P R O V I D I N G P R A C T I C E - O R I E N T E D I N F O R M AT I O N T O F P E s A N D A L L I E D P R O F E S S I O N A L S

FIRE PROTECTION

FALL 2001 Issue No. 12

Mission
ALSO:

23 FIRE
FIRE PROTECTION
PROTECTION FOR
FOR
THE
THE OFFSHORE
OFFSHORE INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY

Critical 30 UL 2360: A NEW TEST

FOR WET BENCH
PLASTICS

Fire Protection page 9

35 FIRE SAFETY DESIGN OF
THE FUNDACIÓN CAIXA
GALICIA

43 LESSONS LEARNED FROM

A CARBON DIOXIDE
SYSTEM ACCIDENT
 FIRE PROTECTION

Fire Protection Engineering (ISSN 1524-900X) is

published quarterly by the Society of Fire Protection
Engineers (SFPE). The mission of Fire Protection
Engineering is to advance the practice of fire protection
contents FA L L 2 0 0 1

engineering and to raise its visibility by providing 9

information to fire protection engineers and allied COVER STORY
professionals. The opinions and positions stated are
the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of SFPE.
MISSION-CRITICAL FACILITIES: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
Editorial Advisory Board
E-COMMERCE
Fire protection systems must ensure continuous operation of computer networks, Web
Carl F. Baldassarra, P.E., Schirmer Engineering Corporation
sites, and communications in order for businesses to survive in today’s environment.
Don Bathurst, P.E. Ray Schmid, P.E.
Russell P. Fleming, P.E., National Fire Sprinkler Association
Douglas P. Forsman, Firescope Mid-America 3 VIEWPOINT
Morgan J. Hurley, P.E., Society of Fire Protection Engineers Loss Prevention Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Industry
William E. Koffel, P.E., Koffel Associates Greg Jakubowski, P.E., CSP, Merck Safety and Environment Engineering
Jane I. Lataille, P.E.
4 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Margaret Law, M.B.E., Arup Fire
Ronald K. Mengel, Honeywell, Inc. 7 FLASHPOINTS
Warren G. Stocker, Jr., Safeway, Inc. Fire Protection Industry News
Beth Tubbs, P.E., International Conference of Building
Officials
23 PROACTIVE VS. PRESCRIPTIVE FIRE PROTECTION FOR THE
OFFSHORE INDUSTRY
Regional Editors Performance-based criteria that use the latest modeling programs are begin-
U.S. H EARTLAND ning to grow. This article addresses performance-based criteria for fire protec-
John W. McCormick, P.E., Code Consultants, Inc.
tion in the offshore industry.
U.S. M ID -ATLANTIC John A. Alderman, P.E., CSP, and Marlon Harding, P.E.
Robert F. Gagnon, P.E., Gagnon Engineering, Inc.
U.S. N EW E NGLAND 30 UL 2360: A NEW TEST FOR WET BENCH PLASTICS
Thomas L. Caisse, P.E., C.S.P., Robert M. Currey & Semiconductor cleanrooms, while they protect highly sensitive chips from
Associates, Inc.
damaging particles, still have fire protection concerns that, if not addressed,
U.S. S OUTHEAST can ruin millions of dollars of property.
Jeffrey Harrington, P.E., The Harrington Group, Inc.
Jane I. Lataille, P.E.
U.S. W EST C OAST
Marsha Savin, Gage-Babcock & Associates, Inc. 35 FIRE SAFETY DESIGN OF THE FUNDACIÓN CAIXA GALICIA
A SIA BUILDING IN SPAIN
Peter Bressington, P.Eng., Arup Fire A fire protection case study regarding the special requirements of a new
A USTRALIA cultural center in Spain.
Richard Custer, Arup Fire
George Faller, C.Eng.
C ANADA
J. Kenneth Richardson, P.Eng., Ken Richardson Fire 43 LESSONS LEARNED FROM A CARBON DIOXIDE SYSTEM
Technologies, Inc. ACCIDENT
N EW Z EALAND Several lessons can be learned from an accidental carbon dioxide
Carol Caldwell, P.E., Caldwell Consulting
extinguishing system discharge.
U NITED K INGDOM Morgan J. Hurley, P.E., and James G. Bisker, P.E.
Dr. Louise Jackman, Loss Prevention Council
Publishing Advisory Board 48 CAREERS/CLASSIFIEDS
Bruce Larcomb, P.E., BOCA International
50 SFPE RESOURCES
Douglas J. Rollman, Gage-Babcock & Associates, Inc.
George E. Toth, Rolf Jensen & Associates 56 FROM THE TECHNICAL DIRECTOR
Personnel
A Paradigm Change
Morgan J. Hurley, P.E.
P UBLISHER
Kathleen H. Almand, P.E., Executive Director, SFPE Cover illustration by Bill Frymire/Masterfile
T ECHNICAL E DITOR
Morgan J. Hurley, P.E., Technical Director, SFPE For more information about the Society of Fire Protection Engineers or Fire Protection
Engineering magazine, try us at www.sfpe.org.
A DVERTISING /S ALES
Terry Tanker, Penton Media, Inc. Invitation to Submit Articles: For information on article submission to Fire
M ANAGING E DITOR Protection Engineering, go to http://www.sfpe.org/publications/invitation.html.
Joe Pulizzi, Custom Media Group, Penton Media, Inc.
A RT D IRECTOR
Subscription and address change correspondence should be sent to: Fire Protection Engineering,
Pat Lang, Custom Media Group, Penton Media, Inc. Penton Media, Inc., 1300 East 9th Street, Cleveland, OH 44114 USA. Tel: 216.931.9566. Fax: 216.696.7668.
C OVER D ESIGN E-mail: jpulizzi@penton.com.
Dave Bosak, Custom Media Group, Copyright © 2001, Society of Fire Protection Engineers. All rights reserved.
Penton Media, Inc.
Fire Protection Engineering 1
viewpoint

Loss Prevention Challenges

in the Pharmaceutical Industry
have been awaiting a breakthrough cal benefits of products to patients,
treatment. Because of the complexity of avoiding exposure to employees
this business, pharmaceutical facilities or the environment of small
encompass a wide range of hazards, amounts of active pharmaceutical
from bulk chemical facilities, clean pro- or biological ingredients during an
duction facilities, and laboratories, to incident which can be a concern,
warehouses and site utilities. especially in large-scale manufac-
A primary goal of any loss preven- turing operations.
tion program in the pharmaceutical 8. Conducting safe construction and
industry is to prevent an incident from facility rehabilitation operations in
occurring. If prevention is effective, and around operating plants.
extensive suppression efforts will not Scientists and manufacturing employ-
be needed, which is a philosophy not ees who are used to demanding the
unlike that of many pharmaceutical application of excellent science in their
By Greg Jakubowski, P.E., CSP products. Extensive process safety pro- daily operations demand the same stan-
grams, chemical handling training, and dard of performance from fire and loss

T he pharmaceutical industry dis-

covers, develops, manufactures,
and markets a broad range of
innovative products to improve human
and animal health. Think of where the
site master planning assist in prevent-
ing incidents. However, there are
numerous fire protection challenges
facing the pharmaceutical industry
today, including:
prevention experts when applying solu-
tions to these challenges. At the same
time, these challenges must be met in a
cost-effective manner to meet, if not
exceed, the expectations of our cus-
world would be today without peni- 1. The ability to understand and tomers.
cillin, without vaccines that prevent a apply the codes and standards of Effective efforts to control fires and
myriad of infectious diseases, and each country in which facilities are innovative means of fire prevention are
without modern products that control located. The business is growing key challenges to the pharmaceutical
cholesterol, prevent heart attacks, ease significantly in South America, industry as it strives to respond to soci-
pain, and reverse the anaphylactic Asia-Pacific, and Africa. ety’s needs for life-saving medicines
effects of something as potentially life- 2. Applying sprinklers that must meet and vaccines, improving quality of life,
threatening as a bee sting. Pharmaceuti- extra hazard, quick response, and and having a positive impact on overall
cals not only save lives but add signifi- insurance company requirements healthcare costs.
cantly to quality of life, and do so while presenting clean surfaces in
while controlling overall health-care compliance with good manufactur- Greg Jakubowski, P.E., CSP, is with
costs. ing practices. Merck Safety and Environment
The pharmaceutical business is 3. Effective control of static ignition Engineering.
complex, with years, and sometimes sources in flammable liquid and
decades, of research required to dust operations.
discover a beneficial molecule, test it 4. Evaluating alternatives to sprinklers
for efficacy and safety, determine its that not only minimize collateral
value in the human body, and produce damage, but also reduce the need
and distribute it. This complexity, and for control of fire water runoff.
the length of time required to bring a 5. Minimizing loss potential in high-
product to market, engenders not only value research, manufacturing, and
a highly competitive business environ- storage areas. This includes protec-
ment, but also one that creates unusual tion of susceptible areas from
loss prevention challenges. Even a external hazards that may expose
small incident can prevent a product and impact our business.
from coming to market for months, or 6. Safe handling of flammable liquids
perhaps years. This delay can have a in research laboratories.
devastating effect for patients that may 7. Notwithstanding the pharmacologi-

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 3

 letters to the editor

We are writing this letter to comment on the MIC problem which Mr. Clarke discuss- sprinklers, in cooperation with the U.S.
the subject matter addressed in recent arti- es in his article as well as the performance Consumer Product Safety Commission, has
cles by Edward K. Budnick (“Automatic of the recently recalled Central Omega announced a replacement program. Full
Sprinkler System Reliability” page 7) and sprinklers. information on the program and the specif-
Bruce H. Clarke (“Microbiologically Using the Omega case as an example, ic models of sprinklers involved is available
Influenced Corrosion in Fire Sprinkler the reliability of that particular design at www.sprinklerreplacement.com.
Systems” page 14) in Fire Protection degraded as a function of years in service.
Engineering Issue No. 9. These articles Test data accumulated in our laboratory, as
both address matters associated with the well as test data collected by others
reliability of fire sprinkler systems. involved in evaluations of Omega sprinkler I am writing regarding the recent article
We agree that traditionally fire sprinklers reliability, demonstrated a consistent drop “Automatic Sprinkler System Reliability” by
have proven to be highly reliable devices, in reliability as number of years in service Edward K. Budnick. While it is true that
which serve as a first line of defense to increased. We have seen, for example, reli- many of the fire sprinkler reliability studies
insure the life and property safety in build- ability of Omega sprinklers we have evalu- are based on the use of older sprinklers,
ings in which they are installed. We also ated drop below 70 percent after several it’s not as if we have no information on the
believe that by combining emerging new years of service. The inference to be drawn performance of newer sprinklers.
technologies and feedback from field ser- from this is that resulting performance will Residential sprinklers, for example, have
vice and testing records, newly developed be significantly less than the 90 percent-plus only been available since 1981. Of 551 fires
fire sprinkler systems can even more reli- reliability one would expect an individual in sprinklered residential occupancies
able. However, we feel it important to fire sprinkler to show to have as described reported to Operation Life Safety between
share our observations relating to informa- in the Budnick article. 1983 and 1995, 90 percent were controlled
tion on reliability of specific, existing sys- More recently, the Central GB family of by a single sprinkler, with another 8 per-
tems as may relate to development of new sprinklers has been the subject of notifica- cent controlled by two sprinklers operating.
fire sprinklers. tions from UL and Factory Mutual and an Scottsdale, Arizona, which published a
As Mr. Budnick points out, existing relia- “Informational Bulletin” from the California report on 10 years of residential sprinkler
bility data is mainly based on older styles State Fire Marshall warning of potential use beginning in 1985, found that 41 of 44
of sprinkler heads. Data for newer fire problems. Test results from evaluations of fires (93 percent) were successfully sup-
sprinkler designs is generally not included. almost 300 GB heads taken from service for pressed by only one or two operating
In addition, and of primary importance in various periods of time at different loca- sprinklers. Two of the three fires that
his analysis, reliability of fire sprinklers is tions without fire occurrence show a similar opened more than two sprinklers were
treated as a whole regardless of possible relationship between failure levels and flammable liquid arson fires. In Prince
fundamental differences in design and years in service to that of the Omega mod- Georges County, Maryland, residential
operating principles on which individual els which were the subject of an earlier sprinklers have been required since 1992,
sprinkler designs are based. We believe that CPSC recall. These levels of reliability are and were involved in 83 fires by August of
fire sprinkler reliability information for dif- unacceptable and suggest problems with 1998. In 72 of them (87 percent) only a sin-
ferent mechanical/design technologies product design and/or manufacture. gle sprinkler activated, with two sprinklers
should be compiled separately since the In terms of the subject matter of the handling another 6 percent of the fires. The
more widely accepted designs may work Budnick article, it is clearly crucial to pre- high percentage of one-sprinkler and two-
on quite different principles, and individual vent production of low-reliability “not sprinkler operations in all of these reports
model types themselves can literally acceptable” designs in the future so that indicates that sprinkler reliability is not
account for millions of installations. such sprinklers are not introduced to the something of the past.
If data from such analyses could be market. Our community needs to learn Recent fire sprinkler recalls and replace-
applied readily, “not acceptable designs” or from recent recalls and the information ment programs attest to the sprinkler indus-
designs with potentially low reliability they have provided us, and we also need try’s commitment to near-zero tolerance of
could be isolated more readily and rejected to prevent such failures from happening sprinklers that are not reliable. A substantial
than at present. In addition, this approach again. effort is underway to ensure that potential
would provide an opportunity for the fire problem sprinklers do not remain in place
safety community cooperatively to develop Joseph B. Zicherman, Ph.D. to eventually damage the historically
reliability testing protocols for fire sprinkler Fire Cause Analysis remarkable performance statistics.
and associated system components before Point Richmond, CA
new designs are introduced. Such an Russell P. Fleming, P.E.
approach is absolutely consistent with Vice President of Engineering
assessments needed to better understand Editor’s Note: Since the receipt of this let- National Fire Sprinkler Association
environmental or aging effects typified by ter, the manufacturer of the GB series of Patterson, NY

