The need for electoral reforms in Uganda
Introduction
Elections are the cornerstone of a democratic political processes, serving as a mechanism for political
parties or candidates to compete for public office under equal conditions before the electorate. For an
election to be credible, the competition must be fair, requiring impartial management of the process.
Uganda has had seven general elections since 1962 with four of them under the current political
dispensation. The multiparty was as aresult of the 2005 refrendum. This led to enactment of the
Political Parties and Organisations Act, 2005. The multi-party system was qimd at ensuring that
elections are regular, free and fair. For the period between January 1986 and july 2005, Uganda had a no
party system of governance also known as the movement system, which considred individual merit as a
basis for election to political office and not party affiliations. Prior to multi-party system, elections in
Uganda were faced with several challenges such as vote rigging, abuse of human rights among others.
From the time the multi-party system was adopted, electoral process has regisred some success such as
increase in voter turns up. Despite registering some progress, elections in Uganda have continoulsy
faced some challenges such as vote rigging, voter bribery, late delivery of voting materials by the
Electoral Commision, defrenchising people, lack of sufficient mechanisms in place to enable persons
with disbailoities vote and human rights abuse inter alia.
Regarding the genarl elections and in particular the preisidential elections, most of the presidential
elections have been challenged before the Supreme Court. In most of these presidential election
petitions, tteh Supreme Court held that elections laws were violated but the vilation was not substantial.
The court has in most cases held that non compliance with the election laws was not sufficient to
warrant conucting fresh elections. This confirms the fact that there is leack of compliance too election
laws and practices especaiully by the Electoral Commission which is the body responsible for organizing
elections in Uganda.
In every democratic state, there should be regular, free and fair elections. Therefore, elections are a
hallmark of a democratic society.
Management of elections in Uganda
This part focuses on managing election in Uganda by the Electoral commission
Electoral Commission is a body in charge of managing elections in Uganda. International IDEA
categorizes electoral management body design into 3 models ie an independent body, govrenmet or
mixed. Independent bodies are established and managed through the constitution and an Act of
parliament. Mixed bodies is usally 2 or more institions managing elections. Regarding government
model, an electoral body assumes judicial powers and is part of judicial branch of governemnet such as
in Brazil. In Uganda, the law recognizes an independent electoral body.
An independent electoral body serves to protect established norms and uphold core values and ideals
deemed intergarl to an equal and fair society. An independent body serves to achieve fai and credible
electoral process. According to Garnett and Van Ham 2019An electoral body reliant upon an executive
to decide its strategic and operationall priorities, its functions and budget, or its stuff recruitment, may
lack functional indpednece. The learned authors futher note that administrative and financial
independence is insperable from legal indpeence. The authors further note that structurally,
indpenndent EMB may not be functionally indpendnt if its commission-the executive organ performs the
EMB’s steering committee, policymaking and strategic decision-making functions –lacks autonomy or is
susceptible to political capture or monopolization by the executive or any political party.
Independnec is usually regarded as interchangeable with impartiality.
The legal framework
Setting the parameters of an electoral body under the law is very crucial. However amking an EMB a
structaully and functionally indpendnet legal entity is no panacea for guaranteeing that the EMB will
commit to and uphold that normatively prescribed indpendnepenc inpractice.
International Norms and Standards
According to ICCPR in Genarla Comment No.25, every signatory has an obligation to ensure that an
indpendnet electoral authority is established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is
conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with establsied laws which are compatible with the
covenat. The electoral process must be organized independently of governemmt. tehCouncil of Europe’s
Venice Commisison Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters1 which is a regional organization for EU
that lays down standards for organizing elections recommends that member states establish electoral
bodies that indpendnet and separate from government. According to the commission, the commission
of an electoral body should be based on principles of impartiality and indpednece from politically
motivated manipulation.
According to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governace2, it is the respobility of every
member state to establish and strenegthenindepednnet and impartial national electoral bodies
resposble for the management of elections. The charter recognizes the principle of independnceand
impartiality in organizing elections.
Most of the countries that conduct their electoral processes with intergritry have an indpeendnet EMB
not necessariluy establsied under the constitution but under anAct of Parliament. Exampels include
Austrilain Electoral Commission created Commonwealth Act3 in Austrailai, Canada Elections Act 4 in
Canada
Possible options for conucting a free and fair elections in Uganda
1
2002
2
2007
3
1920
4
2000
a. An electoral body with political party participation.
