INTRODUCTION

The increasing use of firearms from the middle of the 15 th century in different parts of the
world is often seen as a crucial factor in the rise of centralized monarchical states. Michael
Roberts had formulated his “military revolution” thesis, emphasizing on the role of firearms
behind the emergence of highly centralized European nations in 16 th century. With the advent
of gunpowder technology, the military organization witnessed a revolutionary change as the
musket-wielding infantrymen proved to be more effective than the mounted knights.
Geoffrey Parker elaborated Roberts’ thesis by stating that the vulnerability of the signorial
castles got exposed to the destructive power of the field artillery. Deployment of firearms in
military operations by the central authority, thus, led to the overall weakening of the position
of gentry and local chiefs and subsequently resulted into the centralization of the political
structure. Arguing on the same line, the highly centralized Ottoman Empire in the Middle
East, Safavid Empire in Iran, Uzbek Khanate in Central Asia and Mughal Empire in Indian
subcontinent have been characterized by the Chicago historians like Marshall G.S. Hodgson
and William McNeill as the “gunpowder empires”. These Empires were supposed to have
owed their long-time stamina to the effective use of artillery. This idea is also present in
David Ayalon’s pioneering work on Mamluk Egypt and Burton Stein’s assessment of the
Vijayanagara polity of South India. The eminent medievalist, Iqtidar Alam Khan is of the
opinion that the phenomenon manifested itself in an altered form in Mughal India: the use of
gunpowder technology in military operations undoubtedly prompted the conquest, expansion
and consolidation of the Mughal authority in different parts of the subcontinent, but on the
other hand, particularly since 17th century, the dissemination of the technology among the
subject population, especially peasants heralded the process of disintegration and decline of
the Empire. That gunpowder artillery exclusively made the Mughal army invincible has not
been accepted by historians unanimously. Scholars like Gommans, Irfan Habib and William
Irvine have stressed on the pre-eminence of war-horses or mounted archers during the
military campaigns in Mughal India. Recent researches, however, have brought in fresh
perspectives into the study of military history of the Mughal State. The pre-modern warfare
in India were dependent on a number of factors of which force or military power may have
been primary, but equally significant were political alliances, control over military labour
market, climatic conditions, extension of ‘inner frontiers’, etc. These factors have been
analysed by scholars like Dirk Kolff and Jos Gommans.

HOW GUNPOWDER REACHED INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Iqtidar Alam Khan showed that gunpowder, an explosive mixture of sulphur, charcoal,
potassium nitrate and saltpetre, had reached India through three points. Scholars like Joseph
Needham, L. Carrington Goodrich, Feng Chia-Sheng and Wang Ling stated that by 1230, the
Chinese had developed gunpowder recipes capable of causing explosions and detonations.
The technique was learnt by the Mongols from the Chinese and writings of Rashid al-Din
Fazl Allah attest to the fact that the Mongols had been using gunpowder devices like ‘huo
pao’ and ‘huo chiang’ in their military campaigns against Iran, India and China. As
documented in Khazain ul-Futuh by Amir Khusrao, ‘huo-chiang’ was used by the defenders
of the fort of the Chauhan ruler of Ranthambhor, Rai Hamir Deva during Alauddin Khilji’s
siege in 1300. Moreover, on Alauddin’s orders, the fortifications of Delhi were rebuilt so as
to protect them from gunpowder-based projectiles used by Mongols. I.A. Khan thus argues
that gunpowder had been introduced in India through the north-western borders by Mongol
invaders during the 13th century. Gunpowder recipes given in the Sanskrit texts of the 16th
century bore striking resemblance to those written in Chinese texts. As early as 1419, Chinese
ships were reported to have been carrying firearms to Calicut. Jean Baptiste Tavernier’s
account (1662) referred to Assamese local traditions of gunpowder and firearms being
acquitted by the people of the region through contacts with China. Khan concluded from
these sources that gunpowder had come directly to India, especially to Eastern regions like
Bengal and Assam and to South India through maritime contacts with South China. Historian
David Ayalon had suggested that the European firearm technology might have reached to the
western coast of India through maritime contacts with the Mamluks of Egypt. Historian
Richard Eaton had also confirmed the presence of gunpowder in India in the 15th century.

