DE CASTRO, KRISTEL ANNE B.

BSC 2-2

[ARTICLE 177 - USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS]

CASE: PEOPLE V. LIDRES, G.R. NO. L-12495, JULY 26, 1960

FACTS:
Dionisio Lidres was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Criminal Case No. V-
4137) with the crime of usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in Republic Act
No. 10. On the 22nd day of February, 1954, in the municipality of Balamban, province of Cebu,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent
and without pretense of official position did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade class of the Biasong Elementary
School of the aforementioned municipality, a position assigned to and occupied by Miss Josita
Diutay who had been duly appointed to said position.

Joseta Diutay and Dionisio Lidres filed an application as a substitute teacher of the second-
grade class of Biasong Elementary School when Echavez, the original teacher of said class,
filed and granted a maternity leave. Diutay was appointed as a substitute teacher and began
teaching. However, before the said appointment, Diutay was requested by the supervising
teacher to sign an agreement to take over Echavez' position on a "50-50" basis, that is, the
period from January to March, 1954 would be equally divided between her and Lidres. On the
strength of the agreement, Lidres, armed with a prepared letter of resignation for the signature
of Diotay, appeared at the school and asked Diutay to sign it but the former refused. Despite the
refusal of Diutay, Lidres took over her class. Accordingly, Lidres was charged with the crime of
usurpation of official function with deliberate intent and without pretense of official position under
Republic Act No. 10. Lidres pleaded not guilty and was found guilty by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lidres was guilty of the crime of usurpation of official functions?

RULING:
NO.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted Lidres. The court held
that the facts alleged in the information failed to constitute an offense of usurpation of official
functions. The court based its decision on the specific language used in the information, which
stated that Lidres committed the offense "without pretense of official position. The court
emphasized that pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime of usurpation
of official functions. Since Lidres did not claim to hold an official position or pretend to have
authority, the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense. The court also noted
that Lidres could not be convicted of usurpation of authority, as distinguished from usurpation of
official functions, under the first paragraph of Article 177, as amended by Republic Act No. 10
and Republic Act No. 379, because there was no proof that Lidres was a member of seditious
organizations engaged in subversive activities. Therefore, Lidres was acquitted of the crime of
usurpation of official functions.

[ARTICLE 180- FALSE TESTIMONY AGAINST A DEFENDANT]

CASE: PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. L-45739, APRIL 25, 1939

FACTS:
Sotero Peji Bautista, was charged with violating the provisions of article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code. The charge was based on Bautista knowingly subscribing under oath a
false affidavit. The case was initially filed in the justice of the peace court of Kawit, Cavite, but
was later remanded to the Court of First Instance due to jurisdictional issues. Instead of filing an
information against Bautista for the original charge, the provincial fiscal filed a new charge of
false testimony in a criminal case under article 180 of the Revised Penal Code.

Bautista objected to the new charge, claiming that he had not been given a preliminary
investigation. He also argued that the crime he was being charged with was different from the
one he was initially investigated for. The judge presiding over the Court of First Instance ordered
the transfer of the case to the justice of the peace court of the provincial capital for the
necessary preliminary investigation. However, the justice of the peace returned the case to the
Court of First Instance, stating that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that Bautista
had committed the crime of false testimony in a criminal case. Based on these facts, the Court
of First Instance dismissed the case, citing the lack of preliminary investigation and double
jeopardy. The Solicitor-General appealed the dismissal decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the accused was given a proper preliminary investigation.
2. Whether the accused had been put in jeopardy twice.

RULING:
1.YES, the accused has been given a preliminary investigation. This was in fact conducted by
Judge Endencia as evidenced by his order, which says: It appearing from the preliminary
investigation made in this case that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
has committed the crime of false testimony and that he is liable therefor, the arrest of the
accused Sotero Peji Bautista is ordered after which a day shall be set for the corresponding
trial.
2.NO. The accused had ever been in jeopardy. This is because a preliminary investigation is not
a trial or any part thereof and does not have for its object that of determining definitely the guilt
of the accused by proofs, counterproofs, and the other formalities prescribed by law. One
cannot be considered to have been in jeopardy unless the prior judgment, whether one of
acquittal or conviction in the proper case, has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction to try
the same by reason of the crime with which he was charged and the penalty prescribed therefor.
It is evident that the final dismissal of the case ordered by the lower court under the
circumstances above-mentioned was clearly erroneous. The order appealed from, not being in
accordance with law, must be reversed.

