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Republic of the Philippines
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, POLICE REGIONAL OFFICE 4A
LAGUNA POLICE PROVINCIAL OFFICE
ALAMINOS MUNICIPAL POLICE STATION
Brgy 3 Poblacion Alaminos, Laguna
FOR : Provincial Director
(Attn: PIB/ )
FROM : Officer In Charge
SUBJECT : Security Survey Inspection Report (Alaminos
MPS)
DATE : February 15, 2021
I. INTRODUCTION:
A. AUTHORITY:
Letter Directive from Chief RIID/R2 dated 11 June 2001
B. INCLUSIVE DATE OF SURVEY:
O200H 29 January 2021
C. Composition of the team:
PEMS Leo Averion, Deputy Chief of Police -Team Leader
PMSG Randy A.Rocero, Chief Intel -Member
PCpl Renie P Cabacungan, Intel Invest -Member
D. ENTRANCE BRIEFING:
The purpose of this survey and inspection is to redefine and reassess
the current security threat to the Municipal Police Station, the current security
measure being adopted, and the security lapses/loopholes that maybe observed that
requires immediate as well as long term remedial measures with the end in view of
preventing compromise of the installation to the enemy.
E. IDENTITY OF PERSONNEL ACCOMPANYING THE SURVEY
TEAM:
Same as Composition of Survey Team.
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F. HISTORY: (See attached)
II. SECURITY THREATS:
A. THREATS TO SECURITY:
The latest processed information on the DT’s as regard their primordial
mission against the installation remains to be on the lowest priority. However, this
station does not discount the possibility of the enemy’s abrupt destructive intentions
against this station, premised on the current Info on the massive enemy built-up along
the neighboring congressional district.
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE INSTALLATION
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
As stated .
C. MISSION OF THE INSPECTION
To determine the weaknesses of the said installation and to strengthen it.
D. FUNCTION OF THE INSTALLATION
E. IMPORTANCE OF THE INSTALLATION TO NATIONAL SECURITY:
In its widest strategic perspective, the installation plays a minor role to
national security of which the stretch of area jurisdiction merely partly dissects the
terrain of Laguna province with that of Batangas. The absence of military installation
in the area similarly adds to its lesser importance.
Technically however, it could play a major role by way of immediate
reinforcement to the nearby LPPSC and Bay Geothermal Plant both situated at Brgy
Bitin, Bay, this province, of which the latter is most likely susceptible sabotage target
by the enemy.
Along the same line, the installation being the forefront and gateway to
Hidden Valley Tourist Resort may prove its worth through its visible protective
posture against possible abduction of tourist/well known personalities at said resort.
F. WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER POLICE & AFP UNITS:
Very satisfactory coordination effort has been established by the
station with LPPSC and SPCPS. A monthly intel coordinating meetings through the
effort of PHQ Intel Div has continuously sustained the timely exchange of intel, thus
further reinforcing collection efforts, validation, and assessments of current enemy
threats prevailing province wide.
III. PHYSICAL SECURITY:
A. Perimeter Barriers:
1. Natural Barriers - Negative
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2. Physical Barriers:
The frontage of the installation facing south commencing from the
main parking gate converted to covered court stretching up to the left side of the
station covering the whole eastern portion utilizes a three (3) feet high concrete fence
superimposed with one (1) feet high decorative steel fence with six meters and four
(4) feet high closing lockable steel gate. The installation’s main gate on the other hand
has a four (4) feet high small size steel decorative fence with two (2) meter wide-open
lockable entrance.
3. Structural Barriers:
The MPS is structurally bounded by the medium size
Municipal Building on the south, while the Municipal Health Office and Alaminos
Fire Station barricade the northern portion of the installation. The eastern and
southern portion of the MPS remains open as these points caters two (2) dissecting
streets. The absence of structural barricades on these areas definitely added to the
station’s vulnerability to bombing attack and enemy’s vantage point for the initial
salvo of fire in case of harassment.
4. Energy Barriers - Negative
5. Animal Barriers - The station has a dog pet which serve as warning
to the guard on post.
B. Security of Building and Structure:
1. Human Barriers:
Front Guard/Sentry is deployed in front of the MPS on 24-
hours basis. Duty front guard/sentry however only immediately covers the whole part
of the installation’s southern portion and part of the eastern side of the MPS. The
northern side representing the back portion of the station while not physically manned
is being patrolled continuously on round - the - clock basis.
