INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

REPORT OF

TWENTY SIXTH MEETING OF THE

COMMUNICATIONS/NAVIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE SUB-GROUP
(CNS SG/26) OF APANPIRG

Video Tele-Conference (VTC)

5 - 9 September 2022

The views expressed in this Report should be taken as those of the Sub-group and
not of the Organization. This Report will be submitted to the APANPIRG/33
Meeting and any formal action taken will be published in due course as a
Supplement to the Report of the APANPIRG Meeting.
 i-2

History of the Meeting Page

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. i-5

2. Attendance ............................................................................................................................... i-5
3. Opening of the Meeting ........................................................................................................... i-5
4. Officers and Secretariat............................................................................................................ i-5
5. Organization, Working Arrangement, Language and Documentation .................................... i-6
6. Conclusions and Decisions – Definition .................................................................................. i-6

Report on Agenda Items

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of agenda.......................................................................................... 2

Agenda Item 2: Review outcomes of APANPIRG/RASG Chairpersons review, APANPIRG/32

meeting, DGCA/57 meeting, ATM Sub-group and other major meetings
relevant to CNS Sub-group .............................................................................. 2

Agenda Item 3: Aeronautical Fixed Service (AFS) ................................................................... 4

3.1. Review Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Aeronautical

Communications Services Implementation Coordination Group
(ACSICG/9) including:

- Report of the Ninth and Tenth Meetings of Common aeRonautical

VPN Operations Group (CRV OG/9 & 10); and

- Outcomes of Webinar on CRV Implementation;

3.2. Review the AMHS readiness status for supporting IWXXM Traffic of
the States/Administrations;

3.3. Other AFS related issues

Agenda Item 4: Information Management (IM)....................................................................... 11

4.1 Review Report of the Sixth Meeting of System Wide Information

Management Task Force (SWIM TF/6);

4.2 Other IM related issues

Agenda Item 5: Aeronautical Mobile Communications Service and Aeronautical

electromagnetic spectrum utilization .............................................................. 19

5.1 Update on status of datalink applications and VHF capability sharing

by States;

5.2 Review Report of the Sixth Meeting of Spectrum Review Working

Group (SRWG/6);

5.3 Other issues related to aeronautical communications service and

aeronautical radio spectrum management, especially on 5G
implementation and potential impacts to aircraft radio altimeters
i-3 Table of Contents

Agenda Item 6: Navigation...................................................................................................... 28

6.1 Review Report of the Ninth Meeting of Performance based Navigation

Implementation Coordination Group (PBNICG/9);

6.2 Review Report of the Fourth Meeting of GBAS/SBAS Implementation

Task Force (GBAS/SBAS ITF/4);

6.3 Update on Flight Inspection Guidance Material (FIGM);

6.4 Other navigation related issues

Agenda Item 7: Surveillance ................................................................................................... 32

7.1 Review Report of Sixth Meeting of the Surveillance Implementation

Coordination Group (SURICG/7), including:

- Report of the Fifth Meeting of Mode S Downlinked Aircraft

Parameters Working Group (Mode S DAPs WG/5);

- Report of the Second Meeting of the Surveillance Study Group

(SURSG/2).

7.2 Other surveillance related issues

Agenda Item 8: Automation .................................................................................................... 41

8.1 Review Report of the Third Meeting of ATM Automation Systems

Task Force (ATMAS TF/3);

8.2 Review AIDC implementation status

8.3 Other automation related issues

Agenda Item 9: Review and updates ....................................................................................... 45

9.1 Seamless ANS Reporting Process including the ASBU regional

performance dashboard/implementation plan

9.2 Update on ICAO GANP Study Group related to CNS

9.3 National ANP and elements related to CNS

9.4 Beijing Declaration implementation related to CNS

Agenda Item 10: Review status of CNS deficiencies (APANPIRG Deficiency List) ............. 47

Agenda Item 11: Human Factors and Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel (ATSEPs) related
training ........................................................................................................... 47

11.1 Review outcomes of small working group study on human factor issues
of ATSEP

Agenda Item 12: Cybersecurity of CNS/ATM systems ............................................................. 49

12.1 Updates on ICAO International Aviation Trust Framework

12.2 Other Cybersecurity related issues

i-4 Table of Contents

Agenda Item 13: Discuss and share experience and application of new technologies, including
big data analysis, artificial intelligence, Digital Tower, counter UAS detection
and identification system, UTM, etc.............................................................. 50

Agenda Item 14: CNS related work/projects impacted by COVID-19 ..................................... 51

Agenda Item 15: Any Other Business ....................................................................................... 52

Agenda Item 16: Dates of next meeting.....................................................................................53

List of Appendices

Appendix A: Revised draft amended Pro Document for CRV project (RAS14801)

Appendix B: Revised AFTN/ATSMHS Routing Directory

Appendix C: AMHS Readiness Report for Supporting IWXXM Traffic

Appendix D: Content for SWIM ASBUs in Seamless ANS Plan

Appendix E: The revised ToR of SWIM TF

Appendix F: Flight Inspection Guidance Material (FIGM) Edition 3.0

Appendix G: Mode S DAPs Implementation and Operation Guidance Document v4.0

Appendix H: Revised Surveillance Strategy for the APAC Region

Appendix I: Revised ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (AIGD)

Appendix J: ATMAS IGD Edition 1.0

Appendix K: Updated List of CNS Related Deficiencies

Appendix L: CNS Point of Contacts

Appendix M: CNS SG/26 Action Items

List of Attachments:

Attachment 1: List of participants ........................................................................................... 1-1

Attachment 2: List of working/information papers/flimsies/presentations.............................. 2-1

______________
i-5 History of the Meeting

1. Introduction

1.1 The Twenty Sixth Meeting of the Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Sub-
group (CNS SG/26) of Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group
(APANPIRG), was held from 5 to 9 September 2022 via Video Tele-Conference (VTC) using Microsoft
Teams.

2. Attendance

2.1 The meeting was attended by 247 participants from 26 States/Administrations

(Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong China, Macao China,
France, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, USA, Viet Nam), 4 International
Organizations namely CANSO, IATA, ICAO and IFATSEA, including 21 participants from industry
partners. The list of participants is provided in Attachment 1 to this Report.

3. Opening of the Meeting

3.1 The meeting was inaugurated by Mr. Tao Ma, ICAO Asia/Pacific (APAC) Regional
Director. Mr. Ma extended a warm welcome to all delegates and gave a special greeting to the
chairpersons of various contributing bodies to the CNS SG. He highlighted some significant events,
achievements, and progress in CNS since the Sub-group's last meeting and recent significant
developments relevant to CNS under the challenge of COVID-19 in the APAC Region. He extended
his thanks and appreciation to the excellent leadership and significant contribution of Mr. Richard Wu,
Chair of CNS SG, in steering the work of the CNS Sub-group along with his commitment and support
to this Sub-group.

3.2 Mr. Richard Wu, the Chair of CNS SG of APANPIRG, welcomed all participants and
shared the honour to continue serving as the Chairperson of the CNS Sub-group. He informed about the
IATA forecast about total air passenger numbers in 2022 and 2023, indicating that traffic to be
recovered back to 83% and 94% respectively of pre-pandemic level along with fluid and unpredictable
pace for recovery of international air traffic. Furthermore, he shared various accomplishments of CNS
SG along with its contributory bodies. He hoped to have a solid foundation to pave the way for a smooth
recovery in terms of safe and reliable CNS infrastructure and services. He expressed appreciation to the
contribution from the ICAO Bangkok Office, under the able leadership of the Regional Director, in
organizing a large number of online meetings conducted in the last year and shared the significant
accomplishments made by APAC members. Lastly, he shared the confidence to have another successful
CNS Sub-group meeting with the strong support from the ICAO Regional Office and the active
participation from members and aviation partners in surpassing the challenges.

4. Officers and Secretariat

4.1 The meeting was chaired by Mr. Richard Wu, Deputy Director-General of Civil
Aviation, Civil Aviation Department, Hong Kong China. Mr. Luo Yi, Regional Officer CNS, and Ms.
Soniya Nibhani, Regional Officer ANS (CNS) Implementation, ICAO APAC Regional Office, acted as
the secretaries of the meeting with the support of Mr. How Sze Lung, Regional Officer CNS, Ms. Zhong
Wenhan, Regional Officer CNS, and Ms. Thita Pongdara, the Programme Assistant of the same office.
The meeting was also supported by Regional Officers, ATM and MET of ICAO APAC Regional Office,
Bangkok, Thailand, PBN Officer of ICAO Regional Sub-Office, Beijing, China, along with Technical
Officers from ICAO HQ, Montreal, Canada.
 History of the Meeting i-6

5. Organization, Working Arrangement, Language, and Documentation

5.1 The working language was English inclusive of all documentation and this Report. The
Sub-group met as a single body to deal with all the agenda items.

5.2 The meeting considered 34 Working Papers, 23 Information Papers, and 6

Presentations. A list of Working Papers, Information Papers, Presentations, and Flimsies is provided in
Attachment 2 to the Report.

6. Conclusions and Decisions - Definition

6.1 The Sub-groups of APANPIRG record their actions in the form of Draft Conclusions,
Draft Decisions, Conclusions and Decisions with the following significance:

1) Draft Conclusions deal with matters which, by the Sub-Group’s Terms of

Reference, require the attention of States or actions by ICAO following
established procedures;

2) Draft Decisions relate solely to matters dealing with the internal working
arrangements of APANPIRG and its contributory bodies;

3) Conclusions: Those Conclusions adopted by the Sub-group on behalf of

APANPIRG on technical matters; and

4) Decisions relate solely to matters dealing with the internal working arrangement
of the Sub-group only.

Note: in accordance with APANPIRG Procedural Handbook, Sub-groups are

empowered to adopt Conclusions and Decisions on technical matters
(especially those concerning guidance to States in the implementation of ICAO
SARPs, GANP, RANP, and Seamless ANS Plan).

____________
 List of Conclusions, Decisions, Draft Conclusions and Draft Decisions i-7

Reference Subject Page

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/01 - Revised Amendment of the Management Service 4

(ACSICG/09/01 (CRV OG/09/01)) Agreement for CRV project (RAS14801)

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/02 - Extension of CRV Contract for one year. 5
(ACSICG/09/02 (CRV OG/10/01))

Conclusion CNS SG/26/03 - Revised AFTN/ATSMHS Routing Directory 7

(ACSICG/09/04)

Decision CNS SG/26/04 - The Use of the Internet for MET Information 12
(SWIM TF/06/01)) Services in Regional SWIM architecture

Draft Decision CNS SG/26/05 - Harmonization of Timelines for SWIM-related 13

(SWIM TF/06/03) Initiatives

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/06 - The Asia-Pacific SWIM Implementation 14

(SWIM TF/06/02 and SWIM TF/06/04) Timeframe and inclusion of the Asia/Pacific SWIM
Implementation in the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS
Plan

Decision CNS SG/26/07 - Revised SWIM TF Terms of Reference 17

(SWIM TF/06/06)

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/08 - Planning Principle for Aeronautical Frequency 21

(SRWG/6/02) Bands of 108-117.975 MHz, 960-1215 MHz and
117.975-137 MHz

Conclusion CNS/SG/26/09 - Update of Flight Inspection Guidance Material 31

(FIGM)

Conclusion CNS SG/26/10 - Mode S DAPs IGD 4.0 33

(SURICG/7/1 (DAPs WG/5/1))

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/11 - Revised Surveillance Strategy for the APAC 38
(SURICG/7/3) Region

Conclusion CNS SG/26/12 - Revised ADS-B Implementation and Operations 39

(SURICG/7/4) Guidance Document (AIGD)

Conclusion CNS SG/26/13 - ATMAS IGD Edition 1.0 44

(ATMAS TF/3/1)

____________
 2

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of agenda

Adoption of Agenda (WP/01)

1.1 The tentative agenda proposed in WP/01 was adopted by the meeting.

Agenda Item 2: Review outcomes of APANPIRG/RASG Chairpersons review, APANPIRG/32

meeting, DGCA/57 meeting, ATM Sub-group and other major meetings relevant to CNS Sub-
group

Outcomes of APANPIRG/32, RASG-APAC/11, APANPIRG/32 Midyear Review

and 9th PIRG-RASG Coordination Meeting on CNS- Sec (WP/02)

2.1 APANPIRG/32 was held from 1 to 3 December 2021 via VTC. The meeting discussed
CNS related matters and took subsequent actions on CNS SG/25 meeting report and other papers
presented under Agenda Item 3.4. The APANPIRG/32 noted that CNS SG/25 meeting had adopted 8
Conclusions and 5 Decisions on technical and operational matters, and proposed 4 Draft Conclusions
for APANPIRG/32 adoption, which were adopted by the APANPIRG/32.

2.2 APANPIRG/32 Midyear Review and 9th Planning and Implementation Regional
Group-Regional Aviation Safety Group (PIRG-RASG) Regional Coordination Meeting were held on 2
August 2022 via VTC. APANPIRG/32 Midyear Review meeting discussed APAC key challenges in
Air Navigation, key outcomes and achievements, updates on APANPIRG/32 Action Plan and
outstanding APANPIRG Conclusions/Decisions Action Plan.

2.3 RASG-APAC/11 was held from 4 to 5 December 2021 via VTC. The meeting
discussed 1 Conclusion and 1 Decision regarding potential interference to aircraft radio altimeter by 5G
telecommunications system.

Updates on CNS SG/25 and APANPIRG/32 Conclusions/Decisions, and Action

Items- Sec (WP/03)

2.4 The meeting noted the latest status for various Conclusions/Decisions adopted in the
CNS SG/25, Conclusions/Decisions adopted in the APANPIRG/32 related to CNS along with latest
status and action taken on various ACTION ITEMS formulated by the CNS SG/25 meeting.

Relevant Action Items of 57th Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation-

Sec (WP/04)

2.5 The 57th Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation (DGCA Conf/57), APAC,
was hosted by Republic of Korea in Incheon from 4 to 8 July 2022. Total 503 participants with 302
attending in-person and 201 online, from 31 States/Administrations and 11 International Organizations
participated the meeting. With the theme “Strengthening regional cooperation for the restoration of
air network with No Country Left Behind”, 84 Discussion Papers were presented and 48 Information
Papers were submitted under 11 Agenda Items in the Conference. The Conference formulated 64
Action Items. All Papers related to CNS were listed in the paper, and various Action Items related to
CNS are provided in an appendix to the paper. States/Administrations were urged to take follow-up
actions and provide ICAO APAC Office a status report of implementation in timely manner.

2.6 The meeting noted that the 58th Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation
(DGCA Conf/58) will be hosted by Bangladesh in 2023 with the theme “Promoting ICAO Gender
Equality Programme in conjunction with Next Generation of Aviation Professionals (NGAP)
initiative”. The conference was informed that India will host the Second Asia Pacific Ministerial
Conference in early 2023. The Second Asia Pacific Ministerial Conference is expected to deliver
renewed commitments from the Asia Pacific Aviation Ministers in the new regional aviation landscape
 3

in the post-pandemic era.

Air Traffic Management and Airspace Safety Monitoring Outcomes- Sec (WP/32)

2.7 The paper presented key outcomes from the technical working groups established
under the oversight of the Air Traffic Management and Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory
Sub-Groups of APANPIRG, and other information relevant to CNS Sub-Group.

2.8 The CNS SG/26 meeting noted the outcomes of the Ninth Meeting of the Air Traffic
Management Sub-Group of APANPIRG (ATM/SG/9) held from 01 to 05 November 2021, the first
Meeting of the South Asia, Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia ATM Coordination Group
(SAIOSEACG/1, 28 March to 01 April 2022), the Seventeenth Meeting of the Aeronautical Information
Services (AIS)- Aeronautical Information Management (AIM) Implementation Task Force (AAITF/17,
20 to 24 June 2022), and the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring
Advisory Group (RASMAG/27) held by video teleconference from 22 to 25 August 2022. The meeting
was informed that the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) and Airport Collaborative Decision-
Making (A-CDM) Webinar and Twelfth Meeting of the ATFM Steering Group will be held from 12
to 16 September 2022. Additionally, ATM/SG/10, scheduled to be held from 17 to 21 October 2022,
which will review the outcomes of all abovementioned meetings.

2.9 Several ICAO Activities in the field of Unmanned Aircraft were shared. The meeting
was requested to take advantage of the large volume of guidance on UAS, and participate in the ICAO
Unmanned Aviation 2022 symposia to be held at ICAO Headquarters, Montreal, Canada, from 07 to
09 November 2022. The theme of the symposium is To Certify or Not to Certify.

2.10 The meeting was informed about the Safety Report by the Asia/Pacific RMAs and En-
route Monitoring Agencies (EMA)s and special attention on current Large Height Deviation (LHD) Hot
Spots, the FIRs involved, the year of identification, and status remarks. It was added that CNS SG
should note that although Air Traffic Services (ATS) Inter-facility Data Communication (AIDC) is not
a new technology, it can be a significant mitigation of LHD incidents. However, there appeared to be
cases where alerts to controllers when AIDC messaging had failed may have been either not presented,
not seen, or not responded to. Additionally, At the RASMAG/27 meeting, IFATCA stressed the need
for robust ATC training to ensure compliant use of new technology and application of contingency
procedures when system operation failed.

2.11 The CNS SG Chair suggested the ICAO Secretariat prepares a joint CNS-ATM
working paper to highlight the issue and present it to the fourth meeting of the APAC Automation Task
Force (ATMAS TF/4) ACTION ITEM 26-1.

Review of Regional ATFM Framework and Guidance Material

2.12 The meeting was informed that a major review of the Regional Framework for
Collaborative ATFM will be presented for consideration by the ATFM/SG/12 meeting. CNS SG was
invited to note that the Framework includes information and regional performance expectations relating
to the use of FIXM for the cross-border exchange of ATFM information, and the use of AFTN
messaging where the exchange of information using FIXM is not yet enabled. The meeting was further
invited to note the necessary close collaboration between ATFM/SG, the SWIM TF (APAC FIXM
Extension development) and ACSICG (ATFM information exchange by AFTN).
 4

Agenda Item 3: Aeronautical Fixed Service (AFS)

3.1 Under this agenda, the meeting reviewed meeting reports of a number of contributory
bodies on the AFS matters.

Review the Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Aeronautical Communication

Services Implementation Coordination Group (ACSICG/9) - Sec (WP/05)

3.2 The paper presented the discussions and relevant outcomes of the Ninth Meeting of
the Aeronautical Communication Services Implementation Coordination Group (ACSICG/9) held from
19 to 21 April 2022. ACSICG/9 meeting report, working papers, information papers, and other
resources can be accessed by following link:
https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/Pages/2022-ACSICG9.aspx

3.3 The meeting reviewed various topics discussed in ACSICG/9, updated the
AMHS/ATN implementation status in States, reviewed the outcomes of CRV OG/9 and CRV OG/10
meetings which included discussions on the Upgrade/Downgrade CRV Circuits Subscribed and
Contract Extension requirements, discussed and addressed the implementation issues, reviewed ATN
Table Tree and AMHS/AFTN Communication Chart, further explored Inter-regional AFS connection,
and shared experience on AFS related cybersecurity issues.

Updates on CRV Pioneer State Contribution to the ICAO Managed Service Agreement
(MSA)

3.4 The ICAO Secretariat informed the meeting in CRV OG/2 about the fund balance of
USD 104,596 and proposed a draft of revision of Annex 1b to the MSA, and adopted by APANPIRG/28
as Conclusion APANPIRG/28/19: Amendment of the Management Service Agreement for CRV project
(RAS14801) which remains as one of outstanding Conclusions/Decisions up to APANPIRG/32 held in
December 2021. The paper presented an update on the relevant development of using the balance of the
MSA.

3.5 With the efforts of the ICAO Secretariat, ICAO TCB, CRV OG co-chairs and ACSICG
Chair, the Revised Annex 1 to Management Service Agreement (MSA) was prepared that the fund will
be utilised in the span of 5 years starting from 31 March 2022 to 31 March 2027. The CRV OG/9
meeting requested Member States to provide examples of activities under different categories provided
in scope of supporting CRV Network as described in section 10.5 as an action item of CRV OG/9.

3.6 With aforementioned, the following draft conclusion for the next step for using the rest
of CRV Pioneer State Contribution to the ICAO Managed Service Agreement (MSA) proposed by CRV
OG/9 and ACSICG/9 was endorsed by CNS SG/26 for APANPIRG/33 consideration.

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/01 (ACSICG/09/01 (CRV OG/09/01)):Revised Amendment of the

Management Service Agreement for CRV project (RAS14801)
What: Recognizing that ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau Expected impact:
satisfactorily completed all the defined work items in the initial ☐ Political / Global
Management Service Agreement (MSA) and Project Document of ☐ Inter-regional
RAS14801, that the required payments were settled, and that in end 2016,
☒ Economic
all the requirements of both parties have been fully completed and closed
on record, That, ☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
i) all Pioneer States are encouraged to counter-sign the Revised amended
Pro Document provided in Appendix A to the report;

ii) any Pioneer State not countersigning is entitled to get its share of the
remaining fund balance back. and
 5

iii) a Pioneer State for which a direct CRV connection is not considered
feasible in 2017 by the selected vendor is entitled to get its initial
contribution in full

Why: The initial scope of MSA was completed by

ICAO TCB which allowed for a successful evaluation
process and selection of a best and final offer; a majority of Follow-up: ☒Required from States
Pioneer States is willing to use the rest of their initial
contribution to continue to support CRV implementation.
When: 09-Sep-22 Status: Draft to be adopted by PIRG
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other:

3.7 This draft conclusion will be presented to APANPIRG/33 and may supersede
outstanding Conclusion APANPIRG/28/19: Amendment of the Management Service Agreement for
CRV project (RAS14801).

Proposal to Extend CRV Contract

3.8 As a follow up action of ACTION ITEM 9-4 of CRV OG/9, the ICAO APAC Office
issued a State Letter to request States/Administrations to share the intention to join CRV and its
Tentative Timelines. In response, total 13 (thirteen) Member States shared their intention to join CRV
along with tentative timelines, including 10 (ten) States/Administration intend to join CRV by Q4 2022,
2 (two) States intend to join CRV after Q4 2022, and 1 (one) State has no plan yet.

3.9 To follow up ACTION ITEM 9-5 of CRV OG/9, the first meeting of ICAO CRV
Steering Group created by CRV OG/9 was held on 31 March 2022. The meeting reviewed the responses
received from Member States, discussed the requirement of additional efforts to support pacific Member
States to join CRV, and advised to extend the contract duration for one additional year.

3.10 Based on the proposal of draft conclusion by CRV OG/10, the ACSICG/9 and CNS
SG/26 meeting endorsed the following draft conclusion for the consideration of APANPIRG/33
meeting. If adopted, the ICAO Secretariat will inform Member States about the extension of the current
contract on the same Terms and Conditions.

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/02 (ACSICG/09/02 (CRV OG/10/01)): Extension of CRV

Contract for one year
What: Expected impact:
a) Recognizing that as per current contract, all authorities shall join the CRV ☐ Political / Global
project and sign the relevant Service Contract(s) with PCCWG with the ☐ Inter-regional
billing start date on or before 31 December 2022 to not impose additional
☒ Economic
charges by the service provider and based on the survey responses of 2022,
many Member States are in process to join CRV which may not be ☐ Environmental
completed by December 2022, it is recommended to extend current CRV ☒ Ops/Technical
contract for one year.

b) If agreed to extend, as per amended CRV contract, all authorities shall

join the CRV program and sign the relevant Service Contract(s) with
PCCWG with the billing start date on or before 31 December 2023 to not
impose additional charges by the service provider.

c) After the extension, the CRV contract expiry date will be 31 December
2028.
 6

Why: Several ICAO Member States have requested

to extend CRV contract due to COVID-19 pandemic in
CRV Implementation webinar held in 2021 and based on
Follow-up: ☒Required from States
the response of the survey done in 2022, many Member
States are in process to join CRV which may not be
completed by December 2022.
When: 09-Sep-22 Status: Draft to be adopted by PIRG
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other:

3.11 Singapore queried for the rate for additional one year term after CRV contract
extension. The meeting was informed that the current contract extension will be based on same terms
and conditions and rates. After initial five years term, States may renew the CRV contract on yearly
basis till expiry of the contract. However, States and PCCWG may negotiate bilaterally for better rate
to renew the contract for more than one year. Nevertheless, the last date of contract cannot exceed CRV
contract expiry date.

Upgrade/Downgrade/Addition of New Services or Sites in CRV Contract

3.12 In the first meeting of ICAO CRV Steering Group held on 31 March 2022, PCCWG
shared the revised proposal for upgrade/downgrade/addition of new sites and services with reasonable
pre-estimate of the anticipated losses suffered by PCCWG.

3.13 The revised proposal withdraw cancellation charges and mandate of five years
term for each upgrade case and addition of new sites/services. Therefore, Member States may
upgrade or add new sites or services in their contract without any additional charges or additional terms
on the same rate. The revised proposal recommended to calculate pre-estimate of the anticipated
losses suffered by PCCWG by a proposed formula in case of downgrade and proposed to share the
anticipated losses between PCCWG and States equally. Additionally, the mandate of five years terms
for downgrade cases was withdrawn. Therefore, Member States may downgrade the current package in
their contract with additional charges of 50% of the anticipated losses but without additional terms on
the same rate.

3.14 The proposal was accepted by all members of CRV Steering group for submission to
CRV OG/10 deliberation and agreement. The CRV OG/10 meeting held on 18 April 2022 deliberated
and reviewed the proposal submitted by PCCWG for upgrade/downgrade/addition of new services or
site into current CRV Contract, and endorsed the proposal to work further for revision of relevant
documentation of CRV common package.

3.15 To respond to an enquiry, PCCWG informed that the formalization of the proposal
would be ready tentatively by May 2022. The ICAO Secretariat added that next ICAO CRV Steering
group will review and discuss the phrasings of revised terms and conditions prepared by PCCWG in
July 2022 which was postponed to be discussed on 15 September 2022. The revised common package
would be presented to CRV OG/11 for endorsement and approval. However, the presented proposal is
applicable immediately after the endorsement by CRV OG/10.

3.16 New Zealand informed that the current DRAFT version of the Operations Manual is
ready for publication as version 1.1. The updates in different sections were explained in detail in this
paper. It was added that Member States can request access to the manual be requesting access to the
portal by following the steps mentioned on CRV Landing Page: http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/Join-
CRV.aspx

3.17 Based on the proposal by CRV OG/10, the ACSICG/9 meeting adopted the Decision
ACSICG/09/03 - Publication of the ICAO APAC CRV OG Operations Manual v1.1.
 7

3.18 The State Letter Ref: T 8/9.1 – AP077/22 (CNS) with Subject of Publication of CRV
OG Operations Manual v1.1 has been issued on 24th May 2022 to urge States/Administrations to
reference this manual for implementation of the CRV.

APAC AMHS Implementation Status from AMC

3.19 Thailand presented the AMHS implementation status information in Asia/Pacific

Region updated in ATS Messaging Management Centre (AMC) in Attachment A of the paper through
WP/05. AMC was implemented by EUROCONTROL to provide off-line network management services
in support of the ground ATS Messaging network of Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). The
meeting was invited to review and update information to AMC via AEROTHAI if necessary, including
points of contact in record.

AFTN/ATSMHS Routing Directory and the Communication Chart

3.20 The Secretariat presented the current status of the AFTN/ATSMHS routing directory
and the latest Communication Chart for Asia and Pacific Regions in WP/12. The ACSICG/9 meeting
was informed that the CNS SG/23 meeting agreed to fully follow the AFTN/ATSMHS routing directory
during the transition period by end of 2020.

3.21 The meeting highlighted the any to any connectivity for IP network, as well as the
reality that not all APAC States have joined CRV, while automation systems still heavily depend on the
character-based message exchanging applications, this hybrid environment might keep on existing and
there was not yet a clear timeframe for a full transition to CRV. As such, the ACSICG/9 meeting agreed
to fully follow the AFTN/ATSMHS routing directory for present time in APAC region. For inter-
regional traffic, it is required to follow the existing entry/exit points and procedure.

3.22 The meeting was informed that the updates would be published as 29th edition of
AFTN/ATSMHS Routing Directory after adoption. Subsequently ACSICG/9 endorsed the Draft
Conclusion for consideration by CNS SG/26, which was adopted by CNS SG/26. The adopted
AFTN/ATSMHS Routing Directory is provided in Appendix B to the report.

Conclusion CNS SG/26/03 (ACSICG/09/04) - Revised AFTN/ATSMHS Routing Directory

What: That, the AFTN/ATSMHS Routing Directory for the Expected impact:
APAC Region provided in Appendix B to the report be further ☐ Political / Global
updated and distributed to States/Administrations as 29th ☐ Inter-regional
Edition. ☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: A number of new ATSMHS connections
have been established and became operational.
Consequential amendments to the Follow-up: ☐Required from States
AFTN/ATSMHS Routing Directory are required.

When: 9-Sep-22 Status: Adopted by Subgroup

Who: ☒ CNS SG ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other:

MPLS/IP Based Inter-Regional Connection

3.23 The Secretariat provided current status of discussion being done for potential
interconnection of CRV and REDDIG II and CRV and New PENS, including the final technical
proposal for interconnection of CRV and REDDIG II and business models to way forward. It also
requested APAC Member States to record their interest, willingness, or need for interconnection of the
CRV with other regional networks such as REDDIG II / New PENS with the ICAO Secretariat.
 8

3.24 As the technical proposal for interconnection of CRV and REDDIG II is ready, the two
potential business solutions for the proposed interconnection were proposed by the ICAO Secretariat
for meeting consideration regarding approximately infrastructure cost and revised recurring charges.
The ICAO Secretariat also informed that the ICAO APAC Office and ICAO EUR/NAT Office
coordinated internally as well as with the service providers of regional network in respective regions.
The outcomes of the discussions between PCCWG, the CRV service provider, and British Telecom, the
New PENS service provider, and the internal meeting of British Telecom, EUROCONTROL and
ANSPs were shared.

3.25 The ACSICG/9 meeting agreed to form an Ad-Hoc group comprised of APAC Member
States having interregional connections, CRV OG Chairs, CRV and REDDIG II service providers,
interested Member States of SAM region, and the ICAO Secretariat under CRV OG. The ICAO
Secretariat will coordinate with relevant APAC Member States to nominate focal points for Ad-Hoc
group. The ICAO Secretariat will coordinate with ICAO SAM Office to get nomination from interested
SAM Member States for this task.

Aeronautical Fixed Service (AFS) Cybersecurity Considerations for Information over

CRV

3.26 Some interim security considerations for CRV were presented, including Digital
Identity and Network Information Security, prior to International Aviation Trust Framework (IATF) to
be implemented in future. It further introduced the requirements for IATF Digital Identity concept uses
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Digital Certificates, Network Information Security which includes the
use of IPv6, Domain Name System (DNS), information security, network management and network
contingencies, and SWIM interchanges with external entities.

3.27 The ICAO Secretariat shared that the interim measures proposed in the paper is more
tangible and implementable comparing high level concepts, which can be considered as a useful
reference for the CRV OG Operations Manual. While CRV OG and SWIM TF have their corresponding
action items, the Co-Chairs noticed that the XML-based messages may compromise automation
systems and it would be necessary to formulate managing plans to address the possible threat in
cybersecurity. The ICAO Secretariat suggested to add a regular Agenda Item for ACSICG meetings
and invite States and Organizations concerned to continue the discussion on improving in the
cybersecurity ideas presented in this paper. With CANSO and IATA expressed their interest to
contribute to this Agenda Item, the Secretariat will coordinate with interested parties to discuss various
tasks under this Agenda Item.

CRV Post Implementation Issues in Bhutan

3.28 The ACSICG/9 meeting was informed about the issues faced by Bhutan related to CRV
post implementation due to the non-readiness of peer States and the action taken by CRV OG and
ACSICG including the two ad-hoc meetings for its resolution by WP/09. Bhutan and New Zealand
further updated that due to some technical setup issues, Bhutan revised the SEP (System Engineering
Plan) document, and the managed router service revision has been completed on 25th February, 2022.
Bhutan now awaits for the technical setup from New Zealand. The acceptance and bidirectional test
will be performed between the two countries after the completion of technical setup from New Zealand.

3.29 The ACSICG/9 meeting noted that Thailand has already implemented CRV and
planned to test CRV circuits with Bhutan in June 2022. It was agreed that Bhutan and New Zealand
would continue to work on above mentioned on-going proposal. The Ad-Hoc group will meet in last
week of June 2022 to note the status of testing of CRV circuits between Bhutan and Thailand and
progress on implementation of the temporary routing through New Zealand. Based on the status, the
Ad-Hoc group will decide to continue the task to implement GRE tunnel between Bhutan and New
Zealand or to close the action item.
 9

3.30 Bhutan further informed the ICAO Office through email on 6th July 2022 that
considering the connectivity between Bhutan and Thailand is currently under inspection process for
reliability/stability test and after consensus with New Zealand, Bhutan has decided to discontinue the
temporary CRV connectivity with New Zealand.

AMHS readiness status for supporting IWXXM Traffic of the

States/Administrations - Sec (WP/06)

3.31 The ICAO Secretariat supplemented information for AMHS readiness status for
supporting IWXXM Traffic. As part of Beijing Declaration on “commit to implementation by 2022:
Common ground/ground telecommunication infrastructure to support ANS applications” with reporting
indicators including the status of AMHS with File Transfer Body Parts (FTBP) function for IWXXM
data, the ICAO APAC Region has been promoting the implementation of AMHS as a proper
infrastructure identified for the Region to facilitate the exchange of IWXXM under Conclusion
APANPIRG/28/16 - Upgrade AMHS to support IWXXM traffic and Conclusion CNS SG/22/4 (CRV
OG/4/2) - ATN/BBIS States/Administration Use CRV for AFTN/AMHS Traffic.

3.32 The meeting noted that 13 States/Administrations provided their status on AMHS
readiness for supporting IWXXM Traffic as in Appendix C to the Report, out of the 23
States/Administrations in the APAC Region which put their AMHS into operations per the AMHS
Routing Directory Tables from the ATS Messaging Management Centre (AMC). Although there has
been a significant increase in the AMHS readiness for supporting IWXXM Traffic, the reporting gap
as well as the slow progress on the reporting were still identified, States/Administrations were urged to
inform ICAO APAC Regional Office on their readiness and implementation progress/plan of AMHS
with FTBP as soon as possible.

ATS Messaging Management Centre (AMC) Updating- Sec (WP/23)

3.33 This paper presented the State Letter Ref.: EUR/NAT 22-0239.TEC (NIA/SAN) dated
29 June 2022 regarding the Management and update of Air Traffic Services (ATS) Message Handling
System (AMHS) address and routing information.

3.34 Since the introduction of global routing in AMC, there had been good participation
from External COM Centres (i.e. States outside the ICAO EUR Region), and the AMC encouraged
external COM Centres to continue to participate in the AMC operation. With the introduction of
IWXXM, FTBP capabilities are of greater importance to the AFS. In this regard, all COM Centres were
invited to update their FTBP capabilities information under the AMC Network Inventory section.

3.35 It was noted that some COM centres outside of the EUR Region have not uploaded the
correct addressing tables in accordance with the AMC cycle. In this regard, it was recalled that the
ICAO State Letter Ref.: AN 7/49.1-09/34 dated 14 April 2009 Management and update of air traffic
services (ATS) message handling system (AMHS) address information should be re-iterated. As such,
this paper reminded the action required regarding the Management and update of Air Traffic Services
(ATS) Message Handling System (AMHS) address and routing information, including ensuring the
international COM Centres in States are registered via https://www.eurocontrol.int/tool/air-traffic-
services-messaging-management-centre as AMC users, and participate regularly in the AMC
procedures for AMHS Address and Routing Management as outlined in the EUR ATS Messaging
Management Manual (EUR Doc 021).

Outcomes of Webinar on CRV Implementation- Sec (IP/02)

3.36 The meeting reviewed the outcomes of the ICAO APAC Webinar on Implementation
of CRV in APAC region, which was successfully conducted on 29th June 2022. The Webinar was
attended by 61 participants from 15 States/Administrations, and 1 telecommunication provider. Total
Five (5) presentations were delivered by CRV experts from Fiji, Hong Kong China, New Zealand,
Singapore, and the USA. During the Webinar, Questions and Answers (Q & A) sessions were held at
end of each presentation through the Pigeonhole tool. Throughout the Webinar, a total of 47 questions
 10

were asked and more than 15 feedbacks for the Webinar were provided by Participants with 100%
positive responses. The webinar report, presentations, and other resources can be accessed by following
link: https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/Pages/2022-CRV-Webinar.aspx

Challenges Faced in Joining CRV– Sri Lanka (IP/19)

3.37 Sri Lanka presented challenges that AASL/Sri Lanka is facing in joining CRV. Sri
Lanka informed that it planned CRV migration in a phased manner first with AMHS Singapore and the
tests to be started tentatively in Nov 2022. Additionally, India is also migrating CRV very soon and
AMHS Mumbai connection is planned to be replaced with CRV. AASL/Sri Lanka sought possible
options on CRV migration with both AMHS Singapore and Mumbai, which are
Option 1:- Package D with 128kbps BW 64k for Singapore and 64k for Mumbai; and
Option 2:- Package D+ with 128kbps BW 64k for Singapore and 64k for Mumbai.

3.38 The meeting was informed that Option 1 is economically feasible. However, a single
point of failure will result in total disconnection of AMHS/AFTN to both Sri Lanka and Maldives.
Nonetheless, Option 2 will eliminate single point of failure, however the additional cost required to
implement Package D+ is 8 times higher than the existing circuit cost of AMHS connection between
Sri Lanka and Mumbai. This is with the present economic crisis in Sri Lanka where Sri Lanka Rupee
has been depreciated against USD.

3.39 Sri Lanka shared that until such time the economy in Sri Lanka will be converged
towards a positive growth rate, most probably until Dec 2023, AASL/Sri Lanka has a challenge to go
for Option 2. It added that until such time, necessary negotiations are proposed to begin with India on
following options.

Option A :- To retain with existing AMHS Mumbai/Colombo IPLC circuit

Option B :- To migrate CRV with AMHS Mumbai/Colombo under Package D at Sri

Lanka end and keep the existing AMHS Mumbai/Colombo IPLC circuit as a
contingency for CRV. In this case even in a CRV single point failure, both
AMHS/AFTN communication between Mumbai and Singapore towards Sri Lanka and
Male will be passed through the existing IPLC circuit.

Option C :- To migrate CRV with AMHS Mumbai/Colombo under Package D at Sri

Lanka end and procure a low cost VPN connection between Mumbai and Sri Lanka as
a contingency for CRV.

3.40 India shared its support to Sri Lanka and suggested Option C as the best option to
implement.

3.41 The ICAO Secretariat informed the meeting that Package D+ is not a formal package
approved in the current CRV common package and shared two definitions of Package D+ assumed by
various States in the past few years. It was added that CRV OG Expert Ad-hoc group is working to
formalize the Package D+ based on the definitions assumed by various States.

3.42 Sri Lanka informed that the Package D+ mentioned in the paper is actually two
independent Package D. Therefore, the cost of Package D+ is two times of Package D. The ICAO
Secretariat informed that based on Package D+ proposals shared by various Member States, two
independent Package D have not considered as Package D+. The ICAO Secretariat will follow-up on
this matter with PCCWG and Sri Lanka offline and provide all possible technical support to Sri Lanka
for CRV Implementation. ACTION ITEM 26-2

Current Status of CRV Implementation in India (IP/22)

3.43 India shared the information on the latest progress of CRV implementation. The
meeting noted that the Purchase Order for CRV implementation in India was awarded to M/s PCCWG
 11

on 15th March, 2022. As per information received from M/s PCCWG the implementation of CRV
network is getting delayed due to shortage of Semiconductor Chipsets required for Cisco Router. The
latest delivery date given by M/s PCCWG is Dec, 2022 for CRV Implementation in India. India added
that it has approached adjacent BBIS & BIS States to confirm their readiness for CRV connectivity with
India, to avoid further delay in implementation. Consent from Thailand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Bhutan,
China & Nepal has already been received in this regard. Subsequently, LOA (Letter of Agreement)
shall be signed with adjacent BBIS & BIS States for establishment of connectivity on CRV. India urged
M/s PCCWG for meeting the timelines for establishing the CRV node at Mumbai, India and urged
BBIS/BIS States having connectivity with India to keep themselves in readiness to avoid any further
delay in establishing the connectivity.

Agenda Item 4: Information Management (IM)

Review Report of SWIM TF/6 - Sec (WP/07)

4.1 Dr. Amornrat Jirattigalachote, Strategic Planning Manager (Engineering), Policy and
Strategy Management Bureau of AEROTHAI, Co-Chair of SWIM TF presented the report of the Sixth
Meeting of the APAC SWIM Task Force (SWIM TF/6) held from 17 – 20 May 2022 via Video Tele-
Conferencing (VTC). The meeting was attended by 213 participants from 18 States/Administrations, 5
International Organizations and 1 service provider. The papers and report of SWIM TF/6 meeting are
available at: https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/Pages/2022-SWIM-TF6.aspx

4.2 In the SWIM TF/6 meeting, MET Experts from Australia shared the concern of
mentioning MET service providers as a non-aviation service providers or aviation support service
providers. The SWIM TF/6 meeting requested CRV OG to deliberate the concern and finalize
appropriate name for CRV users/subscribers other than ANSP.

Implications of the Revised Terms of Reference as a result of the CNS SG/25 Decision

4.3 The meeting noted the impact and implications of the change in the Terms of Reference
(ToR) of the SWIM Task Force as a result of the decision by the CNS SG/25 meeting. The paper
summarized the revisions on the SWIM Task Force ToR agreed by CNS SG/25, and explained the
reasons and impacts for these changes in detail. The SWIM TF/6 meeting was informed that with
revised ToR, the work of the APAC SWIM Task Force has been increased significantly. The SWIM
TF will need to deliberate the impact of these changes on ongoing work. The SWIM TF/6 meeting was
invited to review the current deliverables, how to deliver on the items stated in the new ToR, and
consider how the task groups should be structured to produce the required deliverables.

Aviation Support Service Providers Joining CRV

4.4 PCCW introduced PCCWG Console Connect Aviation Platform for non-ANSP users
to exchange SWIM data with CRV members. PCCWG informed that in order to provide an easy,
managed, flexible and scalable mechanism for non-ANSP users to exchange SWIM data with CRV
users, PCCW Global planned to extend its EMS node with its own developed software defined
interconnection platform - Console Connect for Aviation and purposed built SWIM as Service Platform.
Comparison among CRV, Console Connect Platform for Aviation, and Internet on Network Options,
Information Security, Daily Support, and etc. were explained in the paper and it was added that Console
Connect Platform provides web base user interface for SWIM application. Lastly, PCCWG informed
that the SWIM services from ANSPs on CRV can be listed on PCCW SWIM Registry, where users can
select, subscribe, and concluded that the Console Connect Platform provides an alternative path for non-
ANSP users to exchange SWIM data with ANSPs who are on the CRV Network.

4.5 The SWIM TF/6 meeting discussed the certification standard and ability to support
MET data of the PCCW Console Connect Aviation Platform, and was informed that the platform is in
concept stage. The SWIM TF/6 meeting agreed that there is the need to deliberate in CRV OG the
security impact of mixed operational environment, i.e. connecting more SWIM technical infrastructure
service providers and users using internet/other network based services with CRV through a gateway.
 12

Consideration of SWIM Architecture for Efficient Provision of MET Information

Services - MET SG nominated experts

4.6 In 2021, the MET SG shared the concerns with regard to SWIM architecture for
efficient and cost-effective provision of MET information services. Members of the MET community
also raised concern on the accessibility of Meteorological Service Providers and airlines to CRV, SWIM
services for less-sensitive MET data be accommodated in APAC SWIM technical infrastructure, and
the cost implication of highly data intensive. It also discussed the needs of efficient MET information
service provision to be supported by SWIM architecture.

4.7 Considering the operational needs of efficient MET information service provision
mentioned above, a draft Conclusion titled Activities to explore the use of the Internet for MET
information services in Regional SWIM architecture was proposed for SWIM TF/6 consideration. The
SWIM TF/6 meeting noted that the MET information services have already been considered as a part
of SWIM TF's work and regional SWIM architecture since its establishments and a specialised group
has been created by CRV OG/9 that is devising terms and conditions along with standard operating
procedures to join the CRV by other service providers than ANSPs such as MET and airlines.

4.8 According to the outcomes of discussions during SWIM TF/6 and APANPIRG
procedural handbook dated 1 June 2020, the draft decision was endorsed by the meeting for CNS
SG/26’s adoption, which was adopted by CNS SG/26.

Decision CNS SG/26/04 (SWIM TF/06/01) - The Use of the Internet for MET Information Services
in Regional SWIM architecture
What: That, the use of Internet for meteorological Expected impact:
information services will be considered in designing the ☐ Political / Global
regional SWIM architecture. ☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: To support cost-effective and
efficient meteorological information services
for exchange of less-sensitive meteorological Follow-up: ☐Required from States
information in SWIM.
When: 9-Sep-22 Status: Adopted by Subgroup
Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☐ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☒Other: SWIM TF

4.9 The CNS SG Chair commended the SWIM TF in timely managing the concerns from
the MET SG and some APAC members.

4.10 The SWIM TF/6 meeting agreed that Task 2 group will include the use of Internet for
meteorological information services in designing the regional SWIM architecture. The SWIM TF/6
meeting also discussed the need of participation of MET experts in SWIM TF and requested Member
States to nominate MET experts to contribute and participate in various tasks of SWIM TF.

The Asia-Pacific SWIM Implementation Timeline - China, Japan, Singapore, and

Thailand

4.11 The paper presented a proposal for a target timeframe for SWIM implementation in the
Asia-Pacific Region. Considering a significant amount of work produced by SWIM TF so far, the
meeting was suggested to consolidate all these works, experiences, and lessons learnt and to form an
actionable implementation plan with a target timeframe for operational SWIM implementation in the
Asia-Pacific region. Referencing to the timeframes of related events and publications, including the
 13

publication of the ICAO PANS-Information Management (PANS-IM), which is expected to be

published in 2024, and the sunset date of the current flight plan format (FPL2012) in 2032 being
considered by ICAO ATMRPP, the paper proposed that the timeframe for SWIM implementation in
the Asia-Pacific region to be set at between 2024 and 2030 with a buffer of 2 years before 2032 to
conduct FF-ICE related operational trials prior to the planned sunset date for the FPL2012.

4.12 With aforementioned, the Draft Conclusion SWIM TF/06/02: The Asia-Pacific SWIM
Implementation Timeframe was adopted by SWIM TF/6 for CNS SG/26 and APANPIRG/33
consideration, which was adopted by CNS SG/26.

4.13 The SWIM TF/6 meeting agreed that the scope of SWIM implementation depends on
each State’s strategies and the set of common information services, which States shall consider
providing, needs to be agreed on by SWIM TF. The SWIM TF/6 meeting proposed that States may
consider implementing SWIM technical infrastructure and participating in regional SWIM by
developing their own or acquiring services provided by SWIM service provider. Moreover, States may
consider implementing information service provision, information service consumption, or both, or
subscribing to SWIM service provider to enable their information provision and/or consumption.

4.14 The other matter that may impact the SWIM implementation timeframe was the
different schedules set out by the different ICAO Air Navigation Commission Technical Panels which
were not aligned with each other was also discussed, including IWXXM dissemination date, the starting
date of FF-ICE/R1 implementation, and publication date of the PANS-IM.

4.15 Considering to align all the timelines which will definitely assist States in planning
their investment and transition, the meeting adopted the following Draft Decision for CNS SG/26 and
APANPIRG/33 consideration, which was adopted by CNS SG/26.

Draft Decision CNS SG/26/05 (SWIM TF/06/03) - Harmonization of Timelines for SWIM-related
Initiatives
What: To feedback to the ICAO Air Expected impact:
Navigation Commission Technical Panels for a need to harmonize ☒ Political / Global
the implementation timelines of SWIM-related initiatives. ☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: There exists
different timelines for the implementation of
SWIM-related initiatives identified by various
ICAO ANC Technical Panels. This creates Follow-up: ☐Required from States
confusion within States on their corresponding
implementation sequences and as to how these
different timelines are to be met.
Status: Draft to be
When: 9-Sep-22
adopted by PIRG
Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☒ICAO HQ ☒Other: SWIM
TF

SWIM Implementation and the Asia-Pacific Seamless ANS Plan - China, Japan,
Singapore, and Thailand

4.16 The paper examined the relationship between SWIM implementation in Asia/Pacific
and the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan. In the current edition of the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan,
version 3.0, published in November 2019, SWIM is only mentioned once in Appendix C Seamless ANS
 14

Principles under the Technology and Information section, Aeronautical Data sub-section stating about
the cooperative development of SWIM to support interoperable operations. As SWIM is a key piece of
infrastructure required to support other initiatives currently included in the Plan and the future
operational concept, it was proposed that CNS SG and SWIM TF consider including SWIM
implementation as part of Performance Improvement Plan in the next edition the Asia/Pacific Seamless
ANS Plan aligned with SWIM implementation timeframe.

4.17 With aforementioned, the Draft Conclusion SWIM TF/06/04: Inclusion of the
Asia/Pacific SWIM Implementation in the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan was adopted by SWIM TF/6
for CNS SG/26 and APANPIRG/33 consideration, which was adopted by CNS SG/26.

4.18 The two proposed Draft Conclusions SWIM TF/06/02: The Asia-Pacific SWIM
Implementation Timeframe and Draft Conclusion SWIM TF/06/04: Inclusion of the Asia/Pacific
SWIM Implementation in the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan, adopted by CNS SG/26 was merged as
the following one draft conclusion based on the recommendations of CNS SG Chair for APANPIRG/33
consideration.

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/06 (SWIM TF/06/02, SWIM TF/06/04) - The Asia-Pacific SWIM
Implementation Timeframe and inclusion of the Asia/Pacific SWIM Implementation in the
Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan
What: To set the timeframe for the Expected impact:
implementation of SWIM in the Asia-Pacific region to be ☐ Political / Global
between 2024 and 2030, with 2030 being the target timeline ☐ Inter-regional
for implementation completion. ☒ Economic
CNS SG and SWIM TF to consider including SWIM ☐ Environmental
implementation in the next edition of the Asia/Pacific ☒ Ops/Technical
Seamless ANS Plan.
Why: This is to set the concrete
target implementation of the Asia-Pacific regional SWIM
to assist States in harmonizing their implementation plans
in order to achieve the seamless information exchange
across the region in time for future operations, e.g. FF-ICE.
Additionally, to ensure that SWIM, a key building block to Follow-up: ☒ Required from
achieve the vision outlined in ICAO Doc 9854 Global ATM States
Operational Concept (GATMOC), is captured in the
Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan, providing an overall
framework for Asia/Pacific States to plan their
implementations to meet the future performance
requirements.
Status: Draft to be adopted by
When: 9-Sep-22
PIRG
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☒Other: SWIM
TF

4.19 Considering that APAC SWIM Timeline is proposed to be started from 2024 and to
incorporate into the Seamless ANS Plan v5.0, which will be published in 2025, the SWIM TF/6 meeting
agreed to add SWIM-B2/1- Information Service Provision and SWIM-B2/2- Information Service
Consumption under Priority Two in the Seamless ANS Plan v4.0 to be published in 2022. The content
to be added in the plan was discussed, prepared, and finalized, which is provided in Appendix D to this
report.

Result of Asia/Pacific SWIM Implementation Plan and Status Survey- Task 1 Leads
 15

4.20 The paper presented the results of the ICAO Asia/Pacific SWIM Implementation Plan
and Status survey conducted between March and April 2022. Based on the survey results obtained,
recommendations are provided for the consideration of SWIM TF/6.

4.21 Following the Conclusion CNS SG/25/03, the ICAO Asia/Pacific SWIM
Implementation Plan and Status Survey was prepared by China, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand in
consultation with Task leads under SWIM TF, and later disseminated to all Asia/Pacific
States/Administrations by State Letter on 1 March 2022. Throughout March and April 2022, 49
responses in total were received from 26 States/Administrations, including Australia, Bhutan,
Cambodia, China, Fiji, France, Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Macau China,
Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea,
Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Thailand, USA, and Vietnam. The majority of the responses
was from civil aviation regulators, AIS/AIM providers, ANSPs or ATM service providers, and MET
service providers. Only one response was from airport operator, while none was obtained from airspace
user.

4.22 The paper elaborated on the survey results received from States and based on the survey
results obtained, the paper also provided some recommendations, which included

1) Timeframe for completion date/expected completion date of the three SWIM key
components, which was identified to be between 2022 and 2030, can be in lined with
the proposal stated in SWIM TF/6 WP/07.

2) With the list of common SWIM information services and SWIM-enabled applications
indicated in the majority of the responses, it is suggested to adopt a phased approach in
the Asia/Pacific SWIM implementation roadmap to be further devised, to ensure the
harmonized implementation of this common list among stakeholders, in turn leading to
the region-wide operational benefits.

3) Based on the feedback received and considering a significant amount of work done by
SWIM TF so far, SWIM TF is recommended to consider consolidating (i) the
Asia/Pacific SWIM Concept of Operations and (ii) the Asia/Pacific regional SWIM
Implementation Guidance documents to assist States/Administration/Organizations in
their SWIM planning and implementation. Moreover, in the case where the inclusion
of SWIM in the new version of the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan, as proposed in
SWIM TF/6 WP/08, is adopted by APANPIRG, these two documents can then be used
as supplements to the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan in the future.

4.23 The SWIM TF/6 meeting noted that Recommendation-1 was already agreed by the
Draft Decision SWIM TF/06/03 of WP/07. Recommendation-2 can be added in the Task 1 once
detailed SWIM Roadmap is prepared. Recommendation-3 was discussed in WP/21 of SWIM TF/6.
Task 1 will consider phased approach and a common set of SWIM information services while
developing APAC SWIM Implementation Roadmap.

Proposal to establish a Joint Work Group between the ATM SG and CNS SG to Create
the FF-ICE Implementation Strategy

4.24 Task 9 leads reviewed the report of the Second Meeting of the Information
Management Panel (IMP/2) held virtually from September 27 to October 1, 2021, and the status of the
Air Traffic Management Requirements and Performance Panel (ATMRPP), which is developing
SARPs and Guidance Materials to implement FF-ICE operations under the SWIM environment. The
meeting was informed that the IMP/2 reviewed the latest draft Procedures for Air Navigation Services
–Information Management (PANS-IM) and accepted all the modifications. Furthermore, the
applicability of the proposed information security framework, maintenance of the information security
provisions, and the mandatory use of specific IPv6 addresses (aviation block) and domain names were
also discussed in the IMP/2 meeting. The meeting also reviewed the latest version of SWIM Manual
 16

Volume Ⅱ – Implementation Guidance, and the first edition of the Guidance Material - Manual on
SWIM Implementation has been ready for publication. The IMP/2 meeting reviewed the ATM
Information Reference Model (AIRM), endorsed the release of the AIRM v1.0.0, and supported the
AIRM work/release plan.

4.25 Additionally, the meeting was informed that ATMRPP has completed most of the work
on FF-ICE/R1 focusing on pre-departure phase Trajectory Negotiation with ATMRPP/4, and the focus
has shifted to post-departure phase, FF-ICE Release 2 (FF-ICE/R2) and noted that plans to draft the
provisions on FF-ICE/R2 by 2028 are being considered in the ATMRPP.

4.26 Considering the FF-ICE implementation is not something that can be completed by the
SWIM TF alone and collaboration with other groups such as ATM and CNS is important, the SWIM
TF/6 meeting formulated and adopted the Draft Decision SWIM TF/06/05- Establish a Joint Work
Group between the ATM SG and CNS SG to Create the FF-ICE Implementation Strategy for CNS
SG/26 and APANPIRG consideration.

4.27 The meeting deliberated at length the rationale and appropriate timing on the proposal
of establishing a joint working group. The CNS SG Chair expressed his appreciation to the initiatives
taken by the SWIM TF and shared his views, after consulting the views from the ATM SG Chair, that
we should be prudent and with very strong justifications in establishing new contributory bodies under
the APANPIRG. It is important for the meeting to consider how best we could make use of the existing
contributory bodies. There has been established scheme in formation of new contributory bodies which
the Sub-groups have followed over the years to handle prioritized ASBU modules. However, the
meeting was also informed that the implementation of FF-ICE by its nature requires a strong and close
coordination and cooperation between operational and technical experts where there may not be any
single existing contributory body owning such a multi-disciplinary specialists to tackle the issue.

4.28 The meeting was informed that the Third Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Air Traffic
Management Automation System Task Force (ATMAS TF/3) held from 7 – 10 June 2022 had proposed
to set up a half-day seminar to discuss the topics of interest identified by most Member States, including
FF-ICE, SWIM, system interoperability, etc. In this regard, the ATMAS TF may organise the seminar
on FF-ICE in the APAC region in 2023. The meeting was also reminded that the FF-ICE presentation
and small demonstration were conducted during the ICAO APAC SWIM Workshop held from 6-7 July
2021. However, considering the existing different levels of understanding on FF-ICE among the APAC
States/Administrations, the meeting suggested that the said seminar could be a starting point and
relevant outcomes/recommendations may further be considered to bring the matter forward.
Additionally, the meeting considered that it might be pre-mature to decide the said proposal and that a
dedicated TF/WG may be considered in the future when such need has been fully deliberated by all
relevant stakeholders during the seminar to be held by the ATMAS TF. The meeting requested the
ICAO Secretariat to ensure that SWIM TF and ACSICG experts are involved in the FF-ICE
workshop/webinar/seminar to be held by ATMAS TF. ACTION ITEM 26-3

4.29 The SWIM TF/6 meeting noted that similar activity of formation of a joint group is
being carried out by the Inter-Panel task force consisting of ATMRPP, IMP, and CP members to ensure
the consistency among ICAO provisions related to FF-ICE.

Review of SWIM TF ToR and SWIM TF Work Plan

4.30 The SWIM TF/5 meeting revised the ToR of SWIM TF considering the progress made
since the establishment of SWIM TF, the update of ICAO global and regional air navigation plans, and
the revised task groups adopted at SWIM TF/4, and endorsed Draft Decision SWIM TF/05/02- Revised
SWIM TF ToR for adoption by CNS SG/25, which was further adopted by CNS SG/25 by Decision
CNS SG/25/04.

4.31 The CNS SG/25 recapped the concern shared by Australia for SWIM TF ToR and
reminded the SWIM TF to consider other IP-based network technologies in their forthcoming review
on ToR. The CNS SG also advised the SWIM TF to consider other modifications proposed by APAC
 17

member(s) in their task-lead meetings in 2021 and SWIM TF/6 could present revised ToR to the CNS
SG/26. The meeting suggested and Australia had agreed to nominate SWIM experts to participate in
SWIM task leads and task force meetings.

4.32 APANPIRG/32 adopted the Decision APANPIRG/32/12: Meteorological expert

contribution to SWIM/TF based on Draft Decision MET SG/25-08.The ICAO Secretariat shared the
State Letter Ref.: T 4/3.2.9 - AP070/22 (MET) dated 9 May 2022 on subject: Decision
APANPIRG/32/12: Meteorological expert contribution to SWIM/TF to encourage MET representatives
of Member States to participate in the SWIM TF.

4.33 As an established effective practice in progressing various tasks of the SWIM TF,
online Task Leads (TLs) coordination meetings have been organized from time to time between Task
Force meetings. The latest TLs coordination meeting (video teleconference) was held on 01 September
2022. Based on the detailed deliberations, the SWIM TF ToR has been modified. Considering the
progress made since the SWIM TF/5 to deliberate the concerns raised in CNS SG/25 and MET SG/25,
SWIM TF's Terms of Reference (ToR) amended in SWIM TF Task Leads meetings was presented to
the meeting for further review. The meeting reviewed and updated the draft ToR and endorsed following
draft decision for CNS SG/26 adoption, which was adopted by CNS SG/26.

Decision CNS SG/26/07 (SWIM TF/06/05) – Revised SWIM TF Terms of Reference

What: That, the revised SWIM TF Terms of Reference (ToR) as Expected impact:
shown in Appendix E be adopted. ☐ Political / Global
☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: To align with the progress made since the
SWIM TF/5 and outcomes of Action item 25-1 Follow-up: ☐Required from States
from CNS SG/25.
Status: Adopted by
When: 09 September 2022
Subgroup
Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☐ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ
☒Other: SWIM TF

4.34 To ensure that the objectives set in the ToR can be achieved, the Statement of Work
(SOW) of each Tasks was already updated in SWIM TF/5 meeting. The SOW will be reviewed in
further Task Leads Meeting to be in consistent with revised SWIM TF ToR. The SWIM TF/6 meeting
also reviewed and updated the SWIM TF Work Plan.

Review Outcomes from MET SG/26- Sec (WP/34)

4.35 The paper presented outcomes from MET SG/26 relevant to the CNS SG, including
discussion on SWIM architecture support for MET information, MET experts’ contribution and
participation in the SWIM TF, and CNS-related documenting of MET service providers as “non-
aviation” service providers. The paper invited the Meeting to adopt the proposals by the SWIM TF and
MET SG, which support the cost-effective and efficient exchange of MET information in SWIM.

4.36 The Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Meteorology Sub-group (MET SG/26), held online
from 1 to 5 August 2022, reviewed the progress of the MET SG’s work plan and considered further
actions to facilitate the States’ planning and implementation of the ICAO provisions related to
meteorological (MET) service. MET SG/26 recalled that because the CRV might not provide a cost-
effective and efficient solution needed for the exchange of all required MET information in the SWIM
environment, MET SG/25 had previously adopted and presented to APANPIRG/32 the Draft
Conclusion MET SG/25-07 which was not formally adopted as an APANPIRG Conclusion.
 18

4.37 Nevertheless, APANPIRG/32 did acknowledge that the SWIM TF would take action
as proposed in Draft Conclusion MET SG/25-07. i.e., “the MET SG’s draft conclusion will be captured
in the ongoing review of SWIM/TF terms of reference”. MET SG/26 noted that the Sixth Meeting of
the SWIM Task Force (SWIM TF/6) discussed concerns raised by the members of MET SG about
SWIM architecture for the efficient and cost-effective provision of MET information services through
WP19 and formed a Draft Decision SWIM TF/06/01 – The Use of the Internet for MET Information
Services in Regional SWIM architecture and Draft Decision SWIM TF/06/06 – Revised SWIM TF
Terms of Reference to include “other IP-based networks” in the APAC Regional SWIM architecture.

4.38 MET SG/26 welcomed the SWIM TF’s request to the Member States to nominate MET
experts to contribute and participate in various tasks of the SWIM TF. The involvement of MET experts
in the activities of the SWIM TF could help overcome some prevailing concerns or misunderstandings
on how MET information will be made available and used in a SWIM environment. MET SG/26 noted
that, given some States’ concerns about documenting MET service providers as “non-aviation” service
providers, SWIM TF/6 had requested the CRV Operations Group (CRV OG) to finalize an appropriate
name for CRV users and subscribers other than ANSPs.

4.39 MET SG/26 requested CNS SG/26 to note the importance of adopting the proposals in
Draft Decision SWIM TF/06/01 and Draft Decision SWIM TF/06/06, which reflect the action
previously proposed in Draft Conclusion MET SG/25-07, supporting the cost-effective and efficient
exchange of MET information in SWIM.

Status of Proof of Concept Based SWIM Project for Exchanging Aeronautical,

Flight and Weather Data- India (IP/21)

4.40 India presented the Status and accomplishments of the Proof- of- Concept (POC) based
SWIM project undertaken by India. India informed that the project scope covered building SWIM
Technical infrastructure, generating digital datasets for Digital NOTAM, OPMET & flight related ATS
messages. At present SWIM Services, SWIM Digital Applications, and, most notably, SWIM Gateway
services with AMHS and AFTN Switch have been developed and in-house testing has been carried out
successfully.

4.41 India shared capabilities of the prototype SWIM System, SWIM Infrastructure
Developed for POC based SWM system, and SWIM technical infrastructure. It was added that the
project is in the final stage and the system has been tested with Aero Thai SWIM system for validating
the capabilities and deliverables. Through this integration activity, AAI and Aero Thai exchanged Flight
Plan Data (FPL, DEP & ARR) in FIXM v 4.2 format, Digital NOTAM data (NOTAM - New, Replace,
Cancel) in AIXM v 5.1.1 format, and Meteorological data (METAR, SIGMET) in IWXXM v 3.0 format
over SWIM channel using AMQP 1.0 protocol. A successful integration has validated that
1) System complies with ICAO SWIM Standards
2) Capability to integrate with 3rd party systems amid the technological and
implementation differences between the different systems

4.42 The meeting was informed that the successful completion of the project shall pave the
way for preparing Roadmap for the SWIM implementation in AAI. India encouraged other States to
interface their SWIM system with Indian POC SWIM system for further testing and validation.

4.43 The meeting appreciated the information sharing from India and encouraged other
States to contact AAI to interface their SWIM system with Indian POC SWIM system.
 19

Agenda Item 5: Aeronautical Mobile Communications Service and Aeronautical

electromagnetic spectrum utilization

Review Report of SRWG/6 - Sec (WP/08)

5.1 The paper presented the report of the Sixth Meeting of the Spectrum Review Working
Group (SRWG/6) of APANPIRG, held via VTC from 1 to 3 March 2022. The meeting was attended
by 74 participants from 16 States/Administrations and 2 International Organizations.

Outcome of APG23-3 Meeting

5.2 The meeting reviewed the outcome of the Third Meeting of Asia Pacific
Telecommunity (APT) Conference Preparatory Group for World Radiocommunication Conference
2023 (APG23-3) held on 8 – 13 November 2021. Regional Officers CNS presented Information
Document APG23-3/INF-15 on the ICAO Position for WRC-23, i.e. the result of study progressed by
Frequency Spectrum Management Panel (FSMP) based on the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) studies, in order to monitor progress and status of APAC regional preliminary views for WRC-
23 to protect aeronautical spectrum, ensure ICAO Position was supported in accordance with
APANPIRG/27 Conclusion 27/45 and to report to CNS SG and its contributory bodies on the regional
preparation progress made by APG. The meeting was invited to note the outcome of APG23-3,
including agenda items where aviation is seeking actions by WRC.

VHF COM Simulation for 2030

5.3 The meeting reviewed the latest development in simulating the VHF COM
requirements for APAC in 2030 as deemed necessary for the simulation for 2030. SRWG/5 prepared
the survey for Submission of Frequency Requirements for the Period 2021 – 2030, and circulated to
Member States through State Letter Simulation of VHF COM Frequency requirements for next 10 years
on 09 April 2021. The ICAO APAC Office has received submissions from eight States/Administrations.
CNS SG/25 urged delegates to take necessary action to respond to the State Letter by providing required
information for simulation as early as possible. Preliminary analysis on the States’ submission revealed
the challenge of uncertainty to determine the medium-term spectrum requirements for VHF
communication services. Further analysis is being conducted with concerned States to determine
whether these requirements can be assigned. States/Administrations were invited to review and provide
up-to-date information for Frequency List 3 by using Frequency Finder as the simulation result would
only be meaningful for sufficient frequency data. States/Administrations were invited to report issues
to the Secretariat team during this interactive process.

Frequency Simulation for India

5.4 The meeting presented the outcome of frequency simulation for India per discussion in
SRWG/5 WP/07 for future assignment. The simulation demonstrated that the frequency requirements
requested by India for up to 2030 can be satisfied within the frequency band 117.975 - 137 MHz with
conditions, including a re-organization for the pools to which frequencies are allotted. In addition, heavy
congestion is expected at that time throughout most of this frequency band. As such, a similar analysis
in 3 - 5 years 2022 was recommended to assess the severity of the congestion. This study set an example
on the frequency planning techniques with actual situation to estimate the future traffic growth and
subsequently the need for an increase in frequency channels. From the study result, in case 8.33kHz
channel spacing were identified as necessary, strategic planning similar to that of Europe could be
adopted. The meeting noted the discussion on more flexible use of the VHF COM Frequency Allotment
Plan. Two relevant Action Items were proposed in SRWG/6 and endorsed in the meeting as follows:
 Review the registered frequencies from the simulation conducted in 2016 in the
Frequency Finder, and remove those temporary frequencies in the Frequency Finder in
the previous simulation service; and
 20

 Establish an ad-hoc group to review the VHF COM Frequency Allotment Plan for
APAC in terms of effective use of frequencies in the region, including the review of
non-safety critical frequency use.

Preparation for Implementation of VHF Com 8.33 kHz Channel Spacing

Requirements in APAC Region by Indonesia

5.5 This paper discussed Indonesia's preparations for the implementation of VHF COM
8.33 kHz channel spacing. Indonesia stated that the implementation directly impacts the ANSP, airline
operators, ground service (e.g., ground handling, VHF data link frequencies), heliport operators as main
users of such frequency. To ensure all registered civil aircraft operating in Indonesia are capable of
operating at 8.33 kHz, Indonesia will conduct a further survey. When 8.33 kHz channel spacing
implemented, some issues were identified as follows:
 Operational use will have an impact on the ATC load (phraseology) when using the 3
decimal place;
 Implementation of 8.33 kHz channel spacing will impact ANSP on replacing all the
VHF COM facilities which incapable of working on that channel space;
 It is necessary to consider the impact on airlines; and
 Need to update national regulation of the use of 8.33 kHz if it has been recommended
by ICAO APAC in future.

5.6 The paper provided adequate information and precise presentation as a good
observation on the subject of implementation of 8.33kHz channel spacing in the Region. The meeting
suggested considering formulating an implementation roadmap along with deliberation with individual
States when the matter matures in future. IATA acknowledged that most of airline air transport fleet
are already equipped with 8.33 kHz VHF Voice Channel Spacing. IATA suggested that the APAC
region to plan ahead and establish an agreement for a structured implementation plan and timeline for
eventual migration to 8.33 kHz, including an accommodation strategy for non-complying aircraft.

Aeronautical Frequency Spectrum Coordination and Planning Criteria in the APAC

Region

5.7 The meeting reviewed the current practices and coordination procedures for aeronautical
facilities and services operating in the aeronautical frequency bands and the evolution of planning
criteria employed. States should coordinate for all frequency assignments that may affect the use of
frequencies in other States. States should coordinate in principle with the Regional Office for all
frequency assignments that may affect the use of frequency assignments coordinated through the ICAO
mechanism. Not doing so will ultimately result in unforeseen interference, less efficient and less flexible
assignment coordination and planning in a congested environment, as there will not be any possibility
of optimizing assignments to solve congestion, as well as for a chance to conduct a meaningful
simulation at the regional level. As such, the following Draft Conclusion was proposed and discussed
in CNS SG/26. The Secretariat raised that use of frequencies belongs to States themselves and thus need
to encourage States to coordinate with ICAO office to avoid possible interference. With consideration
that frequencies should be coordinated before deployment by default to avoid undesirable interference,
the Chair suggested the Secretariat to issue a State Letter for promulgating the Draft Conclusion
SRWG/6/1. ACTION ITEM 26-4.

5.8 The meeting discussed the frequency planning principles adopted by the ASIA/PAC/3
RAN Meeting in 1993 which covered NDB (List 1), VOR, DME and ILS (List 2), VHF COM (List 3).
The latest revisions of the Handbook on Radio Frequency Spectrum Requirement for Civil Aviation
(Doc 9718) Volumes I and II have been approved by the Secretary-General and published in early 2022.
Subsequently, the revised planning criteria contained in the revision for compatibility assessment of
frequency assignments to VHF COM systems and NAV systems (ILS, VOR, DME and GBAS/VDB)
have been incorporated in the new release of the Frequency Finder tool. With the Doc 9718 overrides
previous RAN meeting outcome, the following Draft Conclusion was discussed and endorsed by CNS
SG/26 for further consideration in APANPIRG/33:
 21

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/08 (SRWG/6/2) - Planning Principle for Aeronautical Frequency
Bands of 108-117.975 MHz, 960- 1215 MHz and 117.975- 137 MHz
What: That, Doc 9718, Handbook on Radio Frequency Spectrum Expected impact:
Requirements for Civil Aviation, Volume II, Second Edition – 2022, ☐ Political / Global
is adopted as the planning principle for aeronautical facilities and ☒ Inter-regional
services operating in the aeronautical frequency bands of 108-117.975 ☐ Economic
MHz, 960- 1215 MHz and 117.975- 137 MHz in APAC.
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: To implement the updated ICAO provisions Follow-up: ☐Required from States
When: 25-Nov-22 Status: Draft to be adopted by PIRG
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other: -

Outcome of Ad-Hoc Group Activities on 50 kHz Channel Spacing for VOR/ILS

Operations

5.9 This paper summarized the outcome of the Ad-hoc Group activities with regard to the
implementation of 50 kHz channel spacing in the frequency band 108.000-117.975 MHz for VOR/ILS
operation in the APAC region. The ad-hoc group proposed a questionnaire for discussion in SRWG/6.
The challenges identified of implementing 50 kHz channel spacing are deemed primarily with airspace
users (airline operators) and not with ground segment. The need for active coordination between the
stakeholders including ANSPs, Civil/Military and Airline Operators (IATA) was also highlighted. The
ad-hoc meeting also noted that the ICAO Frequency Finder tool fully supports 50 kHz channel spacing.
The status of coordination within India and consultation with all stakeholders including IATA and its
Military Organizations was presented. The stakeholders have consented to implement 50 kHz channel
spacing within India. To speed up the process, the Secretariat published a questionnaire via ICAO
APAC State Letter Ref.: AP068/22 (CNS) dated 28 April 2022.

Minimum Coordination Distance and the Need for Coordination of Frequency

Assignments

5.10 This paper described the principles to observe and calculate with examples when
establishing a minimum coordination distance between VHF COM and NAV facilities. Beyond this
distance, no frequency coordination is required with respect to the desired facility. In aeronautical
frequency assignment planning, the receiving station is typically operating at the edge of the Designated
Operational Coverage (DOC) at the maximum range and height. It is not feasible to establish a single
value for a minimum coordination distance because of the variables to be considered in the relevant
calculations, States are invited to note that all facilities that do not meet this requirement need to be
coordinated with ICAO. Besides, it is important to coordinate the use of frequency in order to avoid
interference with other States, however, a State should be allowed to determine, based on ITU standards,
other technical standards and geographical terrain whether the minimum coordination distance
requirements are met. The Regional Guidance Material being developed will deliberately address this
issue clearly.

Rationale for Placing Proper Frequency Coordination Mechanism and Framing

Guidelines

5.11 India reviewed the need for placing a proper coordination mechanism and framing
explicit policy guidelines for States. India informed that all their new frequency assignments have been
coordinated with ICAO Regional Office before being used in order to protect the frequencies being
used in India and neighbouring countries from harmful interference. However, they noted that the ICAO
frequency lists do not contain the complete assignments and the assignments from many States are not
fully recorded in the relevant lists. The issue was discussed during the online Ad-hoc Committee
 22

Meeting on 8, Feb 2022, with certain points as highlighted hereunder need to be addressed to give a
comprehensive guidance to States:

 Clarity is required with respect to the RAN meeting conclusions and relevant Annex 10
Volume V provisions, in respect of whether the States are required to coordinate and
record all the new assignments with the Regional Office or only those assignments near
the border areas.
 In case the new assignments contemplated near the border areas are to be coordinated,
what are the specific distances required for different services for which coordination is
necessary.
 Whether the military assignments (all or near the borders) are required to be
coordinated. Normally, classified assignments are not disclosed. India presently is
coordinating quite a number of military assignments.
 The coordination practices followed by the States/Administrations of other Regions
may help to replicate in Asia/Pac region.
 Need for framing explicit guidelines to remove the ambiguity and for compliance by
States may be considered.

Implementation of 50 kHz Channel Spacing in China

5.12 China shared their implementation of 50 kHz channel spacing due to shortfall from
actual demand from the rapid development of the civil aviation industry and the substantial increase in
the number of Radio Navigation Stations (RNS). Since October 1st, 2014, all new / relocated LOCs,
GPs, VORs and DMEs shall meet the followings:
 The tunable frequency spacing of LOC and VOR equipment shall at least reach 50 kHz;
 The tunable frequency spacing of GP equipment shall at least reach 150 kHz; and
 Both X and Y channel modes are applicable for the DME equipment.
To ensure safe operation, CAAC adopts the mixing condition between 50 kHz and 100 kHz channel
spacing when setting the protection distance of RNS, and refers to Annex 10, Attachment C to Volume
I, paragraphs 2.6, 3.4 and 3.5 for specific details. Implementation of 50 kHz channel spacing is
progressing steadily. Japan has also reported their implementation of 50kHz channel spacing for VOR
and LOC, as well as X and Y channels for DME.

Latest Updates to Frequency Finder Tool

5.13 The latest work, enhancements and functionalities brought to the Frequency Finder tool
were discussed to assist ICAO Regional Offices and States to manage and coordinate aeronautical
frequency assignments in ICAO COM Lists 2 and 3 as well as SSR Mode S II/SI codes. Frequency
Finder provides the calculation of interference areas and a geographical interface for plotting of the
frequency assignments, including any interference area. Work on the development of a module for
VHF/UHF navigation systems as in COM list 2 (ILS, VOR, DME and GBAS) has been completed
using the frequency assignment planning criteria as per the Handbook on Radio Frequency Spectrum
Requirements for Civil Aviation (Doc. 9718) Volume II approved in 2021. Two enhanced features were
introduced, including plotting interference contours in the VHF-NAV module on the Google Map, and
a global database for Mode S II/SI code assignments. The meeting was invited to make extensive usage
of the Frequency finder tool for frequency coordination and provide feedback on FF tool usage,
suggestions, bugs and recommendations. The meeting was also briefed on the development of online
course on fundamentals of frequency management.

Draft of Asia Pacific Regional Aeronautical Radio Frequency Management Guidance

Material

5.14 The meeting discussed and reviewed the second edition of the draft of Asia Pacific
Regional Aeronautical Radio Frequency Management Guidance Material. The guidance includes
objective, scope, institutional framework, spectrum management and procedure of APAC region, air-
 23

ground communication and radio navigation aid frequency management information. Following issues
for meetings’ attention and discussion:
 The minimum coordination distance for radio navigation facilities;
 The minimum separation distance for Localizer and Glide Path;
 The minimum separation distance for adjacent channel of Localizer and VOR;
 Influence of Aircraft Contribution Factor on the Calculation of GBAS Protection Ratio;
 Criteria for Identification coordination.
The meeting reviewed the guidance material for further improvement. To further proceed with the draft,
the Secretariat will issue a State Letter to invite the APAC States to review and comment on the draft
guidance document after further completion of the draft.

Potential Impacts from 5G Implementation on Aircraft Radio Altimeters – Outcomes in

Relevant Meetings and Regional Updates

5.15 This paper reviewed the discussion in APAC after SRWG/5 about 5G implementation
and potential impacts on aircraft radio altimeters, and relevant regional updates including:

 ICAO Headquarters State letter dated 25 March 2021;

 Outcomes of 12th Meeting of Frequency Spectrum Management Panel Working Group
(FSMP WG/12);
 Outcomes of SRWG/5 and CNS SG/25;
 Outcomes of RASG-APAC/11 and Conclusion RASG-APAC 11/3 and Decision
RASG-APAC 11/6 regarding Potential Interference to Aircraft Radio Altimeter by 5G
Telecommunications System
 Regional and global developments on the issue, including FAA, ASEAN, GSMA and
APT statements/researches/reports
As agreed in CNS SG/25, Member States would monitor the impact of 5G on radio altimeters in their
States/Administration about the safety and frequency spectrum issues. Member States CAA and
airworthiness office may collect all relevant information and past issues reported, if any, and inform
RASG-APAC of any significant concern. The issues related to frequency spectrum may be brought to
the attention of the CNS section of the ICAO APAC Office for further coordination with RASG-APAC
and ICAO Headquarters.

5G Interference to Aircraft Radio Altimeters – IATA and Thailand

5.16 The paper discussed recent lessons learned concerning the deployment of 5G
telecommunication networks and outlines recommendations to mitigate the potential risks to flight
safety by 5G deployments. It also reviewed risk mitigation strategies and next steps for implementation.
As a minimum, actions and regulatory measures need to be taken and put in place to safeguard the use
of radio altimeters. Examples from States cooperated 5G network providers about the provision of
location information for their stations, as well as details of the transmission characteristics required. It
cited that maintaining current safety levels for aircraft, passengers and flight crews must be of highest
priority. States should ensure that every frequency allocation/assignment is comprehensively studied
and is well proven not to adversely impact aviation safety and efficiency, and States must provide the
necessary leadership and act as a fair facilitator to ensure open and positive information sharing between
the two industries and national aviation and telecommunication regulators.

5.17 As such, the meeting was invited to review and acknowledge the safety concerns and
potential operational impacts of 5G telecommunication system deployment to radio altimeter, to
consider incorporating “C-Band mobile telecommunications interference impact on aviation
operations” into the ToR of the SRWG, to request ICAO APAC office to consider issuing a State letter
to States within the Asia/Pacific Region in a similar manner to the NACC letter; and to consider
adopting actions taken by some States to mitigate 5G interference and suggest additional actions as
necessary and appropriate. This paper also requested ANSPs and aviation safety regulators to brief
relevant government and telecommunication regulatory/management agencies about the potential
 24

impact of 5G deployment on aviation safety, and propose necessary provisions for the spectrum
auctioning/allotting process that will ensure the radio altimeter frequency is free from harmful
interference at and around airports.

5.18 To address these proposals, the Secretariat introduced the original ToR of SRWG on
studying necessary work for introducing 8.33kHz channel spacing and later included the topic of
frequency spectrum planning. Due to the cross-domain and multi-facet nature of the issue involving
frequency spectrum and flight safety, the ICAO recommended that the terms of reference of SRWG
remain unchanged but the concern raised in this paper could be addressed through a dedicated Agenda
Item for discussion in future meetings as the need arises. The meeting noted that ICAO HQ is preparing
a State Letter or Electronic bulletin to be issued in 2022, hence APAC Region would not need to issue
its own State Letter on the same subject. The Secretariat invited IATA to review and make
improvements to existing Action Item to adequately address the concerned raised, and APAC States
were informed to take necessary follow-up action at the regional level, to support CAAs working with
State’s spectrum regulators to avoid future safety issues on radio altimeter due to 5G implementation.

5.19 Considering the two RASG-APAC/11 Conclusion/Decision, i.e. Conclusion RASG-

APAC 11/3 and Decision RASG-APAC 11/6 regarding Potential Interference to Aircraft Radio
Altimeter by 5G Telecommunications System have already covered the scope of intended proposal, it
would be a duplication of effort should the same issue be under APANPIRG that have already been
addressed under RASG-APAC. The meeting was further informed that the has been communicated and
brought for attention to the ITU Regional Radiocommunication Seminar 2020 for Asia & Pacific held
on 28 October 2020, as well as to the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Regional Interagency Working
Group (IAWG) on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) held on 17 January 2022. The
Secretariat reminded that States/Administrations and industry to provide feedback to RASG-APAC and
APANPIRG, and its sub-groups, on reports of interference from 5G networks as detailed in Decision
RASG-APAC/11/6.

Radio Altimeters and 5G Administration C-Band Deployment – United States

5.20 The flimsy reviewed the synopsis, intra-agency and industry coordination on the 5G
deployment, and actions taken by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) via Airworthiness Notices
(AD), Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOC) and NOTAMs. The FAA expressed that they
believe the expansion of 5G C-band and aviation will safely co-exist. The FAA continues to work
closely with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and wireless companies, and they are
making progress toward safely implementing the 5G C-band expansion. They are confident with the
ongoing collaboration we will reach this shared goal. The flimsy introduced relevant ADs issued, as
well as the AMOC process which allows anyone to propose to the FAA an alternative method of
compliance or a change in the compliance time, if the proposal provides an acceptable level of safety.
NOTAMs will be maintained to identify locations with 5G C-band base station deployments. Further
information could be referred to the FAA website https://www.faa.gov/5g .

Outcome of FSMP WG/13 on Radio Altimeter Issues

5.21 The meeting reviewed the outcome of the Thirteenth Working Group Meeting of the
Frequency Spectrum Management Panel (FSMP-WG/13), held between 21-25 February 2022, on
potential interference to Radio Altimeter from 5G for information and reference by the meeting. Under
its Agenda Item 4 - Radio Altimeter issues, the following papers were discussed:
 Report from correspondence group on radio altimeters (CG-RA) - IP03
 National efforts to implement broadband mobile near 4200-4400 MHz
- Mitigation measures - WP03, WP16, IP02, IP04
- Safety Cases/Compatibility Analyses
The meeting was invited to note FSMP-WG/13 IP/03, which is the best overall fact-finding reference
available today, while IP/04 is more of a simplified “executive-level” briefing style text, they are
provided in Appendices A and B to the paper respectively for easy reference. The Secretariat also
 25

suggested the RTCA Technical Webinar: Interference Risk on Radar Altimeters from Planned 5G
Telecommunication as a good reference at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OpYhjK2MDqM.

Update on Space-based VHF – Singapore

5.22 This paper presented the progress of Space-based VHF discussions at International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) Working Party 5B (WP 5B) and ICAO Frequency Spectrum
Management Panel (FSMP) working group meetings. With the support of ICAO and the different
Regional Groups of the ITU, the space-based VHF frequency allocation was formally accepted as an
agenda item for World Radiocommunication Conference 2023 (WRC-23). Currently, the space-based
VHF frequency compatibility study is still ongoing in ITU WP 5B meetings, and the FSMP is the
designated ICAO point of liaison with ITU WP 5B. The paper discussed the three documents updated
in the ITU WP 5B meeting held from 29 November to 10 December 2021 including a Liaison Statement
(LS) to ICAO to update the progress of space-based VHF studies and to seek clarifications, in particular,
on VHF data link (VDL) Mode 2, a Working document towards a Preliminary Draft New Report
(PDNR) detailing the technical studies and assessments of space-based studies, and a Working
document towards a Draft Conference Preparatory Meeting (CPM) report that details the proposed
regulatory changes for WRC-23. The paper also shared a document from FSMP WG/13 IP/06 regarding
the initial outcomes of the technical studies and test/validations performed by a European initiative
called VOICE, a project to perform a proof of concept (POC) for a satellite-based CNS technology in a
real operational environment. The POC will also include satellite relay of VHF voice and data. As the
activities within the ITU WP5B and the FSMP are intensifying as WRC23 draws nearer, to ensure
aviation interests are safeguarded, the meeting was invited to support the agenda items as advised by
ICAO Assembly Resolution A38-6 (Support of the ICAO Policy on radio frequency spectrum matters);
and submit additional questions, if any, to FSMP through ICAO Regional Office.