[ARTICLE 183 - FALSE TESTIMONY IN OTHER CASES AND PERJURY IN SOLEMN

AFFIRMATION]

CASE: UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 192565, FEBRUARY 28,
2012
FACTS:
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation
stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first
complaint, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second
complaint, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both
complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she
did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal
or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the venue was improperly laid and that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. The Metropolitan Trial Court in Makati City denied
the motion, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The court also ruled that the allegations in the
Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. The Regional Trial Court in Makati City
dismissed the petition to annul and set aside the Metropolitan Trial Court's orders, ruling that
there was no grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing
that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than the ruling in Sy Tiong.

ISSUE:
Whether the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be in Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.
RULING:
The Metropolitan Trial Court in Makati City is the proper venue and court to take cognizance of
the perjury case against the petitioners. Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood
was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material
statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue
and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential
elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati City, not Pasay City.

[ARTICLE 185- MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS]

CASE: OUANO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-40203, AUGUST 21, 1990
FACTS:
There was a land was being sold by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), now the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), through a public bidding. The petitioner, Paterno J.
Ouano, and the respondent, Francisco B. Echavez, both participated in the bidding. Prior to the
second bidding, Ouano and Echavez made an oral agreement that only Echavez would make a
bid for the land. If Echavez's bid was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to
their adjoining properties. They also agreed to convince another interested party, a group
headed by Mrs. Bonsucan, to withdraw from the bidding. Ouano's wife paid the group P2,000 as
reimbursement for their expenses. Echavez submitted the highest bid of P27,826.00 and paid a
20% deposit of P5,565.00. A week later, Echavez sent a letter to Ouano regarding the
P2,000.00 paid by Ouano's wife to the Bonsucan group. Echavez proposed to give Ouano 250
sq. meters of the land in front of his house as reimbursement.
Two weeks after Echavez won the bid, a document titled "Agreement" was signed by both
parties. The agreement stated that they would share the land according to a sketch provided,
with each party responsible for paying their respective installments, interests, and amortizations
to the RFC. However, the RFC never approved the sharing agreement between Echavez and
Ouano. Echavez eventually acquired title to the property in December 1963 after several years
of negotiation and effort. Ouano attempted to have the DBP accept and implement their sharing
agreement or allow him to pay the full price of the land on Echavez's behalf, but his requests
were denied. Ouano filed a lawsuit for specific performance and reconveyance against Echavez
and the DBP. The Trial Court dismissed Ouano's complaint, ruling that the sharing agreement
was unlawful and had no effect.

ISSUE:
Whether the sharing agreement between Ouano and Echavez is valid and enforceable.
RULING:
No.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Ouano's complaint and ordered the forfeiture of
the land to the government. The Supreme Court found that the agreement between Ouano and
Echavez constituted a crime under Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code. The agreement
involved a promise to share the property in exchange for Ouano refraining from participating in
the auction and inducing another bidder to withdraw. The Court ruled that the agreement was
void from the beginning and that both parties were liable to prosecution. Contracts with unlawful
causes or objects are void and cannot be ratified.
The Court applied the pari delicto principle, which states that parties who are both at fault in an
illegal agreement have no action against each other. Therefore, the sharing agreement between
Ouano and Echavez was deemed unlawful and unenforceable. As a result, Ouano's complaint
for specific performance and reconveyance was properly dismissed by the lower courts. The
Supreme Court also ordered the forfeiture of the land to the government, emphasizing the
importance of upholding the law and discouraging illegal agreements.

