NIST CFReDS Project

(Computer Forensic Reference Data Sets)

NIST CFReDS:
Data Leakage Case

Software and Systems Division

Information Technology Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

July 23, 2018

Table of Contents

1. SCENARIO OVERVIEW........................................................................................ 1

2. TARGET SYSTEMS AND DEVICES............................................................................2

3. DETAILED BEHAVIOR OF THE SUSPECT....................................................................3

4. ACQUIRED DATA INFORMATION...........................................................................8

5. DIGITAL FORENSICS PRACTICE POINTS..................................................................11

6. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE SCENARIO..................................................12

7. HISTORY....................................................................................................... 51

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1.SCENARIO OVERVIEW

‘Iaman Informant’ was working as a manager of the technology development division at a famous
international company OOO that developed state-of-the-art technologies and gadgets.
One day, at a place which ‘Mr. Informant’ visited on business, he received an offer from ‘Spy
Conspirator’ to leak of sensitive information related to the newest technology. Actually, ‘Mr.
Conspirator’ was an employee of a rival company, and ‘Mr. Informant’ decided to accept the offer for
large amounts of money, and began establishing a detailed leakage plan.
‘Mr. Informant’ made a deliberate effort to hide the leakage plan. He discussed it with ‘Mr. Conspirator’
using an e-mail service like a business relationship. He also sent samples of confidential information
though personal cloud storage.
After receiving the sample data, ‘Mr. Conspirator’ asked for the direct delivery of storage devices that
stored the remaining (large amounts of) data. Eventually, ‘Mr. Informant’ tried to take his storage devices
away, but he and his devices were detected at the security checkpoint of the company. And he was
suspected of leaking the company data.
At the security checkpoint, although his devices (a USB memory stick and a CD) were briefly checked
(protected with portable write blockers), there was no evidence of any leakage. And then, they were
immediately transferred to the digital forensics laboratory for further analysis.
The information security policies in the company include the following:
(1) Confidential electronic filesa should be stored and kept in the authorized external storage devices
and the secured network drives.
(2) Confidential paper documents and electronic files can be accessed only within the allowed time
range from 10:00 AM to 16:00 PM with the appropriate permissions.
(3) Non-authorized electronic devices such as laptops, portable storages, and smart devices cannot be
carried onto the company.
(4) All employees are required to pass through the ‘Security Checkpoint’ system.
(5) All storage devices such as HDD, SSD, USB memory stick, and CD/DVD are forbidden under
the ‘Security Checkpoint’ rules.

In addition, although the company managed separate internal and external networks and used DRM
(Digital Rights Management) / DLP (Data Loss Prevention) solutions for their information security, ‘Mr.
Informant’ had sufficient authority to bypass them. He was also very interested in IT (Information
Technology), and had a slight knowledge of digital forensics.

In this scenario, find any evidence of the data leakage, and any data that might have been generated from
the suspect’s electronic devices.

a
All the seed files (confidential files used in the scenario) were created based on MS Office files randomly selected from
Govdocs1 (https://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/files). The seed files are available online at NIST/CFReDS web-site.

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2.TARGET SYSTEMS AND DEVICES

Target Detailed Information Note

Personal HW Type Virtual System VMWare v11
Computer CPU 1 Processer (2 Core)
(PC) RAM 2,048 MB
HDD Size 20 GB
File System NTFS
IP Address 10.11.11.129 NAT
SW Operating Microsoft Windows 7 English (64 bits)
(OS) System Ultimate (SP1) MSDN imageb (not activated)

SW Web - MS Internet Explorer Latest versions

(Apps) - Google Chrome if possible

Document Microsoft Office Word, Excel, PowerPoint

MSDN imagec (not activated)
Cloud - Google Drive Auto Syncing is ON
- Apple iCloud if possible

E-mail Microsoft Outlook NIST.gov mail serverd

Anti-forensics - CCleaner Latest versions
- Eraser if possible

Removable HW Type USB removable storage device

Media #1 Mfg. SanDisk Vendor ID = 0x0781
(RM#1) e Model Cruzer Fit
Serial No. 4C530012450531101593 Unique serial number
Size 4 GB
File System exFAT
Volume label Authorized USB
Removable HW Type USB removable storage device
Media #2 Mfg. SanDisk Vendor ID = 0x0781
(RM#2) Model Cruzer Fit
Serial No. 4C530012550531106501 Unique serial number
Size 4 GB Partitioned 1 GB only
File System FAT32
Volume label IAMAN $_@
Removable HW Type CD-R
Media #3 Size 700 MB
(RM#3) File System UDF Created by Windows 7
Volume label IAMAN CD
Smart Device - - - Future workf

3.DETAILED BEHAVIOR OF THE SUSPECT

b
SHA-1 hash value: 1693B6CB50B90D96FC3C04E4329604FEBA88CD51
c
SHA-1 hash value: 377F1F97DBE99104CF053DF3632377F07C9310C7
d
NIST e-mail accounts: iaman.informant@nist.gov, spy.conspirator@nist.gov
e
Authorized USB memory stick ( confidential electronic files of the company)
f
Smart devices and Apple OS X system can be considered in the future work.

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Regarding developing user and system artifacts, we tried to keep simple as much as possible. For
efficiency of both developing and analyzing images, it was designed to avoid complicated operations and
create various meaningful artifacts from the viewpoint of digital forensics.

Detailed behavior of the suspect is described as a text (below table) and visual diagram.
Step Date/Time Action Additional Description Note
Normal ~ 2015-03-22 Install OS Windows 7 Ultimate

Configure settings Set the timezone to (UTC-05) Eastern Time

Install Apps (1) Microsoft Office Latest versions if possible

(2) Microsoft Internet Explorer
(3) Google Chrome
Create/Download Electronic documents Company’s common files
business data (Word, Excel, PowerPoint…)
Email Microsoft Outlook with NIST e-mail account iaman.informant@nist.gov

Create user accounts “admin11”  login count: 2

“ITechTeam”  login count: 0
“temporary”  login count: 1
D-2 2015-03-23 Receive an e-mail spy.conspirator@nist.gov [ Subject: Hello, Iaman ]
13:29  iaman.informant@nist.gov “How are you doing?”
2015-03-23 Prepare a crime Searching the leakage methods through Google, Bing search engine
14:01 ------------------------------------------- Chrome
(data leakage) web-browsers: 1) data leakage methods
~ - Microsoft Internet Explorer 2) leaking confidential information
2015-03-23 3) information leakage cases
- Google Chrome 4) intellectual property theft
14:21 5) how to leak a secret
------------------------------------------- IE 11
6) file sharing and tethering
7) DLP DRM
8) e-mail investigation
9) what is windows system artifacts
10) investigation on windows machine
11) windows event logs
12) cd burning method in Windows
13) external device and forensics
------------------------------------------- Chrome
14) cloud storage
15) digital forensics
16) how to delete data
17) anti-forensics
18) system cleaner
19) how to recover data
20) data recovery tools
2015-03-23 Connect USB ‘RM#1’ USB memory stick
14:31
2015-03-23 Search keywords Searching confidential data using Windows Keyword: “secret”
14:36 Search function
2015-03-23 Open files [secret_project]_proposal.docx Open and read files
14:37 [secret_project]_design_concept.ppt
2015-03-23 Copy & open files Copying confidential files from ‘RM#1’ to “\Desktop\S data”
14:39 ‘PC’
[ RM#1 ] [ PC ]
RM#1\Secret Project Data\proposal\[secret_project]_proposal.docx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\[secret_project]_proposal.docx
RM#1\Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_design_concept.ppt %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\[secret_project]_design_concept.ppt
2015-03-23 Disconnect USB Ejecting ‘RM#1’
14:39
2015-03-23 Configure settings Show ‘file name extensions’ in Windows
14:39 Explorer
2015-03-23 Rename files All names and extensions are changed [secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx
14:41  landscape.png
(e.g., xlsx  jpg, docx  mp3…) [secret_project]_design_concept.ppt
 space_and_earth.mp4
2015-03-23 Send an e-mail iaman.informant@nist.gov “Successfully secured.”
14:44  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
2015-03-23 Receive an e-mail spy.conspirator@nist.gov [ Subject: Good job, buddy ]
15:14  iaman.informant@nist.gov “Good, job. I need a more detailed

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 data about this business.”
2015-03-23 Send an e-mail iaman.informant@nist.gov “This is a sample.”
15:19  spy.conspirator@nist.gov (space_and_earth.mp4)
2015-03-23 Receive an e-mail spy.conspirator@nist.gov “Okay, I got it. I’ll be in touch.”
15:20  iaman.informant@nist.gov
2015-03-23 Receive an e-mail spy.conspirator@nist.gov [ Subject: Important request ]
15:26  iaman.informant@nist.gov “I confirmed it. But, I need a more
data. Do your best.”
2015-03-23 Send an e-mail iaman.informant@nist.gov “Umm... I need time to think.”
15:27  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
2015-03-23 Search and download Searching cloud storage services using
16:00 Apps Chrome

2015-03-23 Install Apps (1) Google Drive

16:00 (2) Apple iCloud

2015-03-23 Login cloud service Login Google Drive service with an account
16:05 (iaman.informant.personal@gmail.com)

2015-03-23 Connect Connecting secured shared network drive \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive

16:23 network drive
2015-03-23 Search files Traversing directories and files using
16:24 Windows Explorer
2015-03-23 Connect Mapping network drive (v:) \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive
16:26 network drive
2015-03-23 Open files (secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx Open and read files
16:26 [secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx
2015-03-23 Copy & open files Copying confidential files from a network “\Desktop\S data”
16:28 drive to ‘PC’
[ Network Drive ] [ PC ]
Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx
Secret Project Data\final\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx
2015-03-23 Disconnect Unmapping network drive (v:) \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive
16:29 network drive
2015-03-23 Rename files All names and extensions are changed (secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx
16:30  happy_holiday.jpg
(e.g., xlsx  jpg, docx  mp3…) [secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx
 do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3
2015-03-23 Upload files Uploading some files to Google Drive and happy_holiday.jpg
do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3
16:32 sharing them
2015-03-23 Send an e-mail iaman.informant@nist.gov [ Subject: It’s me ]
16:38  spy.conspirator@nist.gov “Use links below.”
2015-03-23 Receive an e-mail spy.conspirator@nist.gov “I got it.”
16:41  iaman.informant@nist.gov
2015-03-23 Delete files Deleting files from Google Drive
16:42
2015-03-23 Misc. Personal web-browsing using IE During approx. 15 minutes
16:43

D-1 2015-03-24 Receive an e-mail spy.conspirator@nist.gov [ Subject: Last request ]

09:26  iaman.informant@nist.gov “This is the last request. I want to
get the remaining data.”
2015-03-24 Send an e-mail iaman.informant@nist.gov “Stop it! It is very hard to transfer
09:30  spy.conspirator@nist.gov all data over the internet!”
2015-03-24 Receive an e-mail spy.conspirator@nist.gov “No problem. U can directly deliver
09:33  iaman.informant@nist.gov storage devices that stored it.”
2015-03-24 Send an e-mail iaman.informant@nist.gov “This is the last time..”
09:35  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
2015-03-24 Connect USB ‘RM#1’ USB memory stick
09:38
2015-03-24 Copy files Copying confidential files ‘RM#1’ to ‘PC’
09:40 [ RM#1 ] [ PC ]
RM#1\Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_design_concept.ppt %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_design_concept.ppt
RM#1\Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_detailed_design.pptx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_detailed_design.pptx
RM#1\Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_revised_points.ppt %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_revised_points.ppt
RM#1\Secret Project Data\proposal\[secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\proposal\[secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx
RM#1\Secret Project Data\proposal\[secret_project]_proposal.docx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\proposal\[secret_project]_proposal.docx

2015-03-24 Disconnect USB Ejecting ‘RM#1’

09:40
2015-03-24 Connect Secured shared network drive \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive
09:47 network drive

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 2015-03-24 Copy files Copying confidential files from a network
09:47 drive to ‘PC’
[ Network Drive ] [ PC ]
Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_detailed_design.pptx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\[secret_project]_detailed_design.pptx
Secret Project Data\final\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\final\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx
Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_market_analysis.xlsx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_market_analysis.xlsx
Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_market_shares.xls %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_market_shares.xls
Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_price_analysis_#1.xlsx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_price_analysis_#1.xlsx
Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_price_analysis_#2.xls %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_price_analysis_#2.xls
Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx
Secret Project Data\progress\[secret_project]_progress_#1.docx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\[secret_project]_progress_#1.docx
Secret Project Data\progress\[secret_project]_progress_#2.docx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\[secret_project]_progress_#2.docx
Secret Project Data\progress\[secret_project]_progress_#3.doc %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\[secret_project]_progress_#3.doc
Secret Project Data\proposal\[secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\proposal\[secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx
Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#1.docx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#1.docx
Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#1.pptx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#1.pptx
Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#2.docx %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#2.docx
Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#2.ppt %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#2.ppt
Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#3.doc %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#3.doc
Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#3.ppt %UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\[secret_project]_technical_review_#3.ppt