Potential Impacts from 5G Implementation on Aircraft Radio Altimeters –

Outcomes in Relevant Meetings and Regional Updates - Sec (WP/09)

5.23 To serve as a summary of discussion on the topic of 5G implementation and potential

impacts on aircraft radio altimeters, this paper presented the discussion in APAC after CNS SG/25, and
relevant regional updates, including Thirty-second Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning
and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG/32), 11th Meeting of Regional Aviation Safety
Group – Asia and Pacific (RASG-APAC/11), Sixth Meeting of the Spectrum Review Working Group
(SRWG/6), 13th and 14th Meetings of Frequency Spectrum Management Panel Working Group (FSMP
WG/13 and FSMP WG/14) and certain discussions in other bodies.

5.24 CNS Section of ICAO APAC Regional Office has received zero report on such
interference in radio altimeters from the Member States or IATA so far. As a reminder of agreement in
CNS SG/25, Member States would keep an eye on monitoring the impact of 5G on radio altimeters in
their States/Administration regarding the safety and frequency spectrum issues. In parallel, it was
advised that Member States CAA and airworthiness office may collect all relevant information and past
issues reported, if any, and inform RASG-APAC in case of any significant concern. The issues related
to frequency spectrum may be brought to the attention of CNS section of the ICAO APAC Office for
further coordination with RASG-APAC and ICAO Headquarters.

Amendment 91 to Annex 10, Volume III on Selective Calling Codes - Sec (WP/24)

5.25 The Secretariat presented the main points of State Letter Ref.: AN 7/64.2.2-20/127 and
the action required by the letter regarding the Adoption of Amendment 91 to Annex 10, Volume III
issued on 9 December 2020, which concerns the expansion of the pool of selective calling (SELCAL)
codes. The SELCAL amendment uses sixteen (16) new audio tones, in addition to the existing 16 audio
tones, to create SELCAL codes from a total of 32 available audio frequencies (called SELCAL32). The
air navigation services providers (ANSPs) are requested to upgrade ground systems (flight planning and
SELCAL encoder) to support global implementation of SELCAL32 by 3 November 2022 and should
consider taking the necessary steps to be compliant with the Amendment. The Amendment has also
been reviewed by ACSICG/9 through WP/15, and ICAO Regional Office issued the State Letter Ref.:
 26

T 8/4.3: AP107/22 (CNS) dated 10 August 2022 with the Subject of Selective Calling (SELCAL) Code
Pool Expansion to remind the State/Administration to notify ICAO Headquarters (HQ) on any
differences and compliance regarding Amendment 91 to Annex 10, Volume III before 3 October 2022,
copy notifications to ICAO APAC Regional Office to share readiness status for the applicability of
SELCAL32. The meeting was informed that China, New Zealand and Sri Lanka have been SELCAL32
compliant.

CAAC’S Support for the Enhancement of AeroMACS SARPs and Technical

Manual - China (WP/26)

5.26 The paper presented the Civil Aviation Administration of China’s (CAAC) support for
the enhancement of AeroMACS SARPs and Technical Manual to be open to additional technologies,
and shared the planned activities in the next step. China shared that the CAAC continues to support the
development of the new-generation AeroMACS, and has issued a roadmap for the application of the
new-generation aeronautical broadband communications in April 2021 to promote the advanced
technologies implementation within the AeroMACS dedicated spectrum 5091-5150MHz. The efforts
made by China have also been introduced. The CNS SG/26 was informed that with the support of the
CAAC, the AeroMACS Forum has already commenced the initial analysis on the required revisions of
AeroMACS SARPs and Technical Manual to make them less restrictive or technology specific, so as
to give the ecosystem the flexibility to provide AeroMACS services using any additional technology
(e.g., LTE, 5G) that meets the minimum performance characteristics and capabilities of AeroMACS.
The revisions of the AeroMACS SARPs and Technical Manual, proposed activities, and schedule have
been shared in detail. The meeting was invited to support the enhancement of AeroMACS SARPs and
Technical Manual in the CP meeting.

Survey Result of the Introduction of 50 kHz Channel Spacing for ILS and VOR
Facilities in the APAC Region - Sec (IP/03)

5.27 The ad-hoc group, which formed from SRWG/5 in 2021 to discuss the possible
shortfall of VOR frequency channels with the current 100 kHz channel in the frequency band 108.000-
117.975 MHz, reported the discussion outcome in the SRWG/6. The Group worked with the ICAO
Secretariat and drafted a questionnaire for the APAC States and Airline Operators including IATA
through State Letter Ref.: T 8/8.5 – AP067/22(CNS). Based on the survey results obtained, it was noted
that certain States have already implemented or planned to implement the 50 kHz channel spacing for
ILS/VOR facilities. While most of these States indicated no issues in implementation/planning, States
should ensure the aircrafts operating in their airspaces are able to support the use of such 50 kHz channel
spacing. It is encouraged that IATA would advise on their member airline operators about the capability
of their aircrafts avionics in operating with 50 kHz channel spacing for ILS/VOR facilities. States
should also confirm with other relevant bodies, e.g. Defence and Flying Service bodies, that use
ILS/VOR facilities on their ability to operate with such 50 kHz channel spacing in their States. The
results are planned to be further reviewed and discussed in SRWG/7 meeting in 2023.

Outcomes of APT-ICAO Webinar on 5G Implementation and Radio Altimeter –

Sec (IP/04)

5.28 The APT-ICAO Webinar on 5G Implementation and Radio Altimeter (also known as
APT-ICAO Regional Dialogue: Radio Altimeters at 4200-4400 MHz band and implementation of 5G
in adjacent bands) was held on 23 August 2022 via Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC) on Zoom which
was hosted on APT platform. The Webinar was intended to promote the common understanding among
the spectrum regulators, the airlines and telecommunication industries on the operation of Radio
Altimeters in the band 4.2 – 4.4 GHz and the implementation of 5G in the adjacent bands ensuring
aviation safety in the Asia-Pacific region. The Webinar has registered with about 250 participants. There
were four topics presented by spectrum regulators (APT), aircraft manufacturers (Airbus), aviation
(ICAO) and telecommunication industries (GSMA), covering the each-different viewpoints and
concerns from these entities, potential mitigation measures and future roadmap of complete resolution
of the issue of co-existence of 5G implementation and radio altimeters. The webinar was well received
by the participants, noting that the event served as a platform to bring together the national spectrum
 27

regulators, telecommunications service providers, and the aviation community for direct engagement.
Presentation slides and recording would be available on the ICAO Webinar website at
https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/Pages/2022-Webinar-on-5G-Implementation-and-Radio-Altimeter.aspx.

5G Network within Airport Boundary- Malaysia (IP/07)

5.29 This paper presented the safety concerns and safety recommendations for 5G network
within airport boundary in response to ICAO State Letter on Potential safety concerns regarding
interference to radio altimeters. The proposal for 5G network in Malaysia, categorized as new
equipment or technology to be introduced within the airport boundary, has triggered the change factor
and therefore, an SMS tool used (Management of Change and Safety Assessment) shall be established
to identify safety concern of 5G network on the safety of aircraft operations. The paper introduced their
management of change process and the safety assessment outcome, which determined safety
recommendations to be taken up by the installer prior 5G network can be made available within the
airport boundary. The safety recommendations are to furnish Malaysia Airports Holding Berhad
(MAHB) with a report from Malaysia Communication and Multimedia Commission (MCMC)
confirming the 5G signal allowed in Malaysia have no interference to aircraft operations and surveyed
drawing of the 5G network coverage encroach onto aircraft approach path and radio altimeter protected
area. As for aerodrome operator, a safety circular issued to all airports alerting 5G network shall not be
allowed to be installed within airport boundary and to refer to Safety Office, MAHB.

5.30 On further enquiry, Malaysia stated that their 5G implementation frequency band do
not exceed the use of those frequencies of radio altimeter. The Secretariat supplemented that the 5G
potential interference issue to radio altimeter depends on various factors, including the radio altimeter
itself, installation of base station and frequency bands used, which all contributed to the potential issue.
In addition, Hong Kong China shared with the meeting their proactive work, which included
formulation of a dedicated working group with the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department, local
telecommunication authority and local airport authority as members, who has been closely monitoring
global development of this matter and the local situation. Although so far there has been no reported
cases and no evidence that the local 5G base stations installed have caused interference to radio
altimeters, the working group would continue their close coordination with the industry and local
airlines to monitor the situation and ensure proactive measures are timely implemented to mitigate the
possible interference from 5G to radio altimeters in Hong Kong China.

5.31 The CNS SG Chair advised that an ICAO Regional 5G Interference Workshop would
be held on 16 November 2022 in Bangkok, Thailand and invited meeting members to join.

Verification of Air Traffic Control Services Based on Data-Link for All Flight
Phases in China (IP/09)

5.32 The meeting was informed that guided by the thread of communication infrastructure
(COMI) and communication service (COMS) in ICAO ASBU, Air Traffic Management Bureau
(ATMB) of Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) has carried out a series of technical
feasibility verifications in Zhengzhou airspace since 2019, to optimize the use of China’s aircrafts and
datalink network and provide the fundamental base for full-scale application of Datalink Air Traffic
Control Services in China’s major airspaces in the future. With three years’ research on the project of
‘Technology and Application Research to support Datalink Air Traffic Control Services for All Flight
Phases’, China shared verification work conducted, regarding avionic systems, air-ground data-link
communication network, and ATC information system, and summarized the service performance. The
meeting noted that China will continue to carry out the operation verification of the mixed use of
ACARS ATS and CPDLC data link services and accelerate the full-scale application of Datalink Air
Traffic Control Services in China’s major airspaces in the future.

Implementation and Application of VHF SELCAL in China (IP/10)

5.33 In order to prevent air-ground communication failure and enhance the safety of civil
aviation operations, CAAC has conducted a series of work to improve the selective calling function.
 28

Combining the requirements of the latest technical standards of ICAO and relevant research results,
CAAC implemented SELCAL function on chief position of ACC center at VHF frequency as an
effective approach to re-establish air-ground communication. China further elaborated on two technical
solutions, frequency choice, and the control phase of implementing the VHF SELCAL, and summarized
the operation and safety benefits.

Outcome of APG23-4 Meeting– Sec (IP/20)

5.34 This paper reviewed the outcome of the Fourth Meeting of Asia-Pacific
Telecommunity (APT) Conference Preparatory Group for World Radiocommunication Conference
2023 (APG23-4), which was held on 15-20 August 2022 in hybrid mode of physical meeting at
Bangkok, Thailand and Video Tele-Conference (VTC). 722 participants (with 291 in-person
participation) representing 28 Members, 1 Associate Member, 33 Affiliate Members, 7
International/Regional Organizations and 1 other organization participated in the meeting. Regional
Officers (CNS) from ICAO APAC Office were nominated to participate in the meeting, so as to:
 ensure correct inclusion of latest ICAO Position as the result of study progressed by
FSMP based on latest ITU studies;
 monitor progress and status of Asia/Pacific regional preliminary views for WRC-23;
 protect aeronautical spectrum and support the ICAO Position at regional forums in
accordance with APANPIRG/27 Conclusion 27/45; and
 report to relevant contributory bodies on the regional preparation progress made by
APT APG.
ICAO representatives participated in various sessions of draft groups on agenda items relevant to civil
aviation and provided necessary input and clarification as required, and engaged in lobbing with
participants from civil aviation administrations and exchanged information and views with them. The
outcome of the meeting is in line with the ICAO Position in overall. The Meeting was invited to note
that 5th and 6th Meeting of the APT Conference Preparatory Group for WRC-23 (APG23-5 and 6) is
scheduled for 20-25 February 2023 in Republic of Korea, and 14-19 August 2023 in Australia
respectively. For information, WRC-23 is scheduled for 20 November - 15 December 2023 in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates. The Secretariat mentioned under Agenda Item 1.9 Digital tech for aviation
safety-of-life applications of WRC-23, APT Members are also of the view that the implementation of
new wideband AM(R)S HF systems may require necessary coordination through ICAO given their role
in organizing HF aeronautical channel plans in flight information regions. Although ICAO has no
position and no function role in coordinate HF frequencies,, for States considering to conduct future
studies on application using HF, ICAO APAC Regional Office could support and provide assistance in
grouping the requests from Member States to facilitate wide band HF technology in future.

Agenda Item 6: Navigation

Review Report of PBNICG/9 – Sec (WP/10)

6.1 The paper provided information on the outcomes of the PBNICG/9 held through VTC
from 22-24 March 2022 for the review by the meeting.

6.2 The Secretariat presented global PBN implementation status at international airports.
The Secretariat also presented current implementation status of Asia/Pacific Regional Transition Plan
for RNP APCH Chart Identification from RNAV to RNP. The Secretariat presented global PBN
implementation status as available in ICAO iSTARS. ICAO informed that implementation of APV
procedures for all instrument runway ends by 2016, key requirement of ICAO Assembly Resolution
A37-11, was behind global achievement. However, implementation of PBN SID/STAR were above the
global implementation status (see Table 1 and Chart 1)

Table 1. ICAO Assembly Resolution A37-11 Implementation Status as on September 2021

 29

APV
Sept 2021 LNAV PBN SID PBN STAR
LNAV/VNAV LPV

Global (%) 69.3 57.3 26.2 57.7 50.5

Asia/Pacific
64.5 52.7 0 70 67
(%)

Chart 1. PBN (Approach) Update, as of September 2021(as per iSTARS)

6.3 The Secretariat informed the meeting that discrepancy about the list of International
Airports in iSTARS and ANP had been resolved after extensive coordination with iSTARS team. This
data is reflected in PBN Implementation of the States, and all APAC States should update their list of
Airports in ANP Vol-I & Vol-II as urged by APANPIRG/31 in order to display a more accurate data of
implementation.

6.4 The Secretariat presented the Implementation status of the regional transition plan for
RNP APCH chart identification from RNAV to RNP, Asia/Pacific Regional Transition Plan for RNP
APCH Chart Identification from RNAV to RNP as adopted by APANPIRG/30 vide Conclusion
APANPIRG/30/14 (CNS SG/23/8-PBNICG/6/1). The Secretariat reminded the States about target date
as November 2022 for RNP transition. The plan is available at the following link on ICAO APAC
webpage: Appendix B - Regional Transition Plan for RNP Chart Identification.pdf (icao.int).

6.5 India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Thailand presented PBN Implementation
progress in their States. India also presented a paper on implementation of RNP to XLS Approaches
Facilitating Autopilot Coupling/Smooth Interception of Final Approach Track (LLZ). On Myanmar’s
information that the implementation of some RNP APCH procedures were delayed due to flight
validation, the Secretariat informed the meeting about the provisions of ICAO Doc 9906(Vol-5) on the
validation of procedures and requirement of flight validation.

6.6 The Secretariat presented the requirement of CDO/CCO Implementation as per APAC
Seamless ANS Plan and ASBU Modules. Implementation, design, application and benefits of
CCO/CDO was explained to help States in CDO/CCO Implementation.

6.7 Singapore raised a query about the requirement of implementation of PBN SID/STAR
in a State as the operational requirements and needs are different in each aerodrome. The ICAO
Secretariat explained the ICAO Assembly Resolution A37-11, which calls for the implementation of
 30

PBN SID/STAR if the State considers it necessary for the efficiency of operation. It was further
elaborated that data has been captured from iSTARS for international airports and if States want to
discuss about the Key Indicators, it could be taken up in the next PBNICG.

6.8 Pakistan queried whether study was conducted on implementation of PBN SID/STAR
for the improvement of efficiency of operation along with mitigation of emission and whether there is
a threshold of traffic density recommended for implementation of PBN SID/STAR. The ICAO
Secretariat explained that Assembly resolution A37-11 was adopted after several studies established the
benefits of PBN SID/STAR in the improvement of operational efficiency and environment protection
and PBN SID/STAR helps in the operational efficiency at medium to high density airports as PBN
enables structured arrival and departure paths, which also helps in environment protection.

Review Report of GBAS/SBAS ITF/4 – Sec (WP/11)

6.9 This paper provides information on the outcomes of the GBAS/SBAS ITF/4 held
through VTC on 11-12 May 2022 for the review by the meeting. Various States, including India, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Thailand and the USA, shared updates about their GBAS/SBAS Implementation.

6.10 Co-Chair (Mr. Susumu Saito from Japan) of the task force presented status and
outcomes from the activities of the Expert Group 3-1 for revision of the GBAS and SBAS safety
assessment guidance documents related to anomalous ionospheric conditions and timeline for the work
of the Expert Group 3-1. The group reviewed the GBAS and SBAS safety assessment guidance
documents related to anomalous ionospheric conditions published in 2016, and identified points to be
updated. The group targeted to deliver the first drafts of the guidance documents by fall 2022 and
circulate the drafts to the Task Force members by December 2022. To achieve this, the group would
have online meetings on a monthly basis. As the lead of Expert Group 3-1, India also presented
outcomes from a review of SBAS Safety Assessment Guidance Document Related to Ionospheric
Anomalies and those new proposed contents of the document.

6.11 On behalf of Expert Group 3-2 tasked to draft a guidance reference document for
implementation of GBAS/SBAS in the Asia/Pacific Region, Co-Chair (Mr. George Wong from Hong
Kong China) presented the outcomes from the review and discussion under Expert group for this task.
The guidance reference document would be prepared to present a holistic view of implementation from
the initial phase for the analysis of operational needs to the phase for conducting post-implementation
review. States’ experience in implementation of GBAS/SBAS and specific consideration(s), such as
ionospheric impacts in low altitude region, only particularly applicable to the Asia/Pacific Region
would also be incorporated in this guidance document to be prepared under Expert Group 3-2. Per the
review conducted by the group, the structure of guidance document on implementation process for
GBAS/SBAS and the timeline for drafting this guidance document for the Region as well as the regular
expert group review meetings proposed by Expert Group 3-2 were deliberated and concluded in the
GBAS/SBAS ITF/4.

6.12 Taking into account outcomes from the Task Force, a review on the current status of
items in Action List was conducted and deliberated in GBAS/SBAS ITF/4. For those action items
remained open, target dates were revised appropriately.

Update of Flight Inspection Guidance Material (FIGM) for APAC Region – China
and Hong Kong China (WP/28)

6.13 The FIGM is subject to regular review and update for on-going development of flight
inspection standards and recommended practices. To cope with the dynamic pandemic situation, new
paragraphs were proposed to provide additional guidance on the advance planning for arranging flight
inspections under pandemic situation. In addition, new paragraphs were proposed to adopt surveillance
flight inspection to the safety-critical navigation systems as part of the commissioning flight inspection
programme, and on the application of UAS for flight inspection. With the aforementioned, the following
conclusion was formulated and adopted by the meeting.
 31

Conclusion CNS SG/26/09 - Update of Flight Inspection Guidance Material (FIGM)

What: That, the Edition 3.0 of the Flight Inspection Expected impact:
Guidance Material (FIGM) provided in Appendix F to the ☐ Political / Global
Report be adopted. ☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: The FIGM is subject to regular review and update, in
Follow-up: ☐ Required from
the light of on-going development of flight inspection
standards and recommended practices. States
When: 9-Sep-22 Status: Adopted by Subgroup
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other: -

ITU Circular Letter CR/488 on Prevention of Interference to GNSS - Sec (IP/05)

6.14 The ICAO Secretariat shared information about the Circular Letter CR/488 issued by
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) on prevention of interference to GNSS. With great
concern about the increasing number and range of impact of such harmful interference on safety-of-life
radiocommunication services used for the navigation of aircraft, the ITU issued the Circular Letter
CR/488 with the subject Prevention of harmful interference to Radio Navigation Satellite Service
Receivers in the 1559 – 1610 MHz frequency band on 8 July 2022. Consequently, the ICAO Regional
Office issued the State Letter Ref.: T 8/5.10 : AP099/22 (CNS) dated 21 July 2022, Subject: Prevention
of harmful interference to Radio Navigation Satellite Service Receivers in the 1559 – 1610 MHz
frequency band to highlight the information with operators, service providers, and all stakeholders,
sensitize the national radio regulatory Authority to the risk encountered by the civil aviation, and
encourage States/Administrations to take actions to address this critical issue as appropriate.

BDS Standardization Status in ICAO – China (IP/11)

6.15 China provided the status of BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS)
standardization in ICAO, including the BDS SARPs endorsement progress, the BDS related contents
in GNSS manual revision, and BDS related requirements development and validation in ARAIM
SARPs. The declaration of BDS commissioning on July the 31st, 2020 accelerated the progress of the
BDS SARPs development and validation progress in ICAO Navigation Systems Panel (NSP), which
was completed by NSP in November 2020. The meeting was informed that the proposed amendment to
Annex 10, Volume I to include the BDS core constellation was agreed to become applicable on 2,
November 2023. China also shared the progress of other BDS related ICAO standardization work,
including BDS related part in GNSS Manual and BDS related requirements in ARAIM SARPs, which
will be submitted during NSP/7 for endorsement.

LEO Navigation Augmentation Concept, Constellation Construction Status and

Civil Aviation Application Research in China (IP/12)

6.16 China provided the concept of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) navigation augmentation, the
construction status of LEO navigation augmentation constellations, and preliminary research of LEO
navigation augmentation civil aviation applications in China. The meeting was informed that LEO
satellites, with their unique advantages in constellation and signal, are expected to become a new
increment in the development of a new generation of satellite navigation systems. China shared that
LEO navigation augmentation constellation is an important part of comprehensive national positioning,
navigation and timing (PNT) system of China in the future. Some constellations have been launched
experiment satellites for in-orbit verification, and experimental data of LEO satellite navigation signal
and information augmentation have been accumulated. Combined with construction and development
of LEO navigation augmentation constellations, China has performed preliminary research on
 32

technologies and methods of LEO navigation augmentation civil aviation applications. It was added
that LEO navigation augmentation constellation is optimized to increase Advanced Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) availability, which can provide suggestions for the
construction of LEO constellations.

A Case of GNSS Signal Outage in the Oceanic Airspace in Japan (IP/15)

6.17 Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) has been monitoring the service performance for
air navigation at Network Performance Assessment Center (NPAC) since 2020. The paper presented
the GNSS performance monitoring conducted by NPAC, JCAB, and shared a case study of the response
to GNSS signal outage in Japan, which aimed to track the current situation of GNSS quickly and assess
the impact of navigation accurately based on requirements and recommendations in Annex 10 Volume
1 and GNSS Manual (Doc 9849).

Research and Development Activities Related to GBAS in Japan (IP/16)

6.18 This information paper summarized the status of research and development related to
GBAS in Japan, introduced the DFMC GBAS testbed (ground and airborne mock-ups, as well as
ionospheric observation instruments) at New Ishigaki Airport, and highlighted two major subjects: 1)
development of GBAS, including DFMC GBAS and GAST D, for challenging ionospheric environment
and 2) advanced operations enabled by GBAS.

SBAS Status Update in Japan (IP/17)

6.19 As a part of SBAS implementation in Japan, MSAS (Michibiki Satellites Augmentation

Service) started its operation for Japan’s FIR on September 27th 2007. MSAS has been using QZSS
(Quasi-Zenith Satellite System) GEO to take over the operation since April 2020. MSAS has been
providing GPS Augmentation Information for RNAV/RNP, from En-route through NPA (RNP 0.3),
and the trial operation of LPV/LP started on Dec 2 2021 based on the agreement with stakeholders.
JCAB eventually aims to start the official operation of LPV-200 after 2023.

6.20 Considering GBAS/SBAS are the upcoming navigation technology, the CNS SG Chair
suggested and China and Japan agreed to keep the CNS SG abreast of their latest development in the
next CNS SG meeting.

Agenda Item 7: Surveillance

Review Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Surveillance Implementation

Coordination Group (SURICG/7) - Sec (WP/13)

7.1 The paper reviewed the outcomes of SURICG/7, including the Fifth Meeting of Mode
S Downlinked Aircraft Parameters Working Group (DAPs WG/5) and Second Meeting of the
Surveillance Study Group (SURSG/2).

Outcome of Relevant Meetings on Surveillance

7.2 The meeting reviewed relevant information and updates on Surveillance and related
matters arising from SURICG/6, CNS SG/25 an APANPIRG/32. The meeting noted the discussion
during CNS SG/25 on points of contact for CNS for timely, effective, and efficient response from
States/Administration, which was important in addressing CNS-related operational deficiencies notified
to the Regional Office. The meeting supported the suggestion from the ICAO Secretariat on the need
for DAPs WG to set up the list of Points of Contact for Mode S matters, such as the Mode S Interrogator
Identifier (II)/ Surveillance Identifier (SI) code coordination. The SURICG Co-Chair suggested that
States to present surveillance related implementation matters in SURICG or its contributory bodies
meetings first before considering to present in higher level meetings such as CNS SG / APANPIRG.
 33

Review Report of Mode S DAPs WG/5

7.3 The paper reviewed the outcomes of Mode S DAPs WG/5, and the papers and issues
discussed are summarised below.
 APAC Regional Workshop on Mode S Implementation
 Update on Interregional IC Coordination
 Guidance Material for Assignment of Interrogator Codes (IC) for MLAT and ADS-B
 Reservation of IC Codes 14 and 15 for Research and Military
 Options for Vacating the SSR Mode S II Codes 14 and 15 in the APAC Region
 Update on Mode S IC Code Module in Frequency Finder
 An Abnormal Problem of CPR Decoding caused by the Incorrect Air-ground State of
an Aircraft in China
 Mode S Interrogator Codes Allocation and Conflict Analyses
 Progress on the Trials of Mode S Surveillance Co-ordination Network in China
 Upper Air Wind Speed Estimation based on Mode S SSR DAPs
 Suggestions of Performance Parameters and Benchmarking of Radar System for APAC
Region
 SI Operation Plan at Incheon Airport
 A GPS Interference Identification Method based on ADS-B Data
 An Evaluation Example of a Non-Cooperative Method for DAPS Data Recognition
 Management of 1030/1090MHz Utilization
 Roadmap on Mode S Implementation for APAC Region
 Planning Criteria for II/SI Code Assignment
 Updates to the Mode S DAPs Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

7.4 In Mode S DAPs WG/5 China proposed the revised draft of Edition 4.0 of the Mode S
DAPs Implementation and Operations Guidance Document, developed based on the adopted edition
3.0. The revised draft supplemented the guidance material of ADS-B DAPs, including:
 Introduce ADS-B DAPs and their benefits
 Describe ADS-B DAPs data and the differences between Mode S SSR DAPs and ADS-
B DAPs
 Supplement the mandate of implementing ADS-B DAPs, and the Mode S extended
squitter transponder capability to broadcast ADS-B DAPs
 Add a new section to describe ADS-B DAPs broadcast by Mode S extended squitter
 Insert the application of ADS-B DAPs in the ATM automation system
 Give one example of ADS-B DAPs application

Other amendments included the revision of the description of the use of Mode S DAPs data for the
weather forecast, the addition of a new appendix about guidance on measurement of 1030/1090 MHz
usage. Upon review and discussion, CNS SG/26 endorsed the following Draft Conclusion:

Conclusion CNS SG/26/10 (SURICG/7/1 (DAPs WG/5/1)): Mode S DAPs IGD 4.0

What: The Mode S DAPs Implementation and Operation Guidance Expected impact:
Document Edition 4.0 provided in Appendix G to the Report be ☐ Political / Global
adopted ☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: The revised draft includes ADS-B DAPs and adds Follow-up: ☒Required from
guidance on the measurement of 1030/1090 MHz usage. States
When: 9-Sep-22 Status: Adopted by Sub-group
Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☐ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other: -
 34

7.5 SURICG/7 reviewed and deliberated the proposal from DAPs Working Group to
rename the Group and update its Terms of Reference (ToR) to better reflect the current work scope that
covers not only DAPs but also Mode S radars. After deliberation, SURICG/7 considered it appropriate
to rename the Group as “Mode S and DAPs Working Group”, and endorsed the Decision SURICG/7/2.

Clarification of II/SI Code Allocation in Doc 9924 Appendices H and J

7.6 China, Singapore and the ICAO Secretariat shared the current proposals for amending
the Aeronautical Surveillance Manual (Doc. 9924) Appendix H and J. Amendments in Appendix H will
clarify the steps that can be taken to secure a safe introduction of Mode S II/SI capable interrogators
and transponders with the focus on an environment where both Mode S II only and Mode S II/SI capable
systems are being introduced. Amendments in Appendix J will update the Mode S II code assignment
planning with Mode S SI code and provide for compatibility with Mode S interrogators and
transponders that are not Mode S SI capable. Enhancement of the material would help States and regions
migrate from II to SI under a mixed environment. Following the discussion at the Aeronautical
Surveillance Working Group in Apr 2022, EUROCONTROL proposed improvements to the document.
The meeting reviewed the latest proposal provided in the paper. The proposed text was still being
worked out, and SP Chair commented that the enhancement work could be completed by SP/5 in fall
2023.

Review Report of the Second Meeting of the Surveillance Study Group (SURSG/2)

Surveillance Study Group: Progress Report, Recommendations in Study Report on

surveillance sharing, and moving forward

7.7 SURSG/2 provided a progress summary of SURSG tasks since SURSG/1, lists out
major recommendations in the Study Report and proposed way forwards for the recommendations for
members’ discussion and decisions. SURSG/2 reviewed and deliberated the recommendations and
moving forward proposals provided in the Table. The details of revised high-level recommendation and
moving forward agreed by SURSG/2 was provided in the paper.

7.8 SURSG/2 deliberated the necessity for establishment of the Surveillance Sharing in
SWIM Trial Implementation Group (S3TIG) to oversee such a trial proposed by the recommendation.
China, Hong Kong China, IATA, Singapore, and Thailand seconded the proposal, with PCCWG also
indicated its interest in participating in the trial. SURICG/7 discussed the proposal for establishment of
S3TIG and suggested that it would be more effective to form S3TIG as an ad-hoc group within SURSG
in lieu of a contributory body under SURSG. The SURICG/7 meeting also recommended to add ATFM
SG into Liaison bodies in S3TIG and requested to add drafting and proposing surveillance data
exchange model in the task list of S3TIG ad-hoc group. In addition, in SURICG/7, enquiries were
raised on the difference between the adopted values of service level of shared data for Tiers 1 and 2 in
the SURSG outcome and those specified in the AIGD. The Study group adopted the specifications
from the AIGD v13.0, therefore, the abovementioned specification should be discussed and further
reviewed. The meeting agreed to further discuss this matter.

Surveillance Data Sharing Proof of Concept

7.9 SURSG/2 discussed the Surveillance Data Sharing Proof of Concept (POC) conducted
by HKCAD, PCCWG and Frequentis ComSoft. PCCWG shared the outcomes of a POC conducted on
4 March 2022, which was the collaboration of HKCAD, PCCWG and partner Frequentis ComSoft to
demonstrate sharing ADS-B data in a simulated SWIM over CRV environment and the benefits of a
Surveillance Central Data Processor (SCDP). PCCWG prepared a video to introduce the POC exercise
which was presented in SURICG/7.

Implementation of FF-ICE Interoperability using GUFI in SWIM

7.10 ROK presented its efforts to Implement FF-ICE Interoperability using Globally Unique
 35

Flight Identifier (GUFI) in SWIM Environment. The SURSG/2 meeting noted that by introduction of
GUFI to the surveillance data, it not only solved mismatch problems on co-relation between FPL and
surveillance data by Call sign, DoF, departure/arrival aerodrome, but also made the co-relation become
simple and reliable. Additionally, ROK shared the detailed method of introducing the GUFI in the
surveillance information domain.

Review of Regional Requirements for Surveillance in APAC e-ANP and Seamless ANS
Plan

7.11 The ICAO Secretariat reviewed and consolidated the Regional surveillance
requirements specified in the APAC Regional e-ANP and the Seamless ANS Plan (Version 3.0,
November 2019). States are encouraged to review TABLE CNS II-APAC-3 SURVEILLANCE in the
Specific Regional Requirements in e-ANP Volume II, and provide update to ICAO APAC Regional
Office as necessary through the PfA Process mentioned in the paper.

1090MHz Occupancy Monitoring

7.12 Singapore and ICCAIA discussed in this paper on the need to measure 1090MHz
channel occupancy at flight levels as well as at ground level, and proposed some congestion mitigations.
The paper suggested that congestion seen by receivers depends on “coverage volume. Various
methodologies to avoid/reduce channel congestion at 1090Mhz were discussed and provided in the
paper. States were encouraged to 1090 MHz channel occupancy monitoring at operating Flight levels
and at ground level, and to always seek to minimise 1090MHz channel occupancy commensurate with
their operational needs and environment.

The Sharing of the Software Resource for Benchmarking Radars

7.13 To address the need to access the radar performance among APAC ANSPs for
maintenance and evaluation purposes, this paper proposed that each Member State to share the relevant
radar analysis software for the radar benchmark. ROK introduced their radar analysis software
“Astecat” developed by Incheon International Airport as one of the cost-free software tools for
benchmarking radar performance that is openly shared for APAC States to use with no warranty and
minimum maintenance support. The paper introduced the details of benchmarking of their surveillance
systems, and their use of software in evaluating SI operation tests in Incheon International Airport.
ROK was invited to provide their point of contact to ICAO on sharing their software.

Inconsistent ICAO Aircraft Address and Target Identification between Surveillance

Data and Flight Plan

7.14 SURICG/7 noted the update on the observed discrepancies and contributing factors of
ICAO Aircraft Address and Target Identification between surveillance data and flight plans for some
aircraft flying within the Hong Kong Flight Information Region (HKFIR). More information could be
referred to CNS SG/26 WP/30.

Suggestions of Performance Parameters of Radar System and Relevant Test Methods

for APAC Region

7.15 China presented a minimal set of performance parameters that can effectively evaluate
radar systems as the follow-up of SURICG/6 that an ad-hoc group was formed to study performance
specifications and benchmarking of radar for APAC Region. China updated the minimal set of
performance parameters from WP10 in DAPs WG/5 with the continued research on these documents,
and provided the updated two minimal sets of radar performance parameters before and after updates
with relevant test methods in the paper. Considering it an interesting paper that could benefit the Region,
and China’s courtesy to share their research work documents with SURICG, the meeting agreed to
include this useful information in this paper into a guidance document for the Region. The ad-hoc group
was established to carry on the discussion of generating the proposed guidance document.
 36

ADS-B Equipage and Quality Performance in the U.S.

7.16 FAA provided a summary of observed NIC/NACp performance compared to the

requirements of the USA ADS B mandate, as well as ADS-B equipage trends in the USA. The paper
demonstrated how the performance benchmarking from airlines fleet were performed. FAA added that
FAA’s ADS-B Performance Monitor (APM) has capabilities for tracking ADS-B equipage trends. The
paper further provided the FAA ADS-B coverage map at FL350, which extends somewhat beyond the
airspace of U.S. ADS-B mandate.

Recent ADS-B Avionics Issues Observed in the United States

7.17 FAA described two recent ADS-B avionics issues observed in the USA with DO-
260B/ED-102A systems, namely Embraer 17x track jumping and Honeywell Primus II RCZ. FAA
informed that it monitors all ADS-B Version 2 information received in all airspace covered by FAA-
contracted ADS-B ground stations via the tool ADS-B Performance Monitor (APM). In addition, FAA
Flight Standards personnel have begun a campaign to reach out to aircraft owners, operators, and
certificate holders that operate this equipment to inform them of the Service Bulletin available to correct
the issue.

Performance-Based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PARC) Action Team

(AT) Exemption 12555 Report

7.18 FAA presented the report by the Performance-based Operations Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (PARC) to the FAA that contained an assessment of how well operators (exemption holders)
will be able to achieve planned position source upgrades prior to the expiration of Exemption No. 12555
by December 31, 2024.

Study on Application Optimization and Improvement of ADS-B technology for CAAC

Air Traffic Control

7.19 China introduced the outcomes of the ADS-B application study carried out by ATMB
CAAC between 2020 and 2021, which stemmed from issues that affected the quality of ATC
surveillance for the National ADS-B Project. This study was dedicated to standardising the construction
and operation of ADS-B ground equipment in China, making them in better accordance with the needs
of ADS-B operation in China.

An Anomaly of Mode A/C only Transponder Reply to Mode S Interrogation

7.20 China introduced a case where an aircraft equipped with the Mode A/C only
transponder generated false targets in response to Mode S radar interrogation in January 2022, and
explained how they analysed the causation of the phenomenon in combination with the relevant ICAO
Annex 10 specifications, and provides some suggestions for Mode S radar manufacturers and aircraft
maintenance engineers.

ADS-B IN Retrofit Spacing (AIRS) Evaluation Project

7.21 United States presented the updates to the ADS-B In Retrofit Spacing (AIRS)
evaluation project after the introduction in SURICG/6 IP/08, a large-scale operational evaluation of two
ADS-B In applications since September 2017, namely Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI)-
Assisted Visual Separation (CAVS) and Interval Management (IM). It was informed that the project
aimed to promote early adoption of ADS-B In applications and benefits data will be gathered for one
year after operation commenced.

Update on Air Traffic Control Surveillance Activities in Australia

7.22 Australia presented updates on their ATC surveillance activities including new radars,
 37

sharing of surveillance data via IP based network, the upgrading of Sydney’s ground display system
with A-SMGCS integrated into the tower automation system, and replacement of ADS-B installations.
Australia informed about a trial ground surface movement situational awareness system and a work on
low-cost ADS-B avionics for VFR and added that future joint Civilian/Military Australia wide ATM
system will provide a “Multi Sensor” surveillance tracking function. Australia is in the implementation
phase of an Integrated Drone Surveillance System (IDSS) Trial.

Update on Surveillance Activities in New Zealand

7.23 New Zealand presented an overview of their current and planned surveillance activities
on MSSRs, PSRs, Multilateration/WAM and ADS-B. ADS-B will be mandated for use within all
controlled airspace in NZZC FIR by Dec 31, 2022. Their work on migrating data from surveillance
systems to IP-based network over the last few years, and their use of UAS Traffic Management (UTM)
system “Airshare” were discussed. New Zealand will continue to follow the use of low-cost ADS-B
avionics such as electronic conspicuity (EC) devices. The paper also shared their new Air Traffic
Management system “SkyX” to be operational in Q1 2023, and a joint project between Australia and
New Zealand for the introduction of a Satellite-based augmentation system called the Southern
Positioning Augmentation Network (SouthPAN) to improve GNSS accuracy.

The Update Activity of ATC Surveillance in China

7.24 China introduced their current status of civil ATC surveillance system and latest
development, including Mode S radars, A-SMGCS, SMRs, MLAT and ADS-B ground stations, with
local, regional and national data processing centres as their hierarchal processing infrastructure. CAAC
actively carries out research on Mode S DAPs, and launched surveys on II conflict and II/SI mix
operation capabilities for the APAC Region, launched Mode S Clustering trials in China, and conduct
Surveillance Coordination Network (SCN) trials. The paper also presented the Development Plan for
CNS approved by CAAC in 2021.

Introduction to the Test of the WAM Technology in the Final Approach Monitoring

7.25 China introduced the construction of WAM system for testing the final approach
monitoring at Chengdu Shuangliu airport, and evaluated the position accuracy of the WAM data from
2020 to 2021.

Exploration and Practice of Electronic Handover in Complex Transfer Environment

between Adjacent ATC units

7.26 China introduced the experimental operation of electronic handover in complex

transfer environment between adjacent ATC units, gives and analyses the test verification results, puts
forward the follow-up measures and plans.

Surface Security Enhancement Application Based on Voice and Photoelectric

Intelligent Assistant

7.27 China shared the exploration and application of various new technologies that China
put forward the application of panoramic photoelectric video and two-way recognition technology of
tower control voice, to realize the application of airport scene intelligent security enhancement. The
paper introduced the intelligent surface security assistant system at Shanghai Hongqiao Airport.

Evaluation of Space Based ADS-B

7.28 ICCAIA described how low-cost evaluation of Space based ADS-B at customer
premises was supported. The space-based ADS-B provider, Aireon, has developed the capability to
demonstrate and test the integration of Space based ADS-B into customer ATC automation systems.
The paper also shared the experience and the way forward to arrange such evaluation.
 38

ICAO Surveillance Panel Activities

7.29 Chair of the ICAO Surveillance Panel updated SURICG/7 about the information and
discussions from the Fourth Meeting of the Surveillance Panel (SP/4) held on 28 March – 8 April 2022,
including the two working groups of SP, i.e. the Fifteenth Meeting of Aeronautical Surveillance
Working Group (SP-ASWG/15) and the Thirteenth Meeting of Airborne Surveillance Working Group
(SP-AIRBWG/13). The paper also revealed the plan for SP/5 to be held in September 2023.

RTCA Status

7.30 RTCA introduced their operations as an independent standards development

organization which supports ICAO, coordinates with EUROCAE and supports other organizations.
Their non-profit nature supports various domains across the aviation industry. The presentation
explained the background and objectives of SC-186 WG-4 with a summary of the activities of this
group.

Review APAC Regional Surveillance Strategy

7.31 The Surveillance Strategy for the APAC Region is expected to be regularly reviewed
to cope with the prevailing circumstances and developments. The ICAO Secretariat presented the last
version of the Surveillance Strategy for the APAC Region adopted in 2019 for review. SURICG/7
reviewed the comments/views received for revising the Surveillance Strategy, discussed the amendment
proposals, and formulated the revised Strategy provided in Appendix H to the Report which was further
discussed and endorsed by CNS SG/26 through the following Draft Conclusion for consideration by
APANPIRG/33:

Draft Conclusion CNS SG/26/11 (SURICG/7/3) - Revised Surveillance Strategy for the APAC
Region
What: That, the Revised Surveillance Strategy for the APAC Expected impact:
Region provided in Appendix H to the Report be adopted. ☐ Political / Global
☒ Inter-regional
☒ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: To reflect the outcome of the latest
development in surveillance technology. Follow-up: ☒Required from States

Status: Draft to be adopted by PIRG

When: 09-Sep-22
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☒ Other: SURICG

7.32 Australia expressed that caution should be given on the Strategy item related to
provision of multilayers surveillance to enhance surveillance service for meeting the contingency
surveillance requirements might propose a misinterpretation to keep PSR coverage instead of
SSR/ADS-B/other alternatives if GNSS outage observes. Co-chair of SURICG supplemented that the
Strategy item should read in conjunction with another Strategy item stated to reduce the dependence on
Primary Radar for area surveillance, which should ease the concern raised by Australia.

Positive Effect of CPR Reasonableness Test on ADS-B Security

7.33 Japan presented their reasonableness test for Compact Position Reporting (CPR)
decoding is useful for improving ADS-B security via numerical simulation, and reducing false
information that is intentionally transmitted. In Mode S DAPs WG/5, China presented the technique
called reasonableness test for CPR Decoding, originally written in RTCA-DO260B. ENRI thus
conducted a numerical simulation using this technique with the procedure, parameters and detailed
 39

results provided in the paper.

Revision of Updates to AIGD

7.34 Hong Kong China led the discussion and incorporation of materials to update AIGD
during the meeting with the methodologies to measure 1090MHz congestions and mitigating measures
raised by Singapore and ICCAIA, and the CPR Reasonableness Test by Japan. The meeting agreed to
formulate the following Draft Conclusion, which was reviewed and adopted by CNS SG/26 as follows:

Conclusion CNS SG/26/12 (SURICG/7/4) - Revised ADS-B Implementation and Operations

Guidance Document (AIGD)
What: That, the revised ADS-B Implementation and Expected impact:
Operations Guidance Document (AIGD) provided in Appendix I ☐ Political / Global
to the Report, which consolidated all change proposals during ☐ Inter-regional
SURICG/7, be adopted as Version 15.0. ☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: Updates from SURICG/7 Follow-up: ☐Required from States
When: 9-Sep-22 Status: Adopted by Subgroup
Who: ☒ Subgroup ☐APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☒ Other: SURICG

7.35 Hong Kong China clarified the reasons for the difference between the adopted values
of service level of shared data for Tiers 1 and 2 in the SURSG outcome and those specified in the AIGD,
and suggested a need to align the SURSG outcome as described in Table 1 – High-Level
Recommendations from Study Report with the definitions of Appendix 6 of AIGD. It was decided
that after deliberation, Hong Kong China will take up action to discuss with the Chair of SURSG to
align the SURSG outcome with AIGD thus ensuring no misunderstanding and the specified
performance requirements are suitable for the targeted services.

7.36 In response to the abovementioned action item, the Study Report was updated to align
with the definitions of Appendix 6 of AIGD. The updated report was shared on 15 June 2022 via email
with the focal point of voluntary Administrations/Organizations of SURSG and members who shared
comments on Tier 1 and 2 values in SURICG/7. In response, Vietnam shared its concurrence with the
study report and no feedback from other States/members were received. Therefore, the study report is
updated after incorporating all the comments of SURICG/7. The revised study report is provided in
Appendix E to the paper with updates marked in track change.

Amendment 91 to Annex 10 Volume IV - Introduction of ACAS Xa/Xo

7.37 The ICAO Secretariat presented the main points of State Letter Ref.: AN 7/66.2.2-
22/27 Subject: Adoption of Amendment 91 to Annex 10, Volume IV was circulated to States on 29
March 2022 and the action required by the letter was to notify any disapproval before 18 July 2022;
notify any differences and compliance before 3 October 2022; and consider the use of the Electronic
Filing of Differences (EFOD) System for notification of differences and compliance regarding the
Adoption of Amendment 91 to Annex 10, Volume IV, regarding the introduction of ACAS Xa/Xo, for
review and action if necessary.

7.38 The Secretariat noted that the SURICG enjoyed the support from Surveillance Panel
Chair and Members in this Region, and invited other members of Navigation Systems Panel and
Communications Panel, etc. nominated from APAC States to proactively participate and support the
work of different regional events.

7.39 CNS SG Chair expressed appreciation for the significant efforts by the SURICG and
its contributory bodies to take forward various initiatives to enhance and harmonize the surveillance
 40

capability of Member States/Administrations in the Region.

7.40 The CNS SG Chair proposed to initiate the required action to revise ICAO APAC
Navigation Strategy, if necessary. The ICAO Secretariat will take essential action to review the ICAO
APAC Navigation Strategy by offline discussion with the support of interested member
States/Administrations. ACTION ITEM 26-5

ATS Surveillance and Direct Controller and Pilot Communication VHF Coverage
Charts for APAC Region– Sec (WP/22)

7.41 The work and progress of updating the coverage charts of ATS Surveillance and Direct
Controller and Pilot Communication (DCPC) VHF for APAC Region were discussed and expected to
be incorporated in the next update of the APAC Seamless ANS Plan. The ICAO APAC Regional Office
issued the State Letter AP027/22 (CNS) in February 2022 for States/Administrations to respond to the
survey. With great assistance from Thailand, coverage charts on DCPC VHF and ATS Surveillance
have been produced with highlights of changes discussed in the Meeting. The meeting endorsed to
include the updated charts into the next update of Seamless ANS Plan. States/Administrations were
encouraged to work with appropriate parties and/or other States/Administrations to derive plans in
addressing the coverage gaps identified in the coverage charts, and States/Administrations which have
not yet responded to the survey were encouraged to contribute relevant information to complete the
coverage charts.

7.42 Australia noticed that the coverage only includes ground-based surveillance while
States like Papua New Guinea which have already implemented space-based ADS-B in their airspace
should also be considered. Despite not receiving input related to space-based ADS-B in this round of
input/update, the Secretariat noted the comment and agreed to consider also the space-based ADS-B in
future. The Secretariat also thanked Thailand for the meticulous work done and human resources paid
to complete this task.

Inconsistent ICAO Aircraft Address and Target Identification between

Surveillance Data and Flight Plan– Hong Kong China (WP/30)

7.43 The meeting reviewed the update on the observed discrepancies and contributing
factors of ICAO Aircraft Address and Target Identification between surveillance data and flight plans
for some aircraft flying within the Hong Kong Flight Information Region (HKFIR). Despite Conclusion
CNS SG/25/13 (SURICG/6/7) endorsed to urge States/Administrations to proactively follow up with
air operators to address discrepancies, the problems still persist and improvement in the overall situation
has not been seen. Detailed analysis of the causal factors contributing to “Aircraft Address” (AD) /
“Target Identification” (ID) discrepancies were provided in the paper and discussed in the meeting. The
paper further discussed the remedial and preventive measures taken by Hong Kong China to mitigate
the impact on operations caused by the recurring discrepancies. With this issue also discussed in
SURICG/7, in that meeting IATA appreciated the effort by Hong Kong China and agreed to continue
their effort to communicate with airlines for any ANSPs that encounter such discrepancies and IATA
requested copying of these communications for following up with airline operators. CNS SG Chair
highlighted that this could lead to concern on additional workload to ATC thus potential safety hazard
to ATC operations, and the issue presented in this paper would still require further effort in the Region
considering recovery in air traffic. As such, the Secretariat invited Hong Kong China and IATA to
support ICAO APAC Regional Office to organize a webinar/workshop on this topic in 2023 to promote
awareness of this issue and the best practice in mitigation. ACTION ITEM 26-6

7.44 IATA supplemented that they had already provided a detailed de-brief to airlines about
the issue reported by Hong Kong China after the SURICG/7 meeting. The briefing specifically
sensitized airlines on discrepancies and causes, and appealed to them for crosschecking and reminding
their employees about the issue. IATA also reminded ANSPs to copy any communication with
defaulting airlines on this subject so as to help operators in taking up the issue.

Research on ADS-B Position Verification - Japan (IP/14)

 41

7.45 Japan summarized the outcome of the research on ADS-B position verification
obtained in Electronic Navigation Research Institute (ENRI). The purpose of position verification is to
detect false positions which may be caused by illegal transmissions or avionics failures. By experiment
and computer simulation, ENRI recommended two effective methods: The time-Difference of Arrival
(TDOA) method which has been incorporated into the AIGD, and the reasonableness test for compact
position reporting (CPR) decoding which is to be incorporated into the next AIGD edition.

7.46 Co-chair of SURICG stated that the materials provided by Japan are informative and it
was agreed in SURICG/7 meeting to incorporate them into the AIGD Ver. 15.0 as adopted in CNS
SG/26, and CNS SG Chair encouraged the Region for more sharing from research and experiences to
enable more members States could broaden the horizon in resolving issues observed.

Other Updates from States

7.47 New Zealand advised that Airways New Zealand signed a contract with Indra Spain to
purchase 3 MSSR/PSR3D radars to replace the existing MSSR and PSRs which are nearing end of life.
The new MSSR/PSR3D radars are to be used as a contingency system to provide surveillance coverage
over the international airports at NZAA, NZWN and NZCH in the event of a sustained GNSS outage
affecting New Zealand’s prime surveillance coverage of ADS-B.

7.48 New Zealand would like to request ICAO Member States to update their airlines which
operate into New Zealand, as of midnight Dec 31, 2022 (NZDT) or 202212301100 UTC that all
controlled airspace within the NZZC FIR will become ADS-B mandatory airspace. Updated guidance
for flight into NZ will be published in the NZ AIP towards the end of 2022.

Agenda Item 8: Automation

Review Outcomes of the Webinar on Air Traffic Management Automation System

and the Third Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Air Traffic Management Automation
System Task Force (ATMAS TF/3)- Sec (WP/14)

8.1 The paper summarised the discussion in the Webinar on Air Traffic Management
Automation System and the work accomplished by the Third Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Air Traffic
Management Automation System Task Force (ATMAS TF/3).

Webinar on Implementation of ATM Automation System

8.2 The Webinar on Implementation of ATM Automation System was organized in

conjunction with the ATMAS TF/3 meeting on 7 June 2022. The Webinar was conducted in two
sessions, the Session 1 focused on Practices Experience Sharing, while the Session 2 focused on System
Integration and Interoperability. It provided the APAC region an update on the latest developments and
practices related to ATM automation systems at global and regional levels. Total 8 comprehensive
presentations from contributors were presented during the webinar.

Repository of the ATMAS in APAC

8.3 To follow up the Action Item 2-2 of ATMAS TF/2 to work out a revised repository of
ATMAS implementation status in APAC, based on the draft table designed by Indonesia, the
suggestions from ATMAS TF/2 and the latest version of the ATMAS IGD, the table of ATMAS status
in APAC region was re-designed and re-formatted by the ad-hoc group led by Indonesia. The table of
ATMAS status in APAC region has been reviewed and adopted by the ATMAS TF/3 meeting. While
filling the table, the Member States are recommended to refer to the explanation of the table and the
corresponding chapter of ATMAS IGD to get further information. The ICAO Secretariat was requested
to issue a State Letter in due course to circulate the table to collect information in order to build the
 42

repository of the ATM automation systems for APAC Region.

Updates on Development of Air Traffic Management Automation System Problem

Reporting Database (ATMAS PRD)

8.4 Hong Kong China presented the updates and the latest progress on the development of
ATMAS PRD as a follow-up action to ACTION ITEM 2-3. Further to discussion in ATMAS TF/2, it
was considered more appropriate to separate the ATMAS PRD from ADS-B Avionics Problem
Reporting Database (APRD), and with support from China, Hong Kong China has lined up with the
software development resources from CAAC ATMB. Hong Kong China invited the ATMAS TF/3
meeting to further discuss on the database schemas for Report of ATMS-related issues and AIDC-
related issues. States/Administrations were encouraged to nominate a point of contact for registration
with the ICAO APAC Regional Office, and contribute to the development of ATMAS PRD.

8.5 The ATMAS TF/3 meeting agreed to add one agenda item for next meeting to
encourage the States/Administrations to refer to the classifications of fault introduced by China, share
valuable issues or problems encountered in ATM automation system, and discuss the necessity of
ATMAS PRD.

Updates from States

8.6 Singapore presented its development of a prototype Secure Data Bridge (SDB) to
extract historical and real-time data from the Air Traffic Management System (ATMS) in an automated,
safe and secure manner that would be useful for ATM related functions and services. Singapore shared
the concept of the SDB and the benefits of testing potential use cases safely outside of the ATMS.

8.7 Based on the polygonal MSAW warning area, China summarized the empirical data of
SIDs/STARs procedures and the approach procedures, and proposed a new optimized MSAW around
the airport combining four regions layer by layer in China. Through years of practical experience in
China, the four regional segmentation settings, combined layer by layer, constitute the current optimal
MSAW around the airport, and the advantages and disadvantages of each area alert have been
elaborated.

8.8 China shared the experience in flight inspection of Air Traffic Management
Automation System (ATMAS) in the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). The ATMAS
TF/3 meeting was informed that CAAC has promulgated the ATMAS flight inspection technical
requirements in 2011, and the recommended preparatory work, subjects, implementation, and follow-
up work of the flight inspection have been summarized in detail.

8.9 New Zealand presented an overview implementation history of the new Air Traffic
Management System (ATMS) that will be introduced into operation in 2023 and also highlighted
lessons learnt thus far. The progress of requirements definition and system selection, development, re-
sized implementation under Covid-19, and lessons learnt were shared in detail.

8.10 With this successful experience of Qingdao Jiaodong Airport realizing "overall
relocation and overnight transition", China shared the hurdles in transition and relocation and analyzed
the corresponding solutions. China informed that China will continue in-depth research and
optimization of ATM automation system transition solutions under various transition modes with the
help of advanced technology and management methods.

8.11 Philippines presented the impact of GPS Week Rollover to the ATM Automation
System at Philippine Air Traffic Management Center. Philippines shared that based on this experience
in using NTP servers, it is important to keep track of the hardware and/or software limitations as these
may vary in the solution provided by the vendor.

8.12 China introduced the technical scheme of SWIM-based interoperability for ATM
automation systems, built a test platform to verify the feasibility, and provided the summary of the
 43

research. China summarized that through the studies and tests, SWIM-based interoperability of ATMAS
is theoretically feasible, and expected to carry out practical exploration in the real SWIM network
environment in future.

8.13 China presented the application of a data exchange platform among computer-based
information systems related to air traffic services. China has set up the data exchange platform with
four data exchange sub-platforms located in different physical locations, and introduced the structure
of the data exchange platform and an application example of using sub-module of the data exchange
platform in Capital Airport Tower.

8.14 Singapore presented its plans to implement FF-ICE/Release 1 (R1) and highlights the
key considerations in planning for the Filing Services and Flight Data Request Services. Singapore has
commenced planning in 2020 and plans to introduce two FF-ICE services by 2026. Furthermore, three
key considerations that Singapore would be focusing on for FF-ICE implementation were elaborated.
Singapore also opined that with increased participation, FF-ICE will mature faster and bring about more
accurate and updated information exchanges allowing for a rich collaborative environment. The
ATMAS TF/3 meeting was invited to explore opportunities to synchronize planning for FF-ICE
implementation in the APAC region to achieve tangible benefits for all.

8.15 China introduced the new trends of controller training system development in
circumstance of surging new technological applications, which can not only import airspace situation
from ATM automatic system, extract flight information and generate exercise script, but also be used as
a platform for airspace situation replay.

8.16 China introduced the arrival flight runway allocation optimization method in the
AMAN aided decision-making function in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. This
method is a runway allocation optimization method based on the minimum intersection and ground
taxiing time, which can reduce air cross conflicts, controller workload and ground taxiing time.

8.17 To assist air traffic controllers under the enhanced wake turbulence separation scheme
to improve consistency in handling arrival traffic at the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA), Hong
Kong China is implementing an Approach Spacing Tool (AST) for the final approach traffic. The AST
has passed system acceptance testing and Hong Kong China is now adapting configuration of the system
to fit it into the local operational environment which is currently planned for operation in 2023.

8.18 China presented the current cybersecurity status of ATMAS in China, and the brief
design on 3 key aspects of cybersecurity in common between Air Traffic Management Security Manual
(ICAO Doc 9985) and Chinese cyber security standard serial (GB/T 22239-2019). To downgrade the
risks of ATM automation system, the whole ATM automation system is divided into 6 logical security
domains according to their functions and the segregation measures and security policies between the 6
logical security zones were shared in detail. The ICAO Secretariat proposed that this paper could be
presented in the ICAO cybersecurity webinar in the future.

8.19 China shared the status of the AIDC implementation in China, the progress of
implementation with adjacent ATSUs in 2021, and the related issues and suggestions encountered
during the implementation. China further updated the implementation of AIDC between China and
seven adjacent ATS units, totalling 10 pairs of ATSUs with highlighted on explaining the progress and
issues faced between Beijing ACC and Ulaanbaatar ACC AIDC and Kunming ACC and Vientiane
ACC.

8.20 China presented the current AIDC implementation status of ATMAS in China,
discussed the challenge of balancing AIDC packet delay and switching convenience when the main and
fallback ATMAS are switched, and introduced further solutions. The pros and cons of the two methods
in the AIDC message transmission by shared AFTN link and dedicated link when main and fallback
ATMAS are switched were elaborated.

8.21 China introduced the CAAC Specification for ATMAS Part 3 Data Exchange to follow
 44

up the ACTION ITEMS 2-4 of ATMAS TF/2 to translate the information on MH/T 4029.3 into English.
China informed that the MH/4029.3 is intended to stipulate the requirements for flight data exchange
between ATC and related systems. The advantages, applicable system, content composition, and system
connections were shared in detail.

Air Traffic Management Automation System Implementation and Operations Guidance

Document

8.22 The paper presented the revised draft (Edition 1.0) of the Air Traffic Management
Automation System Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (ATMAS IGD) for ATMAS
TF/3 meeting review. Following ATMAS TF/2 meeting ACTION ITEM 2-5, ICAO APAC regional
office issued the State Letter AP173-21 (CNS) to gather further inputs and comments for the draft of
ATMAS IGD. With 101 comments received from States, the ad-hoc group led by China, with the
support of Hong Kong China and Singapore, worked on further improvement and polishing of the
ATMAS IGD. Based on New Zealand’s additional comments and suggestions during the ATMAS TF/3
meeting, the ATMAS IGD was further updated by the ad-hoc group for ATMAS TF/3 meeting review.

8.23 With aforementioned, the following Conclusion formulated by ATMAS TF/3 was
adopted by CNS SG/26 meeting.

Conclusion CNS SG/26/13 (ATMAS TF/3/1) - ATMAS IGD Edition 1.0

What: The Air Traffic Management Automation System Expected impact:
Implementation and Operations Guidance Document Edition 1.0 ☐ Political / Global
provided in Appendix J to this Report be adopted ☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical
Why: The revised draft has been added the
Follow-up: ☐Required from
DMAN function and reviewed/updated with inputs from
various States States

When: 9-Sep-22 Status: Adopted by Subgroup

Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☐ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☒Other: ATMAS TF

Repository of AIDC Implementation Status in APAC

8.24 To follow up the ACTION ITEM 7-1 of APA TF/7 and considering the necessity of a
comprehensive monitoring tool for AIDC implementation status in APAC region to support data
statistics and analysis, the ICAO Secretariat designed a new table to maintain a common understanding
between ATMAS TF and ACSICG on AIDC implementation, and eventually build up the regional
repository of AIDC Implementation Status. The ACSICG/9 and ATMAS TF/3 have reviewed and
adopted the format of the table of AIDC Implementation Status in APAC region with the current status.
The ICAO Secretariat has incorporated the AIDC implementation status relevant information gathered
before and will issue a State Letter in due course to circulate the table to States/Administrations for
supplements and validation.

AIDC Implementation Issues Report

8.25 The ATMAS TF/3 meeting reviewed and discussed the consolidated implementation
issues collected and presented by Indonesia with support from India and Singapore. Indonesia updated
to the meeting that new reported AIDC implementation issues provided in the ATMAS TF/3 was 7 new
issues. The number of AIDC implementation issues reported by members States/ Administration, based
 45

on fault category are as shown in a table and chart:

ATMAS TF/3 (2022)

Fault Categories
Issues Reported Closed Open
a. Communication Link 9 6 2
b. ATM System 65 35 30
c. AIDC Message 23 14 9
d. Airspace Design/Procedures 13 7 6
e. Other 6 3 3
Total 116 66 50

Check List for ATMAS Project Management

8.26 To follow up the Action Item 1-2 of ATMAS TF/1, China developed check list for
ATMAS project management from the scratch of planning, requirement definition, bidding,
implementation to operational transition, and introduced the check list to Member States in detail. The
meeting discussed and agreed to further polish the check list.

Agenda Item 9: Review and updates

Review of Regional CNS Requirements in ICAO APAC e-ANP, Seamless ANS

Plan and National Air Navigation Plan (NANP) – Sec (WP/15)

9.1 This paper presented the Regional CNS requirements specified in the three Volumes
of ICAO APAC e-ANP, Seamless ANS Plan (Version 3.0, November 2019) and updates on National
Air Navigation Plan (NANP). The meeting participants were invited to review all CNS-related
information affecting their administration in the e-ANP and provide feedback to ICAO APAC Regional
Office to update as necessary. States/Administrations are also invited to formulate their NANP to
comply with commitments to Beijing Declaration by 2022.

9.2 It was noticed that the information contained in e-ANP Volume I Table AOP I-1 –
International Aerodromes Required in the Asia/Pacific Regions, and Volume II Table AOP II-1 –
Requirements and Capacity Assessment in International Aerodromes in the Asia and Pacific Regions
have been updated by various States. In this connection, the Table CNS II-APAC-2 Radio Navigation
Aids, which contains the details of each runway in aerodromes, will need corresponding updates with
inclusion of new aerodromes to reflect the latest status and align with tables aforementioned.
States/Administrations should submit the updates through PfA process. Member States/Administrations
were reminded to review and update all CNS facilities listed and CNS requirements specified in the e-
ANP to verify that the information provided for their States/Administration is up-to-date and correct.

9.3 Noting the GANP to be reviewed in coming 41st Assembly, subsequently the review of
the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan will happen after the 41st Assembly to make sure the Plan follows
the latest version of GANP, subject to the arrangement of ATM Section of the Regional Office. In
addition, States/Administrations were reminded the need to formulate their NANP to comply with
commitments to Beijing Declaration by 2022.

Updates on Beijing Declaration Implementation Related to CNS – Sec (WP/16)

9.4 The ICAO Secretariat shared the information about current status of the Minister’s
commitment for implementation of technology (CNS) components under Air Navigation Services
mentioned in ‘Declaration on Asia/Pacific Ministerial Conference on Civil Aviation’ also known as
Beijing Declaration, which is to be implemented by 2022. The latest status of Ministerial Commitment
for PBN implementation was reflected in graph-based on iSTARS tool updates, while current status of
Common ground/ground telecommunication infrastructure to support ANS applications and Enhanced
 46

surveillance capability including ADS- B technology were informed at the meeting based on the
information updated during CNS meetings.

Updates on Seamless ANS Plan – Sec (WP/33)

9.5 The paper presented a proposal for the update of the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan
for CNS SG comment. The CNS SG/26 meeting was informed that the update cycle of the Asia/Pacific
Seamless ANS Plan was based on the intention that APANPIRG and its contributory bodies conduct a
complete review every three years to align with the review cycle of the Global Air Navigation Plan
(GANP). The 2019 update of the Seamless Plan included consideration of the major GANP update
which was still being finalized during that year and had not yet been approved by the ICAO Assembly.
Additionally, an initial summary of considerations for the update of the Seamless ANS Plan has been
elaborated, and taking into consideration the GANP update cycle, it is proposed that the Seamless ANS
Plan be updated during 2022/2023, and presented to APANPIRG Sub-Groups in 2023 before then being
presented for the approval of APANPIRG/34 in 2023. The CNS SG/26 meeting was also informed that
the Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Plan Volume III is intended to incorporate regional planning objectives,
priorities and targets, implementation monitoring and reporting, and other regional guidance material,
under the management of APANPIRG. The proposed change to the Seamless ANS Plan update cycle
will be presented to the ATM/SG/10 meeting in October 2022, and then to APANPIRG/33 in November
2022 for consideration and agreement. The CNS SG/26 meeting has no further comment on the
proposal raised by this working paper.

Update on ICAO GANP Study Group Related to CNS - Sec (IP/06)

9.6 The ICAO Secretariat presented the updates on ICAO GANP Study Group and shared
the Working Paper from ICAO Council which contained the suggested changes in detail to the GANP
to be presented to the 41st ICAO Assembly Sessions for meeting review. ICAO, following up on
Recommendation 4.3/1 of the Thirteenth Air Navigation Conference (AN/Conf-13), established the
GANP Study Group (GANP-SG) with a group of performance experts in June 2019, which worked on
the updates of the Safety Performance Framework, ASBU Framework and BBBs. The Working Paper
from ICAO Council which introduces the Seven Edition of GANP in detail will be presented to the 41st
ICAO Assembly Sessions for endorsement. States/Administrations were invited to analyze this proposal
and present their comments during the Assembly. Once the proposed changes are approved by the ICAO
Assembly, the Secretariat will share the latest version with the meeting.

The Long-Term Vision for the Future Air Traffic Systems of Japan (CARATS) (IP/18)

9.7 The CARATS (Collaborative Actions for Renovation of Air Traffic Systems), as the
Japanese long-term vision for the future of air traffic systems, was established in 2010, which defined
goals and directions for renovation toward 2025. With the update of the 6th edition of the GANP, the
planning horizon of the roadmap had been extended to 2040. Decarbonization is now a keyword to the
sustainable future development of civil aviation and it should be made in response to corresponding to
the growth in air traffic demand. JCAB is making a further review about CARATS with strong emphasis
on decarbonization, while considering the improvement of the air navigation system through
renovations, such as TBO, domestic airspace reconstruction, optimized take-off and landing.
Information on the CARATS can be obtained from: http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000128185.pdf

Global Developments Related to CNS – Sec (Presentation/02)

9.8 The presentation was prepared by Communications, Navigation, Surveillance and

Frequency Spectrum Management (CNSS) Section and Airport Operations and Infrastructure (AOI)
Section, ANB, ICAO HQ, which covered the outcomes and ongoing tasks from various working groups
such as Communications Panel, Navigation Systems Panel, Surveillance Panel and Frequency Spectrum
Management Panel in the first half of 2022. The presentation also briefly introduced the current status
of the work owned by the Integrated CNS and Spectrum Task Force (ICNSS), and other CNSS activities
 47

with a focus on the Frequency Finder tool.

Agenda Item 10: Review status of CNS deficiencies (APANPIRG Deficiency List)

Review Status of CNS Deficiencies – Sec (WP/17)

10.1 The paper presented the list of Air Navigation Deficiencies in the CNS field which was
reviewed in APANPIRG/31. The only outstanding issue was related to unreliability of AFS
communication between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Poor performance of AFS including data
communication between Kabul and Karachi and ATS voice communication between Lahore and Kabul
had become issues of regional concerns. A COM coordination meeting (Afghanistan, China and
Pakistan) held in July 2019 in ICAO APAC Regional Sub-Office agreed to restore the VSAT connection
by upgrading the VSAT terminals and equipment in Lahore and Karachi. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan
were also agreed to implement CRV as soon as practical. However, there was no further progress after
last update in 2020. The current List of Air Navigation Deficiencies in the CNS field was reviewed in
CNS SG/26 and endorsed as Appendix K to this report.

10.2 The ICAO APAC Regional Office benchmarked Deficiencies in CNS fields in other
Regions for information that is openly available. It was noticed that not all Regions identified
Deficiencies in CNS fields. In addition, in the Ninth Meeting of ATM Sub-Group (ATM SG/9) held in
1-5 November 2021, WP/10 reviewed the IFALPA defined deficiencies. States/Administrations are
encouraged to take note of CNS-related IFALPA deficiencies, and take proper action to address these
IFALPA deficiencies.

10.3 Pakistan stated that they upgraded the hardware of VSAT from IDU 3000 to IDU 5000
in the year 2007. In addition, a VPN link was established between Karachi and Kabul through UK. Now
the VPN link between UK and Kabul is un-serviceable. Pakistan identified that the data and voice
communication through CRV is a workable solution. Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority has conveyed
ICAO its intention to join CRV by December 2022. In the Meeting, Pakistan requested ICAO to
provide assistance in establishing VSAT link and to coordinate with Afghanistan regarding their
tentative timeline to join the CRV.

Agenda Item 11: Human Factors and Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel (ATSEPs)
related training

Review Outcomes of Small Working Group Study on Human Factor Issues of

ATSEP – IFATSEA (WP/18)

11.1 This paper presented the regional ATSEP human factor guidance material for review
and adoption and summarized the discussion and deliberations done in various Ad-hoc work group
meetings held since last CNS SG/25 meeting in October 2021 for finding the left-out gaps and for
preparing the regional ATSEP human factor guidance material. This paper also summarized the key
concepts based on which the guidance material is prepared for assuring the mutual benefits to ANSP
and ATSEP.

11.2 The meeting recalled that in response to APANPIRG Conclusion C 31/15, the State
Letter Ref.: T 3/9.9- AP022/21 (CNS) dated 26 January 2021 on subject Addressing Human Factor
Issues of ATSEP was sent by ICAO APAC Office. In response, Eight (8) States/Administrations (China,
Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Thailand) nominated
their experts, and the ad-hoc group led by IFATSEA was formed with the participants from Eight (8)
States/Administrations and one International Organization namely International Federation of Air
Traffic Safety Electronics Associations (IFATSEA) in April 2021.

11.3 The meeting noted that this Ad-hoc workgroup has conducted Twelve (12) meetings
right from its establishment since April 2021. There has been a total of Seven (7) meetings conducted
since the last CNS SG/25 meeting. Additionally, IFATSEA has conducted Global Webinar on Human
Performance on 12th November 2021 to deliberate the ATSEP human performance and organizational
 48

resilience. IFATSEA has also arranged series of mastermind sessions involving volunteers from the
work group on deliberating the issues that affect the human performance and solutions to ensure the
highest level of performance. The paper shared Roadmap, timeline, and tasks of the Ad-hoc workgroup
meetings and proceedings and Principles adopted in the guidance material.

11.4 The guidance material was presented and discussed in the meeting. The meeting noted
that there are five chapters with evaluation check lists namely (3) People Resourcing, (4) Job, Role And
Skills Analysis And Competency Modelling, (5) Knowledge Management, Talent Management,
Learning And Development, (6) Induction Of New Systems And Maintenance Philosophy, and (7)
Work Environment, Well-Being, Performance, And Reward. In addition, the guidance material has the
three chapters without evaluation check lists namely (8) Motivation, Commitment, And Engagement,
(9) Behavioural And Role Specific Competencies, and (10) Safety Culture Promotion. The eight
appendices are also added in the guidance material. These are (1) Stress factor mapping (2) Stress
factors, (3) Counter measures, (4) ATSEP duty time limitation, (5) Measures during Pandemic, (6)
Progressive Training, (7) Stress management and (8) Safety culture. It was added that with
aforementioned, the ad-hoc group has completed the task for the preparation of ICAO ATSEP human
factor guidance material.

11.5 The meeting appreciated the work completed by the Ad-hoc group in one year. The
ICAO Secretariat suggested to share the guidance material with APAC Member States for their
comments and observations. It was added that once feedbacks from APAC Member States are received
and compiled, the Ad-hoc group may review the comments and modify the guidance material if
required. After modifications, the revised ICAO ATSEP human factor guidance material may be
presented to CNS SG/27 for adoption. The meeting agreed to the proposal. The ICAO Secretariat will
share the State Letter to all APAC Member States to provide their comments on proposed ICAO ATSEP
human factor guidance material in due course. ACTION ITEM 26-7 The meeting encouraged member
States to review the guidance material and respond to the State Letter in a timely manner.

Standardizing the ATSEP Training for the Successful Implementation of the

GANP - Nepal (WP/25)

11.6 Nepal shared that aviation professionals have an essential role in the transition to, and
successful implementation of the GANP. It added that the system changes will affect the work of many
skilled personnel in the air and on the ground, potentially changing their roles and interactions and even
requiring new proficiencies to be developed. Furthermore, with the expected growth of aviation, it is
critical that enough qualified and competent personnel are available to ensure a safe and efficient
aviation system. Therefore, according to the Doc 9750-AN/963 Fifth Edition – 2016 “Global Air
Navigation Plan 2016-2030, for the safe air transportation system along with managing the risks
associated with human performance and proactively anticipate interface and workstation design, need
of the training for Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel (ATSEPs) utilizing competency-based
training methods is essential.

11.7 The meeting was informed that Doc 10057 has recommended the ATSEP training be
organized in the following Phase 0- Selection, Phase 1- Initial training, Phase 2- Unit training, Phase 3-
Continuation training, and Phase 4- Development training. Although, Doc 10057 has recommended the
Training Objectives for the basic training courses, specifying the initial training for the priorities
modules of ASBU as an integral part of GANP, such as B0 ACDM, B1 ACDM, B0 DATM, B1 DATM,
B1 SWIM, B2 SWIM, FF-ICE are not included in Doc 10057. As part of the Next Generation of
Aviation Professionals (NGAP) programme, training, educating and retaining the next generation of
aviation professionals, the basic training of the above ASBU module shall be included in Doc 10057,
“Manual on Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel, Competency-based Training and Assessment” for
the successful implementation of the GANP.

11.8 The meeting was invited to identify the training needs of ATSEPs in some important
ASBU modules like B0 ACDM, B1 ACDM, B0 DATM, B1 DATM, B1 SWIM, B2 SWIM, as
suggested by Nepal, for the successful implementation of GANP and incorporate the ASBU module
described above in Doc 10057, “Manual on Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel, Competency-
 49

based Training.

11.9 IFATSEA shared that scope to include ASBUs are already covered in the document
10057, such as to follow SARPs, regional and global policies etc. Additionally, inclusion of ASBUs
into basic or qualification training as separate subject, if required, should be deliberated in the expert
group at ICAO HQ.

11.10 After some deliberation, the CNS SG Chair shared his views that the “important”
ASBU modules may be different from the prioritised ASBU modules in the APAC Seamless ANS Plan,
and that basic training module covering International and national organizations and standards, Air
traffic services, airspace standards and meteorology, CNS/ATM concepts may include general
terminologies of ASBU modules and human factors. Additionally, qualification training modules may
group ASBU modules into specific modules such as Communications, Navigation, Surveillance,
Information Management including cyber security, etc.

11.11 The ICAO Secretariat noted the deliberation and will work with IFATSEA to share
with the relevant expert group of ICAO HQ and the deliberation be evaluated along with other topics
identified as valuable to the ATSEP training objectives, such as cybersecurity as proposed by other
stakeholders in Assembly 41. ACTION ITEM 26-8

Agenda Item 12: Cybersecurity of CNS/ATM systems

Updates on ICAO International Aviation Trust Framework- Sec

(Presentation/01)

12.1 The ICAO Secretariat shared the recent development ICAO’s work on building an
International Aviation Trust Framework since CNS SG/25, including developments of TFSG,
information security framework (ISF), new proof of concept exercise, and digital identity. The meeting
was informed that several papers on the trust framework and cybersecurity received for A41, and ICAO
is working on SkyTalk and sidebar meeting to promote cyber activities within ICAO.

Ensuring Cyber Resilience for Air Navigation Service in Hong Kong

International Airport and its Expansion (WP/31)

12.2 Hong Kong China shared their experience in provision of an effective cyber security
management framework to ensure safe and secured air navigation service (ANS) for supporting the
operation of Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) and its expansion into Three Runway System,
with high digitization and interconnection put in place. The paper introduced the establishment of Air
Navigation Services Cyber Security Committee (CACSC) by Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department
(CAD) to steer the implementation of cyber security control measures throughout the whole life cycle
of ANS systems to manage risks of cyber security threats while maintaining confidentiality, integrity,
availability and safety in provisions of ANS to the aviation stakeholders. The paper further introduced
the documentation developed to promulgate cyber security policies and implementation guidelines to
all the stakeholders concerned, with internal assessments conducted to ensure the effectiveness of
various control measures. In addition, The Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau (CSTCB) of
the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) has been working in hand with CAD to conduct independent
assessments and make recommendations, including the establishment of a communication mechanism
for CAD to seek swift assistance/advice from the CSTCB for sharing intelligence and in the event of
cyber security incidents, and regular drills performed jointly by CAD and CSTCB. To cope with the
expansion of the HKIA into 3RS, a new ATC tower was implemented with new ANS systems of high-
degree digitization and interconnection. CAD has engaged an independent assessor to carry out an
independent assessment on cyber security, which confirmed that there is no cyber security risk. The
paper invited States/Administrations to share their experience and make reference to the guidelines and
best practices promulgated by ICAO or other international organizations in developing a robust and
effective cyber security management framework.
 50

Agenda Item 13: Discuss and share experience and application of new technologies, including
big data analysis, artificial intelligence, Digital Tower, counter UAS detection
and identification system, UTM, etc.

13.1 Under this agenda item, in response to APANPIRG’s call on enhancing engagement
with the industry, CNS SG invited various industry partners to share and update the latest progress in
relevant areas.

Trial Flight and Standard Establishment of UAS-Based Flight Inspection in

China (WP/27)

13.2 China provided the trial flight information and standard establishment progress of
UAS-based flight inspection in China. China informed that the R&D team has been developing a
leading and practical flight inspection technology based on the fixed-wing and hybrid-wing UAS, which
was tested and validated in several trial flights. The detailed solution and result of the trail flights have
been introduced through a PowerPoint attached. In 2021, based on the achievements obtained from
R&D and trial flights, Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) proposed a standard and
regulation establishment plan covering UAS, mission payload, inspection specification, crew
qualification, routine maintenance and operation, to guide and encourage UAS-based flight inspection
development and application. The meeting was invited to discuss the trial flight solution and result,
review the three parts of the standard and regulation establishment plan, and promote UAS-based flight
inspection technology application.

13.3 Considering UAS-Based flight inspection is the upcoming technology, the CNS SG
Chair invited and China agreed to keep the CNS SG abreast of their latest development in the next CNS
SG meeting.

Provision of a Digital Tower and Apron Management System to Support Safe

and Efficient Operation of the Hong Kong International Airport and its
Expansion (WP/29)

13.4 To support the expansion of the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) into Three
Runway System, Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department (CAD) has partnered with Airport Authority
Hong Kong (AAHK) to implement a Digital Apron and Tower Management System (DATMS) under
roadmap of the ICAO Global Air Navigation Plan. With the first phase commissioned in July 2022, the
DATMS comprises two systems, namely Digital Tower Facilities (DTF) which provides enhanced
visuals of air and ground movements or supplement out-of-sight for ATC purposes, and Digital Apron
Management System (DAMS) which caters for airport operation. The features and benefits of DTF and
DAMS were introduced in depth in the paper. The implementation of DATMS enhances information
exchange and real-time situation awareness between air traffic controllers and airport operational
personnel, fosters closer collaborations and facilitates decision-making, all of which are conducive to
further improving the safety and efficiency of the overall ATC and airport operations. It sets a good
example of further enhancing the safety and efficiency of busy airports, especially during the period of
air traffic recovery. A harmonized approach with common standards and guidance materials is
recommended to facilitate the implementation of Digital Tower and Digital Apron technologies
worldwide. The paper encouraged States/Administrations to share their experience in the use of
advanced technologies in busy airports to support safe and efficient provisions of air navigation service,
which is of particular importance for air traffic recovery.

Development of Digital Tower Prototype at Changi Airport – Singapore (IP/08)

13.5 The paper highlighted the overall experience and lessons learnt from the development
of a digital tower prototype at Changi Airport. The meeting was informed that the Civil Aviation
Authority of Singapore (CAAS) embarked on a research study in 2015 to evaluate a digital tower
concept for high-intensity runway operations at Changi Airport. The research study then concluded that
there was scope to develop a digital tower solution for Changi Airport which could reap numerous
operational benefits, including enhanced situational awareness and visibility, improved line of sight,
 51

and enhanced safety and operational efficiency. Singapore summarized the development of the digital
tower prototype, shared the challenges and lessons learnt, and introduced future plans to evaluate the
next steps required to progress from a prototype system to deploying digital tower technologies in an
operational environment.

13.6 Considering the Digital Tower technology had triggered favourable response from
APAC members, the CNS SG Chair suggested and Hong Kong China and Singapore agreed to keep the
CNS SG abreast of their latest development in the next CNS SG meeting.

Comprehensive Applications of the Radar-based Monitoring Systems in Airport

- CETC Glarun (Presentation/03)

13.7 CETC Glarun Technology presented various monitoring requirements of airport

operation, as well as the site specific restrictions in terms of radio frequency, installation, power supply
and communications. The proposed comprehensive solution for Hong Kong International Airport is
based on a comprehensive application of radar-based movement monitoring system, Radio Frequency
detection, Electro-Optic (EO) sensor and Automatic Identification System (AIS) which comprises UAS
Detection System (UASDS) and Taller Vessel Movement Monitoring System (TVMMS), with AI
capability, to better protect the airport operation.

Digital Towers: Resilience, Recovery, Refocus – Searidge (Presentation/04)

13.8 Searidge Technologies highlighted the Resilience, Recovery, Refocus as its 3Rs
concept applied in the process to implement digital tower. They explained that Resilience is to maintain
essential services and address contingency, Recovery provides scalable solutions to adapt emerging
business cases and system integration, Refocus utilizes technology to make operations more sustainable,
flexible and efficient in broader industry sectors. Digital Apron and Tower Management System
(DATMS) in Hong Kong was discussed as applications for ATC tower & airport apron management.

Advanced Digitization Facilitating Air Traffic Development- Huawei

(Presentation/05)

13.9 Huawei presented its observation on global digital transformation for the aviation
industry, and the challenges of integrating technologies, data and services. Huawei proposed upgraded
connectivity, renewed platform and augmented intelligence to empower smart air traffic control in
meeting the new requirements on full situational awareness, intelligence-assisted decision making and
operation assurance, as well as a Data Governance model for Air Traffic Management.

Experience Sharing on Digital Towers – SAAB (Presentation/06)

13.10 Saab shared its experiences on digital towers as an integral part of ATM and airport
digitalization. Saab presented their generic remote/digital tower setup, multiple use cases solution, air
traffic services on demand, optimization of today and future, flexible and resilient configuration, and
the fields of research.

Agenda Item 14: CNS related work/projects impacted by COVID-19

Impact of COVID-19 to CNS Works in 2022 – Sec (WP/19)

14.1 The ICAO Secretariat summarised the impact of COVID-19 on CNS works in 2022. It
included the CNS meetings scheduled for 2022 by VTC, the organisation of a series of webinars for
easier access to ICAO events, and increase in the number of participants than face to face meeting. The
CNS SG Chair suggested that Hybrid meeting could be considered for the future meeting or workshop
which topic requires winder coverage. The meeting noted that due to the decline of implementation of
CNS/ATM projects by the Member States, the planned programme has been postponed or has broken
into phases and the harmonisation of implementing activities between neighbouring States and among
 52

stakeholders became more difficult. The meeting noted that concerning the development of the COVID
pandemic to the aviation development in APAC Region, DGCA/57 has raised several Action Items
stemmed from recovery of COVID situation. The details of Action Items related to CNS are presented
in WP/04 of CNS SG/26.

Agenda Item 15: Any Other Business

Tracking CNS-Related APANPIRG Conclusions/Decisions – Sec (WP/12)

14.2 The ICAO Secretariat presented the CNS-related APANPIRG Conclusions/Decisions

summarized in the excel table with marked of current status for review and action by the meeting. In
view of the importance of the APANPIRG Conclusions/Decisions, the Secretariat has reviewed the
reports of the former meetings from APANPIRG/1 to APANPIRG/32, and extracted more than 600
CNS-related APANPIRG Conclusions/Decisions from the reports on various media and consolidate in
one Microsoft Excel table with marked status as in force/applicable, closed, not applicable, group
dissolved, superseded, task completed, and undertaken by ICAO HQ/Panels, for easy reference and
tracking by States/Administrations, which is provided in Appendix to this Paper.

