reprisal from his alleged lady victims’ husbands. Petitioner in fact already had a ticket for the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE plane leaving two hours later that day. The Ombudsman assented to the quick movement to
VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA, respondents. Manila for Petitioner’s safety and the interest of the Office’s operations. Subsequently, the
Ombudsman installed Assistant Ombudsman Nicanor J. Cruz as the Officer-in-Charge of OMB-
DECISION Visayas.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Acting on the formal complaint against petitioner, the Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation on the matter.
The FFIB, later in its Report, found the evidence against Petitioner strong on the charges of acts
This is a "petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
of extortion, sexual harassment and oppression. The FFIB report was referred by the
alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65" of the
Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers composed of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals of 18 December 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58460
Luzon, The Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.
entitled, Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto,
Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio, Jr. and the Committee of Peers composed of
Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman Rolando Casimiro and Special The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo. solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the
Ombudsman after careful study, and following the established stand of the Office of the
Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of
through impeachment. As succintly (sic) stated by the Ombudsman in his Memorandum dated
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a
March 27, 2000 (in reiteration of the March 13, 2000 Order of Overall Deputy Ombudsman) -
formal complaint2 with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of
allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo
Mojica, committed the following: Acting on your query as to whether or not the Ombudsman confirms or affirms the disapproval
by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., of your recommendation to conduct
instead an investigation of the complaint against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica solely for
1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
the purpose of impeachment, I hereby confirm the action of disapproval.
2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and
xxx
3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the ₱7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas
Moreover, as demonstrated in many previous cases against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C.
employees on the date the said amount was due for release.
Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman Manuel B. Casaclang, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero,
Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo and former Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A.
The complainants further requested that an officer-in-charge from the OMB-Manila be appointed Villa, the official position of the Office is that the Constitution, R.A. 6770 and the Supreme Court
to manage their office to prevent the Deputy Ombudsman from harassing witnesses and in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, 19 May 1988, exclude the Deputy Ombudsman and
wielding his influence over them. To underscore the seriousness of their intentions, they the Special Prosecutor from the list of impeachable officials and the Jarque case involves
threatened to go on a mass leave of absence, and in fact took their cause to the media. 3 Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto as respondent, hence, the mention therein of the Deputy
Ombudsmen is merely an obiter dictum. Two of your present members in fact participated in the
The subsequent events, as stated by the Ombudsman and adopted by the Court of investigation of the previous Mojica cases and thereafter recommended the dismissal thereof for
Appeals,4 are as follows: lack of merit.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

In the same Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Committee of Peers to evaluate the On 10 April 2000, the complainants in OMB-0-00-0615 filed a Motion to Place Respondent
merits of the case and if warranted by evidence, to conduct administrative and criminal Under Preventive Suspension,5 claiming that the offenses for which private respondent Mojica
investigation(s) immediately thereafter. Upon evaluation, the Committee recommended the was charged warranted removal from office, the evidence against him was strong, and that
docketing of the complaint as criminal and administrative cases. The Committee of Peers’ Mojica’s continued stay in office would prejudice the case, as he was harassing some witnesses
Evaluation dated 30 March 2000, stated as follows: and complainants to recant or otherwise desist from pursuing the case.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, duly supported with sworn-statements executed by all On the same date, the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum6 to the COP, directing them to
concerned parties, the undersigned members of the COP find sufficient cause to warrant the conduct administrative proceedings in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 entitled, OMB Visayas Employees
conduct of preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication against Deputy Ombudsman v. Mojica (for dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
Arturo C. Mojica for the following criminal and administrative offenses, namely: interest of the service, and directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of his office), and submit a recommendation on the propriety
I. CRIMINAL of putting Mojica under preventive suspension.

Violation of Section 3, paragraph[s] (b) and (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Subsequently, the COP issued an Order7 in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 finding prima facie evidence
Act); against Mojica and requiring him to submit an answer to the above-mentioned offenses within
ten days, as well as his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence.8
Violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995),
Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition9 for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
II. ADMINISTRATIVE praying that a resolution be issued:

a. Dishonesty 1. . . . issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) upon the filing of the petition to enjoin and
restrain the respondents, (the Ombudsman, the Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, the Committee of
Peers, and the Special Prosecutor) their agents and representatives, from suspending the
b. Grave Misconduct
petitioner (herein private respondent Mojica);
c. Oppression
2. thereafter, converting said TRO into a Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
d. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
3. after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the following acts of the Ombudsman null and
void ab initio:
e. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of his Office; (Section 22, paragraphs (A), (C), (N), (T) and (U), Rule XIV of Executive
a. detailing and assigning indefinitely the petitioner to OMB-Manila "in a [special] capacity," thus
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987".)
effectively demoting/suspending petitioner, and preventing him from preparing his defense;
Accordingly, let the instant case be docketed separately, one for the criminal case and another
b. authorizing or directing the docketing of the complaints against the petitioner, which is
for the administrative case covering all the offenses specified above and, thereafter, a formal
equivalent to authorizing the filing of the administrative and/or criminal cases against the
investigation be simultaneously and jointly conducted by the Committee of Peers, pursuant to
petitioner, who is an impeachable official;
Administrative Order No. 7.
c. denying the request of petitioner for leave of absence, which acts were done without lawful
Accordingly, on 6 April 2000, the Committee of Peers (COP) directed the herein private
authority, in a malevolent and oppressive manner and without jurisdiction.
respondent Mojica in OMB-0-00-0615 entitled, Padua-Varona v. Mojica, for violation of Republic
Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) and Sec. 3, par. (b) and (c) of Rep. Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) to submit his controverting evidence.
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
On 04 May 2000, the Court of Appeals resolved to grant the prayer for Temporary Restraining of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service"15 (OMB-ADM-0-00-0506).
Order and required the Ombudsman to comment and show cause why no writ of preliminary Feeling that this was merely an attempt at circumventing the directives of the Court of Appeals,
injunction should be issued, which reads in part: Mojica filed an urgent motion before the Court of Appeals for respondents to show cause again
why they should not be cited for contempt.
Meanwhile, to maintain the status quo and in order to forestall the petition at bench from
becoming moot and academic, and considering that upon examination of the records we believe By way of opposition, the Ombudsman pointed out that the writ of preliminary injunction issued
that there is an urgent need for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent great by the appellate court was against any action taken in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615 and No. OMB-
and irreparable injury that would result to herein petitioner before the matter could be heard on ADM-0-00-0316, and not against any new cases filed against the private respondent thereafter.
notice, the herein respondents, their agents and representatives acting for and in their behalf or The Ombudsman further pointed out that since Mojica’s term of office had already expired as of
under their authority, are hereby enjoined and restrained from proceeding with the hearing of the 6 July 2000, the private respondent could no longer invoke his alleged immunity from suit.
Motion to Place Respondent Under Preventive Suspension dated April 10, 2000, which hearing
is set on May 9, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon and/or from conducting any further On 14 August 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military issued an order
proceedings relative to the suspension from (o)ffice of the herein petitioner until further order deeming that cases No. OMB-0-00-1050 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 had been deemed
and/or notice from this Court.10 submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence at hand. On 17 August 2000, the private
respondent filed an urgent motion for the immediate issuance of an order enjoining the
Nevertheless, on 6 June 2000, the COP issued an Order11 in both OMB-0-00-0615 and OMB- Ombudsman from taking any further action whatsoever in OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 and OMB-0-00-
ADM-0-00-0316 to the effect that having failed to submit the required counter-affidavits despite 1050.16
the lapse of seventeen days from the expiration of the extended reglementary period for filing the
same, respondent Mojica was deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence. The On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica’s term of office, the
COP thus deemed both criminal and administrative cases submitted for resolution on the basis Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision17 on the grounds of public interest.
of the evidence on record.
In essence, the appellate court held that although the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations
Thus, on 13 June 2000, the private respondent thus filed an urgent motion 12 before the Court of thereon, and the commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an
Appeals to enjoin the Ombudsman from taking any action whatsoever in the criminal and impeachable official, it was nevertheless constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of this
administrative cases aforementioned. The following day, the private respondent filed another Court’s past rulings. Thus, the dispositive portion thereof reads:
urgent motion, this time praying that the Court of Appeals issue an order requiring the
Ombudsman to show cause why it should not be cited for contempt for failing to conform with the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the order of the Committee of Peers in its Evaluation
4 May 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2000 directing the docketing separately of the criminal case as well as the
directed13 the Ombudsman to comment on the above pleadings, and to comply with the former’s administrative case against the petitioner is hereby SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL AND
Temporary Restraining Order of 4 May 2000. VOID. Accordingly, the complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative
Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, respectively, filed against the petitioner are
The parties subsequently exchanged various pleadings that culminated in a Resolution 14 by the hereby DISMISSED. All acts or orders of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman and
Court of Appeals on 5 July 2000 that, among other things, directed the issuance of a writ of the Committee of Peers, subjecting the petitioner [herein private respondent] to criminal and
preliminary injunction enjoining all therein respondents from taking any action whatsoever in administrative investigations, or pursuant to such investigations, are likewise
cases No. OMB-0-00-0615 (criminal) and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 (administrative) against hereby DECLARED INVALID.18
Mojica, and deemed the instant petition submitted for resolution on the merits upon the
submission of the comment or explanation on the appellate court’s show cause Resolution of 20 Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court "a petition
June 2000. for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an
original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules," of the above
Meanwhile, on 19 June 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military directed the decision, on the following grounds:
private respondent Mojica ostensibly to answer a different set of charges for "violation of Art. 266
and Sec. 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019" (OMB-00-0-1050) and for "grave misconduct, gross neglect I
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of
ERRONEOUSLY RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AS THEN DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7)(1) of the Constitution, be members of the
FOR THE VISAYAS, IS AN IMPEACHABLE OFFICIAL, CONSIDERING THAT THE PLAIN Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2],
TEXT OF SEC. 2, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS THE INTENT OF THE Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s
FRAMERS THEREOF, EXCLUDES A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FROM THE LIST OF incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional
IMPEACHABLE OFFICIALS. mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same
II situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article
XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in
THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE MAY NOT BE INVOKED TO relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified
PERPETUATE AN ERRONEOUS OBITER DICTUM. public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be
members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied.)
III
Barely two months later, we issued another Resolution in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales,22 concerning
the same charges for disbarment brought against Justice Fernan, wherein we cited the above
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE
ruling to underscore the principle involved in the case, that "[a] public officer who under the
DISMISSAL OF A CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST A RETIRED DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS
Constitution is required to be a member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held
STILL PENDING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN. 19
by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer."23
At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision solely by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner
In 1995, we subsequently anchored our Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,24 a disbarment case
lodged the present petition "alternatively" as "an original special civil action for certiorari under
against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, on the above ruling, adding that:
Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules."
. . . [T]he court is not here saying that the Ombudsman and other constitutional officers who are
It is settled that the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
required by the Constitution to be members of the Philippine Bar and are remova[ble] only by
under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
impeachment, are immunized from liability possibly for criminal acts or for violation of the Code
Rule 45 is clear that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any
of Professional Responsibility or other claimed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this
there is here a fundamental procedural requirement which must be observed before such liability
Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process
may be determined and enforced. The Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from
over the original case. Under Rule 45, the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from
office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the
notice of judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration.20
1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Ombudsman be thus terminated by impeachment,
he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively – e.g., in disbarment
The records show that following the petitioner’s receipt on 5 January 2001 of a copy the Court of proceedings – for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against him in appropriate
Appeals Decision, it filed the present petition on 16 January 2001, well within the reglementary proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
period so indicated.
Finally, in Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator
We go now into the substantive aspect of this case, where we are presented an attack upon a Labella,25 the Court, citing its Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,26 dismissed, in a minute
prior interpretation of Article XI, Sec. 2 in relation to Article XI, Sec. 8 of our Constitution. resolution, the complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent Mojica in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, stating that:
The interpretation in question first appears in Cuenco v. Fernan,21 a disbarment case against
then Associate Justice Marcelo Fernan filed by Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former member of the Anent the complaint for disbarment against respondent Arturo C. Mojica in his capacity as
House of Representatives, where we held in part: Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, suffice it to state that a public officer whose membership in the

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office held by him and removable only by impeachment Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies," who will guard the
cannot be charged with disbarment during his membership (In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, 160 SCRA guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a
771, 774 [1988]; Cuenco vs. Fernan, 158 SCRA 29, 40 [1988]). And we have held in the case constitutional commission is also removable only by impeachment.
of Jarque vs. Desierto (A.C. No. 4509, En Banc Resolution December 5, 1995), that the
Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via impeachment before they may MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.
be held to answer for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against them in
disbarment proceedings. MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?

The above Resolution was subsequently made the basis of the appellate court’s assailed MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.
Decision of 18 December 2000. Thus, in holding that a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer, the appellate court stated that it had to "defer to the loftier principle of adherence to
MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank
judicial precedents, otherwise known as the doctrine of Stare Decisis.... necessary for the
of." We know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the
uniformity and continuity of the law and also to give stability to society." 27
Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify
that also and read our discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the
Nevertheless, the court a quo took pains to point out that the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations Committee.
thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman
is not an impeachable officer.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. If I may just comment: the Ombudsman in this provision is a rank in itself
really. That is how we look at it. But for purposes of government classification and salary, we
Is the Deputy Ombudsman, then, an impeachable officer? Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 thought we have to give him a recognizable or an existing rank as a point of reference more than
Constitution, states that: anything else.

Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of MR. REGALADO. Yes, but my concern is whether or not he is removable only by impeachment,
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on because Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officials, and it does not mention public officers
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft with the rank of constitutional commissioners.
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
MR. ROMULO. But we do mention them as the Ombudsman is mentioned in that
enumeration. We used the word "Ombudsman" because we would like it to be his title; we do not
To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or to an want him called "Chairman" or "Justice." We want him called Ombudsman.
office, reference was made by the appellate court to the Records of the Constitutional
Commission, as well as to the opinions of leading commentators in constitutional law. Thus:
...
. . . It appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference only to
(Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 26, 1986, pp. 273-274)
the Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies. The pertinent portions of the record
read, to wit:
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist.
...
On lines 13 and 14, I move for the deletion of the words "and the Ombudsman." The
Ombudsman should not be placed on the level of the President and the Vice-President, the
MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you.
members of the judiciary and the members of the Constitutional Commissions in the matter of
removal from office.
On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by Commissioner
Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because he is
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
something like a guardian of the government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized. MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?

MR. MONSOD. We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we feel that the THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
Ombudsman is at least on the same level as the Constitutional Commissioners and this is one
way of insulating it from politics. MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman removable only by MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
impeachment would be to enshrine and install an officer whose functions are not as delicate as
the others whom we wanted to protect from immediate removal by way of an impeachment. MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.

MR. MONSOD. We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work well, could be MR. MONSOD. No.
stepping on a lot of toes. We would really prefer to keep him there but we would like the body to
vote on it, although I would like to ask if we still have a quorum, Madam President.
...
THE PRESIDENT. Do we have a quorum? There are members who are in the lounge.
(Ibid., p. 305, emphasis supplied)
The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the Commissioners present.
Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal
luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is
THE PRESIDENT. We have a quorum. impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2,
Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his
MR. MONSOD. May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of those who were not deputies, is impeachable. Foremost among them is the erudite Justice Isagani A. Cruz (ret.),
here a few minutes ago. who opined:

MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that amendment was The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members
already covered in the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo. One of those amendments of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
proposed by Commissioner Rodrigo was to delete the word "Ombudsman" and, therefore, we (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative
have already voted on it. enactment. The power to impeach is essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be
exercised by the Congress only within the limits of the authority conferred upon it by the
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, may I comment on that. Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the grantee itself even if motivated by the
desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of the government.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, the Gentleman may proceed.
It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that justices of the Sandiganbayan may be
MR. DAVIDE. The proposed amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo was the total deletion of the removed only through process of impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw them
Office of the Ombudsman and all sections relating to it. It was rejected by the body and, from the removal power of the Supreme Court. This prohibition is of dubious constitutionality. In
therefore, we can have individual amendments now on the particular sections. the first place, the list of impeachable officers is covered by the maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Secondly, Article VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution states that all judges of
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include inferior courts – and this would include the Sandiganbayan – are under the disciplinary power of
the Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only on the Supreme Court and may be removed by it. This view is bolstered by the last sentence of
impeachment. Is that right? Article XI, Section 2, which runs in full as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of of obiter dictum, that as with members of this Court, the officers so enumerated were also
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on constitutionally required to be members of the bar.
impeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Cruz, made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the
Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., pp. 333-334) doctrine of stare decisis.31

Equally worth noting is the opinion of no less than Rev. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself who The legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (follow past precedents and do not disturb
was a member of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, (who) what has been settled) states that where the same questions relating to the same event have
asserted: been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.32
Q. Is the list of officers subject to impeachment found in Section 2 exclusive?
The succeeding cases of In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the
A. As presently worded, yes. impeachability of a Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu
v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously mentioned, is
(Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution, A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. a minute resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent
401) on the basis of the questioned obiter in Cuenco v. Fernan and the succeeding cases without
going into the merits.
Last but certainly not the least is the equally erudite Representative Antonio B. Nachura himself,
who, as a professor of law, commented that the enumeration of impeachable officers in Section Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon
2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, is exclusive. (Nachura, Antonio B., Outline/Reviewer in by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the
Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 192)28 question presented.33

From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that, as enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be
1987 Constitution, only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the
the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the petitioner.
Ombudsman.29
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses
How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited in In Re: Raul which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.34 Hence, the
M. Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep. Ombudsman Mojica and moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability,
Graft Investigator Labella? By way of reiteration, said Resolution reads in part: there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.35

. . . To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have
mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 1236 and 1337 of the Anti-Graft and
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of the Constitution. Precisely the same Corrupt Practices Act.
situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article
XI [2]), . . . all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2000 is hereby
Bar.30 (Emphasis supplied) REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and
Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 are hereby REINSTATED and the Office of the
In cross-referencing Sec. 2, which is an enumeration of impeachable officers, with Sec. 8, which Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases.
lists the qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
3.) G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, x---------------------------------------------------------x
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
x---------------------------------------------------------x REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003 WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN,
MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON- GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR
ABAD, petitioners, ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in- CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-
intervention, HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in- JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA
intervention, CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO
vs. RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR
OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR.,
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA,
GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL
x---------------------------------------------------------x ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-
intervention,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
vs.
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003 ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA,
EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners, RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in- WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, intervention,
vs. vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x

x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003 PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners, HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in- HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
intervention, SENATE, respondents.

vs. x---------------------------------------------------------x
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER
OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
x---------------------------------------------------------x THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003 FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON x---------------------------------------------------------x
MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO,
EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY vs.
EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE x---------------------------------------------------------x
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
x---------------------------------------------------------x vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003 OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
vs. VENECIA, respondents.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x

x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003 VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND
ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN DRILON, respondents.
B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES
AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE x---------------------------------------------------------x
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs. G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO
FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT
x---------------------------------------------------------x
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
x---------------------------------------------------------x
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
vs. REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003 nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence
to, not departure from, the Constitution.
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M.
MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the
ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be
JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE
NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a
vs. relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people.
AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

CARPIO MORALES, J.: Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and ARTICLE XI
seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent
branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers
Accountability of Public Officers
where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy
from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
not by impeachment.
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a
political crisis of conscience.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

 thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, RULE II RULE V
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
session days from receipt thereof. Section 2. Mode of Initiating AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Impeachment. – Impeachment
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either shall be initiated only by a verified Section 16. – Impeachment
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or complaint for impeachment filed by Proceedings Deemed
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. any Member of the House of Initiated. – In cases where a
Representatives or by any citizen Member of the House files a
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one- upon a resolution of endorsement verified complaint of impeachment
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of by any Member thereof or by a or a citizen files a verified
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. verified complaint or resolution of complaint that is endorsed by a
impeachment filed by at least one- Member of the House through a
third (1/3) of all the Members of the resolution of endorsement against
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than House. an impeachable officer,
once within a period of one year. impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. on the day the Committee on
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the Justice finds that the verified
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall complaint and/or resolution
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two- against such official, as the case
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. may be, is sufficient in substance,
or on the date the House votes to
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office overturn or affirm the finding of
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party the said Committee that the
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment verified complaint and/or
according to law. resolution, as the case may be, is
not sufficient in substance.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the impeachment is filed or endorsed,
House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment as the case may be, by at least
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous one-third (1/3) of the Members of
House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between the House, impeachment
these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation: proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES resolution of impeachment with