[ARTICLE 190- POSSESSION, PREPARATION AND USE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS AND

MAINTENANCE OF OPIUM DENS]

CASE: US V. GAN LIAN PO, G.R. NO. 11772, AUGUST 31, 1916
FACTS:
In Manila, on February 29, 1916, Gan Lian Po, along with Gan Sua, Gan Tiao, Gan Hoo,
Gan Chian, Co Ngang, and Ko Seng, were charged with the unlawful possession of 206 grams
and 15 centigrams of cocaine, as well as 2 kilos and 889 grams of morphine. After the
government’s case concluded, five accused, excluding Gan Lian Po and the self-confessed Ko
Seng, were acquitted for lack of evidence of guilt. Ko Seng was convicted, while Gan Lian Po,
who pleaded not guilty, was sentenced to one year of imprisonment, fined P2,000, and directed
to pay a portion of the costs following a trial.
The drugs were discovered during a police raid at a sack manufacturing facility owned by
Gan Lian Po and managed by Ko Seng. The legal contention centered around whether Gan
Lian Po was aware of the drugs’ presence on his premises. Under Philippine law, ownership and
possession of premises where prohibited drugs are found typically imply knowledge and intent
to possess said drugs unless proven otherwise by the accused.
Gan Lian Po contested this presumption, arguing lack of knowledge about the drugs hidden
among the sacks. The prosecution relied primarily on the presumption of knowledge due to
possession and supplementary witness testimonies that failed to directly link Gan Lian Po to the
drug possession except for Sergeant J.J. Sullivan’s testimony, which suggested
acknowledgment from Gan Lian Po of the drugs’ presence is a point contested due to potential
misunderstandings from language barriers.
ISSUE:
Whether Gan Lian Po had knowledge of the presence of the drugs in his building prior to its
discovery by the police.

RULING:
The court ruled in favor of the defendant, Gan Lian Po, and acquitted him of the charges. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, when prohibited drugs are found on a person's
premises, the owner is presumed to know of its presence and possess it. However, this
presumption can be rebutted by showing that the drugs were placed there by someone else
without the owner's knowledge or consent. Gan Lian Po testified that he had no knowledge of
the drugs in his building and that they must have been secretly placed there by his employees.
The court found his testimony credible and concluded that he successfully rebutted the
presumption of guilt. Therefore, the court acquitted Gan Lian Po of the charges.

[ARTICLE 192- IMPORTATION AND SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS]

CASE: US V. AH SHING, G.R. NO. 13005, OCTOBER 10, 1917

FACTS:
Ah Sing is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang, a
foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu after a direct voyage from the port of Saigon.
Ah Sing bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them in his
possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of
Cebu, the authorities on making a search found the 8 cans of opium hidden in the ashes below
the boiler of the steamer's engine. Ah Sing confessed that the same was his but he did not say
anything as to the purpose why he bought them nor did he say that it was his intention to import
the prohibited drug. There is no other evidence, direct or indirect, to show that the intention of
the accused was to illegally import the opium in the country.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has been
proven.

RULING:
YES.
The court ruled that the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has been
proven. The court examined the applicable provisions of the law and concluded that the
defendant was guilty of illegal importation of opium. Section 4 of the Opium Law provides that
the possession of a prohibited drug on a vessel that has come directly from a foreign country
and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands is prima facie evidence of
importation. The court held that unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves
otherwise, a person is guilty of illegal importation of a prohibited drug if it is found under their
control on a vessel that has come directly from a foreign country.
In this case, the defendant's possession of the opium on the steamship Shun Chang, which
arrived in Cebu after a direct voyage from Saigon, constituted illegal importation of opium from a
foreign country into the Philippine Islands. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, finding the defendant guilty of illegal importation of opium, and imposed the appropriate
sentence.