2015-03-24 Rename files All names and extensions are changed (secret_project)_market_analysis.xlsx
09:50  new_years_day.jpg
(20 files in “%UserProfile%\Desktop\S data\ [secret_project]_progress_#3.doc
~ Secret Project Data\”)  my_friends.svg
2015-03-24
09:56
2015-03-24 Connect USB ‘RM#2’ USB memory stick
09:58
2015-03-24 Copy files Copying confidential files to ‘RM#2’ Copy a directory “%UserProfile%\
09:59 Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\”
including sub-dirs and files to RM#2
2015-03-24 Verify files Traversing directories and files in ‘RM#2’ Open a file
10:00 using Windows Explorer (winter_whether_advisory.zip)
2015-03-24 Disconnect USB Ejecting ‘RM#2’
10:02
2015-03-24 Delete files Deleting directories and files from ‘PC’ “\Desktop\S data”
10:07 Normal deletion: [Shift] + [Delete]
2015-03-24 Misc. Personal web-browsing and searching anti- During approx. 4 hours
10:07 forensic methods (Chrome, IE)
2015-03-24 Misc. Launching a game (‘Solitaire’)
14:28
2015-03-24 Misc. Launching the sticky note and writing text
14:31
2015-03-24 Misc. Creating a letter of resignation (.docx) During approx. 30 minutes
14:32 Windows Desktop
2015-03-24 Receive an e-mail spy.conspirator@nist.gov [ Subject: Watch out! ]
15:32  iaman.informant@nist.gov “USB device may be easily
detected. So, try another method.”
2015-03-24 Send an e-mail iaman.informant@nist.gov “I am trying.”
15:34  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
2015-03-24 Connect USB ‘RM#2’ USB memory stick
15:38
2015-03-24 Practice CD burning Testing CD-R burning process and preparing During approx. 55 minutes
15:40 meaningless files for anti-forensics “\Desktop\temp” (1 exe, 8 images)
2015-03-24 Insert CD CD-R Windows CD Burning Type 2:
16:40 With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
2015-03-24 Copy files Copying confidential files from ‘RM#2’ to With renaming directories:
16:40 CD-R - design  de
- pricing decision  pd
- progress  prog
- proposal  prop
- technical review tr
2015-03-24 Burn files Burning confidential files to CD-R
16:41
2015-03-24 Verify files Traversing directories and files in CD-R
16:44 using Windows Explorer
2015-03-24 Format disk Formatting the CD-R as an empty disk
16:44
2015-03-24 Copy files Copying and burning meaningless files to Anti-forensics
16:45 CD-R in order for creating a new session
2015-03-24 Insert CD CD-R (new one) Windows CD Burning Type 1:
16:53 Like a USB flash drive
2015-03-24 Copy files Copying and burning confidential files from
16:54 ‘RM#2’ to CD-R
2015-03-24 Rename directories Renaming directories in CD-R
16:55
2015-03-24 Copy files Copying 3 meaningless files to CD-R Koala.jpg

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 16:57 Penguins.jpg
Tulips.jpg
2015-03-24 Delete files Deleting confidential files from CD-R
16:58
2015-03-24 Verify files Traversing directories and files in CD-R
17:01 using Windows Explorer
2015-03-24 Delete files Deleting copied files from ‘RM#2’ Anti-forensics
17:02 (Quick format)
2015-03-24 Disconnect USB Ejecting ‘RM#2’
17:03
2015-03-24 Send an e-mail iaman.informant@nist.gov [ Subject: Done ]
17:05  spy.conspirator@nist.gov “It’s done. See you tomorrow.”
2015-03-24 Search keywords Searching keywords using Chrome “security checkpoint CD-R”
17:06

D-Day 2015-03-25 Search and download Searching apps for anti-forensics using IE Anti-forensic tools, eraser,
10:46 Apps ccleaner…
2015-03-25 Install Apps (1) Eraser (with .NET Framework) During approx. 8 minutes
10:50 (2) CCleaner
2015-03-25 Delete e-mails Deleting some e-mails in Outlook Anti-forensics
11:00 (9 emails are deleted, and 4 items of
them remain in Deleted Items folder.)
During approx. 10 minutes
2015-03-25 Delete traces Running anti-forensic tools and deleting Wiping “\Desktop\temp” directory
11:13 some files using Eraser
2015-03-25 Delete traces Emptying the Recycle Bin
11:14
2015-03-25 Delete traces Deleting downloaded installer files Normal deletion: [Shift] + [Delete]
11:15 (Eraser, CCleaner)
2015-03-25 Delete traces Launching CCleaner And then, the app was closed after
11:15 doing nothing
2015-03-25 Delete Apps Uninstalling some Apps CCleaner, iCloud
11:18 During approx. 2 minutes
2015-03-25 Delete traces Launching Google Drive app and Logout from Google Drive
11:22 disconnecting an account
2015-03-25 Delete traces Cleaning and arranging Windows desktop Directories and icons in Windows
11:23 Desktop
2015-03-25 Open files Opening the resignation letter (.docx) Windows Desktop
11:24
2015-03-25 Print files Printing the document to the MS XPS file
11:28 and reviewing it with MS XPS viewer
2015-03-25 Finish works Turning off the system and trying to go RM#3 is one of two CD-Rs
11:30 outside with ‘RM#2’ and ‘RM#3’

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4.ACQUIRED DATA INFORMATION

4.1. PERSONAL COMPUTER (PC) – ‘DD’ IMAGE

Item Detailed Information
Filename cfreds_2015_data_leakage_pc
MD5 A49D1254C873808C58E6F1BCD60B5BDE
SHA-1 AFE5C9AB487BD47A8A9856B1371C2384D44FD785
Imaging S/W FTK Imager 3.4.0.1
Image Format DD converted from VMDK ( Some sectors were scrubbedg )
Compression Best (Smallest)
Bytes per Sector 512
Total Sectors 41,943,040
Total Size 20.00 GB (21,474,836,480 bytes)
Compressed Size 5.05 GB (5,427,795,228 bytes)  compressed by 7zip

4.2. PERSONAL COMPUTER (PC) – ‘ENCASE’ IMAGE

Item Detailed Information
Filename cfreds_2015_data_leakage_pc
MD5 A49D1254C873808C58E6F1BCD60B5BDE
SHA-1 AFE5C9AB487BD47A8A9856B1371C2384D44FD785
Imaging S/W EnCase Imager 7.10.00.103
Image Format E01 (Expert Witness Compression Format) converted from above DD image
Compression Best (Smallest)
Bytes per Sector 512
Total Sectors 41,943,040
Total Size 20.00 GB (21,474,836,480 bytes)
Compressed Size 7.28 GB (7,825,209,454 bytes)

g
Unnecessary data (a group of sectors) were scrubbed manually. It was nothing to do with this scenario.

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4.3. REMOVABLE MEDIA #1 (RM#1) – ‘ENCASE’ IMAGE
Item Detailed Information
Filename cfreds_2015_data_leakage_rm#1
MD5 8BFA4230BF4E35DB966B8C1A9321A0B1
SHA-1 F6BB840E98DD7C325AF45539313FC3978FFF812C
Imaging S/W FTK Imager 3.3.0.5 (write-blocked by Tableau USB Bridge T8-R2)
Image Format E01 (Expert Witness Compression Format)
Compression Best (Smallest)
Bytes per Sector 512
Total Sectors 7,821,312
Total Size 3.7 GB (4,004,511,744 bytes)
Compressed Size 74.5 MB (78,186,742 bytes)

4.4. REMOVABLE MEDIA #2 (RM#2) – ‘DD’ IMAGE

Item Detailed Information
Filename cfreds_2015_data_leakage_rm#2
MD5 B4644902ACAB4583A1D0F9F1A08FAA77
SHA-1 048961A85CA3ECED8CC73F1517442D31D4DCA0A3
Imaging S/W FTK Imager 3.3.0.5 (write-blocked by Tableau USB Bridge T8-R2)
Image Format E01 (Expert Witness Compression Format)
Compression Best (Smallest)
Bytes per Sector 512
Total Sectors 7,821,312
Total Size 3.7 GB (4,004,511,744 bytes)
Compressed Size 219 MB (229,899,285 bytes)  compressed by 7zip

4.5. REMOVABLE MEDIA #2 (RM#2) – ‘ENCASE’ IMAGE

Item Detailed Information
Filename cfreds_2015_data_leakage_rm#2
MD5 B4644902ACAB4583A1D0F9F1A08FAA77
SHA-1 048961A85CA3ECED8CC73F1517442D31D4DCA0A3
Imaging S/W EnCase Imager 7.09.00.111 (write-blocked by Tableau USB Bridge T8-R2)
Image Format E01 (Expert Witness Compression Format)
Compression Best (Smallest)
Bytes per Sector 512
Total Sectors 7,821,312
Total Size 3.7 GB (4,004,511,744 bytes)
Compressed Size 243 MB (255,051,328 bytes)

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4.6. REMOVABLE MEDIA #3 (RM#3) – ‘RAW / CUE’ IMAGE
Item Detailed Information
Filename cfreds_2015_data_leakage_rm#3_type1
MD5 858C7250183A44DD83EB706F3F178990
SHA-1 471D3EEDCA9ADD872FC0708297284E1960FF44F8
Imaging S/W FTK Imager 3.3.0.5
Image Format RAW ISO / CUE (sometime BIN / CUE)h
Bytes per Sector 2,048
Total Sectors 52,514
Total Size 102.57 MB (107,548,672 bytes)
Compressed Size 92.8 MB (97,311,442 bytes)  compressed by 7zip

4.7. REMOVABLE MEDIA #3 (RM#3) – ‘DD’ IMAGE

Item Detailed Information
Filename cfreds_2015_data_leakage_rm#3_type2
MD5 858C7250183A44DD83EB706F3F178990
SHA-1 471D3EEDCA9ADD872FC0708297284E1960FF44F8
Imaging S/W FTK Imager 3.3.0.5 + bchunki
Image Format DD converted from ‘RAW + CUE’ using bchunk
Bytes per Sector 2,048
Total Sectors 52,514
Total Size 102.57 MB (107,548,672 bytes)
Compressed Size 78.6 MB (82,511,830 bytes)  compressed by 7zip

4.8. REMOVABLE MEDIA #3 (RM#3) – ‘ENCASE’ IMAGE

Item Detailed Information
Filename cfreds_2015_data_leakage_rm#3_type3
MD5 DF914108FB3D86744EB688EBA482FBDF
SHA-1 7F3C2EB1F1E2DB97BE6E963625402A0E362A532C
Imaging S/W EnCase Imager 7.09.00.111
Image Format E01 (Expert Witness Compression Format)
Compression Best (smallest)
Bytes per Sector 2,048
Total Sectors 52,513
Total Size 102.56 MB (107,546,624 bytes)
Compressed Size 90.21 MB (94,594,894 bytes)
Read Errors (Sector No.) (321), (51,213), (51,233), (51,244), (51,265), (51,276), (51,297), (51,308), (51,329), (51,340), (51,361),
(51,372), (51,393), (52,472), (52,481), (52,500)

5.DIGITAL FORENSICS PRACTICE POINTS

h
The RAW ISO file is a raw sector-by-sector binary copy of tracks in the original disk, and the CUE file is a plain-
text file which stores the information of disk and tracks.
i
bchunk v1.2.0 - BinChunker for Unix / Linux (http://he.fi/bchunk/)

Last Saved 2024-09-09 10 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

The followings are the summary of detailed practice points related to above images.

Practice Point Description Note

Understanding - Storage devices - Interfaces
Types of Data  HDD (Hard Disk Drive)  ATA
Leakage  SSD (Solid State Drive)  SATA, eSATA
 USB flash drive  USB
 Flash memory cards  IEEE 1394
 CD/DVD (with Optical Disk Drive)
- Network Transmission - Network interfaces
 File sharing  Ethernet cable
 Remote Desktop Connection  Wi-Fi
 E-mail  Bluetooth
 SNS (Social Network Service)
 Cloud services - Note
 Messenger  Tethering
* Underlined parts are covered on this image
Windows - Windows event logs - Windows 7 artifacts
Forensics - Opened files and directories - 64 bits Windows
- Application (executable) usage history
- CD/DVD burning records
- External devices attached to PC
- Network drive connection traces
- System caches
- Windows Search databases
- Volume Shadow Copy
File System - FAT, NTFS, UDF
Forensics - Metadata (NTFS MFT, FAT Directory entry)
- Timestamps
- Transaction logs (NTFS)
Web Browser - History, Cache, Cookie - MS Internet Explorer
Forensics - Internet usage history (URLs, Search Keywords…) - Google Chrome
E-mail Forensics - MS Outlook file examination
- E-mails and attachments
Database - MS Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) Database - Windows Search
Forensics - SQLite Database - MS Internet Explorer
- Google Chrome
- Google Drive
Deleted Data - Metadata based recovery
Recovery - Signature & Content based recovery (aka Carving)
- Recycle Bin of Windows
- Unused area examination
User Behavior - Constructing a forensic timeline of events
Analysis - Visualizing the timeline
6.QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE SCENARIO

Last Saved 2024-09-09 11 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 1) What are the hash values (MD5 & SHA-1) of all images?
Does the acquisition and verification hash value match?

Possible Answer Class Hash Algo. Hash value

PC MD5 A49D1254C873808C58E6F1BCD60B5BDE
SHA-1 AFE5C9AB487BD47A8A9856B1371C2384D44FD78
5
RM#2 MD5 B4644902ACAB4583A1D0F9F1A08FAA77
SHA-1 048961A85CA3ECED8CC73F1517442D31D4DCA0A
3
RM#3 MD5 858C7250183A44DD83EB706F3F178990
(Type1 SHA-1 471D3EEDCA9ADD872FC0708297284E1960FF44F
) 8
RM#3 MD5 858C7250183A44DD83EB706F3F178990
(Type2 SHA-1 471D3EEDCA9ADD872FC0708297284E1960FF44F
) 8
RM#3 MD5 DF914108FB3D86744EB688EBA482FBDF
(Type3 SHA-1 7F3C2EB1F1E2DB97BE6E963625402A0E362A532
) C
Considerations N/A

2) Identify the partition information of PC image.

Possible No. Bootable File system Start Sector Total Sectors Size
Answer 1 NTFS 2,048 204,800 100 MB
2 * NTFS 206,848 41,734,144 19.9 GB
Considerations N/A

3) Explain installed OS information in detail.

(OS name, install date, registered owner…)

Possible Answer OS Name Windows 7 Ultimate

Version 6.1
Build Number 7601
Registered Owner informant
System Root C:\\Windows
Install Date 2015-03-22 14:34:26 (GMT)
Considerations HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion

4) What is the timezone setting?

Possible Answer Timezone Eastern Time (US & Canada) (UTC-05:00)
Daylight Time Bias +1
Considerations HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Control\TimeZoneInformation

5) What is the computer name?

Last Saved 2024-09-09 12 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Possible Answer INFORMANT-PC
Considerations HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName (value: ComputerName)
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Services\Tcpip\Parameters (value: Hostname)
……

6) List all accounts in OS except the system accounts: Administrator, Guest, systemprofile, LocalService,
NetworkService. (Account name, login count, last logon date…)
Possible Answer Account Last Login
NT Login
Account SID Status Created Login Failure
Hash Count
(Timezone is Time Time Time
informant 1000 (a) Enabled 10 2015-03-22 2015-03-25 2015-03-25
applied) 09:33:54 09:45:59 09:45:43
admin11 1001 (b) Enabled 2 2015-03-22 2015-03-22 2015-03-22
10:51:54 10:57:02 10:53:02
ITechTeam 1002 (c) Enabled 0 2015-03-22 - -
10:52:30
Temporary 1003 (d) Enabled 1 2015-03-22 2015-03-22 2015-03-22
10:53:01 10:55:57 10:56:37
Considerations - HKLM\SAM\~
- SYSTEM hive is required for calculating hash values of passwords.