CNS Points of Contact – Sec (WP/20)

15.1 The ICAO Secretariat reviewed and updated the CNS Points of contact of ICAO APAC
Member States and requested States/Administrations to provide the latest information about CNS points
of contact for contingency planning and administrative support for effective and efficient coordination.
The Regional Office has requested States/Administrations to provide points of contact for urgency and
administrative purposes in the CNS domain for a few years. As of early August 2022, the office received
the corresponding information from 17 States/Administrations, which was provided in the paper.
States/Administrations that have yet to provide their CNS Points of Contact were urged to provide the
required information by sending an email to the ICAO APAC Regional Office at apac@icao.int.
States/Administrations already provided the information were requested to share updates if any at the
same email addresses. The updated CNS Points of Contact are provided in Appendix L to the Report.

Flight Inspection Capability Building of CAAC for CNS Facility - China (IP/13)

15.2 China provided a brief introduction to the Flight Inspection Center of CAAC (CFI)
which was established in 1989. China shared that during the last 30 years, CFI has committed to
developing the inspection capability and playing an active role in international meetings, symposiums,
and webinars, including CNS meetings. The meeting was informed that CFI serves 248 transport
airports in China, and checks over 1700 facilities per year, which provides commissioning, periodic and
special flight inspection and validation for conventional and New Tech facilities. Through the
communication and cooperation among CNS Facilities, CFI expressed their willingness to contribute
to the conventional or satellite-based technological exchange, ICAO SARPs introduction and digestion,
take active participation in the establishment of ICAO SARPs and relevant program implementation in
Asia-Pacific area, and provide high quality flight inspection and validation services for CNS Facility.

IATA’s Aircraft Equipage and Capability Survey – IATA (IP/23)

15.3 IATA presented a progress analysis of airline responses to ongoing IATA’s Aircraft
Equipage and Capability Survey for Asia-Pacific and North Asia conducted in Quarters 1 and 2 of 2022.

15.4 IATA informed that in recent years there have been multiple queries about fleet
capabilities during ICAO meetings and other workshops dealing with CNS requirements and possible
mandates. Unfortunately, the most recent and complete information isn’t always available, and IATA
needed to conduct many smaller ad-hoc surveys to meet action items. Understanding that a lot has and
is still changing throughout and post-COVID, it was identified as an opportune time to conduct a broad
and detailed survey in order to build a detailed baseline database for operators in APAC region. As
industries are still in recovery mode from COVID-19, the IATA Aircraft Equipage and Capability
 53

Survey asked member and non-member airlines for responses that projected forward in a window of
where fleet capabilities will be by the end of the 2022 calendar year.

15.5 The meeting was informed that to date responses have been received from 26 airlines
which include most major airlines based in APAC, several that are based in other regions but operate
here, and several other airlines from within the region. Responses are still being sought in order to
continue building the database which currently records equipage and capability data for over 4200
aircraft. IATA shared preliminary analysis of data from the responses received to date for the specified
categories across the individual and generic fleet aircraft types.

15.6 IATA informed that it will continue to collect data from the survey and produce
summaries that can support and inform future discussions within ICAO and other forums. More specific
analyses will be conducted once all data is fully filtered and collated and will be based on specific
discussions that will benefit from the outputs from the database. IATA has agreed to support and share
relevant information with the APAC members based on their specific needs to better use the survey
information.

The CNS SG/26 Meeting Action Items

15.7 There are eight (8) action items identified in the CNS SG/26 meeting, the summary of
action items is provided in Appendix M to this Report.

Agenda Item 16: Date of next meeting

Member States’ Support for Contributory bodies Meetings in 2023- Sec (WP/21)

16.1 The paper presented the following schedule of the CNS contributory bodies meetings
to be held in 2023, and requests APAC Member States to support the ICAO Secretariat in conducting
the CNS SG and CNS contributory bodies meetings in effective manner.

No. Name of meeting Dates Mode of Meeting Venue

1. CRV OG/11 25-27 January Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
2. SRWG/7 TBD (Mar/Apr) Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
3. DAPS WG/6 March Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
4. PBNICG/10 March Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
5. SURSG/3 11-13 April Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
6. ACSICG/10 May Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
7. SBAS/GBAS ITF/ 5 May Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
8. SWIM TF/7 May Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
9. SURICG/8 June Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
10. ATMAS TF /4 June Face-to-face /Hybrid Chengdu, China
/VTC (Tentative)
11. CNS SG/27 July Face-to-face /Hybrid ICAO APAC Regional
/VTC Office, Bangkok
 54

16.2 The ICAO Secretariat will inform Member States about the exact dates, mode and
venue of the meeting while issuing invitation letters in due course.

Note of appreciation

16.3 On behalf of the CNS SG, Mr. Richard Wu, the Chair of CNS Sub-group, expressed
thankfulness to the ICAO Secretariats for their excellent support and dedication in ensuring smooth
running of the CNS SG/26 meeting within the tight timeframe.

16.4 Mr. Richard Wu expressed his appreciation to all participants from Member
States/Administrations, International Organizations, and sponsoring industries for their significant
contributions and active participation in making the meeting a successful and fruitful one. Mr. Wu gave
a brief summary on the achievements by the CNS Sub-group in this meeting while highlighting the key
issues discussed and addressed. He shared that with the strong dedication and unfailing support from
all the Subject Matter Experts, the CNS Sub-group would upkeep our professional work and momentum
to ride on the pandemic storm while gearing up ourselves for traffic recovery. He envisaged the CNS
Sub-group would continue taking a significant role in shaping the future direction of CNS development
for this region. He looked forward to meeting the APAC members face-to-face in next year.

16.5 The ICAO Secretariat shared its appreciation to Mr. Richard Wu, the Chair of CNS
Sub-group for operating CNS SG/26 meeting in a timely and efficient manner. Lastly, the ICAO
Secretariat expressed its gratitude for contribution and support from APAC Member States,
international organisations, and industry partners.

______________
 CNS SG/26
Appendix A to the Report

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ANNEX 1 TO THE MANAGEMENT SERVICE AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
AND THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES AND/OR RELATED AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE
PROVIDERS HAVING SIGNED THE AGREEMENT

Project Title: Common Regional Virtual Private Network (CRV) multinational service
with a common service provider

Project No.: RAS/14/801 – Revision B

Duration: 5 years

Sector and
Sub-Sector: Transport and Civil Aviation

Country Implementing
Agency: Civil Aviation Authorities and/or related ANSPs

Executing Agency: International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

Location: Asia Pacific

Estimated Start Date: 31 March 2022

Estimated Project Cost: US$ 88,000

Brief Description: Under Revision B, ICAO will assist the Civil Aviation Authorities and/or related
ANSPs in the continuation of the APAC CRV Project through the provision of expertise and support to the
CRV Network (Stage 2). The ICAO assistance covers the specific work scope outlined in this project
document.

This is a CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT intended only for the exclusive use by the recipient Government, and the International
Civil Aviation Organization. No part of this document may be disseminated, distributed, reproduced, or used in any other way by
any individual, company, organization or any other entity without the prior written approval by the recipient Government and the
International Civil Aviation Organization.

APX. A - 1
 CNS SG/26
Appendix A to the Report
1. BACKGROUND

1.1 The Civil Aviation Authorities and/or related ANSPs as listed in Appendix A,
hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Parties” and individually as the “Party”, have determined
that the Common Regional Virtual Private Network (CRV) multinational service with a common
service provider can more effectively:
• provide network services to the Parties;
• support a common Internet Protocol (IP) network;
• establish services based on Voice over IP (VoIP); and
• enhance network diversity and timely service implementation and delivery.

1.2 In 2014, all Parties jointly agreed to appoint ICAO Technical Cooperation Bureau or
TCB to assist in the procurement management (i.e. Stage 1) of the CRV project and in the selection
of the common Service Provider (RAS14801 Revision A). Upon selection of the common service
provider after a Sealed Tender (ST) process through TCB, each Party were expected to subscribed to
the Services by signing an individual Service Contract with the Service Provider for the
procurement, installation, training, testing, commissioning and operation of the CRV network and
the associated services.

1.3 After selection of the common service provider in 2016, a fund balance of USD
104,596 remained as on 31 March 2017. CNS SG/21 (17 to 21 July 2017) and APANPIRG/28 (11 to
14 September 2017) agreed to manage the remaining funds not used for the CRV selection process,
to procure common services or expertise to support the implementation of the CRV Network (Stage
2).

1.4 As at 31 December 2021, the remaining fund for use are approximately USD 88,000
allowing for the return of funds to two pioneer Member States in terms of the Conclusion
APANPIRG/28/19 “Amendment to the Management Service Agreement for CRV Project
(RAS14801)”.

1.5 As a result of the discussions between the Parties, Revision B has been developed to
utilise the carry-over funds from the completion of the activities of Stage 1 to procure common
services or expertise to support the implementation of the CRV Network (Stage 2).

2. SCOPE OF SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED

2.1 Through this Revision, the following services will be provided by ICAO within the
scope of supporting the CRV Network (Stage 2), as may be required:

a) Provision of expertise through engagement of subject matter experts;

b) Capacity building through training;
c) Procurement of common services to support the implementation of the CRV Network;
d) Other support, as needed.

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Appendix A to the Report

3. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

3.1 The Parties, through the CRV OG will be agreed on which activities to undertake
based on needs priority assessment. Upon determination, the decision will be communicated to TCB
through the APAC Regional Office for execution, as appropriate.

3.2 In case the proposed activities exceed the available funds, TCB will communicate this
to the Parties through the Regional Office. At this point, the parties will need to decide to either
reduce scope of activities, inject additional funds and/or a combination thereof.

4. BUDGET

4.1 The detailed budget is as attached at Appendix A.

4.2 Funds will be equally shared among the Civil Aviation Authorities and/or related
ANSPs that have signed the MSA and continue to be party to this Revision, and provided by them in
advance of commencement of the project.

4.3 The total estimated amount is of US$ 88,000 as per Appendix A. This amount is the
total estimated amount including administrative and technical support.

5. RISK ASSESSMENT

5.1 Delay in the signing of this project document.

Risk Level: Medium

Mitigation: ICAO will work through the APAC Regional Office to facilitate the signing
of the Project Document Revision B.

6. PROJECT MONITORING, REVIEW AND REPORTING

6.1 Monitoring activities

6.1.1 The overall implementation of the project is monitored through regular reporting and
project review meetings as appropriate.

6.1.2 ICAO will execute and monitor the project in close consultation with the focal point
designated by each Party.

6.1.3 ICAO will maintain the financial accounting and budgetary control of the project, in
accordance with its policies and practices.

APX. A - 3
 CNS SG/26
Appendix A to the Report
6.1.4 ICAO may carry out missions on site to monitor the progress of the project, in
accordance with the approved work plan or as required.

6.2 ICAO roles and responsibilities include:

a) to execute and monitor the project under the direction of the Director, TCB. The Director, TCB
will delegate the responsibility for the monitoring/oversight of project activities to the appropriate
level within the designated/nominated representatives of the Parties;
b) to provide financial management and budgetary control in accordance with its policies, rules,
practices, processes and procedures;
c) briefing of personnel;
d) administering ICAO experts’ contracts;
e) to provide financial statements in accordance with ICAO policies, rules, practices, processes and
procedures;
f) organizing experts’ travel to duty station;
g) formalizing acceptance of the completed project deliverables;
h) revising the project document (PRODOC) as requested;
i) formalizing all activities required to close the project.

This Project Document is not intended and should not be construed as a recognition or endorsement
by ICAO of any functions and/or responsibilities entrusted to or performed by regional entities.

7 PROJECT RULES AND REGULATIONS

7.1 International experts/personnel

7.1.2 ICAO will recruit and deploy international experts/personnel in accordance with
ICAO policies, practices, ICAO/TCB Field Staff Services Rules and applicable process and
procedures. In particular, as consultants engaged by ICAO, their entitlement payments will be issued
by ICAO. The lead-time required for the recruitment of the experts may range between six (6) weeks
to three (3) months, from the moment the funds are committed until the deployment of the experts. In
the eventuality of a contract extension being required for one or more ICAO expert(s), the
Implementing Agency will need to issue the necessary request at least three (3) months prior to the
end of the ICAO expert(s)’ contract, subject to availability of funds; the request will include a
justification and corresponding additional duration, as appropriate.

7.2 Procurement

7.1.1 The procurement of equipment or services are carried out in accordance with ICAO’s
Procurement Code, Financial Regulations and Rules, and applicable process and procedures.

7.2 Finance

7.2.1 The reception and management of funds for this project are subject to ICAO’s
Financial Regulations and Rules, and applicable process and procedures. The use of any of the
resources for this project will be processed upon reception of proper formal authorization.

APX. A - 4
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Appendix A to the Report
7.2.2 The unauthorized use of project resources is not allowed and could result in project
delay and the discontinuation of the project’s activities.

7.2.3 The provision of financial management and budgetary control of the project and
submitting financial reports will be in accordance with ICAO rules, regulations, process and
procedures.

7.2.4 ICAO will provide the financial statements concerning the services covered by this
document, indicating the status of the funds, in US dollars. Any clarification or discrepancy with the
financial statements must be officially communicated to ICAO within 30 days of receiving them,
after which they are deemed accepted by the Parties.

7.2.5 If additional information is required after the deadlines set in the previous paragraph,
costs related to such information will be charged to the project, with prior approval from the Parties.

7.3 General regulations

7.3.1 All project’s activities are managed in accordance with the applicable ICAO policies,
rules, regulations, processes and practices and applicable process and procedures.

7.3.2 Project activities, including reports and/or deliverables prepared by the ICAO
experts may be reviewed by ICAO Headquarters and/or Regional Office, as appropriate.

7.3.3 This document was developed in English by the parties. Any document related to the
implementation of this project that is required to be translated into another official language of
ICAO, as may be required, shall be performed by ICAO and charged to the project, as appropriate.
Any document related to the implementation of this project that is required to be translated into any
other language not an official language of ICAO, shall be translated independently by that Party at its
own cost. In case of disagreements on the text of any of the documents, the prevailing version will be
the text in the original English language.

8 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

8.1 This project document shall constitute Revision B to Annex 1 (RAS14801) to the
Management Service Agreement between the Parties.

8.2 The Project Document Revision B will come into force upon its signing by the Parties.

8.3 Any change, amendment or revision to this Project Document Revision (including
scope, duration, budget, responsibilities, or other), will need to be formally approved in writing by
the Parties.

8.4 Nothing contained in or relating to this Project Document Revision B shall be deemed
a waiver, express or implied, of any of the privileges and immunities of ICAO and its personnel.

9 LIABILITY

9.1 The Parties shall indemnify, defend, and hold and save harmless, ICAO and its

APX. A - 5
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Appendix A to the Report
officials, agents and employees, from and against all suits, proceedings, claims, demands, losses, and
liability of any kind or nature brought against ICAO, including, but not limited to, all litigation costs
and expenses, attorney’s fees, settlement payments, and damages. For the avoidance of doubt, the
Parties shall be obligated, at their sole expense, to defend ICAO and its officials, agents, and
employees, regardless of whether the suits, proceedings, claims, and demands in question actually
give rise to or otherwise result in any loss or liability.

9.2 ICAO shall advise the Parties about any such suits, proceedings, claims, demands,
losses, or liability within a reasonable period of time after having received actual notice thereof.
ICAO shall have control over any assertion or defense of the privileges and immunities of ICAO or
any matter relating thereto, including the assertion or defense that ICAO is acting as mandatory for
the Parties, for which only ICAO itself is authorized to assert and maintain. ICAO shall have the
right to be represented in any such suit, proceeding, claim or demand by independent counsel of its
own choosing and shall also be indemnified, held, and saved harmless by the Parties for such
litigation costs and expenses and attorney’s fees.

9.3 ICAO shall have the right to set-off any costs incurred pursuant to this Article from
any remaining funds received under this Agreement.

9.4 The obligation under this clause shall survive the termination of this
Agreement.

APX. A - 6
 CNS SG/26
Appendix A to the Report
APPENDIX A

PROJECT BUDGET COVERING MSA CONTRIBUTION

(IN UNITED STATES DOLLARS)

COUNTRY: REGIONAL PROJECT

PROJECT NO: RAS14801
PROJECT TITLE: COMMON REGIONAL VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK (CRV) APAC
WORK ORDER: RAS14801-01
VERSION: 3

TOTAL 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026

w/m $ w/m $ w/m $ w/m $ w/m $ w/m $
PROJECT PERSONNEL
INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL POSTS
11.501 CONSULTANCIES AND CONTRACTORS (TSS FEE) 35 000 5 000 10 000 10 000 10 000

SUB-TOTAL (INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL POSTS) 35 000 5 000 10 000 10 000 10 000

16.001 INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL 11 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 3 000 2 000

TOTAL (PROJECT PERSONNEL) 46 000 7 000 12 000 12 000 13 000 2 000

EQUIPMENT
41.001 EXPENDABLE EQUIPMENT - INTERNATIONAL 30 000 10 000 20 000

TOTAL (EQUIPMENT) 30 000 10 000 20 000

MISCELLANEOUS
51.001 REPORTING COSTS 2 200 2 200
52.001 MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES 2 000 500 800 300 300 400
B807F PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
53.001 OVERHEAD CHARGES 7 500 2 100 2 700 1 200 1 300 200

TOTAL (MISCELLANEOUS) 12 000 2 600 3 500 1 500 1 600 2 800

PROJECT TOTAL 88 000 19 600 35 500 13 500 14 600 4 800

APX. A - 7
 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

AFTN/ATSMHS ROUTING DIRECTORY

ASIA AND PACIFIC REGIONS

Appendix B of the CNS SG/26 Report

September 2022

PREPARED BY THE ICAO ASIA AND PACIFIC REGIONAL OFFICE

 EXPLANATORY NOTES

The Routing Directory is based on the existing AFTN circuits in the Asia and Pacific
Regions.

I. Explanation of columns:

a) Column A contains destination AFTN routing indicators. These indicators

employ the minimum number of characters to preclude ambiguity.

b) Columns 1, 2, 3 etc. contain the location indicators of the originating/relaying

AFTN COM centres/stations in the heading and the AFTN routing indicators in
conjunction with the destination indicators.

c) Primary Routing is indicated in the left-hand subdivision under each origin, in

upper case letters.

d) Alternate routing is indicated in the right-hand subdivision under each origin, in

lower case letters.

e) National and/or non-AFTN routing is indicated by the letter (N). Local

arrangement for alternate routing is indicated by the letter n.

II. Explanation of Symbols:

A stations - stations in the "A" Aeronautical Fixed Service

Routing Area (AFSRA) - Solomon Is., Nauru,
and Papua New Guinea.
AG stations - stations in Solomon Is.
AN stations - stations in Nauru
AY stations - stations in Papua New Guinea

B stations - stations in the "B" AFSRA - (Greenland, Iceland)

C stations - stations in the "C" AFSRA - (Canada)
D stations - stations in the "D" AFSRA - (West Africa)
E stations - stations in the "E" AFSRA - (Europe)
F stations - stations in the "F" AFSRA - (Central and South Africa)
G stations - stations in the "G" AFSRA - (Coastal West Africa)

H stations - stations in the "H" AFSRA - (Coastal East Africa)

HE stations - stations in the Arab Republic of Egypt

K stations - stations in the "K" AFSRA - (U.S.A.)

L stations - stations in the "L" AFSRA - (Europe, Mediterranean)
M stations - stations in the "M" AFSRA - (Caribbean, Central America)

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 2.

N stations - stations in the "N" AFSRA (South Pacific)

NC stations - stations in Cook Is.
NF stations - stations in Fiji
NFT stations - stations in Tonga
NG stations - stations in Kiribati
NGF stations - stations in Tuvalu
NI stations - stations in Niue Island
NL stations - stations in Futuna and Wallis Islands
NS stations - stations in Samoa
NST stations - stations in American Samoa
NT stations - stations in French Polynesia
NV stations - stations in Vanuatu
NW stations - stations in New Caledonia
NZ stations - stations in New Zealand

O stations - stations in the "O" AFSRA - (Middle East)

OA stations - stations in Afghanistan
OB stations - stations in Bahrain
OE stations - stations in Saudi Arabia
OI stations - stations in Iran, Islamic Rep. of
OJ stations - stations in Jordan
OK stations - stations in Kuwait
OL stations - stations in Lebanon
OM stations - stations in United Arab Emirates
OO stations - stations in Oman
OP stations - stations in Pakistan
OR stations - stations in Iraq
OS stations - stations in Syria
OT stations - stations in Qatar
OY stations - stations in Yemen

P stations - stations in the "P" AFSRA - (North Pacific)

PA stations - stations in Alaska
PB stations - stations in Baker Is.
PC stations - stations in Phoenix Is.
PG stations - stations in Mariana Is. Guam
PH stations - stations in Hawaii
PJ stations - stations in Johnston Is.
PK stations - stations in Marshall Is.
PL stations - stations in Line Is.
PM stations - stations in Midway Is.
PT stations - stations in Federated State of Micronesia
PW stations - stations in Wake Is.

R stations - stations in the "R" AFSRA - (West Pacific)

RC stations - stations in China
RJ stations - stations in Japan
RK stations - stations in Republic of Korea
RO stations - stations in Japan (Ryukyu Is.)
RP stations - stations in the Philippines

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 3.

S stations - stations in the "S" AFSRA - (South America)

SA stations - stations in Argentina
SC stations - stations in Chile

T stations - stations in the "T" AFSRA - (North East Caribbean)

U stations - stations in the "U" AFSRA - (Russian Federation)

UT stations - stations in Uzebekistan

V stations - stations in the "V" AFSRA - (East and West Asia)

VA stations - stations in India (West)
VC stations - stations in Sri Lanka
VD stations - stations in Cambodia
VE stations - stations in India (East)
VG stations - stations in Bangladesh
VH stations - stations in Hong Kong
VI stations - stations in India (North)
VL stations - stations in Lao People's Democratic Republic
VM stations - stations in Macau
VN stations - stations in Nepal
VO stations - stations in India (South)
VQ stations - stations in Bhutan
VR stations - stations in Maldives
VT stations - stations in Thailand
VV stations - stations in Viet Nam
VY stations - stations in Myanmar

W stations - stations in the "W" AFSRA (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,

Singapore, Southern South East Asia)
WA stations - stations in Indonesia (Eastern part of Indonesia)
WB stations - stations in Malaysia (East)
WBA stations - stations in Brunei
WBS stations - stations in Brunei
WI stations - stations in Indonesia (Western part of Indonesia)
WM stations - stations in Malaysia (West)
WP stations - stations in Timor Leste
WR stations - stations in Indonesia (Middle part of Indonesia)
WS stations - stations in Singapore

Y stations - stations in "Y" AFSRA (Australia)

Z stations - stations in the "Z" AFSRA (China, Dem. People's Rep. of

Korea, Mongolia)
Z stations (except ZK and ZM) - stations in China
ZK stations - stations in Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ZM stations - stations in Mongolia

Note 1: The names of the continents, areas and countries appearing in parentheses indicate
broadly the geographical location of the AFSRAs. The chart contained in Doc 7910, shows the
delineation of these AFSRAs.

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 4.

AMENDMENTS

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS AND CORRIGENDA

RELATING TO AFTN ROUTING DIRECTORY, ASIA AND PACIFIC REGIONS,
TWENTY-SEVENTH EDITION

AMENDMENTS CORRIGENDA
No. Date Date Entered No. Date Date Entered
Applicable entered by of issue entered by

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 5.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN AGGG ANAU AYPM KSLC NCRG NFFN
DESTINATION
AG (N) n YB YB YB nf NZ YB ks
AN YB (N) n YB YB nf NZ YB ks
AY YB YB (N) n YB nf NZ YB ks
B YB YB YB (N) n NZ KS yb
C YB YB YB (N) n NZ KS yb
D YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
E YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
F YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
G YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
H YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
K YB YB YB (N) n NZ KS yb
L YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
M YB YB YB (N) n NZ KS yb
NC YB YB YB NZ yb (N) n YB ks
NF (EX. NFT) YB YB YB NF yb NZ (N) n
NFT YB YB YB NZ yb NZ YB ks
NG (EX. NGF) YB YB YB NF yb NZ NGT n
NGF YB YB YB NF yb NZ NGF n
NI YB YB YB NZ yb NZ YB ks
NL YB YB YB NF yb NZ NW n
NS (EX. NST) YB YB YB NZ yb NZ YB ks
NST YB YB YB NST n NZ KS yb
NT YB YB YB NZ yb NZ YB ks
NV YB YB YB YB nf NZ YB ks
NW YB YB YB NF yb NZ NW yb
NZ YB YB YB NZ yb NZ YB ks
OA YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OB YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OE YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OI YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OJ YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OK YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OL YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OM YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OO YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OP YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
OR YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OS YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OT YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
OY YB YB YB (N) n NZ YB ks
P YB YB YB (N) n NZ KS yb
RC YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
RJ,RO YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
RK YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
RP YB YB YB RP rj NZ YB ks
S YB YB YB (N) n NZ KS yb
T YB YB YB (N) n NZ KS yb

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 6.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN AGGG ANAU AYPM KSLC NCRG NFFN
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
UH,UE,UN YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
UI YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
UT YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VA YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VC YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VD YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VE YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VG YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VH YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VI YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VL YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VM YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VN YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VO YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VQ YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VR YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VT YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VV (EX. VVT) YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VVT YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
VY YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
WA YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
WB (EX. WBA WBS) YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
WBA WBS YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
WI YB YB YB YB rj NZ YB ks
WM YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
WP YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
WR YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
WS YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
Y YB YB YB YB nf NZ YB ks
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
ZG YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
ZJ YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
ZK YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks
ZM YB YB YB RJ yb NZ YB ks

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 7.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN NFTF NGFU NGTT NIUE NSFA NSTU
DESTINATION
AG NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
AN NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
AY NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
B NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
C NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
D NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
E NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
F NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
G NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
H NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
K NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
L NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
M NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
NC NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
NF (EX. NFT) NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
NFT (N) n NF NF NZ NZ KS
NG (EX. NGF) NZ NF (N) n NZ NZ KS
NGF NZ (N) n NF NZ NZ KS
NI NZ NF NF (N) n NZ KS
NL NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
NS (EX. NST) NZ NF NF NZ (N) n KS
NST NZ NF NF NZ NZ (N) n
NT NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
NV NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
NW NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
NZ NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OA NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OB NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OE NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OI NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OJ NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OK NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OL NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OM NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OO NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OP NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OR NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OS NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OT NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
OY NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
P NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
RC NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
RJ,RO NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
RK NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
RP NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
S NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
T NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 8.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN NFTF NGFU NGTT NIUE NSFA NSTU
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
UH,UE,UN NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
UI NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
UT NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VA NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VC NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VD NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VE NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VG NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VH NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VI NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VL NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VM NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VN NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VO NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VQ NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VR NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VT NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VV (EX. VVT) NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VVT NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
VY NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
WA NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
WB (EX. WBA WBS) NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
WBA WBS NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
WI NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
WM NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
WP NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
WR NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
WS NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
Y NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
ZG NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
ZJ NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
ZK NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS
ZM NZ NF NF NZ NZ KS

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 9.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN NTAA NVVV NWWW NZCH OPKC PKMJ
DESTINATION
AG NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
AN NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
AY NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
B NZ YB NF KS yb OK oi KS
C NZ YB NF KS yb OK oi KS
D NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
E NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
F NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
G NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
H NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
K NZ YB NF KS yb OK oi KS
L NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
M NZ YB NF KS yb OK zb KS
NC NZ YB NF NC n VA zb KS
NF (EX. NFT) NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
NFT NZ YB NF NFT n VA zb KS
NG (EX. NGF) NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
NGF NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
NI NZ YB NF NI n VA zb KS
NL NZ YB NL YB ks VA zb KS
NS (EX. NST) NZ YB NF NS n VA zb KS
NST NZ YB NF KS yb VA zb KS
NT (N) n YB NF nt NT n VA zb KS
NV NZ (N) n NF YB ks VA zb KS
NW NZ nw YB (N) n YB ks VA zb KS
NZ NZ YB NF (N) n VA zb KS
OA NZ YB NF YB ks OA oi KS
OB NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
OE NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
OI NZ YB NF YB ks OI ok KS
OJ NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
OK NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
OL NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
OM NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
OO NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
OP NZ YB NF YB ks (N) n KS
OR NZ YB NF YB ks OI ok KS
OS NZ YB NF YB ks OI ok KS
OT NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
OY NZ YB NF YB ks OK oi KS
P NZ YB NF KS yb VA zb (N) n
RC NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
RJ,RO NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
RK NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
RP NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
S NZ YB NF KS yb OK oi KS
T NZ YB NF KS yb OK oi KS

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 10.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN NTAA NVVV NWWW NZCH OPKC PKMJ
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) NZ YB NF YB ks OI ok KS
UH,UE,UN NZ YB NF YB ks OI ok KS
UI NZ YB NF YB ks OI ok KS
UT NZ YB NF YB ks VA oi KS
VA NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VC NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VD NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VE NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VG NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VH NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VI NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VL NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VM NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VN NZ YB NF YB ks ZB va KS
VO NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VQ NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VR NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VT NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VV (EX. VVT) NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VVT NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
VY NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
WA NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
WB (EX. WBA WBS) NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
WBA WBS NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
WI NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
WM NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
WP NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
WR NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
WS NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
Y NZ YB NF YB ks VA zb KS
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) NZ YB NF YB ks ZB va KS
ZG NZ YB NF YB ks ZB va KS
ZJ NZ YB NF YB ks ZB va KS
ZK NZ YB NF YB ks ZB va KS
ZM NZ YB NF YB ks ZB va KS

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 11.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN PTKK PTPN PTRO PTSA PTYA RCTP
DESTINATION
AG KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
AN KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
AY KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
B KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
C KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
D KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
E KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
F KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
G KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
H KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
K KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
L KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
M KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
NC KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NF (EX. NFT) KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NFT KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NG (EX. NGF) KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NGF KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NI KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NL KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NS (EX. NST) KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NST KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NT KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NV KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NW KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
NZ KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OA KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OB KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OE KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OI KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OJ KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OK KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OL KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OM KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OO KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OP KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OR KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OS KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OT KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
OY KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
P (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) VH rp
RC KS KS KS KS KS (N) n
RJ,RO KS KS KS KS KS RJ vh
RK KS KS KS KS KS RJ vh
RP KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
S KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
T KS KS KS KS KS VH rp

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 12.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN PTKK PTPN PTRO PTSA PTYA RCTP
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) KS KS KS KS KS RJ vh
UH,UE,UN KS KS KS KS KS RJ vh
UI KS KS KS KS KS RJ vh
UT KS KS KS KS KS RJ vh
VA KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VC KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
VD KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VE KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VG KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VH KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VI KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VL KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VM KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VN KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VO KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VQ KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VR KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
VT KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VV (EX. VVT) KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VVT KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
VY KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
WA KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
WB (EX. WBA WBS) KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
WBA WBS KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
WI KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
WM KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
WP KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
WR KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
WS KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
Y KS KS KS KS KS RP vh
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
ZG KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
ZJ KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
ZK KS KS KS KS KS VH rp
ZM KS KS KS KS KS VH rp

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 13.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN RJJJ RKSS RPLL UHHH UUUU VABB
DESTINATION
AG WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
AN WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
AY WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
B KS ws RJ VH ws UU zb BI n VT vc
C KS ws RJ KS vh UU zb EG n VT vc
D WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb LF n HK vt
E WS vh RJ VH ws UU zb (N) n VT vc
F WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb LF n HK vt
G WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb LE n HK vt
H WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb LG n HK vt
K KS ws RJ zb KS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
L WS vh RJ VH ws UU zb (N) n VT vc
M KS ws RJ KS vh UU zb EG n VT vc
NC KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NF (EX. NFT) KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NFT KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NG (EX. NGF) KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NGF KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NI KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NL KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NS (EX. NST) KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NST KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NT KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NV KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NW KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
NZ KS ws RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
OA WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OP vn
OB WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OE WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OI WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OP oo
OJ WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OK WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OL WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OM WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OO WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OP WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OP oo
OR WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OS WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OT WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
OY WS vh RJ WS vh UU n LC n OO op
P KS ws RJ KS vh UU zb EG n VT vc
RC RC vh RJ RC vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
RJ,RO (N) n RJ zb VH rc UU zb RJ n VT vc
RK RK zb (N) n VH rc UU zb RJ n VT vc
RP WS vh RJ (N) n UU zb RJ n VT vc
S KS ws RJ KS vh UU zb LE n VT vc
T KS ws RJ KS vh UU zb EG n VT vc

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 14.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN RJJJ RKSS RPLL UHHH UUUU VABB
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) UU zb RJ VH rc (N) n (N) n ZB op
UH,UE,UN UU zb RJ VH rc (N) n (N) n ZB op
UI UU zb RJ VH rc (N) n (N) n ZB op
UT UU zb RJ VH rc (N) n UA un ZB op
VA WS vh RJ WS vh ZB n RJ uh (N) n
VC WS vh RJ WS vh ZB n RJ uh VC vt
VD VH ws RJ VH rc ZB n RJ uh VT vc
VE WS vh RJ VH rc ZB n RJ uh VE n
VG VH ws RJ VH rc ZB n RJ uh VG vt
VH VH ws RJ VH rc ZB n RJ uh VT vc
VI WS vh RJ WS vh ZB n RJ uh VI n
VL VH ws RJ VH rc ZB n RJ uh VT vc
VM VH ws RJ VH rc ZB n RJ uh VT vc
VN ZB ws RJ VH ws ZB n RJ uh VN zb
VO WS vh RJ WS vh ZB n RJ uh VO n
VQ WS vh RJ WS vh ZB n RJ uh VQ vt
VR WS vh RJ WS vh ZB n RJ uh VC vt
VT VH ws RJ VH rc ZB n RJ uh VT vc
VV (EX. VVT) VH ws RJ VV vh ZB n RJ uh WS vt
VVT VH ws RJ VV vh ZB n RJ uh WS vt
VY VH ws RJ VH rc ZB n RJ uh WS vt
WA WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n WS vt
WB (EX. WBA WBS) WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n WS vt
WBA WBS WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n WS vt
WI WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n WS vt
WM WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n WS vt
WP WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n WS vt
WR WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n WS vt
WS WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n WS vt
Y WS vh RJ WS vh UU zb RJ n VT vc
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) ZB vh ZB rj VH ws ZB n RJ uh ZB op
ZG ZB vh ZB rj VH ws ZB n RJ uh ZB op
ZJ ZB vh ZB rj VH ws ZB n RJ uh ZB op
ZK RK zb ZK zb VH ws ZB n RJ uh ZB op
ZM ZB vh ZB rj VH ws UI zb UI uh ZB op

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 15.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN VCCC VDPP VECC VGHS VHHH VIDD
DESTINATION
AG WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
AN WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
AY WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
B WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ vt VA n
C WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ rp VA n
D WS va VT VA n VT va VT vvt VA n
E WS va VT VA n VT va VT rj VA n
F WS va VT VA vo VT va VT rp VA ve
G WS va VT VA n VT va VT vvt VA n
H WS va VT VA n VT va VT vvt VA n
K WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ rp VA n
L WS va VT VA n VT va VT rj VA n
M WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ rp VA n
NC WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NF (EX. NFT) WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NFT WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NG (EX. NGF) WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NGF WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NI WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NL WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NS (EX. NST) WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NST WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NT WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NV WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NW WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
NZ WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
OA VA ws VT VA n VT va ZB vt VA n
OB WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OE WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OI WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OJ WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OK WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OL WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OM WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OO WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OP VA ws VT VA n VT va ZB vt VA n
OR WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OS WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OT WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
OY WS va VT VA n VT va VT rp VA n
P WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ rp VA n
RC WS va VT VA vg VT va RC rp VA n
RJ,RO WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ rc VA n
RK WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ zb VA n
RP WS va VT VA vg VT va RP rc VA n
S WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ rp VA n
T WS va VT VA vg VT va RJ rp VA n

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 16.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN VCCC VDPP VECC VGHS VHHH VIDD
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) WS va VT VI n VT va RJ zb UT n
UH,UE,UN WS va VT VI n VT va RJ zb UT n
UI WS va VT VI n VT va RJ zb UT n
UT WS va VT (N) n VT va RJ zb UT n
VA VA ws VT VA n VA vt VT vvt VA n
VC (N) n VT VA n VA vt VT rp VA n
VD WS va (N) n VA n VA va VT vvt (N) n
VE VA ws VT (N) n VA vt VT vvt VA n
VG VA ws VT VA n (N) n VT vvt VA n
VH WS va VT (N) n VT va (N) n VA n
VI VA ws VT (N) n VE vt VT vvt (N) n
VL WS va VT VA vg VT vt VT vvt VA n
VM WS va VT VA n VT vt VM zg VA ve
VN VA ws VT VA n VA vt ZB vt VA n
VO VA ws VT (N) n VA vt VT vvt VA n
VQ VA ws VT VA n VA vt VT vvt VA n
VR VR n VT VA vg VA vt VT rp VA n
VT WS va VT VA vg VT va VT vvt VA n
VV (EX. VVT) WS va VT VA vg VT va VVT vt VA n
VVT WS va VT VA vg VT va VVT vt VA n
VY WS va VT VA vg VT va VT vvt VA n
WA WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
WB (EX. WBA WBS) WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
WBA WBS WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
WI WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
WM WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
WP WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
WR WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
WS WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
Y WS va VT VA vg VT va VT rp VA n
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) VA ws VT VA n VT va ZB zg VA n
ZG VA ws VT VA n VT va ZG zb VA n
ZJ VA ws VT VA n VT va ZJ zg VA n
ZK VA ws VT VA n VT va ZB zg VA n
ZM VA ws VT VA n VT va ZB zg VA n

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 17.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN VLVT VMMC VNKT VOMM VQPR VRMM
DESTINATION
AG VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
AN VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
AY VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
B VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
C VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
D VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
E VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
F VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
G VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
H VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
K VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
L VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
M VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
NC VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NF (EX. NFT) VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NFT VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NG (EX. NGF) VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NGF VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NI VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NL VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NS (EX. NST) VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NST VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NT VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NV VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NW VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
NZ VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
OA VT vv VH zg VA zb VA n VA VC
OB VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OE VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OI VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OJ VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OK VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OL VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OM VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OO VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OP VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
OR VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OS VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OT VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
OY VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
P VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
RC VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
RJ,RO VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
RK VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
RP VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
S VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC
T VT vv VH zg ZB va WM va VA VC

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14/09/2022
 18.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN VLVT VMMC VNKT VOMM VQPR VRMM
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
UH,UE,UN VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
UI VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
UT VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
VA VT vv VH zg VA zb (N) n VA VC
VC VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
VD VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
VE VT vv VH zg VA zb (N) n VA VC
VG VT vv VH zg VA zb VA n VA VC
VH VT vv VH zg ZB va VA wm VA VC
VI VT vv VH zg VA zb (N) n VA VC
VL (N) n VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
VM VT vv (N) n ZB va VA wm VA VC
VN VT vv ZG vh (N) va VA wm VA VC
VO VT vv VH zg VA zb (N) n VA VC
VQ VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm (N) n VC
VR VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA (N) n
VT VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
VV (EX. VVT) VV vt VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
VVT VV vt VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
VY VT vv VH zg VA zb VA wm VA VC
WA VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
WB (EX. WBA WBS) VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
WBA WBS VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
WI VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
WM VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
WP VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
WR VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
WS VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
Y VT vv VH zg VA zb WM va VA VC
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) VT vv ZG vh ZB va VA n VA VC
ZG VV vt ZG vh ZB va VA n VA VC
ZJ VV vt ZG vh ZB va VA n VA VC
ZK VT vv ZG vh ZB va VA n VA VC
ZM VT vv ZG vh ZB va VA n VA VC

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14/09/2022
 19.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN VTBB VVTS VVVV VYYY WBKK WBSB
DESTINATION
AG WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
AN WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
AY WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
B VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
C VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
D WS va VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
E LI ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
F WS va VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
G WS va VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
H WS va VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
K VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
L LI ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
M VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
NC WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NF (EX. NFT) WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NFT WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NG (EX. NGF) WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NGF WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NI WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NL WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NS (EX. NST) WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NST WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NT WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NV WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NW WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
NZ WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OA VA ws VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OB WS va VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OE WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OI WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OJ WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OK WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OL WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OM WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OO WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OP VA ws VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OR WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OS WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OT WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
OY WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
P VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
RC VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
RJ,RO VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
RK VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
RP VH ws RP vh VVT VT WM WS wm
S VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
T VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm

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14/09/2022
 20.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN VTBB VVTS VVVV VYYY WBKK WBSB
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) VH va VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
UH,UE,UN VH va VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
UI VH va VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
UT VH va VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
VA VA ws VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VC WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VD VD n VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VE VA ws VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VG VG n VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VH VH ws VH vt VVT VT WM WS wm
VI VA ws VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VL VL vvt VV vt VL vvt VT WM WS wm
VM VH ws VV vh ZG vvt VT WM WS wm
VN VA vh VV vh ZG vvt VT WM WS wm
VO WM ws VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VQ VA ws VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VR WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VT (N) n VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
VV (EX. VVT) VVT vh VV n (N) n VT WM WS wm
VVT VVT vh (N) n VVT VT WM WS wm
VY VY vh VT vh VVT (N) n WM WS wm
WA WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
WB (EX. WBA WBS) WM ws VT vh VVT VT (N) n WM ws
WBA WBS WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM (N) n
WI WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
WM WM ws VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
WP WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
WR WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
WS WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
Y WS wm VT vh VVT VT WM WS wm
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) ZB vh VV vh ZG vvt ZB vt WM WS wm
ZG ZB vh VV vh ZG vvt ZB vt WM WS wm
ZJ ZB vh VV vh ZG vvt ZB vt WM WS wm
ZK ZB vh VV vh ZG vvt ZB vt WM WS wm
ZM ZB vh VV vh ZG vvt ZB vt WM WS wm

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 21.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN WIII WMKK WPDL WSSS YBBB ZBBB
DESTINATION
AG YB ws WS vt Y YB wi AG n RJ zg
AN YB ws WS vt Y YB wi AN n RJ zg
AY YB ws WS vt Y YB wi AY n RJ zg
B YB ws WS vt Y RJ yb KS nf RJ zg
C YB ws WS vt Y RJ yb KS nf RJ zg
D YB ws WS vt Y YB vt FA ws RJ op
E WS yb WS vt Y EG vt WS wi RJ zg
F YB ws WS vt Y YB vt FA ws RJ op
G YB ws WS vt Y YB vt FA ws RJ op
H YB ws WS vt Y YB vt FA ws RJ op
K YB ws WS vt Y RJ yb KS nf RJ zg
L WS yb WS vt Y EG vt WS wi RJ zg
M YB ws WS vt Y RJ yb KS nf RJ zg
NC YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NZ ks RJ zg
NF (EX. NFT) YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NF nz RJ zg
NFT YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NZ ks RJ zg
NG (EX. NGF) YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NF nz RJ zg
NGF YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NF nz RJ zg
NI YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NZ ks RJ zg
NL YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NF nz RJ zg
NS (EX. NST) YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NZ ks RJ zg
NST YB ws WS vt Y YB wi KS nf RJ zg
NT YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NZ ks RJ zg
NV YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NV n RJ zg
NW YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NF nz RJ zg
NZ YB ws WS vt Y YB wi NZ ks RJ zg
OA WS yb VO vt Y VC vt WS wi OP vn
OB WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OE WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OI WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OJ WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OK WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OL WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OM WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OO WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OP WS yb VT ws Y VT oo WS wi OP zg
OR WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OS WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OT WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
OY WS yb WS vt Y OB vt WS wi OP zg
P YB ws WS vt Y RJ yb KS nf RJ zg
RC WS yb WS vt Y RJ vt WS wi RJ zg
RJ,RO WS yb WS vt Y RJ vt WS wi RJ zg
RK WS yb WS vt Y RJ vt WS wi RK rj
RP WS yb WS vt Y RP vt WS wi VH zg
S YB ws WS vt Y RJ yb KS nf RJ zg
T WS yb WS vt Y RJ yb KS nf RJ zg

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 22.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN WIII WMKK WPDL WSSS YBBB ZBBB
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) WS yb WS vt Y RJ vt WS wi UH rj
UH,UE,UN WS yb WS vt Y RJ vt WS wi UH rj
UI WS yb WS vt Y RJ vt WS wi UH rj
UT WS yb WS vt Y RJ vt WS wi UH rj
VA WS yb VT ws Y VC vt WS wi VA zg
VC WS yb WS vt Y VC vt WS wi VA rj
VD WS yb VT ws Y VT wm WS wi VT zg
VE WS yb VT ws Y VC vt WS wi VA zg
VG WS yb VT ws Y VT wm WS wi ZG rj
VH WS yb WS vt Y RJ vt WS wi VH zg
VI WS yb VT ws Y VC vt WS wi VA zg
VL WS yb VT ws Y VT wm WS wi VT zg
VM WS yb WS vt Y VT rj WS wi ZG rj
VN WS yb VT ws Y VC vt WS wi VN zg
VO WS yb VO ws Y WM vt WS wi VA zg
VQ WS yb VT ws Y VC vt WS wi VA zg
VR WS yb WS vt Y VC vt WS wi VA zg
VT WS yb VT ws Y VT wm WS wi VT zg
VV (EX. VVT) WS yb VT ws Y VVT vt WS wi VT zg
VVT WS yb VT ws Y VVT vt WS wi VT zg
VY WS yb VT ws Y VT wm WS wi VY zg
WA (N) n WS vt Y WI yb WI ws RJ zg
WB (EX. WBA WBS) WS yb WB n Y WM vt WS wi RJ zg
WBA WBS WS yb WBS ws Y WBS wm WS wi RJ zg
WI (N) n WS vt Y WI yb WI ws RJ zg
WM WS yb (N) n Y WM vt WS wi RJ zg
WP YB ws WS vt (N) (n) YB wi WP n RJ zg
WR (N) n WS vt Y WI yb WI ws RJ zg
WS WS yb WS vt Y (N) n WS wi RJ zg
Y YB ws WS vt Y YB wi (N) n RJ zg
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) WS yb VT ws Y RJ vt WS wi (N) n
ZG WS yb VT ws Y VT rj WS wi ZG n
ZJ WS yb VT ws Y VT rj WS wi ZG vh
ZK WS yb VT ws Y RJ vt WS wi ZK rk
ZM WS yb VT ws Y RJ vt WS wi ZM uh

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 23.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN ZGGG ZJHK ZKKK ZMUB
DESTINATION
AG VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
AN VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
AY VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
B ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
C ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
D ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
E VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
F ZB vh VH zg ZB n ZB
G ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
H ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
K ZB vh ZG vh RK zb ZB
L VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
M ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
NC VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NF (EX. NFT) VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NFT VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NG (EX. NGF) VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NGF VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NI VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NL VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NS (EX. NST) VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NST VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NT VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NV VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NW VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
NZ VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
OA ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OB ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OE ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OI ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OJ ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OK ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OL ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OM ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OO ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OP ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OR ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OS ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OT ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
OY ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
P ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
RC ZB vh VH zg ZB n ZB
RJ,RO ZB vh ZG vh RK zb ZB
RK ZB vh ZG vh RK zb ZB
RP VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
S ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
T ZB n ZG vh ZB n ZB

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 24.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN ZGGG ZJHK ZKKK ZMUB
DESTINATION
U (EX. UH UI UT UE UN) ZB n ZG vh ZB n ZB
UH,UE,UN ZB n ZG vh ZB uh ZB
UI ZB n ZG vh ZB uh UI zb
UT ZB n ZG vh ZB uh ZB
VA VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VC VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VD VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VE VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VG VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VH VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VI VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VL VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VM VM vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
VN ZB vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
VO VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VQ VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VR VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VT VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
VV (EX. VVT) VV vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
VVT VV vh ZG vh ZB n ZB
VY VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
WA VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
WB (EX. WBA WBS) VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
WBA WBS VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
WI VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
WM VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
WP VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
WR VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
WS VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
Y VH zb VH zg ZB n ZB
Z (EX. ZG ZJ ZK ZM) ZB n ZG n ZB rk ZB
ZG (N) n ZG n ZB rk ZB
ZJ ZJ vh (N) n ZB rk ZB
ZK ZB n ZG n (N) n ZB
ZM ZB n ZG n ZB rk (N) n

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 25.

A 1 2 3 4 5 6
ORIGIN ZGGG ZJHK ZKKK ZMUB
DESTINATION

ICAO APAC Routing Directrory

14/09/2022
 26.
CNS SG/26
Appendix B to the Report

AFTN/ATSMHS CONNECTIONS - ASIA/PAC ROUTING DIRECTORY

Terminal I Terminal II ATSMHS or AFTN Over CRV (Y/N)

(^ - BBIS)

Apia/Faleolo Christchurch AMHS/UA N

Bangkok^ Beijing AMHS N

Dhaka AMHS N
Ho-Chi-Minh AFTN N
Hong Kong AMHS Y
Kuala Lumpur AMHS N
Mumbai AMHS N
Paro AMHS Y
Phnom Penh AMHS N
Rome AMHS N
Singapore AMHS N
Vientiane AMHS N
Yangon AMHS N

Beijing^ Bangkok AMHS N

Fukuoka AMHS Y
Guangzhou AFTN N
Hong Kong AMHS Y
Karachi AFTN N
Khavarosk AFTN N
Kathmandu AFTN N
Mumbai AMHS N
Pyongyang AFTN N
Seoul AMHS N
Ulaan Baatar AFTN N
Yangon AFTN N

Brisbane^ Christchurch AMHS Y

Honiara AFTN/UA N
Jakarta AFTN N
Johannesburg AMHS N
Nadi AMHS Y
Nauru AFTN/UA N
Port Moresby AFTN Y
Port Vila AFTN/UA N
Salt Lake City AMHS Y
Singapore AMHS Y
Timor Leste AFTN/UA N

Brunei Kuala Lumpur AFTN N

Singapore AFTN N

Chennai Mumbai AFTN N

Kolkata AFTN N
Kuala Lumpur AFTN N

29th Edition
September-22
 27. CNS SG/26
Appendix B to the Report

Terminal I Terminal II ATSMHS or AFTN Over CRV (Y/N)

(^ - BBIS)

Christchurch Apia/Faleolo AMHS/UA N

Brisbane AMHS Y
Niue AMHS/UA N
Papeete/Tahiti AFTN N
Rarotonga AMHS/UA N
Salt Lake City AMHS Y
Tonga/Fua’Amotu AMHS/UA N

Chuuk Salt Lake City AMHS/UA N

Colombo Mumbai AMHS N

Male AFTN N
Singapore AFTN N

Delhi Kolkata AFTN N

Mumbai AFTN N
Tashkent-Uzhny AFTN N

Dhaka Bangkok AMHS N

Mumbai AMHS N
Kolkata AFTN N

Fukuoka^ Beijing AMHS Y

Hong Kong AMHS Y
Moscow AFTN N
Seoul AFTN N
Singapore AMHS Y
Salt Lake City AMHS Y
Taibei AMHS Y

Guangzhou Beijing AFTN N

Hong Kong AFTN N
Haikou AFTN N
Hanoi AFTN N
Macau AFTN N

Hanoi Ho-Chi-Minh AFTN N

Guangzhou AFTN N
Vientiane AFTN N

Haikou Guangzhou AFTN N

Hong Kong AFTN N

Ho-Chi-Minh Bangkok AFTN N

Hanoi AFTN N
Hong Kong AFTN N
Singapore AFTN N
Manila AFTN N

29th Edition
September-22
 28.
CNS SG/26
Appendix B to the Report

Terminal I Terminal II ATSMHS or AFTN Over CRV (Y/N)

(^ - BBIS)
Phnom Penh AFTN N
Kuala Lumpur AFTN N
Vientiane AFTN N

Hong Kong^ Bangkok AMHS Y

Beijing AMHS Y
Fukuoka AMHS Y
Guangzhou AFTN N
Ho-Chi-Minh AFTN N
Macau AMHS N
Manila AMHS Y
Haikou AFTN N
Taibei AMHS Y

Honiara Brisbane AMHS/UA N

Jakarta Brisbane AFTN N

Singapore AMHS N

Karachi Beijing AFTN N

Kabul AFTN N
Kuwait AMHS N
Mumbai AMHS N
Tehran (Not listed in the
ANP AFTN Planning Table)

Kathmandu Beijing AFTN N

Mumbai AMHS N

Kolkata Mumbai AFTN N

Chennai AFTN N
Delhi AFTN N

Koro Salt Lake City AMHS/UA N

Kosrae Salt Lake City AMHS/UA N

Kuala Lumpur Bangkok AFTN N

Brunei AFTN N
Chennai AFTN N
Singapore AFTN N
Ho-Chi-Minh AFTN N

Macau Guangzhou AFTN N

Hong Kong AMHS N

Majuro Salt Lake City AMHS/UA N

Male Colombo AFTN N

29th Edition
September-22
 29. CNS SG/26
Appendix B to the Report

Terminal I Terminal II ATSMHS or AFTN Over CRV (Y/N)

(^ - BBIS)
Manila Hong Kong AMHS Y
Ho Chi Minh AFTN N
Singapore AMHS Y
Salt Lake City AMHS Y
Taibei AMHS Y

Mumbai^ Bangkok AMHS N

Beijing AMHS N
Chennai AFTN N
Colombo AMHS N
Delhi AFTN N
Dhaka AMHS N
Karachi AMHS N
Kathmandu AMHS N
Kolkata AFTN N
Muscat/Seeb AFTN (No connection) N
Nairobi AFTN N
Paro AMHS N
Singapore AMHS N

Nadi^ Brisbane AMHS Y

Funafuti AMHS/UA N
Noumea AMHS N
Salt Lake City AMHS Y
Tarawa AMHS/UA N
Wallis Is. AMHS/UA N

Nauru Brisbane AMHS/UA N

Niue Christchurch Email N

Noumea Nadi AMHS N

Pago Pago Salt Lake City AMHS/UA N

Papeete/Tahiti Christchurch AFTN N

Paro Mumbai AMHS N

Bangkok AMHS Y

Phnom Penh Bangkok AMHS N

Ho Chi Minh AFTN N

Pohnpei Salt Lake City AMHS/UA N

Port Moresby Brisbane AFTN Y

Port Vila Brisbane AMHS/UA N

Pyongyang Beijing AFTN N

29th Edition
September-22
 30.
CNS SG/26
Appendix B to the Report

Terminal I Terminal II ATSMHS or AFTN Over CRV (Y/N)

(^ - BBIS)
Rarotonga Christchurch AFTN N

Salt Lake City^ Brisbane AMHS Y

Christchurch AMHS Y
Chuuk AMHS UA N
Fukuoka AMHS Y
Koro AMHS UA N
Kosrae AMHS UA N
Majuro AMHS UA N
Manila AMHS Y
Nadi AMHS Y
Pago Pago AMHS UA N
Pohnpei AMHS UA N
Yap AMHS UA N

Seoul/Gimpo Beijing AMHS N

Fukuoka AFTN N

Singapore^ Bangkok AMHS N

Bahrain AFTN N
Brisbane AMHS Y
Brunei AFTN N
Colombo AFTN N
Fukuoka AMHS Y
Ho-Chi-Minh AFTN N
Jakarta AMHS N
Kuala Lumpur AMHS N
London AMHS N
Manila AMHS Y
Mumbai AMHS N

Taibei Hong Kong AMHS Y

Fukuoka AMHS Y
Manila AMHS Y

Tarawa Nadi AMHS/UA N

Timor Leste/Dili Brisbane AMHS N

Tonga/Fua’Amotu Christchurch AMHS/UA N

Ulaan Baatar Beijing AFTN N

Irkutsk AFTN N

Vientiane Bangkok AMHS N

Hanoi AFTN N
Ho-Chi-Minh AFTN N

29th Edition
September-22
 31. CNS SG/26
Appendix B to the Report

Terminal I Terminal II ATSMHS or AFTN Over CRV (Y/N)

(^ - BBIS)
Wallist Is. Nadi (planning) -

Yangon Bangkok AMHS N

Beijing AFTN N

Yap Salt Lake City AMHS/UA N

_____________

29th Edition
September-22
 CNS SG/26
Appendix C to the Report

AMHS Readiness Report for Supporting IWXXM Traffic

Readiness Status of AMHS for

Name of State supporting File Transfer Body Part
Capacity status of the operational AFS
(Administration)/name (FTBP), the Interpersonal Message
links to support the exchange of the
No. States/Administration of BBIS/BIS location AFTN/AMHS transition date/schedule (IPM) Heading Extension (IHE) to
required meteorological information in
where AMHS is support for exchanging IWXXM reports
both IWXXM GML form and TAC form:
installed: of a maximum size of 4MB and FTBP of
maximum 2MB:
Completed.
AMHS exchange in place with USA, Fiji, New Zealand,
Singapore and South Africa.

AFTN still in place with Indonesia and PNG, migration to AMHS Airservices has contracted a 2.0Mbps
based on pending readiness both partners bandwidth using CRV Package C+ for
Full compliance and support
1 Australia Airservices - Brisbane Several Pacific island nations connecting via FCO CADAS ATS Voice & AMHS services. Bandwidth on
since Nov 2020
Terminal, currently over AFTN. Airservices plans to migrate to the leased line with South Africa /
AMHS P3 CADAS but will need to provide user training. Johannesburg is also 2Mbps.

All domestic users and data originators still on AFTN, no desire

by external partners to migrate to AMHS, awaiting SWIM
instead
AMHS deployed in 2008 which was upgraded to support
CRV bandwidth is 3M. Minimally 64kbps
2 China Beijing ATN/IPS in 2013 and upgraded to support exchanging IWXXM support
for each AMHS connection..
in 2020.

3 Hong Kong China Hong Kong China December 2009 Support 2MB for CRV and 64kbps for IPLCs

Nadi has contracted a 1.0Mbps

bandwidth using CRV Package C+ for
Voice & AMHS services. The total
The Comsoft AMHS System supports
Completed. In June 2019, Fiji completed the transition of ATN bandwidth usage for voice and data is
File Transfer Body Part (FTBP). Our
BBIS to IPS for the AMHS service from Nadi to Salt Lake, USA 768K from the total 1.0Mbps. The
Fiji Airport/Air Traffic system has the capability of
4 Fiji & Brisbane, Australia over the CRV network. The local end User bandwidth for AMHS is 64Kbps each to
Management Centre exchanging IWXXM reports of a
still operates on AFTN terminal and is converted to AMHS over Brisbane & Salt Lake Center. It is noted
maximum size of 4MB and FTBP of
the AFTN/AMHS Gateway. in the ACSICG/7 WP04 presented by
maximum.
USA that 64Kbps is the minimum
recommended required bandwidth for
AMHS to exchange FTBP for IWXXM.

5 India AAI/Mumbai Airport AMHS is in operation since 2011.

Presently India is not able to
Indian Meteorological Department is
India is in the process of tendering for replacement of existing exchange the required 4 MB
in the process of upgradation of HPC &
AMHS system . The Tender action stands delayed due to messages and 2 MB FTBP
DB to support IWXXM.
COVID pandemic. attachments.

APX. C ‐ 1
 CNS SG/26
Appendix C to the Report

Readiness Status of AMHS for

Name of State supporting File Transfer Body Part
Capacity status of the operational AFS
(Administration)/name (FTBP), the Interpersonal Message
links to support the exchange of the
No. States/Administration of BBIS/BIS location AFTN/AMHS transition date/schedule (IPM) Heading Extension (IHE) to
required meteorological information in
where AMHS is support for exchanging IWXXM reports
both IWXXM GML form and TAC form:
installed: of a maximum size of 4MB and FTBP of
maximum 2MB:

Already support exchange of IWXXM

AFS links over CRV is a Package A,
6 Japan Japan/Fukuoka ATN BBIS router and AMHS installed at 2000. messages based on FTBP in August
Bandwidth 2M.
2015.

It is possible to send , receive and

Connection tests with USA 2000 - 2004 and put into operational
transfer up to 2GB for the contents
use in 2005 and over CRV in February 2019.
such as FTBP,IPM and IHE in
AMHS,and the size of IWXXM
Put into AMHS operation with Hong- Kong and Singapore in suported system by Japan
2021. Meteorological Agency is 2MB
AMHS implementation with China in 2021 , Korea and Taipei in
2022.

7 Macao China Macao China Q4/2009 Q3/2021 To be determined

Airways New Zealand has contracted a

1.0Mbps bandwidth using CRV Package
8 New Zealand Airways – Christchurch AMHS connections are in place with Australia, USA and the New Support
C+ for Voice and AMHS services from
Auckland and Christchurch.
Can support IHE and FTBP maximum
Philippines/ATMC
9 Philippines Completed March 2018 1MB (tested with Taipei on 13-May- 1MB
Manila
20)
Philippines has contracted 2Mbps
bandwidth using CRV package “A”
voice and data services.

Gimpo international AMHS implementation for supporting AFS links over CRV is a Package A,
10 Republic of Korea ATN/AMHS with China put into operational use in June, 2011.
airport FTBP and IHE will be in 4Q, 2022. Bandwidth 2M.
AMHS implementation with China and Japan over CRV will be
in 4Q, 2022.

2MB for CRV and minimally 64kbps for

11 Singapore Singapore March 2011 Yes
IPLCs
BBIS/BIS Routers already implemented. AMHS has been
Completed, the IWXXM exchange
implemented since July 2011. Connection with Bangladesh, The capacity of links readied to support
12 Thailand Thailand has been implemented since
Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Lao PDR, Myanmar, in both form.
November 2020.
Singapore, Hong Kong China, and Malaysia implemented.
Connection with SITA (SITA AMHS Gateway inter-connections)
implemented.
Bangkok - Vietnam Circuit

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 CNS SG/26
Appendix C to the Report

Readiness Status of AMHS for

Name of State supporting File Transfer Body Part
Capacity status of the operational AFS
(Administration)/name (FTBP), the Interpersonal Message
links to support the exchange of the
No. States/Administration of BBIS/BIS location AFTN/AMHS transition date/schedule (IPM) Heading Extension (IHE) to
required meteorological information in
where AMHS is support for exchanging IWXXM reports
both IWXXM GML form and TAC form:
installed: of a maximum size of 4MB and FTBP of
maximum 2MB:

IOT Test : Done

POT Test: Planned for end of 3Q2021
Bangkok - Rome Circuit
IOT Test: Planned for 3Q2021
POT Test: Planned for 4Q2021

Yes. FAA AMHS has FTBP capability.

Federal Aviation National Weather Service (NWS)
13 USA Q4, 2020 Yes. 2MB bandwidth over CRV
Administration projected to implement IWXXM by
Q3, 2021

APX. C ‐ 3
 Appendix D to the Report

Seamless ANS Plan v4.0

With reference to the expected publication of the ICAO PANS-Information Management (PANS-IM) in
2024 and the expected sunset date of the current flight plan format (FPL2012) of 2032 being considered by
ICAO ATMRPP, the timeframe for SWIM implementation in Asia-Pacific region was set at between 2024
and 2030. The expectation is that Asia-Pacific States will be SWIM ready by 2030 and the intervening 2
years till the expected sunset date of 2032 of the FPL2012 format can be used to conduct FF-ICE related
operational trials. The timeframe was adopted by APANPIRG/33 by the Conclusion APANPIRG/33/ xx
(SWIM TF/06/02) - The Asia-Pacific SWIM Implementation Timeframe.
APANPIRG/33 also considered including SWIM implementation as part of Performance Improvement
Plan in the next edition the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan aligned with SWIM implementation timeframe
which was adopted by the Conclusion APANPIRG/33/ xx (SWIM TF/06/04): Inclusion of the Asia/Pacific
SWIM Implementation in the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan.
Therefore, in order to ensure that SWIM, a key building block to achieve the vision outlined in the Global
ATM Operational Concept (Doc 9854), is properly captured in the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan,
following SWIM ASBUs are included for the year 2024. The elements required to be added from 2025
would be added in the fifth amendments of the plan in 2025.

Functional Category Element Priority

Information SWIM-B2/1- Information service provision: 2
Requirements for an information service
provider to make aviation-related information
available as an information service.

SWIM-B2/2- Information service consumption: 2

Requirements for an information service
consumer to discover and access aviation-related
information provided via information services
 CNS SG/26
Appendix E to the Report

TERMS OF REFERENCE

SWIM Task Force

Objectives: In order to achieve the SWIM thread as specified in the Aviation System Block Upgrade
(ASBU) of the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP), the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan objectives, and
the air navigation systems that are in compliance with ICAO global standards for the conceptualisation and
exchange of aeronautical, flight and meteorological information, the SWIM Task Force will:
a) Benchmark the various successful implementations of SWIM in States and regions to
promote best practices;
b) Develop and maintain the Asia/Pacific regional roadmap for SWIM implementation,
including SWIM technical infrastructure, SWIM governance, SWIM information
services;
c) Propose a high-level Asia/Pacific regional SWIM architecture, the corresponding
SWIM technical infrastructure requirements, and the implementation approach to
construct such architecture principally over CRV and other IP based networks to ensure
interoperability among regional SWIM participants, to support transition for non-
SWIM capable entities;
d) Develop the Asia/Pacific regional SWIM cyber security architecture framework and
SWIM security strategy in line with ICAO International Aviation Trust Framework
(IATF);
e) Support APANPIRG WGs/TFs regarding information exchange models and examine
if any extension to the existing information exchange models, i.e. AIXM, FIXM, and
IWXXM, and/or the new information exchange model(s) are required to support the
Asia/Pacific regional operational requirements;
f) Establish a robust and sustainable governance model to ensure that a common set of
policies, rules, and standards for identifying, designing, implementing, discovering,
and operating SWIM-enabling components, including SWIM registries, is consistently
applied and enforced throughout the Asia/Pacific region;
g) Develop and define the Asia/Pacific version of the SWIM information service
overview specifications and the Asia/Pacific version of data catalogue for information
services based on the regional operational needs;
h) Track and observe SWIM demonstrations and trials within the Asia/Pacific region as
well as provide, if required, support for regional SWIM demonstrations;
i) Encourage and support interested APAC Member States to construct a platform for
SWIM services and applications validation and to support the implementation of
SWIM services and applications;
j) Monitor developments by the IMP and escalate the regional issues as required;
k) Identify, communicate, and liaise with relevant APANPIRG WGs/TFs in regard to
SWIM-related activities, including providing support to refine SWIM operational and
communications requirements;
l) Develop an educational and promotional materials required to support the regional
SWIM implementation to ensure cohesiveness among regional SWIM participants;

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 CNS SG/26
Appendix E to the Report

m) Assist APAC Member States to implement the Asia/Pacific regional SWIM, as

appropriate;; and
n) Undertake any other approved tasks related to SWIM implementation that may arise
in the future.

Composition:

The SWIM TF will consist of experts from ATM, AIM, MET, and CNS from Asia/Pacific States and
international organizations such as IATA and ICCAIA.

Conduct of the work:

The task force will conduct its work through web conferences, teleconferences, other electronic means of
communications, and Face-to-Face meetings.

Reporting:

The group will report to CNS SG.

________________

APX. E - 2
 CNS SG/26
Appendix F to the Report

PROPOSED UPDATES TO
FLIGHT INSPECTION GUIDANCE MATERIAL
(SECOND EDITION)

NOTES ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

1. The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text with a line through it and new text
highlighted with grey shading, as shown below:

a) Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it. text to be deleted

b) New text to be inserted is highlighted with grey shading. new text to be inserted

c) Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it followed new text to replace
by the replacement text which is highlighted with grey existing text
shading.

_____________

Page (vii) of Flight Inspection Guidance Material (Second Edition)

ABBREVIATIONS

DF Direction Finder
DGPS Differential Global Positioning System
UAS Unmanned Aerial System

_____________

Page 2-12 of Flight Inspection Guidance Material (Second Edition)

2.5.3 During pandemic situation, every country may have different travel restriction policies in place
to contain the spread of pandemic. Cross-country deployment of flight inspection may become difficult
or infeasible due to border closure, especially for those States who do not have their own FISP.
Therefore, States may have to consider to deploy flight inspection crew and aircraft to alternative base
for timely completion of flight inspection. In this situation and to safeguard the health condition of flight
inspection crew, the following considerations could be made when planning for the flight inspection:

(a) Negotiate with the FISP in advance for performing flight inspection from alternative base
where is classified as low risk of the epidemic situation;

(b) Seek support from the government of the alternative base for the flight inspection activities;

(c) Work with local government to apply for exemption permits for the FISP to enter States If
deployment from alternative base in another country is not possible, either due to border
closure or not practical. The States should cater ample time when applying such permits so
to ensure all the systems and facilities still comply with the State’s regulatory requirement
on the periodicity of flight inspection;

APX. F - 1
 CNS SG/26
Appendix F to the Report

(d) Encourage FISP to develop a special management plan for performing flight inspection
under pandemic as it may facilitate the exemption permits application in States. The
pandemic management plan could include the following areas:

(i) Hazard & risk management

(ii) Fitness for duty evaluation for FISP crew – daily body temperature & symptoms
check records

(iii) Self-isolation requirements for FISP crew

(iv) Mask wearing, social distancing and personal hygiene requirements for FISP crew

(v) Incident reporting mechanism

(vi) Contact tracing documents - names / telephone of physical contacts with FISP crew

(e) Develop special arrangements during the flight inspection period, for example:

(i) Seek support from the relevant party to set up all essential ground equipment for
flight inspection, e.g. DGPS equipment, locally and by local staff, instead of the
flight inspection crew to be deployed;

(ii) Arrange point to point transportation between the airport and accommodation for
the flight crew with close-loop arrangement as far as practicable;

(iii) Conduct virtual meeting with the FISP for coordination and discussion on the flight
inspection reports to avoid face to face meetings;

(iv) Create controlled itinerary for the flight inspection crew, where the flight
inspection crew is only allowed to leave their accommodation to carry out the flight
inspection. This will minimize the physical interaction between the flight
inspection crew and the public; and

(v) Keep up to date with the latest requirements of the exemption permits applied, e.g.
the need for the flight inspection crew to take Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)
tests during the flight inspection period and the maximum number of days the flight
inspection crew is allowed to stay.

(f) Such special/additional arrangements may incur extra cost for each deployment. The flight
inspection crew might need to be quarantined upon return to the country where the FISP is
based. States should consider these additional costs when planning for each deployment.

_____________

Page 3-5 of Flight Inspection Guidance Material (Second Edition)

3.2 OTHER TYPES OF FLIGHT INSPECTION

3.2.1 Procedure Validation

APX. F - 2
 CNS SG/26
Appendix F to the Report

3.2.1.1 This is detailed in ICAO Doc 9906, Quality Assurance Manual for Flight Procedure
Design. Volume 5 – Validation of Instrument Flight Procedures. The ANSP, FISP and Procedure
Design Company need to work closely to ensure this aspect is covered off adequately.

3.2.2 Surveillance Flight Inspection

3.2.2.1 Surveillance flight inspection may be arranged for providing supplementary check and
verification on the performance of the newly commissioned radio navigation aids, before its next
required periodic flight inspection. Since the stability on operating environment and new system itself
are yet to be demonstrated, the additional surveillance flight inspection could early detect any potential
issues on system performance after commissioning and before the next routine check. Maintenance staff
could then take prompt and appropriate actions to rectify the issues spotted to avoid safety hazards.

3.2.1.13.2.3 VHF equipment, ADS-B, GBAS

3.2.2.13.2.3.1 Flight inspection is typically carried out under request from an appropriately
trained Communications/ADS-B or GBAS engineer. The specifics such as location, type of check and
flight profiles are determined by a collaborative approach between all involved disciplines. In some
cases, flight inspection is used to assist in the validation of models for determining coverage.

3.2.33.2.4 Performance-based Navigation – RNAV and RNP

3.2.3.13.2.4.1 At a minimum, the aircraft should have the capability to undertake the desired
procedure validation. RNP procedures’ validation requirements would normally be specified within the
Procedure Design Company specifications. The Aeronautical Design and Development organization
should analyze the results to determine containment within the specified criteria. Technical assessment
perspective is as follows;

(a) Validation of obstacle survey data is recommended during the flight validation
process.

(b) Verification of survey data can be performed by setting ground stations at certain
survey points. The ground survey team can check and compare the DGPS signal
to the TSO avionic aircraft receiver position.

(c) The survey data may be affected by waypoint, track and bearing error.

(d) The effect of terrain shielding should be taken into consideration.

(e) Verification is often done slightly lower than the published profile to remove
altimeter error as often it is advantageous to verify in the worst-case position.

3.3.1 Test Accuracy Ratios (TAR)

3.3.1.1 As the results obtained by the flight inspection system could potentially be used to
defend a service provider in the event of an incident or accident, the State should clearly specify the
standards adopted in the maintenance and calibration of the systems used for flight inspection
purposes. To effectively perform calibration of a system, the calibration equipment should be
typically five 5 times (minimum three3 times) times more accurate than the system equipment. Some
considerations should be as follows:

APX. F - 3
 CNS SG/26
Appendix F to the Report

(a) Temperature stability and compensation.

(b) Electromagnetic interference.

(c) Polar Pattern considerations.

(d) Absolute measurements.

(e) Relative measurements.

(f) Aircraft receiver and calibration equipment duplication.

_____________

App-1 Appendix 1

1. USEFUL REFERENCE

• ICASC Website
http://www.icasc.co

• ICASC - Document on Standards and Recommended Practises Practices for Flight Inspection
& Flight Validation Organisations
http://www.icasc.co/sites/faa/uploads/documents/Library/ICASC/ICASC_SARPs_FI_FV_v1
4_11102018_final101.pdf

• ICASC Recommended Flight Inspection & Flight Validation Contract Annex

http://www.icasc.co/sites/faa/uploads/documents/Library/ICASC/ICASC_FIS_Contract__An
nex_v0_2_26_05_2016_final101.pdf

• Reference Note note from ICAO on the Considerations considerations of Radio radio
Navigation navigation Aids aids Flight flight Inspection inspection Periodicity periodicity
https://www.icao.int/safety/OPS/OPS-Normal/Pages/Flight-inspection-for-radio-aids.aspx

_____________
App-2 Appendix 2

1.2. Among the numerous requirements from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
flight navigation systems must be regularly calibrated, inspected and maintained to ensure that all
essential navigation aids for pilots are always working properly. This means that these systems must be
tuned and maintained to radiate the correct signals in the airspace, at any time. To achieve this, a
combination of ground and air inspections is necessary, like the localizer measurements for CAT III
ILS (Instrument Landing System).

1.3. ILS is an essential navigation aid to help pilots land their aircraft in low visibility conditions
during IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) flights. In order to maintain the ICAO ILS certification, dynamic
measurements need to be performed by the airport operators / ANSPs, their subcontracted flight
inspection organizations or government agencies. These companies are always looking to improve and
streamline inspection processes to mitigate impacts on airport operations. The regular ILS signal
inspection is made in flight, using a manned aircraft. It requires prior coordination and preparation with

APX. F - 4
 CNS SG/26
Appendix F to the Report

various stakeholders, together with ground measurements in order to optimize the manned flight
inspection.

3.1. As in 2019, fFlight inspection organizations or institutes in Belgium, China, Germany, Italy,
Russia, Spain have used drones to assist and provide supplementary tests in flight inspection works.
The drones are normally be used to assist testing of navigation equipment signals, since they are not
competent for all flight inspection missions with limited performance in speed, service ceiling,
endurance, crosswind resistance, payload, etc. Some latest developments on technology and standard
shared by States/organizations are listed below for reference:

3.4. China

(a) In CNS/SG/25 meeting, China has shared their trials and application of UAS as well as
the progress of standards development. Some reference materials contributed by China
are summarized below for reference:

i) UAS-Based PAPI Inspection Technology in China

https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/2021%20CNS%20SG%2025/WP24_CH
N%20AI.12%20-%20UAS-
based%20PAPI%20Inspection%20Technology%20in%20China.pdf
ii) Standard Establishment of UAS-Based Flight Inspection System in China
https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/2021%20CNS%20SG%2025/Flimsy%20
03_CHN%20AI.12%20-%20Standard%20establishment%20of%20UAS-
based%20flight%20inspection%20system%20in%20China.pdf
iii) Standard Establishment of Data Link for UAS-Based Flight Inspection in China
https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/2021%20CNS%20SG%2025/IP15_CHN
%20AI.12%20-
%20Standard%20Establishment%20of%20Data%20Link%20for%20UAS-
based%20Flight%20Inspection.pdf

APX. F - 5
 CNS SG/26
Appendix G to the Report

Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters

Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

MODE S DOWNLINK AIRCRAFT PARAMETERS IMPLEMENTATION

AND OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT

Edition 4.0 - August 2022

Edition 4.0 – August 2022 1

 CNS SG/26
Appendix G to the Report

Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters

Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

Intentionally left blank

Edition 4.0 – August 2022 2

 CNS SG/26
Appendix G to the Report

Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters

Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
PREFACE

This publication is one of the deliverables of the Mode S DAPs WG according to the Terms of Reference
(TOR). It aims at providing guidance materials to States and airspace users on the use of Mode S DAPs
in the Asia and Pacific Regions from both operational and technical perspectives. A working team was
established to develop the contents, and China has volunteered to take lead on coordinating and
consolidating inputs from members of the working team.

During Mode S DAPs WG/1 held in March 2018, the meeting considered that further development work
is required before the initial draft (Edition 0.1) proposed by China and Hong Kong China becomes ready
for approval. Then the working team began to develop the contents of the guidance document, China
organized two internal conferences and ICAO APAC office organized a web conference for reviewing
the contents. Based on numerous rounds of review and comments with joint efforts from the working
team, China has revised the draft into five previous versions. Finally, Edition 1.0 was submitted for
endorsement after Mode S DAPs WG/2, and published in the CNS SG/23. China revised the document
and circulated it to the members of the Working Group for comments. Then Edition 2.0 was released in
2020, during CNS SG/24. The latest version (Edition 3.0) was adopted by CNS SG/25 in 2021. This
version includes information related to ADS-B DAPs, and the revised draft is prepared and proposed to
be endorsed by Mode S DAPs WG/5.

The support from ICAO APAC Office and contributions from the following volunteer
State/Administration and industry partner in preparing the guidance material is acknowledged and highly
appreciated:

⚫ Air Traffic Management Bureau of CAAC, China

⚫ The Second Research Institute of CAAC, China

⚫ Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department, China

⚫ Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

⚫ Japan Civil Aviation Bureau

⚫ Electronic Navigation Research Institute, Japan

⚫ Airways, New Zealand

⚫ Airservices, Australia

Edition 4.0 – August 2022 3

 CNS SG/26
Appendix G to the Report

Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters

Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 7

1.1 PURPOSE ..................................................................................................................................................... 7

1.2 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................ 7
1.2.1 Mode S and DAPs ................................................................................................................................... 7
1.2.2 Benefit of Mode S and Use of DAPs ....................................................................................................... 8
1.3 ARRANGEMENT OF DAPS IGD .................................................................................................................. 9
1.4 DOCUMENT HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................ 9
1.5 COPIES ........................................................................................................................................................ 9
1.6 CHANGES TO DAPS IGD ............................................................................................................................ 9
1.7 EDITING CONVENTIONS ............................................................................................................................. 9
1.8 DAPS IGD REQUEST FOR CHANGE FORM .............................................................................................. 11
1.9 AMENDMENT RECORD ............................................................................................................................. 12

2. ACRONYMS LIST ......................................................................................................................................... 13

3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ....................................................................................................................... 15

4. DESCRIPTION OF MODE S DAPS DATA ................................................................................................. 17

4.1 MODE S ELS ............................................................................................................................................ 17

4.2 MODE S EHS ............................................................................................................................................ 18
4.3 ADS-B DAPS ............................................................................................................................................ 19
4.4 THE DATA ITEM IN SSR DAPS AND ADS-B DAPS .................................................................................. 20
4.5 DAPS DATA EXCHANGE PROTOCOL BETWEEN SURVEILLANCE AND ATM AUTOMATION SYSTEM ..... 21

5. IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES AND PHASES .................................................................................. 23

5.1 IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES ................................................................................................................ 23

5.1.1 Stakeholders Coordination ................................................................................................................... 23
5.1.2 System Compatibility ............................................................................................................................ 23
5.1.3 DAPs Data Integrity ............................................................................................................................. 24
5.1.4 System Integration ................................................................................................................................ 24
5.2 IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST ............................................................................................................ 25
5.2.1 Activity Sequence .................................................................................................................................. 25
5.2.2 Concept Phase ...................................................................................................................................... 25
5.2.3 Design Phase ........................................................................................................................................ 26
5.2.4 Implementation Phase........................................................................................................................... 27

6. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING ............................................................................................. 28

6.1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................... 28
6.2 PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING .................................................................................................. 28
6.3 ATS SYSTEM VALIDATION ....................................................................................................................... 28
6.3.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines ............................................................................................................... 28
6.3.2 System Safety Assessment ..................................................................................................................... 28
6.3.3 Integration Test ..................................................................................................................................... 29

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Appendix G to the Report

Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters

Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
6.3.4 ATS Operation Manuals ....................................................................................................................... 29
6.4 SYSTEM MONITORING ............................................................................................................................. 29
6.4.1 Consideration for System Monitoring ................................................................................................... 29
6.4.2 Mode S DAPs Problem Reports ............................................................................................................ 30
6.4.3 Example of Mode S DAPs Problem ...................................................................................................... 31
6.5 APPLICATION ANALYSIS........................................................................................................................... 32
6.5.1 Data Recording ..................................................................................................................................... 32
6.5.2 Local Data Collection........................................................................................................................... 32
6.5.3 Avionics Problem Identification and Correction................................................................................... 32
6.6 IDENTIFIED ISSUES ................................................................................................................................... 32

7. REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES ........................................................................................................ 33

7.1 MANDATING MODE S DAPS .................................................................................................................... 33

7.2 AVIONICS .................................................................................................................................................. 34
7.2.1 Mode S Transponder Capabilities ........................................................................................................ 34
7.2.2 Mode S Transponder Mandate .............................................................................................................. 36
7.2.3 Transition Guidelines............................................................................................................................ 36
7.2.4 Mode S Transponder Working on the Ground....................................................................................... 37
7.2.5 1090MHz Extended Squitter Transponder capability ............................................................................ 37
7.3 EXTRACT MODE S SSR DAPS USING A MODE S INTERROGATOR ........................................................ 39
7.3.1 Working Principles................................................................................................................................ 39
7.3.2 Interrogator Codes................................................................................................................................ 40
7.3.3 Mode Interlace Pattern ......................................................................................................................... 40
7.3.4 Mode S SSR DAPs Extraction using GICB Protocol ............................................................................ 41
7.3.5 Mode S SSR DAPs Extraction using AICB Protocol ............................................................................. 43
7.3.6 Mode S SSR DAPs Extraction using Comm-B Broadcast ..................................................................... 43
7.4 PROVISION OF ADS-B DAPS USING EXTENDED SQUITTER ..................................................................... 43
7.4.1 Working Principles................................................................................................................................ 43
7.4.2 ADS-B Message content........................................................................................................................ 44
7.4.3 ADS-B message Transmission Broadcast rate ...................................................................................... 47
7.5 APPLICATION OF THE MODE S DAPS IN ATM AUTOMATION SYSTEM .................................................. 49
7.5.1. Implementation of the General DAPs information ........................................................................ 49
7.5.2. Mode S SSR DAPs ........................................................................................................................... 51
7.5.3. ADS-B DAPs .................................................................................................................................... 51
7.6 FLIGHT PLANNING ................................................................................................................................... 52
7.6.1 ICAO Flight Plan Item 7 - Aircraft Identification ................................................................................. 52
7.6.2 Equipment (Surveillance Equipment /SSR Equipment)......................................................................... 53
7.6.3 Inconsistency between Mode S Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability ...................................... 54
7.6.4 Setting Flight ID in Cockpits ................................................................................................................ 54
7.7 CONTINGENCY PLAN ................................................................................................................................ 55

8. TRAINING AND COMPETENCY ............................................................................................................... 56

8.1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................... 56
8.2 TRAINING OF AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER (ATC) IN DAPS .............................................................. 56

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8.3 TRAINING OF AN ATSEP IN DAPS ........................................................................................................... 56
8.4 COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT OF AN ATSEP IN DAPS .............................................................................. 57

9. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES ON MODE S DAPS APPLICATION .................................................................. 58

9.1 USE OF SELECTED ALTITUDE................................................................................................................... 58

9.2 USE OF ACAS RA .................................................................................................................................... 58
9.3 USE OF MODE-S DAPS DATA FOR WEATHER FORECAST ......................................................................... 59
9.4 USE OF BAROMETRIC PRESSURE SETTING ............................................................................................. 60
9.5 APPLICATION OF GEOMETRIC HEIGHT OF ADS-B IN ANALYSIS OF HEIGHT-KEEPING-PERFORMANCE
IN RVSM………………………………………………………………………………………………………….60

APPENDIX 1: MODE S DAPS ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 63

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF IDENTIFIED ISSUES................................................................................................... 66

APPENDIX 3: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF MODE S SSR DAPS DATA SOURCE.................................. 71

APPENDIX 4: MODE S PARAMETER SET ....................................................................................................... 78

APPENDIX 5: RADIO FREQUENCY (RF) MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS ........................................ 83

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

This Mode S Downlink Aircraft Parameters Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (DAPs
IGD) provides guidance for the planning, implementation and operational application of Mode S DAPs
technology in the Asia and Pacific Regions.

The procedures and requirements for Mode S DAPs operations are detailed in the relevant States’ AIP.
This IGD is intended to provide key information on Mode S DAPs performance, integration, principles,
procedures and collaboration mechanisms.

The content is based upon the work to date of the Mode S DAPs Working Group and various ANC
Panels for the operational use of Mode S DAPs.

1.2 Background

1.2.1 Mode S and DAPs

Mode S (Select) is an extension of conventional SSR which permits selective addressing of individual
aircraft equipped with Mode S transponders. Additional data known as Downlink Aircraft Parameters
(DAPs) may also be extracted from the aircraft, including aircraft identification which should correspond
to the ACID entered in the flight plan.