GUNPOWDER ARTILLERY AND CENTRALIZATION BEFORE 1526

The weapon ‘hawai’/’tir-i-hawai’ or ‘ban’ came to be used widely in military operations by

rulers of Malwa, Mewar, Gujarat, Delhi and Jaunpur during 15 th and 16th centuries. This
rocket was a Chinese innovation and possibly came in possession of the Sultans of Delhi
through their contacts with the Mongols and then travelled further south, argued I.A. Khan.
Irfan Habib, however, is of the opinion that the use of this weapon in the Deccan directly
from China between 1397 to 1422. Babur had recorded in his memoir that Nusrat Shah’s
troops used pyrotechnics in 1529 as weapons of war. A passage in Tarikh-i-Firishta recorded
that in 1366, the ‘karkhana-I atishbazi’ (department of pyrotechnics) of Bahamani ruler
became the backbone of his army. The ‘ban’ continued to be an important weapon even after
the advent of cannons and handguns and was used extensively for siege operations by Afghan
rulers, Sur Sultans and even by Akbar. The earliest firearm capable of throwing projectiles
over long distances was the cannon and it was in use in different parts of India during 14th and
15th centuries. The Battle of Raichur fought between the Bahamani and Vijayanagara forces
in 1520 involved extensive use of cannons. Richard Eaton observed that while the First Battle
of Panipat (1526) is often considered to have heralded the ‘gunpowder age’ in India, the
Battle of Raichur, fought six years ago with the extensive use of cannons has been ignored.
This may be because the Bahamani forces, that possessed more cannons than its counterpart,
lost the battle, unlike the case at Panipat where Babur, armed with cannons, had conclusively
defeated the Lodis. The possession of heavy mortars and gunpowder artillery necessitated the
presence of large revenues at the disposal of the rulers who deployed such expensive
weapons in his army. This led to the internal consolidation and limited territorial expansion.
Such a process was noticeable under Sikandar Lodi (1489-1517), Mahmud Khalji in Malwa,
Muhammad Shah of Bahamani kingdom and Mahmud Begarha in Gujarat. Burton Stein
showed how the advent of expensive gunpowder artillery had curbed down the power of the
erstwhile influential local chiefs in Vijayanagara kingdom who now lacked the means and
resources to adopt gunpowder technology and as a result, had to seek protection from the
King. In course of time, as Iqtidar Alam Khan had observed, the introduction of relatively
expensive artillery led to the growth of ‘a well organised central power’ in the regional Indian
kingdoms during the 15th century.

ADVENT OF BABUR AND EUROPEAN INFLUENCES – 16TH CENTURY

Historian Iqtidar Alam Khan identified two important incidents that had ushered in a new
epoch in the history of firearms in India. One was the arrival of Portuguese in Calicut in 1498
and the other was Babur’s occupation of Delhi and Agra in 1526. The most important skill
borrowed from Europe in the beginning of the 16 th century was the art of making cannons out
of wrought iron, instead of copper or bronze. Babur had mentioned about three distinct types
of artillery pieces used by him in Hindustan – ‘kazan’,’firingi’ and ’zarb-zan’. Along with
them, he also used ‘tufang’ which was probably a musket carrying a matchlock of Ottoman
origin. The ‘kazans’ were brass/bronze mortars used primarily for destrying forts. Each was
drawn by 400-500 persons or two to three elephants. Babur used these artilleries against
Bayana and other forts controlled by the Afghans. ‘Firingi’, as described in ‘Baburnama’,
was a lighter gun and was perhaps modelled after one of the European guns introduced by the
Portuguese in India. It was used against the fort of Bajaur in 1519 and played important role
in the phenomenal Battle of Panipat in 1526. ‘Zarb-zans’ were light cannons capable of
hitting targets upto a considerable distance. Iqtidar Alam Khan estimated that this type of
artillery was introduced in Babur’s army after the recruitment of Ottoman artillerist, Mustafa
Rumi some time before 1526. Before 1526, cannons were used in siege operations only. The
significance of the advent of these artilleries in the subcontinent lies in the fact that Babur, for
the first time, used cannons in open warfare, during the Battles of Panipat (1526) and Khanua
(1527). Historian Jadunath Sarkar had attributed Babur’s success in the two battles to his
skilful use of muskets and cannons. During the period between 1526-1556, the growing
importance of firearms as weapons resulted in increased efforts made by the Mughals as well
as their Afghan adversaries to expand their stock of artillery and musketeers. Sher Shah
introduced a number of light cannons; three light brass guns produced by his gun-founder
Khwaja Ahmed Rumi at Sonargaon in 1541-1543 have survived in Bengal. The new design
of these guns economized on copper and could be easily placed along the ramparts when
besieged. The new design of Sher Shah’s ‘zarb-zans’ owed much to the designs of European
cannons brought in by the Portuguese in Bengal. Islam Shah’s (1545-1552) military policies
emphasized on the production of heavy mortars than light artillery. But, those had more
disadvantages and hence were excluded from the “stirrup artillery” since the time of Akbar.