- NT Hashes and user passwords (it will be useful for practicing Windows password cracking)
(a) 9E3D31B073E60BFD7B07978D6F914D0A  Password: informant#suspect1
(b) 21759544B2D7EFCCC978449463CF7E63  Password: djemals11
(c) 75ED0CB7676889AB43764A3B7D3E6943  Password: dkdlxpzmxla
(d) 1B3801B608A6BE89D21FD3C5729D30BF  Password: xpavhfkfl

7) Who was the last user to logon into PC?

Possible Answer informant
Considerations HKLM\SAM\~

8) When was the last recorded shutdown date/time?

Possible Answer 2015-03-25 11:31:05 (Eastern Time + DST)
Considerations HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Control\Windows (value: ShutdownTime)

9) Explain the information of network interface(s) with an IP address assigned by DHCP.

Possible Answer Device Name Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection
IP Address 10.11.11.129
Subnet Mask 255.255.255.0
Name Server 10.11.11.2
Domain localdomain
Default Gateway 10.11.11.2
DHCP Usage Yes
DHCP Server 10.11.11.254
Considerations HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\{GUID}

10) What applications were installed by the suspect after installing OS?

Last Saved 2024-09-09 13 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Possible Answer Installation Name Version Manufacturer Installation Path
Time
2015-03-22 Microsoft Office 15.0.4420.1017 Microsoft C:\Program Files\
Microsoft Office
(Timezone is 10:04:14 Professional Plus Corporation
2013
applied) C:\Program Files (x86)\
2015-03-22 Google Chrome 41.0.2272.101 Google Inc.
Google\Chrome\
10:11:51 Application
2015-03-22 Google Update 1.3.26.9 Google Inc.
10:16:03 Helper
2015-03-23 Apple Application 3.0.6 Apple Inc. C:\Program Files (x86)\
Common Files\Apple\
15:00:45 Support Apple Application
Support\
2015-03-23 Bonjour 3.0.0.10 Apple Inc. C:\Program Files (x86)\
Bonjour\
15:00:58
2015-03-23 Apple Software 2.1.3.127 Apple Inc. C:\Program Files (x86)\
Apple Software Update\
15:01:01 Update
2015-03-23 Google Drive 1.20.8672.3137 Google Inc.
15:02:46
2015-03-25 Microsoft .NET 4.0.30319 Microsoft C:\Windows\
Microsoft.NET\
09:51:39 Framework 4 Corporation Framework64\v4.0.30319
2015-03-25 Eraser 6.2.2962 The Eraser
09:57:31 Project
Considerations HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\~
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\~
…

11) List application execution logs.

(Executable path, execution time, execution count...)

Possible Timestamp Execution Path Count Source

Answer 2015-03-22 C:\Users\informant\Desktop\temp\IE11-Windows6.1-x64-en- N/A Shimcache
11:11:04 us.exe
2015-03-22 C:\Users\informant\Desktop\Download\IE11-Windows6.1- N/A Shimcache
11:11:04 x64-en-us.exe
(Some
2015-03-22 C:\Users\informant\Desktop\Download\IE11-Windows6.1- 1 UserAssist
Windows 11:12:32 x64-en-us.exe
executables 2015-03-23 C:\Users\informant\Downloads\googledrivesync.exe N/A Shimcache
and 15:56:33
duplicated 2015-03-23 C:\Users\INFORM~1\AppData\Local\Temp\GUMA150.tmp\ N/A Shimcache
items are 15:56:33 GoogleUpdateSetup.exe
excluded) 2015-03-23 C:\Users\informant\Downloads\icloudsetup.exe N/A Shimcache
15:56:33
2015-03-23 C:\Windows\Installer\{789A5B64-9DD9-4BA5-915A- N/A Shimcache
(Timezone 16:00:59 F0FC0A1B7BFE}\AppleSoftwareUpdateIco.exe
is applied) 2015-03-23 C:\Users\INFORM~1\AppData\Local\Temp\GUMA150.tmp\ N/A Shimcache
16:02:07 GoogleUpdate.exe
2015-03-23 C:\Program Files (x86)\GUMA94B.tmp\GoogleUpdate.exe N/A Shimcache
16:02:09
2015-03-23 C:\PROGRAM FILES\Microsoft Office\Office15\ 1 UserAssist
16:26:50 EXCEL.EXE
2015-03-23 C:\PROGRAM FILES\Microsoft Office\Office15\ 2 UserAssist
16:27:33 POWERPNT.EXE
2015-03-24 C:\PROGRAM FILES\MICROSOFT GAMES\SOLITAIRE\ 1 Prefetch
14:29:07 SOLITAIRE.EXE
2015-03-24 C:\Windows\System32\StikyNot.exe 2 Prefetch
14:31:55
2015-03-24 Microsoft.Windows.StickyNotes 13 UserAssist

Last Saved 2024-09-09 14 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 14:31:55
2015-03-24 C:\PROGRAM FILES (X86)\GOOGLE\CHROME\ 71 Prefetch
17:05:38 APPLICATION\CHROME.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\MICROSOFT OFFICE\OFFICE15\ 1 Prefetch
10:41:03 OUTLOOK.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\MICROSOFT OFFICE\OFFICE15\ 5 UserAssist
10:41:03 OUTLOOK.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES (X86)\WINDOWS MEDIA PLAYER\ 1 Prefetch
10:42:47 wmplayer.exe
2015-03-25 Microsoft.Windows.MediaPlayer32 1 UserAssist
10:42:47
2015-03-25 C:\Users\informant\Desktop\Download\Eraser 6.2.0.2962.exe N/A Shimcache
10:47:40
2015-03-25 C:\Users\informant\Desktop\Download\ccsetup504.exe N/A Shimcache
10:48:28
2015-03-25 C:\USERS\INFORMANT\DESKTOP\DOWNLOAD\ 1 Prefetch
10:50:14 ERASER 6.2.0.2962.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\USERS\INFORMANT\DESKTOP\DOWNLOAD\ 1 UserAssist
10:50:14 ERASER 6.2.0.2962.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\Users\INFORM~1\AppData\Local\Temp\ N/A Shimcache
10:50:15 eraserInstallBootstrapper\dotNetFx40_Full_setup.exe
2015-03-25 C:\USERS\INFORMANT\APPDATA\LOCAL\TEMP\ 1 Prefetch
10:50:15 ERASERINSTALLBOOTSTRAPPER\
DOTNETFX40_FULL_SETUP.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\USERS\INFORMANT\DESKTOP\DOWNLOAD\ 1 Prefetch
10:57:56 CCSETUP504.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\USERS\INFORMANT\DESKTOP\DOWNLOAD\ 1 UserAssist
10:57:56 CCSETUP504.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\Eraser\Eraser.exe 1 UserAssist
11:12:28
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\Eraser\Eraser.exe 2 Prefetch
11:13:30
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\CCLEANER\CCLEANER64.EXE 1 UserAssist
11:15:50
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\CCLEANER\CCLEANER64.EXE 2 Prefetch
11:15:50
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES (X86)\GOOGLE\UPDATE\ 38 Prefetch
11:16:00 GOOGLEUPDATE.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\CCLEANER\UNINST.EXE 1 Prefetch
11:18:29
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES (X86)\GOOGLE\DRIVE\ 1 UserAssist
11:21:30 GOOGLEDRIVESYNC.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES (X86)\GOOGLE\DRIVE\ 2 Prefetch
11:21:31 GOOGLEDRIVESYNC.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\INTERNET EXPLORER\iexplore.exe 2 Prefetch
11:22:06
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES (X86)\INTERNET EXPLORER\ 14 Prefetch
11:22:07 iexplore.exe
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\MICROSOFT OFFICE\OFFICE15\ 3 Prefetch
11:24:48 WINWORD.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\PROGRAM FILES\MICROSOFT OFFICE\OFFICE15\ 4 UserAssist
11:24:48 WINWORD.EXE
2015-03-25 C:\Windows\System32\xpsrchvw.exe 1 Prefetch
11:28:47
2015-03-25 C:\Windows\System32\xpsrchvw.exe 1 UserAssist
11:28:47
N/A C:\Users\informant\Downloads\icloudsetup.exe N/A UserAssist
N/A C:\PROGRAM FILES (X86)\Common Files\Apple\Internet N/A UserAssist
Services\iCloud.exe
N/A C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Temp\ N/A UserAssist
eraserInstallBootstrapper\dotNetFx40_Full_setup.exe

Last Saved 2024-09-09 15 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 MuiCache C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplorer.exe
MuiCache C:\Users\informant\Desktop\Download\IE11-Windows6.1-x64-en-us.exe
MuiCache C:\Windows\System32\xpsrchvw.exe (XPS Viewer)
Considerati * ‘Execution Count’ may not be accurate.
ons * Timestamps of UserAssist and Prefetch: ‘Execution Time’
* Timestamps of Shimcache: ‘Last Modified Time’ from filesystem metadata

[File] Windows Prefetch folder

> \Windows\Prefetch\*.pf
> Executable file paths and their execution timestamps (+ execution counts)

[File] IconCache
> \Users\informant\AppData\Local\IconCache.db
> Executable file paths and their icon images

[Reg] UserAssist
> HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\*\Count\
> Executable file paths and their execution timestamps (+ execution counts)

[Reg] Application Compatibility (Shimcache)

> HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Control\Session Manager\AppCompatCache\
> Executable file paths and their modified timestamps

[Reg] Application Compatibility Cache

> HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\
> Executable file paths and their modified timestamps

[Reg] MuiCache
> HKU\informant\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\MuiCache\
> Executable file paths

12) List all traces about the system on/off and the user logon/logoff.
(It should be considered only during a time range between 09:00 and 18:00 in the timezone from
Question 4.)

Time Generated Event ID Description

Possible 2015-03-22 10:51:14 4608 Starting up
Answer 2015-03-22 11:00:08 4624 Logon
2015-03-22 11:22:54 4624 Logon
2015-03-22 12:00:08 4647 Logoff
(Some 2015-03-22 12:00:09 1100 Shutdown
duplicated and 2015-03-23 13:24:23 4624 Logon
meaningless 2015-03-23 13:24:23 4608 Starting up
items are 2015-03-23 14:36:07 4624 Logon
excluded) 2015-03-23 16:00:22 4624 Logon
2015-03-23 16:01:02 4624 Logon
2015-03-23 17:02:53 4647 Logoff
(Timezone is
2015-03-23 17:02:59 1100 Shutdown
applied)
2015-03-24 09:21:29 4624 Logon
2015-03-24 09:21:29 4608 Starting up
2015-03-24 09:23:40 4624 Logon
2015-03-24 11:14:30 4624 Logon
2015-03-24 11:22:39 4624 Logon
2015-03-24 11:46:14 4624 Logon
2015-03-24 14:28:38 4624 Logon
2015-03-24 16:58:52 4624 Logon

Last Saved 2024-09-09 16 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 2015-03-24 17:07:25 4647 Logoff
2015-03-24 17:07:26 1100 Shutdown
2015-03-25 09:05:41 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 09:05:41 4608 Starting up
2015-03-25 09:07:49 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 09:23:59 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 10:31:53 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 10:45:59 4637 Logoff
2015-03-25 10:50:28 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 10:50:30 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 10:50:50 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 10:56:55 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 10:57:18 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 11:18:54 4624 Logon
2015-03-25 11:30:57 4647 Logoff
2015-03-25 11:31:00 1100 Shutdown
Considerations - Security event logs
- Event IDs for Windows Vista or higher
: 4608 (Windows is starting up), 1100 (service shutdown)
: 4624 (successful logon), 4634 (logoff), 4625 (logon failure), 4647 (a user initiated the logoff process)...
* Some events may not be accurate.

13) What web browsers were used?

Possible Answer - Microsoft Internet Explorer v11.0.9600.17691
(Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 or lower  updated to IE 11 version)
- Google Chrome v41.0.2272.101
Considerations HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer (value: svcVersion)
HKU\informant\Software\Google\Chrome\BLBeacon (value: version)

14) Identify directory/file paths related to the web browser history.

Possible MS IE C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\
(9 or lower) C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\
Answer C:\Users\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\
MS IE
C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat
11
Chrome C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History
C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Application Cache\
C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Media Cache\
C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\GPUCache\
C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies\
C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extension Cookies
C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions\
……
Considerations - History, Cache, Cookie…
- Windows Search database (related to Question 42 ~ 46)
> C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications\Windows\Windows.edb

15) What websites were the suspect accessing? (Timestamp, URL...)