2. Structural Barrier:
Aside from primary entrance steel gate, the installation has an
accordion door of eight feet in height and six feet in wide, a medium-size 2 - side
wooden door as main entrance and a single wooden back door. It has a total of twelve
(12) windows, four (4) of which of jalousies construction located at the kitchen. The
accordion door and front door is being kept secured by a key padlock and two (2)
meter long wooden bar serving as its lock while the back door is secured by a
medium-size steel side lock.
3. Energy Barriers - Negative
4. Animal Barriers - Same as the other
C. Guard and Guarding System:
(Please refer to attached Stn defense Plan Roster of Troops)
D. Identification and Control of Personnel and Visitors:
In line with LOI “KALASAG” 2001, the station maintain
identification and control of personnel and visitors by way of requiring those organic
personnel in civilian attire the usage of the official “credit-card” computerized PNP
ID while inside the installation. Civilian/visitors on the other hand are required to log-
on to the station log book designed for the purpose.
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E. Identification and control of Vehicles:
Similarly in consonance with LOI “KALASAG” 2001, it is the
intention of the station in the very near future to implement the decal system among
the marked and unmarked vehicles of the station. However, having merely in
possession of two (2) mobile cars, control of vehicle transport and movement to date
is carried out simply on VOCO basis.
F. Fire Fighting Facilities and Supply:
The station maintains two (2) rechargeable chemical fire
extinguisher for immediate use in case of structural fire. attendant to this, the
installation likewise maintain 200 grams of water on stand-by support. In case of
more serious fire
situation, the Alaminos fire truck is stand-by at the back of the installation. (Please
refer to attached Stn Fire Defense Plan)
G. Power/Water Facilities and Supplies:
The abundant power and water supply poses no immediate
hazard to the installation, although if ever it occurred, contingency supplies of petrol-
fed lighting facilities and dry batteries are available. The same holds true for water
supply wherein the Alaminos Fire Station through previous arrangement had
committed to support the need water supply.
H. Anti-Intrusion Alarm System:
At present, the station has no anti-intrusion alarm system.
However, appropriate representation has already been made with the local
government agency for possible procurement of at least one (1) equipment for the
intended purpose.
I. CCTV Camera:
At present, the station has Four (4) installed CCTV camera
outside and inside of the Station. One focused on the entrance (outside part) of the
Police Station, One focused on the entrance (inside part) and one focused on the
Detention Facility of this Station.
J. Other Utilities and Maintenance:
Adequate ventilation and comport room are enhanced to cater
the needs of the personnel.
IV. PERSONNEL SECURITY:
A. Personnel Strength :
1. Authorized strength based on population ratio = 36
2. Actual strength in relation to population = 1: 1, 486
3. Disposition/Details of Personnel (Pls refer to attached Roster of
personnel)
4. Tactical deployment based on Stn Def Plan (Pls refer to Stn Def
Plan)
B. Security Clearance Program:
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The COP, C, Intel, and Intel operatives have security clearance with
classification up to CONFIDENTIAL. It is now being currently updated through
submission of application for its renewal.
C. Security Education and Program:
All other personnel has to their respective credits undergone various
intel seminars.
D. Labor Turn-over, Absentee Rate, and Morale:
Base on the existing manpower strength, the labor turn-over of the
station has maximized its ceiling to meet the 85-15% personnel deployment with
minimal absentee rate. The morale remains satisfactory.
E. Security Check and Investigation:
The station adopts the CI nominal security check, CBI and PBI of
organic personnel prior to assignment to sensitive positions.
F. Personnel Firepower:
The station has but sufficient long F/A’s and Short F/A’s with
appropriate ammo supply to last for a brief firefight. The equipment are issued
individually and the control of which is basically from the supply PNCO.
G. Transport and Mobility Supply:
The installation has Three (3) mobile utility vehicles utilized for patrol
services. However, the POL supply allocations are insufficient for the intended
purpose.
V. DOCUMENT AND INFORMATION SECURITY:
A. Security Classification of Document:
Classified documents are marked with appropriate security
classification according to respective sensitivity.
B. Flow of Incoming and Outgoing Classified Documents:
Incoming classified documents received goes directly to COP for his
initial consumption. Action required is then coursed to the C, Intel for appropriate
action. Outgoing classified documents are then coursed to DCOP and finally to COP
for his signature/information and final order of transmission to office concerned.
C. Transmission of Outgoing Classified Documents:
The station most often utilized safe hand/special courier in the
transmission of classified documents.