Mode S operates on the same radio frequencies (1030 and 1090 MHz) as conventional SSR systems,
allowing for interrogation of Mode A/C only transponders and Mode S transponders.

Each Mode S equipped aircraft is assigned a unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address. Using the selective
interrogation capability of the Mode S SSR, Mode S Sensors are able to first acquire and then selectively
interrogate a specific aircraft via its unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address. This significantly improves the
radar’s detection and tracking performance, and therefore improving the ability of ATC to monitor and
control the aircraft, as well as the others around it.

The innovation of Mode S resides in the use of selective addressing of aircraft which offers technical
advantages over conventional SSR, such as reducing “fruit” and “garbling”, providing higher integrity
radar tracks.

Mode S technology has the following characteristics:

a) selective interrogation,
b) individual aircraft address and
c) datalink capability.
The Mode S application includes Mode S radar system, datalink Systems, MLAT Systems, etc.

Various avionics systems onboard an aircraft receive data from sensors to provide the DAPs output. The
data mainly comes from several sets of sensors, such as air data sensors (including pitot probe, static port,
temperature sensor, and angle of attack sensor), inertial sensors (including position gyroscopes, rate
gyroscopes and accelerometers) and magnetic sensor(s). Part of the parameters produced by other
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avionics systems (such as MCP/FCU, FMS, TCAS, etc.) are also defined as downlink aircraft parameters.
These parameters are then sent to the transponder through standard data buses, and stored inside the
relevant transponder’s 256 different 56-bit wide Binary Data Store. Ground-based surveillance systems
(such as MSSR or MLAT) can downlink the desired parameters using specific Mode S protocols.

For detailed information about DAPs data source, please refer to Appendix 3.

Mode S DAPs is an application of the Mode S Datalink System. The downlink standard length
transaction interface shall deliver DAPs to the transponder which then makes data available to the
ground surveillance systems. Each DAP shall be packed and then transmitted by the downlink SLM,
ground-initiated and broadcast protocols.

There are 255 Comm-B registers within the Mode S transponder, some of them are assigned for Mode S
SSR DAPs and some are assigned for ADS-B DAPs. The Mode S transponder transmits extended
squitter to support the ADS-B message transmitted on 1090 MHz which is called ADS-B DAPs. And the
SSR DAPs can be extracted using either the ground-initiated Comm-B (GICB) protocol, or using MSP
downlink channel 3 via the data flash application.

There are four 1090 MHz Extended Squitter ADS-B MOPS versions with the latest, Version 3 published
in December 2020. With each new version, some messages have different formats and contain additional
or eliminated message subfields in different versions, as the version 3 was published in December, 2020,
As version 3 is so new there are few if any avionics which meet the standards, therefore the related
information of ADS-B DAPs in this document is based on the version 2 and earlier versions.

1.2.2 Benefit of Mode S and Use of DAPs

The Mode S application reduces the weakness of Mode A/C, because of the selective interrogation
reducing synchronous garble and asynchronous interference. The parity check technique improves the
reliability and integrity of surveillance data. The availability of almost 17 million unique aircraft
addresses, in conjunction with the automatic reporting of flight identity, alleviates Mode 3/A code
shortages and enables unambiguous aircraft identification, if the correct aircraft address and/or Aircraft
Identification are entered in both the flight plan and aircraft systems. The datalink technique assists the
acquisition of downlink aircraft parameters, and the additional track label information improves the air
situational awareness. The controller and pilot are presented with improved situation awareness, which
reduces the R/T workload.

Another benefit is to maximize SSR Mode 3/A code savings. By introducing the Mode S Conspicuity
Code, all aircraft identified by Mode S via DAPs (ACID) can use the same SSR Mode 3/A code. During
the 6th meeting of ATM SG, the following Conclusion is adopted:

Conclusion ATM/SG/6-3: Proposed Air Navigation Plan Volume II Amendment

‘A1000’ was reserved for the Mode S Conspicuity Code for the ICAO APAC region.

The ADS-B DAPs also provide benefits such as economical, enhanced safety and efficiency. The
position report in ADS-B message is transmitted with an indication of the integrity associated with the
data. And the ADS-B ground station is simpler than the stations of primary radar, secondary radar and
multilateration, and acquisition and installation costs are significantly lower. Since ADS-B messages are
broadcast, it supports both ground-based and airborne surveillance applications.

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1.3 Arrangement of DAPs IGD

The Mode S DAPs Implementation and Operations Guidance Document consists of the following parts:

Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Acronym Lists
Section 3 Reference Documents
Section 4 Description of Mode S DAPs Data
Section 5 Implementation Principles and Phase
Section 6 System Integrity and Monitoring
Section 7 Regulations and Procedures
Section 8 Training and Competence
Section 9 Specific Examples on Mode S DAPs Applications

1.4 Document History and Management

The framework of this document was introduced in the first Working Group Meeting of Mode S
Downlink Aircraft Parameters in March 2018. The Meeting agreed to further develop based on the
proposed framework to a complete document for approval as a regional guidance document. A working
team, consisting of volunteers from China, Hong Kong-China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and
New Zealand was established by the Meeting to contribute to the content of the document. In July 2018,
the completed draft of this document was ready for circulation among States for review and comment.

The aim of this document to supplement SARPs, PANS and relevant provisions contained in ICAO
documentation, and it will be regularly updated to reflect evolving provisions.

1.5 Copies

Paper copies of this DAPs IGD are not distributed. Controlled and endorsed copies can be found at the
following website: http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx and may be freely downloaded from the
website, or by emailing APANPIRG through the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office who will send a
copy by return email.

1.6 Changes to DAPs IGD

Whenever a user identifies a need for a change to this document, a Request for Change (RFC) Form (see
Section 1.8 below) should be completed and submitted to the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office.
The Regional Office will collate RFCs for consideration by the Surveillance Implementation
Coordination Group.

When an amendment has been adopted by the meeting of the Surveillance Implementation Coordination
Group, then a new version of the DAPs IGD will be prepared, with the changes marked by an “|” in the
margin, and an endnote indicating the relevant RFC, so a reader can see the origin of the change. If the
change is in a table cell, the outside edges of the table will be highlighted, e.g.:

Final approval for publication of an amendment to the DAPs IGD will be the responsibility of
APANPIRG.

1.7 Editing Conventions

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1.8 DAPs IGD Request for Change Form

RFC Nr:

Please use this form when requesting a change to any part of this DAPs IGD. This form may be
photocopied as required, emailed, faxed or e-mailed to ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office
+66 (2) 537-8199 or APAC@icao.int

1. SUBJECT:

2. REASON FOR CHANGE:

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL: [expand / attach additional pages if necessary]

4. REFERENCE(S):
5. PERSON INITIATING: DATE:
ORGANISATION:
TEL/FAX/E-MAIL:

6. CONSULTATION RESPONSE DUE BY DATE:

Organization Name Agree/Disagree Date

7. ACTION REQUIRED :
8. DAPs IGD EDITOR DATE REC’D :
9. FEEDBACK PASSED DATE :

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1.9 Amendment Record

Amendment Date Amended by Comments

Number
0.1 20 March 2018 China Initial draft for consideration by
Hong Kong, China Mode S DAPs WG/1
0.2 1 August 2018 China First completed draft based on the
Hong Kong, China agreed document framework in
Japan Mode S DAPs WG/1 for review and
Singapore comment by States
Malaysia
0.3 23 August 2018 China Based on Version 0.2 draft, China
hold a meeting to discuss problems
respecting the first completed draft.
This is a revised document according
to content of this meeting.
0.3.1 26 September 2018 China Based on Version 0.3 draft, States
Hong Kong, China make a full comment on the content
Singapore of IGD. This is a revised document
New Zealand according to those comments.
0.3.2 6 November 2018 China Based on Version 0.3.1 draft, States
New Zealand discussed all comments of IGD in
Hong Kong, China the Mode S DAPs WG 1st Web
Singapore Conference. This is revised by the
Malaysia meeting decisions.
0.4 27 December 2018 China Based on Version 0.3.2, States
New Zealand review and comment on the IGD.
Singapore This is a revised document according
Australia to those comments.
1.0 14 March 2019 China Consideration by Mode S DAPs
Japan WG/2
Singapore
Malaysia
1.1 17 February 2020 China Modify based on Version 1.0, States
New Zealand review and comment on the IGD.
Singapore
2.0 13 May 2020 China Consideration by Mode S DAPs
WG/3
3.0 March 2021 China Consideration by Mode S DAPs
WG/4
4.0 March 2022 China Add information related to ADS-B
DAPs and guidance on measurement
of 1030/1090 MHz usage

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2. ACRONYMS LIST

AA Aircraft Address
AAD Assigned Altitude Deviation
AC Altitude Code
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ACID Aircraft Identification
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
AICB Air-Initiated Comm-B
AIGD ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance
ANC Air Navigation Conference
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
APAC Asia Pacific
ASE Altimetry System Error
All Purpose Structured EUROCONTROL Surveillance Information
ASTERIX
Exchange
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network
ATS Air Traffic Service
ATSEP Air Traffic Safety Electronic Personnel
BDS Comm-B Data Selector
CA Capability
CDTI Cockpit Display Traffic Information
CFL Cleared Flight Level
CLAM Cleared Level Adherence Monitoring
CNS Communications, Navigation and Surveillance
DAPs Downlink Aircraft Parameters
DF Downlink Format
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
EHS Mode S Enhanced Surveillance
ELM Extended Length Message
ELS Mode S Elementary Surveillance
ES Extended Squitter
EUROCAE European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment
EUROCONTORL European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
FCU Flight Control Unit
FIR Flight Information Region
FLTID Flight Identification (transmitted by aircraft)
FMS Flight Management System
FRUIT False Relies Unsynchronized In Time
FS Flight Status
FTE Flight Technical Error
HDG Heading
HRD Horizontal Reference Direction
GICB Ground-Initiated Comm-B
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GVA Geometric Vertical Accuracy
HMI Human Machine Interface

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IC Interrogator Code
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ID Identity
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
II Interrogator Identifier
IRF Interrogation Repetition Frequency
MCP Mode Control Panel
MET Meteorological
MHz Megahertz
MIP Mode Interlace Patterns
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLAT Multilateration
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standard
MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
MSP Mode S Specific Protocol
MTCD Medium Term Conflict Detection
NAC Navigation Accuracy Category
NIC Navigation Integrity Category
NUC Navigation Uncertainty Category
RA Resolution Advisory
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum
SARPs (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices
SFL Selected Flight Level
SI Surveillance Identifier
SIL Surveillance Integrity Level
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar
STCA Short-Term Conflict Alert
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TRK Track Angle
TVE Total Vertical Error
UTC Universal Time Coordinated
WAM Wide Area Multilateration
WG Working Group

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3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Id Name of the document Edition Date Origin Domain

1 Aeronautical Telecommunications, Edition 2 2007 ICAO
Annex 10 - Vol. III - Communication
Systems

2 Aeronautical Telecommunications, Edition 5 2014 ICAO

Annex 10 - Vol. IV - Surveillance Radar
and Collision Avoidance Systems

3 Doc 9871, Technical Provisions for Edition 2 2012 ICAO

Mode S Services and Extended Squitter.

4 Doc 9688 Manual on Mode S specific Edition 2 2004 ICAO

service.

5 ED-73E, Minimum Operational Edition 1 May EUROCAE

Performance Standards for Secondary 2011
Surveillance Radar Mode S
Transponders.

6 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Edition April 2021 ICAO

Guidance Document (AIGD) 13 APAC
7 Concept of Operations Mode S in Edition 2 November Eurocontrol
Europe (Mode S CONOPS) 2013

8 Mode S Elementary Surveillance (ELS) Edition 1 January Eurocontrol

Operations Manual 2011

9 Asia/Pacific Seamless ATM Plan May ICAO

2015 APAC

10 Doc 9924 Aeronautical Surveillance Third 2020 ICAO

Manual Edition

11 Preliminary System Safety Analysis for Edition April 2004 Eurocontrol EATMP
the Mode S Elementary Surveillance 1.8

12 Elementary Surveillance (ELS) and April 2008 MIT ATC

Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) validation Lincoln Project
via Mode S Secondary Radar
Laboratory
13 Aircraft Derived Data Validation August MIT ATC
Algorithms 2012 Lincoln Project
Laboratory
14 Doc.4444 Procedures For Air Navigation Sixteenth November ICAO
Services Air Traffic Management Edition 2016

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15 Clarification Mode S Transponder in an Edition 3 May Eurocontrol
Airport/A-SMGCS Environment 1.1 2005

16 Minimum Operational Performance Edition E 17 March RTCA

Standards for Air Traffic Control Radar 2011
Beacon System /Mode Select (ATCRBS
/ Mode S) Airborne Equipment

17 MARK 4 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL Edition 4 15 ARINC

TRANSPONDER (ATCRBS/MODE S) November
2011
18 DO-260 Minimum Operational 13 RTCA
Performance Standards for 1090 MHz September
Automatic Dependent Surveillance –
2000
Broadcast (ADS-B)

19 DO-260A Minimum Operational 2003 RTCA

Performance Standards for 1090 MHz
Automatic Dependent Surveillance –
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic
Information Services – Broadcast
(TIS-B)

20 DO-260B Minimum Operational 2 RTCA

Performance Standards for 1090 MHz December
Automatic Dependent Surveillance –
2009
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic
Information Services – Broadcast
(TIS-B)

21 Doc9574 Manual on a 300 m(1 000 ft) Edition 3 2012 ICAO

Vertical Separation Minimum Between
FL 290 and FL410 Inclusive

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4. DESCRIPTION OF MODE S DAPs DATA

Inside the aircraft transponder, DAPs are stored in different BDS Registers for responding to
interrogation requests by a Mode S ground system. Aircraft parameters are periodically delivered from
aircraft sensors, flight management system, etc., to these registers via the downlink standard length
transaction interface. BDS Registers, which have not been updated within the specified maximum update
interval, are cleared or indicated as invalid and such aircraft parameters would be unavailable for ground
interrogations. When a Mode S SSR sends an interrogation requesting the downlink of registers, Mode S
SSR DAPs are packed into Comm-B format (known as “MB” field) and are extracted using either the
GICB protocol or Mode S specific protocols (MSPs) channel 3. Mode S transponder transmit extended
squitter to broadcast ADS-B DAPs.

BDS Registers are identified by a two-digit hex number. For example, BDS Register for selected vertical
intention, which is identified by hex number 4016, is commonly written as BDS code 4, 0 in publications.
Depending on the stage of Mode S implementation, i.e., Mode S ELS and Mode S EHS, the scope of
Mode S SSR DAPs data involved would be different as illustrated in the following subsections. These
subsections also describe ADS-B DAPs data and the differences between Mode S SSR DAPs and
ADS-B DAPs.

Detailed data format and maximum update interval of each BDS register are given in “ICAO Doc 9871 -
Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended Squitter”.

4.1 Mode S ELS

In Mode S ELS implementation, aircraft and ground Mode S system should be compliant with providing
the following functionalities over conventional Mode A/C systems:

a) Selective interrogation.
b) Use of ICAO Aircraft Address.
c) Automatic reporting of ACID.
d) Report of transponder capability;.
e) Altitude reporting with a resolution of 25ft (subject to aircraft capability).
f) Provision of flight status to indicate airborne or on-the-ground (subject to aircraft capability).
g) Report of SI Code capability; and
h) ACAS active resolution advisory report (when equipped with TCAS).

DAPs associated with Mode S ELS are stored in BDS code 1,0, BDS code 1,7, BDS code 2,0 and BDS
code 3,0 registers of the aircraft’s transponder.

Table 4-1 DAPs in Mode S ELS

Register Name Usage

Datalink Capability To report the data link capability of the Mode S
BDS code 1,0
Report transponder/data link installation.
BDS code 1,7 Common Usage GICB To indicate common usage GICB services currently

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Capability Report supported.
BDS code 2,0 Aircraft Identification To report aircraft identification to the ground.
ACAS Resolution
BDS code 3,0 To report ACAS active resolution advisory
Advisory Report
With the above functionalities properly configured, Mode S ELS could bring the following benefits to
ATC operations:

a) Provide unambiguous aircraft identification using the unique aircraft address and aircraft
identification.
b) Help to solve Mode 3/A code shortage in congested airspace, using the Mode S conspicuity
code (A1000) instead of discrete Mode 3/A codes.
c) Improve surveillance data integrity by;
1) reducing synchronous garble*,
2) lessening over-interrogations, and
3) simplifying aircraft identification in case of false targets.
d) Improve the accuracy of multi-surveillance tracking and safety nets with more accurate target
detection from Mode S radars and high resolution in altitude reporting; and
e) Able to process more aircraft tracks than conventional Mode A/C radars; and
f) Able to provide ACAS active resolution advisory from suitably equipped aircraft.
*Note, while Mode S will help to reduce data garble it will not resolve the issue. Issues around
multi-path and different transponder types in close proximity (e.g., Mode A/C near a Mode S
transponder) can mean that the return received by the radar may not be correct. In the case of a Mode
A/C transponder close to a Mode S transponder, instances have been recorded where the Mode S address
has been transposed into the reply from the Mode A transponder.

4.2 Mode S EHS

Mode S EHS implementation includes all the features of Mode S ELS with the addition of DAPs stored
in BDS code 4,0, BDS code 5,0 and BDS code 6,0 registers of the aircraft’s transponder. The following
table summarizes the details of DAPs of these three registers:

Table 4-2 DAPs in Mode S EHS

Register Name/Downlink Aircraft Parameters Usage

MCP/FCU Selected
Altitude
Selected
FMS Selected Altitude To provide information about the
BDS code 4,0 Vertical
Barometric Pressure Setting aircraft’s current vertical intentions
Intention
MCP/FCU Mode
Target Altitude Source
Roll Angle
Track
True Track Angle
and To provide track and turn data to the
BDS code 5,0 Ground Speed
Turn ground systems.
Track Angle Rate
Report
True Air Speed
BDS code 6,0 Heading Magnetic Heading To provide heading and speed data to

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and Indicated Air Speed ground systems.
Speed Mach Number
Report Barometric Altitude Rate
Inertial Vertical Velocity

In addition to those improvements contributed by Mode S ELS in Section 4.1, Mode S EHS
implementation provides the following benefits to ATC operation:

a) Further improve multi-surveillance tracking accuracy and performance through the use of
DAPs on track, turn, speed and heading of the aircraft in the track calculation.
b) Further improve the accuracy of safety nets, e.g., Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA), through
the provision of more accurate aircraft tracks, and Medium-Term Conflict Detection (MTCD),
Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW), through the provision of the earlier judgment of
vertical movement.
c) Allow the implementation of new safety nets in ATM automation system for cross-checking
selected aircraft vertical intention (i.e., Selected Altitude) with ATC controllers’ instruction as
well as verifying the barometric pressure setting applied in the aircraft with QNH setting in
ATM automation system; and
d) Improve situational awareness of ATC controllers by enabling the direct access of aircraft
parameters in ATM automation system, e.g., Indicated Air Speed, Mach speed, Selected
Altitude, Barometric Pressure Setting, etc.
e) Progressive reduction of R/T workload per aircraft.

4.3 ADS-B DAPs

According to the current situation and operation requirements of airborne ADS-B transponder, only the
aircraft downlink parameters corresponding to ADS-B 1090ES Version 2 are considered. DAPs
associated with ADS-B are stored in BDS Code 0,5, BDS Code 0,6, BDS Code 0,8, BDS Code 0,9, BDS
Code 6,1, BDS Code 6,2 and BDS Code 6,5.

The following table summarizes the details of these parameters:

Table 4-3 ADS-B DAPs

Register Name/Downlink Aircraft Parameters Usage

Airborne Position
NIC Supplement-B
Airborne To provide accurate airborne
BDS code 0,5 Pressure Altitude
Position position information
GNSS Height
Surveillance Status
Surface Surface Position To provide accurate surface
BDS code 0,6
Position Ground Speed Vector position information.
Aircraft Aircraft Identification
To provide aircraft
BDS code 0,8 Identification
Emitter Category identification and category
and Category
Ground Speed Vector To provide additional state
BDS code 0,9 Velocity
NACv information for both
Subtype 1/2 Over Ground
Vertical Rate normal and supersonic flight

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Intent Change Flag
Difference from Baro Altitude
Air Speed
Heading To provide additional state
BDS code 0,9 Airspeed and NACv information for both normal
Subtype 3/4 Heading Vertical Rate and supersonic flight based on
Intent Change Flag airspeed and heading
Difference from Baro Altitude
BDS code 6,1 Emergency/P Emergency/Priority Status To provide additional
Subtype 1 riority Status Mode A Code information on aircraft status
BDS code 6,1 ACAS RA To report RAs generated by
ACAS RA Report
Subtype 2 Broadcast TCAS/ACAS equipment.
Selected Altitude
Barometric Pressure Setting
BDS code 6,2 Target State Selected Heading
To provide aircraft state and
and Status NACP, SIL, NICBARO,
Subtype 1 status information
Message SIL Supplement
MCP/FCU Mode
TCAS/ACAS Operational
Airborne Capability Class
Aircraft Airborne Operational Mode
Operational MOPS Version
BDS code 6,5
Status- NIC Supplement-A
Subtype 0
While NACP, GVA, SIL, NICBARO
Airborne HRD
To provide the capability class
SIL Supplement
and current operational mode
Surface Capability Class
of ATC-related applications
Length/Width
and other operational
Surface Operational Mode
Aircraft information.
MOPS Version
BDS code 6,5 Operational
NIC Supplement-A
Subtype 1 Status-On
NACP, SIL
the Surface
TRK/HDG
HRD
SIL Supplement

4.4 The Data Item in SSR DAPs and ADS-B DAPs

The airborne Mode S transponder may transmit the same data item to radar and ADS-B via different
routes. The following table summarizes some of the parameters in use.

Table 4-4 The Data Item in SSR DAPs and ADS-B DAPs

SSR DAPs ADS-B DAPs

Data Items
BDS/DF ASTERIX BDS/DF ASTERIX
DF4/5/20/21 AP
Aircraft Address I048/220 DF17 AA I021/080
DF11 AA
Mode A Code DF5/21_ID I048/070 BDS Code 6,1 I021/070
Pressure Altitude DF4/20_AC I048/090 BDS Code 0,5 I021/145
Airborne/On-the-ground DF4/5/20/21_FS I048/230 Determine by position I021/040

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message type (BDS
Code 0,5 or 0,6)
Aircraft Identification BDS Code 2,0 I048/240 BDS Code 0,8 I021/170
Aircraft Emitter Category - - BDS Code 0,8 I021/020
Special Position I048/020
DF4/5/20/21_FS BDS Code 0,5 I021/200
Indication/SPI I048/230
I048/230
Emergency Status DF5/21_ID BDS Code 6,1 I021/200
I048/070
ACAS RA Report BDS Code 3,0 I048/260 BDS Code 6,1 I021/260
MCP/FCU Selected I021/146
BDS Code 4,0 BDS Code 6,2
Altitude I021/148
FMS Selected Altitude BDS Code 4,0 BDS Code 6,2 I021/146
Barometric Pressure
BDS Code 4,0 BDS Code 6,2 I021/REF
Setting
I021/148
MCP/FCU Mode BDS Code 4,0 BDS Code 6,2
I021/REF
Roll Angle BDS Code 5,0 - I021/230
BDS Code 0,9+6,5
True Track Angle BDS Code 5,0 I021/160
BDS Code 0,6+6,5
I048/250
BDS Code 0,9
Ground Speed BDS Code 5,0 I021/160
BDS Code 0,6
Track Angle Rate BDS Code 5,0 - I021/165
True Air Speed BDS Code 6,0 BDS Code 0,9 I021/151
BDS Code 0,9+6,5
Magnetic Heading BDS Code 6,0 I021/152
BDS Code 0,6+6,5
Indicated Air Speed BDS Code 6,0 BDS Code 0,9 I021/150
Mach Number BDS Code 6,0 - -
Barometric Altitude Rate BDS Code 6,0 BDS Code 0,9 I021/155
Inertial Vertical Velocity BDS Code 6,0 -
Position in WGS-84 BDS Code 0,5 I021/130
- -
Co-ordinates BDS Code 0.6 I021/131
BDS Code 0,5 + 0,9
GNSS Height - - I021/140
BDS Code 0,5
Geometric Vertical Rate - - BDS Code 0,9 I021/157
BDS Code 0,5
BDS Code 0,9
Quality Indicator - - I021/090
BDS Code 6,2
BDS Code 6,5
Aircraft Length and
- - BDS Code 6,5 I021/271
Width
GNSS Antenna Offset - - BDS Code 6,5 I021/REF
Note: The airspeed and magnetic heading values are only available from airborne participants that are
not providing information about their velocities over the ground in ADS-B DAPs.

4.5 DAPs Data Exchange Protocol Between Surveillance and ATM Automation System

The decoding of DAPs data from downlink messages is handled by ground surveillance equipment such
as radars, ADS-B, MLAT and WAM ground stations. The Surveillance Data Processor (SDP) within the
ATM automation system can combine multiple downlink messages into a single target report for display
to controllers. All Purpose Structured EUROCONTROL Surveillance Information Exchange (ASTERIX)

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formats are commonly used as the protocol for target report transmission from surveillance systems to
the ATM automation system.

For detailed information about ASTERIX formats please refer to the following link of EUROCONTROL
web site:

https://www.eurocontrol.int/asterix

ASTERIX formats are categorized based on the types of surveillance data involved. ASTERIX Category
20, ASTERIX Category 21 and ASTERIX Category 48 are responsible for the DAPs data transmission
from MLAT systems, ADS-B systems and radars respectively. For each ASTERIX category, the protocol
format is further divided into different editions with variations on the supported DAPs data. ANSP’s
should carry out appropriate studies on the available protocol editions during the design stage to ensure
the chosen format can cater to the scope of DAPs proposed to be implemented and that the Surveillance
and ATM automation systems can correctly process the protocol selected.

For details, previous and current versions of ASTERIX Category 20, Category 21 and Category 48
specification documents can be downloaded from the following link of EUROCONTROL web sites:

https://www.eurocontrol.int/publication/cat020-eurocontrol-specification-surveillance-data-exchange-ast
erix-part-14-category-20

https://www.eurocontrol.int/publication/cat021-eurocontrol-specification-surveillance-data-exchange-ast
erix-part-12-category-21

https://www.eurocontrol.int/publication/cat021-eurocontrol-specification-surveillance-data-exchange-ast
erix-part-12-category-0

https://www.eurocontrol.int/publication/cat048-eurocontrol-specification-surveillance-data-exchange-ast
erix-part4

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5. IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES AND PHASES

Implementation guidance is developed to progress the DAPs implementation from concept to operational
use in the ICAO APAC region. In this chapter, section one addresses the implementation principles,
which describes the issues of international coordination, system compatibility, data integrity and system
integration, while section two addresses the implementation phase, to assist States with the management
of DAPs implementation activities.

5.1 Implementation Principles

5.1.1 Stakeholders Coordination

DAPs provide useful information from aircraft which can benefit ANSP and airspace users.
Improvements in efficiency and safety can be achieved, however the resultant changes in operational
procedures to provide the improvements, will affect ANSPs, Regulators, Airlines, and other related
airspace users. Before implementation by any State, a coordination team should be formed to study,
coordinate, support and consult the implementation plans and related activities. The coordination team
should include field experts on avionics, data link, surveillance infrastructures and end users.

Changes in the ATM operational procedures as the result of the use of DAPs require coordination among
ATS providers, Regulators, Airlines, and where applicable, coordination among neighboring States to
maximize the benefits. All States are encouraged to share their operational experiences, and to report
anomalies through Mode S DAPs WG and the Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group.

Not all Surveillance and ATM automation systems are capable of processing and using DAPs, therefore
investment in all related fields needs to be considered by all States. The coordination team should be
consulted for future investment plans and related activities considering the technical and operational
aspects. Consideration needs to be given to achieve a balance between investment and benefits.

5.1.2 System Compatibility

a) Technical:
DAPs can be obtained by different surveillance technologies such as Mode S Radar, ADS-B, MLAT and
WAM, however not all the transponders can support DAPs. Different surveillance technologies in the
ICAO APAC States mean that system compatibility should be considered.

Potential interference between different surveillance technologies should be fully considered before
implementation, otherwise the efficiency and safety of the system cannot be ensured. Harmonization
between different technologies should be considered and optimized to reduce the RF congestion on
1030MHz and 1090MHz.

Since not all aircraft are equipped with Mode S transponders, and not all the Mode S transponders have
the ability to support DAPs, compatibility and efficiency should always be considered before
implementation.

When DAPs are implemented, the data rate will increase compared to the conventional radar data, and
the related BDS information extraction strategies should be considered. To reduce the load on the
1090MHz spectrum, only those registers intended for operational use should be interrogated/extracted.

b) Operational:

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Different processing systems can support DAPs in different levels, hence the quality and information of
the target may be different after the processed DAPs have been added. For example, some radar tracking
algorithms will consider DAPs as an input to the tracking, so the quality and information of the target
will be a little bit different, therefore there should be compatibility considerations between different
systems before use of the target data.

There are different air traffic management and operation strategies used by neighboring States. So, the
operational procedures should always consider the operational compatibilities. For example, Mode A/C
transponders and Mode S transponders may be working in the same area.

5.1.3 DAPs Data Integrity

DAPs data integrity should always be the first consideration when putting DAPs data into use. Since the
data integrity from the source is not delivered by any related BDS register now, States are encouraged to
find a reliable methodology to ensure the data integrity before the use of the data. Additionally, ongoing
means of determining data integrity should be implemented, along with an ability to exclude invalid
DAPs data from ATM automation systems.

States which already have experience on data integrity are encouraged to share this information with
other States. The coordination team could support and harmonize this activity, and provide a standard
method to evaluate the data integrity, and share the method with all the States.

5.1.4 System Integration

By introducing DAPs, the target characteristic from the source to the end user may be different
compared to pre-DAPs implementation. In different phases of the processing flow of target data, DAPs
can be used by different systems to improve tracking performance. Some key points in the data flow are
as follows:

a) Airborne Avionics Systems

As DAPs data comes from different kinds of sensors and avionics systems on the aircraft, the reliability
of the data should be ensured before the data is used operationally. Research has shown that some BDS
data is missing or not updated correctly. The reasons for this need to be established, as it can mean that
the use of some DAPs data is not suitable for implementation. Examples of issues include:

1) Older Flight Management Systems which do not provide all the DAPs data, and
2) Incorrect installation (e.g., onboard equipment wired to wrong registers)

b) Ground Sensor Systems

Ground sensors may use the DAPs to improve their target tracking performance, having an impact on the
tracking function; the target data produced by this kind of sensors will show different characteristics to
the pre-DAPs implemented tracking function, such as the turning rate, the kinematic movement and so
on. Data users need to be aware of this performance improvement.

c) Ground Automation Systems

Ground automation systems can use DAPs information for a wide variety of uses, such as for tracking,
safety net processing, situational awareness, en-route meteorological information sharing and so on.
Ensuring DAPs information is processed and used in an appropriate way should be considered during
implementation.

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d) Other Surveillance Systems
Any DAPs data should be capable of being integrated with other surveillance systems data, and any
potential difference and impact should be considered before use. Some of the information can be cross
checked by different surveillance technologies.

e) Other Related Systems

5.2 Implementation CHECKLIST

The purpose of this implementation checklist is to document the range of activities that need to be
considered to bring a DAPs application from an initial concept to operational use. Some activities of this
checklist may be specific to individual stakeholders.

5.2.1 Activity Sequence

The activities are listed in approximate sequential order. However, each activity does not have to be
completed prior to starting the next activity. In many cases, a parallel and iterative process should be
used to feed data and experience from one activity to another. It should be noted that not all activities
will be required for all applications.

5.2.2 Concept Phase

a) Construct operational concept:

1) Purpose.
2) Operational environment.
3) ATM functions; and
4) Infrastructure.

b) Identify benefits:
1) Safety enhancements.
2) Efficiency.
3) Capacity.
4) Environmental.
5) Cost reductions.
6) Accessibility; and
7) Other metrics (e.g., predictability, flexibility, usefulness);

c) Identify constraints:
1) Air-Ground interoperability.
2) Compatibility with non-equipped aircraft.
3) Need for exclusive airspace.
4) Required ground infrastructure.
5) RF spectrum.
6) Integration with existing technology.
7) Technology availability; and

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8) Actuality of existing infrastructure.

d) Prepare business case:

1) Cost benefit analysis; and
2) Demand and justification.

5.2.3 Design Phase

a) Identify operational requirements:

1) Security; and
2) Systems interoperability.

b) Identify human factors issues:

1) Human-machine interfaces.
2) Training development and validation.
3) Workload demands.
4) Role of automation vs. role of human.
5) Crew coordination/pilot decision-making interactions; and
6) ATM collaborative decision-making.

c) Identify technical requirements:

1) Standards development.
2) Prevailing avionics standards.
3) Data required.
4) Functional processing.
5) Functional performance.
6) Required certification levels; and
7) Identify the infrastructure that needs upgrade.

d) Equipment development, test, and evaluation:

1) Prototype systems built to existing or draft standards/specifications.
2) Upgrade and test scheme for the existing infrastructure.
3) Developmental bench and flight tests.
4) Acceptance test parameters: Acceptance test should be performed to ensure all the key
indicators are met; and
5) Select and procure technology.

e) Develop procedures:
1) Pilot and controller actions and responsibilities.
2) Standardize the interaction and phraseologies.
3) Controller’s responsibility to maintain a monitoring function, if appropriate.
4) System certification procedure should be made.

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5) Standard Operating Procedure should be made if the human machine interface of the
system is changed.
6) Contingency procedures: For example, duplicate Mode S address is detected.
7) Emergency procedures, for example ACAS message is received.
8) General procedures for unforeseen issues should be made; and
9) Develop AIP and Information documentation.

f) Prepare design phase safety case:

1) Safety rationale.
2) Safety budget and allocation; and
3) Functional hazard assessment.

5.2.4 Implementation Phase

a) Prepare implementation phase safety case.

b) Conduct operational test and evaluation:

1) Flight deck and ATC validation simulations; and
2) Flight tests and operational trials.

c) Obtain systems certification:

1) Aircraft equipment; and
2) Ground systems.

d) Obtain regulatory approvals:

1) Air traffic certification of use.

e) Impact Assessment
An impact assessment should be conducted to gauge the effect in terms of security, efficiency,
operating regulations, human factors, infrastructure, environment, and so on.
f) Implementation transition:
1) Promulgate procedures.
The regulatory authority shall promulgate general regulations to the participants. Each
participant shall formulate corresponding detailed regulations.
2) Deliver training.
Training should be conducted to ensure the personnel is familiar with the standard, regulation,
and technology of the Mode S DAPs implementation and operation. Licensing process could be
executed if needed.
3) Continue data collection and analysis.
4) Resolve any unforeseen issues; and
5) Continue feedback into standards development processes.

g) Performance monitoring to ensure that the agreed performance is maintained.

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6. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING

6.1 Introduction

CNS and ATM environment is an integrated system including physical systems (hardware, software, and
communication networks), human elements (pilots, controllers, and engineers), and the operational
procedures for its applications. The integration of Mode S DAPs with other surveillance technologies
enables more information from an aircraft to be used to provide a safer service.

Because of the integrated nature of such system and the degree of interaction among its components,
comprehensive system monitoring is recommended. The procedures described in this section aim to
ensure system integrity by validation, identification, reporting and tracking of possible problems
revealed during system monitoring with appropriate follow-up actions.

6.2 Personnel Licensing and Training

Prior to operating any element of the Mode S DAPs system, operational and technical personnel shall
undertake appropriate training as determined by the ANSP or State Regulatory Authority, including
compliance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation where applicable. Such training will
ensure that personnel are familiar with the regulation, standards and requirements of the Mode S DAPs
implementation and operation.

6.3 ATS System Validation

6.3.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines

To meet system integrity requirements, ANSPs or States should conduct a validation process that
confirms the integrity of their equipment and procedures. Such processes shall include:

a) A system safety assessment for new implementations is the basis for definitions of system
performance requirements. Where existing systems are being modified to utilize additional
services, the assessment demonstrates that the ATS Provider’s system will meet safety
objectives.
b) Integration test results confirming interoperability for operational use of airborne and ground
systems; and
c) Confirmation that the ATS operation procedure is compatible with those of adjacent providers
where the system is used across a common boundary.

6.3.2 System Safety Assessment

The objective of the system safety assessment is to ensure that the implementation and operation of
Mode S DAPs are safe. The safety assessment should be conducted for implementation as well as any
future enhancements and should include:

a) Identifying failure or error conditions.

b) Assigning levels of criticality.
c) Determining risks/probabilities for occurrence.

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d) Identifying mitigating measures.
e) Categorizing the degree of acceptability of risks; and
f) Operational hazard ID process.

Following the safety assessment, States should institute measures to offset any identified failure or error
conditions that are not already categorized as acceptable. This should be done to reduce the probability
of their occurrence to an acceptable level. This could be accomplished through the automation of
procedures.

6.3.3 Integration Test

States should conduct trials with suitably equipped aircraft to ensure the DAPs data meets the
operational and technical requirements to provide ATS. The introduction of the Mode S DAPs will give
more information about the aircraft, and should not affect the performance of the existing system. States
should be satisfied by test results and analysis carried out by the ANSP.

6.3.4 ATS Operation Manuals

States may coordinate with adjacent States to confirm that their ATS operation manuals contain standard
operating procedures to ensure harmonization of procedures that impact across common boundaries.

6.4 System Monitoring

During the implementation and operation of the Mode S DAPs technology, routine collection of data is
necessary to ensure that the system continues to meet or exceed its performance, safety and
interoperability requirements, and that operational service delivery and procedures are working as
intended.

6.4.1 Consideration for System Monitoring

Mode S transponders may have been installed a long time ago to support mandatory ACAS functionality.
The Mode A/C function has been permanently used by ATC, but the Mode S functions may not have
been used. Any failure impacting Mode A/C would have been detected by ATC during normal operation
and corrective action would have been undertaken. Before implementing Mode S for surveillance,
system checks are usually made to ensure the correct operation of the Mode S transponders (e.g.,
continue to correctly process Mode A/C and Mode S replies), but possibly no system checks were made
to ensure that the DAPs data was correct, so several undetected failures may have existed over the years
of operation.

A number of Mode S transponder from different OEMs have been observed to be non-compliant with
Annex 10 Volume IV requirements (e.g., no SI code capability, no reply to aircraft register extraction,
incorrectly configured aircraft address, incorrect content of BDS registers), even though the transponder
is certified to level 2. Although actions have been taken in some areas (mainly where Mode S has been
implemented) to address these problems, some aircraft with Mode S which are not working correctly still
operate (mostly in areas where Mode S has not yet been implemented).

During the initial deployment of European Mode S, it was discovered that avionics upgrade performed
on some aircraft had resulted in erroneous transponder operations so that, in some cases, the aircraft
could not even be detected by the ground radar. It is therefore recommended that before commencing
Mode S surveillance operations in a given airspace, system monitoring be put in place for timely

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detection and rectification of hidden transponder problems. This will enable the ANSP and aircraft
operators to remedy identified issues prior to using Mode S operationally.

The communication lines for transferring surveillance information in a Mode S radar require much
higher data throughput as there is more information per aircraft. For example, compared to a Mode A/C
radar, Mode S DAPs require up to three times more data throughput.

Mode S DAPs bring safety benefits even when only a portion of the traffic is properly equipped. Some
aircraft can be configured to provide additional data items, but their use should be considered with
caution since some airborne installations may not have been certified, hence data may be erroneous.
System monitoring to validate the transmitted information is considered desirable for DAPs operation.

6.4.2 Mode S DAPs Problem Reports

During the application of the Mode S DAPs, some problems may be found during the observation of one
or more specific events. Faulty Mode S DAPs data should be recorded and analyzed. Problems may be
found during the routine analysis of application data. Any problem should be documented and reported
to the DAPs WG.

After a problem has been found, the finder can attempt to resolve it with the appropriate party and report
the solution to the DAPs WG. The problem and solution will be distributed to the DAPs WG members.
If the problem has not been resolved, the problem should be reported to the DAPs WG, and members
will be encouraged to resolve the problem. In many cases, a Mode S DAPs problem will be systematic
across a particular aircraft or avionics configuration. Engagement with, and correction by the
manufacturer may be required.

The mode S DAPs problem should be reported with the form as shown in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1 Mode S DAPs Problem Report Form

PRS#
Start Time/Date UTC End Time/Date UTC
Registration Aircraft ID
Flight ID ICAO Aircraft Address
Aircraft Type
Flight Sector/ Location
ATS Unit
Description / additional information
Originator Originator Reference number
Organization
PRS#: A unique identification number assigned by the PRS Administrator to
this problem report. Organizations writing problem reports are
encouraged to maintain their internal list of these problems for tracking
purposes. Once the problems have been reported to the PRS and
incorporated in the database, a number will be assigned by the PRS and
used for tracking by the SURICG.
Start Time/Date UTC: UTC time/date when the event started.
End Time/Date UTC: UTC time/date when the event ended.
Registration: Registration number (tail number) of the aircraft involved.

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Aircraft ID: Coded equivalent of call sign as entered in FPL Item 7.
Flight ID: The Flight ID/Flight Number downlinked from the aircraft.
ICAO Aircraft Address: Unique aircraft address expressed in Hexadecimal form.
Aircraft Type: The aircraft model involved. For the aircraft type designators please
refer to ICAO Doc 8643.
Flight Sector/Location: The departure airport and destination airport for the sector being flown
by the aircraft involved in the event. For the airport indicators please
refer to ICAO Doc 7910 or related AIP. Or if more descriptive, give the
location of the aircraft during the event.
ATS Unit: ICAO identifier of the ATC center or tower controlling the aircraft at
the time of the event.
Originator: Point of contact at the originating organization for this report (usually
the author).
Organization: The name of the organization (airline, ATS provider or communications
service provider) that created the report.
Description: This should provide as complete a description of the situation leading up
to the problem as is possible. Where the organization reporting the
problem is not able to provide all the information (e.g., the controller
may not know everything that happens on the aircraft), it would be
helpful if they would coordinate with the other parties to obtain the
necessary information. The description should include:
a) A complete description of the problem that is being reported
b) The route contained in the FMS and flight plan
c) Any flight deck indications
d) Any indications provided to the controller when the problem
occurred
e) Any additional information that the originator of the problem
report considers might be helpful but is not included on the list
above
If necessary, to contain all the information, additional pages may be
added. If the originator considers it might be helpful, diagrams and other
additional information (such as printouts of message logs) may be
appended to the report.

6.4.3 Example of Mode S DAPs Problem

Through monitoring, it has been reported that erroneous DAPs data have been observed due to failure or
improper setting/installation of Mode S equipment. A Working Paper of the ICAO Surveillance Panel
Working Group (WP ASP12-20) has indicated that a lot of incorrect, outdated and even erroneous data
and parameters are present for DAPs data. The errors and/or miss-matches can be frequent, including:

a) The ACID is not always correct (erroneous)

b) The Selected Altitude is not correct or is not updated (For example Selected Altitude data
should be provided by the MCP/FCU instead of the FMS as the FMS data is usually incorrect).
c) Mode S DAPs data does not correspond to the content of the requested register (BDS swap).

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6.5 Application Analysis

During the Operation of Mode S DAPs application, the analysis is necessary to ensure that the system
continues to meet or exceed its performance, safety, and interoperability requirements. To analyze the
Mode S DAPs applications, routine data should be recorded.

6.5.1 Data Recording

It is recommended that ATS providers and communication service providers retain the records defined
below for at least 30 days to allow for accident/incident investigation processes. These records should be
made available on request to the relevant State safety authority. Where data is sought from an adjacent
State, the usual State to State channels should be used.

Where possible these recordings shall be in a form that permits a replay of the situation and
identification of the messages that were received by the ATS system. Data exchange across borders may
not be possible due to different Radar or ATM message formats or to State regulatory issues.

Not only the data from ground equipment, but also the data from aircraft equipment should be recorded.
By analyzing the recorded data, the exact reason for the failures can be found.

6.5.2 Local Data Collection

ATS providers and communication service providers should identify and record Mode S DAPs system
component failures that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of controlled flights or
compromise service continuity.

6.5.3 Avionics Problem Identification and Correction

ATS providers should develop systems or procedures to:

a) detect Mode S DAPs avionics anomalies and faults

b) advise the regulators and where appropriate the aircraft operators on the detected Mode S DAPs
avionics anomalies and faults
c) devise mechanisms and procedures to address identified faults

Regulators should ensure that appropriate corrective actions are taken to address identified faults.

An example of Mode S DAPs analysis is taken in Appendix 1.

6.6 Identified Issues

Several identified issues had already been recognized during the implementation of the Mode S DAPs
data application in the ATM automation system. Some of them even disrupted the operation of ATC
services. Thus, it is necessary to ensure the reliability of DAPs for utilization for ATC operation. This
section will present some issues for helping to figure them out.

Based on the experience gained from States, the common Mode S SSR DAPs problems are summarized
under different categories in Appendix 2 ,and ADS-B DAPs problems can refer to the Appendix2 of
AIGD. It is noted that many cases of the wrong DAPs found in Mode S implementation were because of
the aircraft avionics capability. Some issues resulted from human factors. Experiences showed that it was
important to keep close coordination with airlines to promote the DAPs application. Airlines should be
informed of the issues in time and to check their aircraft Mode S transponders promptly. At the same
time, airlines need to improve their working procedures including ensuring they file flight plans correctly.

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7. REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES

Mode S DAPs involve the transmission of specific data from aircraft. These data messages can be
interrogated by the ground equipment (Mode S interrogator) or broadcast by the Mode S extend squitter.
ATM uses the data to show the more precise and integrated situation of the surveilled aircraft. The
following procedures relate to the use of Mode S DAPs data in ATS ground surveillance applications.

The implementation of the Mode S DAPs system will support the provision of high-performance
surveillance, enhancing flight safety, improving the controller efficiency, and reducing the workload of
both the controller and pilot.

7.1 Mandating Mode S DAPs

a) Depending on the type of operations that States are going to conduct, States will have to
consider whether there is a need to publish mandates. Some operations will require all aircraft
within airspace to be suitably equipped while others can still work well on a ‘best equipped best
served’ basis.

b) Use of Multilateration on airport surface is an example of an operation where it is

recommended for all aircraft to be equipped with Mode S transponders. Another example is the
conspicuity code environment, where Flight Identification may be used as the prime means to
couple/correlate flight plans, allowing ANSPs to overcome the shortage of Mode A codes.
Equipage mandates would be necessary for such operations.

c) States intending to implement ADS-B based surveillance services may designate portions of
airspace within their area of responsibility by:

i. mandating the carriage and use of ADS-B equipment; or

ii. providing priority for access to such airspace for aircraft with operative ADS-B
equipment over those aircraft not operating ADS-B equipment.

d) With appropriate software, ATM automation systems can use Mode S DAPs to provide
additional information to controllers, enabling a reduction in controller workload and the
enhancement of Safety Net systems. Equipage mandates are not necessary, but consideration of
the nature of the services required and/or a cost-benefit study, may warrant such mandates.

e) As of May 2018, examples of States which use Mode S SSR DAPs without publishing
mandates are Australia1, New Zealand and Singapore. Examples of States with published
mandates for Mode S SSR DAPs are France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

f) In publishing mandate/regulations, States should:

1) Define the standards applicable to the State.
i. E.g., Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) Temporary Guidance Leaflets (TGL) 13
Revision 1 for Elementary Surveillance in version 0 and version 1 transponders; or
ii. E.g., European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Acceptable Means of Compliance
(AMC) 20-13 for Enhanced Surveillance in version 0 and version 1 transponders; or

1 Australia has a mandate for Mode S transponders at selected airports utilizing Multilateration for surface
surveillance, but no widespread mandates for airborne DAPs usage
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iii. E.g., Elementary Surveillance (ELS) requirements stated in European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) CS-ACNS-Subpart D, Section 2 (i.e., CS ACNS.D.ELS) for
Elementary Surveillance in version 2 transponder; or
iv. E.g., Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) requirements stated in European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) CS-ACNS-Subpart D, Section 3 (i.e., CS ACNS.D.EHS) for Enhanced
Surveillance in Version 2 transponder
v. E.g.., Mode S level 2 if the requirement is simply for Airport Surface Multilateration.
vi. , ADS-B avionics compliant to Version 2 ES (equivalent to RTCA DO-260B) or later
version 2.
vii. E.g., European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the
Enhanced ATS in Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA)
Application via 1090 MHZ Extended Squitter (AMC 20-24);or
viii. E.g., European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Specifications and
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation
and Surveillance Subpart D — Surveillance (SUR) (CS-ACNS.D.ADS-B);or
ix. E.g., Federal Aviation Administration – Advisory Circular No: 20-165A (or
later versions) Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance –
Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Systems; or
x. E.g., the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation
Order 20.18 of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia.
2) Define the airspace affected by the regulations
i. E.g., Within the [FIR Authority] Flight Information Region above Flight Level XXX
3) Define the category of aircraft that the regulation applies to
i. E.g., Aircraft with a maximum certified take-off mass exceeding 5,700 kg or having a
maximum cruising true airspeed capability greater than 250 kt; or
ii. E.g., All IFR aircraft
4) Define the timing of the regulations allowing sufficient time for operators to equip.
i. E.g., With effect from 1 Jan 2020.
Note：More information of mandate for 1090 MHz ADS-B can refer to section 9.2 of AIGD.

7.2 Avionics

7.2.1 Mode S Transponder Capabilities

a) The various levels of capabilities for Mode S Transponders are described in subsequent
paragraphs. The state should select the capability as required by its operations.

b) According to ICAO Annex 10, Vol. 4, Mode S transponders shall conform to one of five levels
of capability as follows:
1) Level 1 is the basic transponder. Level 1 permits surveillance based on Mode A/C as well
as on Mode S. With a Mode S aircraft address, it comprises the minimum features for
compatible operation with Mode S interrogators. It has no datalink capability and will not
be used by international air traffic.

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2) Level 2 has the same capabilities as Level 1 and permits standard length datalink
communication from ground to air and air to ground. It includes automatic aircraft
identification reporting. This is the minimum level permitted for international flights. Data
parity with overlay control (ICAO Annex 10, Vol. 4, 3.1.2.6.11.2.5) for equipment
certified on or after 1 January 2020.
3) Level 3 has the capabilities as level 2 and also those prescribed for ground-to-air ELM
communications.
4) Level 4 has the capabilities as level 3 and also those prescribed for air-to-ground ELM
communications.
5) Level 5 has the capabilities as level 4 and also those prescribed for enhanced Comm-B and
ELM communications.

c) Other than the various levels, transponders also can have the following features:
1) Extended squitter - transponders that shall have the capabilities of level 2, 3, 4, or 5 and
those prescribed for extended squitter operation.
2) SI Capability - Transponders with the ability to process SI codes shall have the capabilities
of level 2, 3, 4 , or 5 and those prescribed for SI code operation.
3) Data flash Application – transponders that implement the data flash mode.
4) Hijack Mode Capability – transponders that support the Hijack Mode and have the
capabilities of level 2, 3, 4, or 5.
5) ACAS Compatibility –transponders compatible with ACAS.
6) Antenna Diversity – in aircraft with transponder using two antennas, receivers and
transmitting channels.
7) According to ED-73E, Elementary Surveillance – elementary surveillance transponders
will require at least a level 2 transponder and have the following capabilities:
i. Flight status reporting
ii. Barometric pressure altitude reporting
iii. Transponder capability (CA)
iv. II and SI code capable
v. Declaration of capability (BDS code 1,0)
vi. Common usage GICB capability report (BDS code 1,7)
vii. Mode S specific services capability (BDS code 1,8 to BDS code 1,C)
viii. Flight identification (BDS code 2,0)
ix. ACAS Active Resolution Advisory (BDS code 3,0) if equipped with ACAS II
x. Aircraft register (BDS code 2,1) – optional

8) According to ED-73E, Enhanced Surveillance – enhanced surveillance transponders have

the capabilities of elementary surveillance transponders, plus the capability to provide the
following DAPs:
i. Magnetic Heading (BDS code 6,0)
ii. Indicated Airspeed and/or Mach No. (BDS code 6,0)
iii. Vertical Rate (climb/descend) (BDS code 6,0)
iv. True Airspeed (provided if Track Angle Rate is not available) (BDS code 6,0)
v. MCP/FCU Selected Altitude (BDS code 4,0)
vi. Ground Speed (BDS code 5,0)

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vii. Roll Angle (BDS code 5,0)
viii. Track Angle Rate (if available) (BDS code 5,0)
ix. True Track Angle (BDS code 5,0)
x. Barometric Pressure Setting (BDS code 4,0)
Note：For more information of transponder capabilities for 1090 MHz ADS-B refer to section 9.2 and
appendix 3 of the AIGD.

7.2.2 Mode S Transponder Mandate

During the 31st APANPIRG meeting, the following Conclusion regarding the fitment of Mode S
equipage was adopted, States/Administrations may consider the following conclusion when considering
the publishing of Mode S transponder mandate.

Conclusion APANPIRG/31/14 (CNS SG/24/13 (SURICG/5/3(DAPS WG3/1))) - Mode S Forward

Fit Equipage in APAC Region
What: Regarding fitment of Mode S equipage,
Expected impact:
That, States/Administrations in APAC Region be strongly encouraged to
☐ Political / Global
mandate that registered aircraft with a maximum certified take-off mass
☐ Inter-regional
exceeding 5 700 kg or having a maximum cruising true airspeed capability
☒ Economic
greater than 250 knots, with a date of manufacture on or after 1 January
☐ Environmental
2022 be equipped with Mode S avionics compliant with Enhanced
☒ Ops/Technical
Surveillance (EHS).
Why: Considering that a number of DAPs applications
will require EHS and that it’s easy for new aircraft to be
equipped with EHS. Retrofitting existing airframes with EHS Follow-up: ☒Required from States
will need further deliberation under the challenging pandemic
situation.
When: 16-Dec-20 Status: Adopted by PIRG
Who: ☒Sub groups ☒APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☒APANPIRG ☐ICAO
HQ ☒Other: SURICG

7.2.3 Transition Guidelines

a) Equipage of aircraft will be achieved over a period of time. Not all aircraft will be equipped
with the necessary capability. A transition plan is required to accommodate varying degrees of
aircraft equipment compliance.

b) As part of the formulation for a transition plan, States should assess the impact of having
aircraft that are not suitably equipped within the affected airspace, to enable the implementation
of suitable mitigating measures. States should also collect statistics on the readiness of the
aircraft within the affected airspace.

c) For different operations, the mitigation measures in the transition plan could be different. For
example, if the operation is just to use the Mode S DAPs to provide useful information to the
controllers, the impact of having unequipped aircraft is minor. Mitigating measures could be as
simple as making the controllers aware that not all aircraft are able to provide the information.
On the other hand, where mode S is mandated for airport surface Multilateration, mitigating

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measures for having unequipped aircraft may include having special procedures for
non-equipped aircraft or the deployment of a surface movement radar.

7.2.4 Mode S Transponder Working on the Ground

Table 7-1 summarizes the requirements to inhibit or not inhibit replies from aircraft on the ground.

Table 7-1 The Requirements of Transponders on Ground

Type of interrogations Transponder reply

Mode A/C Should be inhibited
Mode A/C/S All Call Shall always be inhibited
Mode S only All Call (UF =11) Shall always be inhibited
Mode S (Roll call UF=0,4,5,16,20,21,24) Shall not be inhibited
Shall be inhibited if surface type of extended
Acquisition Squitter (Short Squitter)
squitter is transmitted
Extended Squitter (Long Squitter) Shall not be inhibited
[Information obtained from Eurocontrol’s Clarification Mode S Transponder in an Airport/A-SMGCS
Environment Ed 1.1 dated 3 May 2005]

a) Replies to Mode A/C/S all call and Mode S only all call interrogations shall always be inhibited
when the aircraft declares the on the ground state. It shall not be possible to inhibit replies to
discretely addressed Mode S interrogations regardless of whether the aircraft is airborne or on
the ground.
b) Mode A/C replies should be inhibited (i.e., Mode A/C transponder set to standby) when the
aircraft is on the ground to prevent interference when in close proximity to an interrogator or
other aircraft. Mode S discretely addressed interrogations do not give rise to such interference.
An exception on the recommendation to inhibit Mode A/C replies will be at airports having
Multilateration systems working with Mode A/C.
c) Mode S transponders shall be set to the correct mode according to its flight status (i.e., airborne
mode when it’s in the air and ground mode when on the ground). When an aircraft is in ground
mode, replies to all call are inhibited. It is recommended that aircraft provide means to
determine the on-the-ground state automatically and provide that information to the
transponder.

7.2.5 1090MHz Extended Squitter Transponder capability

a) According to the ICAO 1090MH ADS-B Minimum Operational Performance Standard

(MOPS), in a Mode S Transponder-Based Subsystem, the ADS-B Message generation function
and the modulator and 1090 MHz transmitter are present in the Mode S transponder itself. The
transmit antenna subfunction consists of the Mode S antenna(s) connected to that transponder.
b) According to ICAO Annex 10, Volume 4. Extended squitter ADS-B transmission requirements.
Mode S extended squitter transmitting equipment shall be classified according to the unit’s
range capability and the set of parameters that it is capable of transmitting consistent with the
following definition of general equipment classes:
1) Class A extended squitter airborne systems support an interactive capability incorporating
both an extended squitter transmission capability (i.e., ADS-B OUT) with a complementary
extended squitter reception capability (i.e., ADS-B IN) in support of onboard ADS-B

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applications.
2) Class B extended squitter systems provide a transmission only (i.e., ADS-B OUT without
an extended squitter reception capability) for use on aircraft, surface vehicles, or fixed
obstructions; and
3) Class C extended squitter systems have only a reception capability and thus have no
transmission requirements.
c) According to the ICAO 1090Mhz ADS-B Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS), the 1090ES ADS-B transponder has 4 versions, which included:
1) RTCA DO-260/EUROCAE ED-102 (Version 0)
The International Civil Aviation Organization issued the 1090ES ADS-B initial standard
"Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)" (DO-260/ED-102) in September 2000, and was
known as ADS-B version 0.This version defines the 1090 MHz ADS-B Transmitting
Subsystem takes position, velocity, status, and intent inputs from other systems onboard the
aircraft and transmits this information on the 1090 MHz frequency as Mode S Extended
Squitter messages.
According to DO-260/ED-102, the 1090ES transponder should send State Vector (SV), Mode
Status (MS) Reports, and support the following DAPs capabilities:
i. airborne position (BDS 0,5).
ii. surface position (BDS 0,6).
iii. identification and type (BDS 0,8).
iv. airborne velocity (BDS 0,9).
v. emergency/priority status (BDS 6,1).
vi. Current/Next Trajectory Change Point (TCP) (BDS 6,2).
vii. Current/Next Trajectory Change Point (TCP+1) (BDS 6,3).
viii. Aircraft Operational Coordination Message (BDS6,4).
ix. Aircraft operational status (BDS 6,5).
2) RTCA DO-260A (Version 1)
The International Civil Aviation Organization issued “Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast
(ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services–Broadcast (TIS-B)” (RTCA DO-260A) in April
2003, and was known as ADS-B version 1, The formats and protocols for 1090 ES were
revised in part to overcome the limitation of the reporting of surveillance quality using only
navigation uncertainty category (NUC). In the revised formats and protocols, surveillance
accuracy and integrity are reported separately as:
i. navigation accuracy category (NAC),
ii.navigation integrity category (NIC), and
iii.surveillance integrity level (SIL).
Other features added in Version 1 messages include the reporting of additional status
parameters and formats for traffic information service — broadcast and ADS-B rebroadcast
(ADS-R). Version 1 formats are fully compatible with those of Version 0, in that a receiver of
either version can correctly receive and process messages of either version.
According to D0-260A, the 1090ES ADS-B transponder should send State Vector (SV), Mode
Status (MS), Target state (TS), Air Reference Velocity (ARV) Reports, and support the
following DAPs capabilities:

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i. airborne position (BDS 0,5).
ii. Surface Position (BDS 0,6).
iii. Aircraft Identification and Category (BDS 0,8).
iv. Airborne Velocity (BDS 0,9).
v. Aircraft Status (BDS 6,1).
vi. Target State and Status (BDS 6,2).
vii. Aircraft Operational Status (BDS 6,3).
3) RTCA DO-260B/EUROCAE ED-102A (Version 2)
The International Civil Aviation Organization issued "Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast
(ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B)" (DO-260B/ED-102) in
December 2009, and was known as ADS-B version 2. The formats and protocols for 1 090 ES
Version 2 were revised based on experience gained from operational usage with ADS-B that
revealed a number of needed improvements, which included:
i. separated reporting of source and system integrity.
ii. additional levels of NIC to better support airborne and surface applications.
iii. incorporation of the broadcast of the Mode A code into the emergency/priority
message, increased transmission rates after a Mode A code change, and the broadcast of
the Mode A code on the surface.
iv. revision to the target state and status message to include additional parameters.
v. eliminated the vertical component of NIC and NAC.
vi. T = 0 position extrapolation accuracy changed from within 200 ms of the time of
transmission to within 100 ms; and
vii. capabilities were added to support airport surface applications.
According to D0-260B/ED-102A, the 1090ES ADS-B transponder should send State Vector
(SV), Mode Status (MS), Target State (TS) and Air Reference Velocity (ARV) Reports, and
support the following DAPs capabilities:
i. Airborne Position (BDS 0,5).
ii. Surface Position (BDS 0,6).
iii. Aircraft Identification and Category (BDS 0,8).
iv. Airborne Velocity (BDS 0,9).
v. Aircraft Status (BDS 6,1).
vi. Target State and Status (BDS 6,2).
vii. Aircraft Operational Status (BDS 6,5).

7.3 Extract Mode S SSR DAPs using a MODE S Interrogator

7.3.1 Working Principles

The Mode S interrogator transmits interrogation to elicit replies for detection of Mode S transponders
and more information from the aircraft. The use of a unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address and provision
of all the required aircraft data in one reply will reduce interrogation rates.

Each aircraft can be interrogated selectively, needing only one or two ‘hits’ per aircraft per scan and
minimizing interference problems associated with SSR Mode A/C.

The operation of a Mode S interrogator will not interfere with the SSR performance of any aircraft
equipped with a Mode A/C transponder.

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A Mode S interrogator is capable of performing the conventional surveillance function with Mode A/C
transponders.

7.3.2 Interrogator Codes

The Mode S system requires each interrogator to have an IC, which can be carried within the uplink and
downlink transmissions. The 4-bit IC uplink field in UF11 shall contain either 4-bit II code or the lower
4 bits of the 6-bit SI codes. It is recommended that whenever possible an interrogator should operate
using a single interrogator code.

The II codes shall be assigned to interrogators in the range from 0 to 15. The II code value of 0 shall only
be used for supplementary acquisition. The SI codes shall be assigned to interrogators in the range from
1 to 63. The SI code value of 0 shall not be used.

The assignment of interrogator II or SI codes, where necessary in areas of overlapping coverage, across
international boundaries of flight information regions, shall be the subject of regional air navigation
agreements. The ICAO Asia Pacific Regional Office maintains a register of II codes used – where States
have provided this information to the office. States are encouraged to provide this information to the
Regional Office and update it when changes are made.

7.3.3 Mode Interlace Pattern

The particular air traffic and environment of each interrogator will influence the selection of suitable
interrogation periods, interrogation repeat frequency, MIP and Probability of Reply.

Figure.7-1 The Typical MIP

The repetition frequency and duration of the All-Call period is a local implementation issue (the stated
ICAO maximum is 250Hz). The exact duration of either period will depend on the characteristics of the
system such as the antenna revolution rate, the beam-width and the maximum range. There will normally
be several all-call periods (and hence roll-call periods as one will always follow the other) available to
interrogate all targets in range during one revolution.

There is a careful balance between the reliable acquisition of all targets and the potential of flooding the
RF environment with unwanted replies to acquisition interrogations. It is necessary to choose an
appropriate Mode Interlace Pattern to manage the acquisition activities to ensure minimal interference.
The default objective is to define a MIP which effectively detects and performs surveillance on classical
SSR Mode A/C aircraft using Mode A/C interrogations which also detects and acquires Mode S aircraft
using Mode S interrogations. The MIP is constructed in order to separate Mode A/C and Mode S all-calls
from Mode S selective (roll-call) activity. MIP defines the sequences of all-call interrogation types that
might be made during cycles of all-call periods. Every interrogator is likely to have different needs and
hence different ways of operating.

China presented an IP about the Mode S Parameter Set during the 3rd meeting of DAPs WG. For
detailed information please refer to Appendix 4.

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7.3.4 Mode S SSR DAPs Extraction using GICB Protocol

The GICB procedure is initiated by a Mode S interrogator for eliciting the Mode S DAPs containing
aircraft derived data from a Mode S aircraft installation.

The GICB protocol allows for the immediate transfer of data required by the ground and the extraction
of information stored in the Mode S transponder. This information (if available) is contained in the reply
to an interrogation specifying the address (BDS code) of the storage location containing that information.

The interrogation with specific BDS can elicit the corresponding Comm-B data where contained in
Mode S transponder’s registers. The Mode S DAPs can be implemented in two stages: ELS and EHS.

The first processing step for any Mode S data link application is to obtain the transponder CA value from
the aircraft. The 3-bit CA field is found in the “Mode S All-Call Reply” (DF=11) and the “Extended
Squitter” (DF=17) downlinks. If CA=0, then this transponder is surveillance-only and supports no data
link functions at all. If CA≥4 indicates that the Mode S transponder is fully capable of at least 56-bit
short uplink and downlink message transfer. These Mode S transponders may support the ELS, EHS
requirements. The values of CA= 1, 2, 3 are reserved.

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Mode S aircraft
Acquisition

CA Field CA=0 Surveillance

Check Only

CA≥4

BDS 1,0 Request

Initial Phase
BDS 2,0 Request BDS 1,7 Request BDS 3,0 Request

BDS40/50/60 NO Surveillance
Capable Only
YES

Able to Extract NO
BDS40/50/60
YES

Within NO Stop
Coverage Request
Tracking Phase

YES
BDS40/50/60
Request

Figure.7-2 The Typical Procedure of DAPs Extraction

Given that the Mode S transponder’s CA value is 4 or greater, the second processing step for any Mode S
data link application is to extract the transponder’s Mode S data link capability report register BDS code
1,0. Bits in this register indicate the support of such Mode S data link functions as aircraft identification
(register BDS code 2,0), ACAS (register BDS code 3,0), common-usage capability (register BDS code
1,7) etc. The Mode S-Specific services capability bit in register BDS code 1,0 indicates whether the
avionics installation supports further data link functions. If this bit is set, the Mode S data link
application would next extract the common-usage capability register BDS code 1,7. All of the registers
involved with the EHS application have bit flags assigned in this register BDS code 1,7. If the bit flag is
set, it indicates that the corresponding register has been updated in a timely manner and contains valid
data which can be extracted by the interrogator. The processing protocol is sufficient initialization for

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basic data link applications such as ELS, EHS since all their status and configuration information is
available from register BDS code 1,0 and register BDS code 1,7.

So, the Mode S interrogator should transmit the selective interrogation to elicit the Mode S transponder
reply with the specific formats and Comm-B data contained in the corresponding registers.

Normally, the more Comm-B data requested by the Mode S interrogator, the more information can be
extracted from the aircraft transponder registers. It will also help the ATC controller get the aircraft's
flight status and flight intention. However, there should be some necessary limitations for the Comm-B
data request to avoid the phenomenon of Comm-B data discontinuity because of the limited Roll-Call
interrogation duration.

It is suggested that the number, periodicity and priority of BDS data extraction rule be reasonably and
effectively implemented according to the requirements and the number of aircraft in the airspace. The
scientific strategy can ensure the ATC controller gets Comm-B data timely and effectively.

7.3.5 Mode S SSR DAPs Extraction using AICB Protocol

The AICB procedure is initiated by a Mode S transponder for transmitting a single Comm-B segment
from the aircraft installation.

Any changes in the contents of ACAS (register BDS code 3,0) triggers a downlink message via the
air-initiated Comm-B broadcast protocol including the updated register contents.

An AICB sequence shall start upon the acceptance of a message intended for delivery to the ground
sensor. After receipt of this message, the transponder shall set a valid downlink request code of
surveillance or Comm-B reply. On receipt of this message with a valid downlink request code, the
interrogator could start to extract the message.

AICB messages are announced by the transponder and are transmitted in a subsequent reply only after
authorization by the interrogator. AICB messages are announced to all interrogators and can be extracted
by any interrogator. The Mode S data link application should update the aircraft’s “state” values with the
new ones. The changed state might result in discontinuance (or reinstatement) of certain Mode S data
link functions. Mode S transponder AICB broadcast messages are held active in the transponder for 18
seconds after the triggering event. Any Mode S sensor can extract the broadcast information.

7.3.6 Mode S SSR DAPs Extraction using Comm-B Broadcast

A Comm-B broadcast is a message directed to all active interrogators in view. Messages are available for
18 seconds unless a waiting AICB interrupts the cycle. Interrogators have no means to cancel the
Comm-B broadcast.

Currently, only registers of datalink capability report (register BDS code 1,0) and aircraft identification
(register BDS code 2,0) make use of the Comm-B Broadcast.

7.4 Provision of ADS-B DAPs using extended squitter

7.4.1 Working Principles

The “1090 Extended Squitter” is a spontaneous broadcast transmission by the Mode S transponder on the
1090 MHz frequency not initiated by an interrogation on 1030 MHz. The “Automatic Dependent
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)” is a function of airborne or surface aircraft, or other surface vehicles

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operating in the airport surface area, that periodically transmits its state vector (horizontal and vertical
position, horizontal and vertical velocity) and other information via a data link.

The 1090 Extended Squitter allows the transmission of ADS-B messages by means of 1090 Extended
Squitter via 1090 MHz. The ADS-B message is formatted data that conveys information used in the
development of ADS-B reports that can be used for air traffic management activity. The ADS-B reports
can support improved use of airspace, surface surveillance, and enhanced safety such as conflict
management.

There are four defined standards for the ADS-B 1090 ES applications. These standardizations were
consistent with RTCA/DO-260, RTCA/DO-260A, RTCA/DO-260B and RTCA/DO-260C were termed
1090 ES Version 0, Version 1, Version 2 and Version 3. (1090 ES Version 3 has just been released in
December 2020.)

The differences between the first three versions are mainly in the following two areas: (a) its
specification of the ADS-B “event driven” transponder register set, and (b) how available avionics
surveillance accuracy is specified.

7.4.2 ADS-B Message content

The Mode S transponder has 255 BDS registers. Each register stores aircraft parameters, message or data
derived from FMS or other sensors. Some specific registers are defined for the ADS-B application so
that related messages can be delivered via ADS-B message broadcast activity.

Table 7-2 Registers Related to ADS-B Application

Register Content

Version0 Version1 Version2

Airborne Position Message

Single Antenna Flag NIC Supplement-B

BDS code 0,5 Airborne Position

Pressure Altitude

GNSS Height

Surveillance Status

Version0 Version1 Version2

Surface Position Message

BDS code 0,6 Ground Track Heading

Surface Position

Movement

Version0 Version1 Version2

Aircraft Identification and Type Message
BDS code 0,8
Aircraft Category

Aircraft Identification

Version0 Version1 Version2

Airborne Velocity Message

BDS code 0,9 NUCR NACv

IFR Capability Flag -

Subtypes 1 and 2:Velocity Over Ground Subtypes 3 and 4:Airspeed and Heading

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Air Speed
Ground Speed Vector
Heading

Intent Change Flag

Ground Speed Vector

Vertical Rate

Difference from Baro Altitude

Version0 Version1 Version2

Aircraft Status Message

Subtype

2:1090ES
BDS code 6,1 Subtype 1:Emergency/Priority Status
TCAS RA

Broadcast

Emergency Status ACAS RA

- Mode A Code Report

Version 0 Version 1 Version 2

Current/Next Trajectory Change

Target State and Status Information Message
Point(TCP) Message

Target Altitude Selected Altitude

SIL Supplement
-
BDS code 6,2 Barometric Pressure Setting

Track Heading / Track Angle Selected Heading

TCP data
Mode Engaged（Autopilot VNAV
Emergency/Priority Status
Altitude Approach LNAV）

Capability/Mode Code TCAS Operational

NACP 、SIL、NICBARO

Version 0 Version 1 Version 2

Aircraft Operational Status

Current/Next Trajectory Change
Message
Point Message(TCP+1)
Subtype 0 Subtype 1

Surface

Airborne Capability

Capability Class

BDS code 6,3 Class Length/Width

-
Codes

TCP+1 Data NICBARO TRK/HDG

Operational Mode OM

Version Number

NIC Supplement

NACP、SIL

HRD

Version 0 Version 1 Version 2

BDS code 6,4
Aircraft Operational -

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Coordination Message

Paired Address

Runway Threshold Speed -

Roll Angle

Version 0 Version 1 Version 2

Aircraft Operational Status Aircraft Operational Status

-
Message Message

Subtype = 0 Subtype = 1

Surface
Airborne
Capability
Capability
CC Class
Class
Length/Width

Airborne Surface
BDS code 6,5
O[erational Operational

- Mode Mode

GVA -

NICBARO TRK/HDG

Version Number

OM NIC Supplement-A

NACP、SIL

SIL Supplement

HRD

As shown in the above table, all the versions of 1090 ES application involve the 7 basic registers
(Airborne Position, Surface Position, ES Status, ES Identification and Category ES Airborne Velocity ES
Event Driven Register and ES Aircraft Status ). The remaining registers (BDS code 6,2, BDS code 6,3,
BDS code 6,4) in the table have different definitions and applications for the three versions of 1090 ES
application. Generally, for version 0, only five registers (BDS code 0,5, code 0,6, code 0,8, code 0,9 and
BDS code 6,1) will be broadcast. In addition to the above five registers, version 1 will also broadcast
message about BDS code 6,2 and code 6,3, while version 2 will broadcast message about BDS code 6,2
and code 6,5 additionally.

Table 7-3 ADS-B Message

Version Common usage ADS-B Message
ES Airborne Position

ES Surface Position

0,1,2 ES Identification and Category

ES Airborne Velocity

ES Aircraft Status / Type Code=28

1,2 Target State and Status Information / BDS code 6,2/Type Code=29

1 Aircraft Operational Status / BDS code 6,3/Type Code=31 for version 1

2 Aircraft Operational Status /BDS code 6,5/Type Code=31 for version 2

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The three versions of the ADS-B application have different definitions of surveillance accuracy and the
application of “event-driven” register messages. Therefore, the prerequisite for the correctly decoding
the surveillance accuracy information and “event-driven” messages is the determination of the 1090 ES
version.

There are two steps to check the ADS-B version, due to the fact that ADS-B version information in
version 0 is not included in any message. Step 1: Check whether an aircraft is broadcasting ADS-B
messages with Aircraft Operational Status message (Type Code=31) at all. If no message is ever reported,
it is safe to assume that the version is equal to “0”. Step 2: If messages with Type Code =31 are received,
check the version numbers located in the bits 41–43 in ME (or bits 73–75 in the message). The bits “001”
correspond to version 1 and “010” to version 2 respectively.

7.4.3 ADS-B message Transmission Broadcast rate

The maximum ADS-B Message transmission rate shall not exceed 6.2 transmitted messages per second
averaged over any 60 second interval. There are periodic messages which are broadcast in the
periodic manner and event-driven messages which are broadcast following the event-driven
protocol. The event-driven protocol limits event-driven message transmissions to 2 per second in
any second.

a) Airborne position Message (Version 0, 1, 2) is a periodic message, and shall be emitted at

random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range from 0.4 to 0.6 seconds.

b) Surface position Message (Version 0, 1, 2) is a periodic message, and shall be emitted using
one of two rates (high or low rate). The low rate is used when the aircraft is stationary, the high rate is
used when the aircraft is moving. When the high squitter rate has been selected, the transmission interval
of the surface position message obeys a uniform distribution within the interval of 0.4 to 0.6 seconds,
and when the low squitter rate is used, it shall be emitted at random intervals that are uniformly
distributed over the range of 4.8 to 5.2 seconds.

c) Aircraft identification Message (Version 0, 1, 2) is a periodic message, which transmission

interval follows a uniform distribution over 4.8 to 5.2 seconds when the aircraft is reporting the airborne
position message, or when the aircraft is reporting the surface position message at the high rate (moving).
When the surface position message is being broadcasted at the low rate (stationary), the message shall be
emitted at random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 9.8 to 10.2 seconds.

d) Airborne velocity Message ((Version 0, 1, 2) is a periodic message, and shall be emitted at

random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range from 0.4 to 0.6 seconds.

e) Target State and Status Message (Version 1, 2) is delivered using the event-driven protocol
in version 1 and is periodic message in version 2, and shall be initiated only when the aircraft is airborne
and when target state (vertical or horizontal) information is available and valid. The TSS Message shall be
broadcast at random intervals with the uniformly distributed over the range of 1.2 to 1.3 seconds.

f) Aircraft Operational Status Message –Airborne is delivered using the event-driven

protocol in version 1 and is periodic message in version 2, and shall be emitted for a period of 24
seconds at random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 0.7 to 0.9 seconds, when the
Target State and Status (TSS) Message is not being broadcast and there has been a change within the past
24 seconds in the value of one or more of the specific parameters (TCAS Operational/TCAS RA Active/
NACP/SIL for Version 1 and TCAS RA Active/NACP/SIL/NICSUPP for Version 2) included in the
Operational Status Message.

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For other case when there is not any change within the past 24 seconds in the value of the specific
parameters mentioned previous paragraph, the transmission interval of the message obeys a uniform
distribution within the interval of 2.4 to 2.6 seconds

g) Aircraft Operational Status Message –Surface is delivered using the event-driven

protocol in version 1 and is periodic message in version 2, and shall be always broadcast at random
intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 4.8 to 5.2 seconds for Version 1. For Version 2,
the Surface Aircraft Operational Status Messages shall be broadcast at random intervals that are
uniformly distributed over the range of 4.8 to 5.2 when the aircraft is on-ground and not moving. If the
Aircraft is moving and there has been no change in the specific parameters (NICSUPP / NAC / SIL) then
the message shall be broadcast at random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 2.4 to
2.6 seconds for Version 2. When the Version 2 aircraft is on-ground and moving and there has been a
change in the parameters mentioned above then the message shall be broadcast at random intervals that
are uniformly distributed over the range of 0.7 to 0.9 seconds.

h) Extended Squitter Aircraft Status message (Version 0) is an event-driven message, and shall
be broadcast at random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 0.8 to 1.2 seconds for
the duration of the emergency condition (temporary or permanent). If the Mode A Code is changed to
7500, 7600 or 7700, the duration of emergency condition shall be permanent. If the Mode A Code is
changed to any other value, the emergency condition shall be temporary, and duration is equal to 18
seconds (TC).

i) Extended Squitter Aircraft Status message (Version 1) is an event-driven message, and

the transmission rate varies depending on whether the TSS Message is not being broadcast, versus being
broadcast.

In the case where the TSS Message is not being broadcast, the Extended Squitter Aircraft Status message
shall be broadcast at random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 0.7 to 0.9 seconds
for the duration of the emergency condition. It shall be broadcast at random intervals that are uniformly
distributed over the range of 2.4 to 2.6 seconds for the duration of the emergency condition, when the
TSS Message is being broadcast,

j) Extended Squitter Aircraft Status message with Subtype=1 (Version 2) is an event- driven
message, and shall be broadcast at random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 0.7
to 0.9 seconds for the duration of the emergency condition, or the Message shall not be broadcast (no
emergency condition established), When the Mode A Code transmission is disabled (be set to Mode S
Conspicuity Code “1000”).

When the Mode A Code transmission is enabled, the Aircraft Status message with Subtype=1 shall be
broadcast at random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 0.7 to 0.9 seconds for a
duration of 24 ±1 seconds following a Mode A Code change by the pilot

In the absence of conditions above for version 2, the Message shall be broadcast at random intervals that
are uniformly distributed over the range of 4.8 to 5.2 seconds.

The Aircraft Status Message with Subtype=2 (TCAS RA Broadcast) for version 2 shall be broadcast at
random intervals that are uniformly distributed over the range of 0.7 to 0.9 seconds. The transmission
shall be terminated 24 ±1 seconds after the Resolution Advisory Termination (RAT) flag transitions from
ZERO (0) to ONE (1).

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7.5 Application of the Mode S DAPs in ATM Automation System

7.5.1. Implementation of the General DAPs information

General DAPs information refers to the information that both Mode S SSR, MLAT and ADS-B can
provide. This information from aircraft can be beneficial to the ATM automation system:

a) ICAO 24-bit Aircraft Address/Aircraft Identification

1) The ATM automation system should collect the real aircraft address/aircraft identification
from the received message, and the aircraft address/aircraft identification can be shown on
the control HMI to identify the aircraft.
2) The ATM automation system can use the aircraft address/aircraft identification to correlate
an aircraft’s track with the flight plan, so the use of aircraft address/aircraft identity can
alleviate the shortage of Mode 3/A code. Correlation between track and flight plans is
normally based on either the 24-bit aircraft address, aircraft identification, or the Mode
3/A code. The correlation will depend on their weights and priority.
3) The ATM automation system can also utilize the aircraft address/aircraft identification to
improve the tracking function.

4) The ATM automation system could provide DUPE warning between aircrafts which have
the same ICAO 24-bit aircraft address, same aircraft identification or the same Mode 3/A
code.

b) Altitude reporting in 25ft interval

The ATM automation system can collect aircraft altitude reporting in 25ft increments and provides
valuable improvements to the quality of safety nets. The improvements should reduce the number of
nuisance alerts and enhance the integrity of separation assurance.

c) Selected Altitude
1) The ATM automation system can collect the selected altitude of the aircraft from Mode S
SSR DAPs BDS 4,0 or ADS-B DAPs BDS 6,2 (Version 2) that can be shown to the
controller to improve the situational awareness of the controller.
2) The ATM automation system can generate a SFL Mismatch Alarm when the SFL chosen
by the crew does not match the cleared altitude given by the controller (CFL), alerting the
controller to take appropriate action to remedy the issue. A SFL Mismatch Alarm shall be
presented to the responsible controller as an indication in the coupled/correlated
surveillance track label and in the associated flight strip.
3) The ATM automation system can also utilize the SFL to improve the accuracy of the
safety net.

In MTCD function, the ATM automation system can use the selected altitude as the target
climbing/descending altitude in the flight look-ahead time, and calculate the possibility of conflict with
the predicted flight trajectories of other flights in the airspace through trajectory prediction. Calculations
involving SFL could be more accurate, and improve the performance of MTCD.

In MSAW function, the ATM automation system generally provides MSAW warning by using track data
(heading and rate of climb/descent and mode c). The ATMs use of CFL or SFL can enhances the MSAW
algorithms use of vertical data to predict MSAW alerts and reduce the number of false alerts.

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d) Barometric Pressure Setting
The ATM automation system can collect the barometric data of the aircraft from Mode S SSR DAPs
BDS 4,0 or ADS-B DAPs BDS 6,2 (Version 2) and provide this information to the controller. The system
can provide a warning when the barometric data transmitted by the aircraft does not match the parameter
of the area where the aircraft is operating.

e) Ground Speed, True Track Angle, Magnetic Heading, True Airspeed

1) The ATM automation system can collect Ground Speed, True Track Angle from Mode S
SSR DAPs BDS 4,0 or ADS-B DAPs BDS 0,9 and 0,6, True Airspeed from Mode S SSR
DAPs BDS 5,0 or ADS-B DAPs BDS 0,9 (if ground speed is unavailable), Magnetic
Heading from Mode S SSR DAPs BDS 6,0 or ADS-B DAPs BDS 0,9 (if ground speed is
unavailable).The system may provide the display of some of the information to the
controller to improve the situational awareness of the controller. This information can be
displayed in various ways (e.g., a DAP Window) as offline defined, according to the
requirement of the controllers. Display of some parameters provides a clearer picture to
the controllers generating a reduction in radio calls with the pilot, so the R/T usage
between the controller and individual aircraft under service is reduced.
2) The system can make use of DAPs kinematics parameters for consistency checking, and
perform a more precise tracking function.
3) The system can utilize the kinematics information of the aircraft to improve the accuracy
of safety net functions, (e.g., Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA)), through the provision of
more accurate aircraft tracks.
4) The system may use True track angle, Magnetic Heading, True Airspeed and Ground
Speed to calculate a wind direction and speed of a specific area, which will enable the
updating of forecast winds and improve trajectory modeling in the system. The system
may also show the wind information to the controller to improve the situational awareness
of the controller.
f) Barometric Altitude Rate
The ATM automation system can collect the vertical rate data of the aircraft from Mode S SSR DAPs
BDS 4,0 or ADS-B DAPs BDS 0,9 to improve the precision of the compute altitude and the accuracy of
the related alert. The system can make use of the data to realize an optimized CFL protection in STCA
and MSAW analysis function.

g) Indicated Air Speed

The ATM automation system can acquire indicated airspeed of the aircraft from Mode S SSR DAPs BDS
6,0 or ADS-B DAPs BDS 0,9 (if ground speed is unavailable), allow ATC to monitor the aircrew
compliance with the controller’s instructions, and if required provide a warning to the controller when
there is a mismatch.

h) ACAS Resolution Advisory Report

Some of the ATM automation system can collect the ACAS Resolution Advisory Report from Mode S
SSR DAPs BDS 3,0 or ADS-B DAPs BDS 6,5 (Version 2). The ACAS Resolution Advisory information
can be shown in the system to improve situational awareness of the controller. On receipt of ACAS
Resolution Advisory notification, a prominent notification is displayed in a field that may be
acknowledged. The indication is removed when the ACAS RA is resolved.

Note: The display of ACAS Resolution Advisory Report in ATM automation system can be turned on or turned off by a user, and
it’s use if not recommended by IFATCA. The user is suggested to do the relevant safety evaluation before applying this function.