Possible Timestamp URL Browser
Answer 2015-03-22 http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/internet-explorer/ie-8-welcome IE 8
11:09:01
2015-03-22 https://www.google.com/ IE 8

Last Saved 2024-09-09 17 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 11:09:47
2015-03-22 http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/internet-explorer/download-ie IE 8
11:10:50
(Some 2015-03-22 http://download.microsoft.com/download/7/1/7/7179A150-F2D2-4502- IE 8
duplicated and 11:11:04 9D70-4B59EA148EAA/IE11-Windows6.1-x64-en-us.exe
meaningless 2015-03-22 https://dl.google.com/update2/1.3.26.9/GoogleInstaller_en.application? IE 8
items are 11:11:06 appguid%3D%7B8A69D345-D564-463C-AFF1-
2015-03-22 https://www.google.com/intl/en/chrome/browser/welcome.html Chrome
excluded) 11:11:58
2015-03-22 https://www.google.com/#q=outlook+2013+settings Chrome
11:27:59
(Timezone is 2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/ Chrome
applied) 13:26:58
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en Chrome
13:26:58
2015-03-23 http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=69157 IE 11
13:27:36
2015-03-23 http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ie-firstrun/win-7/ie-11/vie IE 11
13:27:49
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=data+leakage+methods Chrome
14:02:09
2015-03-23 http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/awareness/data-leakage- Chrome
14:02:18 threats-mitigation_1931
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/webhp? Chrome
14:02:44 hl=en#hl=en&q=leaking+confidential+information
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/webhp? Chrome
14:03:40 hl=en#hl=en&q=information+leakage+cases
2015-03-23 http://www.emirates247.com/business/technology/top-5-sources-leaking- Chrome
14:04:54 personal-data-2015-03-
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:05:48 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=intellectual+property+theft
2015-03-23 http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/ipr/ipr Chrome
14:05:55
2015-03-23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_property Chrome
14:06:01
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:06:27 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=how+to+leak+a+secret
2015-03-23 http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/yael/publications/2001- Chrome
14:06:53 leak_secret.pdf
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news/search? IE 11
14:07:58 q=file+sharing+and+tethering&FORM=HDRSC6
2015-03-23 http://sysinfotools.com/blog/tethering-internet-files-sharing/ IE 11
14:08:18
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=DLP IE 11
14:08:31 %20DRM&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=dlp%20drm&sc=8-7&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=6e206ee8751e4ad89f882ed52daf3aea&sid=BE5E388F87574
06CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=0
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=e-mail IE 11
14:08:54 %20investigation&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=e-mail%20investigation&sc=8-
7&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=fe1c3738d8c7471284731724166959af&sid=BE5E388F87574
06CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=1
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search? IE 11
14:10:03 q=Forensic+Email+Investigation&FORM=QSRE1&sid=BE5E388F875740
6CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=3
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=what%20is%20windows%20system IE 11
14:10:27 %20artifacts&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=what%20is%20windows%20system
%20artifacts&sc=0-27&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=1ef4ace146854d97acf263b53bf97b8c&sid=BE5E388F87574
06CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=4
2015-03-23 http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/windows-systems-and-artifacts-in- IE 11
14:11:12 digital-forensics-part-i-registry/
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=investigation%20on%20windows IE 11
14:11:50 %20machine&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=investigation%20on%20windows

Last Saved 2024-09-09 18 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 %20machine&sc=8-4&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=eb73de7f523c48769d56201379f55e67&sid=BE5E388F87574
06CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=5
2015-03-23 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc162846.aspx IE 11
14:12:07
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=windows%20event IE 11
14:12:35 %20logs&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=windows%20event%20logs&sc=0-
32&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=36b33ac5151246398f7dc1ca79de069c&sid=BE5E388F87574
06CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=6
2015-03-23 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/308427 IE 11
14:12:45
2015-03-23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Event_Viewer IE 11
14:12:52
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=cd%20burning IE 11
14:13:20 %20method&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=cd%20burning%20method&sc=8-
2&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=b7dbe6fb67424c578172ba57330a0894&sid=BE5E388F8757
406CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=7
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=cd%20burning%20method%20in IE 11
14:13:37 %20windows&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=cd%20burning%20method%20in
%20windows&sc=0-0&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=acec9b1dcb8146c58258ad65c770d76e&sid=BE5E388F87574
06CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=8
2015-03-23 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ IE 11
14:13:57 dd562212(v=vs.85).aspx
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=external%20device%20and IE 11
14:14:11 %20forensics&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=external%20device%20and
%20forensics&sc=8-9&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=c30c4b1f36114b1c9bc683838c69823a&sid=BE5E388F87574
06CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=9
2015-03-23 http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/USB_History_Viewing IE 11
14:14:24
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:14:50 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=cloud+storage
2015-03-23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_storage Chrome
14:15:09
2015-03-23 http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/test-centre/internet/3506734/best-cloud-storage- Chrome
14:15:32 dropbox-google-drive-onedrive-icloud/
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:15:44 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=digital+forensics
2015-03-23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_forensics Chrome
14:15:49
2015-03-23 http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/digital/pages/welcome.aspx Chrome
14:16:06
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:16:55 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=how+to+delete+data
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:17:14 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=anti-forensics
2015-03-23 http://forensicswiki.org/wiki/Anti-forensic_techniques Chrome
14:17:19
2015-03-23 https://defcon.org/images/defcon-20/dc-20-presentations/Perklin/DEFCON- Chrome
14:18:00 20-Perklin-AntiForensics.pdf
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:18:10 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=system+cleaner
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:18:30 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=how+to+recover+data

Last Saved 2024-09-09 19 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/search? Chrome
14:19:03 q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tb
m=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=
0CAoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=data+recovery+tools
2015-03-23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_data_recovery_software Chrome
14:19:17
2015-03-23 http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Tools:Data_Recovery Chrome
14:19:21
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=apple+icloud Chrome
15:55:09
2015-03-23 https://www.apple.com/icloud/setup/pc.html Chrome
15:55:28
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=google+drive Chrome
15:56:04
2015-03-23 https://www.google.com/drive/download/ Chrome
15:56:15
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?FORM=Z9LH3 IE 11
16:43:52
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=Soccer+News&FORM=NSBABR IE 11
16:45:30
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=top+stories&FORM=NWRFSH IE 11
16:53:46
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=world+news&FORM=NSBABR IE 11
16:55:10
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=entertainment+news&FORM=NSBABR IE 11
16:55:18
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=business+news&FORM=NSBABR IE 11
16:55:54
2015-03-24 https://news.google.com/news/section? Chrome
11:22:46 pz=1&cf=all&ned=us&topic=w&siidp=0b2226a6a5dab3b27ee85fc5e8d21f
28f01e
2015-03-24 https://news.google.com/news/section? Chrome
11:23:16 pz=1&cf=all&ned=us&topic=tc&siidp=e6116f8175cb189b8dd7fd58ef6bc9
22ec04&ar=1427212899
2015-03-24 https://news.google.com/news? Chrome
14:59:52 pz=1&cf=all&ned=us&siidp=0c33ef04190b3734a22c5bae18801ff1041e
2015-03-24 https://news.google.com/news/section? Chrome
15:00:27 pz=1&cf=all&ned=us&topic=w&siidp=538c61c825aba06be7485be747a619
778015
2015-03-24 https://www.google.com/#q=security+checkpoint+cd-r Chrome
17:06:50
2015-03-25 http://www.bing.com/search?q=anti- IE 11
10:46:44 forensic+tools&qs=n&form=QBLH&pq=anti-forensic+tools&sc=8-
13&sp=-1&sk=&cvid=e799e715fa2244a5a7967675bdcca9d3
2015-03-25 http://www.bing.com/search? IE 11
10:46:54 q=eraser&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=eraser&sc=8-6&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=e3b983fe889944179093ff5199b2eac4&sid=C7E8F3776E804
120B57C623F21EF33C4&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=0
2015-03-25 http://eraser.heidi.ie/ IE 11
10:46:59
2015-03-25 http://iweb.dl.sourceforge.net/project/eraser/Eraser%206/6.2/Eraser IE 11
10:47:34 %206.2.0.2962.exe
2015-03-25 http://www.bing.com/search? IE 11
10:47:51 q=ccleaner&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=ccleaner&sc=8-8&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=d434736d4e514ad497f68734a6779104&sid=C7E8F3776E80
4120B57C623F21EF33C4&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=1
2015-03-25 http://www.piriform.com/ccleaner/download IE 11
10:48:12
Considerations - History, Cache, Cookie…

16) List all search keywords using web browsers. (Timestamp, URL, keyword...)
Possible Timestamp Keyword (URL) Browser
Answer 2015-03-23 data leakage method Chrome
14:02:09
(https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=data+leakage+methods)

Last Saved 2024-09-09 20 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 2015-03-23 leaking confidential information Chrome
14:02:44
(https://www.google.com/webhp?
(Some hl=en#hl=en&q=leaking+confidential+information)
duplicated and 2015-03-23 information leakage cases Chrome
meaningless 14:03:40
(https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=information+leakage+cases)
items are
2015-03-23 intellectual property theft Chrome
excluded) 14:05:48
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm
=vid&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0C
(Timezone is AoQ_AUoBA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=intellectual+property+theft)
applied) 2015-03-23 how to leak a secret Chrome
14:06:27
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm=vid
&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0CAoQ_AUo
BA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=how+to+leak+a+secret)
2015-03-23 file sharing and tethering IE 11
14:07:58
(http://www.bing.com/news/search?
q=file+sharing+and+tethering&FORM=HDRSC6)
2015-03-23 DLP DRM IE 11
14:08:31
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=DLP
%20DRM&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=dlp%20drm&sc=8-7&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=6e206ee8751e4ad89f882ed52daf3aea&sid=BE5E388F87574
06CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=0)
2015-03-23 e-mail investigation IE 11
14:08:54
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=e-mail
%20investigation&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=e-mail
%20investigation&sc=8-7&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=fe1c3738d8c7471284731724166959af&sid=BE5E388F875740
6CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=1)
2015-03-23 Forensic Email Investigation IE 11
14:10:03
(http://www.bing.com/search?
q=Forensic+Email+Investigation&FORM=QSRE1&sid=BE5E388F8757406CA
A32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=3)
2015-03-23 what is windows system artifacts IE 11
14:10:27
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=what%20is%20windows%20system
%20artifacts&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=what%20is%20windows
%20system%20artifacts&sc=0-27&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=1ef4ace146854d97acf263b53bf97b8c&sid=BE5E388F8757406
CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=4)
2015-03-23 investigation on windows machine IE 11
14:11:50
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=investigation%20on%20windows
%20machine&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=investigation%20on%20windows
%20machine&sc=8-4&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=eb73de7f523c48769d56201379f55e67&sid=BE5E388F875740
6CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=5)
2015-03-23 windows event logs IE 11
14:12:35
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=windows%20event
%20logs&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=windows%20event%20logs&sc=0-
32&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=36b33ac5151246398f7dc1ca79de069c&sid=BE5E388F875740
6CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=6)
2015-03-23 cd burning method IE 11
14:13:20
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=cd%20burning
%20method&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=cd%20burning%20method&sc=8-
2&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=b7dbe6fb67424c578172ba57330a0894&sid=BE5E388F875740
6CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=7)
2015-03-23 cd burning method in windows IE 11

Last Saved 2024-09-09 21 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 14:13:37
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=cd%20burning%20method%20in
%20windows&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=cd%20burning%20method%20in
%20windows&sc=0-0&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=acec9b1dcb8146c58258ad65c770d76e&sid=BE5E388F875740
6CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=8)
2015-03-23 external device and forensics IE 11
14:14:11
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=external%20device%20and
%20forensics&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=external%20device%20and
%20forensics&sc=8-9&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=c30c4b1f36114b1c9bc683838c69823a&sid=BE5E388F875740
6CAA32E58334719A20&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=9)
2015-03-23 cloud storage Chrome
14:14:50
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm=vid
&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0CAoQ_AUo
BA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=cloud+storage)
2015-03-23 digital forensics Chrome
14:15:44
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm=vid
&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0CAoQ_AUo
BA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=digital+forensics)
2015-03-23 how to delete data Chrome
14:16:55
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm=vid
&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0CAoQ_AUo
BA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=how+to+delete+data)
2015-03-23 anti-forensics Chrome
14:17:14
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm=vid
&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0CAoQ_AUo
BA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=anti-forensics)
2015-03-23 system cleaner Chrome
14:18:10
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm=vid
&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0CAoQ_AUo
BA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=system+cleaner)
2015-03-23 how to recover data Chrome
14:18:30
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm=vid
&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0CAoQ_AUo
BA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=how+to+recover+data)
2015-03-23 data recovery tools Chrome
14:19:03
(https://www.google.com/search?
q=information+leakage+cases&hl=en&biw=950&bih=499&site=webhp&tbm=vid
&source=lnms&sa=X&ei=3VUQVYH3FMO1sQTf1YGwBw&ved=0CAoQ_AUo
BA&dpr=1#hl=en&q=data+recovery+tools)
2015-03-23 apple icloud Chrome
15:55:09
(https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=apple+icloud)
2015-03-23 google drive Chrome
15:56:04
(https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=google+drive)
2015-03-24 security checkpoint cd-r Chrome
17:06:50
(https://www.google.com/#q=security+checkpoint+cd-r)
2015-03-25 anti-forensic tools IE 11
10:46:44
(http://www.bing.com/search?q=anti-
forensic+tools&qs=n&form=QBLH&pq=anti-forensic+tools&sc=8-
13&sp=-1&sk=&cvid=e799e715fa2244a5a7967675bdcca9d3)
2015-03-25 eraser IE 11
10:46:54

Last Saved 2024-09-09 22 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 (http://www.bing.com/search?
q=eraser&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=eraser&sc=8-6&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=e3b983fe889944179093ff5199b2eac4&sid=C7E8F3776E8041
20B57C623F21EF33C4&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=0)
2015-03-25 ccleaner IE 11
10:47:51
(http://www.bing.com/search?
q=ccleaner&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=ccleaner&sc=8-8&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=d434736d4e514ad497f68734a6779104&sid=C7E8F3776E804
120B57C623F21EF33C4&format=jsonv2&jsoncbid=1)
Considerations - Web browser logs

17) List all user keywords at the search bar in Windows Explorer. (Timestamp, Keyword)
Possible Answer Timestamp (Timezone is applied) Search Keyword
2015-03-23 14:40:17 secret
Considerations HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\WordWheelQuery\

- ‘Timestamp’ can be inferred from a timestamp of the parent key (‘WordWheelQuery’).

- ‘Timestamp’ may not be accurate because it depends on the update mechanism of Windows Explorer.

18) What application was used for e-mail communication?

Possible Answer Microsoft Outlook 2013
Considerations HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\mailto\shell\open\command (Microsoft Outlook)
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Clients\Mail (Microsoft Outlook)
HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook
…

19) Where is the e-mail file located?

Possible Answer C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\iaman.informant@nist.gov.ost
Considerations - Microsoft Outlook 2013
- Microsoft OST file format

HKEY_USERS\informant\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Search
(value: C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook\iaman.informant@nist.gov.ost)

HKEY_USERS\informant\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\PST
(value: LastCorruptStore)

20) What was the e-mail account used by the suspect?

Possible Answer iaman.informant@nist.gov
Considerations - See Question 19.

21) List all e-mails of the suspect. If possible, identify deleted e-mails.
(You can identify the following items: Timestamp, From, To, Subject, Body, and Attachment)
[Hint: just examine the OST file only.]