4 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

flashpoints
fire protection industry news

JOHNSTON, RI — New fire protection research by industrial and commercial

New property insurer FM Global and its affiliate Factory Mutual Research has identified
an uncommon but realistic scenario where K14 Early Suppression-Fast Response

Research (ESFR) sprinklers, used in some warehouse protection applications, may fail to
perform as intended. Specifically, the findings revealed certain ignition scenarios
can affect the K14 sprinkler’s ability to suppress a fire in buildings over 40 feet
Results (12.2 m) high.

Promote K14 As a result, FM Global no longer recommends to its policyholders the use of
K14 sprinklers as an alternative to in-rack sprinklers in buildings over 40 feet
(12.2 m) high. Rather, the company advises that a combination of in-rack and
Guideline ceiling sprinklers be installed according to FM Global property loss prevention
engineering guidelines.
Revision The findings are the result of FM Global’s long-range sprinkler technology
research program. Additional research has revealed that this storage configuration
issue does not affect K25 ESFR sprinklers installed in 45-foot (13.7 m)-high build-
ings nor K14 or K25 sprinklers installed in buildings up to 40 feet (12.2 m) high.

For additional installation guidelines on ESFR sprinklers, visit

www.fmglobal.com or call FM Global Customer Services at 781.255.6681.

WASHINGTON, DC — The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)

O-Ring Fire and Central Sprinkler Company, an affiliate of Tyco Fire Products LP, of Lansdale,
PA, are announcing a voluntary replacement program. The company will provide
Sprinklers free parts and labor to replace 35 million Central fire sprinklers with O-ring seals.
The program also includes a limited number of O-ring models sold by Gem
Sprinkler Company and Star Sprinkler, Inc., totaling about 167,000 sprinklers.
Recall
Central initiated this action because it discovered the performance of these
Announced O-ring sprinklers can degrade over time. These sprinkler heads can corrode or
minerals, salts, and other contaminants in water can affect the rubber O-ring
seals. These factors could cause the sprinklers not to activate in a fire. Central is
providing newer fire sprinklers that do not use O-ring seals and is voluntarily
launching this program to provide enhanced protection to its sprinkler customers.
This is the third-largest replacement program in CPSC history.

Central will provide, free of charge, replacement sprinklers and the labor
needed to replace the sprinklers. Central will arrange for the installation by using
either its own Central Field Service crews or by contracting with professional
sprinkler contractors.

For more information, go to

http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml01/01201.html.

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 7

 Telecommunications
and e-Commerce

By Ray Schmid, P.E. FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN

SYSTEMS

M any believe that the computer

is humanity’s greatest
achievement. The past thirty
to forty years have witnessed vast
improvement on this amazing techno-
In order to fully understand the way
fire protection systems are used to pro-
tect modern data centers and telecom-
munications facilities, it is important to
logical achievement and the benefits understand the relationship between
of advancements in information pro- the computer hardware and the electri-
cessing. Financial transactions, medical cal and mechanical systems that serve
breakthroughs, power generation, the them.
construction industry, national defense, This relationship is most evident by
and the globalization of economies are the amount of heat that is generated by
all due to the power of the computer modern digital equipment, such as
and the sharing of information. computer servers and telephone switch-
While the most obvious of these ing equipment. Older systems, as could
advancements may be the Internet, be expected, were much larger and
advancements in telecommunications bulkier than today’s digital equipment.
technology have similarly revolution- Current digital hardware takes up far
ized how businesses operate. As these less space than earlier-generation
technological breakthroughs continue, equipment occupied and generates a
society becomes more dependent on large amount of heat that must be con-
their performance and reliability. For tinuously removed. Depending on the
example, consider the importance of
computer operations on air traffic con-
trol, nuclear power generation, national
Providing Fire specific equipment and its physical
configuration, failure can occur within a
matter of ten or fifteen minutes if con-
defense, surgical procedures, and finan- tinuous cooling is not provided. Typical
cial transactions.
Maintaining the operability of com- Protection for mechanical systems that provide this
cooling capacity will be discussed in
puter networks, Web sites, and commu- more detail later in this article.
nications has become an absolute This “compression of technology”
necessity, and there are a number of
ways that businesses ensure their relia-
Mission-Critical has obvious benefits, but there is
another more intrinsic price to be paid.
bility. This article will discuss the way For example, telecommunications
fire protection systems, both passive
and active, are used to meet the impor- Facilities switching sites can now process calls at
much higher rates in relatively small
tant goal of continuous operation and facilities, serving very large geographi-
mission continuity. cal areas as a result. Consequently, the

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 9

 importance of an individual site Reliability Council, an organization a failure of the public water supply
becomes that much more critical, since chartered by the FCC, issued its Report occur.
a fire at a single facility can have such to the Nation, which included recom-
a widespread effect. mended fire prevention and protection DETECTION STRATEGIES
Another example of this is a facility strategies for major telecommunications
that maintains Web site hosting for providers. The FCC continues the Sophisticated fire alarm and detection
businesses. Web site addresses have efforts of this organization, which is systems, fire prevention practices, com-
become as essential to a business as a now known as the Network Reliability partmentation, fire suppression, and, in
phone number, allowing clients and and Interoperability Council. some instances, smoke management
customers the opportunity to view Although these regulatory forces exist also serve to provide redundant levels
products and services, and more impor- and provide criteria for these facilities, of fire protection. Perhaps the most crit-
tantly, make transactions. As the value arguably the most compelling factor dri- ical of these fire protection systems is
of Web sites increases, the need to ving the need for reliable systems is in the area of detection. Detection sys-
have them continuously available market forces. The competitive nature tems serve the basic function of alerting
increases as well, and many businesses of the industries, be they telecommuni- building occupants of a fire condition,
expect guaranteed operability of the cations, e-commerce, the stock market, but are also used routinely to control
Web hosting center. or financial institutions, simply demands the release of fire suppression systems
Continuous operation of a telecom- mission continuity. such as preaction sprinkler and clean
munications facility, Web hosting cen- Mission continuity is assured for facil- agent systems. Normally, these functions
ter, or data center requires reliable, ities through the use of redundant are controlled by standard spot-type
and in many cases, redundant power, power supplies, redundant mechanical ionization and photoelectric smoke
cooling, fire protection, and security systems, and cutting-edge fire protec- detectors, although heat detection,
systems. Building and fire codes tion systems. Primary and secondary flame detection, and other methods
address some of these issues, but the electrical switchgear, uninterruptible may be used where they are more
unique requirements of these facilities power supplies (UPS) and batteries, appropriate for the specific hazard or
demand much more. For a number of and standby generators provide self-suf- application. Standard spot-type smoke
years, the National Fire Protection ficient electrical services. It is common detectors and other devices that detect
Association (NFPA) has published for facilities to be equipped with suffi- fire conditions prior to the time at
NFPA 75, Protection of Electronic cient standby generator capacity and which they threaten the building or
Computer/Data Processing Equipment, fuel storage for more than a week of occupants are referred to as Early
to address fire protection requirements secondary power generation. Similarly, Warning Fire Detection (EWFD).
for computer rooms. Recently, the stored water may be provided to serve Probably the single most important
NFPA created a technical committee to certain types of cooling systems should factor affecting the design of EWFD
assist in the development of a
new standard, NFPA 76,
Protection of
Telecommunications
Facilities. This standard will Ceiling
specifically address fire pro-
tection criteria for telecom-
Return Return
munications facilities using
air air
both prescriptive and perfor- Computer
flow flow
mance-based approaches. rack
These NFPA documents are
not the only sources for deter-
mining appropriate fire pro- Typical
tection requirements. FM CRAH
Global also has requirements unit
for these types of facilities that
Supply
apply when the facility is air flow,
insured by a Factory Mutual typical Raised
affiliate. These can also serve floor
as good practice for those that
are not insured by an FM affil-
iate. The Federal Floor pedestals not shown for clarity
Communications Commission Discharge Slab
(FCC) is also concerned with
reliability and operability of
telecommunications facilities.
In 1992, The Network Figure 1. Typical raised-floor computer space airflow pattern