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

 insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
the Secretary General.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Initiation Of Impeachment Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a period of legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
one (1) year from the date complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings are one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
impeachment proceedings shall be deemed initiated as provided in
initiated against the same official Section 16 hereof, no Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
more than once within the period of impeachment proceedings, as petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
one (1) year. such, can be initiated against the violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
same official. (Italics in the proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
original; emphasis and year."
underscoring supplied)
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
2 member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." 3 and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first
the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5)
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of
on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers,
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment trial.
complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the
taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr.
petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III
PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional. Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the
legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition
for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens,
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray
M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent
therefrom be declared null and void. House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the
protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate
and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors
and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint. In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for
Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of
Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections
16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that
Impeachment be declared null and void. as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate
in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum, 19 and as
impeachment complaint be declared null and void. reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug
Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction"
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void. Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28,
2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at
in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and
Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from moot.
conducting any proceedings thereon.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin
resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a
that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
impeachment trial. petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Constitution."22
the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate
November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional. them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not
later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on 5, 2003.
October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M.
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
the judiciary. petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute
itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment,
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it proceedings in the House of Representatives.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution
issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant
Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination. the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the
threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise
No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining.
Petition in Intervention." These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Judicial Review
Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310. determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted. Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo courts as may be established by law.
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3,
2003, to wit: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
this time. government. (Emphasis supplied)

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up: Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P.
Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the
a) locus standi of petitioners; 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present
provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness); discoursed:

c) political question/justiciability; x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment; conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their
Article XI of the Constitution; and
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to are legally demandable and enforceable."26
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights Marshall, to wit:
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has have that rank.
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for supplied)
the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
Code, to wit:
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency shall be void and the latter shall govern.
of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release
workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of
the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial martial law regime. x x x
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition xxx
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
the judiciary in that balancing operation."34 offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored pass judgment on matters of this nature.
in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion: This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
xxx matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
may be established by law. construction.

I suppose nobody can question it. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain. Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government. the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise: one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to expounded:
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared: proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof. 46 (Emphasis
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared: application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review. 47
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings.
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
impeachment proceedings.49 Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one
scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case
of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise of judicial willfulness and pride."56
point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review
in cases of impeachment. But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for
power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support
restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings. legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well
of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord." justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to constitutional questions.69
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled
that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not
whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly
contends.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases
another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
by the Constitution. government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to
distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original) brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
Standing the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

 adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
xxx vested by the Constitution in his office.83

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the mere
the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted) invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues
personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the issues presented by it.
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned 87 to enable the court
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court. to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
stand.
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
personal interest.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive:
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.80 In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. 91 Such liberality
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter
that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it
of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
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not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he
allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing. asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92 COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise
the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to
Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention. any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to
clothe him with standing.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to
join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging Ripeness and Prematurity
that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
complied with. considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture." 96 Only
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in
160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans an appropriate legal proceeding.
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to
raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution. impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed
al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted. and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of
making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be
the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against Senate should first be exhausted.
which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial
issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to
stated, allowed to argue. this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion,
The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review
Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss. and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional
infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature
Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries. holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its
decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all,
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And
Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on
the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness the Judiciary.
on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as
said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
Justiciability may be established by law.

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term I suppose nobody can question it.
"political question," viz:
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. 101 Even in release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect
the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to
doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
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 thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void.
with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question
lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The xxx
obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast
law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court
fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum.
under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had
not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members
I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very
own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was
taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was
which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern.
The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was
on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word clearly justiciable.
famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft
of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang xxx
felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed
supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
"citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There
questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a
that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as
referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is
was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in dignity."
the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister
of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that xxx
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice. FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme
Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government question doctrine?
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or
so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,
such matters constitute a political question. amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis with the political question doctrine.
supplied)
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further
clarified the concept of judicial power, thus: When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be areas.
created by law.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. political question doctrine.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example? MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. 104 (Emphasis supplied)
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference. From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature. government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly
political following the effectivity of the present Constitution. Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held: judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These
standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would
have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review
is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
declared:
constitutional issue.
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
And in Daza v. Singson, 109
speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated
non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker
v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

 IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
the Constitution. such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of
of the Constitution. the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this
Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and
this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
Constitutional Commission.113 impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome
of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon
two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to
power under Section 1, Article VIII. likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c)
Lis Mota a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on
the independence of the judiciary.121
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this
Commission on Elections,115 this Court held: Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry
is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general,
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied] En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already
been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this
Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
violative of due process, to wit: conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

 The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
respected. days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3
that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who
right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123 signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions
of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the
afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have
of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that: joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute
Fuentebella x x x"124 the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely
endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having Judicial Restraint
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should
have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate,
Article XI of the Constitution, viz: sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no
Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of less than the fundamental law.
the House of Representatives are subject to them.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty." fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators,
singly and collectively.
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What
to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
[his] office."130 valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators- Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them,
Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his
sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held: court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial
power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

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Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its 7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
power of judicial review. doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of may be avoided (citations omitted).
limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows: The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from
different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non- categories:
adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital 1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the 2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
constitutionality of the legislative act.' case

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the 3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.' 4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.' 5. that the parties are not in estoppel

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by 6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
judicial review:
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an 1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
independent state ground.
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is direct injury as a result of its enforcement
more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or
property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance 3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed
the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth 4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the
federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
behalf of all its citizens. possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing
who has availed himself of its benefits. and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against for Impeachment Proceedings
Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and adopted by the 12th Congress
faith in the judiciary.
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of
General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis. exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file"
because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act. in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3)
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives,
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138 The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were
not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims," 140 the pre- That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz
existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of
martial law regime. "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado)
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November
the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3)
branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141 Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted
beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles
exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments
system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation
it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules
Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have
vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just
initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation want to indicate this on record.
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after
actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) xxx

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records: Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the United States regarding impeachment.
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action. I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on
page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action,
calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
and judgment by the Senate. Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
xxx Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam
on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that
the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the
approved by the body. Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting
in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third
is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case"
3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145 before the Senate as impeachment court.

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving. proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz: initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
xxx House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
in the present Constitution.
once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning
in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people,
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists
"impeachment proceeding."
of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of
or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a Section 3. (1) x x x
one year period.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary- House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of session days from receipt thereof.
Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because once within a period of one year.
of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the
Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly
records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be
and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method
of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia,
said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz: he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the
validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non- Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by
if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators. relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did
not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view separation of powers.154
the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held: xxx

"x x x In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules: there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This
Rule XV power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It
was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution.
The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
Legislative departments of government.155
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as
xxx
to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or
clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it being elected by the people.156
is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one xxx
has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
challenge of any other body or tribunal." or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
xxx verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as from "filing."
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present. Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in
the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by one-year period.
undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of Conclusion
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our
parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved. characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the
seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience.
that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe
Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
"the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets
It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the
kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non- fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by
interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non- the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of
justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire
a bearing on the impeachment proceedings. institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on. than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in
life.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by
fact and in law. this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted
to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found
the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of and aggression upon each other.
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
rule of law. G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is
that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been
entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

4.) G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011 Congress. By letter still of even date,7 the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s
complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, 8 also directed the
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS- On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the
BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, Committee on Rules,9 instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for
JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to
MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, include the two complaints in the Order of Business,10 which was complied with by their inclusion
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.
OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S
LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.11
(COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
(LFS), Respondents. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor. sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same
time.
DECISION
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was
CARPIO MORALES, J.: published on September 2, 2010.

