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Echegaray

The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order staying the execution of Leo Echegaray scheduled for January 4, 1999. The Justice Secretary argued this violated the rule of finality of judgments and encroached on the executive's power to grant reprieve. The Supreme Court held that while it loses jurisdiction to amend or modify final judgments, it retains jurisdiction to execute and enforce them. It also has inherent power to control its processes and orders to prevent unfairness from supervening events. Granting the TRO was not the same as granting reprieve, an executive function, as the accused still had collateral rights that could be claimed in court like if the accused became insane after conviction.

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Na-eehs Noicpecnoc Namzug
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126 views1 page

Echegaray

The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order staying the execution of Leo Echegaray scheduled for January 4, 1999. The Justice Secretary argued this violated the rule of finality of judgments and encroached on the executive's power to grant reprieve. The Supreme Court held that while it loses jurisdiction to amend or modify final judgments, it retains jurisdiction to execute and enforce them. It also has inherent power to control its processes and orders to prevent unfairness from supervening events. Granting the TRO was not the same as granting reprieve, an executive function, as the accused still had collateral rights that could be claimed in court like if the accused became insane after conviction.

Uploaded by

Na-eehs Noicpecnoc Namzug
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same

day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice. The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress

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