10 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

systems is the airflow conditions within electric detectors are probably more appropriate action. Due to their high
the space. For example, Figure 1 shows appropriate. In addition, multicriteria sensitivity, VEWFD are not generally
a typical raised-floor computer space detectors and complex algorithms pro- used to release fire suppression sys-
and the airflow patterns that are gener- vided with some detection software are tems; however, in certain applications it
ated by the computer room air-han- becoming more popular in mission-criti- may be appropriate to use them for this
dling (CRAH) units. In this example, cal applications due their ability to purpose. When using VEWFD to
the CRAH units draw air from a zone more completely analyze fire signatures release suppression systems, isolation
above the equipment racks (servers, and screen out false signals. of the space from external smoke
switches, etc.) into the top of the CRAH sources and nuisance alarms must be
unit. The air is conditioned and dis- BEYOND TRADITIONAL carefully controlled.
charged at the bottom of the unit into FIRE DETECTION Air-sampling smoke detectors are
the raised floor space. When the air is probably the most common method of
discharged into the raised floor, a pres- A reduction in spacing may be suffi- providing VEWFD. The detection sys-
sure is developed which forces the air cient to accomplish the goal of detect- tems normally consist of a detection
up through perforated floor tiles. ing a fire condition and releasing a sup- unit, an aspirating air pump, a network
Supply air in the raised floor can be pression system before the occupants of sampling pipes, and related appurte-
10°C (50°F) or less. As this air filters up of the facility are threatened. However, nances. The detection unit contains the
through the equipment racks and EWFD is generally considered to be air pump, the detector, power supply,
adjoining aisles, the equipment is incapable of detecting an incipient fire filters, and electronic interfaces to pro-
cooled. This continuous cooling condition prior to the time at which it vide annunciation and connection to
process is essential to the data center or affects modern digital computer equip- external fire alarm systems or displays.
telecommunications equipment. Failure ment. According to the FCC’s Network System piping (typically 20 mm [0.75
or shutdown of the cooling systems Reliability Council Report to the Nation, inch] CPVC) is laid out in a systematic
will require shutdown of the electrical as much as 95 percent of all damage pattern, and small holes called sam-
power systems within a matter of min- caused to computer and digital switch- pling ports are drilled into the piping.
utes, which is literally a doomsday sce- ing equipment by fires can be charac- The sampling ports are spaced accord-
nario for the facility. terized as nonthermal damage. What ing to the rules of conventional spot-
While the basic concept is straightfor- this shows is that the biggest risk to type smoke detectors, unless a reduced
ward, the airflow patterns raise a num- continuous operation in these facilities spacing is desired based upon the risk
ber of important issues that affect from fire is the smoke, not the fire factors associated with the hazard being
smoke detector location and spacing. itself. Smoldering combustion of one or protected. For example, the spacing of
First, NFPA 72, The National Fire Alarm two circuit boards may produce a heat sampling ports may be reduced to 18
Code requires smoke detector spacing release rate of one or two kilowatts. By m2 (200 ft2) if earlier detection is
in areas of high air movement to be comparison, the heat release rate from desired. It should be noted that these
reduced. This reduction in normal spac- a typical trash can fire is on the order detectors are more reliable in high air
ing is dependant upon the rate at of 15 kW2 or higher. However, relatively velocity environments and are not gov-
which air is circulated in the space, small amounts of smoke and erned by the same rules as spot smoke
expressed as air changes per hour (or hydrochloric acid, a common byproduct detectors with regard to high air move-
minute). It would not be at all uncom- of combustion of PVC cables and digital ment. The resulting piping and sam-
mon to have a required spacing of as circuit boards, can very effectively dam- pling ports form a “zone” of detection,
little as 11.25 m2 (125 ft2) per detector. age digital servers and switches. since the detector cannot determine
When designing EWFD for spaces Detecting combustion byproducts which sampling port(s) on a given pipe
containing modern computer and digi- from these low-energy fires requires a run is drawing in smoke.
tal switching equipment, it is important more sophisticated technology. Two Figure 2 shows a typical air-sampling
to be aware of the differences between common methods of detecting fires of system piping network. The detection
photoelectric and ionization detectors, this magnitude are through the use of system operates by drawing air in
and their performance in areas of high air-sampling smoke-detection systems through the sampling ports, through
air movement. Photoelectric detectors or high-sensitivity laser spot detectors. the piping, and back to the detector
perform better than ionization detectors Detectors such as these that can detect where the sampled air is first filtered
in detecting smoldering fires that pro- products of combustion before they and then analyzed. The detector then
duce larger smoke particles.1 substantially threaten equipment in the determines whether the air sample is
Photoelectric detectors also tend to be space are referred to as Very Early contaminated with smoke or is “clean.”
less susceptible to high air movement, Warning Fire Detectors (VEWFD). The detector may also have software
although there are a number of ioniza- When using these systems, the goal is that can analyze particle size to screen
tion detectors designed for installation generally to provide notification to facil- out unwanted alarms such as dust,
in areas of high air velocity. Given that ity staff that can then intervene to insects, etc. The air is then vented back
the types of fires likely to be generated remove the failed unit from service, dis- into the protected area. It is important
in data centers and telecommunications connect electrical service to the equip- to note that as smoke is drawn into
equipment spaces are low-energy smol- ment rack, extinguish the fire with a one or more sampling ports, it could
dering fires, it would follow that photo- hand-held extinguisher, or take other be mixed with noncontaminated air

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 11

 Typical
sampling port

CRAH

Air-sampling Note: Vented endcap serves Typical equipment

system detection unit as a sampling port cabinets (racks)

Figure 2. Typical air-sampling piping network

that is drawn in through other sampling to alert facility staff of an abnormal borhood of 0.15%/m (0.5 %/ft.). Air-
points on the same piping run. This condition at the detector. A subsequent sampling systems by comparison may
can result in the dilution of smoke as it “Level 2” alarm would indicate that the be capable of detecting smoke obscura-
is transported back to the actual detec- level of smoke sampled by the detector tion levels as low as 0.005%/m
tor for analysis. This dilution effect has increased, requiring compartmenta- (0.0015%/ft.). It is important to recall,
becomes more pronounced as the tion of the space. This may initiate clos- however, that there is the potential for
number of sampling ports is increased ing smoke dampers, sending additional dilution of the smoke sample as it is
along a given pipe run. Therefore, a alarms to facility staff, or shutting down drawn back to the detector. Therefore,
reduction in sampling port spacing (i.e., the air supply from outside the protect- the effective sensitivity at a given sam-
more sampling ports) needs to be bal- ed area. A “Level 3” alarm may result in pling port may not be substantially
anced with the potential for diluting the activating the fire alarm system notifica- higher than that of a spot-type laser
smoke sample. In some cases, this may tion devices, releasing fire suppression detector. The overall effectiveness of
necessitate shorter pipe runs, additional systems, or transmitting an alarm condi- the two technologies is very much a
detectors, or both. tion to an off-site monitoring facility. function of the specific application; in
When smoke is identified, the detec- The functions described above are particular, the ambient conditions and
tor is normally capable of displaying a certainly not unique to air-sampling the desired performance objective.
number of alarm “thresholds” that detectors. They can also be performed Compared with air-sampling detec-
describe the level of smoke obscuration with high-sensitivity laser spot detec- tors, spot laser detectors have several
at the detector. These thresholds can be tors. These detectors function much key advantages and disadvantages. One
displayed at the specific detector, more like conventional spot smoke of these is that they are point-address-
annunciated remotely, or transmitted to detectors; however, they are capable of able, allowing the fire alarm control
a conventional fire alarm control panel. identifying smoke obscuration levels panel to directly monitor the status of
When connected to a fire alarm control much lower than conventional smoke each device, perform sensitivity adjust-
panel, the level of smoke obscuration detectors. For example, one manufac- ments based upon time of day, adjust
can be used to perform different fire turer produces a detector that is capa- monitoring of adjacent or “shared”
safety functions, depending upon the ble of detecting smoke obscuration lev- detectors, and allow for “cross-zoning”
specific alarm threshold reached. For els as low as 0.009%/m (0.03%/ft ). At of detectors. However, since the detec-
example, upon receiving a “Level 1” their most sensitive calibration, conven- tors are spot-type devices, they are
alarm from the detector, the fire alarm tional smoke detectors generally detect somewhat passive, relative to air sam-
panel may initiate a supervisory alarm smoke obscuration levels in the neigh- pling systems. In other words, they rely

FALL 1999 Fire Protection Engineering 15

 on sufficient thermal energy to be gen- advantages over the other, clearly the equipment would be to simply exhaust
erated by the fire to transport the most appropriate system for a given the smoke. In theory, this is a good
smoke to the detectors. Air-sampling application will depend on the type of idea, but such a system must be care-
systems can compensate for this trans- facility being protected, the airflow pat- fully designed. As with any smoke con-
port lag somewhat by actively drawing terns of the space, and the specific risk trol system design, there is a gap (or
in air from the space. Therefore, air- factors involved. overlap, depending on how it is
sampling systems are not totally depen- viewed) in responsibilities among
dent on thermal energy to transport FIRE ALARM SYSTEM FEATURES mechanical, electrical, and fire protec-
smoke to the detector. tion trades. Programming the systems
Since spot-type laser detectors rely The overall fire alarm system design to close the correct dampers and initi-
on smoke transport and have the ability also plays an important role in main- ate the proper fan sequences are an
to make logical decisions among multi- taining continuous operation. For larg- absolute necessity, and this program-
ple detectors, in some cases it may be er facilities having many detectors, the ming logic must survive the test of
appropriate to design these detection number of addressable points on a time as mechanical systems are modi-
systems to release fire suppression sys- system can reach the thousands. fied to accommodate changes in the
tems. In doing so, it would eliminate Displaying alarm information clearly facility’s operation. Failure, in this
the need to have a system of EWFD to through the use of graphic displays, respect, will likely create a situation
release suppression systems and a sep- PC-based annunciators, and traditional that is worse than no smoke manage-
arate VEWFD system to alert facility LCD annunciators should be consid- ment at all.
staff of incipient fire conditions. ered. In addition, providing multiple In addition, the required zoning of
One other important aspect of annunciators or paging systems can the detection and smoke-management
VEWFD is detection for the return air- enhance the speed with which the systems must also be coordinated. This
flow to CRAH units and other HVAC facility staff can locate and isolate the is where the flexibility of addressable
systems serving the protected area. source of the fire. Identifying each detectors becomes clear. With address-
Since the rate of smoke generation in a detector (or addressable point) by its able detection, regardless of how the
low-energy smoldering fire is relatively room designation, column grid, and smoke zones are configured, the fire
small and the airflow velocities in the location (above ceiling, below floor, alarm system can be programmed to
protected space can be quite high, the etc.) can also decrease the time need- complement the smoke-management
movement of smoke within the space ed to identify the source of the alarm system. With zoned detection systems,
tends to be dominated by the airflow and correct the problem. this is simply not the case, and indi-
patterns generated by the mechanical Off-site monitoring is also important, vidual detection zones must be
systems. For this reason, it is essential particularly for facilities that may not be designed in concert with the smoke-
to provide VEWFD at the return side of normally occupied. In many cases, the management system. Coordinating
the CRAH units, particularly in spaces building code will require off-site moni- zoning is frequently complicated by
with large clearances between the ceil- toring of the fire alarm and suppression changes in wall locations that occur
ing and the top of the equipment. systems. Monitoring the system in accor- during construction.
Since the main concept of the CRAH dance with Central Station requirements Another consideration in the design
units is to cool the space, it is unlikely should be considered in most cases, of a smoke-management system is the
that any smoke generated will have suf- unless equivalent reliability and perfor- size of the zone and the locations of
ficient buoyancy to reach detection mance can be provided by some other supply and exhaust points. Exhausting
points at the ceiling. This is further method. In some instances, it may be smoke within a particular zone must be
compounded by the fact that the high beneficial to transmit the alarms to a done in such a way that smoke will not
airflows tend to pull any smoke back to remote facility monitored by the owner. be pulled across equipment racks that
the individual CRAH units, diluting it are remote from the source of smoke.
with clean air in the process. This phe- MANAGING SMOKE MOVEMENT This may require multiple exhaust air
nomenon will be diminished as the intakes and an analysis of how the
ceiling height decreases or one or more The fire alarm and detection systems smoke will move from the source to
CRAH units in the area of fire origin are form the most critical element in pro- the intakes. For example, is it reason-
not operating. Providing VEWFD exclu- tecting mission-critical facilities. They able to assume that the smoke will rise
sively at the ceiling level should be not only serve to detect and alert, but up to the ceiling level and be pulled
done only when it has been deter- also control the release of suppression across the ceiling to the exhaust intake?
mined that the mechanical systems will systems, initiate compartmentation This is probably not realistic for spaces
not adversely impact smoke transport features, and, in some cases, initiate that have airflow patterns dominated by
to ceiling-mounted detectors or sam- smoke-management systems. Smoke- CRAH units and a relatively small
pling ports. management systems continue to gain amount of smoke-production. In this
A variety of configurations, design support in protecting these facilities case, the smoke-management system
schemes, and good practices should be due to the need to protect against non- requires almost surgical precision in its
observed when designing fire-detection thermal damage. One obvious way to design and must be carefully tailored to
systems for mission-critical facilities. prevent collateral damage of equip- the geometry of the space and the air-
While each method of VEWFD has ment from fire in a particular piece of flow patterns present.