D. Destruction of Classified Documents
Unless otherwise instructed from higher headquarters, destruction of
classified documents are seldom made. Declassified documents on the hand are
destroyed through burning after same have been entered and log with book of
destruction.
E. Storage of Classified Documents:
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Classified documents are stored in a separate steel cabinet secured with
security lock. Only authorized personnel are allowed access to the storage.
VI. COMMUNICATION SECURITY:
A. Physical Security:
The station maintains its separate radio room with limited access to
non-organic personnel of the station.
B. Transmission:
Signal security and use of alternate radio frequencies are being
routinely made while land lines are likewise being utilized whenever practicable.
C. Emission:
Decryption of classified documents is solely being made by C, Intel.
Tone Coding has yet to be applied in the absence of a comprehensive learning
required for its use.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Physical Security:
1. Installation of light to the back side of the installation.
B. Personnel Security - No significant recommendation
1. Personnel Strength - Additional personnel is needed.
C. Document Security - Additional steel cabinet is needed.
EXIT BRIEFING:
Having redefined and reassess the current security threats, security measures
adopted, and security lapses noticed and observed, it is therefore of paramount
importance that above-acted recommendations be accorded immediate attention to
preempt a total compromise not merely of the installation but the very lives of its
personnel.
NOTED BY:
MARJON P. FERNANDEZ
Police Captain
NAME UNIT ASSIGNMENT SCHOOLING
PCPT MARJON P.FERNANDEZ Alaminos MPS, LAGPPO, PRO 4A PSOBC
PMSG Randy A. Rocero Alaminos MPS, LAGPPO, PRO 4A PJSLC
PCpl Renie P Cabacungan Alaminos MPS, LAGPPO, PRO 4A PSBRC
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GENERAL INFORMATION
A. History :
Alamimos Laguna was then one of the barrios of San Pablo City which
was the only town belonging to the province of Batangas. Its initial name was
“TRINCHERA” denoting the presence of long deep ditches. In 1873, DON
CIRILO BAYLON, a wealthy president of Trinchera and with good command of
Spanish, invited Captain General Juan de Alaminos Nivera, Chief Executive of the
province of Batangas whose capital was then Lipa City and presented the petition of
their residents asking that Trinchera be made into a duly recognized town. In less
than two (2) months, Brgy Trinchera was proclaimed as new pueblo or town.
At the same time, DON CIRILO BAYLON was appointed the first
Governadorcillo or town Mayor in concurrent capacity as CAPTAIN DE LOS
CONSTABLES DE PUEBLO or the equivalent of local police chief. In appreciation
to CAPTAIN GENERAL JUAN DE ALAMINOS, the new pueblo was named
“ALAMINOS” in 1873 and was separated from Batangas until 1903.
Today, the town is a third class municipality with a land area of Five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Six (5,476) square hectares with Fifty
Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Three (50,963) inhabitants of the last census of file
2005. It is bounded on the North by Calauan, Laguna, on the East by San Pablo City,
on the West by Sto Tomas, Batangas and on the South by Lipa City. It has fifteen (15)
barangay, four (4) barangays inside Poblacion. Common source of living is
agriculture. As of this date the Mayor is Hon Eladio Masa Magampon MD, with Hon
Ruben Alvares as Vice Mayor. It belongs to the 3rd Congressional District of Laguna.
Alaminos Municipal Police Station is manned by Thirty Seven PNP
personnel: Two (1) PCO, Thirty four (34) PNCO’s and Four (3) NUP’s.
So far, there is no security cases/violation nor criminal cases/activities
involving members of this station. Additionally, there has been no incident of tactical
offensive carried out by the enemy to date at this installation
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KITCHEN LOCKER ROOM
CELL-3 PCR/WCPD ROOM CHIEF OF POLICE
CELL-2
CELL-1
INTEL/OPERATION ROOM INVESTIGATION ROOM
STORAGE ROOM
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Picture of Inspection:
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ALAMINOS MPS OPLAN 0519-01 STATION DEFENSE PLAN
Reference:
Monthly JPSCC meeting in relation to Joint Task Force CALABA; and
Current Situation Report
Task Organization: Annex “A”
I. SITUATION
CPP/NPA/NDF elements in consonance with their renewed program of
waging vigorous offensive action against government forces and installations will attack
Alaminos Municipal Hall and PNP Station at any opportune time utilizing combined
forces from various Zone Committee within STRPC.
a. Enemy Forces:
Current INTSUM and INFOREPS: Undetermined number of CPP/NPA/NDF/DT’s Armed
Bands, Secessionists, Fanatics, Rightist and criminal elements.
b. Friendly Forces:
Laguna Provincial Police Office
LPPSC (Former 406th PPMG)
San Pablo City Components City Police Stations; and other
Adjacent PNP units
c. Assumptions:
1. Enemy of undetermined strength may attack at any opportune time
from all venues approach to harass or capture the Municipal Hall and PNP station,
thereafter destroy records, secure firearms and equipment’s and/or liberate prisoners.