[ARTICLE 195- GAMBLING]

CASE: PEOPLE V. SIGUENZA, G.R. NO. L-8531. FEBRUARY 29, 1956

FACTS:
Siguenza was charged with unlawful possession of jueteng lists, cash money, and a pencil.
These items were used or intended to be used in the game of jueteng. The information alleged
that Siguenza was a jueteng collector. Siguenza pleaded guilty to the charge and he was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of
prision correccional. However, the appellant's counsel argued that Siguenza should have been
sentenced only to a fine under subdivision (a) of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subdivision (a) pertains to acts punishable in gambling. But the court ruled that Siguenza falls
under subdivision (c) of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code. Subdivision (c) imposes a
penalty of prision correccional in its medium degree for the illegal possession of lottery lists and
other articles used in the game of jueteng. The court clarified that the allegation that Siguenza is
a jueteng collector was made to show that he had possession of the jueteng lists "knowingly
and without lawful purpose."

ISSUE:
Whether the accused should be sentenced under subdivision (a) or subdivision (c) of Article 195
of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:
The accused should be sentenced under subdivision (c) of Article 195. The court affirmed the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which sentenced the accused to an
indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as well as payment of costs.
The accused falls under subdivision (c) of Article 195 because the information charges him with
unlawful possession of jueteng lists used or intended to be used in the game of jueteng. The
allegation that he is a jueteng collector is only to establish that he had possession of the items
"knowingly and without lawful purpose." It should not be interpreted to mean that he took part in
the game of jueteng as anything other than a maintainer, conductor, or banker under subdivision
(b) or an illegal possessor of any lottery list under subdivision (c). Therefore, the accused
should be sentenced under subdivision (c) and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

[ARTICLE 199– ILLEGAL COCKFIGHTING]

CASE: PEOPLE V. MALABANAN, G.R. NO. 43430, JANUARY 7, 1936

FACTS:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Batangas of a violation of article
208 of the Revised Penal Code. In July, 1933, appellant was municipal president of San Juan,
Batangas and was found guilty of organizing illegal cock-fights on July 22 and July 29, despite
failing to meet the fundraising quota and without authorization by law. The conviction was based
on the violation of article 208 of the Revised Penal Code. The court discusses the ambiguity in
the government's claim against Malabanan. It is unclear whether the government is punishing
him for not prosecuting himself for organizing a cock-fight on unauthorized days or for not
prosecuting all those who attended the cock-fights and bet money. The court examines the
meaning of the word "maliciously" in article 208. It concludes that the action complained of must
be the result of a deliberate evil intent and does not cover a mere voluntary act.
The court argues that interpreting article 208 liberally would lead to impossible conditions in
the Philippines. If every public official who fails to prosecute every misdemeanor, they believe
has been committed is liable to be sent to jail, it would create an intolerable situation. The court
states that every municipal president in the country would be subject to conviction by their
political enemies under a statute as rigorous as any devised by Draco. Although Malabanan
admits to acts that violate article 199, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, pertaining to
illegal cockfighting, the court finds him not guilty of violating article 208.

ISSUE:
Should Malabanan be punished for not instituting prosecution against himself for organizing
illegal cock-fights on unauthorized days?
Should Malabanan be held responsible for not prosecuting all those who attended the cock-
fights and bet money?

RULING:
Malabanan was found guilty of violating article 199, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code,
which pertains to illegal cockfighting. However, Malabanan was not found guilty of violating
article 208. He was sentenced to pay a fine of P10, with subsidiary confinement in case of
insolvency.
The court interpreted the word "maliciously" in article 208 to mean a deliberate evil intent, rather
than a mere voluntary act. It noted that giving the section the most liberal interpretation would
result in an intolerable situation, where every municipal president could be subject to conviction
by their political enemies. Therefore, the court found that Malabanan's actions could be
punished under article 199, paragraph 1, without the need to strain a highly criminal statute.

[ARTICLE 201- IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS,

AND INDECENT SHOWS.]