16 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION requirements for high-rise buildings, damage was to use sprinklers that
STRATEGIES height and area restrictions for the would cycle on and off based upon the
building, local code requirements, or temperature at the individual sprinkler.
Compartmentation, housekeeping, performance-based design goals. There However, reported problems with leak-
and regulation of equipment also play also may be a requirement on the part age have reduced the popularity of
important roles in fire protection design of the building owner, insurance under- “on-off’ sprinklers, and at least one
for these facilities. Smoke and fire writer, or adjacent tenant that the build- major manufacturer has stopped pro-
barriers, dampers, fire doors, and staff ing be fully sprinklered. While the use duction due to low market demand. As
training are essential to confining prod- of alternative suppression systems may indicated previously, any expected col-
ucts of combustion and minimizing the be an acceptable trade-off for specific lateral damage from a catastrophic
damage should even a small fire devel- areas, the use of these systems as an event or component failure should be
op. It may also be appropriate to locate alternative to sprinkler systems general- compared with the potential decrease
the facility in a building of protected ly requires the approval of the local in reliability associated with a more
construction, particularly where evacua- code official. A redundant, directly con- complex system or device.
tion may be impractical or a multitenant nected complement of reserve agent When designing preaction or cycling
occupancy exists. Selection of equip- would normally be required as well. systems, it is important to consider the
ment may also be an issue when the Regardless of the individual reasons sprinkler system zones and locations of
data center, particularly a Web hosting for sprinkler protection of a critical system feed mains in the design
or colocation facility, is subject to tran- facility, wet pipe systems may not be process. Sprinkler zones should be
sitory equipment and multiple clients. the preferred system. While the perfor- grouped logically based on building
Equipment should be evaluated to mance record of wet pipe system relia- configuration, so that if a fire does
ensure it is listed and is constructed of bility is good and failures are rare, the occur, responding firefighters can
materials that do not have an unreason- presence of charged sprinkler piping quickly determine in which area of the
able fire potential. Where the perfor- over critical equipment and processes facility the alarm has occurred. This is
mance of equipment is questionable, causes a substantial liability for facility true of any sprinkler system design, not
segregation or elimination of the com- owners. The added level of protection just mission-critical facilities. The loca-
ponents should be considered. against accidental discharge or leakage tions of feed mains should also be
Similarly, maintaining critical areas that a preaction sprinkler system pro- coordinated with medium- and high-
free of materials that simply have no vides can be worth the additional up- voltage electrical switchgear and unin-
place in a data center or telecommuni- front installation and long-term mainte- terruptible power supply (UPS) mod-
cations facility is also important. nance costs. By requiring activation of ules. In certain instances, NFPA 70, The
Contractor staging during renovations the EWFD system in order to charge National Electric Code, prohibits the
or new equipment installation should the sprinkler system with water, an installation of sprinkler system piping
be confined to appropriate areas, so additional level of protection against from passing through rooms containing
that excessive fuel loads that could unintended discharge is provided in the this type of electrical equipment. In
overcome the fire protection systems event piping is damaged by operations such an instance, the only piping per-
do not exist within critical areas. in the data center. A double interlock mitted would be the piping that was
system also permits the sprinkler system actually serving sprinklers within the
SPRINKLER PROTECTION piping to be monitored for integrity electrical room or enclosure. It is a
through the use of low-air pressure good practice to route distribution
Should a fire develop due to an equip- alarms connected to the facility fire alarm mains to individual preaction valves or
ment malfunction, poor housekeeping system. However, since this type of pre- riser rooms around critical electrical
practices, or even an act of God, sup- action system is more complex, addi- equipment rooms, so that if a leak
pression systems are relied upon to tional failure modes are introduced, were to develop, it would occur within
control or extinguish them. In many making proper inspection, testing, and a noncritical area, such as a corridor,
ways, these systems are a last line of maintenance of the systems more critical. office, or service area.
defense in this type of facility. If they There are also sprinkler systems that Another important consideration in
activate, it means that other efforts at are designed to cycle water flow on sprinkler system design for these facili-
detection, prevention, compartmentation, and off, depending on the fire condi- ties is the need to pitch the system pip-
and control have at least partially failed. tions within the protected area. These ing to the main drain. This is recom-
It also means that a significant amount systems can limit the collateral damage mended even if the system piping is
of smoke and heat is being generated sprinkler system runoff may cause out- not installed in an area that is subject to
that will destroy electronic equipment side the protected area, such as an freezing. The removal of water follow-
in that space. The only question becomes adjacent electrical switchgear room or ing a hydrostatic or trip test, or the
how much damage can be limited. battery room. This added benefit comes flushing of the system is important
In many cases, compliance with with an additional cost, since cycling since even a small amount of water has
applicable building or fire codes will systems generally require separate the potential to damage sensitive elec-
require sprinkler protection for the detection systems in addition to the tronic equipment. Trapped sections
building. This could be triggered by EWFD system. In the past, another requiring auxiliary drains create another
provisions for unlimited area buildings, method of controlling excessive water opportunity for water to be present in

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 19

 the system if not completely drained is of an electrical nature, as can be the be effective in localized extinguishment
following a test. In some cases, howev- case with cable fires, the energy source of fires involving electronic equipment,
er, space limitations may require that an should be interrupted in order for the their use as a total flooding system is
auxiliary drain be installed. In these sit- suppression system to be effective. still relatively new and unproven.
uations, a good practice would be to One very unique feature about Water-mist systems are an emerging
limit the number of auxiliary drains Inergen™ systems is the ability for technology that may prove to be an
needed through careful design. occupants to remain in the protected effective system for critical facilities in
Auxiliary drains should also be clearly area following system discharge. the near future.
marked, even to the extreme, and extra Inergen™ is actually a combination of Clean agent suppression and similar
effort should be made to ensure they three gases (nitrogen, argon, and car- fixed systems necessarily rely on the
are opened following any testing or trip bon dioxide) that basically inert the integrity of the enclosure to help main-
of the system. Where pendant sprin- protected volume. Depending upon the tain appropriate concentrations of the
klers are required, it may be desirable design concentration selected, this agent and effectively control or sup-
to install dry pendant sprinklers. would typically reduce oxygen concen- press the fire. If the integrity of the
Although an expensive option, this trations within the protected area to enclosure is not maintained (for exam-
would eliminate the presence of water approximately 12 percent, which is suf- ple, opened doors or holes in walls
in individual sprinkler drops. ficient to extinguish fires involving most where cables have been run), then the
ordinary combustibles. While this con- agent would be less effective, or not
CLEAN AGENT SUPPRESSION centration is also less than that required effective at all. This is one reason that
SYSTEMS for humans to survive, the presence of local authorities may not permit a direct
additional carbon dioxide stimulates the “trade-off” between alternative suppres-
In many cases, clean agent suppres- body to breathe more deeply, increas- sion systems and traditional sprinkler
sion systems can provide a level of fire ing the absorption of oxygen by the systems.
suppression performance that sprinklers body. This physiological effect allows
do not, allowing critical systems to con- humans to breathe normally, even in an CONCLUSION
tinue to operate during system dis- oxygen-depressed atmosphere.
charge. They also require very little Another key difference between FM- The fire protection methods that have
cleanup following a discharge and are 200™ systems and Inergen™ systems is been discussed by no means represent a
generally safer for building occupants the delivery method and agent dis- complete list of all the systems and strat-
than carbon dioxide or traditional inert charge time. FM-200™ systems are egies that are available to the fire protec-
systems. Two of the more common more like Halon systems in this regard tion professional. The best overall fire
suppression agents are FM-200™ and and require the agent storage contain- protection strategy for a specific facility
Inergen™, although FE-13™, Argon, ers to be located inside or within close is very much a function of acceptable
and others exist as well. Both systems proximity to the protected area. This is risk levels, minimum code requirements,
operate in a manner similar to Halon driven by the dynamics of the two- and interoperability of systems. System
systems in that the agent is stored in phase flow that occurs when the sys- designs should be based upon a total
fixed containers and is discharged tem discharges. Also, since FM-200™ is fire protection approach, not simply
through fixed piping to discharge noz- a halogenated system, it must be com- individual systems pieced together by
zles. The properties of these alternative pletely discharged within 10 seconds. different trades. Only a total fire protec-
agents, however, do not allow them to Inergen™, on the other hand, is stored tion concept approach will integrate
be used as a direct substitute for exist- and discharged as a gas. It operates at a with the facility’s goal of ensuring con-
ing Halon installations. Therefore, pip- higher pressure (approximately 15 MPa tinuous operation.
ing systems, agent storage containers, [2,175 psi] vs. 2.5 MPa [360 psi]), which
nozzle placement, and system hardware allows the agent to be piped over a Ray Schmid is with Koffel Associates,
may need to be redesigned when substantial distance. Since it is an inert- Inc.
replacing an existing Halon installation. ing system, the maximum discharge
Unlike sprinkler systems, clean agent time permitted by NFPA 2001, REFERENCES
systems are normally designed to dis- Standard on Clean Agent Fire
charge solely upon activation of the Extinguishing Systems, is 60 seconds. 1 Mulholland, G., “Smoke Production and
EWFD system within the protected There are many differences between Properties,” SFPE Handbook of Fire
area, permitting the suppression agent the two systems that will affect whether Protection Engineering, Second Edition,
to be distributed early in the fire or not they are appropriate for a given National Fire Protection Association,
growth period. This allows the agent to facility. Selection of equipment, overall Quincy, MA, 1995.
suppress the fire before the heat performance, agent storage methods, 2 Babrauskas, V., “Burning Rates,” SFPE
release rate is low. In addition, the and cost are but a few examples. Both Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering,
presence of a VEWFD system coupled systems, however, are widely accepted. Second Edition, National Fire Protection
with manual release stations allow facil- In addition to clean agents, water-mist Association, Quincy, MA, 1995.
ity staff the opportunity to discharge technology may be an acceptable alter-
the agent even sooner in the fire native for certain applications. Although For an online version of this article, go
growth period. Of note is that if the fire water mist systems have been shown to to www.sfpe.org.

20 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

 Proactive vs. Prescriptive
Fire Protection for the

OFFSHORE INDUSTRY
By John A. Alderman, P.E., CSP, and programs to assess the hazards of fires was not adequately matched with the
Marlon Harding, P.E. and explosions on the offshore installa- actual risks associatred with the facility.
tion are beginning to grow. Based on The amount of fire protection neces-
ABSTRACT the results of the risk calculations, the sary in an offshore environment has
fire protection engineer can then deter- always been subject to debate. Under-
Most companies have standards for mine the appropriate fire protection protection can lead to potential loss of
fire protection on offshore installations. required for the hazard. life and property loss resulting in
These standards typically are prescrip- This paper addresses the use of per- reduced production and possible envi-
tive in nature and require that fire pro- formance-based criteria for fire protec- ronmental impact. Overprotection can
tection be installed, generally, without tion in the offshore industry. lead to increased cost and maintenance.
regard to the actual hazard. Fire protec- More importantly, protection based on
tion generally consists of passive fire INTRODUCTION – MORE IS NOT standards rather than the actual hazard
protection, water and/or foam systems, ALWAYS BETTER can lead to a false sense of security by
and detection systems. management that the facility is safe.
The fire protection community is During the Piper Alpha incident in
slowly beginning to use performance- 1989, 168 people lost their lives as a PRESCRIPTIVE FIRE PROTECTION
based criteria in determining appropri- result of an explosion and resulting fire.
ate fire protection. Performance-based However, more fire protection might With prescriptively designed fire
criteria that uses the latest modeling not have helped in that incident if it protection, protection systems are