II. MISSION:
In connection with its present mission and coordination with the adjacent
friendly forces, Alaminos PNP Station will depend and secure the Municipal Hall and
other government vital installation to repel the enemy from attacking forces and conduct
counter attack to capture them.
III. EXECUTION:
A. Concept of Operation:
1. All available personnel will occupy their area of line of defense upon
hearing three (3) successive shots by the guard who first notice the enemy. The
concepts of COKOA shall always be observed.
Cover and Concealment: The station has a 6 ft high concrete fence
which covers the front portion of the station. Facing South, commencing from the rear
parking gate on the Municipal building as well as the 4ft / two (2) meter wide lockable
decorative steel gate and the 4 ft steel gate on the side of the covered court. The North
and West side of the station was covered by the two (2) storey Municipal Bldg and the
fire station. This barrier will serve as cover to the PNP personnel as line of defense.
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Observation of Field of Fire: In case of enemy attack, personnel
covering the rear Municipal building or parking lot will occupy the second floor of the
building as an observation point to monitor enemy’s field of fire.
Key Terrain: Intel PNCO shall familiar with the terrain of possible
advancement and withdrawal of enemy to be disseminated to reinforcing friendly forces.
Obstacle : The Municipal Building and the concrete perimeter fence
serve as structural and perimeter barriers while the front guard and other duty PNP
personnel covers the whole security of the police station.
Avenues of Enemy Approach and Withdrawal: The two (2) dissecting
streets on the Eastern and Southern portion of the station assess to have been possible
avenues of enemy approach as well as their withdrawal due to the absence of structural
barriers. The terrain is heading the Sitio Tamlong and Brgy Limao of Calauan, Laguna,
and the enemy sighted area of the Municipal countryside’s.
a. Case scenario if the attack is made during Day Time
1. The guard on post shall immediately position
himself in front of the station and make necessary cover for possible
harassment of the aggressor.
2. Other duty personnel will position themselves on
their respective areas of concern to maintain perimeter security and
prevent the force entry of the enemy.
3. Any of the personnel will immediately inform the
COP, DCOP for proper action and MTOC / Radio operator on duty will
inform PTOC and adjacent police / friendly forces for assistance.
b. Case scenario if the attack is made during night time
1. Guards on post shall preposition himself in front of
the perimeter defense and maintain stronghold at their respective position
(to enable other personnel to position themselves from their respective
position)
2. Other personnel who trapped inside the Police
station shall maintain their position by holding their guns to establish
strong position therein.
3. Immediately inform the COP, DCOP for proper
actions and MTOC/ Radio operator will inform PTOC and other adjacent
friendly forces for possible assistance.
IV. Coordinating Instructions:
1. All orders shall emanate from COP or in the absence, the DCOP shall
take over.
2. If the attack will be at night time, all lights inside the police station
should be turned off.
3. Radio operator shall immediately contact higher headquarters and
nearby police stations for reinforcement.
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4. Personnel from PACs, PADs, Traffic, and Patrol of this station shall
lead the reinforcement team for counter-attack against the enemy.
5. PRP shall be at the Alaminos Central School.
6. Perform other instruction as directed by the COP.
V. SERVICE SUPPORT:
a. Administrative Support:
a.1 Initial medical evacuation area will be the nearby hospital.
a.2 All casualties and injured personnel will immediately delivered to
nearby hospitals for medical treatment.
b. Logistical Support:
1. Medicines, ammunitions and other supplies must be maintained in
adequate level.
2. Other logistical procedures will apply.
VI. COMMUNICATION AND SIGN:
A. Alarm and Signal
Execution of Signal:
i. Three (3) successive gunshots or long siren from
Alaminos Police station.
All Clear / Withdraw signal.
ii. Two (2) consecutive short sirens.
