Understanding the Black Box of Chinese
Politics
FAQ on the Chinese political system
How does the Chinese political system function?
1. Broadly speaking, what type of regime is the Chinese political system? What is the
difference between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese state?
China is ruled by a one-party authoritarian dictatorship. The state (i.e. the government) of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is entirely under the monopolistic control of a single ruling
political party, the CCP. The institutions of state and party are nominally separate, and China is
sometimes referred to as a “dual track” political system, in which separate roles are maintained
for state and party positions. For example, the Governor (state leader) of a province may often be
a separate individual from the Party Secretary (party leader) of the same province. However, in
reality, the party is completely intertwined with the state system, all important positions of
government are held by CCP party members, and party leadership positions always take
precedence over state leaders who are theoretically at the same level. The existence of a Chinese
state separate from the CCP is therefore only nominal, and the phrase “party-state” is often used
to more accurately refer to the Chinese regime.
2. What are the most important positions, institutions, or power centers within the Chinese
political system?
The Politburo is the leading core of the party’s Central Committee (varying between around 350-
400 full and alternate members), which itself presides over the 96 million-member CCP. Within
the Politburo, real power rests with its seven-member Standing Committee (PBSC). At the
pinnacle of the party is the General Secretary (though this title has varied in the past), currently
Xi Jinping. The General Secretary also concurrently occupies the position of the President of the
PRC and Chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the top leadership of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), which is notably the CCP’s army – not the Chinese nation-state’s.
In the time Xi has held office, the position of General Secretary has come to wield nearly
supreme power within the Chinese system. Under the General Secretary and the Central
Secretariat (which is in charge of the CCP’s daily operations) is nominally the State Council (led
by the Premier, or #2 leader in the system), essentially the equivalent to the executive cabinet in
a Western state, but this body’s power has declined sharply under Xi Jinping, who has reoriented
power away from state bodies and toward the party’s. He has done so by creating (and himself
chairing) dozens of party “committees,” “commissions,” and “leading groups,” which have
assumed top-level decision-making power over and above state institutions like the State
Council.
Being a Marxist-Leninist, and therefore understanding that “power grows out of the barrel of a
gun,” Xi has also devoted substantial attention to securing his control over the levers of hard
power within the Chinese system, using these to exert and maintain control. These include the
PLA, the intelligence and security ministries, and the Central Political and Legal Affairs
Commission (CPLAC), which oversees all legal and security enforcement authorities. Especially
powerful under Xi’s reign is the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which
investigates violations of “party discipline” (i.e. corrupt activity) and which has been used
exceptionally effectively by Xi to target and purge his political rivals within the system.
Finally, given China’s size and scope, provincial-level governments play an important role in
managing day-to-day governance in the Chinese system. Leaders in the CCP tend to rise to the
top ranks through service in provincial and municipal governments, where they accumulate
connections and patronage ties with other party members; these localities and those individuals
with connections to them then tend to become the political powerbases for future national-level
leaders, even after they have left those regions for Beijing.
3. How are high-level policy decisions made within the Chinese political system? What
about everyday policy decisions and governance?
While the CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee (most importantly Xi Jinping himself) play
the central role in high-level policy decision-making, policy decisions are mainly carried out by
central commissions and leading groups (which are typically chaired by Xi but not always
micromanaged by him), as well as the Central Secretariat and the State Council. Within all of
these institutions, however, day-to-day decision-making is often made not by the heads of these
institutions or commissions, but by the leadership of their internal management bodies, typically
referred to as their General Office. These offices, typically headed by a Politburo-level deputy of
the organization, conduct much of the real governance of Chinese policy issues, alongside the
formal ministries of the state.
Additionally, China’s provincial- and municipal-level party and state governments play a critical
role in the real implementation of policy in the Chinese system, given the size and complexity of
the country. They are also often given some flexibility by the central government, in terms of
implementation and experimentation with policy measures — though this should not be
overstated, especially as Xi Jinping has progressively centralized control.
4. How important are informal networks and relationships within the Chinese political
system? What, if any, are the current main factions within the CCP? How do these factions
come to exist, and how do individuals become part of them? How can we know who is in
what faction?