ADVANCEMENT OF ARTILLERY DURING AKBAR’S REIGN

The opening lines of the section in the Ain-I Akbari dealing with Akbar’s artillery describes it
as ‘a wonderful lock for securing the august edifice of royalty and a pleasing key to the door
of conquest’. This assertion, claimed Iqtidar Alam Khan, records the significance of
gunpowder artillery in the process of territorial expansion and strengthening of the central
authority. Another interesting issue taken up by I.A. Khan is that Abul Fazl had included the
description of gunpowder artillery in the first ‘daftar’ (book) named ‘Manzil Abadi’ which
deals with the royal household. This implies that the entire manufacture of firearms including
artillery was conducted within the imperial household. Expenditure on artillery was
exclusively made out of the royal exchequer. Furthermore, the mounted musketeers were paid
more than the ordinary cavalrymen and though poorly paid than the cavalrymen, the foot
musketeers were given several concessions like payment in advance. The latter received more
stipends than ordinary infantry. The policies of the Emperor ensuring His monopoly over the
firearms suggest the importance of artillery in sustaining and increasing the Mughal
dominance over the nobles and different parts of the suncontinent.

Abul Fazl had categorized the artilleries present during the reign of Akbar into three types –
 a) ‘kaman-ha-I buzurg (heavy mortars)
b) Cannons mainly used for siege operations (“stirrup artillery”)
c) Light cannons like ‘narnals’ (carried by man) and ‘gajnals’ (carried by elephants)

The ‘shaturnal’ (mounted on camels) was adopted in the Mughal artillery on a regular basis
from the beginning of the 17th century. It was used during the expedition sent by Jahangir
against the Rana of Chittor in 1614. A significant development that seems to have followed
the introduction of ‘shaturnals’ was placing of light cannons on turning pivots. This type of
cannon was called ‘jzails’.

LIMITATIONS OF INDIAN GUNNERY

Gunpowder artillery in Mughal India, during the 17th century, did not progress as it had in
Europe. Col. Hector Munro had observed that the bronze guns produced in India were much
inferior to the guns cast in Europe. Though Akbar had initiated the use of light cannons made
of wrought iron, the succeeding Mughal military commanders as well as Maratha and Rajput
armed forces preferred the poorly cast guns made of bronze. The matchlock muskets that
were used in the subcontinent since the latter half of 16th century were much inferior to the
muskets used by the Portuguese on the western coast. Jos Gommans, along with Dirk Kolff,
observed that the gun carriages in the pre-colonial India were deplorable and the subcontinent
lacked the knowledge of blast furnace and finery with water-powered hammer.

In addition to this, another issue, identified by Iqtidar Alam Khan, loomed large in Mughal
India since the 17th century. He argued that the dissemination of matchlock muskets and light
artillery among the common people of the regime had profound impact on the fortunes of the
Empire. Such arming of the common people became a matter of concern for the central
authority as it hampered the peace of the Empire on one hand and made the task of revenue
collection onerous on the other hand. Jahangir had to recruit corps of mounted musketeers
called ‘barqandaz’ to deal with these local disturbances. This policy of combining
horsemanship with musketry, argues Khan, was aimed at enhancing the power of the forces
deployed by the Emperor against the rural armed rebels. But ultimately this enterprise failed
and the Mughals found themselves increasingly impotent in the face of agrarian unrest
spreading to different parts of the Empire in the late 17th century.