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7.5.2. Mode S SSR DAPs

Mode S SSR DAPs information refers to the information that only Mode S SSR can provide. This
following information of aircraft can be beneficial to the ATM automation system:

a) Roll Angle, Track Angle Rate,

1) The ATM automation system can collect these parameters from Mode S SSR DAPs BDS
5,0 and may allow the display of some of the information to the controller to improve the
situational awareness of the controller. This information can be displayed in various ways
(e.g., a DAP Window) as offline defined, according to the requirement of the controllers.
Display of some parameters provides a clearer picture to the controllers generating a
reduction in radio calls with the pilot, so the R/T usage between the controller and
individual aircraft under service is reduced.
2) The system can make use of DAPs kinematics parameters for consistency checking, and
perform a more precise tracking function.
3) The system can utilize the kinematics information of the aircraft to improve the accuracy
of safety net functions, (e.g., Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA)), through the provision of
more accurate aircraft tracks.
4) The system may use True track angle, Magnetic Heading, True Airspeed and Ground
Speed to calculate a wind direction and speed of a specific area, which will enable the
updating of forecast winds and improve trajectory modeling in the system. The system may
also show the wind information to the controller to improve the situational awareness of
the controller.

b) Inertial Vertical Velocity

The ATM automation system can acquire the vertical rate data of the aircraft from Mode S SSR DAPs
BDS 6,0 to improve the precision of the compute altitude and the accuracy of the related alert. The
system can make use of the data to realize an optimized CFL protection in STCA and MSAW analysis
function.

c) Mach Number
The ATM automation system can acquire Mach number of the aircraft from Mode S SSR DAPs BDS 6,0.
This information can allow ATC to monitor the aircrew compliance with the controller’s instructions,
and if required provide a warning to the controller when there is a mismatch.

d) Flight status (airborne/on the ground)

The ATM automation system can collect the flight status of the aircraft from reply of the Mode S SSR
Roll-Call interrogation. Whether the aircraft is airborne or on the ground can be shown in the system to
improve the situational awareness of the controller. Also, the flight status can be used to filter the aircraft
on the ground in the system if necessary.

7.5.3. ADS-B DAPs

a) Aircraft emitter category

The emitter category can be acquired from ADS-B DAPs BDS 0,8 can be provided information about the
type of vehicle to the controller by the ATM automatic system. The system can provide a warning to the
controller when the information transmitted by the aircraft does not match the Flight Plan.

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b) GNSS information (latitude, longitude, height, altitude, velocity, vertical rate, accuracy and

integrity of GNSS information)

1) The precision of aircraft position in GNSS information should be higher than normal
radars. The ATM automation can make use of DAPs GNSS information to perform a more
precise tracking function.
2) The ATM automation system can utilize the GNSS information in different ways or
display in different symbols to the controller based on the accuracy and integrity values of
current GNSS information received in the messages.
3) In order to meet the requirements of ICAO Annex 6 and Annex 10 for aircraft RVSM
altitude maintenance performance monitoring, the geometric altitude in ADS-B (using as
the real altitude of aircraft operation), can be compared with the air pressure altitude
(Mode C) to analyzes the aircraft altitude keeping performance. The comparison verifies
whether the aircraft is flying according to the selected altitude setting by the crew, and
validates the continual compliance for RVSM altitude monitoring.
4) Airborne horizontal position/Geometric altitude can be used in data analysis. Based on
flight trajectory, an analyzer can classify different trajectory models, view different traffic
pattern, find abnormal trajectory, analyze the operation efficiency of traffic flow, and
predict the flight time of future trajectory.
c) Selected Heading/Target Heading
1) The ATM automation system can use the selected heading/target heading of the aircraft,
and may display the information to the controller to improve the situational awareness of
the controller.
2) The ATM automation system can generate a heading Mismatch Alarm when the selected
heading/target heading does not match the heading given by the controller, alerting the
controller to take appropriate action to remedy the issue.
3) The ATM automation system can also utilize the selected heading/target heading to
improve the accuracy of the safety net.

7.6 Flight Planning

7.6.1 ICAO Flight Plan Item 7 - Aircraft Identification

ACID must be accurately recorded in item 7 of the ICAO Flight Plan form as per the following
instructions:

Aircraft Identification, not exceeding 7 alphanumeric characters and without hyphens or symbols is to be
entered both in item 7 of the flight plan and replicated exactly when set in the aircraft (for transmission
as Flight ID) as follows:

Either,

a) The ICAO designator for the aircraft operating agency followed by the flight identification (e.g.,
KLM511, NGA213, JTR25), when in radiotelephony the call sign to be used by the aircraft will
consist of the ICAO telephony designator for the operating agency followed by the flight
identification (e.g., KLM 511, NIGERIA213, JESTER25).
Or,

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b) The nationality or common mark registration marking of the aircraft (e.g., EIAKO, 4XBCD,
N2567GA), when:
1) in radiotelephony the callsign used by the aircraft will consist of this identification alone
(e.g., CGAJS), or preceded by the ICAO telephony designator for the operating agency
(e.g., BLIZZARD CGAJS),
2) the aircraft is not equipped with a radio.

Note 1: No zeros, hyphens, dashes or spaces are to be added when the Aircraft Identification consists of less than 7 characters.

Note 2: Appendix 2 to ICAO DOC4444 (PANS-ATM 16th edition, 2016) refers.

Note 3: Standards for nationality, common and registration marks to be used are contained in Annex 7, section 3.

Note 4: Provisions for the use of radiotelephony call signs are contained in Annex 10, Volume II, Chapter 5. ICAO designators
and telephony designators for aircraft operating agencies are contained in Doc 8585 — Designators for Aircraft
Operating Agencies, Aeronautical Authorities and Services.

7.6.2 Equipment (Surveillance Equipment /SSR Equipment)

a) ICAO Flight Plan Item 10 – Surveillance Equipment and Capabilities

When an aircraft is equipped with a Mode S Transponder, appropriate Mode S designators shall be
entered in item 10 of the flight plan to indicate that the flight is capable of transmitting Mode S DAPs
messages.

These are defined in ICAO DOC 4444 as follows:

‘N’ No surveillance equipment for the route to be flown is carried, or the equipment is
unserviceable
SSR Mode A and C
‘A’ Mode A transponder
‘C’ Mode A and Mode C transponder
SSR Mode S
‘E’ Mode S transponder, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and extended
squitter (ADS-B) capability

‘H’ Mode S transponder, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and enhanced

surveillance capability

‘I’ Mode S transponder, including aircraft identification, but no pressure-altitude capability

‘L’ Mode S transponder, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, extended squitter

(ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability

‘P’ Mode S transponder, including pressure-altitude, but no aircraft identification capability

‘S’ Mode S transponder, including both pressure altitude and aircraft identification capability

‘X’ Mode S transponder with neither aircraft identification nor pressure-altitude capability

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Note: Enhanced surveillance capability is the ability of the aircraft to down-link aircraft derived data via a Mode S transponder.

b) ICAO Flight Plan Item 18 – Other Information

Where required by the appropriate authority the ICAO AA (24 Bit Code) may be recorded in Item 18 of
the ICAO flight plan, in hexadecimal format as per the following example:

CODE/7C432B

Members or states should note that use of hexadecimal code may be prone to human error and is less
flexible in regard to airframe changes for a notified flight.

7.6.3 Inconsistency between Mode S Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability

Inconsistency between flight planning of Mode S and surveillance capability of an aircraft can impact
ATC planning and situational awareness. States are encouraged to monitor for consistency between flight
plan indicators and actual surveillance capability. Where discrepancies are identified aircraft operators
should be contacted and instructed to correct flight plans, or general advice (as appropriate to the
operational environment and type of flight planning problems) should be issued to aircraft operators.

Advice to Operators:

Concerning inconsistency between Mode S Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability:

a) ICAO AA (24 Bit Code) not submitted, or submitted incorrectly.

b) Mode S and surveillance capabilities indicators incorrectly.

The flight planning requirements and relevant designators for aircraft are described in local document
reference or ICAO DOC 4444 Appendix 2. The capability of the aircraft transponder and ADS-B
capability will typically be available in the transponder manual or the aircraft flight manual for the
aircraft. If in doubt, consult the transponder manual, aircraft flight manual or the Licensed Aircraft
Maintenance Engineer.

7.6.4 Setting Flight ID in Cockpits

a) Flight ID Principles
The Flight ID is the equivalent of the aircraft callsign and is used in both Mode S SSR and ADS-B
technology. Up to seven characters long, it is usually set in airline aircraft by the flight crew via a cockpit
interface. It enables air traffic controllers to identify an aircraft on a display and to correlate a radar or
ADS-B track with the filed flight plan ACID. Flight ID is critical, so it must be entered carefully.
Punching in the wrong characters can lead to ATC confusing one aircraft with another.

The Flight ID entered in the transponder exactly must match the ACID entered in the flight plan.

Intuitive correlation between an aircraft’s flight identification and radio callsign enhances situational
awareness and communication. Airlines typically use a three letter ICAO airline code in flight plans,
NOT the two letter IATA codes.

b) Setting Flight ID
The callsign dictates the applicable option below for setting Mode S or ADS-B Flight ID:

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1) The flight number using the ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operator if a
flight number callsign is being used (e.g., QFA1 for Qantas 1, THA54 for Thai 54).
2) The nationality and registration mark (without hyphen) of the aircraft if the callsign is the
full version of the registration (e.g., VHABC for international operations).
3) The registration mark alone of the aircraft if the callsign is the abbreviated version of the
registration (e.g., ABC for domestic operations).
4) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign approved by the ANSP or regulator
(e.g., SPTR13 for firespotter 13).
5) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign in accordance with the operations
manual of the relevant recreational aircraft administrative organization (e.g., G123 for
Gyroplane 123).

Note：More information of Flight plan for 1090 MHz ADS-B can refer to section 9.10 of AIGD.

7.7 Contingency Plan

ANSPs should prepare appropriate contingency plans in the event of a system failure that prevents the
use of Mode S DAPs.

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8. TRAINING AND COMPETENCY

8.1 Introduction

Training and development play an important role in the effectiveness of organizations and to the
experiences of people in work. Training on DAPs has implications in improving productivity, aviation
safety and personal development. The primary goal of the training is to develop and maintain an
appropriate level of trust in DAPs related module, i.e., to make ATC and ATSEP aware of the likely
situations where DAPs will be effective and, more importantly, situations in which DAPs will not be so
effective (e.g., sudden, unexpected maneuvers).

8.2 Training of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) in DAPs

With the inclusion of DAPs into surveillance and ATM automation system, an ATC training plan should
adopt a modular approach. This approach progressively introduces various features, functionality of the
new system on one hand and allows for integration with the ATC operational procedures. Additional
benefits include shorter, logical self-contained units, clear attainable goals, better evaluation of training
effectiveness and simplified self-assessment.

The ANSP should develop familiarization and rating focused training to ATC prior to adoption of DAPs
in Surveillance and ATM automation systems.

The ANSP should ensure that all ATC concerned are assessed as competent for the use of the relevant
DAPs module.

8.3 Training of an ATSEP in DAPs

a) The ANSP should develop an ATSEP training programme that is acceptable to the ANS
Regulator prior to its implementation.

b) As a minimum, the training programme should comprise three levels as described below:
1) Level 1 (Basic training). This should comprise training on the basic Surveillance and ATM
automation systems operating in the State and their impacts on the safety of aircraft
operations. The ANSP should ensure every ATSEP undergoes the basic training.
2) Level 2 (Qualification training). This should comprise training to develop knowledge and
skills on Surveillance and ATM automation systems. The ANSP should ensure each
ATSEP is trained in one or more domains depending on their job scope.
3) Level 3 (Specialized training). This should comprise training on specific Surveillance and
ATM automation systems installed in the State, followed by on-the-job training.

c) The ANSP should conduct a yearly review of the training plan for each ATSEP at the beginning
of the year to identify any gaps in competency or changes in training requirements and
priorities the type of training required for the coming year in regards of DAPs development.

d) The ANSP should keep records of individual ATSEP training, competency assessment and
approval history, where applicable, and associated documents. The records should be kept at
least until the Surveillance and ATM automation system of which the ATSEP was trained on is
no longer in use with the ANSP.

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e) The individual training records for each of ATSEP should include a training plan detailing the
courses completed as well as the time-frame for attending future courses as required under
his/her training plan.

8.4 Competency Assessment of an ATSEP in DAPs

a) The ANSP should develop an assessment methodology to determine the competency of an

ATSEP in accordance with the competency framework developed in PANS-Training and which
should be adapted to suit the local context.

b) The ANSP may select a person to be a competency assessor only if the person –
1) is an ATSEP approved in accordance with paragraph 8.3 for the particular Surveillance
and ATM automation system; and
2) has received adequate training in the conduct of competency assessment, practical checks
and oral questionings.

c) A competency assessor should not conduct a competency assessment on an ATSEP who is

under the direct supervision of the competency assessor unless the assessment is done in the
presence of a second independent assessor.

d) The assessment methodology should include a process for on-going competency checking and
refresher training to ensure retention of competence.

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9. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES ON MODE S DAPs APPLICATION

9.1 Use of Selected Altitude

Since August 2013, Mode S data processing functions have been implemented in Chengdu ATM automation system. The system uses the select altitude data
extracted from the Mode S DAPs to provide an optimized CLAM alert for controllers. The system will generate the alert when the SFL chosen by the crew
does not match the cleared altitude recorded in the ATM automation system. And a time delay parameter is predefined for the response time of the flight after
controllers’ input to the ATM automation system (typically at the time of instruction given to the pilot).

Thanks to this new kind of alert, controllers have a better awareness of the intention of the airplanes and may discover the crew’s mis-operation much earlier
than the traditional CLAM, and then take actions timely to avoid the potential conflict.

In April 2017, an A320 aircraft was maintaining level flight at 27600 feet with another flight flying nearby at 26600 feet. Suddenly, the crew set an error
altitude 22600 feet. The ATM automation system triggered the alert immediately even before the aircraft began to descend. The controller quickly noticed the
alert and informed the crew in time. The aircraft successfully stopped descend at 27400 feet.

9.2 Use of ACAS RA

With the advancement of the ASTERIX standards and DAPs application, an ATM system can handle the derived data from Aircraft, which is detected,
received and transmitted through the Mode S Radar, ADS-B station, and WAM sensors. In the event that an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS)
Resolution Advisory (RA), the ATM system is able to provide a visual and aural alarm warning and indicative pilot intention to the controller.

Resolution Advisory (RA) alerting function works as follows:

- A resolution advisory is present when, in the subfields I048/260, I020/260, I021/260, I021/260 or I062/380 subfield #12(ACS), the bits are set as follows:

• the first bit of the ARA field set to 1 and the RAT bit set to 0 or,

• the first bit of the ARA field set to 0, the MTE bit set to 1 and the RAT bit set to 0.

- A resolution advisory is removed when:

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• the ACAS RA report subfield (I048/260, I020/260, I021/260 or I062/380 subfield #12(ACS)) contains the RAT bit set to 1, or

• An ACAS RA report is not received in the relevant Data Item of the ASTERIX report.

Besides, the Resolution Advisory Intention is populated base on the PILOT selection and according to the following table:

MTE ARA 42 43 44 45 46 47 RA Selection RA Intention

(60) (41)
1 0 Any 0 Any 1 Any Any Descend Positive descend (Descent
to avoid the threat)
1 0 Any 1 Any 0 Any Any Climb Positive climb (Climb to
avoid the threat)
1 0 Any 0 Any 0 Any Any Other Other

*NOTE1: ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System, applied in the EURO Aviation System, has the same meaning as TCAS abbreviated to Traffic Alert
and Collision Avoidance System in the USA Aviation System

*NOTE2: The function and the matters needing attention related to ACAS Resolution Advisory Report in ATM automation system, please refer to 7.4.1 e).

9.3 Use of Mode-S DAPs data for weather forecast

Meteorological Research Institute (MRI) and Electronic Navigation Research Institute (ENRI) conducted experiments for improving weather forecast
accuracy utilizing Mode S DAPs data. In the experiments, horizontal wind and temperature were estimated from the data in registers BDS code 5,0 and
BDS code 6,0 listed below.

Table 9-1 DAPs information for weather forecast

Register Name Data Item

True Track Angle
BDS code 5,0 Track and turn report
Ground Speed

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True Airspeed
Magnetic Heading
BDS code 6,0 Heading and speed report
Mach Number

The temperature is the function of Mach number and true airspeed. To estimate horizontal wind speed and direction, calculating zonal wind speed and
meridional wind speed from ground speed, true airspeed, true track angle and true heading angle. The true heading angle is obtained from magnetic heading
angle and magnetic declination which is given by a quadratic equation of aircraft position. Then the wind and temperature as observation data were used to
produce the initial fields of the numerical model, resulting in the improvements of weather forecast accuracy.

The results of the experiments indicate that Mode S DAPs data have the potential to improve forecasts of rainfalls and shear-lines. For details, please refer to
the IP11 presented by Japan at the Mode S DAPs/3.

9.4 Use of Barometric Pressure Setting

When the aircraft is below the transition level the pilot is required to set barometric pressure setting in altimeter to local QNH/QFE. Wrong barometric
pressure setting (especially QNH higher than actual) can lead to cleared flight level deviation or more serious controlled flight into terrain, as the pilot sees
higher altitude on his altimeter and the flight management system determines the lower target altitude base on barometric pressure setting and selected altitude.
Every millibar of barometric pressure setting error may add 30 feet of error to altimeter and target altitude.

Constantly checking if the barometric pressure setting in DAPs is consistent with the airport's QNH can alert the controller to avoid similar situations. In Feb
2021, an aircraft was cleared to descend to 7000 feet. The pilot set the right selected altitude, but forgot to set barometric pressure setting. At that time, the
airport QNH was 1013, while the crew barometric pressure setting was 1118.5. An alarm system notified the controller of this situation. The error was
corrected after the controller prompted the pilot preventing a dangerous situation.

9.5 Application of geometric height of ADS-B in analysis of Height-Keeping-Performance in RVSM

TVE, AAD and ASE are important indicators reflecting the height keeping performance of aircraft，which can be calculated based on ADS-B data, the
definitions of TVE, AAD, ASE and FTE in Doc 9574 are as followed:

Total vertical error (TVE). The vertical geometric difference between the actual pressure altitude flown by an aircraft and its assigned pressure
altitude (flight level).

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Assigned altitude deviation (AAD). The difference between the transponder Mode C altitude and the assigned altitude/flight level.

Altimetry system error (ASE). The difference between the altitude indicated by the altimeter display, assuming a correct altimeter barometric
setting, and the pressure altitude corresponding to the undisturbed ambient pressure.

Flight technical error (FTE). The difference between the altitude indicated by the altimeter display used to control the aircraft and the assigned
altitude/flight level.

The section 4.10 of Appendix A of Doc 9574 outlines the method for estimating ASE. The description is as followed:

An aircraft’s actual ASE at any time is the difference between its actual TVE and contemporaneous actual FTE. Given a measure of TVE and a
contemporaneous AAD for the aircraft, the difference between TVE and AAD provides an estimate of ASE.

Figure 9-1 shows the relationship between the vertical errors. As noted in Doc 9574, correspondence error can be negligible when estimating ASE, so RMAs
only estimates TVE, AAD and AES usually.

Figure 9-1: Relationship between the vertical errors

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Figure 9-2 shows the calculation process of TVE, AAD and ASE based on ADS-B data. It should be known that the aircraft actual geometric altitude and
Mode C pressure altitude are included in ADS-B data. For assigned pressure altitude, it can be inferred from Mode C pressure altitude. And for the
corresponding geometric altitude, it can be calculated by combining the inferred assigned pressure altitude/FL and the MET data. The difference between
aircraft actual geometric altitude and geometric altitude of the inferred assigned pressure altitude/FL is TVE, the difference between inferred assigned
pressure altitude/FL and Mode C pressure altitude is AAD, and the difference between TVE and AAD is ASE.

ADS-B

Aircraft actual geometric

height(GPS Height)
MET Data
TVE

Geometric height of the

inferred assigned
pressure altitude/FL ASE
Inferred assigned
pressure altitude/FL
AAD
Mode C pressure
altitude

Figure 9-2: Calculation process of TVE, AAD and ASE based on ADS-B

In 9574, the error ranges of TVE, AAD and ASE are defined at the same time
1) TVE ≥ 90 m (300 ft).
2) ASE ≥ 75 m (245 ft); and
3) AAD ≥ 90 m (300 ft).

______________

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APPENDIX 1: Mode S DAPs Analysis

a) Data Recording Configuration

Figure 1 represents an example of a configuration for data recording. The Mode S sensor sends interrogations to an individual aircraft using a unique ICAO
24-bit aircraft address. The Mode S transponder has 255 BDS Registers. Each register stores aircraft parameters data derived from FMS or other sensors.
The messages can be readout on demand by a ground interrogator, in addition to/or being broadcasted.

Aircraft
interrogation
Mode S Transponder FMS
BDS registers
BDS01 altimeter
BDS02 weather
reply … sensor
BDSff …

Mode S Sensor

GICB Radar data

controller monitor Data Storage

Figure1 - Example of Data Recording Configuration

b) Data Analysis

As described above section, erroneous DAPs data have been observed due to failure or improper setting/installation of Mode S avionics equipment. Bad data
hinders the use of DAPs by the ATM service. To employ DAPs for ATM services, the reliability of DAPs is important. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the
recorded data to ensure reliability of the DAPs data.

If a controller finds some problem during the application of the Mode S DAPs, the ATS providers can analyze the recorded data to find the exact reason which
caused the problem. If the ATS equipment has a fault which caused the problem, the ATS provider should implement a solution as soon as possible. If the ATS
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provider proves that the problem is caused by an avionics fault, then the problem should be reported to the appropriate party to solve the problem. The ATS
providers need to devise mechanisms and procedures to address identified faults.

ATS providers should develop systems to analyze the routine recorded data. From the analyses, ATS providers can provide more information of the
transponder’s performance such as SI capability, datalink capability etc. The information can be used to improve the capability of the operation of Mode S
DAPs equipment. By analyzing the recorded data, advice on avionics anomalies and faults, which have been detected, can be passed onto the regulators and
the aircraft operators.

c) DAPs Data Validation

To ensure that Mode S DAPs are operating in conformance with the ICAO requirements, validating DAPs data is highly recommended. It has been noted that
there are some drawbacks in the traditional methodology of executing tests for aircraft on the ground as follows:

1) Avionics for DAPs consist of several devices and functional blocks. They are interconnected, and the configuration is complicated.
2) Avionics and configuration differ depending on each aircraft.
3) It is difficult to cover the possible test patterns completely.
4) Ground test methodology would not detect failures or anomalies that occur after the testing.

Responding to these drawbacks, MIT Lincoln Laboratory developed and proposed a DAPs validation methodology, which monitors DAPs data received from
actual flying aircraft to detect erroneous data. The MIT validation methodology is mainly categorized by two groups, static value tests and dynamic value
tests.

Static value tests are executed to detect erroneous values of the bits and fields in BDS registers which do not change during a flight. Those bits and fields
represent the avionics system’s configuration, capability, and status information. These tests verify that those bits and fields are proper values in compliance
with the ICAO regulations for DAPs applications. Table 1 shows an example of static value tests. As can be seen by the table, failed data were detected in
each BDS register test. For BDS Register 2016, failed data with wrong character coding were caused not due to equipment problem, but to faulty data input.

Table 1 Example of Static Value Tests

BDS Total Count Aircraft

Test Item
Register Executed Failed Executed Failed

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BDS code
Aircraft identification capability flag = ‘1’ 544,980 7,183 3,615 146
1,0
BDS code Each character conforms to ICAO 6-bit
737,993 1,516 3,596 144
2,0 character coding
BDS code
Unavailable data fields are set at zero 54,248,802 1,755 3,614 4
4,0

Dynamic value tests validate the values which dynamically change according to aircraft motion, such as aircraft speed and track angle. The tests compare the
DAPs values with equivalent data like radar-measured positions. If the difference between DAPs values and radar-derived parameters exceeds the
acceptability threshold, the DAPs value is accounted as an error. Figure 2 represents an example of dynamic value tests. This figure indicates that ground
speed differences between DAPs data and radar-derived data fall inside the threshold range.

Figure 2 - Example of Dynamic Value Tests

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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF IDENTIFIED ISSUES

Safety Implications to ATC

Ref. Issue Cause Recommendations
(Yes / No)
Through joint investigation with the airlines, it found
Wrong ground bits Yes
that parts of the aircraft A were exchanged with
in DAPs led to the The wrong ground bits in DAPs could make
another aircraft B for test. The malfunction part was
1. track decoupling ATM automation system display track
discovered when the wrong ground bits data was
from the flight plan decoupled with flight plan
found coming from the aircraft B.

Many cases of wrong aircraft identification were

Through the joint efforts of
found at the beginning of mode S operation. All
ATMB and the airlines, the
Wrong aircraft related data collected and sent to the relevant airlines Yes
aircraft identification data
2. identification by the management department. Through joint Wrong aircraft identification could lead to
became more and more
investigation with the airlines, it was found that the wrong flight plan coupling.
accurate.
issue is normally due to pilot’s error.

Barometric Pressure, such as BARO or QNH, is

available in Mode S BDS code 4,0. Initial testing Yes EASA Safety Information
Wrong Barometric found that data above the transition level for some There will display a wrong Barometric Bulletin SIB-2016-05R2
3. Pressure aircraft types would not be useful due to a mismatch Pressure with aircraft in ATM automation (“Incorrect Downlink
between what the crew set in the cockpit, and what system. Barometric Pressure Settings”)
the aircraft Downlinked. covers this issue.

Different Currently, the altitude accuracy of Mode A/C radar is The altitude tracking, and
processing between Yes
100ft, while that of Mode S radar is 25ft. The altitude display mechanism of ATM
In Mode S radar and Mode, A/C radar
4. Mode A/C and tracking, and display mechanism of ATM automation automation systems need to be
overlapped area, the ATM automation
Mode S Altitude systems could be received both precisions altitude optimized to avoid altitude
systems might display an altitude jumping.
data. jumping.

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Mode S The data transmission rate of

If Mode S interrogators request the aircraft Mode S radar to feed ATM
interrogators transponder registers too frequently in busy airspace, automation system needs to be
Yes
request the aircraft it may appear that the transponder registers ATM automation system would display selected reasonably to meet the
5. transponder information cannot complete the whole transmission requirements of ATC
process. The BDS parameters requesting rule needs track delay or intermittent interruption of operations in busy airspace to
registers too
to be set by the Mode S interrogator reasonably. radar data. prevent track delay or
frequently in busy
intermittent interruption of
airspace radar data.

Mode S DAPs data

does not
correspond to the
content of the Different options can be
requested register It has been noted that from time to time Mode S implemented to decrease the
DAPs data does not correspond to the content of the impact of such as:
requested register. For example, the content of BDS
1. limit the number of radars
code 5,0 is received when extracting BDS code 4,0.
This phenomenon is called “BDS swap”. Yes extracting aircraft registers

6. Wrong information could display to 2. implement specific filters in

Table 1 represents an example data of BDS swap. controller. radar or in the surveillance
The table shows the data of BDS code 0,5/4,0/5,0 data processing to discard the
data downlink from an aircraft in three sequential
erroneous data (e.g. when two
scans. As can be seen by the table, BDS swap
occurred at 08:05:45. different registers are received
with the same content they are
both discarded)

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According to Annex 10, the
aviation authority of each State
is responsible for assigning
24-bit addresses to all aircraft
in its registry using the block
allocated by ICAO to that
State.
The duplicate address should
Yes
One case was related to a local airline, wrong spare be detected and reported.
The possible consequences are as follows:
parts of the airplane were installed by mistake during Without duplicate address
1. An aircraft may be locked out in error, if
maintenance. The airline replaced the spare parts detection, if an aircraft enters
it is the same beam. This may result in a
after being informed. Another case was military the range of the Mode S SSR
new aircraft not being detected when it
aircraft. with the same ICAO 24-bit
enters Mode S radar coverage.
Another reason has been observed that in many cases address as that of an existing
2. Possible track label swap for crossing
Duplicated aircraft the 24-bit aircraft address transmitted by the aircraft aircraft, this may result in incorrect labeling
target, the information of the
7. does not match its nationality (i.e. its State of new aircraft could be
address of an aircraft on the Radar screen.
Registry’s block) or is otherwise incorrectly erroneously associated with
3. In the technical operation of Mode S
configured in the transponder. Care needs to be taken the existing target.
Elementary surveillance, duplicated address
to ensure that the registration and the 24- bit address Once the Mode S DAPs
may result in the possible loss of a track
of every aircraft are processed and assigned System detect more than one
when the two aircraft are crossing due to
simultaneously by the regulatory authority, and aircraft is transmitting the
the interrogation scheduling within the
reporting mechanisms are in place to rectify incorrect same ICAO 24-address, it will
ground station.
configurations. initiate a duplicate address
report and a duplicate address
condition shall be declared,
and when receive new
information of this address, the
system should associate the
information by ID or position
but not the address.

incorrect aircraft Although the overwhelming majority aircrafts are Yes

equipped with Mode S transponders, many flight plans
8. address in flight are not filed with the correct aircraft address in item 18. This affects the function of aircraft address
plan correlation in ATM automation system.
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Aircrew round the system output figures from Spot
Wind data was the main reason for variations by crew
incorrect wind response. No
9.
speed and direction e.g. Recorded wind 283/42kts, crew response
280/40kts.

ASTERIX message “I048/260, ACAS Resolution ACAS message handling

feature at ATM system must be
empty ACAS RA Advisory Report” indicates that airplane is in ACAS Yes
10. RA condition. In some cases, all zero I048/260 ATM automation system may generate false checked on at its installation
message reports are received in the ATM automation system ACAS alarm from Empty RA message. stage following the ACAS
through Mode S radar. message flow
Yes ATM automation system could
erroneous SFL It is noticed ATM automation system could receive ATM automation system may generate false
11. erroneous SFL information due to the BDS swap use multiple data sources to
information SFL mismatch alarm due to the erroneous
problem and other reasons. check the SFL data.
SFL information.
Short term solution:
Reject data (BDS content and/or
reply) in case of difference
between UF and DF.
Reject BDS content (BDS 1,0;
2,0 and 3,0) in case of first byte
Many cases of incorrect ACAS RA information were error.
12. Incorrect ACAS found at the Mode S operation. After analysis the Yes Medium /long term solution:
incorrect ACAS RA data，the reason is so called Wrong information could display to "Overlay" function is introduced
RA information “BDS Swap”and only the old type of Mode S radar controller. in the fifth edition of Volume IV
has the “BDS Swap” problem. of ICAO document annex 10. the
DP (data parity) field is designed
to replace the AP field to check
the BDS register number in the
downlink DF20 / 21. It aims to
solve BDS swap problem from
the source.

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Table 1 Example Data of BDS Swap

Time of Scan
BDS Register 08:05:35 08:05:45 08:05:55
(BDS swap occurred)
BDS code 0,5 605f80c056966f a3280030a40000 605f845303ce8d
BDS code 4,0 a3280030a40000 a3280030a40000 a3280030a40000
BDS code 5,0 fff8cf1f800489 a3280030a40000 ffb8cf1f80048a

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APPENDIX 3: A Brief Introduction of Mode S SSR DAPs Data Source

1. Introduction

1.1 During the 2nd meeting of ICAO APAC Mode S DAPs WG, China presented an information
paper regarding the Mode S DAPs data source, the meeting was of the view that the content of the paper
will help in the understanding of the basic mechanism of avionics relevant to surveillance application
and implementation of DAPs.

-Refer to Mode S DAPs WG/2 IP05 “Preliminary Study of DAPs Data Sources”

1.2 The Mode S DAPs provides useful information on aircraft that will enhance ATM operations.
More attention should be paid when introducing Mode S DAPs and it’s important to clearly understand
what these parameters are and where these parameters come from. This text provides give some brief
information about the parameters.

2. Mode S SSR DAPs ELS and EHS

2.1 Mode S DAPs-based surveillance includes ELS (Elementary Surveillance) and EHS (Enhanced
Surveillance).

2.2 Most of the ELS parameters are capability parameters of the aircraft, hence are static. They can
be used for improved aircraft identification, and have less direct impact on ATC operations. The ELS
parameters are shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 ELS Parameters Information

Register DAP Set Bits Units Quantity Range

24-Bit Aircraft Address (AA) NA NA NA NA

Transponder Capability (CA) NA NA NA NA
Flight Status (FS) NA NA NA NA
Altitude Reporting in 25ft NA ft 25 [-1000, 50175]
ELS
BDS 1,0 Datalink Capability Report 56 NA NA NA
BDS 1,7 Common GICB Capability Report 56 NA NA NA
BDS 2,0 Aircraft Identification Report 56 NA NA NA
BDS 3,0 ACAS Resolution Advisory Report 9-22 NA NA NA

2.3 EHS parameters are more related to the aircraft’s intention and status, and most of them are
dynamic. The implementation of EHS parameters has a larger impact on controllers. The EHS
parameters are shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 EHS Parameters Information

Register DAP Set Bits Units Quantity Range

Selected Altitude (MCP/FCU) 2-13 ft 16 [0, 65520]

EHS BDS 4,0 Selected Altitude (FMS) 15-26 ft 16 [0, 65520]
Barometric Pressure Setting 28-39 mb 0.1 [0, 410]

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Roll Angle 3-11 dg 45/256 [-90, +90]
True Track Angle 14-23 dg 90/512 [-180, +180]
BDS 5,0 Ground Speed 25-34 kt 2 [0, 2046]
Track Angle Rate 37-45 dg/s 8/256 [-16, +16]
True Airspeed 47-56 kt 2 [0, 2046]
Magnetic Heading 3-12 dg 90/512 [-180, +180]
Indicated Airspeed 14-23 kt 1 [0, 1023]
BDS 6,0 Mach No 25-34 NA 2.048/512 [0, 4.092]
Barometric Altitude Rate 37-45 ft/min 32 [-16384, +16352]
Inertial Vertical Velocity 48-56 ft/min 32 [-16384, +16352]

3. Mode S SSR DAPs Data System

3.1 The ELS and EHS parameters originate from varies sensors and cockpit settings. After being
organized by the avionics systems, the information is being sent to the transponder through standard
aircraft data buses, and subsequently formatted by the transponder and stored inside the relevant Binary
Data Storages (BDS). The ground-based surveillance system could downlink desired DAPs by specific
Mode S GICB (Ground Initiated Comm-B) protocol.

Transponder

Cockpit
Setting Avionic
Systems

Other
Other
Aircraft
Other
Aircraft
Systems
Aircraft
Systems
Data Bus Systems

Pitot Static AOA TAT

Figure 3.1 Typical DAPs Data Source Block Diagram

Transponder and TCAS Computer

3.2 The most common standard of the civil aircraft transponder, the Mark 4 Air Traffic Control
Transponder, is based on the ARINC 718A standard. There are 3 main interface plugs defined on the rear
panel, namely TP (Top Plug), MP (Middle Plug), and BP (Bottom Plug).

3.3 The airborne collision avoidance system, Traffic Computer TCAS and ADS-B Functionality, is
based on the ARINC 735B standard . There are 6 main interface plugs defined on the rear panel, namely
LTP (Left Top Plug), LMP (Left Middle Plug), LBP (Left Bottom Plug), RTP (Right Top Plug), RMP
(Right Middle Plug) and RBP (Right Bottom Plug).

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TP LTP RTP

MP LMP RMP

BP LBP RBP

Figure 3.2 Transponder and TCAS Computer Examples from ACSS

Data Bus

3.4 The most common data bus, the Digital Information Transfer System, is based on the ARINC
429 standard. The standard defines the data transfer between most of the avionics systems. There are also
other standards such as the ARINC 629 used on Boeing B777, Airbus A330 and A350, as well as the
ARINC 664 (AFDX, Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet) used on A380 and B787.

Avionics and DAPs Data

3.5 The Aircraft Address (AA) is a parameter programmed into the aircraft frame after the address
is allocated by the State registration authority. Normally there are 2 ways to program this parameter, one
is to program the pins of the MP (connected for “1”, open for “0”), and the other is to use Aircraft
Personality Module (ARINC 607) to store the address, and then interface to the MP.

Note: For more detailed information about Aircraft Address, refer to ARINC 718A Attachment
2B. For APM implementation guidelines, refer to ARINC 718A Attachment 9.

Figure 3.3 APM Example from ACSS

3.6 The Transponder Capability (CA) is a result of the combination of on-the-ground status and
transponder capability level. Normally the on-the-ground status is automatically indicated by the weight
sensor fitted on the aircraft, but some GA planes use manual means to indicate the status by switching
the transponder knob to the GND option. The transponder receives on-the-ground status from the TP
pins (5J and 5K), make validation of the status with Ground Speed, Radio Altitude or Airspeed, and then
announce the status. The transponder capability level is a static value which is fixed after manufacturing.

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Figure 3.4 TT31 Mode S Transponder from TRIG

3.7 The Flight Status (FS) is a result of combination of the on-the-ground status, SPI, and Alert.
The on-the-ground is the same as in 3.6, the SPI is from pushing IDENT function button of the
transponder by pilot, and the Alert is produced by changing Mode A code (If changed to 7500, 7600,
7700, that’s permanent alert; and if changed to other codes, that’s 18 seconds temporary alert).

3.8 The Common Usage GICB Capability Report is generated by the transponder itself by
detecting the corresponding input data availability, and then set the corresponding bit related to that
GICB register.

3.9 The main source of Aircraft Identification is from FMS, input by pilot through Flight ID (or
Flight No) menu, and the related data transmitted to transponder by specific data bus (ARINC 429
Labels 233~237). If the Flight ID is empty, then the Aircraft Registration data may be provided within
another data bus (ARINC 429 Labels 301-303).

3.10 According to TCAS standard (ARINC 735B Chapter 3.3.4.1), the Datalink Capability Report
and the Resolution Advisories Report are sent to the Transponder from TCAS Computer by specific
protocol (TGD-TCAS to Transponder data transfer protocol, and Transponder to TCAS data transfer
protocol is named XGD. The data bus used is ARINC 429 Label 270). The data are sent from RMP of
the TCAS Computer to TP of the Transponder, related pins refer to Figure 3.5.

TP-5E Label270 RMP-15J RMP-14A Label270 TP-5E

TP-5F Label270 RMP-15K RMP-14B Label270 TP-5F

XPDR #1 TCAS XPDR #2
ARINC TP-5G RMP-14F ARINC RMP-14H TP-5G ARINC
718A 735B 718A
TP-5H RMP-14G RMP-14J TP-5H

Figure 3.5 Illustrations of Datalink Capability and RA Report Transfer

3.11 There are 2 kinds of Selected Altitude, one is from MCP/FCU (Boeing’s Mode Control Panel
and Airbus’s Flight Control Unit), and the other is from FMS (Flight Management System). The first one
is set by the pilot in response to a controller’s instruction during the flight, the second one is calculated
by the FMS automatically to achieve the best cost-efficient.

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Figure 3.6 MCP of Boeing B787 & FCU of Airbus A380

3.12 The Barometric Pressure Setting (BPS) is also located in the MCP/FCU, and set by the pilot
rotating the knob to the pressure value comes from the aerodrome’s ATIS (Automatic Terminal
Information System).

3.13 The other parameters mainly come from the sensors onboard the aircraft, the sensors are
organized in 3 groups, the air data sensors, the inertial sensors and the magnetic sensor.

3.14 The air data sensors are used to sense the medium through which the aircraft is flying,
including pitot (static) probe, static port, temperature sensor, angle of attack sensor. Typical sensed
parameters are total pressure (Pt), static pressure (Ps), pressure changing rate, air temperature (TAT), and
angle of attack. Derived data includes Barometric Altitude (ALT), Indicated Airspeed (IAS), Vertical
Speed (VS), Mach (M), Static Air Temperature (SAT), Total Air Temperature (TAT), True Airspeed (TAS)
and Angle of Attack (AOA). The simplest system provides ALT and IAS.

Figure 3.7 Air Data Sensors and Integrated Sensor on Airbus A380

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3.15 The inertial sensors are used to detect the motion of the aircraft in a universal reference system,
including position gyroscopes, rate gyroscopes and accelerometers. By detection of the 3D dynamic of
the aircraft, derived data includes Ground Speed (GS), Wind Speed, Wind Direction, True Track Angle,
Roll Angle, and Track Angle Rate and so on.

Figure 3.8 Gyro, Accelerometer and LASEREF IV IRU from Honeywell

3.16 The magnetic sensor is used to sense the direction and to find the magnetic north, and give out
the main parameter of Magnetic Heading. The world magnetic model is show below:

Figure 3.9 World Magnetic Model 2000

3.17 Some airplane platform uses an integrated solution to process these data, each air data sensor is
connected with an Air Data Module (ADM) which converts the analog data to digital data and make the
compensation of the instrumental and positional error. These data then feed to the input of Air Data
Inertial Reference Systems (ADIRS) to calculate all the parameters mentioned before. And after that the
parameters are sent to transponder and other avionics systems by the Data Bus.

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ADM ADM ADM Total

Transponder Pressure

Static
ADIRS Pressure

Standby Air Data Inertial Angle of

Meters Reference Attack
System
Other
Other
Aircraft Total Air
Other
Aircraft
Systems Temp.
Aircraft
Systems
Systems ADM ADM ADM
Data Bus

Pitot Static AOA TAT

Figure 3.10 Typical ADIRS Architecture

3.18 The most commonly used data bus for parameters from ADIRS is ARINC 429 (and the newest
evolution is AFDX invented by Airbus and implemented in varies new aircrafts like A380 and B787),
and the standard ARINC 429 Labels used by these parameters are as follows:

Table 3.1 ADIRS Parameters Used Labels of ARINC 429

No DAP Item Label
1 Mach No. 205
2 Indicated Air Speed 206
3 True Air Speed 210
4 Barometric Altitude Rate 212
5 Ground Speed 312
6 True Track Angle 313
7 Magnetic Heading 320
8 Roll Angle 325
9 Track Angle Rate 335*
10 Inertial Vertical Velocity 365
*Note: This label in GAMA configuration is not used for Track Angle Rate

3.19 By using these parameters, the aircraft dynamic is illustrated as in Figure 3.11.

True Roll Track Angle

North Angle Rate
Turning
Magnetic Radius
North

Gravity
Magnetic
Heading
True Wind True Track
Airspeed Effect Angle
Ground
Speed Vertical
Rate
True
East

Figure 3.11 Illustration of Aircraft Dynamic

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APPENDIX 4: Mode S Parameter Set

Radar Coverage R

1.1 The Mode S radar coverage is defined as the farthest target the radar will process. If the
Mode S radar uses a lockout map, the difference of the two coverage ranges should be noticed.

Aircraft

Un Acquired Target

Acquired & Unlocked Target

Radar
Site Acquired & Locked Target

Radar Coverage

Lockout Coverage

1.2 The radar coverage will decide the minimal All-Call period, this is to say, the time of
All-Call period should:

Antenna Period Ta

2.1 The antenna period is the time of a successful antenna rotation, this time actually has very
important influence of the total time resource of the radar. Lower antenna rotation speed will provide rich
antenna period, hence time resource of the radar. The most commonly used antenna period is 4000ms
(15rpm) and 6000ms (10rpm) for terminal surveillance radar.

Antenna Beamwidth B

3.1 Most of the secondary surveillance radar uses the same LVA antenna, the beam is more or
less the same, and the standard interrogation beam has a -3dB width of 2.45° ±0.25 °. In Mode S
interrogation, the suppression requirement actually allow to use a wider beam width than -3dB width, most
of the radar choose 3.8° or roughly the -10dB beam width.

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Time on Target Tt

4.1 The time on target is the total time amount the radar beam covers the target during one
scan, it defines the time resource upper limit for one dedicated target, it is determined by both the antenna
period and the beamwidth, and the relation is as follows:

4.2 It should be noticed that during a mix air operation (Conventional targets and Mode S
targets flying in the same area in the same time), there is a need for the Necessary Transaction. That is
during an antenna scan, there should be at least 4 transactions between the radar and the conventional
target, in order not to miss conventional target.

All-Call Period Tac and Roll-Call Period Trc

5.1 The All-Call period and Roll-Call period setting are different radar by radar, but there
should be some principles:

1) All-Call period should long enough to allow the coverage requirement.

2) During the time on target, the Necessary Transaction should be guaranteed.

3) Time resource should allocate to Roll-Call as much as possible; and

4) Algorithm should be used to optimize the scheduling in the Roll-Call period.

Mode Interlace Pattern MIP

6.1 Mode Interlace Pattern defines the radar operating mode setting. The setting is related to
the specific radar environment, hence there is no standard MIP.

6.2 All the modes Mode S radar can use is listed in the following table:

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No. Mode Description Pulse Used

1 A Mode A interrogation 8μs between P1 and P3
2 C Mode C interrogation 21μs between P1 and P3
3 AS Mode A Only All-Call 8μs between P1 and P3, and short P4
4 CS Mode C Only All-Call 21μs between P1 and P3, and short P4
5 SL Mode ACS All-Call 8μs, 21μs between P1 and P3, and Long P4
Mode S Only All-Call 2μs between P1 and P2, and P6
6 SPO
P for PR, O for LO UF11 inside P6
2μs between P1 and P2, and P6
7 R Mode S Roll-Call
UF0/4/5/16/20/21 inside P6

6.3 For a specific MIP, the describe phraseology defines as follows, and also one example is
listed below:

Mode[Time]/ Mode[Time]/ Mode[Time]/......

Note: The All-Call and Roll-Call periods are separated by “/”, the “Mode” is one of the
Modes listed above, and the “[Time]” stands for the duration of the periods.

6.4 An example is show as follows:

No. Mode MIP

A[5.0]/C[5.0]
A C
1 Conventional 5ms 5ms
Mode A and Mode C repeat, both durations are 5ms

S1/2AS[5.0]/S1/2CS[5.0]/R[10.0]
S1/ 2AS S1/ 2CS R
5ms 5ms 10ms
2 Mode S #1 2All-Call periods and 1 Roll-Call period repeat, All-Call duration is 5ms,
Roll-Call duration is 10ms
In the first All-Call, the PR=1/2, and use Mode A with short P4
In the second All-Call, the PR=1/2, and use Mode C with short P4

S1/2AS[5.0]/R[10.0]/S1/2CS[5.0]/R[10.0]
S1/ 2AS R S1/ 2CS R
5ms 10ms 5ms 10ms
3 Mode S #2 1All-Call,1Roll-Call,1All-Call,1Roll-Call repeat, All-Call duration is
5ms, Roll-Call duration is 10ms
In the first All-Call, the PR=1/2, and use Mode A with short P4
In the second All-Call, the PR=1/2, and use Mode C with short P4

Interrogation Repetition Frequency IRF

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7.1 The Mode S introduced the Roll-Call period, which makes the interrogation repetition
frequency a little bit different from the Conventional Mode. There is a need to define the interrogation
repetition frequency by Mode IRFMode. Normally use IRF stands for the IRFAC of Conventional mode and
IRFS of the Mode S All-Call. One example is listed below:

No. MIP IRF

A[5.0]/C[5.0] IRFA=100Hz
1 A C IRFC=100Hz
5ms 5ms IRFAC=200Hz
IRFA=33.3Hz
S1/2As[5.0]/R[10.0]/S1/2Cs[5.0]/R[10.0] IRFC=33.3Hz
2 S1/ 2AS R S1/ 2CS R IRFAC=66.7Hz
5ms 10ms 5ms 10ms IRFS=66.7Hz
IRFR=66.7Hz

DAPs Extraction Strategy

8.1 The DAPs extraction strategy normally includes the BDS number, extraction priority,
extraction period, and re-extraction.

1) BDS number stands for the setting of the number of BDSs which radar is going to
extract. It doesn’t include the ELS registers, these registers should not be extracted periodically.

2) Extraction priority stands for the priority of each BDS when the radar is performing
extraction, the priority should be in accordance to the user’s needs;

3) Extraction period stands for the period of the dedicated BDS extraction, normally
described by the antenna scan number.

4) Re-extraction stands for the function of re-extraction of the dedicated BDS in the same
beam dwell when the extraction is failed, but it’s not recommended to use re-extraction more than 2 times.

Mode S Parameter Set Example

9.1 The following is an example of the Mode S Parameter Set:

No. Parameter Unit Value Note

Equivalent All-Call Time
R
1 NM 200
Coverage Range

Ta
2 ms 3800 Antenna Rotation Period
Antenna Period
B Mode S Work Beamwidth Normally Greater Than
3 ° 3.8
Work Beamwidth -3dB width of 2.45°
The Time on Target In One Scan
Tt
4 ms 40.1
Time on Target

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Equivalent Coverage Range
Tac
5 ms 3.0
All-Call Period

Trc
6 ms 7.0 This Period Related To The Extraction Efficiency
Roll-Call Period
S1/2As[3.0]/R[7.0]/S1/2Cs[3.0]/R[7.0]
S1/ 2AS R S1/ 2CS R
7 MIP —— ——
3ms 7ms 3ms 7ms
Interrogation Repetition Frequency of Mode S
8 IRFAC Hz 100
All-Call
No. of BDS: 3 (BDS 4,0 5,0 6,0)
Extra. Priority: BDS 4,0 6,0 5,0
9 DAPs Extraction —— ——
Extra. Period: 1 Scan
Re-Extraction: Yes

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APPENDIX 5: Radio Frequency (RF) Measurements and Analysis

The following is excerpted from ICAO Doc 9924 Aeronautical Surveillance Manual (Third Edition 2020),
Appendix M: Interference Considerations.

1. Overview

1.1 The 1030 and 1090 MHz frequency bands form the worldwide RF network, which enables the
cooperative surveillance of mobile vehicles involved in ATM including airborne vehicles (aircraft) and
ground vehicles (e.g., specific vehicles operating on airport surface in critical areas). It is utilized to
support civil and military (IFF) air-ground surveillance applications, air-air surveillance applications and
collision avoidance applications.

1.2 In general, the 1030/1090 MHz network is robust in its ability to support the systems that
utilize it but as more systems are added, performance of one or more of these systems may degrade to
unacceptable levels. Since many systems are safety critical in nature, protecting the 1030/1090 MHz
spectrum from reaching unacceptable utilization is paramount.

1.3 Capacity of the system is impacted by the number and types of users. Aircraft density and the
number and type of interrogators directly influence the activity on these links. Information extraction
from ground and aircraft to aircraft interrogators increases the activity of these RF links. High density
airspace is a particular challenge as these locations tend to contain accompanying higher density of
ground interrogators. The systems that utilize the 1030/1090 MHz bands have standards that limit their
impact to protect the performance of all users and provide robust capacity to the system. However,
available capacity can be limited in the highest density areas of the world.

1.4 Therefore, it is necessary to monitor the usage of the 1030/1090 RF network, as is required for
any telecommunication network, in order to regulate its use. Such monitoring should support the
determination of the remaining margin of the network. It should help identify the sources of the
utilization and whether the limits are being reached by misuse of some systems operating in a
non-conforming or inefficient manner to the detriment of the good operation of the other systems using
the same network.

2. Radio frequency (RF) measurements

2.1 Measurements need to provide information to answer the following questions:

a) what is the probability that a transponder correctly receives and decodes an interrogation
sent on 1030 MHz (the utilization of the 1030 MHz frequency);

b) what is the probability that a transponder is available to receive and decode interrogations
and is able to reply (the availability of the transponder); and

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c) what is the probability that a 1090 MHz message is correctly received by a 1090 MHz
receiver, which is impacted by overlaps of messages on 1090 MHz (the utilization of the
1090 MHz frequency).

2.2 Measurement methodologies

2.2.1 Data produced by RF measurement activities is recommended to include a minimum set of

information that can adequately characterize the RF environment of the geographical area under
assessment and support comparison to other measurements. Additionally, the data is intended to support
comparison to other data collection measurements in other geographical areas which can provide insight
to areas with high or unusual activity and help identify areas that warrant further investigation. To allow
comparison between different measurements performed in different locations around the world, it is very
important to define the types and the conditions of measurements. Measurements can be made from the
ground and/or from the air. Each of them provides critical insight into the 1030/1090 MHz utilization.

2.2.2 Airborne measurements provide a larger area of measurement but are more difficult to
conduct and result in higher cost. The airborne measurements provide both the ability to characterize
ground sensor operations (1030 MHz) and transponder occupancy. Providing a 1030 MHz measurement
enables the detection of all types of interrogations to which a transponder is receiving, i.e, interrogations
to which a transponder does or does not transmit a reply. Therefore, it allows an estimation of
transponder occupancy at the given points of measurement. It also allows the tracking of interrogations
received but not generating replies (e.g., SLS interrogations, interrogations directed to other aircraft).

2.2.3 Ground measurements are more easily accomplished, less expensive but geographically
limited. They allow the verification of transponder transmissions on 1090 MHz but are limited in their
ability of providing a complete understanding of the environment that airborne aircraft are experiencing.
Estimates of 1030 MHz activity can be somewhat estimated from measurement of 1090 MHz replies.
However, there is no way to completely account for interrogations that do not result in a reply that
impact transponder occupancy.

2.3 Metrics and measurement methods

2.3.1 Frequency occupancy

2.3.1.1 Method 1, In order to allow simple comparison of signal activity received on either 1030
MHz or 1090 MHz frequency, one method is to calculate a simple time occupancy that corresponds to
the amount of time that there is a signal present above a given threshold without trying to extract or even
decode the content of the messages. The process can be based on the following criteria:

⚫ 1090 MHz frequency occupancy is defined by the proportion of time that there is a
signal above the MTL (-84 dBm) for pulses greater than 0.3 microseconds in duration;
and

⚫ 1030 MHz frequency occupancy is defined by the proportion of time that there is a

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signal above the MTL (-74 dBm) for pulses greater than 0.3 microseconds in duration.

2.3.1.2 Method 2, which analyses the signal received on 1090 MHz, would be determined by
decoding of, and counting the number of signals for, different types of messages. The 1090 MHz
frequency band occupancy can also be estimated using a predefined occupancy time for each type of
message. This message occupancy time is defined as the time there is a signal transmitted on the
frequency, i.e., a pulse is transmitted. It signifies how long the transmission is occupying the frequency
and therefore possibly interfering with another signal. The table below provides the values to be used to
estimate the effective occupancy time and allow comparison between different
measurements/estimations made by different authorities.

Type of message Time occupancy in μs

Mode A/C reply 4.05 (9*0.45)
Short Mode S reply or squitter 30 (60*0.5)
Long Mode S reply or Extended Squitter 58 (116 *0.5)

2.3.1.3 Note that the occupancy of a Mode A/C reply depends on the number of pulses transmitted
in each reply. For this calculation, an average value of 9 pulses (2 framing + 7 code pulses) has been
used. This is sufficient to provide a first order estimation for comparison with the occupancy of other
signal types.

2.3.1.4 The calculation of the number of replies of a given type multiplied by their corresponding
time occupancy enables characterizing the impact of different message types on the frequency. Since this
uses a fixed defined time occupancy for each type of message, the occupancy determined using this
method, in general, will be lower than the occupancy computed using method 1 above, since it can be
expected that interfering pulses that may occur during a detected message are not accounted for using
method 2.

2.3.1.5 Method 3 is similar to the previous methods. An alternate occupancy calculation is based
on the number of signals received on 1030 and 1090 MHz, which are decoded and from which signal
rates are determined. However, the occupancy considers the entire signal length from the leading edge of
the first pulse until the trailing edge of the last pulse as the time duration regardless of whether and how
many intermediate pulses are transmitted. The rationale behind this method is that in RF high-density
areas, multiple signal garbling is likely to occur and therefore pulse gaps are unpredictably filled. The
determination of the band occupancy is based on the signal durations, as shown in table below.

Type of message 1030 MHz signal duration 1090 MHz signal duration
Mode 1 3.8 µs 20.75 µs
Mode 2 5.8 µs 20.75 µs
Mode 3/A 8.8 µs 20.75 µs

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Mode C 21.8 µs 20.75 µs

Mode C (Whisper/Shout) 23.8 µs 20.75 µs
Mode A only All Call 10.8 µs 20.75 µs
Mode C only All-Call 23.8 µs 20.75 µs
Mode A/Mode S All-Call 11.6 µs 20.75 µs or 64 µs
Mode C/Mode S All-Call 24.6 µs 20.75 µs or 64 µs
Mode C only All-Call (W/S) 25.8 µs 20.75 µs
Mode A only All-Call (W/S) 12.8 µs 20.75 µs
Short Mode S 19.75 µs 64 µs
Long Mode S 33.75 µs 120 µs

2.3.2 Determination of transponder reply and broadcast activity

2.3.2.1 By analyzing the transmissions made by a transponder, it is possible to verify if a

transponder is transmitting above the minimum capabilities specified in Annex 10, Volume IV. The
number of messages can be counted over 1 second and 100 msec sliding windows. The peak rates (i.e.,
the interval with the highest number of messages) detected over a given interval (e.g. 1 minute) can be
compared to the values defined in Annex 10, Volume IV. Such information provides a good overall
estimate of transponder activity caused by interrogators and makes possible the detection and further
analysis of unexpected activity on the channel.

2.3.2.2 One method to estimate the number of messages transmitted by individual aircraft is by
counting the number of messages received by a 1090 MHz receiver for aircraft in the vicinity of the
receiver with a good link budget. However, achieving sufficient decoding performance is difficult but
this method lends itself to a long-term ground-based monitoring system.

2.3.2.3 Another method is to conduct flight tests and detect and record the transmissions made by
the operational transponder installed on the test aircraft. This is a good way to determine with high
confidence the activity of an individual transponder in the environment. Decoding ownship replies is
more accurate than attempting to analyses all the replies transmitted by all the other aircraft because the
transmissions are received at high power, thereby reducing the problem of degarbling with other
transmissions.

3. Additional data

3.1 Considering additional data such as aircraft environment and traffic density is desirable to
assist in understanding the RF measurements that are obtained by the various methods previously
identified. RF activity is a function of the number of systems operating, which includes the number and
types of interrogators operating on the 1030 MHz frequency as well as the number and equipage of
aircraft operating in the geographical area surrounding the measurement location.

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3.2 Data to describe the aircraft environment during a measurement activity is helpful to
understand the relationship between the RF measurements and the aircraft traffic in the surrounding area.
Traffic density and traffic patterns influence the RF activity in any given area or region. Determining the
aircraft environment may require collecting and recording data from one or more ground SSRs. Data in
time intervals of 10 to 15 minutes is suggested. To some extent, aircraft information can be determined
by the RF measurement system itself. Mode S equipped aircraft can be detected by 1090 MHz reply via
the 24-bit aircraft address and additionally the position of many aircraft can be determined by extended
squitter data. ACAS equipage can be determined from 1030 MHz TCAS broadcast data, extended
squitter as well as DF 0/16 reply content. These methods are limited to the receiver range of the
measurement system but enable determining the nearby aircraft environment.

3.3 Information to describe the ground interrogator environment during a measurement activity is
helpful to understand the relationship between the RF measurements and the number of interrogators in
the surrounding area. Ground interrogators vary in characteristics that influence the impact to the RF
environment. The expected RF contribution from ground interrogators can be predicted based on their
characteristics such as PRF, scan rate, mode interlace pattern, beamwidth, power, etc. Although there is
no way to associate measured 1030 MHz Mode A/C or Whisper-Shout interrogations to a given ground
interrogator without detailed analysis of interrogation timing, particularly in the mainbeam, Mode S
interrogator All-Call activity can be associated via the II/SI codes. There are many factors that influence
overall RF activity with Mode S since ground interrogators may be extracting many GICB registers that
increase the contribution of Mode S FRUIT caused by ground interrogators. It is possible to associate
All-Call interrogations with UF 4, 5, 20 and 21 interrogations by examining mainbeam activity of
detected Mode S ground interrogators.

3.4 Additional data that can be helpful in assessing the RF activity in a given region is the use of
interrogation and reply data that is broadcast on extended squitter by so equipped aircraft. The capability
to broadcast interrogation and reply data is incorporated into the future version of 1090 MHz extended
squitter as a means of collecting useful 1030 and 1090 MHz activity data. The interrogation data is
useful in conjunction with flight test measurements as it provides insight to the interrogation activity at
different locations in addition to own aircraft. The reply data counts from the broadcasting aircraft enable
comparison to the own aircraft rates as a function of time. For the purpose of ground monitoring of RF
activity over time, decoding of the interrogation and reply monitoring extended squitter messages can be
used for long term assessment of RF activity and enable capture of unusual or excessive RF activity
events.

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NOTES ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

1. The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text with a line through it and new text
highlighted with grey shading, as shown below:

a) Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it. text to be deleted in

b) New text to be inserted is highlighted with grey shading. new text to be inserted in

c) Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it followed by new text to replace existing
the replacement text which is highlighted with grey shading. text

REVISED SURVEILLANCE STRATEGY FOR THE APAC REGION

Considering that:

1. States are implementing CNS/ATM systems to gain safety, efficiency and environmental
benefits, and have endorsed the move toward satellite and data link technologies;

2. The future air traffic environment will require increased use of aircraft-derived surveillance
information for the implementation of a seamless automated air traffic flow management
system;

3. The 11th Air Navigation Conference endorsed the use of ADS-B as an enabler of the global
air traffic management concept and encouraged States to support cost-effective early
implementation of ADS-B applications;

4. The 12th Air Navigation Conference endorsed the ICAO Aviation System Block Upgrades
(ASBU) Framework with Modules specifying effective use of ADS-B/MLAT and associated
communication technologies in bridging surveillance gaps and its role in supporting future
trajectory-based ATM operating concepts. Cooperation between States is the key to achieve
harmonized ATM system operations;

5. The 13th Air Navigation Conference endorsed the multilayer structure for the GANP, the
ASBU and initial version of basic building block (BBB) frameworks and its change
management process, which are available in an interactive format as part of the web-based
GANP Portal. This allows ICAO to incorporate a flexible framework for new/emerging
surveillance-related concepts such as space based ADS-B into future editions of the GANP;

6. APANPIRG has decided to use the 1090MHz Extended Squitter data link for ADS-B air-
ground and air-air applications in the Asia/Pacific Region;

7. Use of surveillance systems that do not require GNSS will continue to meet many critical
surveillance needs for the foreseeable future;

8. SARPs, PANS and guidance material for the use of ADS-B have been developed;

9. Availability of new technologies, such as space based ADS-B which is now operationally used
by some States;

10. Mode S and ADS-B avionics (including DAPs) and processing systems are available;

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11. ADS-B IN applications and equipment are now available in commercial airliners and ICAO
ASBUs include ADS-B IN applications;

12. There are continuing significant pressures on the radio spectrum for purposes outside aviation,
particularly in the primary radar spectrum; and

13. ADS-B security issues are addressed by the ADS-B regional guidance material and security
issues of Mode S surveillance may need to be further considered in the future.

THE SURVEILLANCE STRATEGY FOR THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION IS TO:

1. Minimize the reliance upon pilot position reporting, particularly voice position reporting, for
surveillance of aircraft;

2. Maximize the use of ADS-B on major air routes and in terminal areas, giving consideration to
the mandatory carriage of ADS-B Out as specified in Note 1 and use of ADS-B for ATC
separation service;

3. Reduce the dependence on Primary Radar for area surveillance, consider the ongoing need for
primary radars in terminal areas with a view to reducing primary surveillance coverage or use
of phased array radar or other technologies with coverage focusing on areas of concern, and the
potential use of alternate technologies or procedures (e.g. transponder veil regulations);

4. Encourage deployment of Mode S systems instead of Mode A/C only radars when replacement
is required;

5. Provide maximum contiguous ATS surveillance coverage of air routes using 1090MHz
Extended Squitter (1090ES) ADS-B, Wide Area Multilateration and Mode S SSR to meet
operational and safety requirements;

6. Make full use of aircraft Mode S capabilities, where suitable surveillance systems and ATM
automation systems are available, to reduce reliance on 4-digit octal codes. Mode S capabilities
such as DAPs should also be considered for used to support ATM services where appropriate;

7. Make use of alternative technologies where technical constraint or comparative cost benefit
analysis does not support the use of ADS-B, SSR or Multilateration;

8. Make use of Multilateration and/or ADS-B for surface, terminal and area surveillance where
appropriate, feasible and cost effective;

9. Monitor ADS-B OUT developments such as Version 3 (DO-260C) MOPS development, and
Version 2 (DO260B) equipage in the APAC region. At an appropriate time (circa 2020) APAC
States should review progress and consider development of transition plans where cost/benefit
studies indicate positive advantages for the region;

10. Monitor ADS-B IN development and cost benefits to ensure that APAC States are able to take
advantage of ADS-B IN benefits when appropriate, through procedures, rules and ATC
automation capabilities;

APX. H - 2
 CNS SG/26
Appendix H to the Report

11. To the extent possible, implement ADS-B in the non-radar environment as a priority. In the
radar or other surveillance environment, use ADS-B to supplement or replace existing
surveillance coverage, subject to local factors and risk assessment;

12. Make use of surveillance capability to support the GADSS as appropriate;

13. Implementation of surveillance capability should also include consideration of contingency

surveillance requirements Note 2and multilayer surveillance provision should be implemented to
enhance the availability of surveillance services;

14. Monitor development of surveillance systems to support integration of UAS including new
technology capable to detect non cooperative targets such as UAS.

15. Encourage sharing of surveillance data, utilizing provisions in the Region such as CRV, to
improve safety and efficiency in air traffic management with a justifiable cost; and

16. Monitor potential congestion on 1090 MHz by means of routine measurements of channel
occupancy, at both terrestrial and airborne levels, and monitor the availability of 24-bit aircraft
address

Note 1:

a) Version 0 ES as specified in Annex 10, Volume IV, Chapter 3, Paragraph3.1.2.8.6 (up to and
including Amendment 82 to Annex 10) and Chapter 2 of Technical Provisions for Mode S Services
and Extended Squitter (ICAO Doc 9871) (Equivalent to DO260) to be used till at least 2020.

b) Version 1 ES as specified in Chapter 3 of Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended
Squitter (ICAO Doc 9871) (Equivalent to DO260A);

c) Version 2 ES as specified in Chapter 4 of Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended
Squitter (ICAO Doc 9871) (Equivalent to DO260B).

d) States/Administrations in APAC region are strongly encouraged to mandate aircraft with a

maximum take-off mass exceeding 5 700 kg or having a maximum cruising true airspeed
capability greater than 250 knots, to be equipped with ADS-B OUT avionics compliant with
Version 2 ES (DO-260B) or later version with date of manufacture on or after 1 January 2020.

Note 2:

Contingency surveillance requirements are requirements to handle contingency situations in

surveillance thus retain capacity to continue providing/using air navigation services. Such situations
include but are not limited to the followings:
• failure of surveillance system or infrastructure such as ground stations or GNSS failure;
• avionics failure or equipped aircraft transmitting bad data in flight with good data integrity
indicators.
____________

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 CNS SG/26
Appendix I to the Report

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION AND

OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT

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 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 7

1.1 Arrangement of the AIGD .................................................................................................. 7

1.2 Document History and Management .................................................................................. 7
1.3 Copies ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.4 Changes to the AIGD .......................................................................................................... 8
1.5 Editing conventions ............................................................................................................ 8
1.6 AIGD Request for Change Form ........................................................................................ 9
1.7 Amendment Record .......................................................................................................... 10

2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS ............................................................ 15

2.1 Acronym List .................................................................................................................... 15

2.2 Glossary of Terms ............................................................................................................. 16

3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS………………………………………………………... 17

4. ADS-B DATA .................................................................................................................. 19

5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 20

5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 20

5.1.1 Planning ................................................................................................................... 20

5.1.2 Implementation team to ensure international coordination ...................................... 20
5.1.3 System compatibility ............................................................................................... 20
5.1.4 Integration ................................................................................................................ 21
5.1.5 Coverage Predictions ............................................................................................... 24

5.2 Implementation checklist .................................................................................................. 25

5.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 25

5.2.2 Activity Sequence .................................................................................................... 25
5.2.3 Concept Phase .......................................................................................................... 25
5.2.4 Design Phase ............................................................................................................ 25
5.2.5 Implementation Phase .............................................................................................. 26

6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 28

6.1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 28

6.2 Template of Harmonization Framework for ADS-B Implementation .............................. 29

7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING ............................................................ 32

7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 32

7.2 Personnel Licensing and Training .................................................................................... 32
7.3 System Performance Criteria for an ATC separation service ........................................... 32
7.4 ATC system validation ..................................................................................................... 33

7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines ............................................................................. 33

7.4.2 System safety assessment .................................................................................... 33

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7.4.3 Integration test ..................................................................................................... 34

7.4.4 ATS Operation Manuals ...................................................................................... 34
7.4.5 ATS System Integrity .......................................................................................... 34

7.5 System Monitoring ........................................................................................................... 35

7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS) ....................................................................... 35

7.5.2 The monitoring process ....................................................................................... 35
7.5.3 Distribution of confidential information .............................................................. 36
7.5.4 ADS-B problem reports ....................................................................................... 36
7.5.5 ADS-B periodic status report ............................................................................... 36
7.5.6 Processing of Reports .......................................................................................... 37

7.6 APANPIRG ...................................................................................................................... 37

7.7 Local Data Recording and Analysis ................................................................................. 37

7.7.1 Data recording...................................................................................................... 37

7.7.2 Local data collection ............................................................................................ 38
7.7.3 Avionics problem identification and correction................................................... 38

7.8 ADS-B Problem Report .................................................................................................... 39

7.8.1 Report Form ......................................................................................................... 39

7.8.2 Description of Fields ............................................................................................ 40

7.9 ADS-B Performance Report Form.................................................................................... 41

8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS ....................................... 42

8.1 Reliability.......................................................................................................................... 42
8.2 Availability ....................................................................................................................... 42
8.3 Recommendations for high reliability/availability ADS-B systems ................................. 43
A: System design ......................................................................................................... 43
B: Logistics strategy ................................................................................................... 44
C: Configuration Management .................................................................................... 45
D: Training & Competency plans ................................................................................ 46
E: Data collection & Review ....................................................................................... 46

9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES .......................................................... 47

9.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 47

9.2 ADS-B Regulations .......................................................................................................... 47
9.3 Factors to be considered when using ADS-B ................................................................... 48

9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data..................................................................................... 48

9.3.2 Position Reporting Performance .......................................................................... 48
9.3.3 GNSS Integrity Prediction Service ...................................................................... 49
9.3.4 Sharing of ADS-B Data........................................................................................ 49
9.3.5 Synergy between GNSS and ADS-B ................................................................... 50
9.3.6 Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface Movement .................................................... 51
9.3.7 1090 Mhz Spectrum and 24-bit Aircraft Address Issue With Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) ................................................................................................................... 52
9.3.8 Methodologies to Avoid or Reduce 1090 MHz Congestion ................................ 52

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9.4 Reporting Rates................................................................................................................. 53

9.4.1 General ................................................................................................................ 53

9.5 Separation ......................................................................................................................... 53

9.5.1 General ................................................................................................................. 53

9.5.2 Identification Methods ......................................................................................... 53
9.5.3 ADS-B Separation ................................................................................................ 53
9.5.4 Vertical Separation ............................................................................................... 53

9.6 Air Traffic Control Clearance Monitoring ........................................................................ 55

9.6.1 General ................................................................................................................. 55

9.6.2 Deviation from ATC clearances ........................................................................... 55

9.7 Alerting service ................................................................................................................. 54

9.8 Position Reporting ............................................................................................................ 55

9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage................................... 55

9.8.2 Meteorological reporting requirement in ADS-B airspace .................................. 55

9.9 Phraseology ....................................................................................................................... 55

9.9.1 Phraseology standard ........................................................................................... 55

9.9.2 Operations of Mode S Transponder and ADS-B ................................................. 56

9.10 Flight Planning .................................................................................................................. 57

9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity ........................................ 57

9.10.2 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirements ................................................................. 58
9.10.3 Setting Flight Identification (Flight ID) in Cockpits ............................................ 59

9.11 Procedures to Handle Non-compliant ADS-B Aircraft or

Mis-leading ADS-B Transmissions .................................................................................. 60

9.12 Emergency Procedures ..................................................................................................... 63

9.13 Procedures to Handle GPS Time and Week Counter Rollover......................................... 64

10. Security Issues Associated with ADS-B ........................................................................ 65

10.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 65

10.2 Considerations .................................................................................................................. 65
10.3 Measures for Enhancing the Security of ADS-B .............................................................. 66
10.3.1 Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) Based Position Verification Method ......... 66
10.3.2 Appropriate Implementation of a Decoding Method of CPR .............................. 67

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Appendix 1 – An Example of Commissioning Checklist

Appendix 2 – Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis of ADS-B Avionics

Performance

Appendix 3 – A Template for ADS-B Mandate/Regulations for Aircraft Avionics

Appendix 4 – An Example of Advice to Operators Concerning Inconsistency between

ADS-B Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability

Appendix 5 – Checklist of Common Items or Parameters for the Monitoring of ADS-B

System

Appendix 6 – Baseline ADS-B Service Performance Parameters

Appendix 7 – Guidance Material on Generation, Processing and Sharing of ASTERIX

Category 21 ADS-B Messages

Appendix 8 – ICAO Guidance Material on 1 090 Mhz Spectrum Issues and Proper
Management of 24-Bit Aircraft Addresses Assoicated with Unmanned
Aircraft

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh ICAO Air Navigation Conference held in 2003 recommended that States recognize
ADS-B as an enabler of the global ATM concept bringing substantial safety and capacity benefits;
support the cost-effective early implementation of it; and ensuring it is harmonized, compatible and
interoperable with operational procedures, data linking and ATM applications.

The Twelve ICAO Air Navigation Conference held in 2012 endorsed the Aviation System Block
Upgrades (ASBU) to provide a framework for global harmonization and interoperability of seamless
ATM systems. Among the Block Upgrades, the Block 0 module “Initial Capability for Ground
Surveillance” recommends States to implement ADS-B which provides an economical alternative to
acquire surveillance capabilities especially for areas where it is technically infeasible or commercially
unviable to install radars.

This ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (AIGD) provides guidance material
for the planning, implementation and operational application of ADS-B technology in the Asia and
Pacific Regions.

The procedures and requirements for ADS-B operations are detailed in the relevant States’ AIP. The
AIGD is intended to provide key information on ADS-B performance, integration, principles, procedures
and collaboration mechanisms.

The content is based upon the work to date of the APANPIRG ADS-B Study and Implementation Task
Force (SITF), the Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group (SURICG) and various ANC Panels
developing provisions for the operational use of ADS-B. Amendment to the guidance material will be
required as new/revised SARPs and PANS are published.

1.1 ARRANGEMENT OF THE AIGD

The AIGD consists of the following Parts:

Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Acronyms and Glossary of Terms
Section 3 Reference Documents
Section 4 ADS-B Data
Section 5 ADS-B Implementation
Section 6 Template of Harmonization Framework for ADS-B
Implementation
Section 7 System Integrity and Monitoring
Section 8 Reliability and Availability Considerations
Section 9 ADS-B Regulations and Procedures
Section 10 Security Issues Associated with ADS-B

1.2 DOCUMENT HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT

This document is managed by the APANPIRG. It was introduced as draft to the first Working Group
meeting of the ADS-B SITF in Singapore in October 2004, at which it was agreed to develop the draft to
an approved working document that provides implementation guidance for States. The first edition was
presented to APANPIRG for adoption in August 2005. It is intended to supplement SARPs, PANS and
relevant provisions contained in ICAO documentation and it will be regularly updated to reflect evolving
provisions.

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1.3 COPIES

Paper copies of this AIGD are not distributed. Controlled and endorsed copies can be found at the
following web site: http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx

Copy may be freely downloaded from the web site, or by emailing APANPIRG through the ICAO Asia
and Pacific Regional Office who will send a copy by return email.

1.4 CHANGES TO THE AIGD

Whenever a user identifies a need for a change to this document, a Request for Change (RFC) Form (see
Section 1.6 below) should be completed and submitted to the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office.
The Regional Office will collate RFCs for consideration by the Surveillance Implementation
Coordination Group.

When an amendment has been agreed by a meeting of the Surveillance Implementation Coordination
Group then a new version of the AIGD will be prepared, with the changes marked by an “|” in the
margin, and an endnote indicating the relevant RFC, so a reader can see the origin of the change. If the
change is in a table cell, the outside edges of the table will be highlighted; e.g.:

Final approval for publication of an amendment to the AIGD will be the responsibility of APANPIRG.

1.5 EDITING CONVENTIONS

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1.6 AIGD REQUEST FOR CHANGE FORM

RFC Nr:

Please use this form when requesting a change to any part of this AIGD. This form may be photocopied
as required, emailed, faxed or e-mailed to ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office
+66 (2) 537-8199 or APAC@icao.int

1. SUBJECT:

2. REASON FOR CHANGE:

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL: [expand / attach additional pages if necessary]

4. REFERENCE(S):
5. PERSON INITIATING: DATE:
ORGANISATION:
TEL/FA/X/E-MAIL:

6. CONSULTATION RESPONSE DUE BY DATE:

Organization Name Agree/Disagree Date

7. ACTION REQUIRE :
8. AIGD EDITOR DATE REC’D :
9. FEEDBACK PASSED DATE :

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1.7 AMENDMENT RECORD

Amendment Date Amended by Comments

Number
0.1 24 December 2004 W. Blythe Modified draft following contributions
H. Anderson from ADS-B SITF Working Group
members. Incorporated to TF/3 Working
Paper #3.
0.2 (1.0) 24 March 2005 H. Anderson Final draft prepared at ADS-B SITF WG/3

0.3 (1.1) 03 June 2005 Nick King Amendments following SASP WG/WHL
meeting of May 2005
0.4 15 July 2005 CNS/MET SG/9 Editorial changes made

1.0 26 August 2005 APANPIRG/16 Adopted as the first Edition

2.0 25 August 2006 Proposed by Adopted as the second Edition

ADS-B SITF/5
and adopted by
APANPIRG/17
3.0 7 September 2007 Proposed by Adopted as the second amendment (3rd
ADS-B SITF/6 edition)
and adopted by
APANPIRG/18
4.0 5 September 2011 Proposed by Adopted amendment on consequential
ADS-B SITF/10 change to the Flight Plan and additional
and adopted by material on the reliability and availability
APANPIRG/22 for ADS-B ground system
5.0 14 September 2012 Proposed by Included sample template on harmonization
ADS-B SITF/11 framework
and adopted by
APANPIRG/23
6.0 June 2013 Proposed by Revamped to include the latest ADS-B
ADS-B SITF/12 developments and references to guidance
and adopted by materials on ADS-B implementation
APANPIRG/24
7.0 September 2014 Proposed by (i) Included guidance materials on
ADS-B SITF/13 monitoring and analysis of ADS-B
and adopted by equipped aircraft
APANPIRG/25 (ii) Included guidance materials on
synergy between GNSS and ADS-B
(iii) Revised ATC Phraseology
(iv) Included clarification on Flight
Planning
8.0 September 2015 Proposed by (i) Updated the guidance materials on
ADS-B SITF/14 monitoring and analysis of ADS-B
and adopted by equipped aircraft
APANPIRG/26 (ii) Updated the categories of reported
ADS-B avionics problems
(iii) Updated the guidance materials on
ADS-B flight plan
(iv) Updated the guidance materials on
disabling ADS-B transmissions
(v) Remove reference to operational

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approval for use of ADS-B Out by

ATC

9.0 September 2016 Proposed by (i) Included a list of additional functional

ADS-B SITF/15 requirements for ADS-B integration
and adopted by (ii) Addition of a checklist of common
APANPIRG/27 items or parameters for monitoring of
ADS-B System
(iii) Amendment to emphasize the issue on
potential incorrect processing of DO-
260B downlinks by ADS-B ground
stations during upgrade
(iv) Updated the list of known ADS-B
avionics problems
(v) Included a general recommendation of
technical solution on acquisition of
Mode 3/A code information via Mode
S downlink for DO-260 aircraft in
ADS-B implementation with Mode
A/C SSR environment

10.0 June 2017 Proposed by (i) Updated “B787 position error with
SURICG/2 good NUC” in the list of known ADS-
B avionics problems.
(ii) Included new problem type “Incorrect
Ground Bit Setting in ADS-B
Avionics Downlink Data” and “A350
ADS-B on-ground performance” in
the list of known ADS-B avionics
problems.
(iii) Amendment to the template for ADS-
B Mandate / Regulations for Aircraft
Avionics.
(iv) Included a general recommendation to
use ADS-B in overcoming the
limitations of Mode A/C radar
technology.
(v) Included a general recommendation on
carrying out ICAO Aircraft Address
Monitoring
(vi) Aligned to replace NACp for NAC
throughout the document
(vii) Aligned to use ICAO Aircraft Address
throughout the document

11.0 April 2018 Proposed by (i) Editorial Updates – including

SURICG/3 /replacing ADS-B SITF with SURICG
(Sections 1, 1.4, 2.1, 7.5.1, 7.5.5,
7.5.6, 7.6, 7.8.2)
(ii) Correction of HPL Definition (Section
2.2)
(iii) Update of reference documents as in
Attachment 2 of WP/02
(iv) Include reference to APRD (Section

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7.5.1)
(v) Update of sample regulations (Section
9.2)
(vi) Update in Position Reporting
Performance (Section 9.3.2)
(vii) Update in GNSS Integrity Prediction
Service (Section 9.3.3)
(viii) Update name of RASMAG in
Sharing of ADS-B Data (Section
9.3.4)
(ix) Clarification of reporting rate
requirements (Section 9.4.1)
(x) Use of Ident during ADS-B
emergencies.(Section 9.12)
(xi) Appendix 1 missing from Version 10
– reinstate.
(xii) Appendix 2 – update for available
APRD.
(xiii) Update to B787 service bulletin
status. (Attachment A in Appendix 2)
(xiv) replace "Date UTC" to "Start
Time/Date UTC", replace "Time
UTC" to "End Time/Date UTC" and
related contents in the Report Form
(Section 7.8.1)
(xv) replace description of "Date UTC" as
"UTC Time/Date when the event
occurred", replace description of
"Time UTC" as "UTC Time/Date
when the event ended" as sometimes
the problem will lasts across mid-
night. (Section 7.8.2)
(xvi) In Remote Control & Monitoring
(RCMS) part, suggest to replace
"ASTERIX Output Load" to
"ASTERIX Output Load and Link
Status" (Appendix 5)
(xvii) Update on DO260A EMG issue
(Section 9.12)
(xviii) Update the link to the Guidance
Material on generation, processing and
sharing of ASTERIX (Section 4)
(xix) Reference to Space based ADS-B
and ATC automation as in WP12 is
added under 5.1.4.4.6
(xx) Updated Section 4Managing the
Problem in Appendix 2 to incorporate
the General mechanism and procedure
for blacklisting aircraft
(xxi) Updated the Attachment A to
Appendix 2 – List of known ADS-B
avionics problems
(xxii) Added Appendix 6 – Baseline
ADS-B Service Performance
Parameters

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(xxiii) Added Appendix 7 – Guidance

Material on Generation, Processing
and Sharing of ASTERIX Category 21
ADS-B Messages

12.0 April 2019 Proposed by (i) Added procedures on handling GPS

SURICG/4 time and week counters rollover
(Section 9.13)

(ii) Added two new problem types to

Attachment A of Appendix 2 “List of
known ADS-B avionics problems”,
including:

o Rockwell TSS-4100 Geometric

Altitude Reporting as Pressure
Altitude
o Improper NACv reporting

(iii) Updated the status of known ADS-B

avionics problems in Attachment A of
Appendix 2 “List of known ADS-B
avionics problems”, including:

o B787 position error with good NIC

o Rockwell TSS-4100 track
extrapolation issue
o Embraer 170 track jumping issue
o Airbus Single Aisle production
wiring issue
o Boeing 777-300ER production
wiring issue

13.0 September 2020 Proposed by (i) Updated the status of known ADS-B
SURICG/5 avionics problems in Attachment A of
Appendix 2 “List of known ADS-B
avionics problems”, including B787
NACv = 0 Issue

(ii) Updated Section 5.1.4.5.1 on ICAO

Aircraft Address Monitoring

(iii) Added the following new sections:

o Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface

Movement (Section 9.3.6)

o 1090 Mhz Spectrum and 24-bit

Aircraft Address Issue with
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
(Section 9.3.7)

o Measures for Enhancing the

Security of ADS-B (Section 10.3)

o Time Difference of Arrival

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(TDOA) Based Position

Verification Method (Section
10.3.1)
14.0 August 2021 Proposed by (i) Added the following new issue to the
SURICG/6 “List of known ADS-B avionics
problems” in Attachment A of
Appendix 2

o Honeywell Primus II RCZ Issue

15.0 May 2022 Proposed by (i) Added Section 9.3.8 on

SURICG/7 Methodologies to Avoid or Reduce
1090 MHz Congestion

(ii) Added Section 10.3.2 on Appropriate

Implementation of a Decoding Method
of CPR

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2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS

2.1 ACRONYM LIST

ACID Aircraft Identification

ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Contract
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
AIGD ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
AIT ADS-B Implementation Team
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
APANPIRG Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group
APRD ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database
ARINC Aeronautical Radio Incorporate
ATC Air Traffic Control (or Air Traffic Controller)
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
ATSP ATS Provider
ATSU ATS unit
CNS Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CDTI Cockpit Display Traffic Information
DAIW Danger Area Infringement Warning
FIR Flight Information Region
FLTID Flight Identification
FMS Flight Management System
FOM Figure of Merit used in ASTERIX messaging
GPS Global Positioning System (USA)
HPL Horizontal Protection Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
MTCA Medium Term Conflict Alert
MTTR Mean Time To Restore
NACp Navigation Accuracy Category
NIC Navigation Integrity Category
PRS Problem Reporting System
RAI Restricted Area Intrusion
RAM Route Adherence Monitoring
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RFC Request for Change
RNP Required Navigation Performance
SIL Source Integrity Level
SITF Study and Implementation Task Force
STCA Short Term Conflict Alert
SURICG Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group

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2.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ADS-B In An ADS-B system feature that enables the display of

real time ADS-B tracks on a situation display in the
aircraft cockpit.
ADS-B Out An ADS-B system feature that enables the frequent
broadcast of accurate aircraft position and vector
data together with other information.
Asterix 21 Eurocontrol standard format for data message
exchange
FOM (Figure of Merit) A numeric value that is used to determine the
accuracy and integrity of associated position data.
HPL (Horizontal Position Limit) The containment radius within which the true
position of the aircraft will be found for 99.999% of
the time, or the probability indicated by the reported
SIL value (DO-260A/B).
NACp (Navigational Accuracy Category) Subfield used to announce the 95% accuracy limits
for the horizontal position data being broadcast.
NIC (Navigational Integrity Category) Subfield used to specify the containment radius
integrity associated with horizontal position data.
NUCp ( Navigation Uncertainty Category) A numeric value that announces the integrity of the
associated horizontal position data being broadcast.
SIL (Source Integrity Level) Subfield used to specify the probability of the true
position lying outside the containment radius defined
by NIC without being alerted.