B. Command and Control
iii. Alaminos Municipal Police Station
Daniel Fandiño Street, Brgy. 3 poblacion
Alaminos Laguna
Acknowledge
MARJON P. FERNANDEZ
Police Captain
ANNEX “A”
TASK ORGANIZATION
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PCPT MARJON P. FERNANDEZ - TASK FORCE COMMANDER
PEMS LEO AVERION - ASST TFC
POST NR: 1 FRONT GUARD
(Covers the front, left and right portion of the station)
PCPL Paolo V. Talento
POST NR: 2 PERIMETER FENCE RIGHT SIDE OF THE STATION
PSSg Mark Allan Verastique
POST NR: 3 PERIMETER FENCE LEFT SIDE OF THE STATION
PSSg Aimee Handug Magunot
POST NR: 5 REAR PORTION OF ALAMINOS POLICE STATION (HEALTH CENTER)
PCpl Rytchel Galletes Asuncion
REINFORCEMENT TEAM FROM PACs, PADS, and PATROL
MOBILE PATROL PERSONNEL:
PSSg Vicente Esguerra
PMsg Hillario Sombilla Jr
MOBILE PATROL PERSONNEL:
PSSg Jeffrey O.Umali
PCPL Cecil Hermenigildo Anon
PADs PERSONNEL:
PEMS Victor Dimasapit
PSSG Darwilito M.Chavez
JAILER / FRONT GUARD / MTOC:
PCPL Paolo V. Talento
Acknowledge
MARJON P. FERNANDEZ
Police Captain
ANNEX “B”
TASK ORGANIZATION
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PCPT MARJON P. FERNANDEZ - TASK FORCE COMMANDER
PEMS LEO AVERION - ASST TFC
POST NR: 1 FRONT GUARD
(Covers the front, left and right portion of the station)
PSSG Ferdinand Daquigan
POST NR: 2 PERIMETER FENCE RIGHT SIDE OF THE STATION
PSMS Leigh Michel Noriesta Veracruz
POST NR: 3 PERIMETER FENCE LEFT SIDE OF THE STATION
PCMS Jean Bimeda Ebron
POST NR: 5 REAR PORTION OF ALAMINOS POLICE STATION (HEALTH CENTER)
PCpl Karen Cadavez
REINFORCEMENT TEAM FROM PACs, PADS, and PATROL
Mobile Patrol PERSONNEL:
PSMS Fabian Gapiangao
PAT James Fernandez
MOBILE PATROL PERSONNEL:
PSSg Mark Allan Venerayan Verastigue
MOTORCOPS / PADs PERSONNEL:
PCms Fabian Gapiangao
JAILER / FRONT GUARD / MTOC:
PSSg Ferdinand Ravanzo Daquigan
Acknowledge
MARJON P. FERNANDEZ
Police Captain
ANNEX “C”
TASK ORGANIZATION
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PCPT MARJON P. FERNANDEZ - TASK FORCE COMMANDER
PEMS LEO AVERION - ASST TFC
POST NR: 1 FRONT GUARD
(Covers the front, left and right portion of the station)
PSMS Bernard Tuzon Anciado
PMSg Arly Cabigas Salapa
POST NR: 2 PERIMETER FENCE RIGHT SIDE OF THE STATION
PSMS Leigh Michel Noriesta Veracruz
POST NR: 3 PERIMETER FENCE LEFT SIDE OF THE STATION
PCMS Jean Bimeda Ebron
PSSg Aimee Handug Magunot
POST NR: 5 REAR PORTION OF ALAMINOS POLICE STATION (HEALTH CENTER)
PCPL Karen Cadavez
PCpl Rytchell Galletes Asuncion
REINFORCEMENT TEAM FROM PACs, PADS, and PATROL
PACBASE PERSONNEL:
PEMS Victor Dimasapit
PSMS Fabian Gapiangao
PSSG Darwilito M.Chavez
PAT James Fernandez
MOBILE PATROL PERSONNEL:
PSSg Vicente Esguerra
PMsg Hillario Sombilla Jr
PSSg Jeffrey O.Umali
PAT Cecil Hermenigildo Conda Añon
MOTORCOPS / PAD PERSONNEL:
PSMS Fabian Gapiangao
Pat Dave Vergel Dayok
JAILER / FRONT GUARD / MTOC:
PSSg Ferdinand Ravanzo Daquigan
PCPL Paolo V. Talento
Acknowledge
MARJON P.FERNANDEZ
Police Captain
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