Possible Timestamp E-Mail Communication

Source [Inbox]

Last Saved 2024-09-09 23 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Answer 2015-03-23 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
13:29:27 Subject Hello, Iaman
Body How are you doing?

(Timezone
2015-03-23 Source [Sent Items]
is applied) From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
14:44:31
Subject RE: Hello, Iaman
Body Successfully secured.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 1:29 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Hello, Iaman

How are you doing?

2015-03-23 Source [Inbox]
15:14:58 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject Good job, buddy.
Body Good, job.
I need a more detailed data about this business.
2015-03-23 Source [Inbox]
15:20:41 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject RE: Good job, buddy.
Body Okay, I got it.
I’ll be in touch.

---------------------------
From: iaman
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:19 PM
To: spy
Subject: RE: Good job, buddy.

This is a sample.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:15 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Good job, buddy.

Good, job.
I need a more detailed data about this business.
2015-03-23 Source [Inbox]
15:26:22 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject Important request
Body I confirmed it.
But, I need a more data.
Do your best.
2015-03-23 Source [Sent Items]
15:27:05 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject RE: Important request
Body Umm….. I need time to think.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:26 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Important request

I confirmed it.
But, I need a more data.
Do your best.
2015-03-23 Source Recovered Item from unused area of OST file
16:38:47 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject It's me

Last Saved 2024-09-09 24 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Body Use links below,

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz0ye6gXtiZaVl8yVU5mWHlGbWc/view?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz0ye6gXtiZaakx6d3R3c0JmM1U/view?usp=sharing

2015-03-23 Source [Deleted Items]

16:41:19 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject RE: It's me
Body I got it.

---------------------------
From: iaman
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 4:39 PM
To: spy
Subject: It's me

Use links below,

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz0ye6gXtiZaVl8yVU5mWHlGbWc/view?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz0ye6gXtiZaakx6d3R3c0JmM1U/view?usp=sharing

2015-03-24 Source [Inbox]

09:25:57 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject Last request
Body This is the last request.
I want to get the remaining data.
2015-03-24 Source [Deleted Items]
09:35:10 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject RE: Last request
Body This is the last time..

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:34 AM
To: iaman
Subject: RE: Last request

No problem.
U can directly deliver storage devices that stored it.

---------------------------
From: iaman
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:30 AM
To: spy
Subject: RE: Last request

Stop it!
It is very hard to transfer all data over the internet!

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:26 AM
To: iaman
Subject: Last request

This is the last request.

I want to get the remaining data.
2015-03-24 Source [Deleted Items]
15:34:02 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject RE: Watch out!
Body I am trying.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 3:33 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Watch out!

Last Saved 2024-09-09 25 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 USB device may be easily detected.

So, try another method.

2015-03-24 Source [Deleted Items]
17:05:09 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject Done
Body It’s done. See you tomorrow.
Considerati - Fortunately, a suspected OST file was not protected and encrypted with a password.
ons - OST file parsing  Inbox, Deleted Items, Contact, and Calendar…
- Deleted e-mail recovery from unused area of OST file.

Last Saved 2024-09-09 26 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 22) List external storage devices attached to PC.
Possible Answer Device Name Volume Name Serial No. First Connected Connected Time
Time After Reboot
SanDisk Cruzer 4C530012450531101593 2015-03-23 2015-03-24
Fit USB Device 14:31:10 Mon 09:38:00 Tue
SanDisk Cruzer IAMAN $_@ 4C530012550531106501 2015-03-24 2015-03-24
Fit USB Device 09:58:32 Tue 09:58:33 Tue
Considerations - ‘First Connected Time’ can be identified from SetupAPI Log. ( C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log)

HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices\
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Enum\USBSTOR\
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Control\DeviceClasses\{a5dcbf10-6530-11d2-901f-00c04fb951ed}\
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet###\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\
……
HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2\
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Search\VolumeInfoCache\E:
> timestamp: 2015-03-24 09:58:34 Tue
> value: VolumeLabel
> data: ‘IAMAN $_@’
\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\System.evtx (Event ID: 20001, 20003…)
……

23) Identify all traces related to ‘renaming’ of files in Windows Desktop.

(It should be considered only during a date range between 2015-03-23 and 2015-03-24.)
[Hint: the parent directories of renamed files were deleted and their MFT entries were also
overwritten. Therefore, you may not be able to find their full paths.]

Possible Timestamp USN Path (Of course, just file names are OK) Event
Answer 2015-03-23 56306184 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\[secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx Renamed
14:41:40 Old
56306328 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\landscape.png Renamed
New
(Timezone is 2015-03-23 56307712 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\[secret_project]_design_concept.ppt Renamed
applied) 14:41:55 Old
56307848 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\space_and_earth.mp4 Renamed
New
2015-03-23 58506640 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx Renamed
16:30:44 Old
58506776 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\happy_holiday.jpg Renamed
New
2015-03-23 58510288 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx Renamed
16:31:02 Old
58510424 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3 Renamed
New
2015-03-24 59801680 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\ Renamed
09:49:51 [secret_project]_detailed_design.pptx Old
59801816 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\ Renamed
winter_whether_advisory.zip New
2015-03-24 59802408 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\ Renamed
09:50:08 [secret_project]_revised_points.ppt Old
59802544 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\ Renamed
winter_storm.amr New
2015-03-24 59803456 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\ Renamed
09:50:49 [secret_project]_design_concept.ppt Old
59803592 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\design\ Renamed
space_and_earth.mp4 New
2015-03-24 59814352 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\final\ Renamed
09:52:35 [secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx Old
59814488 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\final\ Renamed
do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3 New
2015-03-24 59814904 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
09:52:56 (secret_project)_market_analysis.xlsx Old
59815040 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed

Last Saved 2024-09-09 27 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 new_years_day.jpg New
2015-03-24 59815232 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
09:53:08 (secret_project)_market_shares.xls Old
59815360 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
super_bowl.avi New
2015-03-24 59815536 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
09:53:38 (secret_project)_price_analysis_#1.xlsx Old
59815680 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
my_favorite_movies.7z New
2015-03-24 59815968 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
09:53:52 (secret_project)_price_analysis_#2.xls Old
59816104 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
my_favorite_cars.db New
2015-03-24 59816312 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
09:54:05 (secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx Old
59816448 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ Renamed
happy_holiday.jpg New
2015-03-24 59816880 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\ Renamed
09:54:23 [secret_project]_progress_#1.docx Old
59817008 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\ Renamed
my_smartphone.png New
2015-03-24 59817984 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\ Renamed
09:54:43 [secret_project]_progress_#2.docx Old
59818112 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\ Renamed
new_year_calendar.one New
2015-03-24 59818320 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\ Renamed
09:54:52 [secret_project]_progress_#3.doc Old
59818448 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\progress\ Renamed
my_friends.svg New
2015-03-24 59818624 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\proposal\ Renamed
09:55:08 [secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx Old
59818768 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\proposal\ Renamed
a_gift_from_you.gif New
2015-03-24 59818976 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\proposal\ Renamed
09:55:17 [secret_project]_proposal.docx Old
59819096 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\proposal\ Renamed
landscape.png New
2015-03-24 59819272 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
09:55:32 [secret_project]_technical_review_#1.docx Old
59819416 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
diary_#1d.txt New
2015-03-24 59819592 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
09:55:42 [secret_project]_technical_review_#1.pptx Old
59819736 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
diary_#1p.txt New
2015-03-24 59819912 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
09:55:53 [secret_project]_technical_review_#2.docx Old
59820056 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
diary_#2d.txt New
2015-03-24 59823280 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
09:56:09 [secret_project]_technical_review_#2.ppt Old
59823424 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
diary_#2p.txt New
2015-03-24 59823600 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
09:56:14 [secret_project]_technical_review_#3.doc Old
59823744 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
diary_#3d.txt New
2015-03-24 59823920 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
09:56:20 [secret_project]_technical_review_#3.ppt Old
59824064 \Users\informant\Desktop\S data\Secret Project Data\technical review\ Renamed
diary_#3p.txt New
Considerations - NTFS journal file analysis ( $UsnJrnl)
- \$Extend\$UsnJrnl·$J (+ $MFT for identifying full paths of files)

- With NTFS journal file only, it may be hard to find full paths.
- You can consider the Registry ShellBags for further information.
- You can also consider the Windows Search database. (See Questions 46)

Last Saved 2024-09-09 28 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 24) What is the IP address of company’s shared network drive?
Possible Answer 10.11.11.128
Considerations HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\
> timestamp: 2015-03-23 16:23:28 Mon
> value: b
> data: ‘\\10.11.11.128\secured_drive’

HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Map Network Drive MRU\

> timestamp: 2015-03-23 16:26:04 Mon
> value: a
> data: ‘\\10.11.11.128\secured_drive’

HKU\informant\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\8\0\
……

25) List all directories that were traversed in ‘RM#2’.

Possible Answer Timestamp Directory Path Source
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\ ShellBag
(created)
(Timezone is 10:00:19
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\technical review\ ShellBag
applied)
10:01:11 (created)
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\proposal\ ShellBag
(created)
10:01:14
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\progress\ ShellBag
(created)
10:01:15
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ ShellBag
(created)
10:01:17
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\design\ ShellBag
(last accessed)
10:01:29
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\ ShellBag
(last accessed)
16:54:07
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\progress\ ShellBag
(last accessed)
16:54:07
Considerations - ‘Timestamp’ may not be accurate.
- E:\ can be inferred from external storage devices attached to PC in Question 22.
- You can consider a created timestamp and a last accessed timestamp of each ShellBag entry.

HKU\informant\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\1\0\1~
……

26) List all files that were opened in ‘RM#2’.

Possible Answer Timestamp Directory Path Source
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\design\winter_whether_advisory.zip\ JumpList
(Timezone is 10:01:23
applied) 2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\design\winter_whether_advisory.zip\ppt\ JumpList
10:01:29
2015-03-24 E:\Secret Project Data\design\winter_whether_advisory.zip\ ShellBag
10:01:29 (created)

Last Saved 2024-09-09 29 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Considerations - Actually, above list shows directories opened in ‘RM#2’.
- We can infer that a file ‘winter_whether_advisory.zip’ was opened and traversed in Windows Explorer.

- ‘Timestamp’ may not be accurate.

- E:\ can be inferred from external storage devices attached to PC in Question 22.

HKU\informant\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\1\0\1~

\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations
\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations
……

27) List all directories that were traversed in the company’s network drive.
Possible Answer Timestamp Directory Path Source
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Common Data\ ShellBag
16:24:01 (created)
(Timezone is 2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Past Projects\ ShellBag
16:24:08 (created)
applied)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\design\ ShellBag
16:24:12 (created)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ ShellBag
16:24:15 (created)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\final\ ShellBag
16:24:16 (created)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\technical review\ ShellBag
16:24:18 (created)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\proposal\ ShellBag
16:24:20 (created)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\progress\ ShellBag
16:24:27 (created)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ JumpList
16:26:53
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ .LNK
16:26:54 (Windows)
2015-03-23 V:\Secret Project Data\ ShellBag
16:27:24 (created)
2015-03-23 V:\Secret Project Data\final\ ShellBag
16:27:29 (created)
2015-03-23 V:\Secret Project Data\final\ JumpList
16:27:33
2015-03-23 V:\Secret Project Data\final\ .LNK
16:27:33 (Windows)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\ ShellBag
16:28:17 (last accessed)

2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\pricing decision\ ShellBag

16:28:17 (last accessed)

2015-03-24 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\ ShellBag

09:47:54 (last accessed)

2015-03-24 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Past Projects\ ShellBag

09:47:54 (last accessed)

Considerations - ‘Timestamp’ may not be accurate.

- V:\ is mapped on \\10.11.11.128

HKU\informant\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\8\0\~

\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations
\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations

\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.lnk
\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\*.lnk

Last Saved 2024-09-09 30 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 ……

Last Saved 2024-09-09 31 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 28) List all files that were opened in the company’s network drive.
Possible Answer Timestamp Directory Path Source
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\SECURED_DRIVE\Secret Project Data\ JumpList
16:26:53 pricing decision\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx
(Timezone is 2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\SECURED_DRIVE\Secret Project Data\ .LNK
16:26:53 pricing decision\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx (Windows)
applied)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\SECURED_DRIVE\Secret Project Data\ .LNK
16:26:53 pricing decision\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx (Office)
2015-03-23 \\10.11.11.128\secured_drive\Secret Project Data\ Registry
16:26:56 pricing decision\(secret_project)_pricing_decision.xlsx (Office)
2015-03-23 V:\Secret Project Data\final\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx JumpList
16:27:33
2015-03-23 V:\Secret Project Data\final\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx .LNK
16:27:33 (Windows)
2015-03-23 V:\Secret Project Data\final\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx .LNK
16:27:37 (Office)
2015-03-23 V:\Secret Project Data\final\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx Registry
16:27:37 (Office)
Considerations - V: is mapped on \\10.11.11.128

\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.lnk
\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\*.lnk

\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations
\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations

HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Excel\File MRU
HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\PowerPoint\File MRU
……

29) Find traces related to cloud services on PC.

(Service name, log files...)

Possible Answer Cloud Service Type Traces

Google Drive File/Dir \Program Files (x86)\Google\Drive\
Google Drive File/Dir \User\informant\AppData\Google\Drive\user_default\
> sync_config.db (deleted)
> snapshot.db (deleted)
> sync_log.log
…
Google Drive File/Dir \User\informant\Downloads\googledrivesync.exe
Google Drive Registry HKU\informant\Software\Google\Drive
Google Drive Registry HKU\informant\Software\Classes\GoogleDrive.*
Apple iCloud File/Dir \User\informant\Downloads\icloudsetup.exe
Considerations - Installation directory
- Registry (Configuration, Uninstall Information, Autoruns, UserAssist, Classes…)

30) What files were deleted from Google Drive?

Find the filename and modified timestamp of the file.
[Hint: Find a transaction log file of Google Drive.]