Support of all electoral stake holders- political parties and the electorate contributes to broader
acceptance and support of the electoral body. Political parties act as a link between the citizesn and the
political system. Commission formed by political party nominations may be more amenable to political
parties’ concerns, providing and avenue for the expression of their interests and needs in an electoral
process. This system was developed in 1989 in Central and Estern Europe. This can foster tranparecy
and concensus over electoral procedures and prevent manipulation by the executive or legislature.
Political parties control each other and ensure that no party unduly benefits from a decision over
another. The main challenge with this arrangement is that the electoral body may be overly politicized.
b. Commisisons without political participation.
Another approach is constituting a commission consisting of members without political party affliation.
Criteria for selection is often required and specified in an electoral law such as possessing certain
qualifications, being a member of a particular profession among others. Former politicians hsoudl not
be appointed to the commission.
c. Commissions with participation of the judiciary.
This is another option that can be used to ensure that elections are free and fair. This is done by
constiting a commission composed of members of the judiciary. In Egypt, the 10- member commission
comprises judges appoionted from various judicial bodies. In Costa Rica, members of the commsion are
serving judges while in Costa Rica, members of the commission are retired judges. This approach is
unique to Latin America and was adopted as a pecific solution to a unique history of elections being
undermined by excutive branch of government.However, this sytem is not the best option where judicial
impartiality is question.
d. Commissions with mixed political party and no-party participation
According to this approach, where a combination of partisan and technical expertise is desired, it may
be optimal for a commission to comprise political parties and expert members, to encourage
impartiality. Mixed membership commission assume numerous and dievrse forms, born out of the need
to ensure cross-party support for an electoral body’s mandate and broader acceptance of an election
result. They can further promote puvlic trust, inclsive decision making and the professional delivevry of
electoral processes. In the Republic of Korea, three of the nine commissioners are appointed by the
president. The Natioanl Assembly selects another there and the final there are nominated by the Chief
Justice. In Mozambique, the National Election Commision has seveneteen members out of which ten
are nominated by the largest political parties and sven represent civil society organizations. In the UK,
the Electoral Commisison can have 10 commisisoners out of which a maximum of four are nominated by
the political parties in parliament with three are nominated by the leaers of the three largest parties and
the fourth is nominated by the remaining smaller parties. The other six commissioners are subjcetd to
restrictions on any political ativity, with four nominated to represent the interests of devolved nations of
the UK. Mixed approach ensures both impartiality and inclusion.
In constituting the commison, cosnideratiuon should be made to gender and inclusion of minority. In
Kenya, the cosntititoion specifies that the vice chairperson of the commission must of the opposite
gender5. In Kosovo, the commission has eleven memebsr out of which four are reserved for Serbian and
other ethno-cultural minorities in the country per the constitution. 6
Appointment of the members of the commission
One of the best ways of constituting the commission is bipartisan selection process. According to this
method, theer should be concesus between the prime minister or the president and the elader of
opposition for each appointment. This ensures inclusion of opposition party even when it has the least
lowest parliamentary representation. In an attempt to include minority political parties and indpeednet
mebers, tehse should also be consulted. Inclusive appointment systems typically rely on a system of
proportional represnetaion to appoint commissioners, with the legislature performing the function of an
electoral collsge. Thgis design is appropriate for multi-party systems like Uganda. Each party should be
consulted before appointment is made. In Colombia, the National Election Commsiion cosnoists of nine
members elected by the congress in a plenary session in accordance with a system of proportional
represnetaion and based on proposals submitted by the political parties as provided for under the
cosntitution7. In Albania, the Centarl Election Commisison consists of seven members. Two members are
nominated by the largest party, one by the second largest party, two by the largest opposition party and
one by the second larghest opposition party. The entire parliament selecs the chair through an open
application process as provided for under the Electoral Code 2008 as amended. 8
Parties or members not represneted in parliemnt to be included. In Botswana, the Independnet
Electoral Commisison has seven memebsr, comprising a cahir, deputy chair and five commissioners. The
five commissioners are chosen from candidates deemd fit and impartial, and tehn nominated by an all
party conference convened on an ad hoc basis which includes all the registred political paries as
provided for by the Constitution of the republic of Botswana.9
5
Article 250
6
Article 139
7
Article 264
8
2015
9
Article 65A