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010
prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for
Committee on Justice (public respondent). prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the
complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in public respondent.
accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private
respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints,
(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint1 against petitioner, upon the endorsement of which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient in
Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.2 substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public
respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days. 13
House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.3 who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.4 Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner
filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo
Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another ante order14 and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court
impeachment complaint5 against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General
Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition
Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.6 On even date, the House of Representatives
provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils
complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective of judicial willfulness and pride."
Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010. matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for
Under an Advisory15 issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
2010, followed by petitioner’s filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by
the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period. xxxx

The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review
over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
discretionary in nature,16 and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
investigation.17 justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. 18 The to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
argument that impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
in this wise: congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the
House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review.
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.19 (citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari Petitioner alleges that public respondent’s chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep.
jurisdiction20 of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there has Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
branch or instrumentality of the Government."21 Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against
Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and
special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well- substance of the complaints against her.
within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution
or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being
translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. 26
Court.
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.27 teaches:
simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will. 22
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein.
review, as they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
present petition23 on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of ripeness. 24 The question of alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. 28

ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the
challenged conduct.25 In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely
the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the
mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House complaints.29
(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
Even petitioner’s counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have
acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one JUSTICE CUEVAS:
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of
one year.
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges
that the Ombudsman filed. In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public respondent case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.
assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due
process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the
JUSTICE MORALES:
Constitution.
Is he a one-man committee?
Due process of law
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
JUSTICE CUEVAS: there was objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a
constitutional crisis.
He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.
JUSTICE MORALES:
JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith? mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable
for violation of a law[?]
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with
JUSTICE MORALES: that background as the material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the
right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot
come from an impartial adjudicator.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that
mean that your client will be deprived of due process of law?
Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public respondent in finding the
two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.lawphi1

No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman,
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however.
which goes with the element of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of
So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice31 holds:
him.
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be
JUSTICE MORALES:
instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be
another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee? constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

JUSTICE CUEVAS: The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work.
Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory
That is correct, Your Honor. evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to
discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as
JUSTICE MORALES: shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five
state prosecutors.32 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?
Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and
JUSTICE CUEVAS: substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in
fact, conceded by petitioner’s counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in filing of an answer.
this case there were objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard,
JUSTICE MORALES:

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible
substance before she is asked to file her answer (interrupted) standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are
clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified
JUSTICE CUEVAS: complaint or resolution,"36 and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee." 37
That is correct, Your Honor.
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
JUSTICE MORALES: sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This
requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing."38 In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and
House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint
related irregularities?
is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in
the Impeachment Rules.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
only after a determination that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint
may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be asked, how is not your action premature,
This the Court cannot do.
Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is
(interrupted).33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the
at the Committee-level, particularly Section 534 which denotes that petitioner’s initial participation
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
in the impeachment proceedings – the opportunity to file an Answer – starts after the Committee
decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to
power[.]"39 Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain
accept petitioner’s motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the
grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which
impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
involve matters of defense.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or,
substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own
more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.
Impeachment Rules.35
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public
The claim fails.
respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter
published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.40
exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the
Citing Tañada v. Tuvera,41 petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the
discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential
ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section
considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to
3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on
effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
constitutional guidelines.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the
any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. 49
circulation."42
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of
Investigations43 which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way
procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the
intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
of Constitution.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no
position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of
announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for
law or regulation to become known or obligatory.44 (emphasis supplied) Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that

While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
their usage. of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in
The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times.45 A number of those instances the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how
involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices. that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the them, before the courts may intervene.50 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement supplied; citations omitted)
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably
required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated
concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri.
filing and publication."46 Other than "promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the English language to
appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to
"promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates" in the presidential and vice IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section
presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is
2010 national elections on May 25, 2010,47 it did not require the publication thereof for its a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is
effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption. that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987
Constitution’s directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v.
In the case of administrative agencies, "promulgation" and "publication" likewise take on different Tuvera.51 Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor
meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as expressed through the allowance of
case,48 the publication of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption. either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to
make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would
House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process. already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the
completion of the publication requirement.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because,
for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is
impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no
impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on
that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in
harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In
as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the
EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other procedural power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed
requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.52 (emphasis and underscoring purpose.
supplied)
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may
Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment be given retroactive application to pending actions. "It is axiomatic that the retroactive application
mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details. of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws."54 In the present case, petitioner fails
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate to allege any impairment of vested rights.
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.55
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has and void in its entirety. Rather,
always been, that —
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature proceedings are considered valid and effective.56 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.53 (emphasis and underscoring availed of and invoked certain provisions57 of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September
supplied) 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus
finds no violation of the due process clause.
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings
taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant The one-year bar rule
self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment
complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress’ Rules of
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings ─ Sections 1663 and 1764 of Rule V thereof ─ "clearly
period of one year." contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term ‘initiate’ a meaning different
from filing and referral."65
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint
against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the
Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambong’s statements66 that the
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.

On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong
submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the was all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the
referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the House’s action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase.
initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal
of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, Commissioner Maambong saw the need "to be very technical about this,"67 for certain exchanges
essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties’ interpretation, its in the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following
impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny. exchanges.

Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco58 states that the term "initiate" means to file the MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment
complaint and take initial action on it.59 The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935
which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of Constitution.
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The
initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate
Committee on Justice. proceedings.

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the
impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action" 60 which membership of the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is
contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. required.
Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of
initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
xxxx
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of
report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
period of one year.
the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
third61 of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an
one year period.62 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) ordinary Member.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears
liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the Committee to report, submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and
whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves
the questions we would like to be discussed. or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are
overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4). proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on
record.
Another point, Madam President. x x x68 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.70 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An apparent effort to clarify the term "initiate" was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
[II]
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3
MR. BENGZON. One-third. (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the
exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to
convict. To impeach means to file the case before the Senate.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of "initiative," we refer here to the Articles of
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase
Impeachment.
WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word
"by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding.69 (emphasis and impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
underscoring supplied) shall be recorded."

Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives
delivered on at least two occasions: of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
[I] words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with
the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure,
as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And Thank you, Madam President.71 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by the body. To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and
Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
be any clearer in pointing out the material dates. longer rekindle the candle.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner’s stance suggests that whoever files the
the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective
complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix from filing an impeachment complaint.
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its
officer within a one-year period.72 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without
seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed
These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was out "worms" in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the
considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of ultra-limited season.
initiation because "something prior to that had already been done,"73 apparently citing Bernas’
discussion. Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants,
injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always
The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism. unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted
from directly participating in the impeachment process.
What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the House’s action on the committee
report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of
absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the
verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps done prior to same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have already
the filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a
second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment
Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of
impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint"74 to the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment
denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.
construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.75
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is been initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment
the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas’ disquisition76 in Francisco, a proceeding which
impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, "takes place not in the Senate but in the House"77 precedes the bringing of an impeachment case
however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is
wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With within the sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives. 78 Conscious of the legal
a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide
candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an
individual, should own up to its processes. impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an
impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the lips of the House Secretary
General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment But neither does the Court find merit in respondents’ alternative contention that the initiation of
complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await,
alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of
House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of
its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against all the members of the House.82 To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the
the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.83 To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the
complaint. Committee on Justice’s recommendation to the House plenary.84

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in
decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present
rule.79 Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for
to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment
the referral.80 With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other
refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a
and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable court of law.
officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet
expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine,
impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one
deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
session days within which to make the proper referral. manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding Nature of the Judicial Process:
deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter." decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case
was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment
In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my
"belated" referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent
said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed
only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10- administration of justice in the courts.85
day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte
directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House
within the said 10-day session period.81 deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint
filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and triggers the series of steps that follow."86

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act of referral allows the Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a
unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the
period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and
until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioner’s fear, a
for impeachment or the overriding87 of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.
or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), 88 or the
Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad
recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod publicity are enough oppression.
the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too
loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding. Petitioner’s claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources
runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend
proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on
concurred with the Francisco ruling.89 Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable
is two-fold: "to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the
principal task [of] legislation," with main reference to the records of the Constitutional charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern
Commission, that reads: themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when
they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such
who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to
body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This
allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.
nothing else but that.90 (underscoring supplied)
Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element
of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.
functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as
not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" the provisions of
in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment
constitutional provision. Rules, Section 16 of which provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of
Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House."
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of
multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective
days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral. rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts
or rejects two procedural devices.
As pointed out during the oral arguments91 by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the
framework of privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the
requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint, Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on
endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance – all these Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense,
must be met before bothering a respondent to answer – already weigh heavily in favor of an except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." To petitioner, the two
impeachable officer. impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its
respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules. chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to
consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will
her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate." 95 Petitioner’s
process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated." 96
functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report
within the deadline. Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation,
the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature,
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment conjectural or anticipatory.97
complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the
application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two impeachment complaints
defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the were deemed consolidated,98 her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s
grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor theory obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already
also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a brushed aside.
political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the
complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and
complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines. September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions92 outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure 14, 2010 is LIFTED
that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if
Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioner’s case falls under the exception since
impeachment prescribes a single punishment – removal from office and disqualification to hold
any public office – even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner
concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.

Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the
Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application of
the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the
House93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of
that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution
allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an
article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment." 94 It,
therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation,
petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her
within one year.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

5.) A.M. No. 3135 February 17, 1988 petitions, having emanated from a common source and being closely interrelated, were
subsequently consolidated.
MIGUEL CUENCO, complainant,
vs. On 23 July 1987, the Third Division of the Court, through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
HON. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondent. rendered a Decision in the consolidated petitions, the dispositive portion of which reads:

RESOLUTION WHEREFORE, —

(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24,
1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito
PER CURIAM: Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being
In a sworn complaint dated 10 October 1987, complainant Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former NULL and VOID;
Member of the Philippine House of Representatives from the province of Cebu prayed for
judgment ordering the disbarment of Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Chairman of the Third (2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver document
Division of this Court. valid is hereby SET ASIDE;

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows: (3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering the inhibition of
On 13 March 1952, Vito Borromeo died without any forced heirs, but leaving behind extensive Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special Proceedings No. 916-R
properties situated in the province of Cebu. On 19 April 1952, a Petition for probate (docketed as is declared moot and academic. The judge who has taken over the sala of retired
Special Proceedings No. 916-R) of a one-page document — purportedly the last will and Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall immediately conduct hearings with a view to
testament of the decedent — was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. Those terminating the proceedings. In the event that the successor-judge is likewise
instituted under said will as the sole heirs of the late Vito Borromeo were Fortunate, Tomas and disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing the Executive
Amelia, an surnamed Borromeo. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall be
implemented;
On 28 May 1960, the probate court rendered a Decision declaring the will to be a forgery. That
decision became final in 1967 after being affirmed by this Court in Testate Estate of Vito (4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The issue seeking to
Borromeo Jose H. Junquera vs. Crispin Borromeo, et al., 19 SCRA 656 [1967]. In the intestacy restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is
proceedings that ensued, nine (9) individuals were declared by the trial court as the rightful MOOT and ACADEMIC;
successors to the decedent Vito Borromeo's estate.
(5) In G.R. No.62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily terminate and
During the course of the intestacy proceedings, several petitions were filed with this Court by the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an inventory
parties involved therein. These petitions are: G.R. No. L-41171 (entitled "Intestate Estate of the of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank
Late Vito Borromeo. Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera v. Fortunato Borromeo, et al. G.R. No. deposits by the petitioner-administrator of the estate as required by this Court in
55000 (entitled "In the Matter of the Estate of Vito Borromeo, Deceased. Pilar N. Borromeo, et al. its Resolution dated June 15, 1983; and
v. Fortunate Borromeo"); G.R. No. 62895 (entitled 'Jose Cuenco Borromeo v. Court of Appeals,
et al. G.R. No. 63818 (entitled 'Domingo Antigua, et al. v. Court of appeals, et al."); and G.R. No. (6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the market
65995 (entitled "Petra Borromeo, et al. v. Francisco P. Burgos, etc., et al."). These five (5) value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be,
as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees
who individually hired them, attorney's fees according to the nature of the
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 services rendered but in amounts which should not exceed more than 20% of the of Miguel Cuenco's attorney's fees for his services rendered to the Vito Borromeo
market value of the property the latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries. Estate.