Possible Answer Timestamp File name Modified Time (UTC-05)

2015-03-23 happy_holiday.jpg 2015-01-30 11:49:20

Last Saved 2024-09-09 32 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 (Timezone is 16:42:17
applied) 2015-03-23 do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3 2015-01-29 15:35:14
16:42:17
Considerations \User\informant\AppData\Google\Drive\user_default\sync_log.log

> 2015-03-23 16:32:35,072 -0400 INFO pid=2576 4004:LocalWatcher

common.aggregator:114 --------> Received event RawEvent(CREATE, path=u'\\\\?\\
C:\\Users\\informant\\Google Drive\\happy_holiday.jpg', time=1427142755.056,
is_dir=False, ino=4503599627374809L, size=440517L, mtime=1422563714.5256062,
parent_ino=844424930207017L, is_cancelled=<RawEventIsCancelledFlag.FALSE:
0>, backup=<Backup.NO_BACKUP_CONTENT: (False, False)>) None

> 2015-03-23 16:32:35,086 -0400 INFO pid=2576 4004:LocalWatcher

common.aggregator:114 --------> Received event RawEvent(CREATE, path=u'\\\\?\\
C:\\Users\\informant\\Google Drive\\do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3',
time=1427142755.072, is_dir=False, ino=1125899906846942L, size=6844294L,
mtime=1422636560.5520115, parent_ino=844424930207017L,
is_cancelled=<RawEventIsCancelledFlag.FALSE: 0>,
backup=<Backup.NO_BACKUP_CONTENT: (False, False)>) None

> 2015-03-23 16:42:17,026 -0400 INFO pid=2576 4004:LocalWatcher

common.aggregator:114 --------> Received event RawEvent(DELETE, path=u'\\\\?\\
C:\\Users\\informant\\Google Drive\\happy_holiday.jpg', time=1427143336.964,
ino=4503599627374809L, parent_ino=844424930207017L, affects_gdoc=False,
is_cancelled=<RawEventIsCancelledFlag.FALSE: 0>,
backup=<Backup.NO_BACKUP_CONTENT: (False, False)>) None

> 2015-03-23 16:42:17,026 -0400 INFO pid=2576 4004:LocalWatcher

common.aggregator:114 --------> Received event RawEvent(DELETE, path=u'\\\\?\\
C:\\Users\\informant\\Google Drive\\do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3',
time=1427143336.964, ino=1125899906846942L, parent_ino=844424930207017L,
affects_gdoc=False, is_cancelled=<RawEventIsCancelledFlag.FALSE: 0>,
backup=<Backup.NO_BACKUP_CONTENT: (False, False)>) None

\User\informant\AppData\Google\Drive\user_default\snapshot.db
\User\informant\AppData\Google\Drive\user_default\snapshot.db-wal
> These files are deleted because of the logoff activity.
> Need to recover records from unused area of SQLite file.
> If ‘sync_log.log’ file is missing, deleted SQLite record recovery should be considered.
…

31) Identify account information for synchronizing Google Drive.

Possible Answer Logon Time (from sync_log.log) Account
(Timezone is 2015-03-23 16:05:32 iaman.informant.personal@gmail.com
applied)
Considerations \User\informant\AppData\Google\Drive\user_default\sync_log.log

> 2015-03-23 16:05:32,279 -0400 INFO pid=2576 2828:LaunchThreads

common.service.user:64 Initializing User instance with new credentials.
iaman.informant.personal@gmail.com

\User\informant\AppData\Google\Drive\user_default\sync_config.db
\User\informant\AppData\Google\Drive\user_default\sync_config.db-wal
> These files are deleted because of the logoff activity.
> Need to recover records from unused area of SQLite file.
> If ‘sync_log.log’ file is missing, deleted SQLite record recovery should be considered.
…

Last Saved 2024-09-09 33 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 32) What a method (or software) was used for burning CD-R?
Possible Answer Windows default CD/DVD burning feature
( No 3rd party application was used for burning CD-R)
Considerations - http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-vista/burn-a-cd-or-dvd
> Burning Type 1: Like a USB flash drive
> Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)

- System event logs (for burning type 2 only)

> Event IDs for Windows Vista or higher
: 113 (cdrom)

- Default burning directory (for burning type 2 only)

> \User\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn

- NTFS journal file analysis (for burning type 2 only)

> \$LogFile
> \$Extend\$UsnJrnl·$J (+ $MFT for identifying full paths of files)
> DAT#####.tmp, DAT#####.tmp, FIL#####.tmp, POST#####.tmp
……

33) When did the suspect burn CD-R?

[Hint: It may be one or more times.]

Possible Answer Timestamp Source Description

2015-03-24 $UsnJrnl Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
15:47:47 --------------------
(Timezone is > DAT67383.tmp, DAT34216.tmp
> FIL39751.tmp, POST39751.tmp
applied)
2015-03-24 Event Log Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
15:47:47 (System)
2015-03-24 $UsnJrnl Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
15:56:01 --------------------
> DAT32224.tmp, DAT08538.tmp
> FIL66692.tmp, POST66692.tmp
2015-03-24 Event Log Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
15:56:11 (System)
2015-03-24 $UsnJrnl Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
16:24:19 --------------------
> DAT67829.tmp, DAT74017.tmp
> FIL51898.tmp, POST51898.tmp
2015-03-24 Event Log Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
16:24:46 (System)
2015-03-24 Event Log Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
16:41:21 (System) --------------------
> DAT85234.tmp, DAT11399.tmp
> FIL61821.tmp, POST61821.tmp
2015-03-24 Event Log Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
16:41:21 (System)
2015-03-24 Registry Selecting the method ‘Type 1: Like a USB flash drive’
16:53:16 (Burning Option) --------------------
> A registry key was updated because the suspect
selected a new method for burning CD-R
> It can be inferred from timestamps of RM#3 image
2015-03-24 RM#3 image Formatting Type 1: Like a USB flash drive
16:53:17

Last Saved 2024-09-09 34 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 2015-03-24 RM#3 image Burning Type 1: Like a USB flash drive
16:54 ~ 16:58 --------------------
> Creating 17 confidential files
> Renaming files
> Creating 3 meaningless files
> Deleting 17 confidential files
Considerations - http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-vista/burn-a-cd-or-dvd
> Burning Type 1: Like a USB flash drive
> Burning Type 2: With a CD/DVD/ player (Mastered)
 System event logs, burning directory, journal logs…

- System event logs (for burning type 2 only)

> Event IDs for Windows Vista or higher
: 113 (cdrom)

- Default burning directory (for burning type 2 only)

> \User\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn
> NTFS Journal Logs
> Deleted MFT entry
> Registry ShellBag
> NFTS INDX slack

- NTFS journal file analysis (for burning type 2 only)

> \$LogFile
> \$Extend\$UsnJrnl·$J (+ $MFT for identifying full paths of files)
> DAT#####.tmp, DAT#####.tmp, FIL#####.tmp, POST#####.tmp

- CD Burning Options
> HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD Burning\
> If the last selection is burning type 1, ‘DefaultToMastered’ value will be 0.
> If the last selection is burning type 2, ‘DefaultToMastered’ value will be 1.

- Traces of mounting a CD volume for both burning types

> Windows .LNK
> Jumplist
>…

- How to find more traces of burning type 1 on PC?

> Is there a solution? It’s up to you!

- UDF (Universal Disk Format, http://www.osta.org/specs/pdf/udf260.pdf)

> Timestamps stored in descriptors of UDF (ECMA 167 1/7.3)
> ex) file offset 0x1017A of RM#3

> DF 07 (2015), 03 (03), 18 (24), 10 (16), 35 (53), 11 (17)…

> 2015-03-24 16:53:17 – Format time of UDF
……

34) What files were copied from PC to CD-R?

[Hint: Just use PC image only. You can examine transaction logs of the file system for this task.]

Possible Answer \Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\de\

> winter_storm.amr
> winter_whether_advisory.zip

\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\pd\

Last Saved 2024-09-09 35 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 > my_favorite_cars.db
> my_favorite_movies.7z
> new_years_day.jpg
> super_bowl.avi

\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\prog\
> my_friends.svg
> my_smartphone.png
> new_year_calendar.one

\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\prop\
> a_gift_from_you.gif
> landscape.png

\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\tr\
> diary_#1d.txt
> diary_#1p.txt
> diary_#2d.txt
> diary_#2p.txt
> diary_#3d.txt
> diary_#3p.txt

\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
> Penguins.jpg
> Koala.jpg
> Tulips.jpg
Considerations - It can be inferred from traces of burning type 2 and Question 35.

- Traces related to a burning directory (for burning type 2 only)

> \User\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn

- NTFS journal file analysis (for burning type 2 only)

> \$Extend\$UsnJrnl·$J (+ $MFT for identifying full paths of files)

35) What files were opened from CD-R?

Possible Answer Timestamp File (or Directory) Path Source
2015-03-24 D:\de\winter_whether_advisory.zip\ JumpList
(Timezone is 16:44:13
applied) 2015-03-24 D:\de\winter_whether_advisory.zip\ppt\ JumpList
16:44:14
2015-03-24 D:\de\winter_whether_advisory.zip\ppt\slides\ JumpList
16:44:16
2015-03-24 D:\de\winter_whether_advisory.zip\ppt\slideMasters\ JumpList
16:44:18
2015-03-24 D:\de\winter_whether_advisory.zip .LNK
16:44:18 (Windows)
2015-03-24 D:\Penguins.jpg .LNK
17:01:10 (Windows)
2015-03-24 D:\Koala.jpg .LNK
17:01:12 (Windows)
2015-03-24 D:\Tulips.jpg .LNK
17:01:14 (Windows)
Considerations \User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations
\User\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.lnk

Last Saved 2024-09-09 36 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 ……

36) Identify all timestamps related to a resignation file in Windows Desktop.

[Hint: the resignation file is a DOCX file in NTFS file system.]

Possible Answer Timestamp Type Source

2015-03-24 14:48:40 File Created NTFS MFT Entry
(Timezone is 2015-03-24 14:59:30 File Modified $STANDARD_INFORMATIO
applied) 2015-03-24 14:59:30 Last Accessed N
2015-03-24 14:59:30 Entry Modified attribute

2015-03-24 14:48:40 File Created NTFS MFT Entry

2015-03-24 14:59:30 File Modified $FILE_NAME
2015-03-24 14:59:30 Last Accessed attribute
2015-03-24 14:59:30 Entry Modified
2015-03-24 14:32:00 File Created OOXML
2015-03-24 14:59:00 File Modified \docProps\core.xml
Considerations - External timestamps ( NTFS File system)
- Internal timestamps ( OOXML)

37) How and when did the suspect print a resignation file?
Possible Answer Type Description
How Printed to XPS format
(Timezone is When 2015-03-25 11:28:34
applied) Where \Users\informant\Desktop\Resignation_Letter_(Iaman_Informant).xps
Considerations - There are no real printer devices.
- A XPS file can be found in Windows Desktop.

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\
> Fax
> Microsoft XPS Document Writer
…

38) Where are ‘Thumbcache’ files located?

Possible Answer cf\thumbcache_32.db
\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\thumbcache_64.db
\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\thumbcache_256.db
\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\thumbcache_idx.db
Considerations thumbcache_32.db : BMP files for less than or equal to 32x32
thumbcache_64.db : BMP files for less than or equal to 64x64
thumbcache_256.db : JPG or PNG files for less than or equal to 256x256

Last Saved 2024-09-09 37 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 39) Identify traces related to confidential files stored in Thumbcache. (Include ‘256’ only)
Possible
Answer

Considerations - thumbcache_256.db
- Thumbnail images of the first pages in MS PowerPoint files.

40) Where are Sticky Note files located?

Possible Answer \Users\informant\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Sticky Notes\StickyNotes.snt

Considerations - Microsoft Compound File Binary File Format

> https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd942138.aspx

41) Identify notes stored in the Sticky Note file.

Possible Answer Timestamp (File Modified) Content
2015-03-24 14:31:59 Tomorrow…

Everything will be OK…

Considerations * Timestamp may not be accurate.

42) Was the ‘Windows Search and Indexing’ function enabled? How can you identify it?
If it was enabled, what is a file path of the ‘Windows Search’ index database?

Possible Answer Search & Enabled

Indexing
DB File path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications\Windows\Windows.edb
Considerations HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Search\
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Search\Databases\Windows (value: FileName)
HKU\informant\Software\Microsoft\Windows Search\
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\WSearch\ (SearchIndexer service  Start up automatically)
…...

Last Saved 2024-09-09 38 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 43) What kinds of data were stored in Windows Search database?
Possible Answer - Internet Explorer History
- Microsoft Outlook
- Files in %UserProfile% (Excluding ‘AppData’ directory)
- Start Menu (/ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/)
- Sticky Note
Considerations - Microsoft ESE (Extensible Storage Engine) database format
- Windows.edb
> ‘System_ItemFolderPathDisplay’ column
> ‘System_ItemPathDisplay’ column
> ‘System_Search_Store’ column ( file, iehistory, mapi15, StickyNotes…)
> ‘System_ItemNameDisplay’ column
> ‘System_ItemName’ column
>…

44) Find traces of Internet Explorer usage stored in Windows Search database.
(It should be considered only during a date range between 2015-03-22 and 2015-03-23.)