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3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Id Name of the document Reference Date Origin Domain

1 Annex 2: Rules of the Air Tenth Edition July 2005 ICAO
Including
Amendment 43
dated 10/11/16
2 Annex 4: Aeronautical Chart Eleventh Edition July 2009 ICAO
including
Amendment 59
dated 10/11/16
3 Annex 10: Aeronautical Fifth Edition July 2014 ICAO
Telecommunications, Vol. IV –
Surveillance Radar and Collision
Avoidance Systems
4 Annex 11: Air Traffic Services Fourteenth Edition July 2016 ICAO

5 Annex 15: Aeronautical Fifteenth Edition July 2016 ICAO

Information Services
6 PAN-ATM (Doc 4444/ATM501) Sixteenth Edition November ICAO
2016
7 Air Traffic Services Planning First Edition 1984 ICAO
Manual (Doc 9426/AN924) including
Amendment 4
30/12/92
8 Manual on Airspace Planning First Edition 1998 ICAO
Methodology for the Determination including
of Separation Minima (Doc Amendment 1
9689/AN953) dated 30/8/02
9 Doc 9859 Safety Management Third Edition 2013 ICAO
Manual (SMM)

10 Technical Provisions for Mode S Second Edition 2012 ICAO

Services and Extended Squitter including
(Doc 9871/AN460) Amendment 1
dated 09/01/17
11 Aeronautical Surveillance Manual Second Edition 2017 ICAO
(Doc 9924)

12 ICAO Circular 326 AN/188 First Edition 2012 ICAO

“Assessment of ADS-B and
Multilateration Surveillance to
Support Air Traffic Services and
Guidelines for Implementation”.
13 Regional Supplementary Fifth Edition 2008 ICAO
Procedures (Doc 7030) including
Amendment 9
dated 25/04/14
14 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260 2000 RTCA
Standards (MOPS) for 1090 MHz September 13,
Automatic Dependent Surveillance 2000
– Broadcast (ADS-B) – including
Change 1 Change 1 to 2006
RTCA DO-260

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 ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document

June 27, 2006

15 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2003 RTCA

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended April 10, 2003
Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B)

Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2006

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Change 1
Squitter Automatic Dependent June 27, 2006
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Change 1

Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2006

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Change 2
Squitter Automatic Dependent December 13,
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 2006
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Change 2
16 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260B 2009 RTCA
Standards for 1090 MHz Extended December 2, 2009
Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services
(TIS-B)

Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260B 2011

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended December 13,
Squitter Automatic Dependent 2011
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Corrigendum 1

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4. ADS-B DATA

APANPIRG has decided to use 1090MHz Extended Squitter data link for ADS-B data exchange in the
Asia and Pacific Regions. In the longer term an additional link type may be required.

To ensure interoperability of ADS-B ground stations in the Asia Pacific (ASIA/PAC) Regions, during
the 16th APANPIRG Meeting held in August 2005, the ASTERIX Category 21 version 0.23 (V0.23)
which had incorporated DO260 standard was adopted as the baselined ADS-B data format for
deployment of ADS-B ground stations and sharing of ADS-B data in the ASIA/PAC Regions. At this
time, DO260A and DO260B standards were not defined.

This baselined version provides adequate information so that useful ATC operational services, including
aircraft separation, can be provided. V0.23 can be used with DO260, DO260A and DO260B ADS-B
avionics/ground stations to provide basic ATC operational services. However, V0.23 cannot fully
support the more advanced capabilities offered by DO260A and DO260B.

As the avionics standards changed through the different versions of DO260, the ADS-B ground station
processing also needed to change, so that downlinks received from aircraft would be correctly
interpreted in construction of the ASTERIX Category 21 messages. It is important that States with
“older generation” ADS-B ground stations designed to support DO260 or DO260A, take action to
upgrade to support the latest ADS-B avionics standard as well as the older standards. DO260B avionics
will become more common in the Asia Pacific region as the FAA and European ADS-B mandates for
2020 require this version.

States intending to implement ADS-B surveillance and share ADS-B data with others might consider to
adopt a more updated version of ASTERIX in order to make use of the advanced capabilities offered by
DO260A and DO260B compliant avionics.

A guidance material on generation, processing and sharing of ASTERIX Cat. 21 ADS-B messages is
provided at Appendix 7 for reference by States.

In this guidance material, the ADS-B data contained inside ASTERIX Cat 21 are classified as Group 1
(mandatory), Group 2 (Desirable) and Group 3 (Optional). It is required to transmit all data that are
operationally desirable (Group 2), when such data are received from the aircraft, in addition to the data
that are mandatory (Group 1) in ASTERIX messages. Whether Group 3 optional data will need to be
transmitted or not should be configurable on item-by-item basis within the ADS-B ground station
depending on specific operational needs.

It is considered necessary that all data that are mandatory in ASTERIX messages (i.e. Group 1 data
items) and operationally desirable (i.e. Group 2 data items) when such data are received from aircraft,
should be included in data sharing. In the event that the data have to be filtered, the list of optional data
items (i.e. Group 3 data items) needs to be shared will be subject to mutual agreement between the two
data sharing parties concerned.

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5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.1.1 Planning

There are a range of activities needed to progress ADS-B implementation from initial concept
level to operational use. This section addresses the issues of collaborative decision making,
system compatibility and integration, while the second section of this chapter provides a
checklist to assist States with the management of ADS-B implementation activities.

5.1.2 Implementation team to ensure international coordination

5.1.2.1 Any decision to implement ADS-B by a State should include consultation with the wider
ATM community. Moreover, where ADS-B procedures or requirements will affect
traffic transiting between states, the implementation should also be coordinated between
States and Regions, in order to achieve maximum benefits for airspace users and service
providers.

5.1.2.2 An effective means of coordinating the various demands of the affected organizations is
to establish an implementation team. Team composition may vary by State or Region,
but the core group responsible for ADS-B implementation planning should include
members with multidiscipline operational expertise from affected aviation disciplines,
with access to other specialists where required.

5.1.2.3 Ideally, such a team should comprise representatives from the ATS providers, regulators
and airspace users, as well as other stakeholders likely to be influenced by the
introduction of ADS-B, such as manufacturers and military authorities. All identified
stakeholders should participate as early as possible in this process so that their
requirements can be identified prior to the making of schedules or contracts.

5.1.2.4 The role of the implementation team is to consult widely with stakeholders, identify
operational needs, resolve conflicting demands and make recommendations to the
various stakeholders managing the implementation. To this end, the implementation
team should have appropriate access to the decision-makers.

5.1.3 System compatibility

5.1.3.1 ADS-B has potential use in almost all environments and operations and is likely to
become a mainstay of the future ATM system. In addition to traditional radar-like
services, it is likely that ADS-B will also be used for niche application where radar
surveillance is not available or possible. The isolated use of ADS-B has the potential to
foster a variety of standards and practices that, once expanded to a wider environment,
may prove to be incompatible with neighbouring areas.

5.1.3.2 Given the international nature of aviation, special efforts should be taken to ensure
harmonization though compliance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs). The choice of systems to support ADS-B should consider not only the
required performance of individual components, but also their compatibility with other
CNS systems and prevailing avionics standards.

5.1.3.3 The future concept of ATM encompasses the advantages of interoperable and seamless
transition across flight information region (FIR) boundaries and, where necessary, ADS-

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B implementation teams should conduct simulations, trials and cost/benefit analysis to

support these objectives.

5.1.4 Integration

5.1.4.1 ADS-B implementation plans should include the development of both business and
safety cases. The adoption of any new CNS system has major implications for service
providers, regulators and airspace users and special planning should be considered for
the integration of ADS-B into the existing and foreseen CNS/ATM system. The
following briefly discusses each element.

5.1.4.2 Communication system

5.1.4.2.1 The communication system is an essential element within CNS. An air

traffic controller can now monitor an aircraft position in real time using
ADS-B where previously only voice position reports were available.
However, a communication system that will support the new services
that result from the improved surveillance may be necessary.
Consequently, there is an impact of the ongoing ADS-B related work on
the communication infrastructure developments.

5.1.4.3 Navigation system infrastructure

5.1.4.3.1 ADS-B is dependent upon the data obtained from a navigation system
(typically GNSS), in order to enable its functions and performance.
Therefore, the navigation infrastructure should fulfill the corresponding
requirements of the ADS-B application, in terms of:

a) Data items; and

b) Performance (e.g. accuracy, integrity, availability etc.).

5.1.4.3.2 This has an obvious impact on the navigation system development,

which evolves in parallel with the development of the surveillance
system.

5.1.4.4 Other surveillance infrastructure

5.1.4.4.1 ADS-B may be used to supplement existing surveillance systems or as the

principal source of surveillance data. Ideally, surveillance systems will
incorporate data from ADS-B and other sources to provide a coherent
picture that improves both the amount and utility of surveillance data to the
user. The choice of the optimal mix of data sources will be defined on the
basis of operational demands, available technology, safety and cost-benefit
considerations.

5.1.4.4.2 ADS-B is one of the cost-effective means in complementing and

overcoming limitations of Mode A/C radars, including false targets, aircraft
positions temporarily not displayed and split tracks, which could cause
aircraft display issues on radar screens for ATC irrespective of brands of Air
Traffic Management System being used. Within busy airspace, aircraft
could be managed at close lateral distance while vertically separated. In
such situation, Mode A/C radars sometimes provide garbled detection, in
the form of false targets due to overlapping replies from two or more aircraft.
In the case of ADS-B, ADS-B data are broadcast in an omni-directional,

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random and periodic intervals without suffering from the same issue. In
addition, automatic data validation is usually done at ADS-B receivers to
ensure integrity of ADS-B information received from the aircraft.

5.1.4.4.3 A guidance material on issues to be considered in ATC multi-sensor fusion

processing including integration of ADS-B data is provided on the ICAO
website http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx for reference by
States.

5.1.4.4.4 Acquisition of Mode 3/A code for DO-260 aircraft through Mode S
downlink

There is a potential problem for some of the air traffic management systems
(ATMS) for fusion of ADS-B targets with Mode A/C SSR targets, because
a common identifier to the aircraft, Mode 3/A code, is not available through
ADS-B. Then ATMS can only rely on proximity analysis of aircraft position
and Mode C altitude to determine whether detections from two distinct
types of surveillance sources belong to the same aircraft. This matching
technique might introduce ambiguity in associating ADS-B with Mode A/C
SSR targets for fused display.

States may consider enhancing their ADS-B ground stations to listen to

Downlink Format 5 and 21 (DF 5 and 21) of Mode S interrogation replies
which carry the Mode 3/A code of the same aircraft. As a result, ADS-B
target reports of the same DO-260 aircraft can be filled with Mode 3/A code
acquired from Mode S downlink to facilitate matching with Mode A/C SSR
targets before transmitting to the ATMS.

The transmission of DF 5 and DF 21 messages from a Mode S aircraft

requires to be triggered by ground-based Mode S interrogators, either
through active or passive interrogation. For active interrogation, Mode S
interrogators can be installed alongside with ADS-B ground stations for
actively triggering DF 5 and DF 21 messages transmission from the aircraft.
The interrogators shall follow ICAO standard to perform periodic all-call
and roll-call to the aircraft in range. For passive interrogation, the ADS-B
ground stations will only passively listen to the DF messages from the
aircraft for acquiring the Mode 3/A code. It is required to ensure that Mode
S interrogations are performed by external systems, such as A-SMGCS,
MLAT system or Mode S radar under their coverage.

The above provides an interim solution during transition from Mode A/C
SSR to Mode S SSR. After upgrading to Mode S SSR, ATMS can have an
alternative means to make use of Flight ID or ICAO Aircraft Address to
perform association between ADS-B and Mode S radar targets without
ambiguity.

5.1.4.4.5 A guidance material on processing and displaying of ADS-B data at air

traffic controller positions is provided on the ICAO website
“http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by States.

5.1.4.4.6 Most of the ATC automation systems that support terrestrial ADS-B will
also support space-based ADS-B without modifications. For more guidance,
reference can be made to WP/12 on "ATC Automation Requirement and
Space-based ADS-B" delivered during 3rd meeting of the SURICG.

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5.1.4.5 Additional Functional Requirements for ADS-B Integration

5.1.4.5.1 The following list of functions could be considered by each individual

States to see whether they are suitable for their own operational needs or
applicable to local environment from ADS-B integration point of view:

▪ The priority of ADS-B sensor position data vs radar data could be

adaptable;

▪ For ADS-B aircraft, receipt of the Mode S conspicuity code could

trigger use of the Flight ID / ICAO Aircraft Address for flight plan
correlation;

▪ If, due to sensor or aircraft capability limitation, no SSR code is received

for an aircraft, the system could use Flight ID/ ICAO Aircraft Address
for track correlation;

▪ For correlation based on Flight ID, the received ID could exactly match
the ACID of the flight plan;

▪ For correlation based on ICAO Aircraft Address, the received address

could match the address entered in the flight plan item 18 CODE/
keyword;

▪ The system could generate an alert for a correlated flight for which the
Flight ID from the track does not match the flight plan ACID and/or the
ICAO Aircraft Address from the track does not match the code given in
the flight plan Item 18 CODE/ keyword;

▪ The system could allow the setting of ADS-B above or below the radar
sources within the Surveillance Data Processor Tile Set on a per-tile
basis;

▪ Priority could only apply to data received at or above the adapted NUCp,
NACp, NIC, and/or SIL thresholds;

▪ The system could be configurable to either discard ADS-B data or

display the track with an indication of ADS-B degradation if the
received NUCp, NACp, NIC, or SIL is below an adapted threshold;

▪ If the system is configured to display the degraded track, the degraded

position and status could only be displayed if there are no other
surveillance sources available;

▪ The system could allow the adaptation of ADS-B emergency codes to

map to special Mnemonics;

▪ The system could include an adaptable Downlinked Aircraft Parameters

(DAP) field that invokes a popup with the following information from
Mode-S and ADS-B aircraft:

- Magnetic Heading
- True Track Angle

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- Indicated Airspeed/Mach Number

- Groundspeed
- Track Angle Rate
- True Airspeed
- Roll Angle
- Selected Altitude
- Vertical Rate

▪ The system could generate a conformance alert if the Selected Altitude

and the Cleared Flight Level do not match.

▪ The system could monitor 1 the ICAO Aircraft Address of individual

aircraft and generate alert for the following cases:
- ICAO Aircraft Address does not match with that specified in
flight planICAO Aircraft Address is all 0 or F (expressed in
hexadecimal)
- ICAO Aircraft Address is not defined in ICAO’s allocation
- Duplicate ICAO Aircraft Address detected within single sensor
in the same time-frame
- Duplicate ICAO Aircraft Address detected within multi-sensors
in the same time-frameICAO Aircraft Address changes during
the flight
- Aircrafts whose state identification number is not match with
the state information registered in its flight plan
- Aircrafts whose state identification number is not defined in
SARPs (Annex 10)
- Mode-S transponder of which P4 pulse was not detected
- Mode-A/C transponder replied to Mode-S all call

5.1.5 Coverage Predictions

5.1.5.1 Reliable and robust analysis and planning of ADS-B coverage to support seamless
ATM initiative requires accurate and reliable coverage modelling. States should ensure
that surveillance engineering/technical teams are provided with modelling tools to
provide accurate and reliable coverage predictions for ATM planning and analysis.

1
Monitoring could be done by ATM system or other systems of the States/Administration

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5.2 IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST

5.2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this implementation checklist is to document the range of activities that needs to be
completed to bring an ADS-B application from an initial concept to operational use. This checklist may
form the basis of the terms of reference for an ADS-B implementation team, although some activities
may be specific to individual stakeholders. An example of the checklist used by AirServices Australia is
given at Appendix 1.

5.2.2 Activity Sequence

The activities are listed in an approximate sequential order. However, each activity does not have to be
completed prior to starting the next activity. In many cases, a parallel and iterative process should be
used to feed data and experience from one activity to another. It should be noted that not all activities
will be required for all applications.

5.2.3 Concept Phase

a) construct operational concept:

1) purpose;
2) operational environment;
3) ATM functions; and
4) infrastructure;

b) identify benefits:

1) safety enhancements;
2) efficiency;
3) capacity;
4) environmental;
5) cost reductions;
6) access; and
7) other metrics (e.g. predictability, flexibility, usefulness);

c) identify constraints:

1) pair-wise equipage;
2) compatibility with non-equipped aircraft;
3) need for exclusive airspace;
4) required ground infrastructure;
5) RF spectrum;
6) integration with existing technology; and
7) technology availability;

d) prepare business case:

1) cost benefit analysis; and

2) demand and justification.

5.2.4 Design Phase

a) identify operational requirements:

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1) security; and
2) systems interoperability;

b) identify human factors issues:

1) human-machine interfaces;
2) training development and validation;
3) workload demands;
4) role of automation vs. role of human;
5) crew coordination/pilot decision-making interactions; and
6) ATM collaborative decision-making;

c) identify technical requirements:

1) standards development;
2) prevailing avionics standards;
3) data required;
4) functional processing;
5) functional performance; and
6) required certification levels;

d) equipment development, test, and evaluation:

1) prototype systems built to existing or draft standards/specifications;

2) developmental bench and flight tests; and
3) acceptance test parameters; and
4) select and procure technology;

e) develop procedures:

1) pilot and controller actions and responsibilities;

2) phraseologies;
3) separation/spacing criteria and requirements;
4) controller’s responsibility to maintain a monitoring function, if appropriate;
5) contingency procedures;
6) emergency procedures; and
7) develop AIP and Information documentation

f) prepare design phase safety case:

1) safety rationale;
2) safety budget and allocation; and
3) functional hazard assessment.

5.2.5 Implementation phase

a) prepare implementation phase safety case;

b) conduct operational test and evaluation:

1) flight deck and ATC validation simulations; and

2) flight tests and operational trials;

c) obtain systems certification:

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1) aircraft equipment; and

2) ground systems;

d) obtain regulatory approvals:

1) air traffic certification of use;

e) implementation transition:

1) Promulgate procedures and deliver training

2) continue data collection and analysis;
3) resolve any unforeseen issues; and
4) continue feedback into standards development processes;

f) performance monitoring to ensure that the agreed performance is maintained.

5.2.5.1 Once the implementation project is complete, ongoing maintenance and upgrading of
both ADS-B operations and infrastructure should continue to be monitored, through
the appropriate forums.

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6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 BACKGROUND

6.1.1 It is obvious that full benefits of ADS-B will only be achieved by its harmonized
implementation and seamless operations. During the 6th meeting of ADS-B SEA/WG in
February 2011, Hong Kong, China initiated to strengthen collaboration among
concerned States/Administrations for harmonized ADS-B implementation and seamless
operations along two ATS routes L642 and M771 with major traffic flow (MTF). An
ad-hoc workgroup comprising concerned CAAs/ANSPs from Hong Kong, China,
Mainland China, Vietnam and Singapore was subsequently formed to elaborate and
agree on a framework regarding implementation timelines, avionics standards, optimal
flight levels, and ATC and engineering handling procedures. As a coherent effort, ADS-B
implementation along ATS routes L642 and M771 has been harmonized while Hong
Kong, China and Singapore have published respective Aeronautical Information
Circulars and Airworthiness Notices on ADS-B mandates for these two routes with
effect on 12 December 2013.

6.1.2 It is considered that the above implementation framework for ATS routes L642/M771
would serve as a useful template for extension to other high density routes to harmonize
ADS-B implementation. Paragraph 6.2 shows the detailed framework.

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6.2 TEMPLATE OF HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION

Harmonization Framework for ADS-B Implementation along ATS Routes L642 and M771

No. What to harmonize What was agreed Issue / what needs to be further
discussed
1 Mandate Effective Singapore (SG), Hong Kong (HK), China (Sanya) :
12 Dec 2013
Vietnam (VN) : to be confirmed

2 ATC Operating Procedures No need to harmonize Refer to SEACG for consideration of the
impact of expanding ADS-B surveillance
on ATC Operating Procedures including
Large Scale Weather procedures.

3 Mandate Publish Date No need to harmonize To publish equipment requirements as

early as possible.

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4 Flight Level SG, HK, CN :

- At or Above FL290 (ADS-B airspace)
- Below FL290 (Non-ADS-B airspace)

VN to be confirmed

5 Avionics Standard (CASA/AMC2024) SG - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 ADS-B Task Force agreed that DO260B
HK - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 will be accepted as well.
VN - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165
CN - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 SG, HK, and CN agreed their ADS-B GS
will accept DO260, DO260A and
DO260B by 1 July 2014 (Note 1)

6 Flight Planning Before 15 Nov 2012, as per AIGD

On or after 15 Nov 2012, as per new flight plan
format

7 Aircraft Equippage
7a) Procedures if Aircraft Not Equipped or SG, HK, CN : FL280 and Below
Aircraft without a Serviceable ADS-B VN to be confirmed
Transmitting Equipment before Flight

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7b) Aircraft Equipped but Transmitting Bad For known aircraft, treat as non ADS-B aircraft. Share blacklisted aircraft among

Data (Blacklisted Aircraft) concerned States/Administration

8 Contingency Plan

8a) Systemic Failure such as Ground System Revert back to current procedure.

/ GPS Failure

8b) Avionics Failure or Equipped Aircraft Provide other form of separation, subject to bilateral Address the procedure for aircraft

Transmitting Bad Data in Flight agreement. transiting from radar to ADS-B airspace

From radar/ADS-B environment to ADS-B only and from ADS-B to ADS-B airspace.

environment, ATC coordination may be able to

provide early notification of ADS-B failure.

9 Commonly Agreed Route Spacing SEACG Need for commonly agreed minimal in-

trail spacing throughout.

Note 1: Also included two ADS-B GS supplied by Indonesia at Matak and Natuna

______________

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7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The Communications, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) environment
is an integrated system including physical systems (hardware, software, and communication networks),
human elements (pilots, controllers and engineers), and the operational procedures for its applications.
ADS-B is a surveillance system that may be integrated with other surveillance technologies or may also
operate as an independent source for surveillance monitoring within the CNS/ATM system.

Because of the integrated nature of such system and the degree of interaction among its components,
comprehensive system monitoring is recommended. The procedures described in this section aim to
ensure system integrity by validation, identification, reporting and tracking of possible problems
revealed during system monitoring with appropriate follow-up actions.

These procedures do not replace the ATS incident reporting procedures and requirements, as specified in
PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), Appendix 4; ICAO’s Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Doc 9426),
Chapter 3; or applicable State regulations, affecting the reporting responsibilities of parties directly
involved in a potential ATS incident.

7.2 PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING

Prior to operating any element of the ADS-B system, operational and technical personnel shall undertake
appropriate training as determined by the States, including compliance with the Convention on
International Civil Aviation where applicable.

Notwithstanding the above requirement and for the purposes of undertaking limited trials of the
ADS-B system, special arrangements may be agreed between the operator and an Air Traffic Services
Unit (ATSU).

7.3 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR AN ATC SEPARATION SERVICE

A number of States have introduced ADS-B for the provision of Air Traffic Services, including for
surveillance separation. The ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel (SASP) has completed
assessment on the suitability of ADS-B for various applications including provision of aircraft separation
based on comparison of technical characteristics between ADS-B and monopulse secondary surveillance
radar. It is concluded that that ADS-B surveillance is better or at least no worse than the referenced
radar, and can be used to provide separation minima as described in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444) whether
ADS-B is used as a sole means of ATC surveillance or used together with radar, subject to certain
conditions to be met. The assessment result is detailed in the ICAO Circular 326 AN/188 “Assessment
of ADS-B and Multilateration Surveillance to Support Air Traffic Services and Guidelines for
Implementation”.

Regarding the use of ADS-B in complex airspace (as discussed in ICAO Circular 326), complex airspace
may be considered to be airspace with the following characteristics:

- Higher aircraft density

- Higher route crossing point density
- A higher mixture of different aircraft performance levels
- A higher rate of aircraft manoeuvring (as distinct from straight and level flight).

The following recommendations need to be considered:

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1. Whether complex or not, States are urged to consider whether the current or required
surveillance system performance is better, equivalent or worse than the SASP reference.

2. If the current or required surveillance system used by a State is lower or equivalent in

performance than the reference MSSR used in Circular 326 Appendix A, then that State may use
the Appendix C performance criteria.

3. If the current or required surveillance system used by a State is higher performance than the
reference MSSR used in Circular 326 Appendix A, then the State must ensure that the ADS-B
system achieves the more demanding performance.

4. State should undertake, in all cases, a safety assessment that ensures that any additional risks
and safety requirements already identified for the airspace where ADSB or MLAT is to be
implemented, or any newly identified risks, are effectively controlled and risk is reduced to an
acceptable level.

States intending to introduce ADS-B separation minima shall comply with provisions of PANS-ATM,
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030) and Annex 11 paragraph 3.4.1. States should adopt the
guidelines contained in this document unless conformance with
PANS-ATM specifications requires change.

7.4 ATC SYSTEM VALIDATION

7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines

To meet system integrity requirements, States should conduct a validation process that confirms
the integrity of their equipment and procedures. Such processes shall include:

a) A system safety assessment for new implementations is the basis for definitions of
system performance requirements. Where existing systems are being modified to utilize
additional services, the assessment demonstrates that the ATS Provider’s system will
meet safety objectives;

b) Integration test results confirming interoperability for operational use of airborne and
ground systems; and

c) Confirmation that the ATS Operation Manuals are compatible with those of adjacent
providers where the system is used across a common boundary.

7.4.2 System safety assessment

The objective of the system safety assessment is to ensure the State that introduction and
operation of ADS-B is safe. This can be achieved through application of the provisions of Annex
11 paragraph 2.27 and PANS-ATM Chapter 2. The safety assessment should be conducted for
initial implementation as well as any future enhancements and should include:

a) Identifying failure conditions;

b) Assigning levels of criticality;

c) Determining risks/ probabilities for occurrence;

d) Identifying mitigating measures and fallback arrangements;

e) Categorising the degree of acceptability of risks; and

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f) Operational hazard ID process.

Following the safety assessment, States should institute measures to offset any identified failure
conditions that are not already categorized as acceptable. This should be done to reduce the
probability of their occurrence to a level as low as reasonably practicable. This could be
accomplished through system automation or manual procedures.

Guidance material on building a safety case for delivery of an ADS-B separation service is
provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for
reference by States.

7.4.3 Integration test

States should conduct trials with suitably equipped aircraft to ensure they meet the operational
and technical requirements to provide an ATS. Alternatively, they may be satisfied by test
results and analysis conducted by another State or organization deemed competent to provide
such service. Where this process is followed, the tests conducted by another State or
organization should be comparable (i.e. using similar equipment under similar conditions). Refer
also to the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation
Minima (Doc9689).

7.4.4 ATS Operation Manuals

States should coordinate with adjacent States to confirm that their ATS Operation Manuals
contain standard operating procedures to ensure harmonization of procedures that impact across
common boundaries.

7.4.5 ATS System Integrity

With automated ATM systems, data changes, software upgrades, and system failures can affect
adjacent units. States shall ensure that:

a) A conservative approach is taken to manage any changes to the system;

b) Aircrew, aircraft operating companies and adjacent ATSU(s) are notified of any planned
system changes in advance, where that system is used across a common boundary;

c) ATSUs have verification procedures in place to ensure that following any system
changes, displayed data is both correct and accurate;

d) In cases of system failures or where upgrades (or downgrades) or other changes may
impact surrounding ATS units, ATSUs should have a procedure in place for timely
notification to adjacent units. Such notification procedures will normally be detailed in
Letters of Agreement between adjacent units; and

e) ADS-B surveillance data is provided with equal to or better level of protection and
security than existing surveillance radar data.

7.5 SYSTEM MONITORING

During the initial period of implementation of ADS-B technology, routine collection of data is necessary
in order to ensure that the system continues to meet or exceed its performance, safety and
interoperability requirements, and that operational service delivery and procedures are working as
intended. The monitoring program is a two-fold process. Firstly, summarised statistical data should be

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produced periodically showing the performance of the system. This is accomplished through ADS-B
Periodic Status Reports. Secondly, as problems or abnormalities arise, they should be identified,
tracked, analyzed and corrected and information disseminated as required, utilizing the ADS-B Problem
Report.

Guidance materials on monitoring and analysis of ADS-B Avionics Performance are given at
Appendix 2. Checklist of common items or parameters that could be considered for monitoring is
summarized at Appendix 5 for reference.

7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS)

The Problem Reporting System is tasked with the collection, storage and regular dissemination
of data based on reports received from SURICG members. The PRS tracks problem reports and
publish information from those reports to SURICG members. Problem resolution is the
responsibility of the appropriate SURICG members.

The PRS Administrator shall:

a) prepare consolidated problem report summaries for each SURICG meeting;

b) collect and consolidate ADS-B Problem Reports; and

c) maintain a functional website (with controlled access) to manage the problem reporting
function.

The PRS is managed through the Asia Pacific ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting
Database (APRD) which is accessible to authorized users via
https://applications.icao.int/ADSB-APRD/login.aspx.

7.5.2 The monitoring process

When problems or abnormalities are discovered, the initial analysis should be performed by the
organization(s) identifying the problem. In addition, a copy of the problem report should be
entered in to the PRS which will assign a tracking number. As some problems or abnormalities
may involve more than one organization, the originator should be responsible for follow-up
action to rectify the problem and forward the information to the PRS. It is essential that all
information relating to the problem is documented and recorded and resolved in a timely
manner.

The following groups should be involved in the monitoring process and problem tracking to
ensure a comprehensive review and analysis of the collected data:

a) ATS Providers;

b) Organizations responsible for ATS system maintenance (where different from the ATS
provider);

c) Relevant State regulatory authorities;

d) Communication Service Providers being used;

e) Aircraft operators; and

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f) Aircraft and avionics manufacturers.

7.5.3 Distribution of confidential information

It is important that information that may have an operational impact on other parties be
distributed by the authorised investigator to all authorised groups that are likely to be affected, as
soon as possible. In this way, each party is made aware of problems already encountered by
others, and may be able to contribute further information to aid in the solution of these problems.
The default position is that all states agree to provide the data which will be de-identified for
reporting and record keeping purposes.

7.5.4 ADS-B problem reports

Problem reports may originate from many sources, but most will fall within two categories;
reports based on observation of one or more specific events, or reports generated from the
routine analysis of data. The user would document the problem, resolve it with the appropriate
party and forward a copy of the report to the PRS for tracking and distribution. While one
occurrence may appear to be an isolated case, the receipt of numerous similar reports by the PRS
could indicate that an area needs more detailed analysis.

To effectively resolve problems and track progress, the problem reports should be sent to the
nominated point of contact at the appropriate organization and the PRS. The resolution of the
identified problems may require:

a) Re-training of system operators, or revision of training procedures to ensure compliance

with existing procedures;

b) Change to operating procedures;

c) Change to system requirements, including performance and interoperability; or

d) Change to system design.

7.5.5 ADS-B periodic status report

The ATS Providers should complete the ADS-B Periodic Status Report annually and deliver the
report to the regional meeting of the SURICG. The Periodic Status Report should give an
indication of system performance and identify any trend in system deficiencies, the resultant
operational implications, and the proposed resolution, if applicable.

Communications Service Providers, if used, are also expected to submit Periodic Status Reports
on the performance of the networks carrying ADS-B data at the annual regional meeting of the
SURICG. These reports could also contain the details of planned or current upgrades to the
network.

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7.5.6 Processing of Reports

Each group in the monitoring process should nominate a single point of contact for receipt of
problem reports and coordination with the other parties. This list will be distributed by the PRS
Administrator to all parties to the monitoring process.
Each State should establish mechanisms within its ATS Provider and regulatory authority to:

a) Assess problem reports and refer them to the appropriate technical or operational
expertise for investigation and resolution;

b) Coordinate with aircraft operators;

c) Develop interim operational procedures to mitigate the effects of problems until such
time as the problem is resolved;

d) Monitor the progress of problem resolution;

e) Prepare a report on problems encountered and their operational implications and forward
these to the PRS;

f) Prepare the ADS-B periodic status report at pre-determined times and forward these to
the Secretary of the annual meeting of the SURICG; and

g) Coordinate with any Communication Service Providers used.

7.6 APANPIRG

APANPIRG, with the assistance of its contributory bodies, shall oversee the monitoring process to
ensure the ADS-B system continues to meet its performance and safety requirements, and that
operational procedures are working as intended. The APANPIRG’S objectives are to:

a) review Periodic Status Reports and any significant Problem Reports;

b) highlight successful problem resolutions to SURICG members;

c) monitor the progress of outstanding problem resolutions;

d) prepare summaries of problems encountered and their operational implications; and

e) assess system performance based on information in the PRS and Periodic Status
Reports.

7.7 LOCAL DATA RECORDING AND ANALYSIS

7.7.1 Data recording

It is recommended that ATS Providers and Communication Service Providers retain the records
defined below for at least 30 days to allow for accident/incident investigation processes. These
records should be made available on request to the relevant State safety authority. Where data is
sought from an adjacent State, the usual State to State channels should be used.

These recordings shall be in a form that permits a replay of the situation and identification of the
messages that were received by the ATS system.

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7.7.2 Local data collection

ATS providers and communications service providers should identify and record ADS-B system
component failures that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of controlled flights or
compromise service continuity.

7.7.3 Avionics problem identification and correction

ATS providers need to develop systems to:

a) detect ADS-B avionics anomalies and faults

b) advise the regulators and where appropriate the aircraft operators on the detected
ADS-B avionics anomalies and faults

c) devise mechanisms and procedures to address identified faults

Regulators need to develop and maintain systems to ensure that appropriate corrective actions
are taken to address identified faults.

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7.8 ADS-B PROBLEM REPORT

7.8.1 Report Form

PRS #
Start Time/Date UTC End Time/Date UTC
Registration Aircraft ID

Flight ID ICAO Aircraft Address

Aircraft Type
Flight Sector/
Location
ATS Unit
Description / additional information

Originator Reference
Originator
number
Organization

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7.8.2 Description of Fields

Field Meaning
Number A unique identification number assigned by the PRS
Administrator to this problem report. Organizations writing problem reports
are encouraged to maintain their own internal list of these problems for
tracking purposes. Once the problems have been reported to the PRS and
incorporated in the database, a number will be assigned by the PRS and used
for tracking by the SURICG.
Start Time/Date UTC time/date when the event occurred.
UTC
End Time/Date UTC time/date when the event ended.
UTC
Registration Registration number (tail number) of the aircraft involved.
Aircraft ID (ACID) Coded equivalent of voice call sign as entered in FPL Item 7.
ICAO Aircraft Unique ICAO Aircraft Address expressed in Hexadecimal form (e.g.
Address 7432DB)
Flight ID (FLTID) The identification transmitted by ADS-B for display on a controller situation
display or a CDTI.
Flight The departure airport and destination airport for the sector being flown by the
Sector/Location aircraft involved in the event. These should be the ICAO identifiers of those
airports. Or if more descriptive, the location of the aircraft during the event.
Originator Point of contact at the originating organization for this report (usually the
author).
Aircraft Type The aircraft model involved.
Organization The name of the organization (airline, ATS provider or communications
service provider) that created the report.
ATS Unit ICAO identifier of the ATC Center or Tower controlling the aircraft at the
time of the event.
Description This should provide as complete a description of the situation leading up to
the problem as is possible. Where the organization reporting the problem is
not able to provide all the information (e.g. the controller may not know
everything that happens on the aircraft), it would be helpful if they would
coordinate with the other parties to obtain the necessary information.
The description should include:

• A complete description of the problem that is being reported

• The route contained in the FMS and flight plan
• Any flight deck indications
• Any indications provided to the controller when the problem
occurred
• Any additional information that the originator of the problem report
considers might be helpful but is not included on the list above

If necessary to contain all the information, additional pages may be added. if

the originator considers it might be helpful, diagrams and other additional
information (such as printouts of message logs) may be appended to the
report.

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7.9 ADS-B PERFORMANCE REPORT FORM

Originating Organization
Date of submission Originator
Report Period
TECHNICAL ISSUES

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

GENERAL COMMENTS

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8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

Reliability and Availability of ADS-B systems should normally be equivalent or better than the reliability
and availability of radar systems.

Guidance material on Reliability and Availability standards for ADS-B systems and supporting voice
communications systems are included in the document “Baseline ADS-B Service Performance
Parameters” at Appendix 6.

The “Baseline ADS-B Performance Parameters” document contains three Tiers of service performance
parameters with different reliability and availability standards for each Tier. The appropriate Tier should
be selected for the type of ADS-B service intended:

(a) Tier 1 standards are for a high performance traffic separation service;

(b) Tier 2 standards are for a traffic situational awareness service with procedural separation; and

(c) Tier 3 standards are for a traffic advisory service (flight information service)

To achieve high operational availability of ADS-B systems to support aircraft separation services, it is
necessary to operate with duplicated/redundant systems. If one system fails, the service continues using
an unduplicated system. This is acceptable for a short period, whilst the faulty system is being repaired,
because the probability of a second failure during the short time window of repairing is low.

However, it is necessary to ensure that the repair does not take too long. A long repair time increases the
risk of an unexpected failure (loss of service continuity); which in turn, introduces potential loss of
service (low availability) and loss of aircraft operational efficiency and/or safety impacts.

Checklist of common items or parameters that could be considered for monitoring is summarized at
Appendix 5 for reference.

8.1 Reliability

8.1.1 Reliability is a measure of how often a system fails and is usually measured as Mean
Time Between Failure (MTBF) expressed in hours. Continuity is a measure equivalent
to reliability, but expressed as the probability of system failure over a defined period. In
the context of this document, failure means inability to deliver ADS-B data to the ATC
centre. Ie: Failure of the ADS-B system rather than an equipment or component failure.

8.1.2 Poor system MTBF has a safety impact because typically it causes unexpected transition
from one operating mode to another. For example, aircraft within surveillance coverage
that are safely separated by a surveillance standard distance (say, 5 NM) are
unexpectedly no longer separated by a procedural standard distance (say 15 mins), due
to an unplanned surveillance outage.

8.1.3 In general, reliability is determined by design (see para 8.3 B below)

8.2 Availability

8.2.1 Availability is a measure of how often the system is available for operational use. It is
usually expressed as a percentage of the time that the system is available.

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8.2.2 Poor availability usually results in loss of economic benefit because efficiencies are not
available when the ATC system is operating in a degraded mode (eg using procedural
control instead of say 5 NM separation).

8.2.3 Planned outages are often included as outages because the efficiencies provided to the
Industry are lost, no matter what the cause of the outage. However, some organisations
do not include planned outages because it is assumed that planned outages only occur
when the facility is not required.

8.2.4 Availability is calculated as

Availability (Ao) = MTBF/(MTBF+MDT)

where MTBF= Mean Time Between SYSTEM Failure

MDT = Mean Down Time for the SYSTEM

The MDT includes Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), Turn Around Time (TAT) for
spares, and Mean Logistic Delay Time (MLDT)
NB: This relates to the failure of the system to provide a service, rather than the time
between individual equipment failures. Some organisations use Mean Time Between
Outage (MTBO) rather than MTBF.

8.2.5 Availability is directly a function of how quickly the SYSTEM can be repaired. Ie:
directly a function of MDT. Thus availability is highly dependent on the ability & speed
of the support organisation to get the system back on-line.

8.3 Recommendations for high reliability/availability ADS-B systems

A: System design can keep system failure rate low with long MTBF. Typical techniques are:
• to duplicate each element and minimise single points of failure. Automatic changeover or
parallel operation of both channels keeps system failure rates low. Ie: the system keeps
operating despite individual failures. Examples are :

o Separate communication channels between ADS-B ground station and ATC centre
preferably using different technologies or service providers eg one terrestrial and one
satellite

• Consideration of Human factors in design can reduce the number of system failures due to
human error. E.g. inadvertent switch off, incorrect software load, incorrect maintenance
operation.

• Take great care with earthing, cable runs and lightning protection to minimise the risks of
system damage

• Take great care to protect against water ingress to cables and systems

• Establish a system baseline that documents the achieved performance of the site that can be
later be used as a reference. This can shorten troubleshooting in future.

• System design can also improve the MDT by quickly identifying problems and alerting
maintenance staff. Eg Built in equipment test (BITE) can significantly contribute to lowering
MDT.

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B: Logistics strategy aims to keep MDT very low. Low MDT depends on logistic support
providing short repair times. To achieve short repair times, ANSPs usually provide a range
of logistics, including the following, to ensure that the outage is less than a few days:

• ensure the procured system is designed to allow for quick replacement of faulty modules to
restore operations
• provide remote monitoring to allow maintainers to identify the faulty modules for transport
to site
• provide support tools to allow technicians to repair faulty modules or to configure/setup
replacement modules
• provide technicians training to identify & repair the faulty modules
• provide local maintenance depots to reduce the time it takes to access to the site
• provide documentation and procedures to “standardise” the process
• use an in-country spares pool to ensure that replacement modules are available within
reasonable times
• use a maintenance contract to repair faulty modules within a specified turnaround time. I.e.:
to replenish the spares pool quickly.

Whilst technical training and remote monitoring are usually considered by ANSPs, sometimes
there is less focus on spares support.

Difficulties can be experienced if States :

a) Fail to establish a spares pool – because procurement of spares at the time of failure can
bring extensive delays due to :
b) obtaining funds
c) obtaining approval to purchase overseas
d) obtaining approval to purchase from a “sole source”
e) difficulties and delays in obtaining a quotation
f) delays in delivery because the purchase was unexpected by the supplier
g) Fail to establish a module repair contract resulting in :
- long repair times
- unplanned expenditure
- inability for a supplier to repair modules because the supplier did not have adequate
certainty of funding of the work

Spares pool
ANSPs can establish, preferably as part of their acquisition purchase, adequate spares buffer
stock to support the required repair times. The prime objective is to reduce the time period that
the system operates un-duplicated. It allows decoupling of the restoration time from the module
repair time.

Module repair contract

ANSPs can also enter into a maintenance repair contract, preferably as part of their acquisition
purchase, to require the supplier to repair or replace and deliver failed modules within a
specified time – preferably with contractual incentives/penalties for compliance. Such support
contracts are best negotiated as part of the acquisition contract when competition between
vendors is at play to keep costs down. Sometimes it is appropriate to demand that the support
contractor also keep a certain level of buffer stock of spares “in country”.

It is strongly recommended that maintenance support is purchased under the same contract as the

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acquisition contract.

The advantages of a module repair contract are:

- The price can be determined whilst in the competitive phase of acquisition –
hence avoids excessive costs
- The contract can include the supplier bearing all shipping costs
- Can be funded by a define amount per year, which support the budget
processes. If the costs are fixed, the supplier is encouraged to develop a
reliable system minimising module repairs.
- It avoids delays and funding issues at the time of the module failure

Other typical strategies are:

• Establish availability and reliability objectives that are agreed organization wide. In
particular agree System response times (SRT) for faults and system failure to ensure that
MDT is achieved. An agreed SRT can help organizations to decide on the required logistics
strategy including number, location and skills of staff to support the system.

• Establish baseline preventative maintenance regimes including procedures and performance

inspections in conjunction with manufacturer recommendations for all subsystems

• Use remote control & monitoring systems to identify faulty modules before travel to site.
This can avoid multiple trips to site and reduce the repair time

• Have handbooks, procedures, tools available at the site or a nearby depot so that travel time
does not adversely affect down time

• Have adequate spares and test equipment ready at a maintenance depot near the site or at the
site itself. Vendors can be required to perform analysis of the number of spares required to
achieve low probability of spare “stock out”

• Have appropriate plans to cope with system and component obsolescence. It is possible to
contractually require suppliers to regularly report on the ability to support the system and
supply components.

• Have ongoing training programs and competency testing to ensure that staff are able to
perform the required role

The detailed set of operational and technical arrangements in place and actions required to
maintain a system through the lifecycle are often documented in a Integrated Logistics Support
Plan.

C: Configuration Management aims to ensure that the configuration of the ground stations is
maintained with integrity. Erroneous configuration can cause unnecessary outages. Normally
configuration management is achieved by :

• Having clear organizational & individual responsibilities and accountabilities for system
configuration.

• Having clear procedures in place which define who has authority to change configuration
and records of the changes made including, inter alia
o The nature of the change including the reason
o Impact of the change & safety assessment

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o An appropriate transition or cutover plan

o Who approved the change
o When the change was authorized and when the change was implemented

• Having appropriate test and analysis capabilities to confirm that new configurations are
acceptable before operational deployment.

• Having appropriate methods to deploy the approved configuration (Logistics of

configuration distribution). Suggested methods;

o Approved configuration published on intranet web pages

o Approved configuration distributed on approved media

D: Training & Competency plans aim to ensure that staff has the skills to safety repairs
Normally this is achieved by:

• Conduct of appropriate Training Needs Analysis (TNA) to identify the gap between trainee
skill/knowledge and the required skill/knowledge.

• Development and delivery of appropriate training to maintainers

• Competency based testing of trainees

• Ongoing refresher training to ensure that skills are maintained even when fault rates are low

E: Data collection & Review :

Regular and scheduled review should be undertaken to determine whether reliability/availability

objectives are being met. These reviews need to consider :

• Reports of actual achieved availability & reliability

• Data regarding system failures including “down time” needs to be captured and analysed so
the ANSP actually knows what is being (or not being) achieved.

• Any failure trends that need to be assessed. This requires data capture of the root cause of
failures

• Any environmental impacts on system performance, such coverage obstructions such as

trees, planned building developments, corrosion, RFI etc. Changes in infrastructure may also
be relevant including air conditioning (temperature/humidity etc.) and power system
changes.

• System problem reports especially those that relate to software deficiencies (design)

• System and component obsolescence

• Staff skills and need for refresher training

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9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES

9.1 INTRODUCTION

ADS-B involves the transmission of specific data messages from aircraft and vehicle systems. These
data messages are broadcast at approximately 0.5 second intervals and received at compatible ground
stations that relay these messages to ATSU(s) for presentation on ATS situation displays. The following
procedures relate to the use of ADS-B data in ATS ground surveillance applications.

The implementation of the ADS-B system will support the provision of high performance surveillance,
enhancing flight safety, facilitating the reduction of separation minima and supporting user demands
such as user-preferred trajectories.

9.2 ADS-B REGULATIONS

As agreed at APANPRIG 22/8, States intending to implement ADS-B based surveillance services may
designate portions of airspace within their area of responsibility by:

(a) mandating the carriage and use of ADS-B equipment; or

(b) providing priority for access to such airspace for aircraft with operative ADS-B equipment over
those aircraft not operating ADS-B equipment.

In publishing ADS-B mandate/regulations, States should consider to :

• define the ADS-B standards applicable to the State. For interoperability and harmonization, such
regulations need to define both the standards applicable for the aircraft ADS-B position source
and the ADS-B transmitter.

• define the airspace affected by the regulations and the category of aircraft that the regulation
applies to.

• define the timing of the regulations allowing sufficient time for operators to equip. Experience in
Asia Pacific Regions is that major international carriers are having high equippage rates of ADS-
B avionics. However the equippage rates of ADS-B avionics for some regional fleets, business
jets and general aviation are currently low and more time will be required to achieve high
equippage rates.

• establish the technical and operational standards for the ground stations and air traffic
management procedures used for ADS-B separation services, including the associated voice
communications services.

States may refer to Appendix 3 on the template for ADS-B mandate/regulations for aircraft avionics.
Some States listed below have published their ADS-B mandate/regulations on their web sites that could
also be used for reference.

(a) Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia

Civil Aviation Order 20.18 Compilation No. 4) 2014, Civil Aviation Order 82.1 (Compilation No. 13) ,
Civil Aviation Order 82.3 (No. 18), Civil Aviation Order 82.5 (No. 19)
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017C01115/Download”

(b) Civil Aviation Department (CAD) of Hong Kong, China

Aeronautical Information Publication Supplement No. A01/16 dated 1 February 2016
“https://www.ais.gov.hk/HK_AIP/supp/A01-16.pdf”

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(c) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS)

Aeronautical Information Publication (eAIP) Part 2 ENR 1.8 – Regional Supplementary Procedures –
Section 7 – Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out exclusive airspace within parts
of the Singapore FIR
“https://fpl-1.caasaim.gov.sg/aip/2018-03-14/final/2018-03-14/html/index-en-GB.html”

(d) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

ADS–B Out Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, Final Rule
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-05-28/pdf/2010-12645.pdf

States are encouraged to mandate forward fit for newly manufactured aircraft on and after 1
January 2020, having a maximum certified takeoff weight of 5700kg or greater, or having a
maximum cruising true airspeed capability of greater than 250 knots, with ADS-B avionics
compliant to Version 2 ES (equivalent to RTCA DO-260B) or later version 2.

9.3 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN USING ADS-B

9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data

The accuracy and integrity of pressure altitude derived level information provided by ADS-B are
equivalent to Mode C level data provided through an SSR sensor and subject to the same
operational procedures as those used in an SSR environment. Where the ATM system converts
ADS-B level data to display barometric equivalent level data, the displayed data should not be
used to determine vertical separation until the data is verified by comparison with a pilot
reported barometric level.

9.3.2 Position Reporting Performance

The ADS-B data from the aircraft will include a NUCp/NIC/SIL/NACp categorization of the
integrity and accuracy of the horizontal position data. This figure is determined from
NIC/ NACp/ SIL values for DO260A/B compliant avionics and NUC values for DO260/ED102
compliant avionics.

In general, for 5NM separation, if the HPL value used to generate ADS-B quality indicators
(NUC or NIC) is greater than 2 nautical miles the data is unlikely to be of comparable quality to
that provided by a single monopulse SSR. ADS-B data should not be used for separation unless
a suitable means of determining data integrity is used.

The key minimum performance requirements for an ADS-B system to enable the use of a 3 NM
or 5 NM separation minimum in the provision of air traffic control is provided in the ICAO
Circular 326 (especially Appendix C).

ADS-B reports with low integrity may be presented on situation displays, provided the controller
is alerted (e.g. by a change in symbology and/or visual alert) to the change and the implications
for the provision of separation. An ANS Provider may elect not to display
ADS-B tracks that fail to meet a given position reporting performance criterion.

9.3.3 GNSS Integrity Prediction Service

2
Subject to endorsement by CNS/SG/22 in July 2018

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ADS-B uses GNSS for position determination. As such, availability of GNSS data has a direct
influence on the provision of a surveillance service.

ATS Providers may elect to use a GNSS integrity prediction service to assist in determining the
future availability of useable ADS-B data. The integrity prediction service alerts users to
potential future loss or degradation of the ADS-B service in defined areas. When these alerts are
displayed, the system is indicating to its users that at some time in the future the ADS-B
positional data may be inadequate to support the application of ADS-B separation. It is
recommended that the prediction service is made available to each ATSU that is employing
ADS-B to provide a separation service, to ensure that air traffic controllers are alerted in
advance of any predicted degradation of the GNSS service and the associated reduction in their
ability to provide ADS-B separation to flights that are within the affected area. This is similar to
having advance warning of a planned radar outage for maintenance.

ADS-B should not be used to provide separation between aircraft that will be affected by an
expected period of inadequate position reporting integrity.

If an unpredicted loss of integrity occurs (including a RAIM warning report from aircrew) then;

(a) ADS-B separation should not be applied by ATC to the particular aircraft reporting until
the integrity has been assured; and

(b) The controller should check with other aircraft in the vicinity of the aircraft reporting the
RAIM warning, to determine if they have also been affected and establish alternative
forms of separation if necessary.

9.3.4 Sharing of ADS-B Data

ADS-B Data-sharing for ATC Operations

Member States should consider the benefits of sharing ADS-B data received from aircraft
operating in the proximity of their international airspace boundaries with adjacent States that
have compatible technology in an effort to maximize the service benefits and promote
operational safety.

Data sharing may involve the use of the data to provide separation services if all the
requirements for delivery of separation services are satisfied. In some cases, States may choose
to use a lower standard that supports surveillance safety nets and situational awareness whilst
operations are conducted using procedural separation standards.

Any agreement on the sharing of surveillance data should be incorporated in Letters of

Agreement between the States concerned. Such agreements may also include the sharing of VHF
communication facilities.

A template for ADS-B data-sharing agreement is provided on the ICAO APAC website
“http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by States.

ADS-B Data-sharing for Safety Monitoring

With endorsement of the methodology by both the ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel
(SASP) and the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG), ADS-B
data can be used for calculating the altimetry system error (ASE) which is a measure of the
height-keeping performance of an aircraft. It is an ICAO requirement that aircraft operating in
RVSM airspace must undergo periodic monitoring on height-keeping performance. The existing
methods to estimate aircraft ASE include use of a portable device, the Enhanced GPS

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Monitoring Unit, and ground-based systems called Height Monitoring Unit/Aircraft Geometric
Height Measurement Element. The use of ADS-B data for height-keeping performance
monitoring, on top of providing enhanced and alternative means of surveillance, will provide a
cost-effective option for aircraft operators. States are encouraged to share ADS-B data to support
the height-keeping performance monitoring of airframe.

Civil/Military ADS-B Data-sharing

Civil/military data sharing arrangements, including aircraft surveillance, were a key part of
civil/military cooperation in terms of tactical operational responses and increasing trust between
civil and military units.

Aircraft operating ADS-B technology transmit their position, altitude and identity to all listeners,
conveying information from co-operative aircraft that have chosen to equip and publicly
broadcast ADS-B messages. Thus there should be no defence or national security issues with the
use and sharing of such data.

Some military transponders may support ADS-B using encrypted DF19 messages, but these data
are normally not decoded or used at all by civil systems. In most cases today, tactical military
aircraft are not ADS-B equipped or could choose to disable transmissions. In future, increasing
numbers of military aircraft will be ADS-B capable, with the ability to disable these
transmissions. ADS-B data sharing should not influence the decision by military authorities to
equip or not equip with ADS-B. Moreover, it is possible for States to install ADS-B filters that
prevent data from sensitive flights being shared. These filters can be based on a number of
criteria and typically use geographical parameters to only provide ADS-B data to an external
party if aircraft are near the boundary.

A guidance material on advice to military authorities regarding ADS-B data sharing is provided
on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by
States.

9.3.5 Synergy of ADS-B and GNSS

States intending to implement GNSS/PBN or ADS-B should consider the efficiency of

implementing the other technology at the same time due to the inherent efficiencies in doing so.
GNSS systems provide navigation solutions to IFR aircraft for the conduct of enroute, terminal
and non-precision approaches. The use of GNSS/PBN can provide higher performance and
higher safety. Transition to GNSS can avoid significant ground infrastructure costs.

ADS-B systems provide surveillance based upon GNSS position source. ADS-B provides high
performance and high update surveillance for both air-air and ATC surveillance. Transition to
ADS-B can avoid the costs associated with ground based radar infrastructure. ADS-B system
installations rely on acceptable GNSS equipment being installed in the aircraft to provide the
position source and integrity.

If the fleet is equipped with ADS-B, they will already have most of the requirements to use
GNSS for navigation satisfied. Similarly, if aircraft have suitable GNSS on board, they will have
a position source to support ADS-B. It is noted however, that some care is needed to ensure that
the requirements of GNSS/PBN and surveillance are both satisfied.

There is significantly less cost for these systems to be installed in an aircraft at the same time. A
single installation of GNSS & ADS-B will involve :
− a single design activity instead of two
− a single downtime instead of two

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− installation of the connection between GPS and ADS-B transponder

− a single test, certification and aircraft flight test
For the affected aviation community (ANSP, regulator and operator), the lessons learnt and
issues faced in both GNSS and ADS-B have significant commonality. This can lead to
efficiencies in Industry education and training.

9.3.6 Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface Movement

Both DO321/ED-163 and the EUROCONTROL guidance for the provision of ATS using ADS-
B for Airport Surface Movement state the horizontal position accuracy needs to be ≤ 10 meters
at 95%, which translates into a positional accuracy of NACp = 10.

However, most of the currently deployed GNSS horizontal position sources provide values
leading to either a NACp = 9 (30 meters) or a NACp = 8 (92 meters), whilst the actual position
accuracy could reach 2 to 3 meters. Provided that the position source is GNSS-based, States can
consider to use the following ADS-B quality indicators to determine the horizontal positional
accuracy:

➢ DO260
▪ NUCp > 6

➢ DO260A
▪ NACp ≥ 8
▪ NIC > 0
▪ SIL = 2

➢ DO260B
▪ NACp ≥ 8
▪ NIC > 0
▪ SIL = 3

Guidance documents recommend implementing some form of horizontal positional accuracy

monitoring for using ADS-B positional data with accuracy down to NUCp > 6 or NACp ≥ 8 for
airport surface movement. Visual monitoring by controllers of vehicles on taxiways and runways
can be considered as an initial monitoring of the horizontal positional accuracy within the
airport. In addition, States can consider to evaluate the performance of ADS-B tracks against
reference tracks from proven surveillance systems, e.g. tracks from MLAT systems with
certified accuracy, to show that ADS-B data is suitable for ground surveillance and falls within
the requirements of international standards.

For ADS-B only tracks with quality indicators below the required accuracy, States are
encouraged to keep the display of the tracks in the surveillance display with due discrimination
on the track symbols in order to enhance the situation awareness of controllers.

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9.3.7 1090 Mhz Spectrum and 24-bit Aircraft Address Issue with Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS)

Proper and efficient utilization of available bandwidth and capacity at 1 090 MHz is a key
element to ensure the safe and reliable operation of aeronautical surveillance systems, including
secondary surveillance radar (SSR), automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) and
airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS). Studies conducted by ICAO expert groups have
identified certain issues and potential technical concerns to the operation of these surveillance
systems in the presence of large numbers of unmanned aircraft (UA), if those UA are equipped
with an ADS-B OUT transmitter on 1 090 MHz and operating at very low levels.

Recognizing issues associated with those UA which may adversely affect safety for all aircraft
in the area, ICAO has developed guidance material (see Appendix 8) to assist States in
validating the utilization of 1 090 MHz and for withholding 24-bit aircraft addresses to UA
unless certain criteria have been met. States are encouraged to make use of the guidance material
as well as any other related provisions to ensure that the surveillance capabilities being provided
by the aforementioned surveillance systems.

9.3.8 Methodologies to Avoid or Reduce 1090MHz Congestion

• Make periodic measurements, say every few years so that the environment status is known.
• Reduce the number of SSR radars, especially non Monopulse and Mode A/C radars if
operationally viable.
o Convert Mode A/C to either ADS-B or Mode S
o Some Secondary surveillance radars can be replaced by using ADS-B. e.g.: Australia
removed 2 radars in the last decade in favor of ADS-B.
o Complement existing coverage with Space based ADS-B
• Use Monopulse radars instead of old conventional radars so that the interrogation rate can be
reduced
• Minimise the interrogation rate from radars and active multilateration consistent with the
operational objective
• Decommission old Mode A/C radars because they allow multiple aircraft to reply to all
interrogations
• Implement radar interrogation patterns to only interrogate on azimuths where additional
surveillance is warranted.
• Minimise “all call” rate commensurate with operational needs
• Reduce interrogation transmit power to the minimum needed for the operational objective. Some
systems allow this to be changed on different azimuths
• Avoid or reduce active multilateration if possible, and minimize transmit power commensurate
with the operational objective
o Mandate ADS-B fitment in aircraft: Multilateration position can be determined using the DF17
ADS-B message if required, so no interrogation is required
o Gradually mandate Mode S in aircraft so that the need to interrogate Mode A/C transponders is
removed eventually. Multilateration position can be determined using the DF11 message if
required. A mode S interrogation still required for altitude and identity to be obtained. Mode S
interrogation only triggers a single aircraft to reply.
o Aircraft with mode A/C transponders (without Mode S require or ADS-B) require multiple
interrogations with typically an omni directional antenna which makes all such aircraft to reply.
• Replace or reduce any navaids (e.g. DME/TACAN, ICAO standard or non ICAO standard) that
impinge on the 1090 MHz channel.
• Close any illegal transmissions affecting the 1090MHhz band
• Take care with DAPS interrogation to ensure only wanted data is requested

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9.4 Reporting Rates

9.4.1 General

The ADS-B system shall maintain a reporting rate that ensures at least an equivalent degree of
accuracy, integrity and availability as specified by the performance requirements of a radar
system that is used to provide a similar ATC service. The standard reporting rate is
approximately 0.5 second from the aircraft, but the rate of update provided to the ATM system
(for the situation display) may be less frequent (e.g. 5 seconds), provided performance
requirements for the service are achieved. Reporting rate requirements are included in the
document “Baseline ADS-B Service Performance Parameters” which is available at Appendix 6.

9.5 SEPARATION

9.5.1 General

ADS-B data may be used in combination with data obtained by other means of surveillance
(such as radar, flight plan track, ADS-C) for the application of separation provided appropriate
minima as determined by the State are applied. It should be noted that the quality of
communications will have a bearing on the determination of appropriate minima.

All safety net features (MSAW, STCA, MTCA, RAM and DAIW/ RAI etc) should possess the
same responsiveness as equivalent radar safety net features.

9.5.2 Identification Methods

Some of the methods approved by ICAO for establishing identification with radar, may be
employed with ADS-B (see PANS-ATM chapter 8). One or more of the following identification
procedures are suggested:

a) direct recognition of the aircraft identification in an ADS-B label on a

situation display;

b) transfer of ADS-B identification;

c) observation of compliance with an instruction to TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT.

Note: In automated systems, the “IDENT” feature may be presented in different ways,
e.g. as a flashing of all or part of the position indication and associated label.

9.5.3 ADS-B Separation

ADS-B Separation minima has been incorporated by ICAO in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), and in
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030).

In a mixed surveillance environment, States should use the larger separation standard applicable
between aircraft in the conflict pair being considered.

9.5.4 Vertical separation

9.5.4.1 Introduction
The ADS-B level data presented on the controllers situation display shall normally be
derived from barometric pressure altitude. In the event that barometric altitude is

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absent, geometric altitude shall not be displayed on displays used for provision of air
traffic services. Geometric altitude may be used in ATM systems for other purposes.

9.5.4.2 Vertical tolerance standard

The vertical tolerances for ADS-B level information should be consistent with those
applied to Mode C level information.

9.5.4.3 Verification of ADS-B level information

The verification procedures for ADS-B level information shall be the same as those
employed for the verification of Mode C level data in a radar environment.

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9.6 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CLEARANCE MONITORING

9.6.1 General

ADS-B track data can be used to monitor flight path conformance with air traffic control
clearances.

9.6.2 Deviations from ATC clearances

The ATC requirements relating to monitoring of ADS-B traffic on the situation display should
be similar to those contained in PANS-ATM Ch.8.

9.7 ALERTING SERVICE

For ADS-B equipped aircraft, the provision of an alerting service should be based on the same criteria as
applied within a radar environment.

9.8 POSITION REPORTING

9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage

States should establish voice and/or CPDLC position reporting procedures consistent with those
applicable with radar for aircraft that have been identified by ATC.

9.8.2 Meteorological reporting requirements in ADS-B airspace

ATSUs may promulgate in the AIP meteorological reporting requirements that apply within the
nominated FIR. The meteorological reporting data required and the transmission methods to be
used by aircrew shall be specified in AIP.

9.9 PHRASEOLOGY

9.9.1 Phraseology Standard

States should use common phraseology for both ADS-B and radar where possible, and should
note the requirement for ADS-B specific phraseology in some instances. States shall refer to
PANS ATM Chapter 12 for ADS-B phraseology:
ADS-B EQUIPMENT DEGRADATION
ADS-B OUT OF SERVICE (appropriate information as necessary).

TO REQUEST THE CAPABILITY OF THE ADS-B EQUIPMENT

a) ADVISE ADS-B CAPABILITY;

*b) ADS-B TRANSMITTER (data link);
*c) ADS-B RECEIVER (data link);
*d) NEGATIVE ADS-B.
* Denotes pilot transmission.

Note: For (b) and (c) – the options are not available for aircraft that are not equipped.

TO REQUEST RESELECTION OF AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION

REENTER FLIGHT IDENTIFICATION.

Note: For some aircraft, this option is not available in-flight

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TERMINATION OF RADAR AND/OR ADS-B SERVICE

IDENTIFICATION LOST [reasons] (instructions).

TO REQUEST THE OPERATION OF THE MODE S OR ADS-B IDENT FEATURE

SQUAWK IDENT.

Note: For some standalone ADS-B equipage affecting General Aviation, the option of
“TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT” may be available

TO REQUEST AIRCRAFT SWITCHING TO OTHER TRANSPONDER OR TERMINATION

OF ADS-B TRANSMITTER OPERATION
a) SWITCH TO OTHER TRANSPONDER
b) STOP ADS-B TRANSMISSION. SQUAWK (code) ONLY.

Note:
a) In many cases the ADS-B transmitter cannot be operated independently of the SSR
transponder and switching off the ADS-B transmission would also switch off the SSR
transponder operation

b) “STOP ADS-B TRANSMISSION” applies only to aircraft that have the facility to
switch off the ADS-B transmission, while maintaining SSR operation.

9.9.2 Operations of Mode S Transponder and ADS-B

It should be noted that independent operations of Mode S transponder and ADS-B will not be possible in
many aircraft (e.g. where ADS-B is solely provided by 1090 MHz extended squitter emitted from the
transponder). Additionally, some desirable but optional features of ADS-B transmitters may not be fitted
in some aircraft. Controller training on this issue, as it relates to the following examples of radio
telephony and/or CPDLC phraseology is recommended.

9.9.2.1 STOP ADSB TRANSMISSION or STOP SQUAWK

Issue: In most commercial aircraft, a common “transponder control head” is used for SSR transponder,
ACAS and ADS-B functionality. In this case, a pilot who complies with the instruction to stop operation
of one system will also need to stop operation of the other systems – resulting in a loss of surveillance
not intended or expected by the controller.

ATC need to be aware that an instruction to “Stop ADS-B Transmission” may require the pilot to switch
off their transponder that will then stop all other functions associated with the transponder operations
(such as ACARs etc). Pilots need to be aware of their aircraft’s equipment limitations, the consequences
of complying with this ATC instruction, and be aware of their company policy in regard to this. As with
any ATC instruction issued, the pilot should advise ATC if they are unable to comply.
Recommendation: It is recommended that the concatenated phrases STOP ADSB TRANSMISSION,
SQUAWK (code) ONLY or STOP SQUAWK, TRANSMIT ADSB ONLY are used. It is recommended
that controller training highlights the possible consequences of issuing these instructions and that pilot
training highlights the consequences of complying with this instruction. It is also recommended that
aircraft operators have a clearly stated policy on procedures for this situation. Should a pilot respond
with UNABLE then the controller should consider alternative solutions to the problem that do not
remove the safety defences of the other surveillance technologies. This might include manual changes to
flight data, coordination with other controllers and/or change of assigned codes or callsigns.

Very few aircraft provide the capability to turn off ADS-B without turning off TCAS. It is not
recommended to switch off ATC transponders (& remove TCAS protection). The only action for most

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pilots of aircraft transmitting misleading ADS-B data in response to ATC requests is to recycle the
transponder, or switch to the alternate transponder as appropriate. Besides, aircraft that do not support
ADS-B OFF should have the details included in the flight manual including the undesirability of
disabling TCAS.

9.9.2.2 STOP ADSB ALTITUDE TRANSMISSION [WRONG INDICATION or reason] and

TRANSMIT ADSB ALTITUDE

Issue: Most aircraft will not have separate control of ADSB altitude transmission. In such cases
compliance with the instruction may require the pilot to stop transmission of all ADSB data and/or Mode
C altitude – resulting in a loss of surveillance not intended or expected by the controller.

Recommendation: It is recommended that, should the pilot respond with UNABLE, the controller
should consider alternative solutions to the problem that do not remove the safety defences of other
surveillance data. This might include a procedure that continues the display of incorrect level
information but uses pilot reported levels with manual changes to flight data and coordination with other
controllers.

9.9.2.3 TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT

Issue: Some aircraft may not be capable or the ADSB SPI IDENT control may be shared with the SSR
SPI IDENT function.

Recommendation: It is recommended that controllers are made aware that some pilots are unable to
comply with this instruction. An alternative means of identification that does not rely on the ADSB SPI
IDENT function should be used.

9.10 FLIGHT PLANNING

9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity

The aircraft identification (ACID) must be accurately recorded in section 7 of the ICAO Flight
Plan form as per the following instructions:

Aircraft Identification, not exceeding 7 characters is to be entered both in item 7 of the flight
plan and replicated exactly when set in the aircraft (for transmission as Flight ID) as follows:
Either,

a) The ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operating agency followed by the
flight identification (e.g. KLM511, BAW213, JTR25), when:

in radiotelephony the callsign used consists of the ICAO telephony designator for the
operating agency followed by the flight identification (e.g. KLM 511, SPEEDBIRD 213,
HERBIE 25).
Or,

b) The registration marking of the aircraft (e.g. EIAKO, 4XBCD, OOTEK), when:

1) in radiotelephony the callsign used consists of the registration marking alone

(e.g. EIAKO), or preceded by the ICAO telephony designator for the operating
agency (e.g. SVENAIR EIAKO),

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2) the aircraft is not equipped with radio.

Note 1: No zeros, hyphens, dashes or spaces are to be added when the Aircraft
Identification consists of less than 7 characters.

Note 2: Appendix 2 to PANS-ATM refers. ICAO designators and telephony designators

for aircraft operating agencies are contained in ICAO Doc 8585.

9.10.2 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirements

9.10.2.1 ICAO Flight Plan Item 10 – Surveillance Equipment and Capabilities

An appropriate ADS-B designator shall be entered in item 10 of the flight plan to indicate that the
flight is capable of transmitting ADS-B messages.

These are defined in ICAO DOC 4444 as follows:

B1 ADS-B with dedicated 1090 MHz ADS-B “out” capability

B2 ADS-B with dedicated 1090 MHz ADS-B “out” and “in” capability
U1 ADS-B “out” capability using UAT
U2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using UAT
V1 ADS-B “out” capability using VDL Mode 4
V2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using VDL Mode 4

During the ADS-B SITF/13 meeting held in April 2014, clarification of the B1 and B2 descriptors
was recommended as follows. This will be progressed for change to ICAO DOC 4444, but may take
some time for formal adoption:

B1 ADS-B “out” capability using 1090 MHz extended squitter

B2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using 1090 MHz extended squitter

States should consider use of the revised descriptors in AIP.

9.10.2.2 ICAO Flight Plan Item 18 – Other Information

Where required by the appropriate authority the ICAO Aircraft Address (24 Bit Code) may be
recorded in Item 18 of the ICAO flight plan, in hexadecimal format as per the following example:

CODE/7C432B

States should note that use of hexadecimal code may be prone to human error and is
less flexible in regard to airframe changes for a notified flight.

9.10.2.3 Transponder Capabilities

When an aircraft is equipped with a mode S transponder, that transmits ADS-B messages, according
to ICAO Doc 4444, an appropriate Mode S designator should also be entered in item 10; i.e.: either
s

o E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and extended

squitter (ADS-B) capability, or
o L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, extended squitter
(ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability.

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During the ADS-B SITF/13 meeting held in April 2014, clarification of the E and L descriptors was
recommended as follows. This will be progressed for change to ICAO DOC 4444, but may take
some time for formal adoption:

o E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and ADS-B

capability, or
o L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, ADS-B and
enhanced surveillance capability.

States should consider use of the revised descriptors in AIP.

9.10.2.4 Inconsistency between ADS-B Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability

Inconsistency between flight planning of ADS-B and surveillance capability of an aircraft can
impact on ATC planning and situational awareness. States are encouraged to monitor for
consistency between flight plan indicators and actual surveillance capability. Where discrepancies
are identified, aircraft operators should be contacted and instructed to correct flight plans, or general
advice (as appropriate to the operational environment and type of flight planning problems) should
be issued to aircraft operators. An example of such advice is provided at Appendix 4.

9.10.3 Setting Aircraft Identification (Flight ID) in Cockpits

(a) Flight ID Principles

The aircraft identification (sometimes called the flight identification or FLTID) is the equivalent
of the aircraft callsign and is used in both ADS-B and Mode S SSR technology. Up to seven
characters long, it is usually set in airline aircraft by the flight crew via a cockpit interface. It
enables air traffic controllers to identify and aircraft on a display and to correlate a radar or
ADS-B track with the flight plan date. Aircraft identification is critical, so it must be entered
carefully. Punching in the wrong characters can lead to ATC confusing once aircraft with
another.

It is important that the identification exactly matches the aircraft identification (ACID) entered
in the flight notification.

Intuitive correlation between an aircraft’s identification and radio callsign enhances situational
awareness and communication. Airline aircraft typically use a three letter ICAO airline code
used in flight plans, NOT the two letter IATA codes.

(b) Setting Flight ID

The callsign dictates the applicable option below for setting ADS-B or Mode S Flight ID:

(i) the flight number using the ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operator if a
flight number callsign is being used (e.g. QFA1 for Qantas 1, THA54 for Thai 54).

(ii) the nationality and registration mark (without hyphen) of the aircraft if the callsign is the
full version of the registration (e.g .VHABC for international operations).

(iii) The registration mark alone of the aircraft if the callsign is the abbreviated version of the
registration (eg ABC for domestic operations).

(iv) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign approved by the ANSP or regulator
(e.g. SPTR13 for firespotter 3).

(v) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign in accordance with the operations

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manual of the relevant recreational aircraft administrative organization (e.g. G123 for
Gyroplane 123).

9.11 PROCEDURES TO HANDLE NON-COMPLANT ADS-B AIRCAFT OR MIS-LEADING

ADS-B TRANSMISSIONS

ADS-B technology is increasingly being adopted by States in the Asia/Pacific Region. Asia/Pacific
Region adopted 1090 extended squitter technology. Reliance on ADS-B transmissions can be expected
to increase over the coming years.

Currently a number of aircraft are transmitting ADS-B data which is misleading or non-compliant with
the ICAO standards specified in Annex 10. Examples include:

a) aircraft broadcasting incorrect message formats;

b) aircraft broadcasting inertial positional data and occasionally indicating in the messages that the
data has high integrity when it does not;

c) using GPS sources that do not generate correct integrity data, whilst indicating in the messages
that the data has high integrity;

d) transmitting ADS-B data with changing (and incorrect) flight identity; and

e) transmitting ADS-B data with incorrect flight identity continuously.

If the benefits of ADS-B are to flow to the aviation industry, misleading and non-compliant ADS-B
transmissions need to be curtailed to the extent possible.

The transmission of a value of zero for the NUCp or the NIC or the NACp or the SIL by an aircraft
indicates a navigational uncertainty related to the position of the aircraft or a navigation integrity issue
that is too significant to be used by air traffic controllers.

As such, the following procedure currently stipulated in the Regional Supplementary Procedures Doc
7030 3 , shall be applicable in the concerned FIRs on commencement of ADS-B based surveillance
services notified by AIP or NOTAM:

If an aircraft operates within an FIR where ADS-B-based ATS surveillance service is provided, and

a) carries 1090 extended squitter ADS-B transmitting equipment which does not comply with one of the
following:

1) EASA AMC 20-24; or

2) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the Civil
Aviation Safety Authority of Australia; or
3) installation in accordance with the FAA AC No. 20-165 – Airworthiness Approval of ADS-B; or

b) the aircraft ADS-B transmitting equipment becomes unserviceable resulting in the aircraft
transmitting misleading information;

then:

3
SURICG/2 recommended States/Administrations to update their ADS-B Avionics Equipage
Requirements to align with the template in Appendix 3

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a) except when specifically authorized by the appropriate ATS authority, the aircraft shall not fly unless
the equipment is:

1) deactivated; or
2) transmits only a value of zero for the NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL

States may elect to implement a scheme to blacklist those non-compliant aircraft or aircraft consistently
transmitting mis-leading ADS-B information, so as to refrain the aircraft from being displayed to ATC.
Please refer Appendix 2 for guidance in implementing the blacklist scheme.
A sample template is given below for reference by States to publish the procedures to handle non-
compliant ADS-B aircraft or misleading ADS-B transmissions in their ADS-B mandate/regulations:

After <insert earliest date that ADS-B may be used for any relevant operational purpose> if an aircraft
carries ADS-B transmitting equipment which does not comply with :

(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in Non-
Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ Extended
Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
(b) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of
Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Subpart D —
Surveillance (SUR) (CS-ACNS.D.ADS-B), or
(c) Federal Aviation Administration – Advisory Circular No: 20-165A (or later versions)
Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Systems, or
(d) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the Civil
Aviation Safety Authority of Australia.

or the aircraft ADS-B transmitting equipment becomes unserviceable resulting in the aircraft
transmitting misleading information;

the aircraft must not fly unless equipment is:

(a) deactivated; or

(b) set to transmit only a value of zero for the NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL.

Note:

1. It is considered equivalent to deactivation if NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL is set to continually

transmit only a value of zero.

2. Regulators should take appropriate action to ensure that such regulations are complied with.

3. ATC systems should discard ADS-B data when NUC or NIC or NACp or SIL =0.

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9.12 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

ATC surveillance systems should provide for the display of safety-related alerts and warnings, including
conflict alert, minimum safe altitude warning, conflict prediction and unintentionally duplicated SSR
codes and aircraft identifications.

The ADS-B avionics may transmit emergency status messages to any ADS-B ground station within
coverage. The controller receiving these messages should determine the nature of the emergency,
acknowledge receipt if appropriate, and initiate any assistance required. An aircraft equipped with ADS-
B might operate the emergency and/or urgency mode as follows:

a) emergency;
b) no communications;
c) unlawful interference;
d) minimum fuel; and/or
e) medical.

Selection of an emergency transponder code (e.g. 7600) automatically generates an emergency

indication in the ADS-B message. However, some ADS-B transponders may only generate a generic
emergency indication. That means, the specific type of emergency, e.g., communication failure, is not
always conveyed to the controller in an ADS-B environment. The controller may only receive a generic
emergency indication irrespective of the emergency codes being selected by the pilot.

In some early ADS-B avionics configurations, when a generic emergency indication is being transmitted,
a request to “Transmit ADS-B Ident” or “Squawk Ident” may not result in the Ident indication being
displayed in the ATC System. This is because the emergency and ident flags share the same data
elements in the ADS-B downlink message.

Due to limitations of some ADS-B transponders, procedures should be developed for ATC to confirm
the types of emergency with pilots based on operational needs of States.

In contrast to DO260 avionics, for DO-260A avionics, the transmission of an Emergency/Priority status
message in the ADS-B message set will also include the original MODE A code allocated by ATC.
When the aircraft resets the MODE A code to the original allocated code the ground station can retain
the Emergency/Priority status in the Asterix message, for up to 100 seconds, even though the aircraft is
no longer squawking an emergency code. This situation can generate confusion as to the actual status of
the aircraft.

Executive control responsibility

The responsibility for control of the flight rests with the ATSU within whose airspace the aircraft is
operating. However, if the pilot takes action contrary to a clearance that has already been coordinated
with another sector or ATSU and further coordination is not possible in the time available, the
responsibility for this action would rest with the pilot in command, and performed under the pilot’s
emergency authority.

Emergency procedures

The various circumstances surrounding each emergency situation preclude the establishment of exact
detailed procedures to be followed. The procedures outlined in PANS-ATM Chapter 15 provide a
general guide to air traffic services personnel and where necessary, should be adapted for the use of
ADS-B.

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9.13 PROCEDURES TO HANDLE GPS TIME AND WEEK COUNTER ROLLOVER

The GPS system is often used in the ATC environment, including:

- to time stamp surveillance data with the “time of applicability” of the data. This allows
positional data to be “extrapolated” to the time of display and allows old data to be discarded.
- to time synchronise ATC systems to the correct time, so that when it uses surveillance data, it
can determine the “age” of the data.
- to time stamp recorded data and maintenance data

Thus accurate time is important to minimise incorrect positional data being presented to ATC and to
ensure that valid data is not discarded – amongst other important technical roles in synchronising
various computer servers in a network.

9.13.1 GPS TIME – COUNTERS AND LEAP SECONDS

The GPS navigation message contains information about the current date and time in the form of a
sequential week counter (representing the number of weeks elapsed since the last time this counter
was reset to zero). This counter is 10 bits long and this resets to zero every 1024 weeks (19.6 years).
GPS week zero started at 00:00:00 UTC on January 6, 1980, and the week number became zero again
on August 21, 1999. A rollover event occurred on 6 April 2019.

ATC systems use UTC. The difference between GPS time and UTC changes whenever a “leap
second” is inserted in UTC. Wikipedia says that “one-second adjustment that is occasionally applied
to civil time Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) to keep it close to the mean solar time at Greenwich,
in spite of the Earth's rotation slowdown and irregularities”. This is done in coordination with the
international community.

The GPS messages sent by the satellites includes the difference between GPS time and UTC, thus
allowing the GPS receivers to calculate UTC.

9.13.2 GPS RECEIVER ISSUES

Each GPS receiver has firmware/software that computes UTC from the GPS time counters and from
the known offset. In the past some GPS receivers have not coped well with these changes. The
triggers occur very infrequently and in some cases they have not been adequately tested.

This can cause incorrect UTC time to be output following some events such as:

- Software deficiencies highlighted by the week number rollover. The rollover occurs each 19.6
years

- Deficiencies at leap second introductions (at intervals greater than 1 year)

- Loss of GPS-UTC time offset (sometimes at power off in devices not using non-volatile
storage). Typically this can result in up to 15 minutes of incorrect time data until the offset is
restored from the satellite messages.

Other problems such as receiver lock up (service failure) can occur when the GPS receiver is exposed
to rare real world events or stimuli.

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9.13.3 ATC SYSTEM RISKS AND MITIGATION

ANSPs and regulators need to be aware of the potential issues that may arise from GPS receivers that
inadequately process events and stimuli.

Possible mitigations that could be considered include:

- Testing GPS receivers with a GPS test tool that simulates possible events/ stimuli

- Co-ordination with GPS receiver manufacturers

- Disconnect GPS receivers just before expected events – and check the output before
reconnecting the GPS receiver. (in this case the ANSP would be relying on the ability of the
ATC or surveillance system to operate for a period without the GPS synchronisation).

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10. SECURITY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ADS-B

10.1 INTRODUCTION

ADS-B technologies are currently “open systems” and the openness is an essential component of
successful use of ADS-B. It was also noted that ADS-B transmission from commercial aircraft is a
“fact of life” today. Many commercial aircraft are already equipped with ADS-B and have been
transmitting data for some time.

It was noted that there has been considerable alarmist publicity regarding ADS-B security. To a large
extent, this publicity has not considered the nature and complexity of ATC. Careful assessment of
security policies in use today for ADS-B and other technologies can provide a more balanced view.

10.2 CONSIDERATIONS

A list of ADS-B vulnerabilities categorised into threats to Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
has been reviewed and documented into the guidance material on security issues associated with
ADS-B provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” under
“Restricted Site” for reference by States. States could contact ICAO Regional Office to get access to
the guidance material. The following recommendations are made to States :

(a) While ADS-B is recognized as a key enabling technology for aviation with potential safety
benefits, it is recommended that States made aware of possible ADS-B security specific
issues;

(b) It is recommended that States note that much of the discussion of ADS-B issues in the Press
has not considered the complete picture regarding the ATC use of surveillance data;

(c) For current ADS-B technology implementation, security risk assessment studies should be
made in coordination with appropriate national organisations and ANSPs to address
appropriate mitigation applicable in each operational environment, in accordance with ATM
interoperability requirements; and

(d) Future development of ADS-B technology, as planned in the SESAR master plan for
example, should address security issues. Studies should be made to identify potential
encryption and authentication techniques, taking into consideration the operational need of air
to ground and air to air surveillance applications. Distribution of encryption keys to a large
number of ADS-B receivers is likely to be problematic and solutions in the near and medium
term are not considered likely to be deployed worldwide. Internet based encryption strategies
are not deployable when ground stations are pass receivers.

10.3 MEASURES FOR ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF ADS-B

10.3.1 TIME DIFFERENCE OF ARRIVAL (TDOA) BASED POSITION VERIFICATION

METHOD

One of the technologies for enhancing ADS-B security is TDOA-based position verifiation,
which is able to mitigate false targets caused by spoofing. In a case of spoofing, the position of the
emitter (attacker) is likely to differ from the position contained in the ADS-B signal. Such positional
difference can be detected by means of TDOA.

When an emitter (aircraft or spoofing emitter) transmits an ADS-B signal, (at least) two
receivers detect the signal and measure the time of arrival (TOA). The difference of the TOAs
between the two receivers is a TDOA. Next, decoding the ADS-B signal obtains the position

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contained in the signal. A calculation using the ADS-B position and the known receiver positions
obtains the expected TDOA.
True position (unknown)

Measured
TDOA
Compare
ADS-B Position
Expected
TDOA
Figure 10.3.1.1 Illustration of the Procedures of TDOA method

The measured and expected TDOAs are compared. The TDOA difference is large in a case of
spoofing and small in a case of a legitimate aircraft, as illustrated in Figure 10.3.1.2 (a) and (b),
respectively. Therefore, a threshold can be used to make a decision; if the TDOA difference is smaller
than the threshold, the position is determined as valid. If the TDOA difference is larger than the
threshold, the position is determined as anomalous (spoofing).