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 23

 Table 1. Examples of Some Prescriptive Requirements
installed based on specific guidance or
requirements without much deviation. SOURCE REQUIREMENT
For example, one company provides Regulation Mineral Management Service (MMS)
two 0.157 m3/s (2,500 gpm) fire pumps US Coast Guard
on all platforms, without consideration
UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
of the size of the platform or water
Insurance Active fire protection
demand. Prescriptive approaches to
Passive fire protection
fire protection generally are a result of
regulation, insurance requirements, Safety systems
industry practice, and company proce- Specific equipment requirements for compressors and heaters
dures. Table 1 illustrates examples of Industry Practice American Petroleum Institute (API)
prescriptive approaches to fire protec- • API 500 Electrical Classification
tion. Each of these tend to be based • API 2030 Water Spray
on past incidents rather then trying to • API 2018 Fireproofing
look forward and determine what • API 2031 Gas Detection
could happen. International Maritime Organization – Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
Classification Societies
APPROACH TO PERFORMANCE-
• American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
BASED FIRE PROTECTION
• Lloyd’s Register
Performance-based fire protection is • Det Norske Veritas (DNV)
determined by conducting some form National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
of analysis or calculations to define the • Fire Extinguishers
fire protection required to mitigate the • Carbon Dioxide Systems
hazards. The risk analysis process fre- • Sprinkler Systems
quently used in the offshore industry is • Water Spray Systems
illustrated in Figure 1. • Fire Water Pumps
Company Requirements Standards or procedures for:
HAZARD ANALYSIS • Equipment spacing
• Electrical area classification
The first step in any performance-
• Water spray and sprinklers
based approach is to conduct a hazard
analysis. The hazard analysis tech- • Fireproofing
niques used to identify potential haz- • Safety shutdown systems
ards in the process and facility are • Isolation and blowdown
shown in Table 2. Typical offshore • Relief and flare design
facilities where hazard analyses are per- • Pressurization systems
formed include platforms; Floating, • Drainage
Production, Storage, and Offloading
facilities (FPSO); Floating, Storage,
Offloading facilities (FSO); drilling
(such as jack-up, semi, or ship); Spars be a seal failure that results in a vapor In performing any consequence
or Tension Leg Platforms (TLP); or any cloud forming with an explosion in the assessment, analytical tools can be
combination of these. separation area if ignited. In assessing very useful to determine the conse-
The outcome of the hazard analysis the consequences, two questions need quences of a scenario. In most cases,
is a list of potential fire hazards that to be answered: each scenario will have a variety of
may occur on the facility. A partial list • What is the range in size of the conditions that need to be evaluated
could include jet fire, pool fire, explo- events that can occur? in the consequence assessment. These
sion, electrical fire, or Class A fire. The • What is the impact of the event? include factors such as size of the
list would also include the correspond- In assessing the impact, radiant heat, release, orientation of release, temper-
ing location where each could occur. overpressure, toxic effects on the tem- ature and pressure of operation, and
These hazards can then be turned into porary refuge, evacuation routes, weather conditions (that will all vary).
scenarios for further analysis. escape equipment, and offshore equip- During the consequence analysis, it
ment that could be involved in escala- is necessary to determine the neces-
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS tion are normally taken into account. sary sophistication of the models that
Toxic effects can include products of will be used. Programs range from
Consequence analysis is the process combustion from fires, such as smoke, spreadsheets that use simple equations
to determine the impact of the scenar- carbon monoxide, and hydrogen sulfide to Computational Fluid Dynamics
ios. For example, one scenario could contained in the material. (CFD) modeling that can take a day

24 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

 Table 2.
Hazard Analysis Methods

• Checklist
Identify hazards • Hazard identification
• What-if?
Identify initiating events/ • Hazard and operability study
scenarios • Failure modes and effects analysis

for one scenario evaluation. The models

used depend on the level of the design,
Determine frequency Determine physical
the time available to do the analysis,
of initiating events consequences of scenarios
and the desired results. In the conceptu-
al or feed-stage, simple models can be
used, but as the design details increase,
the complexity of the consequence
Establish death and
Establish risk to persons serious injury resulting analysis will also need to increase.
for each initiating event at time of initial incident
LIKELIHOOD DETERMINATION

If installed fire protection would be

Assess escalation based on only the consequence analy-
consequences sis, then the offshore industry would be
very well protected. In reality, the likeli-
hood of the consequences must be
taken into consideration. In determining
the likelihood of the consequences, cer-
Evaluate effectiveness
tain key information is required, such as
of protective measures
the frequency of the initiating event, fre-
quency of ignition, probability of escala-
tion, likelihood that the weather will be
favorable or not, etc. In any likelihood
determination, there are generally a
Determine total and
large number of scenarios to be ana-
individual risk
lyzed.
Computer models are often used to
perform the iterative process of evaluat-
Assess risk and impairment ing each variable of each scenario.
frequencies against acceptance
criteria and performance standards RISK

Risk is the product of consequence

and likelihood of each scenario. The risk
Yes Is risk for each scenario can be combined by
Stop acceptable? specific areas or for the whole facility to
obtain desired risk profiles. The risk is
No calculated using event and fault trees that
take into account safety and protection
Determine potential systems.
modifications to The main problem associated with any
reduce risk risk assessment is the appropriateness of
the data used in the calculations.
Obviously, the use of generic industry
data may result in risk numbers that vary
widely. It is best if company-specific
Figure 1. Risk Analysis Process data can be used.

26 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

RISK TOLERANCE

After the risk is calculated, the

results must be compared to either Unacceptable region Risk cannot be justified
governmental or company criteria except in extraordinary
to determine if the risk is tolerable. circumstances
If it is, then additional fire protec-
tion is not required and the level of
fire protection used in the risk cal-
culation is adequate. The ALARP or tolerability Tolerable only if further
region (risks undertaken risk reduction is
If the level of risk does not meet
only if a benefit is desired) impractical, or the cost
the risk criteria, then additional
is not proportionate
protection may be required. The to the benefit gained
options for reducing the risk are
selected and the analysis recalcu-
lated to determine the impact on
the risk. In some cases, the Broadly acceptable region Negligible risk
options (for example, fireproofing
on a quarters wall to reduce
impact of jet fire) provide signifi-
cant risk reduction, whereas others
(water spray of offshore vessels to
protect from jet fire) have very lit-
tle impact on the risk. Figure 2. ALARP concept
One concept that has been used
extensively in the North Sea is “as
low as reasonably practical” (ALARP). Figure 2 shows the
ALARP concept. This concept suggests that at some point the
cost to mitigate a hazard is so high that it is no longer practi- F
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FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 27

 By Jane I. Lataille, P.E.

W hen completed, the semi-

conductor chips in comput-
ers and other electronic
devices can withstand the nor-
mal work environment. But
while these chips are being
made, they are highly sensitive
to damage from even the
smallest particles. This is why
the semiconductor industry
must process chips in rooms
with highly controlled environ-
ments called cleanrooms.
Despite their high level of
cleanliness, cleanrooms still
have fire protection concerns.
The wet benches used to clean
chips between process steps are
not only made of plastic, they
contain heaters to heat baths of
cleaning solvents and wiring to
control automated processes.
The concern is that a small wisp
of smoke from overheated plas-
tic can ruin millions of dollars
of chips in process.
The semiconductor industry
has long been aware of the risk
associated with using plastic
materials in cleanrooms. One
way it has sought to manage this risk is
by limiting the use of plastics in lated, numerous plastics manufacturers 2. Conduct Parallel Panel tests on
process equipment. However, some of expressed the need to test their own representative plastics.
the chemicals used in processing chips products during development. They 3. Conduct ASTM E1354 cone
are not compatible with any other were not able to run the FM 4910 test calorimeter tests on the same plas-
material. The semiconductor industry is because the nonstandard test apparatus tics.
therefore supporting the development is not readily available and the test 4. Correlate Parallel Panel and cone
of new plastics. results were not reproducible. In addi- calorimeter test results.
tion, the test is complex and expensive. 5. Develop a classification scheme
TEST BACKGROUND At the semiconductor industry’s request, for the combustibility of semicon-
IRI and UL teamed up to explore ductor plastics.
Until recently, the only test for evalu- whether a simple, reproducible test 6. Develop a UL standard for classify-
ating the combustibility of wet bench using standard apparatus could be ing semiconductor plastics.
plastics was the Factory Mutual developed. The ASTM E1354 test Tasks 1, 2, and 4 were necessary to
Research Corporation (FMRC) Test method for the Cone Calorimeter was confirm that results from the new test
Standard 4910.1 This test measures fire selected for investigation. would correspond with results from the
characteristics in a specially modified With input from the semiconductor larger-scale Parallel Panel test and to
calorimeter. Fire propagation, smoke industry, IRI and UL decided to base develop a meaningful classification
damage, and corrosion damage indices the classification system resulting from scheme.
are then calculated from the measure- the new test on fire propagation and Samples of the following eight mate-
ments. It has been found that materials smoke damage properties. rials were tested:
with a fire propagation index of less The project was divided into six tasks • Polypropylene
than 6 in this test are not self-propagat- as follows: • Fire-retardant polypropylene
ing in the referred Parallel Panel test. 1. Characterize the Parallel Panel test • Takiron PVC™
As the search for better plastics esca- ignition source. • Corzan™

30 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

 • Kynar HFP™ gen concentration, exhaust gas temper- l = Path length (m)
• Clear PVC ature, exhaust gas velocity, and smoke I0 = Reference light beam signal
• Polycarbonate obscuration. Flame propagation was (V)
• Halar 901™ noted for each test. I = Instantaneous light beam
The heat release rate was calculated signal (V)
This article summarizes the results of from these measurements by means of
the six tasks in this project. For more the oxygen consumption technique The total smoke released was calcu-
complete information, see the UL using the following equation: lated as a time integral using the trape-
report.2 zoidal method. The specific extinction
V˙ (0.2095 − x ) area is then the total smoke released
CHARACTERIZING THE PARALLEL q˙ = k p ×
T (1.105 − 1.5 x ) divided by the sample mass loss:
PANEL TEST IGNITION SOURCE tf

FM Test Standard 4910 describes the

Where:
q̇ = Heat release rate (kW) ∫ ṡdt
Constant (kJ × K/m3)
σ= 0
Parallel Panel test apparatus, which kp = ∆m
consists of metal frames for holding V̇ = Volumetric flow rate (m3/s)
two 2-ft by 8-ft (0.6 m by 2.4 m) verti- T = Exhaust gas temperature (K) Where:
cal panels 1 ft (0.3) apart. A 1-ft by 2-ft x = Instantaneous mole fraction σ = Specific extinction area
(0.3 m by 0.6 m) sand burner using of oxygen (m2/g)
propane fuel generates a 60 kW igni- ṡ = Rate of smoke release (m2/s)
tion source between the panels. The value of the constant kp includes ∆m = Sample mass loss (g)
Both heat flux and smoke release factors for the heat release per kg of
from the sand burner were measured oxygen consumed, the ratio of the mol- Table 1 shows the average results of
with noncombustible panels in the test ecular weight of oxygen to air, the den- the Parallel Panel test for each type of
frame. Heat flux data were used to sity of air at ambient temperature and plastic.
select the radiant heat flux for exposing pressure, the ambient temperature, and
the plastics samples in Task 2. Smoke the calibration constant for the parallel CONDUCTING THE ASTM E1354
release data were used to compensate panel apparatus. CONE CALORIMETER TEST
for differences in smoke generation The smoke release rate was calculat-
between the Parallel Panel and ASTM ed from the following equation: This test measures oxygen concentra-
E1354 Cone Calorimeter tests. tion, exhaust gas temperature, pressure
V˙
× ln  0 
I difference across an orifice plate, and
s˙ =
CONDUCTING PARALLEL PANEL l  I smoke obscuration. The heat release
TESTS ON THE SAMPLES rate was calculated from these mea-
Where: surements by means of the oxygen
Three samples of each type of plastic ṡ = Smoke release rate (m2/s) consumption technique using the fol-
were tested. Each test measured oxy- V̇ = Volumetric flow rate (m3/s) lowing equation:

TABLE 1
Average Results of Parallel Panel Test
Flame Peak Heat Peak Smoke Total Sample Specific
Plastic Propagation Release Release Smoke Mass Ext. Area
[Ft (m)] Rate (kW) Rate (m2/s) (m2) Loss (g) (m2/g)
Polypropylene >8 (>2.4) * * * * *
Fire-retardant
polypropylene >8 (>2.4) * * * * *
Takiron PVC™ 3.8 (1.2) 129 17.3 6107 7.88 0.759
Corzan™ 4.0 (1.2) 122 6.9 2719 8.03 0.339
Kynar HFP™ 6.5 (2.0) 219.3 18.3 4914 8.64 0.566
Clear PVC 4.2 (1.3) 192 26.1 11,420 8.94 1.275
Polycarbonate >8 (>2.4) * * * * *
Halar 901™ 3.0 (0.9) 105.3 13.1 5386 6.06 0.890

* Tests terminated when flame height exceeded 8 ft (2.4m).