Possible Date Modified Microsoft IE TargetUrl

Answer 2015-03-22 http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/internet-explorer/ie-8-welcome
11:09:22
2015-03-22 http://www.msn.com/?ocid=iehp
11:09:23
(Timezone is
2015-03-22 https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl
applied) 11:09:40
2015-03-22 https://www.google.com/search?
11:09:50 hl=en&source=hp&q=internet+explorer+11&gbv=2&oq=internet+explorer+
11&gs_l=heirloom-
hp.3..0l10.5163.7893.0.9562.20.13.0.7.7.0.156.1110.11j2.13.0.msedr...0...1ac
.1.34.heirloom-hp..0.20.1250.5j7Xm44tv5w
2015-03-22 http://www.google.com/url?url=http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/internet-
11:09:52 explorer/download-
ie&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&ei=6ykQVZWLGbeJsQT7goDACg&v
ed=0CB8QFjAA&usg=AFQjCNEwsIz17kY-jTXbaWPcQDfBbVEi7A
2015-03-22 http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/internet-explorer/download-ie
11:09:54
2015-03-22 http://www.google.com/url?url=http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/internet-
11:09:56 explorer/ie-11-worldwide-
languages&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&ei=6ykQVZWLGbeJsQT7goD
ACg&ved=0CCoQFjAB&usg=AFQjCNE7UKIWEBiWO2N96IFeo6ZywhR
Lfw
2015-03-22 http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/internet-explorer/ie-11-worldwide-
11:10:24 languages
2015-03-22 https://www.google.com/webhp?hl=en
11:10:54
2015-03-22 https://www.google.com/chrome/index.html?
11:10:58 hl=en&brand=CHNG&utm_source=en-
hpp&utm_medium=hpp&utm_campaign=en
2015-03-22 http://download.microsoft.com/download/7/1/7/7179A150-F2D2-4502-9D70-
11:11:06 4B59EA148EAA/IE11-Windows6.1-x64-en-us.exe
2015-03-22 https://www.google.com/chrome/browser/thankyou.html?
11:11:16 brand=CHNG&platform=win&clickonceinstalled=1
2015-03-23 https://odc.officeapps.live.com/odc/emailhrd?
13:26:33 lcid=1033&syslcid=1033&uilcid=1033&app=5&ver=15&build=15.0.4420&
p=0&a=1&hm=1&sp=0

Last Saved 2024-09-09 39 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 2015-03-23 http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ie-firstrun/win-7/ie-11/vie
13:27:49
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search
13:27:49
2015-03-23 http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=69157
13:27:49
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/
13:28:19
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news/search?q=Top Stories&FORM=NSBABR
14:07:52
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=Top+Stories&FORM=HDRSC1
14:07:55
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news/search?
14:07:58 q=file+sharing+and+tethering&FORM=HDRSC6
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?
14:08:00 q=file+sharing+and+tethering&qs=n&form=QBLH&pq=file+sharing+and+te
thering&sc=0-18&sp=-1&sk=&cvid=171b77e4ffd54b2a92c4e97abf995fe1
2015-03-23 http://sysinfotools.com/blog/tethering-internet-files-sharing/
14:08:18
2015-03-23 http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/windows-systems-and-artifacts-in-
14:11:13 digital-forensics-part-i-registry/
2015-03-23 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc162846.aspx
14:12:08
2015-03-23 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/308427
14:12:45
2015-03-23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Event_Viewer
14:12:52
2015-03-23 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/
14:13:58 dd562212(v=vs.85).aspx
2015-03-23 http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/USB_History_Viewing
14:14:25
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/search?q=external%20device%20and
16:43:48 %20forensics&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=external%20device%20and
%20forensics&sc=8-9&sp=-
1&sk=&cvid=c30c4b1f36114b1c9bc683838c69823a
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/?FORM=Z9FD1
16:43:50
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?FORM=Z9LH3
16:43:52
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?
16:44:58 q=science+technology+news&FORM=NWBTCB
2015-03-23 http://www.wired.com/?p=1756538
16:45:22
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=Soccer+News&FORM=NSBABR
16:45:30
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=top+stories&FORM=NWRFSH
16:53:47
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=us+news&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:09
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=world+news&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:10
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=local&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:17
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=entertainment+news&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:18
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=science+technology+news&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:29
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=business+news&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:55
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=political+news&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:56

Last Saved 2024-09-09 40 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=sports+news&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:57
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=health+news&FORM=NSBABR
16:55:59
2015-03-23 http://www.bing.com/news?q=top+stories&FORM=NSBABR
16:56:09
2015-03-23 http://www.wired.com/2015/03/stealing-data-computers-using-heat/
16:56:33
Considerations - Microsoft ESE (Extensible Storage Engine) database format
- Windows.edb
> ‘System_DateModified’ column
> ‘Microsoft_IE_TargetUrl’ column

45) List the e-mail communication stored in Windows Search database.

(It should be considered only during a date range between 2015-03-23 and 2015-03-24.)

Possible Timestamp E-Mail Communication

Answer 2015-03-23 Source [Inbox]
13:29:29 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject Hello, Iaman
Body How are you doing?
(Timezone
2015-03-23 Source [Sent Items]
is applied) From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
14:44:32
Subject RE: Hello, Iaman
Body Successfully secured.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 1:29 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Hello, Iaman

How are you doing?

2015-03-23 Source [Inbox]

15:14:58 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject Good job, buddy.
Body Good, job.
I need a more detailed data about this business.
2015-03-23 Source [Sent Items]
15:19:22 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject Good job, buddy.
Attachment space_and_earth.mp4
(Windows.edb only)
Body This is a sample.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:15 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Good job, buddy.

Good, job.
I need a more detailed data about this business.
2015-03-23 Source [Inbox]
15:20:41 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject RE: Good job, buddy.
Body Okay, I got it.
I’ll be in touch.

---------------------------
From: iaman

Last Saved 2024-09-09 41 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:19 PM
To: spy
Subject: RE: Good job, buddy.

This is a sample.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:15 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Good job, buddy.

Good, job.
I need a more detailed data about this business.
2015-03-23 Source [Inbox]
15:26:22 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject Important request
Body I confirmed it.
But, I need a more data.
Do your best.
2015-03-23 Source [Sent Items]
15:27:05 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject RE: Important request
Body Umm….. I need time to think.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 3:26 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Important request

I confirmed it.
But, I need a more data.
Do your best.
2015-03-23 Source [Sent Items]
16:38:48 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject It's me
Body Use links below,

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz0ye6gXtiZaVl8yVU5mWHlGbWc/view?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz0ye6gXtiZaakx6d3R3c0JmM1U/view?usp=sharing

2015-03-23 Source [Inbox]

16:41:19 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject RE: It's me
Body I got it.

---------------------------
From: iaman
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2015 4:39 PM
To: spy
Subject: It's me

Use links below,

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz0ye6gXtiZaVl8yVU5mWHlGbWc/view?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bz0ye6gXtiZaakx6d3R3c0JmM1U/view?usp=sharing

2015-03-24 Source [Inbox]

09:25:57 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject Last request
Body This is the last request.
I want to get the remaining data.
2015-03-24 Source [Sent Items]
09:30:11 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject RE: Last request
(Windows.edb only) Body Stop it!

Last Saved 2024-09-09 42 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 It is very hard to transfer all data over the internet!

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:26 AM
To: iaman
Subject: Last request

This is the last request.

I want to get the remaining data.
2015-03-24 Source [Inbox]
09:33:45 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject RE: Last request
(Windows.edb only) Body No problem.
U can directly deliver storage devices that stored it.

---------------------------
From: iaman
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:30 AM
To: spy
Subject: RE: Last request

Stop it!
It is very hard to transfer all data over the internet!

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:26 AM
To: iaman
Subject: Last request

This is the last request.

I want to get the remaining data.
2015-03-24 Source [Sent Items]
09:35:10 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject RE: Last request
Body This is the last time..

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:34 AM
To: iaman
Subject: RE: Last request

No problem.
U can directly deliver storage devices that stored it.

---------------------------
From: iaman
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:30 AM
To: spy
Subject: RE: Last request

Stop it!
It is very hard to transfer all data over the internet!

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 9:26 AM
To: iaman
Subject: Last request

This is the last request.

I want to get the remaining data.
2015-03-24 Source [Inbox]
15:32:42 From  To spy.conspirator@nist.gov  iaman.informant@nist.gov
Subject Watch out!
(Windows.edb only) Body USB device may be easily detected.

Last Saved 2024-09-09 43 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 So, try another method.
2015-03-24 Source [Sent Items]
15:34:02 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject RE: Watch out!
Body I am trying.

---------------------------
From: spy
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2015 3:33 PM
To: iaman
Subject: Watch out!

USB device may be easily detected.

So, try another method.

2015-03-24 Source [Sent Items]
17:05:10 From  To iaman.informant@nist.gov  spy.conspirator@nist.gov
Subject Done
Body It’s done. See you tomorrow.
Considerati - Microsoft ESE (Extensible Storage Engine) database format
ons - Windows.edb
> ‘System_ItemPathDisplay’ column
> ‘System_Message_FromName’ column
> ‘System_Message_ToAddress’ column
> ‘System_Message_ToName’ column
> ‘System_Message_DateSent’ column
> ‘System_Message_DateReceived’ column
> ‘System_Message_AttachmentNames’ column
> ‘System_Search_AutoSummary’ column
> ‘System_Search_AutoSummary’ column
…
- Some e-mail items can be found only in Windows Search database.

46) List files and directories related to Windows Desktop stored in Windows Search database.
(Windows Desktop directory: \Users\informant\Desktop\)

Possible Answer Date Created Full Path

2015-03-23 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\Google Drive.lnk
16:05:33
(Timezone is 2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:40:09 Data\\design\\space_and_earth.mp4
applied)
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:40:09 Data\\design\\winter_whether_advisory.zip
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:40:10 Data\\design\\winter_storm.amr
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:40:11 Data\\proposal\\[secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:40:13 Data\\proposal\\[secret_project]_proposal.docx
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:47:58 Data\\design\\[secret_project]_detailed_design.pptx
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:47:58 Data\\final\\[secret_project]_final_meeting.pptx
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:47:58 Data\\pricing decision\\(secret_project)_market_analysis.xlsx
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:47:58 Data\\pricing decision\\(secret_project)_market_shares.xls
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project

Last Saved 2024-09-09 44 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 09:47:58 Data\\pricing decision\\(secret_project)_price_analysis_#1.xlsx
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\S data\\Secret Project Data\\Secret Project
09:47:59 Data\\proposal
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\Resignation_Letter_(Iaman_Informant).docx
14:48:41
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp
15:52:06
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\IE11-Windows6.1-x64-en-us.exe
15:52:36
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\Chrysanthemum.jpg
15:52:47
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\Hydrangeas.jpg
15:52:47
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\Desert.jpg
15:52:47
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\Lighthouse.jpg
15:52:47
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\Koala.jpg
15:52:47
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\Jellyfish.jpg
15:52:47
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\Tulips.jpg
15:52:47
2015-03-24 C:\\Users\\informant\\Desktop\\temp\\Penguins.jpg
15:52:47
Considerations - Microsoft ESE (Extensible Storage Engine) database format
- Windows.edb
> ‘System_DateCreated’ column
> ‘System_ItemDate’ column
> ‘System_ItemPathDisplay’ column
> ‘System_Search_AutoSummary’ column
…

47) Where are Volume Shadow Copies stored? When were they created?
Possible There is a Volume Shadow Copy in ‘\System Volume Information\’ directory
Answer
\System Volume Information\{9b365826-d2ef-11e4-b734-000c29ff2429}{Global GUID}
> Created Time: 2015-03-25 10:57:27 AM (Timezone is applied)
> File size: 320 MB (335,544,320 bytes)
Considerations - \System Volume Information\{Random GUID for a VSC}{VSS identifier - Common GUID for VSCs}

- VSS identifier stored at file offset 0 for 16 bytes

> {3808876b-c176-4e48-b7ae-04046e6cc752}
> Global GUID for VSS

- Shadow Copy ID stored at file offset 144 for 16 bytes

> {8f1a2a2d-ce6b-42a5-b92b-f13e65d9c2cb}

- Shadow Copy set ID stored at file offset 160 for 16 bytes

> {56e43eb5-ac18-4f06-a521-1e17712b7ced}
…

48) Find traces related to Google Drive service in Volume Shadow Copy. What are the differences
between the current system image (of Question 29 ~ 31) and its VSC?
Possible Date Created Date Path Size Format
Modified

Last Saved 2024-09-09 45 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Answer 2015-03-23 2015-03-23 \User\informant\AppData\Google\ 20 KB SQLite
16:02:51 16:47:55 Drive\user_default\snapshot.db
(Timezone is 2015-03-23 2015-03-23 \User\informant\AppData\Google\ 11 KB SQLite
applied) 16:02:51 16:47:55 Drive\user_default\sync_config.db
2015-03-23 2015-03-23 \User\informant\AppData\Google\ 341 TEXT
16:02:51 16:47:56 Drive\user_default\sync_log.log KB
[ Current system image vs. VSC ]

- The last log inside sync_log.log from VSC was added at 2015-03-23 16:47:56.
- Two SQLite files (snapshot.db and sync_config.db) exist in VSC.
- These files were deleted because of the logoff activity in 2015-03-25.
- In other words, VSC was created before the logoff activity.
Considerations - Creation time of a Volume Shadow Copy
> 2015-03-25 10:57:27 AM

49) What files were deleted from Google Drive?

Find deleted records of cloud_entry table inside snapshot.db from VSC.
(Just examine the SQLite database only. Let us suppose that a text based log file was wiped.)
[Hint: DDL of cloud_entry table is as follows.]
CREATE TABLE cloud_entry
(doc_id TEXT, filename TEXT, modified INTEGER, created INTEGER, acl_role INTEGER,
doc_type INTEGER, removed INTEGER, size INTEGER, checksum TEXT, shared INTEGER,
resource_type TEXT, PRIMARY KEY (doc_id));

Possible Record Info Column Size (bytes) Data

Answer doc_id (69-13)/2 = 0Bz0ye6gXtiZaVl8yVU5mWHlGbWc
[File offset 0x702] 28
Filename (75-13)/2 = do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3
RecordSize: 0x76 31
RowID: 0x03 modified 4 0x54CBB610 (1422636560)
HeaderSize: 0x0C  2015-01-30 11:49:20 (UTC-05)
created 4 0x5510786D (1427142765)
 2015-03-23 16:32:45 (UTC-04)
acl_role 0 0
doc_type 0 1
removed 0 0
size 3 0x686F86 (6844294)
 6,844,294 bytes
checksum (77-13)/2 = 2c4553f99533d85adb104b3a5c38521a
32
shared 0 1
resource_type (21-13)/2 = 4 file
doc_id fixed size (28) 0Bz0ye6gXtiZaakx6d3R3c0JmM1U
[File offset 0x77A] Filename (47-13)/2 = happy_holiday.jpg
17
First 4 bytes are modified 4 0x54CA9982 (1422563714)
overwritten  2015-01-29 15:35:14 (UTC-05)
created 4 0x5510786A (1427142762)
RecordSize: N/A  2015-03-23 16:32:42 (UTC-04)
RowID: N/A acl_role 0 0
HeaderSize: N/A doc_type 0 1
removed 0 0

Last Saved 2024-09-09 46 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 size 3 0x6B8C5 (440517)
 440,517 bytes
checksum (77-13)/2 = 0c77d6a2704155dbfdf29817769b7478
32
shared 0 1
resource_type (21-13)/2 = 4 file
Consideratio - Deleted SQLite record recovery
ns > http://www.sqlite.org/fileformat2.html
>…

- (Deleted record #1) File offset 0x702 of snapshot.db from VSC

- (Deleted record #2) File offset 0x77A of snapshot.db from VSC

50) Why can’t we find Outlook’s e-mail data in Volume Shadow Copy?
Possible Answer Outlook OST files were excluded by the following snapshot configuration.

HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BackupRestore\FilesNotToSnapshot\
> OutlookOST: $UserProfile$\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook\*.ost
Considerations - Excluding Files from Shadow Copies
> https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa819132(v=vs.85).aspx

51) Examine ‘Recycle Bin’ data in PC.

Possible $I Name Timestamp Original File (or Directory) Path
Deleted
Answer
$I40295N 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\prop
15:51:47
$IXWGVWC 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\prog
(Timezone is 15:51:47
applied) $I55Z163 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\pd
15:51:47
$I9M7UMY 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\tr
15:51:47
$I508CBB.jpg 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
16:11:42 Hydrangeas.jpg
$I8YP3XK.jpg 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
16:11:42 Jellyfish.jpg
$IDOI3HE.jpg 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\

Last Saved 2024-09-09 47 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 16:11:42 Tulips.jpg
$IFVCH5V.jpg 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
16:11:42 Penguins.jpg
$II3FM2A.jpg 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
16:11:42 Desert.jpg
$IIQGWTT.ini 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
16:11:42 desktop.ini
$IJEMT64.exe 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\IE11-
16:11:42 Windows6.1-x64-en-us.exe
$IKXD1U3.jpg 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
16:11:42 Chrysanthemum.jpg
$IU3FKWI.jpg 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
16:11:42 Koala.jpg
$IX538VH.jpg 2015-03-24 C:\Users\informant\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\Burn\
16:11:42 Lighthouse.jpg
Considerations - The SID of ‘informant’ account is 1000.
> \$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-2425377081-3129163575-2985601102-1000\*

- Windows 7 Recycle Bin

> pairs of $I[random].extension & $R[random].extension

- Although Recycle Bin was emptied in this scenario, the deleted files can be recovered by
metadata based data recovery.

52) What actions were performed for anti-forensics on PC at the last day ‘2015-03-25’?
Possible Timestamp Behavior Description
Answer 2015-03-25 Search anti-forensic tools
10:46:44 anti-forensic methods
2015-03-25 Search eraser
10:46:54 anti-forensic methods
(Timezone is
2015-03-25 Download http://iweb.dl.sourceforge.net/project/eraser/Eraser
applied) 10:47:34 anti-forensic tools %206/6.2/Eraser%206.2.0.2962.exe
2015-03-25 Search ccleaner
10:47:51 anti-forensic methods
2015-03-25 Download http://www.piriform.com/ccleaner/download
10:48:12 anti-forensic tools
2015-03-25 Install \USERS\INFORMANT\DESKTOP\DOWNLOAD\
10:50:14 anti-forensic tools ERASER 6.2.0.2962.EXE
2015-03-25 Install \USERS\INFORMANT\DESKTOP\DOWNLOAD\
10:57:56 anti-forensic tools CCSETUP504.EXE
2015-03-25 Run \PROGRAM FILES\Eraser\Eraser.exe
11:13:30 anti-forensic tools
2015-03-25 Wiping \User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Chrysanthemum.jpg
11:13:39 files & directories \User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Desert.jpg
\User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Hydrangeas.jpg
~ 11:14:44 using Eraser \User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\IE11-Windows6.1-x64-en-us.exe
\User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Jellyfish.jpg
\User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Koala.jpg
\User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Lighthouse.jpg
\User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Penguins.jpg
\User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Tulips.jpg
\User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\Tulips.jpg
\User\Informant\Desktop\Temp\
(See below)
2015-03-25 Delete files \Users\informant\Desktop\Download\ccsetup504.exe
11:15:45 [Shift] + [Delete] \Users\informant\Desktop\Download\Eraser 6.2.0.2962.exe
2015-03-25 Run \PROGRAM FILES\CCLEANER\CCLEANER64.EXE
11:15:50 anti-forensic tools
2015-03-25 Uninstall \PROGRAM FILES\CCLEANER\UNINST.EXE
11:18:29 anti-forensic tools
2015-03-25 Disconnecting sync_log.log
11:22:47 Google drive account

Last Saved 2024-09-09 48 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 > 2015-03-25 11:22:47,053 -0400 INFO pid=3164
1528:MainThread common.sync_app:1630
Signing Out
> 2015-03-25 11:22:48,878 -0400 INFO pid=3164
1528:MainThread common.sync_app:1741
Deleting file: C:\Users\INFORM~1\AppData\
Local\Google\Drive\user_default\sync_config.db
> 2015-03-25 11:22:48,878 -0400 INFO pid=3164
1528:MainThread common.sync_app:1741
Deleting file: C:\Users\INFORM~1\AppData\
Local\Google\Drive\user_default\snapshot.db
Delete some e-mails See Question 21 and Question 45.
N/A in Outlook (1) It's me
(2) RE: It's me
(3) Good job, buddy.
(4) RE: Last request
(5) Watch out!
(6) RE: Watch out!
(7) Done
Considerations [Wiping traces of Eraser in $UsnJrnl]
- Eraser renames the target file as random bytes, and fills random data.
> Current Eraser settings: erasure method (US DoD 5220.22-M  7 Passes)
> (0) Chrysanthemum.jpg ( target file)
> (1) S9(wQm9ff_gd/hZ~c (Renamed file for Step 1)
> (2) KclInDLFM3YdDX}t1 (Renamed file for Step 2)
> (3) C0jAF)No] VBZJoxE (Renamed file for Step 3)
> (4) +a]Zd+UuQ88qn/K9J (Renamed file for Step 4)
> (5) 2O8josN{78q7Ju7dx (Renamed file for Step 5)
> (6) v1hNH f]1bDJc2'(I (Renamed file for Step 6)
> (7) 8BkLKk2 cBfQ7`SvH (Renamed file for Step 7)
> (8) Delete the last file

- See Question 10 and 11 for identifying application usage logs.

- See Question 15, 16 and 44 for identifying web history.
- See Question 30 and 49 for identifying cloud storage drive history.
……

53) Recover deleted files from USB drive ‘RM#2’.

Possible Recovery Filename (Path) Format Filesize Viewable
Answer Type
Metadata \DESIGN\winter_storm.amr PPT 13.8 MB O
\DESIGN\winter_whether_advisory.zip PPTX 15.6 MB O
(FAT \pricing decision\my_favorite_cars.db XLS 1.20 MB O
Directory \pricing decision\my_favorite_movies.7z XLSX 97.7 KB O
Entry) \pricing decision\new_years_day.jpg XLSX 9.76 MB O
\pricing decision\super_bowl.avi XLS 9.81 MB O
\PROGRESS\my_friends.svg DOC 57.0 KB O
\PROGRESS\my_smartphone.png DOCX 4.23 MB O
\PROGRESS\new_year_calendar.one DOCX 26.7 KB O
\PROPOSAL\a_gift_from_you.gif DOCX 33.5 MB O
\PROPOSAL\landscape.png DOCX 6.18 MB O
\technical review\diary_#1d.txt DOCX 118 KB O
\technical review\diary_#1p.txt PPTX 447 KB O
\technical review\diary_#2d.txt DOCX 643 KB O
\technical review\diary_#2p.txt PPT 1.10 MB O
\technical review\diary_#3d.txt DOC 2.25 MB O
\technical review\diary_#3p.txt PPT 317 KB O

Last Saved 2024-09-09 49 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Carving - All other files do not have a relationship with this scenario.
- Results from TestData (PhotoRec)
> OGG, 3GP, GIF, JPG, XLS, DOC, MOV, MP4, MPG, PNG, TIF, WMA,
WMV, XML…
Considerations - Metadata based data recovery
> Directory Entries of FAT file system.
> This task may be enough for ‘RM#2’ image.
- Contents (signatures) based data carving
> This task is optional.

54) What actions were performed for anti-forensics on USB drive ‘RM#2’?
[Hint: this can be inferred from the results of Question 53.]

Possible Answer Quick format for deleting data

Considerations - Inference from data recovery results.
- Some directory entries prior to the quick format do exist in unallocated areas.
winter

55) What files were copied from PC to USB drive ‘RM#2’?

Possible Filename Format Filesize JumpList and ShellBag entry in PC
Answer winter_storm.amr PPT 13.8 MB None
winter_whether_advisory.zip PPTX 15.6 MB E:\Secret Project Data\design\winter_whether_advisory.zip
(Timezone is my_favorite_cars.db XLS 1.20 MB None

applied) my_favorite_movies.7z XLSX 97.7 KB None

new_years_day.jpg XLSX 9.76 MB None
super_bowl.avi XLS 9.81 MB None
my_friends.svg DOC 57.0 KB None
my_smartphone.png DOCX 4.23 MB None
new_year_calendar.one DOCX 26.7 KB None
a_gift_from_you.gif DOCX 33.5 MB None
landscape.png DOCX 6.18 MB None
diary_#1d.txt DOCX 118 KB None
diary_#1p.txt PPTX 447 KB None
diary_#2d.txt DOCX 643 KB None
diary_#2p.txt PPT 1.10 MB None
diary_#3d.txt DOC 2.25 MB None
diary_#3p.txt PPT 317 KB None

Considerations - Inference from the results of deleted data recovery in Question 53.
- Inference from the results of traversed files/directories in Question 25 and 26.

56) Recover hidden files from the CD-R ‘RM#3’.

How to determine proper filenames of the original files prior to renaming tasks?

Possible Recovery Filename inferred from Format Filesize Viewable

Answer Type the First Page & its storage format
Data [secret_project]_revised_points.ppt PPT 13.8 MB O
Carving [secret_project]_detailed_design.pptx PPTX 15.6 MB O
[secret_project]_price_analysis_#1.xlsx XLSX 97.7 KB O
[secret_project]_price_analysis_#2.xls XLS 1.20 MB O
[secret_project]_market_analysis.xlsx XLSX 9.76 MB O
[secret_project]_market_shares.xls XLS 9.81 MB O

Last Saved 2024-09-09 50 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 [secret_project]_progress_#1.docx DOCX 4.23 MB O
[secret_project]_progress_#2.docx DOCX 26.7 KB O
[secret_project]_progress_#3.doc DOC 56.0 KB O
[secret_project]_detailed_proposal.docx DOCX - Partial
[secret_project]_proposal.docx DOCX 6.18 MB O
[secret_project]_technical_review_#1.docx DOCX 118 KB O
[secret_project]_technical_review_#1.pptx PPTX 447 KB O
[secret_project]_technical_review_#2.docx DOCX 643 KB O
[secret_project]_technical_review_#2.ppt PPT 1.10 MB O
[secret_project]_technical_review_#3.doc DOC 2.25 MB O
[secret_project]_technical_review_#3.ppt PPT 317 KB O
Considerations - Contents (signatures) based data carving
> This task is useful for ‘RM#3’ image.
> Filename can be inferred from the first page and its storage format.
- Metadata based data recovery
> If this task is possible, it may be good for analyst.
> With this method, we may be able to identify renamed filenames.
> So, additional process is needed for determining original filenames.
- All other files (some JPEG files) do not have a relationship with this scenario.

57) What actions were performed for anti-forensics on CD-R ‘RM#3’?

Possible Answer (1) Formatting CD-R (Burning Type 1: Like a USB flash drive)
(2) Copying confidential files and some meaningless files to CD-R
(3) Deleting confidential files from CD-R for hiding them
Considerations - This can be inferred from CD-R image examination.

58) Create a detailed timeline of data leakage processes.

Possible Answer See Section 3
Considerations - Behavior of the suspect
> 2015-03-22: Normal business works (installation and configuration of apps)
> 2015-03-23: Transferring sample confidential data through the internet
> 2015-03-24: Copying confidential data to storage devices
> 2015-03-25: Trying to do anti-forensics and take storage devices out
- Some traces may be hard to be exactly identified from the images.

59) List and explain methodologies of data leakage performed by the suspect.
Possible Answer (1) Network Transmission
- E-mail
> 2015-03-23 15:19 – space_and_earth.mp4
> 2015-03-23 16:38 – links of shared files in cloud storage service
- Cloud storage services
> 2015-03-23 16:32 – happy_holiday.jpg, do_u_wanna_build_a_snow_man.mp3

(2) Storage Device

- USB flash drive
> 2015-03-24 09:58 ~ 10:00 – winter_whether_advisory.zip and so on
> The suspect formatted the partition, but copied files exist in unused area
- CD-R
> 2015-03-24 16:54 ~ 16:58 – 17 files (e.g., winter_whether_advisory.zip and so on)
> The suspect deleted the confidential files, but the files exist in unused area

Last Saved 2024-09-09 51 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

 Considerations - See Section 5.
- See Question 45 related to the e-mail communication.
- See Question 30 and 49 related to the cloud storage service.
- See Question 22, 25, 26, 54 and 55 related to USB flash drive.
- See Question 34 and 56 related to CD-R.

60) Create a visual diagram for a summary of results.

Possible
Answer

- See Section 3 (Graphical Timeline of the Data Leakage Scenario)

Considerations - A visual diagram of Section 3 is a simple example to better understanding.

- You can create your own visual diagram for explaining the results of digital forensic analysis.

Last Saved 2024-09-09 52 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case

7.HISTORY

Rev Issue Date Section History

1.00 2015-06-05 All - First release version
1.10 2015-09-08 6 - Added additional information about user accounts to Question 6
1.20 2016-11-10 3 - Added additional information about copying files
- Corrected typing errors
1.30 2017-12-06 All
- Added additional information about seed files
1.31 2018-03-05 4 - Added a subsection for describing the RM#1 image file
- For Question 11, updated additional entries from UserAssist,
1.32 2018-07-23 6 Prefetch and Shimcache, and corrected wrong information
(NULL timestamps of several UserAssist entries)

Last Saved 2024-09-09 53 NIST CFReDS Data Leakage Case