Hyperbola of Emitter Hyperbola of Emitter

Hyperbola Emitter Hyperbola
of ADS-B Position of ADS-B Position
Emitter
ADS-B Position ADS-B Position

Deviation: Anomaly Position Agreement: Valid Position

(a) (b)
Figure 10.3.1.2 Illustration of (a) case of spoofing, and (b) case of legitimate aircraft

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10.3.2 APPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DECODING METHOD OF CPR

CPR (Compact Position Reporting) is the format used to encode a latitude and longitude in the ADS-
B position report using 1090 Extended Squitter (DF = 17, BDS = 0,5 and 0,6). There are two ways of
decoding the encoded CPR:
a) globally unambiguous decoding, which requires two signals called “even” and “odd".
b) locally unambiguous decoding, which requires either even or odd signal plus a reference
position.

Appropriate implementation of a decoding method is important also for security aspect. In the
technical standards, there are techniques available for supporting correct decoding, for example, range
test and reasonableness test for CPR decoding in RTCA DO-260B. Although they are not originally
intended for security purpose, reduction of false position information is expected.

The CPR reasonableness test is a technique to verify the decoded position. The basic mechanism of
the reasonable test for locally unambiguous decoding is detecting a position jump from previous
decoding. The criteria is available in DO-260B. The basic mechanism of the reasonable test for
globally unambiguous decoding is decoding an additional pair of signal and use it for verifying the
previous decoding.

The CPR reasonableness test is included in the ADS-B message decoding logic in DO-260B together
with a range test, which checks whether the output of globally unambiguous decoding is within the
receiver’s operational coverage. The range test and CPR reasonableness test are included also in
EUROCAE ED-129B (Technical Specification for a 1090 MHz Extended Squitter ADS-B Ground
System).

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Appendix 2
Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis
of ADS-B Avionics Performance

1 Introduction

1.1 The APANPIRG has endorsed the following Conclusion during its 24th Meeting to
encourage States/Administration to exchange their ADS-B performance monitoring
results and experience gained from the process :

Conclusion 24/45 - Exchange ADS-B Performance Monitoring Result

“That, States be encouraged to exchange findings/result of their ADS-B performance
monitoring including experience gained in conducting the required performance
monitoring.”

1.2 Since the ADS-B mandate for some airspace in the Region became effective in
December 2013, monitoring and analysis on avionics performance of ADS-B
equipped aircraft has become an increasingly important task for concerned States. The
fully functional ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database (APRD) was launched
on the 21 July 2017. The database is placed at ICAO APAC website in the restricted
area with name: APAC ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database accessible via
https://applications.icao.int/ADSB-APRD/login.aspx. States are encouraged to make
full use of the APRD for reporting ADS-B avionics problems and sharing experience
as well as follow-up actions through the APRD web-page.

1.3 This document serves to provide guidance materials on monitoring and analysis of
avionics performance of ADS-B equipped aircraft, which is based on the experience
gained by States.

2 Problem Reporting and Feedback

2.1 For ADS-B avionics problems, it is critical that an appropriate reporting and feedback
mechanism be established. It is highly desirable that those discovering the problems
should report them to the appropriate parties to take action, such as study and analyse
the problems, identify the root causes, and rectify them. Those action parties
include :-

(a) Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) – upon detection of any unacceptable
ADS-B reports from an aircraft, report the observed problem to the performance
monitoring agent(s), if any, and the Aircraft Operators for investigation. In
addition, ANSPs should take all actions to avoid using the ADS-B reports from
the aircraft until the problem is rectified (e.g. black listing the aircraft), if usage of
such reports could compromise safety.
(b) Regulators – to initiate any appropriate regulatory action or enforcement.

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(c) Aircraft Operators – to allow avionics specialists to examine the causes and as
customers of the avionics manufacturers ensure that corrective action will take
place.
(d) Avionics Manufacturers and Aircraft Manufacturers – to provide technical
evidence and knowledge about the problem and problem rectification

2.2 Incentives should be received by those parties acting on the problems including :-

(a) Regulations that require deficiencies to be rectified

(b) Regulatory enforcement
(c) Consequences if conduct of operations with problematic equipment (e.g. no access
to the airspace requiring healthy equipment)

2.3 When an ADS-B avionics problem is reported, it should come along with adequate
details about the problem nature to the action parties. In addition, the problem should
be properly categorised, so that appropriate parties could diagnose and rectify them
systematically.

3 Problem Categorisation

3.1 Regarding ADS-B avionics, their problems are quite diversified in the Region but can
be categorized to ensure they will be examined and tackled systematically.

3.2 Based on the experience gained from States, the common ADS-B avionics problems
in the Region are summarized under different categories in Attachment A. It is noted
that only a relatively minor portion of the aircraft population exhibits these problems.
It must be emphasized that aircraft transmitting incorrect positional data with NUC =
0 or NIC = 0 should not be considered a safety problem. The data transmitted have no
integrity and shall not be used by ATC. This situation exists for many aircraft when
their GNSS receivers are not connected to the transponders.

4 Managing the Problem

4.1 There are two major approaches to manage the problems :-

(a) Regulatory approach

Regulations which require non-approved avionics to disable ADS-B transmission
(or transmit “no integrity”), and the concerned operators to file flight plans to
indicate no ADS-B equipage. APANPIRG has endorsed this approach which is
reflected in the Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030).

(b) Blacklist approach

Filtering out (“black listing”) any airframes that do not comply with the
regulations or transmitting bad data, and advising the regulator of the non-
compliance. This approach is temporary which allows the ANSP to protect the
system whilst regulatory action is underway.

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While deciding on whether an aircraft transmitting erroneous ADS-B data should

be added into the blacklist, the following factors will be critically assessed:

i. Impact and risk to ATC operational safety

Use of erroneous ADS-B data to maintain separation may potentially contribute
to loss of separation or ATC coordination error.
ii. Frequency of erroneous position
Whether it is occasional or frequently broadcast of erroneous position.
iii. Amount of deviation
This can be a track jumping problem which is of significant safety impact to
ATC or just an occasional small position jump which is not detectable in ATC
with insignificant impact.
iv. Others
Such as the ICAO aircraft address received from ADS-B being inconsistent
with the aircraft registration, Flight ID entered via cockpit interface
mismatched with aircraft callsign in the Flight Plan, etc.

After deciding to put an aircraft into the blacklist list, the following procedures will be
carried out:

i. Informing the concerned aircraft operator/regulatory authority

The concerned aircraft operator/regularity authority will be notified of the
decision and the rationale before putting the aircraft into the exclusion list.

ii. Pre-processing of flight plan concerned

As the blacklist mechanism involves filtering out the ADS-B data of the subject
aircraft, from operational perspective, air traffic controllers need to be aware in
advance that the concerned aircraft plans to operate in their FIR. A flight plan
pre-processing system may locate the flight plan by checking against the 24-bit
address or aircraft registration in the blacklist, and issue an alert to the air
traffic controllers if appropriate, such as automatically insert a remark in the
Item 18 of the concerned flight plan before feeding the flight plan into the ATC
Automation System, and the ATC Automation System may issue an alert to the
air traffic controllers with a specific label annotated in the corresponding
electronic flight strips.

iii. Coordinate with adjacent Area Control Centre (ACC)

Upon posting of pending inbound flights with corresponding electronic flight
strips indicating non-ADS-B equipage or in the blacklist, the air traffic
controllers shall inform the upstream ACC that transfer of that particular flight
will not be accepted at the ADS-B exclusive airspace. It is important to carry
out this coordination action as early as possible as the upstream sector may
have difficulty to adjust the flight route at the transfer stage.

iv. Handling of an aircraft for removal from the blacklist once rectification action
had taken place
Once notification from the aircraft operators/regulatory authorities is received
that the problem has been rectified, performance of the aircraft will be closely

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monitored when it flies to the concerned FIR. If the aircraft shows the observed
problem has been resolved, the aircraft will be removed from the blacklist. The
aircraft operator/regulatory authority will also be notified accordingly.

5 Systematic Monitoring and Analysis of the Problem

States using ADS-B should have in place systematic ways to identify and manage
ADS-B deficiencies similar to that described below :-

5.1 Reporting Deficiencies

States using ADS-B should have in place systematic ways to identify ADS-B
deficiencies including :-
(a) Systematic capture of ATC reported events and engineering detected events into a
database; and
(b) Manual or automatic detection of anomalous avionics behavior independent from
controller reports

5.1.1 ATC Reported Deficiencies

ATC procedures should exist that allow services to continue to be provided safety, as
well as to capture relevant information for later analysis. This should include :-

(a) ATC request for the pilot to select the alternate transponder; and
(b) ATC to adequately record the circumstances including Flight ID, ICAO Aircraft
Address (if readily available) accurate time, Flight plan, and pilot provided
information.

5.1.2 Non ATC reported deficiencies

5.1.2.1 Where capability is available, States should also identify non ATC reported
deficiencies.

5.1.2.2 Without overlapping radar coverage: ADS-B data may be examined for the
following :-
(a) NUCp of each ADS-B reported position is smaller than required for service
delivery for more than 5% of total number of ADS-B updates;
(b) NIC, NACp, SIL are smaller than required for service delivery for more than 5%
of total number of ADS-B updates;
(c) ICAO Aircraft Address (i.e. I021/080) is inconsistent with the flight planned
registration (REG) based on each state’s ICAO Aircraft Address allocation
methodology;

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(d) Flight ID entered via cockpit interface and downlinked in ADS-B data (i.e.
I021/170 in Asterix CAT 21) is a mismatch1 with aircraft callsign in the ATS
Flight Plan;
(e) Inconsistent vertical rate compared to flight level change; and
(f) Inconsistency of position reports and presence of "jumps.

5.1.2.3 Overlapping radar coverage: For States that have overlapping radar coverage, a
systematic means to monitor and analyze ADS-B could be considered in addition to
relying on ATC to report the problem, or utilising the evaluation criteria in 5.1.2.2
above.
This can be achieved by comparing radar information with ADS-B reported position,
velocity, flight level and vertical rate change data as well as examining the ADS-B
quality indicators and Flight Identification (FLTID) contained in the ADS-B reports.

For each ADS-B flight, its ADS-B data could be compared with its corresponding
radar information. For example, this would allow analysis to determine if the
following pre-defined criteria are met :-

(a) Deviation between ADS-B reported position and independent referenced radar
position is greater than 1NM2, with the indication of good positional quality in
the quality indicators for more than 5% of total number ADS-B updates. A
sample screen shot of a system performing the analysis automatically is given at
Attachment B for reference.

5.2 Managing and Processing Deficiencies

Whether detected by ATC or not, all deficiencies should trigger:

(a) Systematic recording of the details of each occurrence such as date/time of

occurrence, ICAO aircraft address and flight plan information should be obtained.
Graphical representations such as screen capture of radar and ADS-B history
tracks, graphs of NUCp/NIC value changes versus time and deviation between
radar and ADS-B tracks along the flight journey would be desirable. Examples of
typical graphical representations are shown below :-

1
A missing Flight ID, or a Flight ID with only “spaces” should not be considered a mismatch.
2
For example, the deviation between ADS-B and radar tracks could be set to 1NM in accordance with
ICAO Circular 326 defining position integrity (0.5NM < HPL < 1NM) for 3NM aircraft separation use,
on assumption that radar targets are close to actual aircraft position. The values of ADS-B quality
indicators (NUCp, NACp, SIL, NIC) could be chosen based on the definition in ICAO Circular 326 on
Position Accuracy and Position Integrity for 3NM aircraft separation minimum. A threshold of 5% is
initially set to exclude aircraft only exhibiting occasional problems during their flight journey. The
above criteria should be made configurable to allow fine-turning in future. Evaluation of ADS-B vs
radar may alternatively expose radar calibration issues requiring further investigation.

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(b) Systematic technical analysis of each detected issue using ADS-B recorded data,
to ensure that all detected issues are examined and addressed. Typically this will
need:
• systems to record ADS-B data, replay ADS-B data and analyze ADS-B data
• staff and procedures to analyze each report
• A database system to manage the status of each event and to store the results
of each analysis

(c) Procedures to support engagement with operators (domestic & foreign),

regulators, other ANSPs, Airframe OEMs and avionics vendors to ensure that
each issue is investigated adequately and maximize the probability that the root
cause of the event is determined. The procedures could include :-
• Data collection procedures;
• Telephone & email contact details; and
• Mechanisms for reporting, as appropriate, to the Asia Pacific ADS-B Avionics
Problem Reporting Database (APRD)

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Attachment A – List of known ADS-B avionics problems

Ref. Problem Cause Safety Implications to ATC Recommendations

(Yes / No)

1. Track Jumping problem Software issue with TPR901 Yes. Rockwell Collins has successfully
with Rockwell Collins transponder initially only introduced a Service Bulletin that
TPR901 affecting Boeing aircraft. Will present as a few wild/large solves the problem in Boeing aircraft.
(See Figure1) Does not occur in all aircraftpositional jumps. Nearly all reports
with this transponder. are tagged as low quality (NUC=0) The problem is known to exist on
and are discarded, however, some Airbus aircraft. Rockwell has advised
Subsequent investigation by occasional non zero reports get that a solution is available in their
Rockwell Collins has found through. DO260B upgrade.
that the particular
transponder, common to all Problem is very “obvious”. Could Rockwell Collins may not have a fix
of the aircraft where the result in incorrect longitudinal for some time. Workaround solutions
position jumps had been position of Flight Data Record are being examined by Airbus,
observed, had an issue when track. Can trigger RAM alerts. Operators and Airservices Australia.
crossing ±180 degrees
longitude. The only workaround identified at
this time is to power down the
On some crossings (10% transponders before flight to states
probability), errors are using ADS-B – after crossing
introduced into the position longitude 180. It can be noted that in
longitude before encoding. Airbus aircraft it is not possible to
These errors are not self- safely power down the transponder in
correcting and can only be flight.
removed by a power reset of
the transponder. The Airbus have prepared a procedure to
problem, once triggered can support power down before flight.
last days, since many Airservices Australia have negotiated
transponders are not with 2 airlines to enact this procedure
routinely powered down. prior to flights to Australia.

An additional partial workaround is :

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Ref. Problem Cause Safety Implications to ATC Recommendations

(Yes / No)

to ensure that procedures exist for

ATC to ask the pilot to changeover
transponders if the problem is
observed. Since there is a 10%
chance of the problem occurring on
each crossing of ±180 degrees
longitude, the chance that both
transponders being affected is 1%.

There is no complete workaround

available for flights that operate
across 180 degrees longitude directly
to destination without replacing the
transponder. Airbus advised that a
new TPR901 transponder compliant
with DO260B is available from
December 2015. This new
transponder does not have such
problem.

2. Rockwell Collins TDR94 Old software typically before Yes. Problem well known. Particularly
Old version. version -108. The design was affects Gulfstream aircraft which
completed before the ADS-BWill present as a few wild unfortunately leave the factory with
The pattern of erroneous standards were establishedpositional jumps. Nearly all reports ADS-B enabled from this
positional data is very and the message definitions
are tagged as low quality (NUC=0) transponder model.
distinctive of the are different to the current
and are discarded, however, some
problem. DO260. occasional non zero reports get Rockwell has issued a service
(See Figure 2) through. Also causes incorrect bulletin recommending that ADS-B
Rockwell has recommended altitude reports. be disabled for aircraft with this
that ADS-B be disabled on transponder software. See Service
these models. Problem is very “obvious”. Information Letter 1-05 July 19,
2005. It is easy to disable the
transmission.

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Ref. Problem Cause Safety Implications to ATC Recommendations

(Yes / No)

If a new case is discovered, an entry

needs to be made to the black list
until rectification has been effected.

3. Litton GPS with proper Litton GNSSU (GPS) Mark No. This GPS is installed in some older,
RAIM processing 1 design problem. (Does not typically Airbus, fleets.
apply to Litton Mark II). Perceived GPS integrity changes
GPS does not output correct seemingly randomly. With the GPS Data appears “Correct” but integrity
messages to transponder. satellite constellation working value can vary. Performance under
properly, the position data is good. “bad” satellite conditions is a
However the reported integrity is problem.
inconsistent and hence the data is
sometimes/often discarded by the Correction involves replacing the
ATC system. The effected is GNSSU (GPS) which is expensive.
perceived extremely poor
“coverage”. The data is not If a new case is discovered, an entry
properly “protected” against needs to be made to the black list
erroneous satellite ranging signals – until rectification has been effected.
although this cannot be “seen” by
ATC unless there is a rare satellite
problem.

4. SIL programming error Installers of ADS-B avionics No. Would NOT be included in a “black
for DO260A avionics using the newer DO260A list”.
standard mis program “SIL”. First report of detection appears
good (and is good), all subsequent Aircraft with “Dynon avionics”
a) This problem appears for reports not displayed because the exhibit this behavior. They do not
DO260A transponders, with data quality is perceived as “bad” have a certified GPS and hence
SIL incorrectly set to 0 or 1 by the ATC system. Operational always set SIL = 0. This is actually
(instead of 2 or 3) effect is effectively no ADS-B data. correct but hence they do not get
Hence no risk. treated as ADS-B equipped.
b) As the aircraft enters

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coverage, the ADS-B ground

station correctly assumes
DO260 until it receives the
version number.

c) The transmitted NIC

(DO260A) is interpreted as a
good NUC (DO260) value,
because no SIL message has
yet been received. The data
is presented to ATC.

5. Garmin “N” Flight ID Installers of Garmin Yes. Can be corrected by installer

problem transponder incorrectly set manipulation of front panel. Does not
(See Figure 3) “Callsign”/Flight ID. This is Flight ID appears as “N”. Inhibits warrant “black list” activity.
caused by poor human proper coupling.
factors and design that
assumes that GA aircraft are
US registered.

6. Flight ID corruption issue TPR901 software problem Yes. Affects mainly B747 aircraft. Boeing
1 – trailing “U” interfacing with Flight ID SB is available for Rockwell
Flight ID’s received : source. Results in constantly Flight ID changes during flight transponders and B744 aircraft.
GT615, T615U ,NEB033, changing Flight ID with inhibits proper coupling or causes
NEB033U, QF7550, some reports having an extra decoupling. Rockwell Collins have SB 503 which
QF7550U, QF7583, “U” character. upgrades faulty -003 transponder to -
QF7583U, QF7585, 005 standard.
QF7585, QF7585U,
QF7594, QFA7521, If a new case is discovered, an entry
QFA7531, QFA7531, needs to be made to the black list
QFA7531U, QFA7532, until rectification has been effected.
QFA7532U, QFA7532W,
QFA7550, QFA7552,

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QFA7581
7. Flight ID corruption issue ACSS software problem Yes. Software upgrade available.
2 results in constantly
changing Flight ID. Flight ID changes during flight If a new case is discovered, an entry
inhibits proper coupling or causes needs to be made to the black list
Applies to ACSS XS950 decoupling. until rectification has been effected.
transponder Pn 7517800-
110006 and Honeywell FMC
(pn 4052508 952). ACSS fix
was available in Sept 2007.

8. No Flight ID transmitted Various causes No. Aircraft could “fail to couple with
Flight Data Record”. Not strictly
Flight ID not available. Inhibits misleading – but could cause
proper coupling. controller distraction.

9. ACSS Transponder Yes. Not approved and hence not

10005/6 without Mod A compliant with CASA regulations.
reports NUC based on Appears good in all respects until
HFOM. there is a satellite constellation If known could be added to black list.
problem (not normally detectable Configuration is not permitted by
by ground systems). regulation.

10. Occasional small position For some older Airbus No. ATC ground system processing can
jump backwards aircraft, an occasional report eliminate these.
(See Figure 4) may exhibit a small “jump Not detectable in ATC due to
back” of less than 0.1 nm extrapolation, use of latest data and
screen ranges used.
Root cause not known

11. Older ACSS transponders Design error reports integrity No. Can be treated in the same manner as
report integrity too one value worse than reality a loss of transponder capability.
conservatively In poor GPS geometry cases the

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ATC system could discard the data

when the data is in fact useable.
Will be perceived as loss of ADS-B
data.

12. Intermittent wiring GPS ADS-B transmissions switch Yes. If a new case is discovered, an entry
transponder intermittently between INS needs to be made to the black list
position and GPS position. Normally the integrity data goes to until rectification has been effected.
zero when INS is broadcast, but
sometimes during transition
between INS and GPS, an INS
position or two can be broadcast
with “good” NUC value.

Disturbing small positional jump.

13. Wrong ICAO Aircraft Installation error No. This is not a direct ADS-B problem,
Address but relates to a Mode S transponder
No direct ATC impact unless a rare issue that can put TCAS at risk.
duplicate is detected.
Cannot be fixed by black list entry.
Needs to be passed to regulator for
resolution.

14. Toggling between high Faulty GPS receiver/ADS-B No. While it is normal for NUC value to
and low NUC transponder switch between a high and low figure
(See Figure 5) ATC will see tracks appear and based on the geometry of GPS
disappear discretely. No safety satellites available, it is of the view
implications to ATC. that more should be done to examine
this phenomenon. It is observed that
such switching between high and low
NUC occurs on certain airframe and

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not on others. The issue was raised to

the airlines so as to get a better
understanding. On one occasion, the
airline replied that a module on their
GPS receiver was faulty. On another
occasion, the airline replied that one
of the ADS-B transponder was
faulty. Good NUC was transmitted
when the working transponder was in
use and poor NUC was transmitted
when the faulty ADS-B transponder
was in use.

15. Consistent Low NUC GNSS receivers are not No. Not considered a safety problem but
(See Figure 6) connected to the ADS-B a common phenomenon in the
transponders. Data shall be filtered out by the Region – the concerned aircraft will
system and not detectable in ATC be treated equivalent to “aircraft not
equipped with ADS-B”.

While it is normal for aircraft to

transmit low NUC, it is of the view
that “consistent low NUC’ could be
due to the avionics problem (e.g.
GNSS receiver is not connected to
the ADS-B transponder).

It is recognised that operators may

not be aware that their aircraft are
transmitting unexpected low NUC
/ NIC values, due to equipment
malfunction. Hence, it is desirable
for States to inform the operators
when unexpected low NUC

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values are transmitted, where

practicable.

Concerned airline operators are

required to take early remedial
actions. Otherwise, their aircraft will
be treated as if non-ADS-B equipped
which will be requested to fly outside
the ADS-B airspace after the ADS-B
mandate becomes effective.

16. ADS-B position report Faulty ADS-B avionics Yes. The problem should be immediately
with good integrity (i.e. reported to the concerned
NUC >= “4”) but ADS-B As the ground system could not CAA/operators for problem
position data are actually "automatically" discard ADS-B diagnosis including digging out the
bad as compared with data with good integrity (i.e. NUC root causes, avionics/GPS types etc.,
radar (met criteria 5.2(a)) value >=4), there could be safety and ensure problem rectification
implications to ATC. before the ADS-B data could be used
by ATC.

Consider to “blacklist” the aircraft

before the problem is rectified.

17. FLTID transmitted by Human errors Yes. Issue regulations/letters to concerned

ADS-B aircraft does not operators urging them to set FLTID
match with callsign in Could lead to screen clutter - two exactly match with callsign in flight
flight plan target labels with different IDs (one plan.
(see Figures 7a – 7d) for radar and another for ADS-B)
being displayed, causing potential
confusion and safety implications
to ATC.

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18 B787 position error with Issue 1: Yes. Boeing performed a change to the
good NIC Software issue - surveillance B787 Type Certificate for
system inappropriately Misleading position presentation incorporation of the upgraded ISS
“coasts” the position when which is typically detected by ATC software in March of 2017. All B787
data received by the observing aircraft “off track” when aircraft delivered after Line number
transponder is split across in fact it is “on-track”. 541 have the upgraded ISS software
multiple messages. which corrects this issue.

System seems to self correct Boeing released Service Bulletin

after some time. Can be B787-81205-SB340036-00 on 30
corrected by surveillance June 2017. Note that this Service
system power off. Bulletin is available at no cost to the
operator, and includes the concurrent
Issue 2: requirement to implement Boeing
Data packets were not being Service Bulletin B787-81205-
distributed to the transponder SB340005-00.
when the internal timing
between different elements On 5 Nov 2018, FAA issued
of the Integrated Surveillance Airworthiness Directive 2017-NM-
System became 118-AD, effective 10 Dec 2018,
synchronized. which requires application of Boeing
SB B787-81205-SB340036-00 by 10
Dec 2019. EASA has invoked this
AD for States under its jurisdiction.
States and Operators are urged to
implement the service bulletin
immediately and report to FAA or
ICAO APAC Office.

As of 9 Sep 2020, 32 B787 aircraft

were on the NSAL; 18 of these
aircraft have been detected within

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U.S. ADS-B coverage during 2020.

The FAA is coordinating with State
Regulators who have operators with
B787 aircraft on the NSAL.

19 A number of airlines have Being actively investigated. No. Aircraft must be managed
reported or experienced One airline has implemented procedurally if outside radar
ADS-B outages for on-board recording which Equivalent to a failed transponder. coverage.
complete flight sectors in confirms that the MMRs are
A330 aircraft. Appears as not providing HIL/HPL to
low reliability ADS-B and the transponder whilst
has afflicted both A & B continuing to provide
side at same time. HFOM, GPS alt etc

20 A380 flight ID lost after For the A380 fleet, it has No. The correction to this logic is
landing been confirmed that for some planned for next AESS standard
seconds after landing, the release; planned for 2017.” Only a
flight ID is set as invalid by problem for arriving aircraft on
FMS to AESS. surface surveillance systems.
Consequently, the current
AESS design uses, as per
design, the Aircraft
Registration Number as a
back-up source for A/C flight
identification field in ADS-B
broadcast messages.
21 A350 ADS-B On-ground On departure, A350 aircraft Yes. where ADS-B is used for Airbus is in discussion with FAA and
Performance will initially use INS derived surface movement display EUROCONTROL about this issue.
position for ADS-B reports
when taxying and only use
GNSS when entering the
runway. INS positions can
drift leading to inaccurate

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position reports.

22 Incorrect Ground Bit Occasionally, some airborne Yes. Misleading information States/Administrations contact the
Setting (GBS) in both aircraft will incorrectly set shown on ATC system. Aircraft concerned airline operators for
Mode S Interrogation ground bit as “1” meaning not visible to TCAS and will not remedial actions.
Reply and ADS-B they are on ground, while reply to all-call interrogations.
Downlink some landed aircraft
incorrectly set ground bit as
“0” meaning they are
airborne. This could confuse
the ATC system, by not
showing the airborne targets
as the system thought they
are on ground, or forming
tracks for landed targets
triggering alarms against
other taking-off aircraft.

23 Rockwell TSS-4100 track The TSS-4100 shares Yes. Misleading position FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD)
extrapolation issue. software with the Rockwell presentation which is typically 2017-22-14 was issued on 20 Dec
Collins ISS transponder in shown on ATC system. 2017.
the B787, and the software The compliance date for this AD is
defect in the B787 ISS 20 Dec 2018 (or 750 hours in service,
reported at SURICG/2 also whichever occurs first).
exists in the TSS-4100.
FAA has not detected any aircraft
with this issue since the AD
compliance date and will not further
report on it, as it is considered
resolved.

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24 Embraer 170 track Unknown as being a random, Yes. Misleading position In all of the cases of this issue to
jumping issue occasional issue with no presentation which is typically date, removing and replacing the
clear fault diagnosis shown on ATC system. transponders cleared whatever the
available from Honeywell. issue was. This issue has never
FAA has decided that when recurred on the same aircraft. Bench
the next E170 aircraft is testing by Honeywell avionics
detected with this issue, it engineering of the removed
will be immediately placed transponders has revealed no faults
on the FAA’s No Services or anomalies. As such,
Aircraft List (NSAL). States/Administrations to consider
Simultaneously, FAA will removing and replacing the
notify Embraer and transponders concerned if issue
Honeywell of the affected observed.
aircraft and request that
appropriate engineering The FAA has since learned from
personnel be sent to inspect discussions with the OEM that most
and test the affected aircraft. recent events detected by FAA
generated an “ADS-B NOT AVAIL”
Crew Alerting System (CAS)
message. When flight crews report
this message, airline maintenance
replaces the transponder(s), which
resolves the problem. To date, this
has consistently occurred before
FAA monitoring detected the
problem and engaged with the
airline. The root cause for this issue
remains unknown.

25 Airbus Single Aisle FAA has observed 17 Airbus No. Airbus released three Service
production wiring issue Single Aisle aircraft from Bulletins to correct this issue, which
two airlines with missing existed in 128 Airbus Single Aisle
Length-Width Codes (LWC aircraft.

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is a message element in DO- As of 1-Dec-2018, all of the aircraft

260B/ED-102A that is which operate at US airports with
required by both the US and ADS-B surface surveillance were
European mandates). FAA corrected. The FAA will not further
believes that this was a report on this issue.
production line wiring issue.

26 Boeing 777-300ER FAA has observed at least 10 No. On 7 July 2017, Boeing released
production wiring issue Boeing B777-300ER aircraft Service Bulletin SB 777-34-0281 to
with missing or improper correct this issue. Boeing has
NACv/SDA/eCat/LWC informed FAA that all affected B777
message elements (these are operators have been notified. The
message elements in DO- FAA will not further report on this
260B/ED-102A that are issue.
required by both the US and
European mandates (eCat is
FAA shorthand for Emitter
Category). After notification,
Boeing reported to FAA that
this was a production line
parity pin wiring issue.

27 Rockwell TSS-4100 This issue exists in any TSS- Yes. At present, the FAA regulator has
Geometric Altitude 4100 installed with TSSA- determined that this issue occurs too
Reporting as Pressure 4100 software RCPN 810- rarely to warrant issuing an
Altitude 0052-100, RCPN 810-0052- Airworthiness Directive or a Special
101, or RCPN 810-0052-102. Airworthiness Information Bulletin
All of the following must be (SAIB).
true for the issue to occur:
Rockwell Collins has released
(1) TSS is the selected updated software, RCPN 810-0052-
transponder; 110, to address this issue. Refer to
(2) TSS is receiving valid SIL TSSA-4100-10-1 titled, "TSSA-

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(Yes / No)

pressure altitude; 4100 Field Loadable Software",

(3) TSS is receiving valid RCPN 523-0818785.
GPS data with an
integrity of NIC 9 or
better; and
(4) The mode of operation
for the transponder must
be "ALT OFF".

Note that in an SBAS service

area, only condition (4)
would be considered
uncommon.

When the issue exists, the

TSS will insert geometric
altitude information into the
ADS-B Airborne Position
Squitter, but this altitude will
be encoded as if it were
pressure altitude. The net
effect is that, when this issue
occurs, the TSS-4100 reports
geometric altitude
information as if it were
pressure altitude. In many
cases, this will be incorrect
altitude information.

28 NACv reporting greater The FAA has detected a No. While there is no known urgent issue
than 2 number of aircraft which with these findings, as no known

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consistently report NACv = 3 ATC or airborne application requires

and NACv = 4. NACv values exceeding two, FAA
does have long-term intentions of
Per FAA AC 20-165B deploying surveillance tracking and
section 3.3.3.7.3, “A NACv alerting prediction algorithms in
= 3 or NACv = 4 should not ATC automation which will use real-
be set based on GNSS time NACv values. ICAO States
velocity accuracy unless you planning to make similar
can demonstrate to the FAA improvements should be aware of
that the velocity accuracy this situation.
actually meets the
requirement.” EASA CS-
ACNS states that “There is
currently no established
guidance on establishing a
NACv performance of
‘three’ or better.” Therefore,
it appears that there are
improperly configured ADS-
B installations operating in
the U.S.

29 B787 NACv = 0 Issue FAA noted certain B787s No. The erroneous NACv=0 condition
exhibiting a relatively high clears at the next power up of the
percentage of NACv =0 ISSPU.
reports.
Boeing has issued guidance urging
Starting with line number B787 operators to not intermix INR
442 (June 2016), Honeywell P/N 940-2001-002 or -004 (which do
Integrated Navigation not output HFOMv) with INR P/N
Receiver (INR) P/N 940- 940-2001-008 (which does output
2001-008 was introduced, HFOMv) until the ISSPU software

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(Yes / No)

which has an HFOMv has been updated per an available

output. Boeing investigations Boeing Service Bulletin. This
revealed a software flaw in guidance was provided in Boeing
the ISSPU that causes an Fleet Team Digest 787-FTD-34-
erroneous NACv=0 reporting 19005 (dated 21 Dec 2019).
condition on B787s equipped
with a mixed set of As of 9-Aug-2020, FAA has
Honeywell INR part observed no significant occurrences
numbers. This condition of this issue within U.S. ADS-B
occurs when the ISSPU coverage during the prior two
switches between an INR months.
with an HFOMv output and
an INR without an HFOMv
output.

30 Honeywell Primus II RCZ FAA observed that a number No In October 2015, Honeywell released
issue of operators equipped with a Service Information Letter
the Honeywell Primus II (Publication Number
integrated system were filing D201507000061) to notify customers
flight plans as ADS-B of these power up conditions, the
equipped, but not effect it would have on the Primus II
transmitting ADS-B. equipment, and a potential work
around to address the problem.
Honeywell had identified an
issue where the ADS-B Out In December 2019, Honeywell
capable RCZ transponder released Service Bulletin (SB)
and Radio Management Unit (Publication Number A21-2254-148)
(RMU) components of the providing required modifications for
Primus II system will not the RMU to correct the ON/OFF
broadcast ADS-B data if logic for the ADS-B Out
powered on under specific functionality.
conditions. Also, the Radio
Management Unit (RMU) The FAA has been working in

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(Yes / No)

will fail to notify the flight collaboration with Honeywell to

crew that ADS-B Out update the existing Service
functionality is disabled. Information Letter to emphasize the
importance of updating the RMU
with the latest SB, to include
implementing the option of
configuring the ADS-B Out
installation through a strap setting to
provide indication of the ON/OFF
control of ADS-B to the flight crew.
The latest revision of the Service
Information Letter will be referenced
as part of the FAA issued Special
Airworthiness Information Bulletin
(SAIB) expected to be released
before the end of December 2021.

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Figure 1 - Track Jumping problem with TPR901 Figure 3 - Garmin “N” Flight ID problem

Figure 2 - Rockwell Collins TDR94 Old version. The pattern of Figure 4 - Occasional small position jump backwards

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erroneous positional data is very distinctive of the problem

NUC always 0

Figure 5 - NUC value toggling Figure 6 – Consistent low NUC

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ADS-B
ADS-B

Radar

NUC always 0 Radar

Figure 7a - Additional zero inserted Figure 7b - ICAO Airline Designator Code dropped

ADS-B
ADS-B

Radar
Radar

Figure 7c - Wrong numerical codes entered Figure 7d - IATA Airline Designator Code used

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Attachment B - Sample screen shot of a system to monitor and analyse performance of ADS-B avionics

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Appendix 3

A Template for ADS-B Mandate/Regulations for Aircraft Avionics

(1) On and after dd/mm/yyyy, if an aircraft carries 1090MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B
transmitting equipment for operational use in xxxxxxxx territory, the equipment must have been
certificated as meeting :1

(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in
Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ
Extended Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
(b) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of
Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Subpart D —
Surveillance (SUR) (CS-ACNS.D.ADS-B), or
(c) Federal Aviation Administration – Advisory Circular No: 20-165A (or later versions)
Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Systems, or
(d) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia.

(2) On and after dd/mm/yyyy, if an aircraft operates on airways (insert routes)…………at or above
FLXXX………(or in defined airspace boundaries ……………. at or above FLXXX):2

The aircraft must carry serviceable 1090MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B transmitting
equipment that has been certificated as meeting :-

(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in
Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ
Extended Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
(b) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of
Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Subpart D —
Surveillance (SUR) (CS-ACNS.D.ADS-B), or
(c) Federal Aviation Administration – Advisory Circular No: 20-165A (or later versions)
Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Systems, or
(d) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia.

(3) An aircraft carrying 1 090 MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B equipment shall disable
ADS-B transmission unless:

(a) the aircraft emits position information of an accuracy and integrity consistent with the
transmitted value of the position quality indicator; or
(b) the aircraft always transmits a value of 0 (zero) for one or more of the position quality
indicators (NUCp, NIC, NACp or SIL); or

1
This paragraph ensures all aircraft operating in the airspace, if equipped with ADS-B, are compliant
to standards.
2
This paragraph provides mandate requirements within certain parts of the airspace

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(c) the operator has received an exemption granted by the appropriate ATS authority.

Note: States are urged to include at least the standards stated in the template. States may include other
standards allowed by the State’s regulations.

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Appendix 4

An Example of Advice to Operators Concerning Inconsistency Between ADS-B

Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability

1 Background

Newer technologies for aircraft surveillance are now available – such as Mode S and
ADS-B – which in many aircraft are installed as replacements for older Mode A/C
transponders.

Air Traffic Control makes use of these new capabilities, and uses the Flight Plan
information as a decision support tool – to allow the Air Traffic Controller to predict
the surveillance capability of a particular aircraft before it enters radar or ADS-B
coverage.

Requirements for ADS-B and Mode S (insert local reference document if

applicable) may mean that if flight planning does not accurately reflect the aircraft
capability, services may be withheld (for example if ADS-B is mandatory, but not
indicated on the flight plan – this section to be modified for local requirements).

2 Flight Planning Requirements for Transponder and ADS-B

The flight planning requirements for aircraft are described in (local document
reference or ICAO DOC 4444 Appendix 2) and repeated below.

Surveillance Equipment
N if no surveillance equipment for the route to be flown is carried, or the equipment is
unserviceable
OR
INSERT one or more of the following descriptors, to a maximum of 20 characters, to
describe the serviceable surveillance equipment and/or capabilities on board:

SSR Modes A and C

A Transponder — Mode A (4 digits — 4 096 codes)
C Transponder — Mode A (4 digits — 4 096 codes) and Mode C

SSR Mode S
E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and
extended squitter (ADS-B) capability
H Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and
enhanced surveillance capability

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I Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, but no pressure-altitude

capability
L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude,
extended squitter (ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability
P Transponder — Mode S, including pressure-altitude, but no aircraft identification
capability
S Transponder — Mode S, including both pressure altitude and aircraft identification
capability
X Transponder — Mode S with neither aircraft identification nor pressure-altitude
capability
Note : Enhanced surveillance capability is the ability of the aircraft to down-link
aircraft derived data via a Mode S transponder.

ADS-B
B1 ADS-B with dedicated 1 090 MHz ADS-B “out” capability1
B2 ADS-B with dedicated 1 090 MHz ADS-B “out” and “in” capability1
U1 ADS-B “out” capability using UAT
U2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using UAT
V1 ADS-B “out” capability using VDL Mode 4
V2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using VDL Mode 4

3 Additional information

The capability of your aircraft transponder, and ADS-B capability, will typically be
available in the transponder manual, or in the aircraft flight manual for the aircraft.
For General Aviation aircraft, the most common configurations for filing in the flight
plan item10b will be (listed in order of capability).

EB1 – An ADS-B equipped aircraft would typically file this to indicate the Mode S
transponder capability with ADS-B out.

S – The majority of Mode S transponders (without ADS-B) will support pressure

altitude information and Flight ID transmission.

C – For aircraft with an older Mode A/C transponder – most of which provide
pressure altitude capability.

Less common configurations in General Aviation will include:

1
Based on current version of ICAO Doc 4444

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H, LB1 or LB2 – Enhanced surveillance capability is more usually associated with

higher end aircraft. ADS-B IN (B2) is relatively rare at this time, but may be
available for some aircraft.

I, P or X – Most Mode S transponders will support Flight ID and pressure altitude, so

these configurations are not common.

A – some low end GA aircraft may not provide pressure altitude information.

U1 or U2 – these ADS-B technologies are only authorized in a limited number of

countries in the Asia Pacific Region.

Planning designations not to be used in Asia Pacific:

V1 or V2 – these ADS-B technologies are not authorised for use in Asia Pacific
Region.

Remember:
Always flight plan the correct surveillance capability for your aircraft. If in doubt,
consult the transponder manual, aircraft flight manual, or your Licenced Aircraft
Maintenance Engineer.

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Appendix 5

Checklist of Common Items or Parameters for the Monitoring of ADS-B System

1 ADS-B Ground Station

Site Monitoring
• Receiver Sensitivity
• Antenna Cable
• GPS Health
• Coverage Check
• Probability of Detection
• Station Service Availability
• Receiver Status

Remote Control & Monitoring (RCMS)

• CPU Process Operation
• Temperature
• ASTERIX Output Load and Link Status
• Time Synchronization
• GPS Status
• Power Status
• Site Monitor Status
• Memory Usage
• Software Version (Operating System and RCMS Application)

Logistic Support Monitoring

• Record all failures, service outage and repair/return to service times

2 ADS-B Equipage Monitoring

• Update and maintain list of ADS-B equipped airframe details database

• Identify aircraft non-compliant to regional mandate

3 ADS-B Avionics Monitoring

• Track Consistency
• Valid Flight ID
• Presence of NACp/NIC/NUC Values
• Presence of Geometric Altitude
• Correctness of ICAO Aircraft Address

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• Avionics Configuration and Connections

• Update and maintain list of aircraft with faulty avionics

4 ADS-B Performance Monitoring

• Percentage of aircraft with good integrity reports

• Accuracy of ADS-B Horizontal Position (Based on a reference sensor)
• Deviation between Geometric and Barometric Height
• Monitor the number of position jumps
• Message interval rate

5 ADS-B Display on ATC Display

• Split Track – ADS-B reported position might be off

• Coupling Failure – Wrong aircraft ID
• Duplicated ICAO Aircraft Address
• Display of data block

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Appendix 6
BASELINE ADS-B SERVICE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

The following table provides guidelines for various performance requirements of ADS-B Category (Tier) 1, 2 or 3 services that States may consider when acquisition of an ADS-B managed
service agreement with a service provider:

Service Parameter Guidance Category 1 (Tier 1) Category 2 (Tier 2) Category 3 (Tier 3)

5Nm separation capable commensurate with Situational awareness similar to ADS-C Position Reporting with Enhanced Flight
Radars (safety-net alerts, SAR, supports Operation
(separation/vectoring/high performance procedural separation without voice, not
with reliability, integrity & latency) 5nm separation)
Aircraft Recommended 0.5 second < Interval < 5 0.5 second < Interval < 20 0.5 second < Interval < 60
Updates seconds as Operationally seconds as Operationally seconds as Operationally
required required required
Maximum 0.5 second < Interval < 10
seconds as Operationally
required
Network Recommended 95%: < 2 seconds of 95%: < 15 seconds of 95%: < 60 seconds of
Latency receiver-station output receiver-station output receiver-station output

Reliability 1 Recommended 2 autonomous receiver-stations including 1 unduplicated receiver-station including 1 unduplicated receiver-station including
antenna, each providing data, no common point antenna antenna
of failure
Reliability 2 - Recommended Each receiver-station Each receiver-station Each receiver-station
MTBF including antenna to have including antenna to have including antenna to
MTBF >10,000 hrs MTBF >10,000 hrs have MTBF >10,000 hrs

Reliability – Recommended Completely duplicated, no common point of Unduplicated, MTBF > 400 hrs Unduplicated, MTBF> 200 hrs
Communications failure
Infrastructure
Reliability – Recommended Total Service MTBF >50,000 hrs Total Service MTBF > 400hrs Total Service MTBF> 200 hrs
Total ADS-B
Service
Availability – Recommended Total Service Availability > .999 Total Service Availability >.95 Total Service Availability >.90
Total ADS-B
Service

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Service Parameter Guidance Category 1 (Tier 1) Category 2 (Tier 2) Category 3 (Tier 3)

5Nm separation capable commensurate with Situational awareness similar to ADS-C Position Reporting with Enhanced Flight
Radars (safety-net alerts, SAR, supports Operation
(separation/vectoring/high performance procedural separation without voice, not
with reliability, integrity & latency) 5nm separation)
Integrity – Recommended Site monitor Site monitor System Monitoring
Ground Station System Monitoring System Monitoring
Minimum System Monitoring Not required Not required
Integrity – Data Recommended All systems up to ATM system, All systems up to ATM system, errors < 1 x All systems up to ATM system,
Communications & errors < 1 x 10E-6 10E-6 errors < 1 x 10E-6
Processing

The choice of category (tier) could be based upon a number of factors including the following,

a) The desired service

b) The available budget
c) The available ATC automation system & its capabilities and/or interim display systems
d) ATC training and ratings
e) Availability of appropriately tailored ATC procedures

States could initially choose one level and transition to another at a later time. For example, Category (Tier) 2 could be used to add additional safety nets/situational awareness and gain operational
experience during the initial stage, moving later to a full separation service using Category (Tier) 1.

Note: The Performance Based Surveillance Sub Group of the ICAO Surveillance Panel is reviewing performance standards for surveillance systems generally. A future update to the requirements
in the above table may be based on the outcomes of that panel.

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Appendix 7
GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON
GENERATION, PROCESSING & SHARING of ASTERIX
CATEGORY 21 ADS-B MESSAGES
(Including Attachments A, B, C & D)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The “All Purpose Structured Eurocontrol Surveillance Information Exchange”

(ASTERIX) Category 21 is a data format standard globally accepted by the Air Traffic Management
(ATM) system manufacturing industry for sharing of ADS-B data with ATM automation system.8
Asterix Category 21 data is used to convey ADS-B data from ADS-B receiver stations to ATC
processing and display system. This guidance material discusses various aspects of this process. Since
the ASTERIX Category 21 edition 0.23 was issued in November 2003, it has undergone continuous
revisions with some 19 subsequent editions. The focus of this guidance material is to concentrate on
1090ES ADS-B data using:

a) RTCA DO-260 (Version 0);

b) RTCA DO-260A (Version 1); and
c) RTCA DO-260B (Version 2)

1.2 The ASTERIX Category 21 edition 1.0 issued in August 2008 fully incorporated the
DO260A standard while edition 2.1 issued in May 2011 fully incorporated the latest DO260B
standard. The latest edition (as at April 2018) is edition 2.4.

2. ASTERIX CAT 21 IN ASIA AND PACIFIC REGIONS

2.1 To ensure interoperability of ADS-B receiver stations in the Asia Pacific (ASIA/PAC)
Regions, during the 16th APANPIRG Meeting held in August 2005, the ASTERIX Category 21 edition
0.23 which had incorporated DO260 standard was adopted as the baselined ADS-B data format for
deployment of ADS-B receiver stations and sharing of ADS-B data in the ASIA/PAC Regions. At that
time DO260A and DO260B standards were not defined.

3. CHOICE OF ASTERIX VERSION NUMBER

3.1 The Asterix standard has been developed over many years. Stability in the standard is
desirable so that ADS-B receiver station designers and ATM automation designers and manufacturers
can build interoperable systems with confidence. Because ADS-B technology has been evolving over
the years, and will continue to do so, it is not surprising that the Asterix standard has also developed
along with the ADS-B link technology standards to grasp the best benefits of its intended design.

3.2 During 2005, Asia Pacific decided to use Ed0.23 as the edition for sharing ADS-B data
between states. This version provides adequate information so that useful ATC operational services can
be provided including ATC 3 nautical mile and 5 nautical mile separation services. Ed0.23 can be used
with DO260, DO260A and DO260B ADS-B avionics/receiver stations to provide basic ATC operational

8
FAA utilise Asterix Cat 33 for ADS-B message distribution.

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services. However, Ed0.23 cannot fully support all the capabilities offered by DO260A and DO260B.

3.3 Nearly all Ed0.23 data items can be “re-constructed” from a received Ed2.1 data
stream. However, most of the special DO260A/B data items cannot be “re-constructed” from an
Ed0.23 data stream. In terms of domestic use and data sharing with other ANSPs concerning ADS-B
data, several options exist for ANSPs as follows:

Option Domestic use Data sharing

1 Ed0.23 Ed0.23. This is the default and basic standard.

2 Ed2.1 Ed0.23. This will require some conversions to occur, probably

through an ADS-B format conversion and filter system (see
Paragraph 11), between a domestic system and a foreign system.
Difficulties may exist if the domestic ATM system requires special
DO260A/B data items, since they cannot all be re-constructed from
the external foreign Ed0.23 data stream.

3 Ed2.1 Ed2.1. Must negotiate bilaterally with data sharing partner regarding
exact version to be used to achieve the intended functions.

Note: In this table, Ed2.1, a later DO260B compliant Asterix Cat 21 edition, is chosen as a representation of an
Asterix Cat 21 edition after Ed0.23. There exists other Asterix CAT 21 editions (e.g. 0.26, 1.3, 2.4 etc.) after
Ed0.23 that could be used by ANSPs for domestic and data sharing use.

4. SPECIFICATION OF ASTERIX MESSAGE PROCESSING

4.1 Care is needed to understand the difference in specifications :

4.2 Asterix Cat 21: Defines the characteristics of the data ON the interface including
fields that are mandatory on the interface.

4.3 ADS-B receiver station specifications: To define the Asterix standard, the ANSP
must also define which optional Asterix data items are required to be delivered on the Asterix
interface, when the appropriate data is received from the aircraft. It is desirable that suppliers be
required to:

a) indicate how the receiver station processes and outputs every received DO260,
DO260A and DO260B data element into an Asterix data element/field; and

b) indicate which and how each Asterix data element and field presented at the output are
populated.
4.4 ATM automation system specifications: Defines which received Asterix data
element and fields are processed and how they are processed. Also defines which Asterix optional
data fields are required by the ATM automation systems (if any). ANSPs that specify ADS-B receiver
stations and ATM automation systems need to consider carefully and clearly about what they desire to
achieve. Specifications which simply require compliance with a particular Asterix edition will be
inadequate in most circumstances. In particular ANSPs, together with their suppliers should :

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a) Specify the Asterix standard edition to be used. This defines the message formats that
are placed on the link between ADS-B receiver station and downstream systems like
ATM automation, recording & analysis systems, bypass ATC systems and foreign
ANSPs. The edition will define which messages elements are mandatory in each
message (very few fields) and a large number of optional fields. The optional fields
can only be filled if relevant data is received from the aircraft. The optional fields will
only be filled if the receiver station specification requires them to be filled.

b) Specify the ADS-B receiver station behaviour so that when data is received from the
aircraft, the receiver station is required to fill appropriate optional Asterix data fields.

c) Specify the ATM automation system behaviour including appropriate semantic and
syntax checks applied to the Asterix data, including any triggers for the system to
discard data. The processing applied to each received Asterix data field should be
specified. The ATC system should discard any messages with unexpected Asterix
categories without discarding messages with known and defined Asterix categories.

5. MANDATORY FIELDS : ASTERIX AND 1090ES ADS-B

5.1 Asterix Cat 21 has been designed to support multiple datalinks. It has been defined to
support data fields which are not available in the 1090ES standards. Therefore some data items and
fields are not relevant when 1090ES is used.

5.2 The standard itself defines various items as optional or mandatory. This is defining
what is ON the interface. It does NOT specify the behaviour of the transmitting receiver station nor the
behaviour of the receiving ATM automation system.

5.3 When a single link technology has been chosen it may be sensible to diverge from the
formal Ed0.23 standard to reduce the required Asterix datalink bandwidth. E.g.: in an environment with
only 1090ES, it is unnecessary to transmit “Link Technology Indicator”. Asterix Cat 21 Ed 2.1 allows
this selection.

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Data Description Mandatory (M) or Optional (O) items as

Items per ASTERIX Category 21
Version 0.23 Version 2.1
Specification Specification
I021/010 Data Source Identification M M
I021/030 Time of Day M N/A
I021/071 Time of Applicability of N/A One of these is must be
or I021/073 Position or transmitted
Time of Message
reception for position
I021/040 Target Report Descriptor M M

I021/080 Target Address M M

I021/210 Link Technology Indicator/ M O
MOPS version

6. GENERATION OF ASTERIX AT AN ADS-B RECEIVER STATION

6.1 The following general principles should be adopted:

6.2 Commensurate with link bandwidth availability, transmit all mandatory Asterix data
items and also transmit those Asterix data items that are operationally desirable. That is, when the
appropriate aircraft transmission is received by the ADS-B receiver station, the data should be
transmitted to the ATC system for operational use or for technical recording and analysis use. If no
aircraft transmission data is received to fill an Asterix data item during any update cycle, the data item
should not be included in the Asterix data stream to reduce bandwidth requirements.

6.3 Group 1 (Mandatory Data Items): An Asterix Cat21 message should not be
transmitted unless the mandatory data items defined in Appendix A are all present.

6.4 Group 2 (Desirable Data Items) : The data items defined in Appendix B are
operationally desirable which should always be transmitted in the Asterix Cat 21 messages whenever
the data are received by the 1090ES receiver station from aircraft (if allowed by the relevant Asterix
standard chosen).

6.5 Group 3 (Optional Data Items) : The data items defined in Appendix C are
considered optional and may or may not need to be transmitted depending on availability of such data
from aircraft and/or other specific operational needs.

6.6. Group 4 (Future Data Items): The following data are defined in the DO260A and
DO260B standards but are not yet defined in the Asterix standard. This group is provided for
information only. It illustrates the need for system designers to provide for future adaptability when
possible and when cost effective to do so. Not only will the Asterix standard continue to evolve, but
changes to DO260 can also be anticipated within the decade.

a) Target heading: Information from DO260A/B Target state and status

messages (On condition messages). These could be used for detection of pilot

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errors in selection of heading/altitude; and

b) GPS Offset: Could be used to more accurately display aircraft position on an

airport surface, or better detect that an aircraft has passed an airport hold
point.

6.7 When developing a specification for an ADS-B receiver station, it is considered

necessary that the specification requires the transmission of all data items that are operationally
desirable (Group 2), when such data are received from the aircraft, in addition to the data items that are
mandatory (Group 1) in Asterix messages. Whether Group 3 optional data items will need to be
transmitted or not should be configurable on item-by-item basis within the ADS-B receiver station
depending on specific operational needs.

7. PROCESSING OF ASTERIX ADS-B DATA AT THE ATC SYSTEM

7.1 An Asterix Cat21 message should not be accepted by the ATC system for processing
unless it includes at least all the Group 1 data items.

7.2 The ATC system should process all received Asterix Cat21 message data items that
bring operational benefits (i.e. Group 2 data items). An ATM automation specification should require
that the system appropriately process those Group 2 data items depending on specific operational need.
Whether the ATC system will process Group 3 optional data items will depend on specific operational
needs.

8. DATA SHARING OF ASTERIX ADS-B DATA

8.1 In principle, all data receiving from the shared ADS-B receiver station should be delivered to
the receiving party as far as practicable without filtering, unless owing to technical reasons such as the
need to convert the data from one ASTERIX format to another, or it is requested by the receiving party
of the data.

8.2 It is considered necessary that all data items that are mandatory in Asterix messages (i.e.
Group 1 data items) and operationally desirable (i.e. Group 2 data items) when such data are received
from aircraft, should be included in data sharing. In the event that the data have to be filtered, the list of
optional data items (i.e. Group 3 data items) needs to be shared will be subject to mutual agreement
between the two data sharing parties concerned.

9. ISSUE RELATED TO DO260A

9.1 Support of DO260A using Asterix Cat 21 Ed0.23

a) DO260A was developed after Ed0.23 of Asterix was defined. Therefore,

Ed0.23 does not directly support DO260A. However, receiver station
software can generate useful Ed0.23 Asterix data from DO260A reports
through use of the following techniques;

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b) A useful I021/090 Figure of Merit can be generated from DO260A messages.

Some implementations have a table, which defines the FOM/PA to be
generated for each combination of SIL, NIC and NAC. The contents of the
table can be offline defined to generate the appropriate FOM/PA values. The
downstream ATC system can then process DO260A reports as if they were
DO260 reports; and

c) If there is a particular need for the ATC system to have access to the
NIC/NAC or SIL or other data item that exist in DO260A (but not in DO260),
then users may need to consider a more recent version of Cat 21.

9.2 Support of DO260A using Asterix Cat 21 Ed 1.0 or Ed2.1 (or later versions)

a) When DO260A is used, then the ANSP could decide to use Asterix Cat 21
Ed1.0 (or later versions) or Ed2.1 (or later versions); and

b) Readers are invited to carefully examine the DO260A fields (see Appendix D)
to determine if the benefits of additional DO260A fields are large enough to
warrant adoption of Asterix Cat 21 Ed1.0 (or later versions) or Ed2.1 (or later
versions).

10. ISSUE RELATED TO DO260B

10.1 Support of DO260B using Asterix Cat 21 Ed0.23

a) DO260B was developed some years after DO260A. Therefore, Asterix Cat
21, Ed0.23 does not directly support DO260B;

b) The same techniques used for processing DO260A can be used for processing
DO260B, however, the table used must account for NIC supplement B &
NIC supplement C, and may also wish to account for SDA; and

c) If there is a particular need for the ATC system to have access to the new data
items offered by DO260B, then users may need to consider a more recent
version of Cat 21 (e.g. Ed2.1 or later versions).

10.2 Support of DO260B using Asterix Cat 21 Ed2.1 or later versions

a) If DO260B is used, then the ANSP could decide to use Asterix Cat 21 Ed2.1
or later; and

b) Readers are invited to carefully examine the DO260B data items (see
Appendix D) to determine if the benefits of additional DO260B data items
are large enough to warrant adoption of Asterix Cat 21 Version 2.1 or later.

11. ADS-B FORMAT CONVERSION AND FILTER SYSTEM

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11.1 It is clear that the evolution of 1090ES ADS-B transmission will continue. Avionics
software will be upgraded to provide additional or changed functionality. As a result Asterix standards
will also continue to evolve, and ATC systems will need to be adaptable to be able to cope with new
functionality requirements and new message standards.

11.2 The use of an ADS-B format conversion & filter (ADS-B FC&F) system between
domestic ADS-B systems and data shared with other states is a cost-effective way to provide the
necessary protection and flexibility in this evolution. Such a system provides ADS-B format
conversion between domestic and foreign ADS-B systems. While decoupling one ADS-B Asterix
environment from another, the system allows information that meets specific sharing criteria to be
passed through for data sharing. By doing so, loading on the ATM automation systems to process
ADS-B data and bandwidth requires to transmit the ADS-B data could then be reduced. The system
also allows independent domestic format changes without disruption to the foreign environment. A
typical structure could be as shown below:

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7 Attachment A - Group 1 (Mandatory Data Items)

Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1

I021/010 Data Source Identification X X Identifies source of data. Important if validity checks
are performed as an anti spoofing capability.
Validation that the data is received from an
approved ADS-B receiverstation. Data received
from a receiver station should not be processed if the
position of the reported aircraft is an unreasonable
distance away from the known location of the ADS-
B receiver
station. Where space based ADS-B is used and a
nominal station location is defined, such range
processing limits will need to account for the
coverage supplied.
I021/030 Time of Day X Necessary to extrapolate the ADS-B data to time of
display. Data received with a Time of Day too far in
the past should be
discarded. This data is too old.
I021/071 Time of Applicability of X Necessary to extrapolate the ADS-B data to time of
or I021/073 Position or display. Data received with a Time of Day too far in
Time of Message the past should be
reception for position discarded. This data is too old.
I021/040 Target Report Descriptor X X Indicates if report is a duplicate, on the receiver, is a
simulated target, is a test target. This needs to be
checked by ATC system prior to processing. If the
data indicates that the report is a test target or a
simulated target, it is normally processed differently
to “real” targets.

I021/080 Target Address X X Included in all 1090ES downlink messages, so

always available. Used for report/report
linkage in ATC tracking.
I021/090 Figure of Merit/Quality X X Position cannot be used without quality indicator. If
Indicators the quality of the positional data does not meet the
requirements the data
should be discarded.
I021/130 Position in WGS-84 X X Report cannot be used without position
co-ordinates

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Attachment B - Group 2 (Desirable Data Items)

Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1

I021/008 Aircraft operational status X TCAS capability, Target state reporting

capability, CDTI capability, Single/dual
aircraft antenna.
It is desirable to have immediate
knowledge of RA event.
I021/020 Emitter Category X X Aircraft or vehicle type
I021/140 Geometric Altitude/Height X X Useful for RVSM monitoring. Not normally
used for ATC application. Could perhaps be
used as an indicator of
correct QNH setting in aircraft.
I021/145 Flight Level X X Flight level is an important information
to ATC
I021/155 Barometric Vertical Rate X X Used for predictive tools and safety nets. Either
I021/157 Geometric Vertical Rate X X Barometric vertical rate or Geometric vertical
rate is provided by the aircraft – not both.

However, the ATC system can calculate

vertical rate from multiple flight level reports if
these data items are not
available.

I021/160 Ground Vector X X Provides excellent vector to support

extrapolation of positional data to time of
display.

However, the ATC system can calculate the

velocity vector (ground vector) from multiple
position reports. I021/160 however, is normally
far superior that
ATC system calculation.
I021/170 Target Identification X X This is the callsign/Flight ID is extremely
useful for ATC and matching to the flight plan
(if any).

Target identification is only sent once per 5

seconds. Some receiver stations designs attach
the target identification (if known from previous
recent downlinks) even if not received in the last
5 seconds.

The field can be missing at the edge of

ADS-B coverage – for flights inbound to
coverage.

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I021/200 Target Status X X This is the emergency type and is highly

desirable.

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Attachment C - Group 3 (Optional Data Items)

Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1

I021/077 Time of report transmission X Time of applicability is relevant for

ATC system processing. Time of
transmission is less relevant.
I021/032 Time of Day Accuracy X Maximum error in Time of day.
Normally the maximum value is
known by the ANSP because of
station design.
I021/095 Velocity Accuracy X If using GPS, velocity accuracy will be
adequate if the Position quality is
accurate.
I021/072 Time of applicability of X Can be managed by a velocity data
velocity time out in receiver station.
I021/075 Time of message reception of X Normally velocity is in the same Asterix
velocity message as position. Velocity
data time out in receiver station.
I021/161 Track number X Tracking can be performed by ATC
system. Also the 24 bit code (aircraft
address) could be used as a pseudo
track number.
I021/110 Trajectory Intent X X Defined in DO260 but not transmitted by
any known product. Not defined in
DO260A or DO260B
I021/146 (Intermediate) Selected X X Target altitude :
Altitude Information from DO260A/B Target state
I021/148 Final State Selected Altitude X X and status messages (On condition
messages). These could be used for
detection of pilot errors in
selection of heading/altitude.
I021/015 Service identification X Type of Service (VDL4, Ext Squitter, UAT,
TIS-B VDL4, TIS-B Ext Squitter, TIS-B
UAT, FIS-B VDL4,
GRAS VDL4, MLT). Not useful to
most ATC systems.
I021/016 Service management X Update rate or whether data driven
output from GS. Normally known by
receiver.

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Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1

I021/074 Time of message reception of X High resolution is designed to support

position – high resolution MLAT system processing by receiver.
Not required for pure ADS-B.
I021/076 Time of message reception of X High resolution is designed to support
velocity – high resolution MLAT system processing by receiver. Not
required for pure ADS-B.
I021/210 MOPS version/ Link Technology X X Maybe useful for statistics about equipage.
Indicator Not operationally relevant

I021/070 Mode 3/A code X Could be used for legacy ATC system
that do not use Flight ID
I021/165 Rate of Turn/Track Angle rate X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/271 Surface capabilities and X
characteristics
I021/132 Message amplitude X Useful for technical analysis. Not
operationally relevant
I021/250 Mode S MB data X
I021/260 ACAS resolution advisory X
report
I021/400 Receiver ID X
I021/295 Data ages X
I021/150 Air Speed X X Defined in standards but only sent in
I021/151 True Air Speed X X absence Ground vector information. Can’t
be used for extrapolation unless wind speed
known.

I021/152 Magnetic Heading X X Defined in standards but only sent in

absence Ground vector information.
I021/220 Met Report X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/230 Roll Angle X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/131 Position in WGS-84 X
coordinates, high resolution

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Attachment D - Differences among DO260, DO260A, DO260B

DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information
Asterix CAT 21

Introduction of NUCP is used. NIC is used to More levels of NIC is shown in Ed1.0 The additional quantum levels of NIC would
Navigation Integrity replace NUCP. NIC available. and above. More levels allow the ANSP more flexibility in deciding
Category (NIC) to Vertical of NIC (shown as PIC) whether the NIC is considered as ‘good’ (if
replace Navigation component are available in v2.1. required)
Uncertainty Category removed.
(NUCP) However, for 3 NM & 5 NM separation with
HPL 1Nm and 2 Nm respectively, this additional
quantum is not useful.

Quality Indicator for NUCR is used. Replaced with Vertical Available in Ed0.23 Vertical component is not available for DO260B.
Velocity (NUCR and NACV. component and above.
NACV) Definition removed.
remains the
same.
Surveillance Integrity Not available. Surveillance Renamed as Available in Ed1.0 and The SIL will allow the user to further assess the
Level and Source Integrity Level Source Integrity above. integrity of the reported position (if required).
Integrity Level (SIL) is used. Level. Definition
is changed to NB: An implied SIL exists for DO260 aircraft if
exclude avionics they always use GPS. However DO260 aircraft
fault. do not provide SIL.

System Design Not available. Not available. To address Available in Ed2.1. The SDA will indicate the robustness of the
Assurance (SDA) probability of system. ANSPs may decide on a minimum SDA
avionics fault. for ADS-B services.
If this action is taken then DO260 and DO260A
aircraft will be unable to meet the criteria.

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DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information

Asterix CAT 21

Navigation Accuracy Not available. Derived from Relies only on Available in Ed1.0 and A reported accuracy is not provided by DO260.
Category (NACP) HFOM and HFOM. above. However, an estimated accuracy can be derived
VFOM. from NUC – assuming that NUC is HPL based.

Geometric Vertical Not available. Not available. Derived from Available in Ed2.1. Geometric altitude accuracy is not normally
Accuracy (GVA) VFOM. required for operational purposes.

Barometric Altitude Not available. To indicate Same as Available in Ed1.0 and The NICBARO indicates the integrity of the
Integrity Code integrity of DO-260A above. barometric height.
(NICBARO) barometric
altitude. ANSPs could indicate to the controller that
Barometric data has not been verified, however,
aircraft without dual barometric systems/air data
computers may be unable to provide a non zero
NICBARO as data could be unnecessarily
discarded.

Length / Width of Not available. Provide an Same as Available in Ed1.0 and The width / length indicate the size of the
Aircraft indication of DO-260A above. aircraft. This information may be used as an
aircraft size. input for generating alerts on airport surface
movement control.

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DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information

Asterix CAT 21

Indication of Only show More Additional Available in Ed1.0 and Indication on the availability of 1090ES in /
capabilities status of information information on above, except UAT in may allow the controller to anticipate a
TCAS and available type of ADS-B in availability of potential request for in-trail procedure clearance.
CDTI. including (i.e. 1090ES in or 1090ES/UAT in and NB: ITP requires decision support aids which are
capability to UAT in). information on GPS more complex than ADS-B IN alone.
send Air antenna offset.
Reference
Velocity, Target
State and
Trajectory
Change reports.
Status of
Identity
Switch.
Status of Resolution Not available. Information on Same as Available in Ed1.0 and Indication of the resolution advisory status
Advisory whether DO-260A above, allows the controller to know whether the pilots
Resolution were alerted about the potential conflict.
Advisory is
active.
GPS offset Not available. Indication on Information on GPS offset status is Indication on GPS offset may be one of the
whether GPS GPS antenna available in Ed1.0 and inputs for generating alerts on airport surface
offset is offset is above. Information on movement control.
applied. provided. GPS offset is not
available in ASTERIX
Intention Not available. Able to Same as Intended altitude is The intended heading and flight level can be
indicate DO-260A available in Ed0.23. used as an input to the trajectory prediction
intended Intended heading is not algorithm in the Short-Term Conflict Alert.
altitude and available in ASTERIX.
heading.

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DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information

Asterix CAT 21

Target Status Not available. Not available. Indication of Vertical Navigation The target status allows the controller to know
Autopilot mode, mode, Altitude Hold the mode that the aircraft is in. i.e.: It could be
Vertical mode and Approach presented to ATC.
Navigation mode, Mode are available in
Altitude Hold Ed
mode, Approach 0.23 and above
Mode and LNAV
Mode. LNAV Mode is
available in Ed2.1
Resolution Advisory Not available. Not available. Availability of Available in Ed1.0 and The Resolution Advisory will help the controller
Active above. know the advisories that are provided to the
Resolution pilots by the ACAS. This helps prevent the
Advisories; controller from giving instructions that are in
Resolution conflict with the ACAS.
Advisory
complement
record,
Resolution
Terminated;
Multiple Threat
encounter; Threat
Type indicator;
and Threat
Identity data.

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DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information

Asterix CAT 21

Mode A DO260 Broadcasted Broadcasted Available in Ed0.26 and The Mode A allows flight plans to be coupled
change 1, using test worldwide as a above. with the ADS-B tracks (supports legacy ATM
allows this message in regular message. automation system).
using test USA only.

message in
USA only.
This was not
implemented
in actual
products.

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Appendix 8

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_____________

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 Air Traffic Management Automation System

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CNS SG/26
Appendix J to the Report

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE

AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AUTOMATION SYSTEM

IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT

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AMENDMENTS

The issue of amendments is announced, when an amendment has been agreed

by a meeting of the ICAO Asia/Pacific Air Traffic Management Automation
System Task Force (APAC ATMAS TF). The space below is provided to keep
a record of such amendment.

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

Amendment Date Amended by Comments

Number
0.0 Feb 2020 China The framework of this
document is firstly work
out by China.

0.1 Sep 2021 China, Hong Kong China, First completed draft based
Philippines on the agreed document
framework in ATMAS
TF/1 for review and
comment by States
1.0 Jun 2022 China, Singapore, Hong Revised the draft according
Kong China to the inputs from States.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................VI

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................................................. 1

1.2 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2.1 ATM Operational Concept ......................................................................................................................... 1
1.2.2 ATM System and Its Sub-system ................................................................................................................. 2
1.2.3 Concept of ATMAS ..................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.4 Challenges and Solutions ........................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.5 Outcomes and Endorsements ..................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 ARRANGEMENT OF ATMAS IGD ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.4 DOCUMENT HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT .......................................................................................................... 5
1.5 COPIES................................................................................................................................................................ 5
1.6 CHANGES TO ATMAS IGD ................................................................................................................................ 5
1.7 EDITING CONVENTIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 6

2. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS .............................................................................................................................. 8

3. SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL BASELINE .............................................................................................................. 10

3.1 SYSTEM ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS ....................................................................................................................... 10

3.1.1 Surveillance Data Processing Function ................................................................................................... 11
3.1.2 Flight Data Processing Function ............................................................................................................. 14
3.1.3 Bypass Surveillance Data Processing Function ....................................................................................... 17
3.1.4 Correlation of Surveillance and Flight Data ........................................................................................... 18
3.1.5 Safety Net Function .................................................................................................................................. 19
3.1.6 Meteorological Information Processing Function ................................................................................... 23
3.1.7 Air-Ground Data Link Function ............................................................................................................... 24
3.1.8 System Parameter Management Function ................................................................................................ 25
3.1.9 ATS Inter-facility Data Communication Function ................................................................................... 26
3.1.10 Human Machine Interface Function ...................................................................................................... 28
3.1.11 Recording and Playback Function ......................................................................................................... 32
3.1.12 System Monitoring and Control Function .............................................................................................. 34
3.1.13 GNSS Time Synchronization .................................................................................................................. 35
3.2 SYSTEM OPTIONAL FUNCTION .......................................................................................................................... 36
3.2.1 Extended Surveillance Data Processing................................................................................................... 36
3.2.2 Extended Correlation ............................................................................................................................... 37
3.2.3 Extended Alert, Warning, and Advisory Function .................................................................................... 37
3.2.4 Downlink Aircraft Parameter Processing and Display ............................................................................ 41
3.2.5 Arrival Manager Function ....................................................................................................................... 43
3.2.6 Departure Manager Function .................................................................................................................. 44
3.2.7 System Log Management .......................................................................................................................... 44
3.2.8 Enhancement Recording and Playback Function..................................................................................... 45

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3.2.9 Enhanced Wake Turbulence Separation and Pairwise Separation Tools ................................................ 45
3.2.10 Operational Data Synchronization......................................................................................................... 50
3.2.11 Statistics and Analysis Function ............................................................................................................. 51

4. SYSTEM DESIGN .............................................................................................................................................. 53

4.1 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................................... 53

4.2 POSITION ROLES AND TYPES ............................................................................................................................ 54
4.3 MAIN AND FALLBACK SYSTEM CONFIGURATION.............................................................................................. 55
4.4 SYSTEM OPERATION MODE .............................................................................................................................. 56
4.4.1 Normal and Degraded Modes .................................................................................................................. 56
4.4.2 Main and Fallback Modes ........................................................................................................................ 57
4.5 CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE ......................................................................................................................... 57
4.5.1 System Capacity ....................................................................................................................................... 57
4.5.2 Response Time .......................................................................................................................................... 58
4.5.3 Performance of Surveillance Data Processing......................................................................................... 58
4.5.4 Capacity of Recording and Playback ....................................................................................................... 59
4.6 EXTERNAL INTERFACES .................................................................................................................................... 59
4.7 SYSTEMS INTEROPERABILITY ........................................................................................................................... 61
4.8 CYBER THREATS AND MITIGATION ................................................................................................................... 61
4.8.1 General Description ................................................................................................................................. 61
4.8.2 Cyber Security Management .................................................................................................................... 62

5. SYSTEM TRANSITION..................................................................................................................................... 65

5.1 PHASES OF SYSTEM TRANSITION ...................................................................................................................... 65

5.2 TRANSITION PREPARATION ............................................................................................................................... 66
5.2.1 Transition Scheme .................................................................................................................................... 66
5.2.2 Scheme Evaluation ................................................................................................................................... 66
5.2.3 System Deployment .................................................................................................................................. 66
5.2.4 Table Pre-rehearsal .................................................................................................................................. 67
5.2.5 Other Preparations................................................................................................................................... 67
5.3 SYSTEM REHEARSAL/PRE-TRANSITION VERIFICATION..................................................................................... 67
5.3.1 System Switch Steps Validation ................................................................................................................ 67
5.3.2 System Functions and External Interfaces Validation ............................................................................. 67
5.4 SYSTEM TRANSITION ........................................................................................................................................ 68
5.5 POST-TRANSITION OPERATION ......................................................................................................................... 68

6. SYSTEM MAINTENANCE ............................................................................................................................... 69

6.1 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................................ 69

6.1.1 System Supplier ........................................................................................................................................ 69
6.1.2 Maintenance Service Provider ................................................................................................................. 71
6.1.3 Air Navigation Service Provider .............................................................................................................. 72
6.2 RESOURCES REQUIREMENT .............................................................................................................................. 72
6.2.1 Staffing ..................................................................................................................................................... 72
6.2.2 Documents ................................................................................................................................................ 73

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6.2.3 Maintenance Tools.................................................................................................................................... 74
6.2.4 Spare parts ............................................................................................................................................... 74
6.3 MAINTENANCE CONTENT ................................................................................................................................. 75
6.3.1 Periodic maintenance ............................................................................................................................... 75
6.3.2 Troubleshooting ........................................................................................................................................ 75
6.3.3 Software Version and Requirement Management ..................................................................................... 76

APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................................................................... 78

APPENDIX B ........................................................................................................................................................... 79

APPENDIX C........................................................................................................................................................... 81

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast

ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Contract
ADEXP ATS Data Exchange Presentation
AFTN Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network
AIDC ATS Inter-facility Data Communication
AGDL Air Ground Data Link
AMAN Arrival Manager
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
APP Approach Center
APM Approach Path Monitoring
APW Area Proximity Warning
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guide Control System
AST Approach Spacing Tool
All-purpose Structured EUROCONTROL Radar Information
ASTERIX
Exchange Protocol
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATMAS Air Traffic Management Automation System
ATO Actual Time Over
ATS Air Traffic Service
ATSU Air Traffic Service Unit
AWOS Automatic Weather Observation System
BSDP Bypass Surveillance Data Processing
CA Conflict Alert
CFL Cleared Flight Level
CLAM Cleared Level Adherence Monitoring
CPDLC Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CWP Controller Working Position
DAP Downlink Aircraft Parameter
DBS Distance-based Spacing
DCL Data Link Departure Clearance
DMAN Departure Management
DPM Departure Path Monitoring
ELDT Estimated Landing Time
ETO Estimated Time Over
ETO Expected Time Over
EUROCONTROL European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FDP Flight Data Processing
FIR Flight Information Region
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

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Processed Meteorological Data in the Form of Grid Point Values
GRIB
Expressed in Binary Form
HMI Human Machine Interface
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICD Interface Control Document
LAN Local Area Network
METAR Aerodrome Routine Meteorological Report(in Meteorological Code)
MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
MSP Maintenance Service Provider
MTCD Medium Term Conflict Detection
NTP Network Time Protocol
NTZ No Transgression Zone
PBN Performance Based Navigation
PCA Predicted Conflict Alert
PDC Pre-Departure Clearance
PMON Position Report Monitoring
PSR Primary Surveillance Radar
QNH Altimeter Sub-scale Setting to Obtain Elevation When on the Ground
RAM Route Adherence Monitoring
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum
SCA Similar Callsign Advisory
SDP Surveillance Data Processing
SID Standard Instrument of Departure
SMAN Surface Management
SMD Software Management Department
SP System Supplier
SPI Special Position Identification
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar
STAR Standard instrument Arrival
STCA Short Term Conflict Alert
TBS Time-based Spacing
TLDT Target Landing Time
UTC Universal Time Coordinated
VSP Variable System Parameter
WAM Wide Area Multilateration

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

Since the Air Navigation Conference held in 2012, ICAO has been exploiting a global roadmap
in the Aviation System Block Upgrades (ASBU) under its Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP),
with a focus on harmonization and interoperability leading to a global Air Traffic Management
(ATM) system.

Following the framework of GANP and the timeline of ASBU, the Asia/Pacific Seamless ATM
Plan was adopted by the 24th Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Planning and Implementation Regional
Group (APANPIRG/25) in 2013. It defines goals and the means of meeting State planning
objectives for a Regional seamless ATM performance framework, focusing on technological and
human performance.4

To facilitate and harmonize the provision of robust, safe, efficient and orderly ATM services in
the region, it is considered necessary to develop regional guidance materials with
recommendations on the development and implementation of Air Traffic Management
Automation System (ATMAS).

This Air Traffic Management Automation System Implementation and Operations Guidance
Document (ATMAS IGD) provides guidance for the planning, design, testing, and
implementation of the ATMAS in the Asia and Pacific Regions, with the purpose of ensuring
continuous and coherent development of the ATMAS that is harmonized with adjacent regions.

The system requirements and operational procedures for the ATMAS are detailed in the relevant
States’ projects and AIP. This ATMAS IGD is intended to provide guidelines on the primary and
the most important function as well as performance requirements of the ATMAS, based on the
operations and maintenance practices.

1.2 Background

1.2.1 ATM Operational Concept

The global ATM operational concept presents the ICAO vision of an integrated, harmonized, and
globally interoperable ATM system. The planning horizon is up to and beyond 2025. The baseline
against which the significance of the changes proposed in the operational concept may be
measured is the global ATM environment in 2000.

Vision Statement
To achieve an interoperable global air traffic management system, for all
users during all phases of flight, that meets agreed levels of safety,
provides for optimum economic operations, is environmentally
sustainable and meets national security requirements.

While the operational concept is visionary and even challenging, many current practices and
processes will continue to exist through the planning horizon. In this sense, this operational
concept document should be seen as evolutionary.

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A key point to note is that the operational concept, to the greatest extent possible, is independent
of technology; that is, it recognizes that within a planning horizon of more than twenty years,
much of the technology that exists or is in development today may change or cease to exist. This
operational concept has therefore been developed to stand the test of time.

Air Traffic Management

Air traffic management is the dynamic, integrated management of air
traffic and airspace — safely, economically and efficiently — through
the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration with all
parties.

1.2.2 ATM System and Its Sub-system

The objective of ATM is to provide safe, economic, efficient, and dynamic management of air
traffic and airspace that includes Air Traffic Service (ATS), Air Traffic Flow Management
(ATFM), and Airspace Management (ASM), as shown in Figure 1.2.2-1.

Air Traffic
Management

Air Traffic Air Traffic Flow Airspace

Service Management Management

Air Traffic Flight Information

Alerting Service
Control Service

Figure 1.2.2-1 Composition of air traffic management

ATS is the central part of ATM, which includes Air Traffic Control (ATC), Flight Information
Service (FIS), and Alerting Service (ALRS).

The Objective of:

a. ATC is to prevent collisions between aircraft and, on the maneuvering area,

collisions between aircraft and obstructions. ATC also expedites and maintains the
orderly flow of traffic.
b. FIS is to give advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of
flights.
c. ALRS is to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in need of search
and rescue aid, and assist such organizations as required.

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1.2.3 Concept of ATMAS

The ATMAS mentioned in this document is mainly applied in ATC service, and offers assistance
for ALRS and ATFM. It comprises a group of processing sub-systems dedicated to specific
functions, which are integrated as one air traffic management system to provide functional
capabilities to air traffic controllers in the Area Control Centers (ACC), Approach Control Unit,
and Aerodrome Control towers. The ATMAS helps controllers keep conformance monitoring,
hazard monitoring, and assuring safety separation to air traffic flow.

The ATMAS has a modular design and distributed architecture to ensure robustness under adverse
operating conditions. The modularity enables modifications to the baseline product to be made
with relative ease. The principle of distributed processing ensures the safe, uninterrupted
provision of Air Traffic Services by controllers.

All processing and display sub-systems are interconnected via high-capacity redundant LANs.
Computers providing common services (e.g., Flight Data Processing) may be duplicated, with
each computer connected to each LAN providing a high degree of redundancy. Fail safe operation
of the dual computer groups is achieved by multiple computation redundancy (parallel operation
of the computer), or hot stand-by redundancy, to provide uninterrupted service to the controllers.

Typically, considering the safety and redundancy requirements, the ATMAS has two individual
LANs, which are called working LANs, where the redundancy computers are connected. The
working LANs keep sharing information and function as main and fallback modes. Air traffic
control airspace with high-density traffic is recommended to use a third LAN, which is called
service LAN. The latter’s primary function is system trace collection, handling of recording and
playback, etc.

1.2.4 Challenges and Solutions

Considering the framework for global ATM roadmap requirements and the current world situation,
ATMAS is facing the following challenges:

a. The challenge for States to implement technologies as prescribed in the GANP and
ASBU timeframes particularly is innovative concepts such as 4D trajectory and seamless
ATM across FIRs. The seamless ATM Plan requires the individual ATMAS sharing a
common set of accurate information in a timely manner, which needs to interface with
each other seamlessly and work interoperability.
b. Traditional ATMAS procurement processes deliver systems that are not COTS but
a baseline of core function and subsequent accumulation of bespoke design for
previous ANSP applications. As the system functions and features continue to
develop, the system is getting more and more complex. These cause long
software/application development and practically, in most cases, these
functions/features are seldom used. Consequently, the system is getting hard to
maintain and costly to deploy.
c. Increase scrutiny of costs for ANSPs due to various reasons, including airspace
user scrutiny, public oversight into spending, or constrained national budgets due
to local or regional economic events. Significantly, public health emergencies
have a devastating impact on the economy and the aviation industry worldwide. It
will not be surprising that the ICAO member states, including those in the APAC
Region, must reappraise both their capital and operational expenses (CAPEX and
OPEX) in the coming years, including the expenditure in the ATMAS.

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To overcome the above challenges, it is important to come up with the ATMAS IGD that will
provide the main functions and performances which is aimed at facilitating the implementation
or provision of the robust, safe, efficient ATM automation systems. This will help the APAC
region member states/CAAs/ANSPs to have an ATM automation system that shares common/core
functions/performances while achieving seamless interoperability rather than investing more on
CAPEX/OPEX to cope with future increase in air traffic. It is relatively more important to put
focus on:

a. application of new/innovative technologies that would help make good business cases,
b. incorporating baseline/key optional features into their system design at an early stage,
and
c. preparing for system completion affecting changes during low air traffic periods before
full traffic recovery.

1.2.5 Outcomes and Endorsements

To ensure continuous and coherent development of the ATM automation systems harmonized
with adjacent regions to enhance systems interoperability, and to keep abreast of the latest
developments in ASBU and ATM automation systems, topics pertaining to ATMAS have been
focusing and discussing in APAC Region since 2018.

The ICAO Asia Pacific Regional ATMAS Symposium (APAC RATMS) held in Nanjing, China,
from 22 to 23 November 2018 successfully addressed Action Item 54/13 of 54th DGCA
Conference on ATMAS where it also suggested for States/Administrations to consider
establishment of a regional working group/task force under the ICAO CNS Sub-group of
APANPIRG to deal with matters arisen from this symposium concerning ATM automation
systems. The symposium agreed to formulate an action item for the 23rd meeting of CNS Sub-
group in 2019 to review and consider whether such regional working group/task force is needed.

The SURICG/4 was held in Nanjing, China from 9 to 12 April 2019. The meeting reviewed and
further discussed the outcomes of the ICAO APAC Regional ATMAS Symposium (APAC
RATMS) and other SURICG/4 papers relevant to ATMAS, and endorsed the draft Decision of
“Draft Decision SURICG/4/5-Establishment of ATM Automation System Working Group
(ATMAS/WG)” for consideration by CNS SG.

The Twenty Third Meeting of the Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Sub-group
(CNS SG/23) of Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group
(APANPIRG) held at the ICAO Regional Office, Bangkok, Thailand, from 2 to 6 September 2019
considered the report of SURICG/4 with some other CNS SG/23 working papers and noted that
a briefing on the proposal on establishing a working group to deal with ATMAS issue was also
provided to ATM SG/7 meeting. Several States/Administrations expressed their willingness to
support the work of the Task Force, including China, Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia, Nepal,
Singapore, Thailand, and the USA. Hence, the meeting adopted the “Decision CNS SG/23/13
(SURICG/4/5) - Establishment of ATM Automation System Task Force (ATMAS/TF)”.

APANPIRG/30 meeting that was held from 4-6 November 2019 at ICAO APAC Office, Bangkok,
Thailand. The APANPIRG/30 meeting noted with appreciation the work done and achievements
by the CNS SG and the contributory bodies reporting to APANPIRG through the SG pertaining
to ATMAS. The panel noted that CNS SG/23 meeting had adopted 9 Conclusions and 4 Decisions
on technical and operational matters, including the “Decision CNS SG/23/13 (SURICG/4/5)
Establishment of the Asia/Pacific ATM Automation System Task Force (ATMAS/TF)”.