SO ORDERED. 5. That Mr. Justice Fernan's strong and unyielding determination to collect big
sums of money in payment of his legal services rendered to his clients' had
In a Manifestation dated 22 August 1987 and filed with this Court on 24 August 1987, induced the Honorable Justice, as Chairman of the Court's Third Division, to
complainant Cuenco requested that he be given until 22 September 1987 within which to file a unduly influence the Members thereof into dismissing Atty. Cuenco complaint
motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision in the consolidated petitions. This (Administrative Matter No. R-593-RTJ) against Judge Francisco P. Burgos, then
request was granted by the Court's Third Division in a resolution issued on 16 September 1987 the trial judge in the intestacy proceedings, thereby resurrecting the claim of the
with the Warning, however, that no further extensions of time would be allowed. Complainant's three (3) instituted heirs over the thirteen (13) commercial lots subject of Civil
formal Motion for Reconsideration was posted only on 28 September 1987. Case No. R-7646; and

Meanwhile, on 19 November 1987, the Court, sitting en banc resolved, among other things, to 6. That Mr. Justice Fernan "had wilfully, persistently, stubbornly and
dismiss for lack of merit Administrative Matter No. R-593-RTJ and Administrative Matter No. R- systematically violated his Oath of Office as a lawyer which imposes upon him
672-RTJ, filed by complainant Cuenco and Numeriano E. Estenzo, respectively, against Judge the duty not to delay any man for money or malice."
Francisco P. Burgos, the former trial judge at the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings.
We find complainant's charges against Mr. Justice Fernan completely unsupported by the facts
Complainant Cuenco, who had represented a group of heirs in the Vito Borromeo intestate and evidence of record.
estate proceedings, makes the following allegations in his complaint for disbarment
1. We have found nothing in the record of the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings — and
1. That Mr. Justice Fernan, in Civil Case No. R-7646 filed with Branch III of the complainant Cuenco has failed to point to anything therein — to indicate that Mr. Justice Fernan
then Court of First Instance of Cebu, appeared as counsel for the three (3) had appeared as counsel in such proceedings representation of instituted heir and claimant
instituted heirs (i.e., Fortunato, Tomas and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo) and Fortunato Borromeo, who was represented in those proceedings, as early as 19 January 1953,
despite having already accepted his appointment as an Associate Justice of the by Atty. Juan Legarte Sanchez. Mr. Justice Fernan did enter his appearance on 7 August 1965
Court, "continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs;' as counsel, in collaboration with Atty. Crispin Baizas, for claimants Tomas and Amelia Borromeo
in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The record, however, reveals that Mr. Justice Fernan
1

2. That Mr. Justice Fernan "had exerted personal efforts to take away from the withdrew as such counsel as early as 19 February 1968. The records of this case are bereft of
2

Supreme Court en banc, the First and Second Divisions of the Tribunal, the Vito any suggestion that Mr. Justice Fernan had represented any of these instituted heirs in any other
Borromeo proceedings to his Office as Chairman of the Third Division to enable case or proceeding arising from or related to Special Proceedings No. 916-R. Complainant
him to influence the decision or the outcome of the Vito Borromeo proceedings " Cuenco has submitted nothing at all to support his accusation that Mr. Justice Fernan
"continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs." It is entirely clear that Mr. Justice Fernan's
professional involvement in Special Proceedings No. 916-R had ceased long before his
3. That Mr. Justice Fernan "has operated his Office in Cebu City as a Star
appointment to this Court in April of 1986.
Chamber to fabricate fake and fictitious heirs of Vito Borromeo," an action which
will not only dilute and diminish the distributive shares of complainant's clients,
but "will prolong indefinitely the agony of Miguel Cuenco and Judge Fernando 2. Prior to the appointment of Mr. Justice Fernan to the Court, the aforementioned five (5)
Ruiz to have their attorney's fees paid;" consolidated petitions had already been assigned for preliminary study to Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., the ponente of the disputed Decision in G.R. Nos. L-41171, 55000, 62895, 63818
and 65995 and a Member then of the Court's First Division. The subsequent designation of Mr.
4. That Mr. Justice Fernan has 'practically abolished and crippled the legitimate
Justice Fernan as Chairman of the Court's Third Division and the assignment of Mr. Justice
functions of the Court of Appeals in CA. G.R. No. 08093, knowingly (sic) that the
Gutierrez along with three other Members of the Court to said Third Division, after the 1987
claims for attorney's fees of movant Miguel Cuenco and Judge Fernando Ruiz
Constitution went into effect, were determined and carried out by the Chief Justice in accordance
are pending in the Court of Appeals,' thereby 'render[ing] impossible the payment
with the time-honored procedures followed by the Court in those matters and were, thus,

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

circumstances of pure coincidence. Mr. Justice Gutierrez brought the Vito Borromeo estate ... The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired
cases (and all other pending cases previously assigned to him) along with him to the Third them, attorney's fees according to the nature of the services rendered but in
Division of the Court when the third Division was organized in accordance with procedures amounts which should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the
agreed upon by the Court en banc. Mr. Justice Fernan inhibited himself from participating in the property the latter acquired from the state as beneficiaries.
deliberations on the Vito Borromeo estate cases and, in fact, did not take part in the resolution
thereof; this was made explicit by the annotation appearing beside his signature: "No part — I It is evident that the "legitimate functions" of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 08093 —
appeared as counsel for one of the parties". This express statement on the record has been where complainant Cuenco has filed a claim for payment of attorney's fees — have not been
totally ignored by complainant Cuenco. Thus, not only has complainant Cuenco failed to submit abolished and crippled" by the mere fact that the maximum amounts, expressed in a percentage
anything at all to support his accusation that Mr. Justice Fernan 'had exerted personal efforts' to of the market value of the distributive shares received from the estate, of attorney's fees had
have the Vito Borromeo estate cases assigned to the Third Division "to enable him to influence been determined and set by this Court. This is a matter well within the competence and authority
the outcome" thereof; complainant Cuenco is simply and clearly wrong in charging that Mr. of the Court. Furthermore, the Court is unable to see how payment of complainant Cuenco's
Justice Fernan had anything to do with the assignment of those estate cases to the Third attorney's fees for services rendered in the Vito Borromeo estate case has been "rendered
Division of the Court. The record is bare of any suggestion that complainant Cuenco made any impossible;' while final settlement of the decedent's estate may have to be awaited, payment of
effort to inform himself on the procedures followed by this Court in constituting itself into three such fees may nevertheless be expected in due course.
(rather than two) Divisions, before making his accusation.
5. In Administrative Matter No. R-593-RTJ, complainant Cuenco charged Judge Francisco P.
3. The principal opposing parties in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings are, on the Burgos, former trial judge in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings, with "gross
one hand, the group of heirs instituted under the will (i.e., Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia, an incompetence and manifest negligence" for allegedly having intentionally delayed settlement of
surnamed Borromeo) and, on the other hand, the group of heirs — a number of whom are the estate of the late Vito Borromeo. In an En Banc Resolution dated 19 November 1987, tills
represented by complainant Cuenco — declared as such by the trial court subsequent to the Court, having found that the delay complained of was caused by several factors beyond the
declaration of nullity of said will. One of the main reasons that said proceedings had dragged on control of respondent judge, dismissed that complaint for lack of merit. The Court is completely
for such a long period of time is that the three (3) instituted heirs had sought, as early as 1954, unable to understand the claim of complainant Cuenco that dismissal of administrative Matter
the exclusion, from the inventory of the late Vito Borromeo's estate, of thirteen (13) parcels of No. R-593-RTJ, has "resurrected, rejuvenated and reinvigorated the claims of the three (3)
land over which the three claimed rights of ownership, and which rights continued to be asserted instituted heirs (Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia Borromeo) over the aforementioned thirteen (13)
against the other heirs- claimants. As far as the records show, there are no other persons parcels of land. The Court is also baffled by complainant Cuenco's assertion that such dismissal
claiming successional rights adverse to those of either of the two major groups of heirs in the "has a great money value in itself" and would result in the big increase of assets of the Vito
intestacy proceedings. Borromeo Estate." As pointed out above, complainant Cuenco's complaint in A.M. No. R-593-
RTJ was dismissed by a Resolution of the Court en banc, not of the Third Division as Cuenco
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, Mr. Justice Fernan could not have, as claimed by apparently believes. In any case, the Members of the Third Division of the Court expressly reject
complainant Cuenco, "fabricate[d] fake and fictitious heirs Vito Borromeo." The Court is unable to complainant Cuenco's assertion or insinuation that they were unduly influenced by any
see how Mr. Justice Fernan, whose involvement in the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings began consideration other than the simple lack of merit of the complaint in A.M. No. R-593-RTJ.
on 7 August 1965 and ended on 19 February 1968, could have had any control or influence over
the actions of the instituted heirs (Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia Borromeo) either in 1952 when 6. There is no in the record, other than the undocumented assertions of complainant Cuenco,
Special Proceedings 916-R for probate of the will was, or in 1954 when said heirs claimed rights that would suggest that Mr. Justice Fernan has violated his oath of office as a lawyer either
of ownership over the aforementioned thirteen (13) parcels of land and sought to exclude them during the time when he was collaborating counsel for Tomas and Amelia Borromeo in the
from the estate of the decedent. We think it clear, that complainant Cuenco was here making, proceedings below or thereafter, and since joining this Court. Complainant Cuenco has offered
once again, a totally baseless accusation which he made no effort to support as he could not not a shred of evidence to support his serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Indeed,
support it. complainant Cuenco is either unaware of the seriousness of the charges he made against Mr.
Justice Fernan, or complainant Cuenco, if he is aware of the nature of the charges he has
4. The dispositive portion of our Decision in the consolidated estate cases states in part: brought, has acted with bad faith.