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 31

 ecular weight of oxygen to air, and the CORRELATING PARALLEL PANEL
∆P (0.2095 − x ) calibration constant for the Cone AND CONE CALORIMETER
q˙ = kc × × Calorimeter. RESULTS
T (1.105 − 1.5 x )
The total heat released was then cal- The data collected in the Parallel
Where: culated as a time integral using the Panel and Cone Calorimeter tests were
q̇ = Heat release rate (kW) trapezoidal method. Smoke release rate, used to determine the Thermal
kc = Constant ( kJ ( m × K ) / kg ) total smoke released, and specific Response Parameter (TRP), Fire
∆P = Pressure difference across extinction area were calculated the Propagation Index (FPI), and Smoke
orifice plate (N/m2) same way as in the Parallel Panel test. Damage Index (SDI) as specified in the
T = Exhaust gas temperature (K) Table 2 shows the average results of FM 4910 test. The TRP was determined
x = Instantaneous mole fraction the Cone Calorimeter test in the hori- from the following equation:
of oxygen zontal orientation for selected proper-
ties of the tested samples. Several other
4 1
The value of the constant kc includes properties were measured or calculated TRP =
factors for the heat release per kg of in these tests. The tests were also done π m
oxygen consumed, the ratio of the mol- in the vertical orientation.

TABLE 2
Average Results of Cone Calorimeter Test in Horizontal Orientation
Peak Heat Total Heat Peak Smoke Total Sample Specific
Plastic Release Unit Area Release Smoke Mass Ext. Area
Rate (kW) (kW/m2) Rate (m2/s) (m2) Loss (g) (m2/g)
Polypropylene 6.0 179 0.11 29.3 52.4 0.557
Fire-retardant
polypropylene 5.4 137 0.24 58.7 51.6 1.139
Takiron PVC™ 1.6 45 0.13 37.2 67.3 0.552
Corzan™ 0.7 24 0.06 6.9 72.5 0.094
Kynar HFP™ 1.4 70 0.13 46.6 111.4 0.418
Clear PVC 1.7 64 0.25 72.5 75.5 0.960
Polycarbonate 2.5 182 o.14 88.0 95.8 0.918
Halar 901™ 0.3 9 0.26 90.8 83.5 1.088

TABLE 3
Comparison of Parallel Panel and Cone Calorimeter Tests
Peak FPI Peak FPI Peak SDI Peak SDI
Plastic Parallel Panel Cone Calorimeter Parallel Panel Cone Calorimeter
(horizontal) (horizontal)
Polypropylene * 20.5 * 1.34
Fire-retardant * 21.5 * 2.88
polypropylene
Takiron PVC™ 4.5 5.0 0.39 0.32
Corzan™ 1.0 0.5 0.04 0.01
Kynar HFP™ 8.5 8.0 0.57 0.39
Clear PVC 13.5 14.0 2.00 1.58
Polycarbonate * 9.0 * 0.97
Halar 901™ 2.0 1.0 0.22 0.13

* Tests terminated wen flame height exceeded 8ft (2.4m).

32 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

 This equation is derived from equa- DEVELOPING A CLASSIFICATION CONCLUSIONS
tions for flame height and flame propa- SCHEME
gation rate, and it is arranged to use UL 2360 is a simple, reproducible test
measured and calculated data. (See the Using the results of the eight plastics for the combustion properties of plas-
UL report for details.) The variable m is tested, UL developed two classification tics. It was developed from test infor-
the slope of the line of least square fit schemes, one a prescriptive scheme mation on plastics used in making wet
in a plot of 1/tig1/2 vs. radiant heat flux. and one performance-based. The pre- benches for semiconductor industry
The tests measured the time to ignition, scriptive classification scheme is shown cleanrooms. However, this test can also
tig. The radiant heat flux was calculated in Table 4. be applied to plastics used in other
from test measurements. The performance-based classification semiconductor tools, such as wafer
scheme lists the properties of the tested stockers and tools for metal vapor
The FPI is then calculated as follows: plastics for use in fire hazard assess- deposition.
ments. The properties are determined at Wet benches are just one source of
(0.42Q˙ ′′)1/ 3
FPI = k a radiant flux of 50 kW/m2. risk in the semiconductor industry.
TRP See NFPA 3183 for information about
Where: Properties reported include the fol- other fire protection concerns of this
k = Constant (1200 for Calorimeter lowing: industry.
horizontal orientation, 1000 Ignition Properties
for Parallel Panel) • Critical Flux Jane I. Lataille was formally with
Q˙ ′′ = Peak heat release rate per • Thermal Response Parameter Industrial Risk Insurers.
unit sample area (kW/m2) Combustibility Properties
TRP = Thermal response parameter • Mass Loss
(kW × s1/2/m2) • Heat Release REFERENCES
• Smoke Release
Finally, the SDI is: • Effective Heat of Combustion 1 FM 4910, FMRC Clean Room Materials –
σ • Specific Extinction Area Flammability Test Protocol, Factory Mutual
SDI = FPI Research Corporation, Norwood, MA.
8500
Where: DEVELOPING THE UL STANDARD 2 Report on the Research Investigation of t
σ = Specific extinction area he Combustibility of Plastics Used for
(m2/kg) To conclude the project, UL devel- Semiconductor Tools, Underwriters
oped the standard UL 2360 – Standard Laboratories Inc., Northbrook, IL.
Table 3 compares the FPI and SDI Test Method for Determining the 3 NFPA 318, Standard for the Protection of
calculated from the Parallel Panel and Combustibility Characteristics of Cleanrooms, National Fire Protection
Cone Calorimeter tests. Plastics Used in Semiconductor Tool Association, Quincy, MA, 1998.
The table shows that FPI and SDI val- Construction. The first edition was
ues obtained in the Cone Calorimeter issued on May 10, 2000. The standard For an online version of this article,
correspond well with those obtained in will be reissued with minor revisions go to www.sfpe.org.
the Parallel Panel test. sometime in 2001.

TABLE 4
UL 2360 Prescriptive Classification Scheme

Acceptance Criteria

Class 1: Class 2: Class 3:

Non- Limited Slow
Test Property propagating Propagating Propagating

ASTM E1354 FPI 6 or less Parallel Panel Parallel Panel

required required

SDI 0.4 or less 0.4 or less <1

Parallel Panel Propagation (ft) 4 or less 8 or less 8 or less at

10 minutes

Pooling of melted No No No
material

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 33

 FIRE SAFETY DESIGN OF THE

FUNDACIÓN CAIXA GALICIA

BUILDING
IN SPAIN
By George Faller, C.Eng

1. Introduction
The “Caixa Galicia” is a prominent Spanish bank
that has traditionally promoted the arts in Galicia, a
region in the northwest of Spain. In the mid-1990s
the “Fundación Caixa Galicia” expressed their inten-
tion to build a new cultural centre to display its
impressive collection of local artwork.
The building that was envisioned was one that
would be accessible to the public at street level,
one that would have a solid appearance but be full
of light, and the intention was that the building
should be a work of art in itself.
The site measures approximately 20 m across by
30 m long, and the new building will be hemmed
in between two existing six-story buildings. The
new building has six-stories above ground level,
with a roof height to match the eaves level of the
adjacent buildings. The ground to fourth floor levels
consisted of galleries and associated public areas,
with the top two levels dedicated to administrative
use. To meet the functional area requirements of the
brief on a restricted site, four basement levels were
introduced to accommodate additional public gallery
space, an auditorium, and a services plant level.
An important feature of the design was an atrium
that bisects the building, allowing natural light to
penetrate at all levels over the full height and depth
of the building. The atrium forms a “canyon” above
the public thoroughfare at street level, dividing the
building in two parts, and open circulation bridges
link the accommodation on either side. Due to the
space restrictions of the site, the two escape stairs
from the upper levels have been superimposed,
one above the other in a “scissors” arrangement,
and located to one side of the atrium. One of the Figure 1. Caixa Galicia atrium
two stairways in the “scissors” arrangement is a

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 35

 protected stair, the other an open stair.
Escape from the galleries located on
the side remote from the protected stair
is via open bridges through the atrium.

2. Fire Safety Design

The fire safety design for the building
was based on the Spanish national
code NBE-CPI/96.1 This code had no
prescriptive guidance that adequately
addressed the fire safety issues present-
ed by this design. Key elements of the
design were evacuation of the upper
gallery areas via open bridges through
the atrium, evacuation of a 300-seat
auditorium in the third basement level,
full-height glazing separating the gal-
leries from the atrium, and appropriate
fire-resistance requirements for the
structure and separating elements.

3. Smoke Control in the Atrium

Evacuation of galleries on the first to
fourth floors of the building takes place
via two open bridges at each level,
which link the two sides of the build-
ing either side of the atrium. These gal-
leries are served by two protected stair-
ways, both of which are on the same
side of the atrium. There is therefore
the possibility that people would have
to travel over the open bridges and
through the atrium “canyon” to the pro-
tected stairs on the other side to make
their escape.
The accumulation and control of
smoke in the atrium was a fundamental
issue that had to be addressed to
ensure safe egress in the event of a fire
at one of the lower levels. The fire
strategy attempted first of all to min-
imise the risk of smoke ingress into the
atrium by a combination of:
i. fire-resistant separation of fire loads
from the atrium, and
ii. local smoke control with mechani-
cal extraction.
Smoke from a fire in the accommo- Figure 2. Smoke in atrium from a fire in the open “street”
dation on either side of the atrium was
controlled at all levels by a combina- nario, a 1.5MW design fire was Using automatically driven roof
tion of these two methods. The atrium assumed, representing about 3m2 of a vents, a system of natural ventilation
base, however, could not be treated in typical retail premises fuel load with a was used to manage the smoke from
the same way. Although it is a “street” maximum heat release rate of 500 this design fire. The natural ventilation
thoroughfare, which under normal cir- kW/m2. It would be difficult to imagine system was designed so as to ensure
cumstances would be free of any fire a fire source of this magnitude being tenable conditions within the atrium for
load, there is always the possibility that left unattended in the “street” area for a a period of time well in excess of the
someone could, either inadvertently or building such as this with a high level calculated egress time.
maliciously, introduce a fire load into of security and management, but a It was found to be impractical to
this space. number of design guides stipulate this remove smoke at such a rate that it
To investigate the effects of this sce- as a minimum design fire size. would not build down to any open

36 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

 Advancing the Science and Practice of Fire Protection Engineering

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of Fire Protection
Engineers
An Invitation to Join
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Phone: 301/718-2910
bridge level, so there was a possibility levels into one of the two protected further implication of the strict code
that some people escaping through the stairs was calculated to be less than 3 interpretation would have meant that
atrium would have to move through minutes. the separating elements between the
the smoke in order to reach the pro- With the limiting parameters for ten- gallery accommodation and atrium
tected stairways. An analysis was done ability assumed to be a smoke tempera- would require a fire rating of 90 min-
to determine the smoke temperature ture of 60°C and visibility of more than utes. In order to allow natural lighting
and density of smoke particulates in the 10m, it was found that acceptable con- of the galleries at all levels, the archi-
atrium, and from this the visibility, at ditions were maintained in the atrium tect wanted full-height glazing along
any given time. for more than twice the evacuation the gallery/atrium interface. Even it
Due to the shallow depth of the period. were possible to achieve a 90-minute
gallery spaces on either side of the atri- Tenability of the open bridge links is fire-resisting glazed partition to the
um, escape distances to the protected therefore maintained during the escape galleries with acceptable framing
stairs are relatively short. Furthermore, period, even for this unlikely scenario. details, it would have been prohibi-
clear views into the atrium from all The situation is shown schematically in tively expensive.
accommodation areas would enhance Figure 2. However, it was obvious from the
early awareness of any smoke accumu- outset that the gallery fire loads were
lating in the atrium, and gallery man- 4. Fire Resistance Requirements much lower than the fire load density
agement procedures ensure that trained The height of the top floor of this of 750 MJ/m2 typically associated with
staff would be in attendance in the building is in excess of 28 m, and such a “public assembly” building.3
public areas at all times. Given these therefore the Spanish NBE-CPI/96 code There were also large areas of potential
characteristics, an upper limit to the recommended a minimum 3-hour fire- ventilation from the gallery levels into
total time for evacuation of the upper resistance period for the structure. A the atrium. Therefore, Article 14(a) of
NBE-CPI/96 was used, which states that
the designer has the choice of either
adopting the tabulated fire-resistance
values or to determine the value by
analytical means using approved calcu-
lation methods.
In the Caixa Galicia building, the fire
loads in the galleries are less than nor-
mal for public assembly buildings, and
the compartment sizes are far smaller
than the limiting dimensions assumed
for the tabulated fire-resistance values.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the fire
loading for this building could change
significantly without a major refurbish-
ment. It was felt, therefore, that a per-
formance-based approach should be
used to derive a fire-resistance period
more appropriate to this particular
building.
The method adopted for the calcula-
tion of the fire-resistance period was
based on the “equivalent time” calcula-
tion approach given in the Eurocode
ENV 1991-2-2: 19962, which takes the
following form:

te, d = q f , d × kb × wt

where
te,d = equivalent time of fire expo-
sure (minutes)
qf,d = design fire load density
(MJ/m2)
kb = conversion factor for thermal
properties of enclosure
wt = ventilation factor
Figure 3. Section through the Caixa Galicia atrium bisecting the building