The situation, however, changed entirely towards the middle of the 18 th century when the
English East India Company’s troops used cast-iron field guns at Plassey (1757) with deadly
effect. Subsequently, some of the Indian powers such as Mysore, the Nizam of Hyderabad
and Ranjit Singh of Punjab tried to put into use advanced guns under the guidance of
European technicians in battlefields. As evident from the outcome of the Anglo-Mysore wars,
Anglo-Maratha wars and Anglo-Sikh wars, Iqtidar Alam Khan argues that mere acquisition
of cast-iron field guns was not enough when their overall army organization was not in parity
with the new changes.

The story of the firearms in pre-modern India is thus a complex one, claims I.A. Khan. The
initiation of its use led to centralization and then its dissemination among subject population
led to its disintegration. The process of disintegration alongside the shortcomings of Mughal
artillery in the 18th century set the stage for British conquest.

CRITICISM OF IAK

Historians like William Irvine and Douglas Streusand had criticized Iqtidar Alam Khan’s
argument and the “gunpowder thesis” of Hodgson in the context of Mughal India on the
ground that artillery was not solely responsible for making the Mughals invincible and for the
subsequent centralization of the state. Francois Bernier had recorded the significance of
mounted archers in Mughal army over the musketeers. William Irvine, taking cue from
Bernier argues that the speed and swiftness of the cavalrymen proved to be the backbone of
Mughal army. The firearms were basically immobile and only complemented the cavalry in
battlefield. Irfan Habib also stated that it was cavalry, rather than artillery, that had played
important role in occupying strong forts. Douglas Streusand argued that the Mughals neither
produced nor employed firearms in a sophisticated manner as the Europeans or the Ottomans.
Moreover, he observed, the Mughals bought gunpowder in open market instead of
manufacturing it within their own domain.

GOMMANS

Conquests and territorial acquisitions by the Mughals undoubtedly demonstrated impressive

military development, be it in the case of cavalry or artillery. While discussing the expansion,
sustenance and centralization of the Mughal state, the military technology or ‘hardware
components’ have generally been emphasized. Jos Gommans, however, showed how
ecological and geographical factors, along with the diplomatic exchanges and ever-changing
political alliances or ‘fitna’ had determined warfare in pre-colonial India. He argued that
India witnessed two military breakthroughs between 1000 and 1850. The first was the
‘cavalry revolution’ that took place in between 1000-1200 with the intrusion of Turkish
mounted archer. The second breakthrough took place from about 1750 to 1850 when,
according to Gommans, gunpowder revolutionized Indian warfare. These revolutions were
introduced by foreigners who had to cross the ‘inner frontiers’ of the subcontinent and
established their control. The concept of Indian ‘inner frontier’ was put forward by Jan
Heestermann and it entails that pre-colonial India lacked the idea of closed boundaries, as
present in centralized sovereign European nations of the time. In contrast, Indian kingdoms
remained open-ended entities without external boundaries but with numerous inner frontiers.
The landscape of the subcontinent can be divided into two zones – humid zones, facilitating
growth of sedentary society and arid zones. The arid regions traversed by highly mobile
pastoralists, traders and all sorts of warrior bands gave access to resources like cash, cattle
and military recruits, all crucially needed for the exploitation of the sedentary, agrarian
economy. Thus, to wield power, an Indian ruler had to have stakes on both sides. Another
determining factor in Indian warfare was the climate as campaigns had to be conducted in
between October to April to avoid the wrath of monsoon. ‘Fitna’ or changing sides during or
after a battle was a common feature of Mughal warfare. Of course, military superiority could
bring rapid conquests but its consolidation required the extremely malleable politics of
‘fitna’. This game of ‘fitna’ was the further stimulated by a highly monetized military labour
market. Dirk Kolff had observed that the relation of the military labour market with their
employees were defined by the traditions of ‘naukari’/service rather than loyalty to any
particular dynasty. The soldiers looked for a patron competent enough to provide them steady
income and a livelihood. The politics of ‘fitna’ also played an important role in the
disintegration of Mughal Empire, as concluded by Gommans.