Informal networks and relationships are exceptionally important in the Chinese political system,
due to both traditional Chinese social norms’ emphasis on interpersonal relations, and the CCP
regime’s historical nature of “rule by personality” rather than rule by law. In the CCP system,
political factions tend to form around the interpersonal networks of powerful political figures
(also see note on regional powerbases above). Currently, three major factions hold some sway in
the Chinese system, each centered around a current or former top leader: Jiang Zemin’s faction,
often nicknamed “the Shanghai Gang” due to Shanghai being Jiang’s major powerbase; Hu
Jintao’s faction, also known as the Communist Youth League faction (or “tuanpai”), due to Hu’s
career path and network having been forged within this CCP-led youth organization; and the Xi
Jinping faction, which has quickly arisen since Xi took power ten years ago. Xi’s faction
includes a number of subgroups, each built around different localities where he once held power
during his career, the most notable of which is perhaps the “New Zhijiang Army,” a nickname
for those loyalists Xi collected during his time as Party Secretary and Governor of Zhejiang
province (the difference in spelling is intentional). Many members of this group have been
rapidly elevated into positions of power since Xi took office.
However, while factions are important in Chinese politics, it is often very difficult to know for
sure which individual belongs to which faction if any. This is primarily because, as noted,
factions are based on informal networks and personal (rather than public) connections. And
given the intense nature of Chinese elite politics, individuals typically strive to keep this
information as private as possible. Observers of Chinese politics therefore often employ small,
even seemingly trivial, pieces of information, such as mutual places of birth, schools attended, or
overlapping work experience, to attempt to guess factional linkages among Chinese political
figures. The reliability of this can of course be questionable; it is simply better than nothing
when attempting to perceive who is loyal to whom — Chinese politicians are unsurprisingly
doing the same thing.
5. Are there fixed rules that determine how political leadership and government function in
China, or only informal norms? For example, is there a limit on how long China’s top
leaders and cadres can remain in power?
While there are both some fixed rules and informal norms in terms of how politics works in
China, the former are few, incomplete, and weakly followed. This leaves the latter mostly
governing the system. For example, while the PRC constitution stipulates term limits for most
state leadership positions, such as Premier (5-year terms, two consecutive terms maximum),
there are no fixed rules in this regard for party positions. And since all state leaders are generally
party leaders, the rule has little fixed impact. However, there have been some informal norms
that have been shaped by having been followed for decades, despite never being publicly
codified or even announced. For example, in addition to the retirement age limit of 68 for
Politburo-level positions (as noted above), it is an informal policy that officials will retire if they
fail to make a full ministerial-level position by age 65.
6. How does ideology function in the Party-state? How is it set, and are there different
ideological paths open in China? How do these different ideological paths affect
policymaking?
The CCP’s official ideology is “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” essentially a mix of
Marxism, Leninism, and the unique ideological take of “Mao Zedong Thought.” This has been
supplemented in the post-Mao era with the ideological contributions of each of the party’s top
leaders, respectively entitled: “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” the “Three Represents” (by Jiang
Zemin), the “Perspective of Scientific Development” (by Hu Jintao), and, today, “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” This ideological corpus
functions to provide basic doctrine for cadres of the 96 million member CCP, covering not only
political strategy but all vital aspects of social and economic life. All party members and state
cadres (and, ideally as far as the regime is concerned, all residents of China) are required to
adhere to this ideology, and, officially, there are no alternative ideological paths open in China.
With post-Mao marketization of the economy, however, a limited degree of ideational diversity
has emerged, and the CCP’s adoption of market mechanisms in developing China’s economy has
effectively opened divergent ideological paths, including the ongoing dispute over how and to
what extent market-based (i.e. capitalist) measures should be used to advance China’s
development.
What is the Party Congress?