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

Of his own accord, Mr. Justice Fernan made a statement to the Court en banc and embodied of the Third Division of the Court. The Court has, nevertheless, gone into substantial detail in
that in a Memorandum given to the Members of the Court on 17 December 1987. In this dealing with the accusations so freely made by complainant Cuenco, apparently in his concern
Memorandum, Mr. Justice Fernan invited attention to his written Appearance and Motion to over the amount of the attorney's fees he can hope to claim and collect from some of the
Withdraw as Counsel (already referred to above) and stressed that he had ceased a long time distributees of the Vito Borromeo Estate. The Court has done so precisely because the person
ago to act as counsel for the two Borromeos mentioned earlier and that he did not in any way charged is a Member of this Court. The record of this case suggests strongly, however, that
take part in the deliberations and decision of G.R. Nos. 41171, etc. those accusations were not only instituted without any basis but were also made recklessly
without regard for the good name and reputation of Mr. Justice Fernan. Indeed, those charges fly
By a telegram dated 6 January 1988, complainant Cuenco asked for leave to file a "Clarificatory in the face of the record itself, which complainant has casually chosen to ignore.
Memorandum based on official court records already filed in Supreme Court before and after
Honorable Fernan was appointed Justice of the Supreme Court — " by 24 February 1988. By a There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of
Resolution dated 14 January 1988, the Court granted complainant Cuenco leave to file a the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the
"Clarificatory Memorandum" within a non-extendible period of ten (1 0) days from notice thereof. Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2],
Complainant Cuenco received a copy of Resolution of the Court on 26 January 1988. To date, Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's
no memorandum has been filed by complainant Cuenco. On 5 February 1988, the Court incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the constitutional
received the following telegram from complainant Cuenco: mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same
Received UST Hospital to [sic] resolutions S.C. En Banc co a first resolution situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article
giving me February five file Clarificatory memorandum and second setting XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in
February twenty-four file memorandum stop aye prefer February twenty-four file relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of the Commission on audit who are not certified
memorandum paragraph memorandum affects Salud Borromeo and Asuncion public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be
Borromeo signers Judge Laya's order of August 15 1969 which is res judicata members of the Philippine Bar.
comma died long time ago paragraph Marcial Borromeo signer Judge Laya's
order died long time ago comma by agreement of parties approved by judge ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISCUSS the charges made by complainant Cuenco
Gomez substituted by heirs of Marcial Borromeo semicolon Cosme Borromeo against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit.
one of Marcial Borromeo's heirs reported dead living children stop aye cannot
remember names of one of two daughters of Marcial Borromeo stop am The Court, further, Resolved to REQUIRE complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should
confident Supreme Court En Banc exercising inherent power can order not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice
substitution new parties give them due process stop it can also issue proper Fernan within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
orders have correct names of Marcial Borromeo daughters aye cannot remember
stop my preferences for February 24 deadline is due aye had not typist during
January 18 election long holidays stop my hospitalization also delays my legal
work stop many thanks.

From the above quoted telegram (to the extent the Court can understand it), it appears that
complainant Cuenco believes that he is preparing a memorandum addressing, not the
administrative charges he has preferred against Mr. Justice Fernan, but rather the merits of the
consolidated petitions in G.R. Nos. L-41171, etc. There appears no reason therefore why the
Court should entertain this second request of complainant Cuenco.

The Court could have dismissed outright the complaint of Mr. Cuenco, since the Court could
have simply taken judicial notice of the record of the consolidated petitions filed before the Court
and since the other charges made relate to matters peculiarly within the knowledge of Members

EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers

6.) A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988 curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for
Reconsideration.
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH
1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle may be
ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT. succinctly formulated in the following terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is
required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and
RESOLUTION who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,
cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence
which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would
amount to removal from office.
PER CURIAM:
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No.
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
3135 in the following terms:
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-
complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be
from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the
Court en banc in view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement. Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office
only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by
effect be to circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate theat
"Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to
Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and
charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely
and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a
the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article
telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco
XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the
refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and
Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any
the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public
"intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file
accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to
responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees
be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied)
Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention.
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v.
The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M Gonzales a copy of the per
Sandiganbayan, the Court said:
1

curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled
"Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to
dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with
merit. In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in government-
why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however, like
against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an extension constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by
of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:
relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is
concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers
 from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
or graft and corruption."
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements
holding his office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the
law. Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment
under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either
Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of
law. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection
Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful
that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
equally manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded against, tried
and thereafter punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu
expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person
process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The clear implication with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be
liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution upon Hon. Raul M.
if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not thereby removed, Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.
the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. 2

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are
substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
EPOA 6 – Accountability of Public Officers