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 39

 TABLE 1
Fire load densities
As a basis for the calculations, fire Occupancy Fire load densities
loads appropriate to the use of the dif-
ferent areas were taken from statistical (MJ/m2)
data based on a comprehensive survey
Office 570
carried out on buildings throughout
Europe.3 The fire load densities used Assembly (entertainment) 750
for the different areas in the Caixa
Galicia building are given in Table 1, Shops and Commercial 900
and it can be seen from this how the
fire loads can differ substantially from Gallery 250
the values assumed in the code tables.
The thermal inertia of the compart-
ment is represented by the factor kb
and can be quite easily calculated TABLE 2
once some basic fitting out details are Calculated fire resistance periods
known, or alternatively a conservative
default value can be used. The ventila- Occupancy Height (m) t-equivalent Risk Risk Calculated
tion factor is calculated from a formula (minutes) Factor(1) Factor(2) Resistance
based on the compartment geometry; (minutes)
height, floor area, and area of ventila- Consequence Probability
tion openings.
The “t-equivalent” value, therefore, Ground Floor Gallery 0.00 33 0.8 0.8 21
can readily be calculated for each
Ground F1 Bookshop 0.00 65 0.8 0.8 21
compartment using the relationship
given above. Upper Levels Gallery 17.10 24 1.1 0.8 21
But fire-resistance periods given in
national regulations take into account Upper Levels Offices 29.70 29 1.6 1.2 56
factors other than fire load and ventila-
tion – they make allowance for ease of
escape, access for firefighters, the
probability of a fully developed fire ferent to the typical values assumed which allowed us to use a standard
occurring, and the consequence of for the code tables. The results from 30-minute fire-resistant glazing to sepa-
structural failure. The “t-equivalent” applying the approach outlined above rate the galleries from the atrium.
value on its own, therefore, cannot be to a number of floors is given in the
equated to a fire-resistance period. Table 2. George Faller is with Arup Fire.
The fire-resistance values were cal- The method used for calculating the
culated by multiplying “t-equivalent” fire-resistance period described above REFERENCES
time period with factors for quantify- also recognises the role of sprinklers
ing the risk of structural failure, as in controlling the size of a compart- 1. Norma Básica de la Edificación, NBE-
suggested in a UK ‘National ment fire and makes allowance for this CPI/96: “Condiciones de protección con-
Application Document,4 intended to by means of an additional reduction tra incendios en los edificios,” CSCAE,
supplement Eurocode guidance. The factor. In the later development of the 1996.
application of these “gamma factors” design, sprinkler protection was intro- 2. Eurocode 1: Basis of Design and Action
((1) and (2)) relate the “t-equivalent” duced into the Caixa Galicia building on Structures, Part 2.2 – Actions on
values to a fire-resistance period by at all levels as a property protection Structures Exposed to Fire, DD ENV
associating the risk of failure with measure. This introduced an addition- 1991-2-2:1996.
height of building above access level. al factor of safety into the design that 3. CIB W14 Workshop. Design Guide –
The derivation of the “gamma factors” was not used in the derivation of the Structural Fire Safety, Fire Safety Journal,
for the NAD4 approach was done in fire-resistance values given above. March 1986.
such a way to ensure that the fire By using this “first principles” 4. BSI, National Application Document,
resistance values calculated using the approach, it was determined that a 60- Eurocode 1: Basis of Design and Action
“t-equivalent” approach are similar to minute fire-resistance period was ade- on Structures, Part 2.2 – Actions on
the prescriptive code values and, as quate for the structure of the Caixa Structures Exposed to Fire for use in the
such, have no deeper scientific basis. Galicia building. The main benefit of UK, DD ENV 1991-2-2:1996
The method, however, does give the this approach in this case was that it
designer some flexibility when the fire could be used to justify a 60-minute For an online version of this article,
load or ventilation conditions are dif- compartmentation between floors, go to www.sfpe.org.

40 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

 LESSONS
LEARNED
FROM A

Carbon Dioxide
System Accident
By Morgan J. Hurley, P.E, and that contains electrical support equipment CO2 upon activation of a heat detector or
James G. Bisker, P.E. for a reactor and support facilities within upon activation of one of the two manual
the Test Reactor Area. The building is CO2 releasing stations. The emergency

A high-pressure, total-flooding, car-

bon dioxide extinguishing system
discharged without warning dur-
ing routine maintenance of electrical
equipment resulting in one fatality and
protected with a carbon dioxide (CO2)
extinguishing system, with automatic
sprinklers installed in an adjoining emer-
gency generator room. The CO2 system
release lever in the storage shed was not
connected to the fire-detection system.
When the CO2 system was discharged
via the fire-detection system, discharge
was originally installed in 1971 and con- was accomplished by operation of two
several serious injuries. At the time of the sists of a fire-detection system, 2,500 kg electrically operated control heads. The
accident, the newly installed system (5,500 lb) of carbon dioxide stored in 55 control heads were connected directly to
releasing panel was electronically dis- high-pressure bottles, and discharge pip- two of the 45 kg (100 lb) CO2 storage
abled and considered out of service, yet ing and nozzles. The CO2 system was bottles. Operation of a control head
it still actuated the system when work designed to achieve a 50 percent concen- released the CO2 from the bottle to which
crews disconnected primary power to the tration of carbon dioxide. it was connected, which pressurized the
panel. The fire-detection system consists of a discharge manifold. Pressuriza- tion of the
Several lessons can be learned from releasing panel, initiating devices, notifica- discharge manifold opened pressure-
this accident. In particular, designers must tion devices, and actuation devices. operated valves on the other CO2 storage
examine personnel safety in the context Initiating devices include 14 heat detec- bottles. The CO2 would then flow
of possible special extinguishing system tors, two manual pull stations, two manu- through a piping network and discharge
failure modes as well as the protection of al CO2 releasing stations, and a waterflow out of nozzles located in Building 648.
the facility from attack by fire. detector for the building’s dry pipe sprin- Manual operation of the emergency
kler system. Notification devices include release lever would directly release the
BACKGROUND1 building evacuation signals. Actuating CO2, independent of the fire-detection
devices include releasing circuits for the system. See Figure 1 for a diagram of the
The Idaho National Engineering and CO2 supply and an interface circuit that CO2 system arrangement.
Testing Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) allowed the fire alarm to be monitored by The CO2 and fire-detection systems
is a government-owned, contractor-oper- the facility’s fire alarm reporting system. incorporated two distinct time delays.
ated facility located in a rural area of The CO2 system was designed to be The control panel was programmed with
southeastern Idaho. The site houses released upon a signal either from the a 30-second delay. Upon operation of
nuclear reactors that are used for testing fire-detection system or manually via an either a heat detector or a manual CO2
and research, fuel storage buildings, and emergency release lever located in the releasing station, the control panel was
miscellaneous support infrastructure. CO2 storage shed. The fire-detection sys- programmed to sound the evacuation sig-
Building 648 is a two-story building tem was programmed to discharge the nals immediately and begin a 30-second

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 43

 To switchgear Safety outlet
room (Pressure relief valve)

2" (50 mm) During a recreation of the events lead-

Connecting pipe ing up the accident, the circumstances
to bypass stop valve that would have led to another CO2 dis-
charge were duplicated when primary
power was disconnected from the control
Check valve panel. When primary power was discon-
nected from the control panel, a spurious
and momentary signal developed in the
releasing panel’s energy power supply
and charging circuitry that migrated
through the releasing circuits, causing the
control solenoids to actuate and the evac-
uation signals to momentarily sound. The
CO2 Storage evacuation alarms again failed to continu-
bottles
ously sound for a duration that would
adequately warn building occupants.
While the malfunction of the control
panel was the direct cause of the acci-
CO2 Manifold
dent, several contributing factors were
piping
identified, which included:
• The releasing panel did not monitor
discharge of the CO2 system.
Electronic • The alarm sounded for an insufficient
control heads period of time prior to the CO2 dis-
charge.
Discharge
• The CO2 system was not equipped
delay
with a mechanism that would have
supported lockout.
• The releasing panel was not equipped
Figure 1. CO2 system arrangement1 with a supervised circuit disconnect
switch and had to be electronically
time delay sequence, after which the con- after the last breaker was opened, the CO2
disabled for work in the facility.
trol panel would actuate the control head system discharged, creating “near zero vis-
solenoids. ibility.”1 While the evacuation alarms may
HAZARDS OF CARBON DIOXIDE
An additional 25-second mechanical have briefly sounded for less than one
EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS
delay device was installed between the second, they did not continuously sound
CO2 storage bottles and the discharge in conjunction with the CO2 release. Carbon dioxide is a commonly used
piping to the building. This mechanical After the CO2 discharge, the workers extinguishing agent. According to the
delay would automatically retard the dis- ran towards the exits, which were visible Environmental Protection Agency, CO2 is
charge of CO2 and only required the since they were held open by cables run- used in approximately 20 percent (based
pressure of the CO2 for its operation. ning into the building from portable gen- on cost) of all special hazard fire protec-
With the combination of the delay pro- erators. Eight of the workers were able to tion systems.2 The U.S. EPA also estimates
grammed into the control panel and the exit on their own; however, five remained that special hazard applications comprise
mechanical delay, the evacuation signals inside of the building and were rendered 20 percent of all fire protection system
would sound for a total of 55 seconds unconscious by the CO2. Three were later applications;2 therefore, CO2 systems com-
prior to the discharge of CO2 when dis- rescued by the workers who had earlier prise approximately 4 percent of all fire
charge was initiated via the fire-detection escaped, which left two people remaining protection systems.
system. in the building. One of the remaining Carbon dioxide possesses several prop-
workers was later revived, and the other erties that make it a desirable fire protec-
THE ACCIDENT1 perished. tion agent. These include:2
• CO2 is noncombustible and does not
On the afternoon of July 29, 1998, INVESTIGATION BY DOE1 produce other hazardous substances
workers were preparing to perform pre- when heated (as some “clean agents”
ventive maintenance of the electrical Following the accident, the Department do).
switchgear in Building 648. The CO2 sys- of Energy conducted an investigation to • CO2 is stored in a pressurized state,
tem was electronically impaired by pro- determine the causes of the accident. The and the pressurization alone is suffi-
gramming the control panel not to acti- accident investigation determined that a cient to propel the gas into a protect-
vate the control heads located on the CO2 likely cause of the CO2 system release was ed space.
bottles. the transmission of a spurious signal to • CO2 leaves no residue following a
Later, the work crew began opening the control heads, which occurred when discharge.
circuit breakers in preparation for the the power to the control panel was dis- • CO2 does not react with most other
preventive maintenance work. Shortly connected. materials.