7. What is the Party Congress and why is it important?
The National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (NCCCP), typically referred to simply
as the Party Congress, is a body that is theoretically the highest body of the CCP (although this is
functionally fiction). This body should not be confused with the National People’s Congress
(NPC), which meets more regularly to pass official laws. The national-level Party Congress only
meets once every five years, for around a week, with more than two thousand “delegates” to the
Congress selected from among the members of the party by the CCP's provincial-level party
congresses to attend. The Party Congress formally approves the membership of the Central
Committee for the next five years, determining the CCP’s top-level leadership at the Central
Committee’s first plenary meeting immediately following the adjournment of the Party Congress
(the powers of the Party Congress are then delegated to the Central Committee, which meets in
full usually once a year). In reality, however, these selections have already been made ahead of
time.
8. What actually happens at the Party Congress? Are decisions made there, or are they
already determined ahead of time?
While the selection of CCP leadership at the Party Congress itself is essentially ceremonial, this
does not diminish the immense importance of the event to Chinese elite politics. By the time the
Party Congress itself is held, an intense stretch of cutthroat internal politicking, factional
bargaining, and individual competition will have occurred as the CCP’s top leadership, and the
potential candidates to join that leadership, all jostle behind the scenes to improve their position.
This can result in dramatic political change, as occurred with Xi Jinping’s somewhat unexpected
ascension in the past.
9. How are individuals selected for leadership positions in China’s political system? How
can we tell who is a rising star, and who is not? How can we tell whether a “successor” to
be China’s top leader is appointed at the Party Congress?
This is among the most opaque — some might even say “mystical” — parts of Chinese politics,
so much so that even the individuals involved in the selection process often are not able to tell
which factor eventually made the difference in securing a cadre’s promotion. This is primarily
due to the highly informal nature of Chinese “backroom” politics. Signs and omens can be
recognized when a political star arises, however. Usually, this star is younger than most of
his/her peers at the same rank, having climbed those ranks faster, and completing job postings
more quickly. They typically demonstrate a reason to believe they have the trust and patronage
of a major party leader (especially the party chief), with their careers often overlapping with that
figure at some point. At the highest level, when one or two (historically no more than two) new
members join the Politburo Standing Committee at an age much younger than their colleagues
(usually around a ten-year age gap exists), public opinion tends to recognize this as a sign that
they have been designated as a successor to the current General Secretary or (if two are in
position) Premier.
How important is Xi Jinping?
10. How has Xi Jinping changed how China and the CCP are run during his time in office,
compared to past leaders? What is new? What does it mean for China's party-state system
if Xi gets his "unprecedented" third term?
While previously China’s post-Mao CCP regime might have been described, in political science
terms, as an authoritarian oligarchy – that is, ruled by a small collective leadership – since
coming to power as General Secretary Xi Jinping has dismantled this system of collective
leadership. In its place, he has implemented a system of, effectively, one-man rule — or
dictatorship — by successfully purging factional rivals, concentrating power into new
institutions directly under his control, and establishing a popular cult of personality. By doing so,
Xi succeeded in reversing the project of former leader Deng Xiaoping, who sought to reform the
Chinese political system explicitly to prevent the return of the one-man rule that had plagued
China during the era of Mao Zedong.
Xi-era China can also be technically referred to as having returned to a form of totalitarianism.
“Totalitarianism" here refers to a political arrangement in which the state (or the party-state,
more accurately in this case) entirely penetrates and controls every aspect of society. Mao’s
China was a typical example of totalitarianism; post-Mao China, during the decades between the
late 1970s and the early 2000s, however, adapted to allow greater social autonomy and even
limited social and intellectual plurality alongside the implementation of market economics. Xi
Jinping has simultaneously cracked down significantly on societal openness, such as by limiting
freedom of expression and academic independence, and reasserted the power of the state to
direct economic activity. This has been referred to as Xi’s “pivot to the state,” and reflects, in
part, the rise of a strand of so-called “statist,” “neo-authoritarian,” or “neo-totalitarian” political
thought that emerged in China after 1989 and has been championed, in addition to Xi, by
prominent figures such as party “ideology tsar” Wang Huning.
The appointment of Xi for a third term (precedent-breaking, if hardly unprecedented in the
CCP’s history) would confirm the return of China to a political state much closer to that of the
Mao-era than that of Deng’s “reform and opening” that prevailed for nearly four decades. It
would also signal that Xi is likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future.