CASE: DEMATA Y GARZON V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 228583, SEPTEMBER 15, 2021
FACTS:
On November 21, 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), upon the complaint of
minor AAA's father, filed two criminal information’s against Demata before the RTC of Manila. In
Criminal Case No. 13-301632, for violation of Article 201 of the RPC. Demata was accused of
selling and circulating a tabloid containing a photo of a minor in a sexually explicit context. In
Criminal Case No. 13-301633, Demata was accused of causing psychological injury to the
minor by posting her picture without her consent. The RTC consolidated the two cases and
Demata pleaded not guilty to both charges.
The records show that Demata was one of the editors-in-chief of Bagong Toro, a tabloid
newspaper published by Remate News Central. The June 21, 2012 issues of Bagong Toro
contained photographs of women in revealing swimwear and erotic novellas. The minor,
referred to as AAA, discovered her picture in the tabloid and suffered emotional distress as a
result. AAA's family confronted her about the picture, and she experienced bullying and negative
effects on her studies and relationships. AAA was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) and received psychological counseling. Demata argued that the publication
was not obscene and that he relied on the representations of the layout artists regarding the
ownership of the photos.
The RTC found Demata guilty of violating Article 201, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7610. Demata was sentenced to pay
a fine and imprisonment, and ordered to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and costs. The RTC ruled that the publication was obscene and that Demata's
actions constituted child abuse. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, ruling that the publication
did not pass the obscenity tests and that Demata violated R.A. 7610. The CA found no
reversible error in the RTC's ruling.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether Demata was properly charged and convicted of selling and circulating the
Bagong Toro issue;
2. Whether the other photographs and stories in the tabloid can be considered obscene;
3. Whether Demata is guilty of creating conditions prejudicial to the development of the
minor.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Demata and ordered his acquittal.
1.The Court found that there was a variance between the crime charged and the crime proved,
as Demata was charged with selling and circulating the tabloid issue, but there was no evidence
that he actually sold or circulated it.
2.The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove that the tabloid issue was obscene under
the three-pronged test of Miller v. California. The lower courts did not establish the applicable
community standards and did not sufficiently consider the newspaper as a whole, including its
other contents such as news, comics, commentary, and puzzles. The material must be
evaluated from the perspective of the average Filipino.
3.The Court held that Demata was not guilty of creating conditions prejudicial to the
development of the minor. There was no evidence that he had the intent to harm the minor or
that his actions were the proximate cause of her psychological distress. Other factors, such as
the sudden revelation of the publication to her by her brother and the subsequent reactions of
her family and peers, may have contributed to her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

[ARTICLE 202- VAGRANTS AND PROSTITUTES]

CASE: PEOPLE V. SITON Y SACIL, G.R. NO. 169364, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009
FACTS:
The respondents, Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano, were charged with
vagrancy for wandering and loitering around certain streets in Davao City without any visible
means of support. The respondents filed a motion to quash the charges, arguing that Article 202
(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad. They claimed that the law is vague and
results in an arbitrary identification of violators. They also argued that it violates the equal
protection clause.

The municipal trial court denied the motion and declared that the law on vagrancy was
enacted pursuant to the State's police power. The court justified the law by stating that it
promotes public welfare and subordinates’ individual benefit to the interest of the greater
number. The court noted that there was prior surveillance conducted on the respondents, which
justified the prosecution's case. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, challenging the constitutionality of Article 202 (2).
 The Regional Trial Court granted the petition and declared Article 202 (2) unconstitutional.
The court held that the law is vague and violates the equal protection clause. The court opined
that the law offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations and fails to provide fair notice
of what constitutes forbidden conduct.

ISSUE:
Whether Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional for being vague and
overbroad.

RULING:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, upholding the constitutionality of Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. The court held that the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties is
legislative in nature and inherent in the state's police power. It also recognized the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, which states that a statute that forbids or requires an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application violates due process of law.
However, the court found that Article 202 (2) is not vague and does not violate due process. The
court also rejected the argument that Article 202 (2) violates the equal protection clause, stating
that the law does not discriminate against the poor and the unemployed, but rather punishes
individuals for conducting themselves in a manner that endangers public peace or causes alarm
and apprehension in the community.
The court held that Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code is constitutional and does not
violate due process or the equal protection clause. It emphasized that public order laws,
including Article 202 (2), are necessary to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality,
and civility in society. It also recognized the requirement of probable cause as a limit on police
or executive authority to prevent abuse and concluded that Article 202 (2) should be presumed
valid and constitutional, and that every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.