44 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

 • Since it is a gas, CO2 provides “three- provisions are contained in 29 CFR 1910, al release at the CO2 storage. This latter
dimensional” protection, i.e., it can subpart J. The scope of 29 CFR 1910, sub- means of operation is referred to as
protect spatially complex hazards part J, (contained in 29 CFR “emergency manual operation” by NFPA
such as printing presses or marine 1910.147(a)(1)(i)) states that the regulation 12.3 Emergency manual operation is
engine rooms. applies to “the servicing and maintenance required by NFPA 12 for all CO2 system
• CO2 does not conduct electricity. of machines and equipment in which the valves.3 Because the control panel did not
Although CO2 is a naturally occurring unexpected energization or startup of the monitor release of the CO2 system, opera-
substance, produced, for example, by fires machines or equipment, or release of tion of the emergency manual control
and breathing, it also can pose dangers in stored energy could cause injury to would have caused the CO2 system to
high concentrations. At low concentrations employees.”5 discharge, without sounding the evacua-
(~4%), CO2 is relatively benign.2 However, “Lockout” is defined as “the placement tion alarms or notifying response organi-
at greater concentrations, CO2 is lethal to of a lockout device on an energy isolating zations.
humans, and at concentrations greater device... ensuring that the energy isolating NFPA 72 also requires that fire alarm
than 17 percent, death can occur in less device and the equipment being con- systems used for releasing service be pro-
than one minute. Other adverse physiolog- trolled cannot be operated until the lock- vided with a supervised disconnect
ical effects can occur from exposures less out device is removed.”5 switch to allow for system testing without
than 17 percent, including headache, NFPA 12 also contains lockout require- activating the fire suppression system.
shortness of breath, and unconsciousness.2 ments. The edition of NFPA 12 that was in Had this switch been provided at this
The minimum design concentration of effect at the time of the accident stated:3 site, it could have been used to physically
CO2 for fire suppression varies with dif- “To prevent accidental or deliberate dis- separate the releasing panel from the CO2
ferent fuels and ranges from 34 percent charge, a ‘lockout’ shall be provided when control heads as opposed to disabling the
to 75 percent.3 Most CO2 system applica- persons not familiar with the systems and releasing panel electronically. Since this
tions are at the low end of this range. their operation are present in a protected switch is not required as a condition for
Nevertheless, at a minimum design con- space.” The 2000 edition of NFPA 12 listing as a releasing panel, design engi-
centration of 34 percent, all total flooding added a definition of “lockout” that paral- neers must specify and verify its installa-
systems create an environment that is lels the OSHA definition. tion.
lethal to humans. While the CO2 system was not fitted It is noteworthy that the appendix to
Carbon dioxide for extinguishing sys- with a lockout device that would have the 1996 edition of the National Fire
tems is typically stored in a liquid form. met the definitions contained in the Alarm Code contained explanatory mater-
When CO2 is discharged, the endothermic OSHA rules, INEEL operating procedures ial (in A-5-7) that stated that evacuation
expansion absorbs heat, and the discharged called for removal of the electronic con- alarms may be initiated by the fire-detec-
CO2 is cold enough to cause water vapor trol heads “prior to maintenance that tion system. While this explanatory mater-
in the air to condense into small droplets, could cause a release of CO2.”1 However, ial was deleted in the 1999 edition of the
creating a fog. This fog can obscure visi- at the time of the accident, the control National Fire Alarm Code, it is likely that
bility, making egress more difficult. panel was used to electronically disable there are many CO2 systems and other
Walking speed through nonirritating the system in lieu of removing the control releasing panel controlled suppression
smoke has been shown to decrease as heads. systems in service that are configured in a
the smoke concentration increases.4 Since similar manner to the CO2 system at
Engineering Controls
the effect of nonirritating smoke on INEEL.
The National Fire Alarm Code (NFPA
humans would primarily be a reduction
72) requires that6 “the operation of an
in visibility, it can be concluded that the
automatic fire suppression system OTHER AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY
decrease in visibility caused by the fog
installed within the protected premises
created by CO2 discharge would also With the exception of “small” systems,
shall cause an alarm signal...” The
decrease walking speed. defined as those with less than 140 kg
National Fire Alarm Code also states that
Taken together, these two effects (300 lb) of CO2 storage, marine CO2 sys-
“the operation of... fire extinguishing sys-
demonstrate the importance of evacuating tems in the U.S. incorporate a number of
tem(s) or suppression system(s) shall initi-
all people from a protected space before features that are not required in their
ate an alarm signal by means appropriate
CO2 discharge. Since for systems installed land-based counterparts. Neither automat-
to the system, such as agent flow or agent
to extinguish surface fires, a CO2 design ic nor electronic operation is permitted in
pressure, by alarm-initiating devices
concentration of at least 34 percent must marine CO2 systems; operation must be
installed in accordance with their individ-
be achieved within one minute,3 a lethal by mechanical means. In marine CO2 sys-
ual listings.”
environment would be created very tems, electronic pre-discharge delays are
The CO2 system at the INEEL was
quickly, and evacuation times would not permitted. Predischarge delays must
installed to operate the evacuation alarm
increase due to the reduction in visibility. also be mechanical and depend only on
and began counting down the logic-based
predischarge delay simultaneously. the pressure of the CO2 to operate. Also,
ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTING However, because the control panel did the audible evacuation alarms used in
CAUSES IDENTIFIED BY DOE not intentionally operate the control heads, marine CO2 systems must be powered by
the predischarge alarm did not sound. the CO2 pressure; electronic alarms are
Lockout Operation of the CO2 system was not permitted.7
The U.S. Occupational Safety and accomplished via two means – upon a The types of components that are used
Health Administration (OSHA) lockout signal from the control panel or by manu- in marine CO2 systems are readily avail-

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 45

able and provide an increase in safety IMPLICATIONS FOR CO2 DESIGN provision of mechanically operated CO2-
over the types of components typically powered sirens in the CO2 discharge pip-
used in shore-based systems. Although The CO2 system in Building 648 nearly ing that operated by the pressure of the
they are not required in shore-based sys- complied with NFPA 12 and NFPA 72. CO2 alone.
tems, their use should be considered However, the accident could have been While the provision of a lockout
since they would eliminate many readily prevented by one of two methods: (1) device or a circuit disconnect switch
foreseeable failure modes that could lead the provision of pressure switches in the potentially could have prevented the
to injury or death of people in a space CO2 discharge piping upstream of the accident, given that it would require a
protected by CO2. mechanical delay that would cause the deliberate action to operate, and that the
evacuation alarm to sound, or (2) the procedures that were in place to remove
the control heads were not followed, it is
suggested that a lockout device alone is
not sufficient. Addition- ally, a failure
mode would still be present where the
system can discharge without the evacua-
tion alarms sounding.
This accident demonstrates that code
compliance alone may not be sufficient
for CO2 system design, and engineers
should consider possible failure modes
and effects during the design of CO2 sys-
tems. Similarly, existing CO2 systems
should be evaluated to determine
whether they provide adequate worker
safety.

Morgan Hurley is with the Society of

Fire Protection Engineers. James Bisker is
with the U.S. Department of Energy.

REFERENCES

1 “Type A Accident Investigation Board Report

of the July 28, 1998, Fatality and Multiple
Injuries Resulting from Release of Carbon
Dioxide at Building 648, Test Reactor Area
Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory,” U.S. Department
of Energy, EH2PUB/09-98/01A1, September,
1998.
2 “Carbon Dioxide as a Fire Suppressant:
Examining the Risks.” EPA430-R-00-002, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 2000.
3 NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide
Extinguishing Systems, National Fire
Protection Association, Quincy, MA: 1993.
4 Jin, T., “Studies on Human Behavior and
Tenability in Fire Smoke,” Fire Safety
Science: Proceedings of the Fifth
International Symposium, Dr. Y. Hasemi,
Ed., Society of Fire Protection Engineers,
Bethesda, MD: 1997.
5 29 CFR 1910.147
6 NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code,
National Fire Protection Association, Quincy,
MA: 1999.
7 46 CFR 76.15.

For an online version of this article, go

to www.sfpe.org.

FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 46

 Careers/ Classifieds
Fire protection engineering is a growing profession with many challenging career opportunities. Contact the Society of
Fire Protection Engineers at www.sfpe.org or the organizations below for more information.

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 Resources To Order Any Publication, Call SFPE at 301.718.2910

Refresh your
FIRE Structural Design for Fire Safety
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University of Canterbury, New Zealand
PROTECTION Presenting a comprehensive overview of the fire resistance
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Published in 2001 by John Wiley and Sons.

new titles Price: SFPE Member, $118.00; Nonmember, $150.00

available from

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50 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

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FALL 2001 Fire Protection Engineering 51

 Resources
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NFPA Fall Meeting
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March 20-22, 2002

4th International Conference on Performance-
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May 19-23, 2002

NFPA World Fire Safety Congress and Exposition
Minneapolis, MN
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UPCOMING EVENTS
52 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12
 CORPORATE 100
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Index of • Ansul, Inc. .....................................................Page 21 • Master Control Systems.................................Page 22
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• Gem Sprinkler Company.........................Back Cover • Wheelock, Inc. ..............................................Page 34
• Great Lakes Chemicals..................................Page 53

54 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12

 from the technical director

A Paradigm Change

critic, as the engineer who prepared a

P erformance-based fire protection

design requires doing many
things differently than prescrip-
tive-based design. Some of these dif-
ferences are obvious; for example, the
design has the best perspective of
whether or not the design provides an
acceptable level of safety.

use of more sophisticated models and Models, correlations, and other engi-
calculation methods and the amount of neering methods are often used during
engineering analysis required. However, the development of a performance-
there is a key difference that is not based design to establish the design
always immediately obvious: the met- attributes and to verify that the design
ric that an engineer uses to gage the meets the performance criteria in the
acceptability of their own design. design fire scenarios selected. Each of
these models and correlations will have
In the case of prescriptive-based a limited range of applicability.
design, determination of what general Similarly, input data that is used in the
design attributes constitute an accept- models or correlations will only have a
able level of safety is one step removed limited range of applicability. Also all
from the engineer. These determina- models, correlations, and data have
tions were made during the develop- some uncertainty associated with them.
Morgan J. Hurley, P.E.
Technical Director ment of codes and standards and by
governmental jurisdictions as they There is nobody better suited to con-
Society of Fire Protection Engineers
decided which codes and standards to sider the applicability of the models,
adopt and what amendments, if any, to correlations, and data that is used in the
impose. development and evaluation of perfor-
mance-based designs than the engineer
With such designs, a designer needed that performed the analysis. While
only to ensure that all attributes of a enforcement officials or third-party engi-
design fit within the minimums and neers may review a performance-based
maximums specified by a code or stan- design, they will not consider the devel-
dard to determine if their design was opment of the design and the selection
acceptable. Similarly, from an enforce- of methods and data as closely as the
ment standpoint, verification that a engineer who developed the design
design complied with the code or stan- did.
dard was relatively straightforward.
The engineer’s final metric of success No engineer would intentionally pre-
was frequently whether or not enforce- pare a design that he or she knew did
ment officials accepted the design. not provide an acceptable level of safe-
ty. In most cases when designing to
However, with performance-based prescriptive codes and standards, code
design, the attributes of an acceptable compliance is sufficient to provide an
design are not as clearly stated. While acceptable level of safety. However,
an “acceptable level of safety” is still when using models or other engineer-
established through the development ing methods to develop or evaluate a
and adoption of codes and standards, performance-based design, an engineer
the responsibility falls to engineers to must first evaluate the applicability, lim-
specify a design that is acceptably safe itations, and inherent assumptions of
– and to demonstrate why the design is the methods and data used to fully
sufficiently safe. Before asking enforce- understand the level of safety provided.
ment officials to evaluate a design, the
engineer should first prove to himself
or herself that the design is safe. In fact,
the engineer should be their own worst

56 Fire Protection Engineering N UMBER 12