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1.3 Arrangement of ATMAS IGD

This ATMAS IGD consists of the following parts:

Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Reference Documents
Section 3 System Functional Baseline
Section 4 System Design
Section 5 System Transition
Section 6 System Maintenance

1.4 Document History and Management

The framework of this document was first introduced in the first Working Group Meeting of
ATMAS Task Force (ATMAS TF/1) video conference, which was held in October 2020. The
Meeting agreed to further develop based on the proposed framework into a complete document
for approval as a regional guidance document. A working team consisting of volunteers from
China, Hong Kong-China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
was established during the Meeting to contribute to document’s content. In August 2021, the
completed draft of this document was ready for circulation among States for review and comment.

This document aims to supplement SARPs, PANS and relevant provisions contained in ICAO
documentation, and it will be regularly updated to reflect evolving conditions. To support the
ICAO in making specific recommendations and developing guidance materials, such as minimum
functional/performance requirements and additional/local requirements, which aim at facilitating
the implementation or provision of robust, safe, efficient, and orderly ATM services by the use of
existing and/or new procedures, facilities, and technologies concerning ATMAS.

1.5 Copies

Paper copies of this ATMAS IGD are not distributed. Controlled and endorsed copies can be
found at the following website: http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx.

Copy may be freely downloaded from the website or by sending an email of request to
APANPIRG through the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office.

1.6 Changes to ATMAS IGD

Whenever a user identifies a need for a change to this document, a Request for Change (RFC)
Form (refer to Appendix A) should be completed and submitted to the ICAO Asia and Pacific
Regional Office. This form may be photocopied as required, emailed, faxed, or emailed to ICAO
Asia and Pacific Regional Office +66 (2) 537-8199 or APAC@icao.int. The Regional Office will
collate RFCs for consideration by the ICAO Communications, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS)
Sub-group of APANPIRG.

When an amendment has been agreed by a meeting of the ICAO CNS Sub-group of PANPIRG,
then a new version of the ATMAS IGD will be prepared, with the changes marked by an “|” in
the margin, and an endnote indicating the relevant RFC for the traceability of the change. If the
change is in a table cell, the outside edges of the table will be highlighted, for example, as follows.

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Final approval for publication of an amendment to the ATMAS IGD will be the responsibility of
APANPIRG.

1.7 Editing Conventions

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2. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Id Name of the document Edition Date Origin Domain

1 Annex 2 - Rules of the Air 10th Edition 2005 ICAO
Annex 12 - Search and 8th Edition, July ICAO
2
Rescue 2004
Annex 11 — Air Traffic 15th Edition 2018 ICAO
3
Services
4 Annex 17 - Security 10th Edition 2017 ICAO
11th Edition March 2020 ICAO
“PANS-ATM, or Procedures 16th Edition 2020 ICAO
for Navigation Services – (Amendment
5
Air Traffic Management 9 dated
(DOC 4444) 5/11/20)
Global Air Navigation Plan 6th Edition 2020 ICAO
6 (GANP) (Doc 9750)

Global Air Traffic First Edition 2005 ICAO

7 Management Operational
Concept (Doc 9854)
Manual on Air Traffic First Edition 2008 ICAO
8 Management System
Requirements (Doc 9882)
Manual on Global First edition 2009 ICAO
Performance of the Air
9
Navigation System (ICAO
Doc 9883)
Doc 10031 Guidance on First edition 2014 ICAO
Environmental Assessment
10 of Proposed Air Traffic
Management Operational
Changes
Restricted—Air Traffic First edition 2013 ICAO
11 Management Security
Manual(Doc 9985)
Air Traffic Services 4th Edition 2007 ICAO
12 Planning Manual (Doc
9426)
Manual on Implementation 4th Edition 2013 ICAO
of a 300 m (1 000 ft)
Vertical Separation
13
Minimum Between FL 290
and FL 410 Inclusive (Doc
9574)

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Performance Based 4th Edition, 2013 ICAO
Navigation (PBN) Manual
14
(Doc 9613)

Manual on Airspace 2nd Edition 2007 ICAO

Planning Methodology for
15 the Determination of
Separation Minima (Doc
9689)
Manual of Air Traffic 5thEdition 2010 ICAO
16 Services Data Link
Applications (Doc 9694)
Manual on Flight and Flow First edition 2012 ICAO
— Information for a
17 Collaborative Environment
（FF-ICE）(Doc 9965)
Manual on Simultaneous 2nd Edition 2020 ICAO
Operations or Parallel or
18 Near-Parallel Instrument
Runways (SOIR) (Doc
9643)
Pan Regional (NAT and Version 1.0 2014 ICAO
APAC)Interface Control PAN
Document (ICD) for ATS
19
Interfacility Data
Communications (PAN
AIDC AIDC)
ICAO Asia/Pacific Regional Version 13.0 April ICAO
ADS-B Implementation and 2021 APAC
20 Operations Guidance
Document (AIGD)

ICAO Asia/Pacific Regional Edition 3.0 2021 ICAO

Mode S DAPs APAC
Implementation and
21 Operation Guidance
Document

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3. SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL BASELINE

The functional baseline, forming the core of the ATMAS, is broadly described as those
involved with the processing and display of operational information that will be used
in providing an alerting, flight information, and separation service to aircraft.

3.1 System Essential Functions

In order to provide controllers with the display of air situation, the ATMAS is suggested
with the following essential functions.

a. Surveillance Data Processing Function (SDP). Chapter 3.1.1 introduces the

essential surveillance data processing function. For the processing of enhanced
surveillance data such as ADS-B, please refer to chapter 3.2.1.
b. Flight Data Processing Function.
c. Bypass Surveillance Data Processing Function.
d. Correlation of Surveillance and Flight Data function. Chapter 3.1.4 introduces
the essential correlation function with mode 3/A code. The processing of using
24-bit address code etc., as the condition for correlation, please refer to chapter
3.2.2.
e. Safety Net Function. Chapter 3.1.5 introduces the essential Safety Net function.
For the extended Safety Net function, such as Medium Term Conflict
Detection Warning (MTCD), please refer to chapter 3.2.3.
f. Meteorological Information Processing Function.
g. Air-Ground Data Link Function (AGDL).
h. Variable System Parameter (VSP) Management Function.
i. ATS Inter-facility Data Communication Function.
j. Human Machine Interface Function (HMI).
k. Recording and Playback Function. Chapter 3.1.11 introduces the essential data
recording and playback function. For the video recording and playback
function, please refer to chapter 3.2.7.
l. System Monitoring and Controlling Function.
m. Software Version Management Function.
n. GNSS Time Synchronization.

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3.1.1 Surveillance Data Processing Function

SDP is one core function of ATMAS. SDP should be able to integrate multiple radars
and process the received data to generate a unique system track. System tracks contain
accurate real-time positioning information, which correlates with flight plans and is
displayed on HMI with specific track symbols.

Usually, SDP includes the following functions:

a. Access and process data from primary radar, secondary radar, primary and
secondary combined radar, and weather data from PSR radars.
b. Pre-process the surveillance data to monitor the data quality.
c. Process mono-sensor surveillance data and generate mono-sensor track.
d. Process multi-sensor surveillance data and generate continuous and smooth
system tracks adopting advanced tracking filtering algorithms.
e. Manage the altitude tracking and perform conversion of Mode C derived data
according to QNH value.
f. Provide prompts in case of overload, filter received data, and discard extra data.
g. Process the special position identification pulse (SPI) and display using a
unique indication.
h. Allow special area definition to improve system track accuracy.

3.1.1.1 Surveillance Data Pre-processing

The system is recommended to process standard radar formats, including ASTERIX

format and related standards. It should automatically identify the form of surveillance
data, then decompose and extract the data items according to the corresponding format
specifications.

The system is encouraged to be able to monitor the received data quality and filter out
the abnormal data to ensure the data fusion quality. The surveillance data quality check
is suggested by considering the following factors:

a. CRC error.
b. Data frame error.
c. North messages lost.
d. Radar sector crossing messages lost.
e. Track lost.
f. Timestamp check.

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3.1.1.2 Mono-radar Data Processing

The system is recommended to perform syntactic and semantic checks on the received
data against specifications, including the target attributes, identifier (SSR code, track
number, address code, etc.), position, altitude, speed, time stamp, SIC/SAC, etc.

The system is suggested with time drift management to handle abnormal time stamping,
and correct the timestamp by adding a time shift in received data.

The system handles target correlation for the purpose of generating a new track, or
updating the existing, or deleting the dated, and then form a stable mono-radar track in
the end.

3.1.1.3 Multi-radar Data Processing

The system fuses the accessed multi-radar to generate a stable system track by
associating the targets of multiple radars, and forms a unique target identification mark.
When the radar data are associated, the data and state attributes of radar, including
position, secondary code, altitude, speed, track characteristics, and other data, are
considered.

The system associates the existing system track for updating or establishes a new track
to ensure accuracy, continuity, and smoothing. Abnormal data derived from some radars
should not impact system track quality. The system track is provided to alert calculation,
correlation process, and HMI display. In the track fusion process, the system records
the quality of every surveillance sensor to estimate the quality of this sensor based on
historical and real-time data. Abnormal data derived from some radars should not
impact system track quality.

3.1.1.4 Target Altitude Tracking and Processing

The system is suggested to provide altitude tracking by extrapolating the flight level
according to the current mode C value and altitude change rate.

The system should support QNH area definition and correct Mode C values into
barometric altitudes for all aircraft in a specific QNH area.

The system should discard abnormal altitude reported.

3.1.1.5 Special Pulse Identification Processing

When receiving SPI from radar track, the system is suggested to display a prompt on
track identifier automatically.

3.1.1.6 Automatic Test Target Monitoring

The system is advised to be capable of monitoring the quality of radar via automatic
Test Target Monitoring with fixed SSR Test Transponders.

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3.1.1.7 Surveillance Data Overload Processing

The system should detect plots overload (i.e., the maximum number of plots per radar
and per antenna revolution and the maximum number of plots per radar and per sector)
to filter out excess plots.

The system is recommended to cope with surveillance data overloading processing as

follows:

a. When the total number of targets processed by SDP reaches a certain threshold,
the system will automatically generate a warning prompt.
b. When the total number of targets exceeds the load threshold, the system will
give prompts to users and considers filtering or discarding the extra data.

3.1.1.8 Special Area Setting and Processing

The system is proposed to be capable of:

a. Defining areas of interest (AOI) for each sensor and discarding reports outside
the AOIs.
b. Defining inhibition areas for each sensor and stoping track initialization but
provide reports for exist track in the inhibition areas.
c. Defining distrust areas for each sensor, and discard reports in the areas.

3.1.1.9 Real-time Quality Control (RTQC) of Radar

Real-time quality control (RTQC) is used to monitor and control the quality of radar
signals received by the system. It calculates the radar (sensor) correction factor and the
fusion weight coefficient based on the results of monitoring and controlling. RTQC
should manually and automatically compensate for the deviation in azimuth and
distance of radars or sensors to improve the radar detection accuracy and provide the
necessary fusion parameters for subsequent multi-radar tracking processing.

When the RTQC finds abnormal monitoring data, it gives a warning on the system
monitor interface in real-time. When the quality of one or more data sources is abnormal
or interrupted, the system will isolate it to ensure the system tracks in a normal work
state. The system judges the availability of the data according to the confidence
coefficient of source surveillance data.

3.1.1.10 System Tracks Output

d. The system should output the system tracks according to various specified
radar formats (such as ASTERIXcat062, etc.).
e. The output system tracks can be adjusted within a reasonable range by
modifying parameters, and its fastest update rate is the same as the track of
ATMAS.

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3.1.2 Flight Data Processing Function

Flight data processing (FDP) is one core function of the ATMAS. Data relevant to flight
plan are received, stored, processed, and updated by FDP. FDP can also exchange data
with other software modules.

Usually, FDP includes the following functions:

a. ATS messages processing, which processes ICAO, AIDC, OLDI, and other
format messages.
b. Flight plan life cycle management to the flight plan.
c. 4D profile trajectory computation, including route analysis, profile calculation
and time estimation, SID /STAR /runway automatic allocation.
d. SSR code management, including SSR code automatic assignment and manual
SSR codes assignment by controllers;
e. Sector management and posting computation, post flight plans based on
conditions, and provide electronic postings and paper flight strip printing at
the designated position;
f. Flight plan data exchange with other external systems (such as Main/Fallback
ATM automation systems, tower ATM automation systems, air traffic flow
management systems, etc.). This part will be described in detail in section 5.7
of this document.

3.1.2.1 Flight Message Processing

The system should be capable of processing flight messages following ICAO

PANS-ATM(Doc 4444) and AIDC and other related regulations, including FPL, CHG,
CNL, DEP, ARR, DLA, CPL, EST, CDN, ACP, LAM.
The system is advised to perform semantic and syntactic checks on the received
messages and create or update associated flight plans with correction. Messages that
failed in semantic or syntactic checks are categorized and sent to the designated position
for manual processing. Manually corrected messages will be processed again by the
system.
The system is suggested to be designed with a messages manual transmission
function and provide a default template for each type of message to be modified and
confirmed by users.
The system is recommended to transmit messages according to the pre-defined
conditions and addresses automatically. At least the following types can be sent: FPL,
DEP, ARR, CHG, DLA, CPL.

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3.1.2.2 Life Cycle Management

The system shall be able to manage the life cycle of flight plans. Flight plan states
could be generally defined as INACTIVE, PREACTIVE, COORDINATED, ACTIVE,
FINISHED, etc. Users can adjust the above states according to the operation
requirement.
The evolution of the flight plan states could be triggered automatically based on
time, message, correlation, etc., or by manual input.
Examples of the central state transition conditions and processing are as follows:
a. INACTIVE
When created, the flight plan state is INACTIVE.
Typically, all flight plans in INACTIVE state support manual modification or
via ATS messages.
b. PREACTIVE
When the flight is approaching its execution and control airspace, the flight
plan state will change to PREACTIVE.
At PREACTIVE state, the system is suggested to perform 4D trajectory and
posting computation and send flight strips to relevant positions. The system
could allocate SSR codes, departure runways, and SIDs for departure flights.
c. COORDINATED
When the flight is ready for control, the plan state will change to
COORDINATED which can be triggered by manual operations or system
events.
The flight plan in the COORDINATED state is qualified for correlation with
system tracks.
d. ACTIVE
The flight plan state becomes ACTIVE when the flight is in the jurisdiction.
Generally, the system calculates and updates 4D trajectory based on
surveillance data, air-ground data, and manual commands. The flight plan in
the ACTIVE state is qualified for correlation with system tracks.
e. FINISHED
When the flight plan is no longer used to assist in controlling the actual
flight, the plan state becomes FINISHED.
At the FINISHED state, the system is suggested to:

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- Release the SSR code.
- Stop the 4D trajectory calculation.
- Delete posting events and remove the electronic flight strip.

- Save the records for further analysis and statistics.

f. Other states
In addition to the above states, users can also define SUSPENDED,
INHIBITED, and other states according to operation requirements. Under
these states, FDP will stop updating the flight profile and suppress related
alarms.

3.1.2.3 4D Profile Trajectory Calculation

It is recommended the system support 4D flight profile trajectory calculation. The

profile calculation is continuous and generally divided into three stages: climb, level
flight, and descent. The profile may start from the departure airport or the fixes before
the FDRG entry, containing height and time information for each waypoint, and ends
at the destination airport.
The profile calculation could refer to waypoint information, DEP/ARR airport, runway,
requested altitude, cruise speed, aircraft performance parameter, GRIB, target position,
real-time data input by controllers, etc.
The profile updates could be done at the change of flight attitude, passing waypoints,
sector boundary points, system events, or controller inputs.
The system is proposed to automatically allocate departure runways and SIDs for
departure flight plans and arrival runways and STARs for arrival flight plans. The
system would provide the function of manual assignment, modification, and deletion to
SID/STAR/runway.

3.1.2.4 SSR Code Management

Usually, the system is capable of manually and automatically assigning SSR codes.
The system is recommended to adopt specific SSR code group and allocation rules
according to the type of flights (inbound and outbound).
The system is suggested to perform an SSR code retention check and use the SSR code
in received messages (e.g., DEP messages) if the code is available. If not accessible,
the system will allocate a new code from the free code list. In case of no free codes, the
system could assign an SSR code from the given code list, and the earliest allocated
code should have priority.

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Generally, the system is not supporting special codes (such as 7700, 7600, 7500, etc.)
assignment.
The SSR code will be released when the flight plan is finished.
The system is proposed to support manually modifying the flight plans' SSR. If the
input code is already occupied, a prompt is suggested to be produced.
It is recommended that the system uses A1000 as Mode S conspicuity code. The flight
plan with that code will use a 24-bit address or ACID to correlate with system tracks,
and warnings/alerts should not be generated when SSR duplication occurs due to Mode
S conspicuity code.

3.1.2.5 Sector Management and Posting Computation

Normally, the system can pre-configure the airspace into different sectors and enables
the controllers to group or ungroup these sectors online.
The system is recommended to post the relevant electronic flight strip to the designated
sector according to offline defined conditions. The electronic flight strip is suggested
to display on the controlling sector and posted sector in specific colors.
The system is proposed to compute and insert posting events based on the waypoints
or sectors in the flight plan. Posting conditions are tightly linked with the operational
concept and control procedures, including waypoints, altitude range, ACID, airport,
runway, flight rule, flight type, etc.
The system is advised to support the manual and automatic transfer of jurisdiction. The
automatic transfer could be computed based on offline rules to get the timing and the
target sector. The mechanical transfer conditions are similar to posting conditions.

3.1.3 Bypass Surveillance Data Processing Function

To further enhance resilience, bypass surveillance data processing（BSDP）could be

implemented according to the operational need. BSDP is a redundancy module of SDP,
which can independently receive, process and distribute surveillance data
independently to SDP. When the SDPs fail, the system will switch to BSDP
automatically. When the system switches to bypass mode, the HMI should clearly
indicate if controller is working in BSDP mode.

BSDP is recommended to be capable of directly accessing various surveillance sources,

using a different tracking algorithm with SDP.

BSDP should at least provide mono-sensor tracking function. Multiple-sensor data

tracking function and alarm functions, such as Special Codes alert, Short Term Conflict
Alert (STCA), Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW), Area Proximity Warning
(APW), etc., could be considered as part of BSDP.

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3.1.4 Correlation of Surveillance and Flight Data

The objective of the surveillance and flight plan correlation function is to establish an
association between a surveillance track and a flight plan based on identifying codes
and position checks. The way to develop association includes automatic and manual
correlation.

3.1.4.1 Automatic correlation

Usually, the system performs an automatic correlation between the flight plan and the
system track when pre-defined conditions are met, for example:

a. Specific flight plan status.

b. Identical SSR code.
c. Passing position and altitude check.
The flight plan in the system has two kinds of SSR codes:

a. ASSR (Assigned SSR code): currently assigned to the flight plan within the
FIR.
b. PSSR (Previous SSR code): used for inbound flight, which was used in the
previous FIR or the previous code used in the case of a code change within the
FIR.
The position and altitude checks will improve the accuracy of correlation. The method
of position and altitude checks are suggested as follows:

a. Whether the track position is in the route model. The route model is composed
of airports, waypoints, and route corridors in the flight plan.
b. Whether the difference between the estimated flight plan position and the track
position is within a certain range.
c. For take-off and landing system tracks, the altitude check is recommended to
be performed.

3.1.4.2 Manual Correlation

The system is recommended to support manual correlation of a flight plan with a track
by controllers, for example, using mode 3/A code as a criterion.

A warning message is suggested to be provided if the manual correlation is failed.

3.1.4.3 Cancel Correlation

The system is suggested to cancel correlation if the correlation conditions are no longer
met, and automatically generate a warning prompt to designated position except
Emergency Settings.

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Under emergency settings, the system is advised to maintain the correlation when the
SSR code is changed to 7500, 7600, and 7700.

3.1.4.4 Correlation Data Distribution

After correlation, the system is recommended to distribute correlation information to

other modules and display correlated system tracks on the controller positions.

Usually, the system updates the flight profile according to the position and altitude
information of the correlated surveillance track.

3.1.5 Safety Net Function

Safety Net Function serves to alert controllers of a potential, imminent or actual

infringement of safety margins to prevent hazardous situations from developing into
major incidents or even accidents. The aviation safety areas covered by Safety Net
Function generally include:

a. Aircraft Separation.
b. Airspace Operation Requirement.
c. Conformance of Clearance.
d. Terrain Clearance.
e. Approach/Departure Path Conformance.
Alerts/warnings from Safety Net Function are generated based on different levels of
severity of infringement and imminency with distinguishable visual and/or aural alarms
with their prominence corresponding to the severity and imminency of the infringement.

During the planning stage, States/Administrations are encouraged to conduct a

comprehensive study on the applicability of safety net features in ATMAS to their local
environment considering system behavior, Human Machine Interface (HMI) design,
and operational procedures. By design, the Safety Net Function in the ATMAS should
be configurable with various parameters on activation/deactivation/acknowledgement
of alarm adjustable by the users. Where applicable, references, especially on test
strategy and system parameters, to successful cases of Safety Net implementation by
other States/Administrations are suggested.

For actual implementation of Safety Net Function, a progressive approach is suggested

with potential advantages as below:

a. Reducing risks in implementation and operation of one safety feature at a time

as compared to deployment of all planned safety features in one go;
b. Reducing demand for resources and staff workload involved in the evaluation
of the safety features; and
c. More time for air traffic controllers to evaluate the safety features and fine-
tune the parameters before further implementation.

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A post-implementation review is recommended, including the collection of feedback
and suggestions from frontline air traffic controllers, effectiveness and performance of
the safety features (such as user-friendliness, alert timeliness, nuisance alerts), data
analysis to gauge improvement in safety figures with a view to continuously fine-tuning
of safety net parameters to reduce nuisance alerts.

3.1.5.1 Types and Priority

The system provides safety net to controllers with visual and aural indications,
integrating surveillance data, flight plan data, and other operational data using different
algorithms and rules.

The safety net includes Emergency, STCA, MSAW, APW, APMW, etc.

It is recommended that the system is capable of setting the priority of alerts. The priority
of warning is higher than its corresponding pre-warning. The emergency should have
the highest priority, including Hijack (7500), Radio Failure (7600), Emergency (7700),
etc.

3.1.5.2 Emergency

Once the Emergency codes were received, the system is suggested to process it and
display the Emergency on the concerned positions.

The emergency codes include:

a. 7500 (Hijack).
b. 7600 (Radio Failure).
c. 7700 (Emergency).
Normally, the Emergency is displayed until the received Mode 3/A code is different
from the emergency code.

3.1.5.3 Short Term Conflict Alert

Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) is an important safety net feature of ATMAS as
collision avoidance tool, or to provide a separation alert for a potential or actual
infringement of separation minima between aircraft. STCA can work between targets
associated with an FPL and unknown targets without an FPL.

The STCA function in ATMAS generates visual and/or aural alerts to controllers in air
situation display if any aircraft is predicted to or is violating a pre-defined conflict or
separation minimum in the STCA settings of the ATMAS. Controllers would need to
resolve the conflict immediately once the alert has been generated.

Surveillance, flight plan, and environmental data are required for generating STCA in
ATMAS. The following list of information could be considered to include in the STCA
processing:

a. Aircraft position

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b. Pressure altitude
c. Cleared flight level
d. Flight rule
e. RVSM status
f. Concerned controller jurisdiction
g. Separation standards of STCA areas
h. Look-ahead time
The Flight plan is not obligatory. Flight plan data, i.e., cleared flight level, flight rule,
and RVSM status of the aircraft, could help improve the relevancy of alert generation
so as to reduce cases of nuisance alerts. In addition, the implementation of STCA
inhibition could be considered based on a definition of inhibition zones, SSR code
groups, callsign, or other conditions applicable to the local operating environment and
needs.

The STCA processing cycle is recommended to be at a frequency not less than once per
track update of ATMAS. States/Administrations could also consider implementing
STCA with two stages of alerts based on the situation of predicted and actual
infringements, i.e., Predicted Conflict Alert (PCA) and Conflict Alert (CA).

For complex airspaces with different separation standards for respective sectors, the
design of ATMAS is recommended to allow the configuration of multiple STCA
volumes. Users could apply specific STCA parameters for a given STCA volume
according to operational needs.

The performance of STCA is highly dependent on the optimization of the conflict

detection algorithm and adapted parameters for the local environment.
States/Administrations are suggested to work closely with system manufacturers to
adapt the STCA detection according to the local environment. For successful
implementation, regular review with controllers on the performance is necessary.

3.1.5.4 Minimum Safe Altitude Warning

Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) is intended to assist controllers with alerts
of the potential risk of an aircraft infringing a defined minimum safe altitude over a
concerned region.

The MSAW function monitors the position and altitude of an aircraft against
defined MSAW regions and minimum safe altitudes. The MSAW region can be defined
by height or polygon. When the altitude of an aircraft is found or predicted to be lower
than the applicable minimum safe altitude within defined the MSAW region, a visual
and/or aural warning would be generated to alert controllers to take necessary actions
to resolve the infringement.

For reference, examples of surveillance, flight plan, and environmental data are
required for the MSAW functional module to generate alerts are:

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a. Aircraft position.
b. Pressure altitude.
c. Cleared flight level.
d. Flight rule.
e. Concerned controller jurisdiction.
f. Terrain and obstacle model.
g. Look-ahead time.
To minimize nuisance alerts, flight rules and cleared flight levels in flight plan data can
help improve the relevancy of MSAW alert generation. In addition,
States/Administrations could consider implementing MSAW alert inhibition which
suppresses MSAW alerts based on defined inhibition zones (such as final approach
zones), SSR code groups, callsign, or other conditions applicable to the local
operational environment.

The accuracy of MSAW alert is related to MSAW terrain/obstacle definition, look-

ahead time setting, and inhibition strategy adopted for flights intentionally flying close
to terrains/obstacles. Appropriate settings of the above are necessary for providing a
reliable MSAW detection that controllers can rely on. Any unoptimized parameters
would likely result in nuisance alerts or insufficient time for controllers to respond to
the alert. It is important to perform tuning of MSAW parameters based on controllers’
feedback for successful MSAW implementation.

3.1.5.5 Area Proximity Warning

Area Proximity Warning (APW) is a safety net for alerting controllers of any potential
or actual unauthorized penetration of aircraft into Special Use Airspaces (SUA)
including:

a. Danger airspace.

b. Prohibited airspace.

c. Restricted airspace.

d. Temporarily restricted airspace.

Each SUA volume could be defined in ATMAS as an area (e.g., circle, polygon, etc.)
with upper and lower bounds on altitudes. The warning activation/deactivation of each
SUA could be triggered automatically according to an online-defined schedule or by
the manual action of controllers. The system should provide APW inhibition function
based on flight rules, SSR code groups, callsign, and other conditions applicable to the
local environment and operational needs.

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3.1.5.6 Approach Path Monitoring Warning

The Approach Path Monitoring Warning (APMW) monitors the aircraft’s vertical and
lateral deviation from the final approach profile in ATMAS, and generates visual and/or
aural alerts when an aircraft exceeds or is predicted to exceed the defined tolerance of
deviation. The system should allow multiple groups of glide path monitoring
parameters to be defined.

An APM zone would generally be defined in ATMAS for performing APMW

processing on flights. Examples of parameters on the definition of APM zone are:

a. Runway name and direction.

b. Touchdown point on the runway.
c. Horizontal angular extend from the touchdown point.
d. Vertical angular extend from the touchdown point.
e. Distance from the touchdown point.
f. Glide slope elevation.
g. APMW inhibition zone.
Surveillance, flight plan, and environmental data are required for generating APMW.
The APMW prompt will be given on the HMI when the alarm conditions are met.

To minimize nuisance alerts, checking flight rules could help improve the relevancy of
warning generation. In addition, an aircraft flying close to terrains/obstacles during the
final approach which could easily trigger MSAW alert due to nearby terrains/obstacles.
States/Administrations could consider suppressing MSAW alert generation in ATMAS
within the APM zone or via the definition of inhibition zones if an aircraft’s descent
profile is already under the monitoring by APMW.

The performance of APMW is highly related to adapted APMW parameters for the local
environment, look-ahead time setting and inhibition strategy adopted for flights that
intentionally deviated from the optimal final approach path. Regular review of the
performance is crucial for the tuning of APMW parameters based on controllers’
feedback to increase its effectiveness.

3.1.6 Meteorological Information Processing Function

Generally, the system is capable of receiving, processing, and displaying

meteorological information, including GRIB, QNH, and weather data derived from
mono-radar. The meteorological information should be applied in surveillance data and
flight data processing.

The system could process GRIB messages from the meteorological information system,
which contains upper wind and temperature for accurate calculation and estimation of
flight plan profiles.

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The system is recommended to automatically extract and process QNH data from
METAR and SPECI messages, as well as manual input.

The system is recommended to be capable of receiving and processing mono-radar

derived weather data, and displaying it on the controller positions. From experience,
the categorization of weather echo display could be classified as no less than three
levels. The parameters of display level and priority could be defined as required.

3.1.7 Air-Ground Data Link Function

The AGDL function mainly processes the information based on the data link
communication, including ADS-C (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Contract),
CPDLC (Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication), and DCL (Departure Clearance),
etc. States/Administrations could implement the Air-Ground Data Link Function
according to the operational needs.

3.1.7.1 ADS-C Data Processing

The ADS-C data processing is recommended as follows:

a. The system automatically determines whether the aircraft enters the ADS-C
area according to route information.
b. The ADS-C connection could be initiated by pilots or controllers.
c. The system receives and processes ADS-C messages, including periodic
contract, event contract, emergency, current location, etc.
d. The system updates and manages ADS-C tracks with received ADS-C
messages.

3.1.7.2 CPDLC Data Processing

From experience, the system is suggested to provide the following functions for
CPDLC data processing:

a. Display CPDLC position report and flight data.

b. Display a CPDLC dialogue window.
c. Determine whether the aircraft enters the CPDLC area according to route
information.
d. Allow initiating a CPDLC connection automatically or manually by the pilot
or the controller.
e. Receive and process CPDLC downlink messages, send CPDLC uplink
messages, and manage the message status.
f. Allow to search CPDLC historical messages and display the messages in
chronological order.

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g. Provide prompts to controllers in the following cases: correct message
transmission and reception, manual operation, and successful logon.

3.1.7.3 DCL Processing

The system is recommended to provide the following DCL functions:

a. Receive, process, and send DCL messages (ARINC 623, EUROCAE ED-85A,
etc.).
b. Identify and process the RCD message and automatically send error messages
to controllers suggesting voice-clearance in case of invalid RCD message.
c. Correlate the RCD message with a specific flight plan according to the callsign,
departure airport, landing airport, and automatically reply with an FSM
message.
d. Automatically send CLD messages according to the correlated FDR and
manual input data and perform synthetic and semantic checks.
e. Check the compliance between the CDA and CLD message.
f. Be capable of displaying RCD information, including the callsign, SSR code,
CLD processing identification, and enable the edition and transmission of
CLD messages.

3.1.8 System Parameter Management Function

For the convenience of system maintenance, the system is proposed to be capable of

managing the variable system parameters through a user/ops orientated adaptation
interface used by trained adaptors.

3.1.8.1 Types of System Parameters

The system is recommended to be able to adapt system functional parameters for all
functionality.

That parameters adaptation is highly preferential to software-code based system

management, e.g., pre-set files.

Those parameters are designed to accommodate future performance loads to avoid

errors or limitations brought on by inflexible value limits.

That parameters adaptation is orientated towards use by ATS operational orientated staff.
Variables, their units of use, and values range should reflect the operational application.

Generally, the types of system parameters include the following:

a. Basic parameters: airspace, sectors, positions, routes, QNH areas, etc.

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b. Surveillance data parameters: surveillance source parameters, fusion
parameters, etc.
c. Flight data parameters: message processing and transmission rules, SSR code
allocation rules, FDR parameters, etc.
d. System interface parameters: interface configuration parameters.
e. HMI parameters: sectorization parameters, electronic and paper flight strips
formats, CFL popup values, system maps, etc.
f. Alert parameters: warning and inhibition area definition, warning condition
parameters, etc.
g. Other maintenance parameters: recording parameters, warning messages, error
messages, etc.

3.1.8.2 System Parameter Management

The system is recommended to support a graphical user interface tool, such as Database
Management System (DBMS) to establish, delete, modify, display release, and validate
the online/offline system parameters.

The DBMS tool is suggested to support accuracy check, provide error prompts and
references according to parameters format, character length, and mold to ensure
accuracy of parameters, and limit illegal input of the parameters. The system has the
fallback function. If a step of parameters setting goes wrong, you can go back to the
previous step.

3.1.8.3 System Parameter Activation

In order to balance the efficiency and safety, by experience, the system is suggested to
support the following two ways to let the system parameters go into effect:

a. Online generate: for parameters allowed to be configured, selected, and

generated online, without restarting the system.
b. Offline generate: for parameters to be generated after restarting the entire
system or specific system modules.

3.1.9 ATS Inter-facility Data Communication Function

The system is recommended to incorporate an AIDC application that supports the ATS-
related information exchanges within the ATMAS of adjacent Control Units and Flight
Information Regions adopted in the Asia-Pacific region.

The AIDC function of the system should conform to the standards in the prevailing
version of the following documents:

a. Pan Regional (NAT and APAC) PAN AIDC ICD; and

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b. Procedure for Air Navigation Services-Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM)
(ICAO Doc4444).

3.1.9.1 AIDC message transmission and processing

The system should support the core AIDC messages recommended in Asia/Pacific
Regional ICD, such as ABI, CPL, EST, MAC, CDN, ACP, REJ, TOC, AOC, EMG,
MIS, LAM, and LRM.

The system should be configurable in supporting variations in AIDC processing and

messages dependent on the mutual agreements with each adjacent Control Unit or FIR.

Commonly, the system is recommended to transmit AIDC messages automatically,and

be capable of processing received AIDC messages automatically.

The system is suggested to transmit ABI, EST, PAC, and other messages automatically
according to the AIDC handover conditions and the status of the flight plan.

The system is proposed to transmit TOC and EST messages manually through the HMI
in specific cases. The flight data operation position (FDOP) is capable of processing
erroneous and irrelevant messages manually.

For received messages that failed syntactic and semantic checks, the system should
send such messages to a message queue to process by controllers manually.

The system is expected to alert controllers of any unsuccessful transmission of AIDC

messages due to communication fault, rejection by the receiving adjacent Control Units
or FIRs, or failure to receive an expected application response from the receiving
Control Unit within a time threshold.

3.1.9.2 AIDC Handover

The system should be able to trigger AIDC handover automatically, depending on

configured AIDC handover parameters, which may include handover points, height,
time, adjacent Control Unit, etc.

The system could allow controllers to initiate AIDC handover manually.

3.1.9.3 AIDC Coordination Process

Generally, the AIDC handover is mainly fulfilled by exchanging a variety of messages.

The AIDC procedure is composed of three phases forming a standard AIDC process:

a. Notification Phase;
b. Coordination Phase; and
c. Transfer of Control Phase.

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The standard AIDC procedure could be simplified according to the handover agreement
between adjacent Control Units. For example, taking advantage of several
indispensable messages regarding EST/PAC, ACP, TOC, AOC, and LAM, the handover
could be simplified into two phases coordination and handover. The procedure is shown
in the figure below:

Figure 3.1.9-1 Simplified AIDC procedure

The system could update the flight state of a flight as it transits through the AIDC
coordination phases.

After completing a coordination process, the system could automatically update the
concerned flight plan with the cleared flight profile.

The system is expected to alert controllers when coordination with an adjacent

Control Unit or FIR is not completed within certain time thresholds before Estimated
Time over Boundary RP, Estimated Time of Departure, etc.

3.1.10 Human Machine Interface Function

HMI (Human Machine Interface), as an important part of the ATMAS, is the medium
for interaction and information exchange between the system and controllers.
Operational users can monitor air traffic situations and modify flight plans and other
relevant information through tphysical peripherals and/or onscreen control interfaces.
Technicians can monitor the status of the ATMAS and perform technical maintenance
operations as well. HMI design of ATMAS should consider the day-to-day operation of
air traffic controllers to provide a user-friendly interface for controllers to perform their
duties effectively and efficiently. In general, the design should facilitate safe, efficient,
and sustainable control of air traffic based on the following principles:

a. Accurate presentation of air traffic data

b. Timely presentation of air traffic data
c. Automatic data validity checking including operator input
d. Input options automatically limited to valid data selections

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e. Allow a variety of user-friendly input methods (e.g., keyboard, number pads,
mouse, etc.) for data entry by controllers
For friendly use,, the HMI function is recommended to include at least as follows:

a. Providing graphical interfaces and functions for different positions, such as

supervisor position, controller position, flight data operator position, etc.
b. Providing multiple position modes (e.g., Normal, Degraded, Bypass, and
Mono) if required.
c. Providing variable user modes (e.g., Operational, Free, Shadow, and Replay)
if required.
d. Providing a complete set of HMI configuration, including track display, HMI
layout, menu setting, color management, mouse/keyboard functional
definitions, map management, etc.
e. Providing the operation interfaces for flight plan modification and
control/management of onscreen information.
f. Providing warnings related to HMI.

3.1.10.1 Controller Position

The controller position provides controllers with relevant information required for air
traffic control, helping the controller be fully aware of the situation and manage the
aircraft in the responsible area. The specific functions are suggested as follows:

a. Display system tracks, multi-radar tracks, multi-ADSB tracks (if available),

multi-WAM tracks (if available), flight plan tracks, and bypass tracks.
b. Enable interactive flight operations such as aircraft handover and acceptance,
manual correlation, level assignment, and coordination status.
c. Allow screen operations such as zoom in, zoom out, off-center, measurement,
window movement, label rotation, etc.
d. Manage map display.
e. Display and edit Flight plans.
f. Post and display electronic flight strips/flight data list.
g. Display system information.
h. Personalize position parameters and display.
i. Other relevant information required for operations.

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3.1.10.2 Supervisor Position

The supervisor position typically has the same display and operation interface as the
controller position. In addition, the system is advised to provide other functions on the
supervisor position, such as online operation parameters settings and management, SSR
code management, sector management, automatic handover setting, position alert
management temporary/global map setting, etc.

3.1.10.3 Flight Data Operator Position

The flight data operator position is capable of displaying relevant flight plans in a flight
list containing all the flight information fields, and enabling the online flight plan
editing function and AFTN message display, query, error correction, and sending
function.

3.1.10.4 Technical Management Position

The technical management position provides a graphic interface enabling efficient

system maintenance and software management. The specific functions of the position
are generally as follows:

a. Technical parameters management.

b. Operational parameters management.
c. Software configuration and management.
d. User Management.
e. Map generator.

3.1.10.5 Position Mode Switch

The system could be designed to provide controller positions with various user modes
to cater to different operational needs. Below is an example of different user modes.

States/Administrations could define their own set of position modes according to the
operational need.

a. Operational mode

The position in operational mode is allocated with sector and provides ATC service.
b. Free mode
The position in free mode is sector-free and functionally limited, such as read-only access
to flight data.

c. Shadow mode
The position in shadow mode provides real-time monitoring of the operational position of
specific sectors and the functionally limited, such as read-only access to flight data.

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d. Replay mode
The system only provides playback function in replay mode and cannot be used for ATC
service.

3.1.10.6 Track Display

The graphical representation of a track usually includes a track symbol located at the
current position of the aircraft, a label, a label leader, a selectable velocity vector, and
a selectable number of track history dots, etc.

The system should be able to display the accurate position of the track, generated and
updated according to surveillance source.

From experience, the system can customize of the display of information in different
layout types to show information on the label in different levels of detail depending on
he operational needs.

The system is suggested to support label action such as CFL modification, handover
request and acceptance, runway modification, STAR allocation, etc.

3.1.10.7 Map Display

The system is recommended to be capable of the offline definition of the system maps,
the online creation of the local maps by individual controller position, and the online
creation of the Global Map, temporary Restricted / Danger Area maps, etc. by the
supervisor position.

The online created local map, global map, and temporary restricted / danger area maps
could be saved and restored automatically during system restart.

Note: Controllers should use the online creation of maps with caution to avoid safety
impact.

3.1.10.8 Flight Plan Window

The flight plan window is suggested to support displaying and modifying of the flight
plan data fields such as SSR code, ACID, flight rule, aircraft type, wake category,
departure airport, destination airport, requested flight level, route, field 18 data.

The flight plan window is recommended to enable at least the following flight plan
functions: creation, deletion, modification, flight strip printing, etc.

3.1.10.9 Electronic Flight Strip Function (if applicable)

Electronic Flight Strip Function could be implemented as a part of HMI function, from
which controllers can access to do handover, acceptance, filtering, and sorting function.
The electronic flight strips can be sorted and displayed by flight plan state, route fixes,
time information, etc.

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3.1.10.10 System Information Display

It is recommended to provide in the HMI system information, including device failure,

operational data, feedback of operation, system status information, etc., for controllers’
awareness of system status.

3.1.10.11 Tracks Quick Search

It is recommended that the system has a quick search function to search a track with
complete or partial search criteria of the callsign, SSR code, departure/destination
airport, or other information. The matching track will be highlighted to the controllers.

3.1.10.12 Track/Label Filtering

It is recommended that the system provides a track and/or label filtering function.

The system could filter tracks based on upper/lower limitation of level or SSR code,
and search the track label by part or entire of ACID.

Enabling and disabling the flight plan track display could also be achieved via the HMI.

3.1.10.13 Personalized Position Parameters Setting

The system is recommended to provide flexible configurations, including label layout,

HMI colors, mouse and keyboard functions, color configurations of all elements, menus,
and windows according to operational demand.

3.1.10.14 SSR Code Duplication Warning

When detecting multiple aircraft with the same SSR code in a certain area, the system
is suggested to provide an SSR Code Duplication warning to the controller.

3.1.10.15 AIDC Coordination Failure Warning

On failure of AIDC coordination, the system is advised to provide visual indications to

controllers on track labels and electronic flight strips.

3.1.10.16 SPI Indication

The system provides visual indications to controllers at the reception of SPI information
transmitted by the aircraft.

3.1.11 Recording and Playback Function

The Recording and Playback function enables the recording of operational data of
ATMAS. It allows synchronized playback of the air traffic situation, controller-pilot
communication, and controller actions in the air situation display for incident analysis
and investigation. The recording and playback could be implemented as part of ATMAS
or via an external recording system. The design should aim at reconstructing the actual
scenario as accurately as possible.

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3.1.11.1 Recording Function

The Recording Function for ATMAS should maintain a continuous recording on all
controller working positions. The following data and display could be considered to be
recorded by the system:

a. Screen data of controller working positions, including an identical picture of

windows, temporary maps, and any alert /warning, etc.
b. Surveillance data, including SDP track output, radar data, ADS-B data, etc.
c. Controller input actions on keyboard or mouse.
d. Messages of external interfaces such as AIDC messages, meteorological
messages such as GRIB, AFTN, ICAO messages (including flight plan data),
ADEXP messages, data links such as PDC, CPDLC, ADS-C.
e. System data such as system event data, system performance data, system log,
etc.
The recording of data and display is suggested to be synchronized with a deviation of
less than 1 second or an acceptable tolerance according to the local operational needs.
The deviation is suggested to be as minimal as possible to allow the best reconstruction
of the recorded scenario during playback.

The Recording Function should ensure no loss of data at all times during the operation
of ATMAS, and the recording process should not render any degradation to the
performance of other functions of ATMAS. Recorded data should be retained for at
least 31 days or a duration which satisfies local regulatory requirements. Some States
may require a longer recording period for other purposes e.g., requests for data from
other organisations. Periods of 90 or 120 days may be more applicable for such needs.
Appropriate warnings are needed for notifying maintenance personnel when storage
capacity drops below a certain threshold so that appropriate action could be taken to
resolve the situation.

3.1.11.2 Playback Function

The ATMAS or external recording system should allow the replay of recorded and
archived data onto designated or idle controller working positions. In general, a
playback session should be able to start up within a short period of time and allow
continuous replay of recorded data for a considerable duration according to operational
needs. The system shall support synchronized playback of voice data.

The following two modes of playback are suggested for implementation in ATMAS to
cater to different investigation scenarios:

a. Passive Playback
The system replays what was on the screen of controller position with recorded
and archived data at the period of recording without interaction

b. Interactive Playback
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The system replays the air situation display of the controller' working position
at the period of recording. Controller tools, such as change of display range,
range, and bearing line, separation probe, quick look, altitude filtering, map
selection, etc., are allowed to be used interactively during playback.

For both of the above playback modes, the system should allow synchronized playback
of voice data in order to provide a complete picture of events for investigation purpose.
To facilitate the playback, the following controls are recommended to be included in
the playback function of ATMAS or external recording system:

a. Start / Pause (Resume) / Stop of a playback session.

b. Selection of different playback speeds at least real-time speed and a range of
playback speeds faster than normal recording speed.
c. Allow to select a start time for playback in terms of minute.
d. Selection of playback mode.
The system is suggested to be capable of performing multiple playback sessions
simultaneously to allow the playback of the same or different scenarios using different
controller working positions. For the same playback session, synchronized replay of
recording multiple controller working positions could be considered as part of the
playback function to facilitate the investigation of events involving multiple control
sectors.

The screen dump function is recommended to capture the screens during playback and
store them as files for subsequent printing and exporting. The facility should be
provided for exporting the screen dump file to external media using a common image
format that could be viewed on computers using non-proprietary software readily
available in the market.

3.1.11.3 Data Archiving

Data Archiving function is needed in ATMAS or external recording system for

transferring recording data onto removable media for the backup or impounding
purpose. The archiving process could be initiated in the system via manual action or
configured automatic process based on criteria, e.g., periodic archiving process at a
defined time interval or when remaining storage dropped below a certain threshold.

In general, the archiving process should not interfere with normal recording and
playback processes in the system as well as other system functions. Appropriate
warnings should be given whenever there is an error, or the archiving media is full
during the archiving process.

3.1.12 System Monitoring and Control Function

The system is recommended to provide the monitoring and controlling function, and
the failure of the monitoring and controlling function should not affect the operation of
other modules.

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3.1.12.1 Monitoring Function

The system is suggested to monitor in real-time the operational status of each module
and display the significant events. Alerts could be raised in levels according to severity,
and log files are generated accordingly. The system should be able to search, print, and
export logs by time. Usually, the system monitoring function mainly includes:

a. Interface status monitoring.

b. Hardware operation status monitoring.
c. Software operation status monitoring.
d. Network equipment operation status monitoring.
e. Database operation status monitoring.
f. System capacity and resource usage monitoring.
g. Important system events monitoring.

3.1.12.2 Control Function

In general, the system controlling function mainly includes the operations of start, stop,
restart, and switch as follows:

a. Start and stop the entire system.

b. Start and stop single surveillance source.
c. Start and stop a single server.
d. Start and stop network.
e. Switch between redundant equipment and networks
f. Start and stop software modules.

3.1.13 GNSS Time Synchronization

The system is suggested to be able to access an accurate time source, synchronize

external GNSS signals, and calibrate internal system time based on the NTP (Network
Time Protocol), so that the system time is consistent with the UTC.

The system is capable of receiving multiple external clock sources and switching
among them automatically or manually.

If all the external clock signals are interrupted or lost, the system is proposed to
synchronize with internal time correspondingly.

Unified time within the system is recommended to be shown on the HMI and provided
for surveillance data processing, flight data processing, monitoring and controlling,
recording and playback, etc.

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3.2 System Optional Function

3.2.1 Extended Surveillance Data Processing

Except for PSR and mode A/C radar data, the extended surveillance data include Mode
S radar data, ADS-B data, WAM, and other surveillance data, which contain more target
information, such as DAP parameters and accuracy, etc.

The system is encouraged to be able to process the extended surveillance data to provide
higher quality tracks and supplementary data.

The systems should be able to receive, process and display data from all the connected
sources in an integrated manner. When extended surveillance data is connected, in
addition to the essential surveillance data processing requirements (see 3.1.1), the
following additional requirements is suggested to be met.

The system can filter anomalous data according to the sensor type. Anomalous data
filtering can be carried out during pre-processing, mono-sensor data processing, and
multi-sensor data processing. Some suggested anomalous data filtering is as follows:

a. The system should check the integrity of mandatory data items in the ADS-B
message. And only ADS-B messages containing all mandatory data items will
be processed. Refer to ICAO APAC’s GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON GENERATION,
PROCESSING & SHARING of ASTERIX CATEGORY 21 ADS-B MESSAGES for definitions
of ADS-B mandatory data items.
b. The system should check the quality indicators of ADS-B data and position
accuracy of WAM data to ensure that only the data meeting the operational
requirements is used for track tracking and fusion.
c. Downlink aircraft parameters rely on airborne equipment besides surveillance
system, and their data quality is affected by more factors. It is recommended
that the system should perform the validity and consistency check of downlink
aircraft parameters.
d. Due to the anomalous Mode S SSR DAPs caused by BDS SWAP, it is
recommended that the system performs additional verification for Mode S
SSR DAPs, for example, cross-verification of SSR DAPs from different radar
stations.
The system should be able to use the ICAO 24bit aircraft address and aircraft
identification for track tracking and correlation.

The system should be able to process the extra emergencies beyond those indicated by
codes 7500, 7600, and 7700, including lifeguard/medical, minimum fuel, and downed
aircraft.

Note: DO-260 systems only transmit EMG and don’t transmit a MODE A code. DO-260A systems broadcast Mode
A information using a test message field. DO-260B systems can transmit the MODE A code. While emergency status

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can be transmitted by all version of ADS-B transponder. Considering aircraft equipped with DO-260/DO-260A ADS-
B transponder in airspace covered only by ADS-B, ATMAS should be able to identify the aircraft's emergency status
based on the emergency status of the ADS-B data only.

Mode S radar, ADS-B, and WAM systems can detect aircraft on the ground. The system
should be able to process ground/air flags to filter unnecessary ground targets.

The system should be able to process Mode S conspicuity code. Mode S conspicuity
code is a standard and non-discrete Mode 3/A code to tell the ATMAS that this is a
Mode S equipped aircraft. ATMAS should not use Mode S conspicuity code to identify
the aircraft、correlate the flight plans. Instead, the ATMAS should make of the Mode
S interrogated information, such as aircraft identification or ICAO 24bit aircraft address,
to identify the aircraft and correlate the flight plan. Asia Pacific region adopts “1000”
as Mode S Conspicuity Code.

3.2.2 Extended Correlation

On the basis of the original automatic correlation conditions, the system could further
perform correlation for a surveillance track and a flight plan based on the aircraft’s 24-
bit address or Aircraft Identification (ACID) provided by the aircraft downlink
parameters.

The system is recommended to give prompts on the correlated track label when SSR
codes, aircraft 24-bit address, or ACID of the flight plan mismatch the ones of the
surveillance track.

3.2.3 Extended Alert, Warning, and Advisory Function

In addition to the Safety Net Functions stated in paragraph 4.1.5, States/Administrations

could consider implementing the following extended set of alert, warning, and advisory
functions in ATMAS according to the local environment and operational needs. These
optional functions aim at enhancing operational efficiency and possibly reducing
controller workload.

3.2.3.1 Departure No Transgression Zone (DTZ)

The Departure No Transgression Zone (DTZ) function informs the controller if a track
is predicted to infringe a Departure No Transgression Zone area within a predefined
time interval, or has already infringed a Departure No Transgression Zone area. The
DTZ function also may suppress improper STCA generate between two normal flights
in DMA(Departure Monitoring Area).

The DTZ is an offline defined volume capturing the departure path of aircraft taking
off between two extended runway center lines which aircraft is not allowed to penetrate.
It shall be possible to define DTZ area off-line by specifying associated DMA
(Departure Monitoring Area).

When a track is predicted to infringe an DTZ area within a predefined time interval, or
has already infringed an DTZ area, the system shall provide DTZ warning.

a. The system shall generate DTZ warning for a track predicted to infringe an

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active DTZ area within a predefined time interval.
b. Visual and aural signals shall be provided on concerned controller positions on
DTZ warning is raised. The system shall enable operators to acknowledge the
raised warning to cancel the aural alarm.
c. The system shall be allowed to define multiple DTZ areas and activate or de-
activate online.
d. The system shall have STCA filtering function within an active Departure
Monitoring Area.

3.2.3.2 No Transgression Zone Alert

In the context of parallel approaches, No Transgression Zone (NTZ) is generally

defined as the corridor of airspace between two extended runway centerlines that
aircraft are not allowed to penetrate. The purpose of the NTZ alert is to warn controllers
of a predicted or actual unauthorized penetration of NTZ by aircraft during the final
approach. An appropriate look-ahead of the predicted NTZ alert is important to allow
enough time for controllers to respond to the situation.

When a track is predicted to infringe an NTZ area within a predefined time interval or
has already infringed an NTZ area, the system shall provide an NTZ warning.

e. The NTZ warning function includes two parts: NTZ pre-warning and NTZ
warning.
f. The system shall generate a pre-NTZ warning for a track predicted to infringe
an active NTZ area within a predefined time interval.
g. The system shall generate an NTZ warning for a track having infringed an
active NTZ area.
h. Visual and aural signals shall be provided on concerned controller positions on
which pre-NTZ or NTZ warning is raised. The system shall enable operators
to acknowledge the raised warning to cancel the aural alarm.
i. The system shall be allowed to define multiple NTZ areas and activate or de-
activate online.

3.2.3.3 Medium Term Conflict Detection Warning

Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD) is designed as a safety advisory tool that
provides warnings to controllers for potential conflict for“aircraft-to aircraft” or
“aircraft-to-airspace” encounters up to a looking ahead time. The aim of MTCD is to
proactively provide possible conflict in advance during sector planning to reduce
tactical workload.

States/Administration should consider the following factors to determine the

applicability of MTCD to their local environment:

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a. Suitability of local airspace structure to cater for long look-ahead time.
b. Local air traffic control procedures.
c. Whether airspace is under Free Route Operation.
d. CNS capability to support application.
MTCD advisory could be considered implemented in the following situation:

Potential or risk conflict detected based on current track trajectory and trial
clearance/probe. While a controller inputs a clearance, the MTCD will be calculated,
and conflict information, if any, will be provided to the controller and prompt for a
confirmation to proceed or abort. If a confirmation to proceed is received, an MTCD
warning would be generated to concerned controllers with the jurisdiction where
conflict may occur.
The MTCD function shall generate visual and/or aural alerts to controllers in air
situation display if any pair of aircraft is violating within a look-ahead time, which is a
pre-defined separation minimum in the MTCD settings. If more than one type of
conflict is implemented, different visual presentations are recommended for each type
of conflict to avoid confusion of alerts. In addition, MTCD inhibition could also be
implemented based on airspace, flight rule, SSR code groups, ACID, or other conditions
applicable to the local environment and operational needs.

3.2.3.4 Route Adherence Monitoring

Route Adherence Monitoring (RAM) monitors if an aircraft (i.e., surveillance track) is

following the planned route, as stated in the associate flight plan.

When an aircraft is detected to have deviated from the ATMAS trajectory by more than
a defined tolerance, a visual/or aural warning shall be generated to alert controllers to
take action on the situation.

In the case of the RAM caused by an incorrect Flight route, the warning may be
suppressed after the controller amends the flight plan route to reflect the actual flight
path by a user-friendly route modification interface (e.g., Graphical Re-route function).

The RAM warning can be acknowledged manually.

The RAM route model could be defined by the width of the corridor and the radius of
the waypoint. It is recommended that the system is designed to allow the definition of
different route model parameters for specific route segments.

3.2.3.5 Cleared Level Adherence Monitoring

Cleared Level Adherence Monitoring (CLAM) monitors the conformance of the Actual
Flight Level (AFL) of an aircraft to the Cleared Flight Level (CFL) issued by the air
traffic controller and provides warnings if the deviation between the two levels (i.e.,
Level Bust) was found after the aircraft has been level-off. To reduce nuisance alerts,
the system could allow an adaptable tolerance on the deviation of AFL from CFL.

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States/Administrations can consider including the use of Mode S DAPs, Selected
Altitude, in the CLAM detection logic. Selected Altitude is the altitude inputted by the
pilot at the aircraft cockpit based on the clearance from controllers. The checking of
Selected Altitude with CFL in the CLAM logic could allow early detection of potential
Level Bust and alert controller in advance.

3.2.3.6 Similar Callsign Advisory

Similar Callsign Advisory (SCA) provides advisory to alert controllers when an aircraft
carries a similar callsign with another one in the same jurisdiction controlled by a
controller. According to the operational environment and local needs, SCA checking
rules could be pre-defined or pre-programmed at the design stage of ATMAS
implementation. Adaptable SCA checking rules or look-up tables are preferred to allow
modification of similar callsign checking process based on the latest requirement and
feedback from controllers.

3.2.3.7 Reduce Vertical Separation Minimum Warning

Reduce Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) Warning provides alerts to controllers

when a non-RVSM approved/compliant aircraft is within or is predicted to enter RVSM
airspace.

To provide the warning to controllers, the volume of RVSM airspace would need to be
defined in the ATMAS, and the Field 10 of ICAO flight plan would be checked to see
if the aircraft is RVSM-approved. Visual indication would be generated if the aircraft
did not match the airspace requirement on RVSM.

3.2.3.8 Position Report Monitoring

The ATMAS trajectory needs to update for every point inside the route model when the
aircraft overflow this point. Position report permits a more precise calculation of the
Estimated Time of Overflight (ETO) of subsequent points along the planned route. The
Position Report shall also include intent information from Surveillance reports for use
in trajectory estimation.

To make the maintenance staff aware of the inconsistency in position reports, Position
Report Monitoring (PMON) monitors ATO/ETO and provides warnings to controllers
when:

a. Actual Time Over (ATO) and/or Estimated Time Over (ETO) of the next report
point differs from that calculated by the flight trajectory by more than a defined
time interval
b. The ETO of the respective waypoint differs by more than a defined time
interval
c. No position report is received for a defined time interval after the ETO missed
the position report

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3.2.3.9 Last Known Position Display

Last Known Position Display occurs when correlated tracks, uncorrelated, or ADS-C
tracks with critical alerts are lost.

The last known position of the track is displayed with a special track symbol to the
dedicated position.

3.2.3.10 SSR Inconsistency Warning

For correlated flight plan tracks, when the Mode 3/A code in the surveillance data is
inconsistent with the SSR code in the flight plan, the system is suggested to raise ASSR
Inconsistency Warning.

NOTE: 24-Bit Code Mismatch Warning and Callsign Mismatch Warning, please refer
to chapter 3.2.4.2.

3.2.3.11 PBN Capability Indication

The PBN function shall provide PBN indicator and/or PBN route mismatch indication
for controllers in order to indicate whether the aircraft match the RNAV/RNP Route or
Arrival.

When the PBN indicator is presented in the flight plan message, the system is suggested
to determine the PBN capability of the aircraft and inform controllers of the PBN
capability.

It is proposed that the system could define different priorities of PBN capability display
for each logical position.

The PBN function shall provide PBN route mismatch indication to the controllers:

a. When PBN route is mismatch between offline defined and PBN of flight plan
message.
b. It shall be raised at offline define time prior to the route segments.
c. It shall be able to offline turn on or off.

3.2.3.12 Downlink Aircraft Parameters Related Warnings

Please refer to section 3.2.4.2 for Downlink Aircraft Parameters related warnings.

3.2.4 Downlink Aircraft Parameter Processing and Display

It is recommended that the system have the capability to process and display aircraft
downlink aircraft parameters (DAPs) from Mode S radars, ADS-B and/or WAM to help
controllers have a more integrated view of the aircraft's flight status in the air.

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3.2.4.1 DAPs in Consistency Checks

The system is capable of making use of DAPs for report consistency checks, altitude
and position tracking. The data in DAPs include the magnetic heading, true airspeed,
selected altitude, barometric vertical rate, geometric vertical rate, roll angle, track angle
rate, track angle, and ground speed, etc.

3.2.4.2 DAPs Related Warnings

DAPs Related Warnings generally include:

a. 24-Bit Code Mismatch Warning

For the correlated track, the system can provide an ICAO 24-bit code mismatch
warning and present to the responsible controller when the downlink 24-bit
code does not match the CODE in field 18 of the FPL message.

b. Callsign Mismatch Warning

For the correlated track, the system can provide a callsign mismatch warning
and present it to the responsible controller when the downlink callsign does
not match the callsign in field 7a of the FPL message.

c. Predicted Level Mismatch Warning

The system is suggested to continuously monitor the consistency of Selected
Altitude from the airborne equipment and the Cleared Flight Level from the
controller. A predicted level mismatch warning will present to the responsible
controller if the difference is greater than the pre-defined threshold.

d. Resolution Advisory (RA) alert indication

The system may provide a RA alert indication and present on the track label to
the responsible controller when a RA report is received via the airborne ACAS
system.

Note: The display of ACAS Resolution Advisory Report in ATM automation system can be turn on or turn off
by user, and it is not recommended by IFATCA. The user is suggested to do the relevant safety evaluation
before applying this function.

3.2.4.3 DAPs Display

The system is suggested to provide a downlink data window, which is used to display
the downlink aircraft information. Displayable information is recommended to include:
SSR code, Target aircraft address, Target aircraft identification, Magnetic heading, True
airspeed, Selected altitude, Final state selected altitude, Barometric vertical rate,
Geometric vertical rate, Roll angle, Geometric vertical rate, Track angle rate, Track
angle, Ground speed, Velocity uncertainty, Position uncertainty, Indicated airspeed,
Mach number, Barometric pressure setting, etc.

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The information in the DAP Window can be configured per logical positions, such as
the airborne downlink data to display and the unit of data items, etc.

3.2.5 Arrival Manager Function

The purpose of Arrival Manager (AMAN) is an advisory tool to optimize the flight
landing sequence with suggested arrival interval and reduce flight holding time in the
air, thus minimizing delay and providing control actions and advisories. These are
achieved by considering factors such as airport runway configuration, runway rate,
weather conditions, stand arrangements, etc.

The essential functions of AMAN include flight sequencing, spacing, and delay advice.

a. Flight sequencing and spacing function

According to the calculated four-dimensional trajectory, AMAN calculation
takes into account the metering point or runway spacing and performs a sorting
calculation to obtain the target landing time (TLDT) and the arrival sequence.
The tool recalculates the TLDT, when it obtains a new estimated landing time
(ELDT), or when ATC reissues a request to revise the metering point or runway
spacing.

b. Delay advice function

The delay advice generated by AMAN includes re-route, holding pattern, point
merge system (PMS), and delay time indication. The system gives different
delay advice according to the time of the delay.

AMAN may interact with ATFM or CDM system to follow a strategic plan to balance
capacity and demand within different volumes of airspace and airport environments.
There are many types of ATFM measures. Their lifetime typically spans the pre-
tactical and tactical phases of the ATFM timeline. Fix balancing, Re-routing
(mandatory or alternative), Level capping scenarios, and Collaborative trajectory
options are included in the lateral aspect. For details and more information, please
refer to DOC 9971.

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3.2.6 Departure Manager Function

The basic function of DMAN shall include stakeholders to file Target Off-Block Time
(TOBT) to a particular flight and ATC to calculate Target Take-Off Time (TTOT)
which in turn issues a Target Startup Approval Time (TSAT). DMAN should also take
in Calculated Take-Off Time (CTOT) from Flow Managers to apply ground delay
programs.

The purpose of Departure Manager (DMAN) is to allow the operator to plan flights and
share the planning decisions with other operators enabling Airport Collaboration
Decision Making (A-CDM) to optimize departure sequence. This reduces fuel wastage
by reducing taxing and waiting time on taxiways.

a. Filing TOBT
When operators and stakeholder to file a TOBT, it enables ATC to know when
the aircraft will be ready for pushback. This enable better predictability of
flight readiness
b. Calculating TTOT and TSAT
With a known TOBT, DMAN will calculate a take off time for this flight. If
take off time is free of conflict, TSAT will be TOBT. If take off time is
occupied by another flight, DMAN will find the next available take off time
base on system set departure interval and wake constraint, forming the TTOT.
TTOT will be back calculated by deducting taxing time to runway and
pushback time deriving a TSAT. In this case, TSAT is not the same as TOBT
thus a delay advice in gate is issued.
c. Taking CTOT into consideration
d. If ground delay program is needed, Flow Managers will issue a specific CTOT
to a flight. This will then replace TTOT of the flight and DMAN will back
calculate by deducting taxing time to runway and pushback time deriving a
TSAT. This CTOT shall be within system configured constraint and other non
CTOT flights to be sequenced around it.

DMAN can be enhanced by introducing Surface Manager (SMAN) which will feed
taxing time to DMAN base on ground sensors rather than a fix system configured table.

3.2.7 System Log Management

For the convenience of anomalies investigation, the system is recommended to be able

to collect and manage operational logs and error messages. The operational logs include

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personnel commands, hardware logs, software logs, external interface logs, etc. The
error messages consist of software and hardware error messages, etc.

The system is suggested to be capable to:

a. Record operational logs and error messages.

b. Display necessary logs on the dedicated positions.
c. Store logs on the disk and classifies by dependency. The user is allowed to sort
logs by given conditions.
d. Backup logs automatically or manually, and the backup logs are readable.
e. Store logs on the disk for at least 31 days.

3.2.8 Enhancement Recording and Playback Function

Considering the convenience to user, the system is recommended to extend the

capability to integrally record the screenshots of the HMI by way of frames and replay
the recording onto designated positions and mobile devices in the form of video.

3.2.8.1 Video Recording Function

The video record refers to the continuous footage derived from the controller’s screen
as exactly the same as shown. The video recording data is recommended to output as
common video formats.

The system is suggested to support the storage of video recording data over a period of
time, such as 31 days. By reducing disk occupancy and transferring the data for the
method, the system should not be impacted by storage overload.

3.2.8.2 Video Playback Function

It is recommended that the replay of the video record data could be performed on any
designated controller position, and the video replay should be synchronized with the
Audio.

The system is expected to be able to control the replay, including the selection of replay
mode, retrieval replay, change replay speed, start, pause, forward, stop, etc.

3.2.9 Enhanced Wake Turbulence Separation and Pairwise Separation Tools

Amendment 9 of the PANS-ATM (Doc 4444) introduces a new enhanced wake

turbulence separation scheme with an alternative set of wake turbulence groups and
associated wake turbulence separation minima for approach and departure phases of
flights. The new scheme is based on the studies performed by Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL) on the wake generation and wake resistance characteristics of
different aircraft types, which allows a reduction in wake turbulence separation between
some aircraft pairs depending on the leading and the following aircraft type, as well as

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increases in wake turbulence separation for the smaller and more vulnerable aircraft
type.

The ICAO Flight Plan is not required to be updated with the new wake turbulence
groups, while air traffic controllers will have to consider seven wake turbulence groups
instead of four categories when applying the new wake turbulence separation minima.
States/Administrations are recommended to implement Pairwise Separation Tools
function in ATMAS to assist air traffic controllers in the delivery of intended aircraft
separation under the new scheme without memorizing all the separation pairs.

3.2.9.1 Wake Turbulence Groups and Airspace

The harmonized ICAO wake turbulence group categorizes aircraft into seven groups,
Groups A to G, based on maximum certified take-off mass and wing span:

For the implementation of enhanced wake turbulence separation scheme,

States/Administrations have the flexibility to determine the scope of applicability to
their airspaces. Also, States/Administrations can consider introducing the reduced
minima in total, or in part as the first step, or a combination of these with fewer groups,
or updating the local minima based on a partial set of enhanced wake turbulence
separation minima, whichever will provide the most benefit given the local traffic
mixture.

To facilitate the transition from legacy to new scheme by air traffic controllers, the
design of ATMAS should allow the flexibility to adapt the mapping of wake turbulence
groups (A to G) to a custom set of abbreviations according to the local operational
environment to minimize the impact to air traffic controllers in handling extra wake
turbulence groups under the new scheme.

States/Administrations would need to define the specific volume of airspace that

operates using ICAO enhanced wake turbulence separation, whilst other airspaces
should continue to operate using legacy ICAO wake turbulence categories. For the
implementation, the design of ATMAS should allow the use of both wake turbulence
categories and groups in the system so that the appropriate wake turbulence
categories/groups could be applied based on airspaces, controlling sectors, or
controller’s roles in accordance to operational needs.

3.2.9.2 Human Machine Interface of Wake Turbulence Groups

The abbreviation of wake turbulence categories/groups is normally displayed in the

track labels of an aircraft in the HMI of ATMAS. Since the enhanced separation would
only be implemented in the designated volume of airspace, the ATMAS should be
configurable to display the appropriate wake turbulence categories/groups to air traffic
controllers in accordance with the applied wake turbulence scheme of that airspace. The
ATMAS could determine the appropriate scheme by referring to the location of the
aircraft and/or roles of the controllers.

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In addition, States/Administrations can consider implementing electronic cue cards on
the pair-wise aircraft separation under wake turbulence groups in ATMAS to assist
controllers in identifying the required separation for aircraft pairs during operation.

3.2.9.3 AMAN Optimization

With the implementation of ICAO enhanced wake turbulence separation, runway

capacity is expected to increase in most cases due to a general reduction of wake
turbulence separation in popular aircraft pairs of traffic mix. To benefit from the
increase in runway capacity, the AMAN would need to be optimized to provide plans
with arrival rate matchingthe runway capacity. The optimization could involve a change
in the AMAN logic on handling extra wake turbulence groups or fine-tuning of system
parameters to increase the arrival rate of the landing sequence generated by AMAN to
match with the theoretical runway capacity as far as possible.

3.2.9.4 Pairwise Separation Tools

To assist air traffic controllers in handling air traffic under enhanced wake turbulence
separation and improve air traffic controllers’ consistency in delivering the traffic
according to the intended runway capacity, Pairwise Separation Tools are recommended
to be implemented. There are several examples of such tools in use, the following tool,
namely Approach Spacing Tool (AST), provides an example of the function and
application of such tools. The AST could project and present the required spacing
graphically between aircraft pairs along the approach sequence and provide advisories,
in the form of graphical indicators on the Air Situation Display, to indicate the optimal
positions of aircraft along the final approach path.

The AST could be operated in either Distance-based Separation (DBS) or Time-based

Separation (TBS). Time-based Spacing could be helpful in safely managing the traffic
without reduction in capacity when aircraft ground speed is generally reduced on the
final approach due to strong and consistent headwinds. States/Administrations should
assess separation standards by considering the performance/accuracy/reliability of local
wind prediction, time-to-fly forecast, and other relevant ATC support tools.

Projection of Spacing
During the computation of spacing guidance, the AST should consider all the
required separation criteria for a given aircraft pair, including wake turbulence
separation minima, minimum radar separation, and dependent parallel approach
separation. Then the tool would apply the most stringent criteria to ensure that none
of the required separations is infringed.

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Figure 3.2.8-1 Minimum Separation

Apart from the required minimum separation, the AST would also consider other
operational situations or parameters which could affect the optimal spacings
between aircraft such as runway occupancy times, specific minimum separation
defined for a runway, extra gap required between specific landing aircraft, etc.
Together with the operational mode on the aircraft spacing and runway mode, the
AST would consider all the above factors and provide spacing guidance in the form
of graphical cues illustrated in the subsequent paragraphs.

AST Guidance Cues

Provision of visual guidance on the computed spacing, in the form of graphical
indicators on the Air Situation Display, is recommended as part of the AST function.
The purpose of visual guidance is to support air traffic controllers in delivering the
traffic according to the intended capacity as far as practicable. Two guidance cues
are recommended to be implemented by the AST:

a. Final Target Distance (FTD)

b. Initial/Intermediate Target Distance (ITD)
Final Target Distance (FTD) is the appropriate position for the following aircraft
behind a leading aircraft at the required minimum spacing applied at the runway
threshold. The follower shall always be behind its respective FTD indicator along
the final approach path.

Initial Target Distance (ITD) is the optimal distance for the following aircraft to be
positioned behind a leading aircraft with the consideration of the required
minimum spacing and the deceleration compression buffer. The ITD should be
calculated based on the estimated 3D trajectory, the estimated speed profile,
environment data (including wind, temperature, etc.), and the target FTD.

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Figure 3.2.8-2 FTD and ITD Guidance

FTD and ITD guidance should be updated at every track update of ATMAS.
Depending on the actual operational environment, the position of the FTD and ITD
guidance cues could be chosen to implement in AST along:

a. Planned trajectory of the flight.

b. Predefined common path.

(a) Planned trajectory of the flight (b) Predefined common path

Figure 3.2.8-3: Guidance Cues

Final Approach Sequence Management

The planned Final Approach sequence is crucial in the generation of AST Guidance
Cues by providing necessary information to the AST in determining the required
wake turbulence separation between aircraft. Therefore, an accurately planned
sequence is important for smooth AST operation.

If State/Administration has implemented Arrival Manager (AMAN) in its

operation, its arrival sequence data would be the best candidate for processing by
the AST. If AMAN is not available, an arrival sequence based on the flight
trajectories from ATMAS would be an alternate option for AST processing.

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Monitoring Aids in Approach Spacing Tool
To ensure the appropriate spacing between arriving aircraft can be delivered, the
following monitoring aids could be implemented for aircraft under management by
AST for detecting catch-up scenarios, infringement of aircraft spacing, arrival
sequence mismatch, speed non-conformance, etc..

3.2.10 Operational Data Synchronization

In order to provide continuous ATM service in case of the ATMAS suffers from
technical problems, system failures, or other critical anomalies, some ATM centers are
configured with two types of ATM automation systems, which work in main and backup
mode.

The Operational Data Synchronization Function serves for both master and backup
ATM automation systems deployed in the same ATM center. This function enables the
system to synchronize operational data to the backup system when in master mode. This
function also synchronizes the system when in backup mode with operational data from
other master systems.

3.2.10.1 System Main/Fallback Mode

The system provided with the operation data synchronization function shall have two
working modes at least: main and fallback mode. These two working modes can be
switched manually.

In the main mode, all of the system functions operate normally and output
synchronization data in real-time.

In the fallback mode, the system receives and processes the synchronization data in
real-time. System functions run as usual, apart from the transmission of messages to
external systems.

3.2.10.2 Synchronous Data

Data synchronous data between the main and fallback systems is recommended to
include basic flight data and operational setting data as follows. Users can adjust the
data to be synchronized based on the operation needs:

a. Basic flight data comprises flight plan information, allocated runway,

SID/STAR, etc.
b. Operational setting data includes sector allocation, airport runway status,
position settings, online area creation or modification, etc.

3.2.10.3 Synchronization Trigger

Data synchronization is recommended to carry out periodically at a pre-defined time

interval. In addition to the periodic data synchronization, the synchronization could be
triggered by pre-defined events, for examples:

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a. Each item in the flight plan information changed.
b. Each flight plan state changed
c. Each operational setting changed.

3.2.11 Statistics and Analysis Function

Statistics and analysis function could be implemented for generating reports on the
surveillance data, flight plans, alarm information, and traffic flow data.

Flight data that can be extracted from the ATMAS database at a minimum would have
the following correlated data fields: aircraft ID1, number of aircraft movements in the
airspace sector and controlled airspace2, flight rule3, flight type4, number of danger
area infringements, number of rejected & accepted uplink messages, number of rejected
& accepted downlink messages, number of uplink & downlink delivery timeouts,
number of received and transmitted messages, number of AIDC messages 5
(transmitted, received, rejected, and accepted) and the total number of flights.

Presentation of correlated data fields would be in the form as shown in Appendix B:

Table 3.2.10-1A for Flight Specific Flight Data and Table 3.2.10-1B for Collective
Flight Data, where these are organized according to the date and/or time (in hour
resolution6) of interest. The date and/or time window selection will allow flexibility in
the period of data of interest. Hence, the correlated data will not be limited to fixed time
periods, e.g., daily, weekly, or monthly. Nonetheless, a fixed time period can be the
default setting and, in any case, the selected time period that defines the scope/coverage
of the data that are being presented in the interface will always be visible to the user.

The data fields for Collective Flight Data will refer to the specified time periods. For
example, data for the Total No. of Flights will be presented for the Day if the selected
Time Period is set to Day; the Total No. of Flights will be shown in each sector for the
Airspace Sector; and so on. Furthermore, the Total No. of Flights data need not be equal
to the Total No. of Flights in the Airspace Sector when the Total No. of Flights in each
Airspace Sector is summed together for the reason that the flight may have traversed
more than one Airspace Sector. The same principle is applied in the presentation of
other correlated data fields.

Correctness and accuracy of the information in the presented data should be verified
prior to deployment of the ATMAS into live operation. This can be arranged as one of

1ICAO 2012 strictly enforces that this figure should be letters and numbers only, devoid of dashes, spaces, or other
punctuation.
2
sorted into ARR, DEP, Overflight, and Domestic Flights
3 “I” for IFR, “V” for VFR, “Y” for when the flight will be initially IFR followed by one or more subsequent flight
rules changes, and “Z” for VFR first with any number of subsequent changes.
4 “S” for Scheduled Air Service, “N” for Non-scheduled Air Transport Operation, “G” for General Aviation, “M”
for Military, and “X” for everything else
5 applicable to flights involving the exchange of AIDC messages with adjacent FIR/ATS Unit
6 the selection of time period will allow up to values in hour, e.g., 19 March 2021 0900-1000 UTC

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the test cases for each data field that the vendor must be able to comply verifying its
performance.

Similarly, surveillance data correlated with flight data records can be retrieved from the
ATMAS. These data are grouped into Flight Specific Surveillance Data.

Flight Specific Surveillance Data should be able to provide information on the type of
surveillance track that is/are correlated to the flight. For instance, in a single flight data
record, there is information if Secondary, Mode S, Multilateration and ADS-B tracks
are correlated to the flight. This applies to an ATMAS interfaced with multiple
surveillance technologies. For more than one source of the same type of surveillance
technology, information about the source of that correlated track data should be
provided, e.g., ADS-B Source: 2 (ADS-B track data taken from the second ADS-B
sensor defined in the system). Furthermore, information about the surveillance track
quality should also be provided if coasting, normal, low or high. This track information
shall be based on the time stamped track at the time of track distribution. The time
stamp shall be the reference of the ATMAS for generating the Flight Specific
Surveillance Data after selecting the time period of interest. Appendix B Table 3.2.10-
2 illustrates the presentation of Flight Specific Surveillance Data.

Considering the number of surveillance tracks generated as system tracks for the
ATMAS from a single source alone for one target, it will be quite irrelevant to gather
Collective Surveillance Data. Flight Specific Surveillance Data would be more
useful for the analysis of information generated by the ATMAS.

Data records should be retained for at least 31 days to allow for accident/incident
investigation processes. These records should be made available on request to the
relevant State safety authority. Where data is sought from an adjacent State, the usual
State to State channels should be used. These recordings shall be in a form that permits
a replay of the situation and identification of the messages that were received by the
ATS system7.

The data can be used for pre- and post-analysis of Air Traffic Management situation.
Peri-analysis process will allow the ATC Supervisor to make the necessary adjustment(s)
in the operations, while post-analysis can provide guidance in improving the
operational processes and activities complementary to the technical aspect of the
operations.

7 The excerpts from Chapter 7.7.1 of the ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONS GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT, Edition 8.0 – September 2015 is hereby adopted for all surveillance data sources.

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4. SYSTEM DESIGN

4.1 System Architecture

In general, ATMAS should be equipped with adequate redundancy to ensure full

availability for all critical, essential, and routine operational functions for air traffic
control. Its system architecture should allow extra redundancy to be deployed whenever
considered necessary. The architecture of ATMAS should follow the design and
implementation principles below:

a. The ATMAS software should adopt modular design and distributed

architecture to ensure robustness under adverse operating conditions. For the
key function modules, such as FDP and SDP, they should be at least deployed
on dual redundant servers in hot standby configuration to ensure a safe and
uninterrupted service of ATMAS.
b. To minimize the number of single point failures due to hardware or software,
multiple system redundancy and distributed system architecture are
recommended.
c. System elements running simultaneously on multiple servers/computers
should communicate over redundant networks and the failure of any element
should not affect the operation of other system elements.
d. The network of ATMAS should be built on redundant network elements. Each
mainstream operational data should be transmitted over independent links and
networks. Failure of any network element would not affect the delivery of the
main data stream within ATMAS.
e. For large-scale ATMAS designed for handling large traffic volumes, it is
recommended to separate the transmission of different types of system data
into dedicated networks. For example,
➢ Operational Network: for handling the exchange of operational data,
including surveillance data, flight plans, etc., between all controller
working positions and operational servers.
➢ Maintenance Network: for the transmission control & monitoring data,
maintenance-related data, system log, replay data as well as distribution
of new software and adaptation updates to system elements.
➢ Direct Surveillance Access Network: for direct distribution of
surveillance data from surveillance sources to controller working
positions as the backup to the system track output of Surveillance Data
Processor (SDP) of ATMAS.
➢ Data Synchronization Network: for synchronizing data between

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redundant systems of ATMAS.
f. High reliability through redundancy such that at least two identical system
elements of the same function operate concurrently and the failure of either
one should not affect the satisfactory operation of its counterpart and the
system service.
g. Fault tolerant such that the system could continue its service, rather than failed
completely, when some elements of the system failed.
h. With fail safe capability such that the system operation should switch over to
the fallback system elements after failure or abnormal termination of
operational system elements.
i. Apart from having redundant elements within ATMAS, it is encouraged to
implement a separate set of ATMAS as the fallback system to main operational
system for maintaining air traffic services in case of catastrophic events
happen in the main system.
j. For ATMAS managing busy airspaces with high traffic volume, the main and
fallback systems are recommended to be provided by different manufacturers
to avoid common software faults to both systems.
k. The main and fallback systems are suggested to be physically located at
different sites to prevent any single-site accident affecting the operation of
ATMAS.
l. External interfaces of the system (such as radar, AFTN, etc.) shall be
redundantly configured and the system support automatic/manual switch to the
redundant interface channels in case of partial failure.

4.2 Position Roles and Types

Based on functionalities, positions of ATMAS can be categorized into the different

types, e.g.

a. Controller Working Position.

b. Flight Data Operator Position.
c. Flow Management Position.
d. Technical Maintenance Position.
e. Data Management Position.
f. Search and Rescue Position.

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States/Administrations is suggested to review their operational needs during the design
stage of ATMAS in order to adopt the suitable set of positions for their operational
environment.

Working positions can be further categorized based on the user roles. For example, in
ATC Center, controller working positions are categorized into roles of Supervisors,
Executive Controller, Planning Controller, and Assistants under Enroute, Terminal, and
Approach Control Streams. In ATC Tower, controller working positions are categorized
into roles of Supervisor, Air / Ground Controls, Clearance Delivery, and Assistant.

Access to different system functions by users would be controlled based on the assigned
roles. Controllers would be assigned with controlling roles for flights under their
jurisdiction, while maintenance engineers would be granted monitoring and control
permission on system components of ATMAS. All the roles and permissions should be
offline adaptable in the system database by authorized personnel. Once a role has been
assigned to an individual, that person can access the data and functions based on the
assigned permission.

States/Administrations could consider strategically deploying extra controller working

positions as spare in ATC Center and Tower. If a controller working position fails for
some reason, controllers can quickly move to a spare controller working position and
continue the ATC operation. The design of ATMAS should allow the restoration of air
traffic situation display, flight data, electronic flight strips, display settings, and
preferences after controllers move to another position to continue their works.

The type and number of positions shall be deployed on each site according to the
operational requirement. For the functions of each position, please refer to section
3.1.10.

4.3 Main and Fallback System Configuration

States/Administrations are encouraged to implement ATMAS in Main and Fallback

configuration as the baseline in order to be capable of providing uninterrupted ATC
service for their airspace. The Main and Fallback configuration can be achieved by two
sets of ATMAS or redundant processors of the same system. The Fallback system
should possess comparable system scale, configuration, and software functions with the
Main system. In addition, the Main-Fallback data synchronization mechanism should
be implemented to ensure the readiness of Fallback system for taking up the role as
operational system for air traffic control in case of failures in Main system.

For ATMAS managing busy airspaces with high traffic volume, States/Administrations
are encouraged to set up the Main and Fallback ATMAS with the same functionalities,
capabilities, and capacities but in separated systems in order to enhance robustness and
continuity in providing safe, efficient, and orderly ATC services. In busy airspaces,
ATMAS failure could be a catastrophic event and cause disruption to air traffic. The
Main and Fallback systems with data synchronization mechanism should allow the
switch over between Main and Fallback systems seamlessly when needed. In addition,
since the system switch over due to unexpected failure could be a rare event,
States/Administrations are suggested to perform the switch over between Main and

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Fallback systems regularly to get air traffic controllers and engineers familiar with the
process.

To further enhance resilience and mitigate risks of complete ATMAS failure, Main and
Fallback systems are recommended to be provided by different manufacturers to avoid
common software faults encountered in both systems simultaneously. If Main and
Fallback systems with the same functionalities, capabilities, and capacities were
supplied by the same manufacturer, a full-fledged Ultimate Fallback system from a
different manufacturer would need to be implemented such that the Ultimate Fallback
system could take up the operation as last resort in case of common software faults in
Main and Fallback systems. The Ultimate Fallback should be designed to have the same
level of functionalities, capabilities, and handling capacity as Main and Fallback
systems in order to sustain possible prolonged control of the airspace.

For the case of (1) Main and Fallback systems from the same manufacturer or (2)
redundant processors of the same system, but without the deployment of Ultimate
Fallback system, States/Administrations should conduct safety risk assessment on the
overall system architecture to ensure that the risks of having common software faults
in both Main and Fallback systems simultaneously have been mitigated to an acceptable
level.

Real-time data synchronization function shall be implemented between the main and
fallback systems to ensure the data consistency and smooth switch when technical
failure. The operational data synchronization function can refer to section 3.2.9.

4.4 System Operation Mode

4.4.1 Normal and Degraded Modes

The ATMAS should be capable of operating in normal and degraded modes. Under the
normal mode of operation, all the system elements of ATMAS are running normally
with full redundancy. Whenever there is any key system function (such as FDP or SDP)
fails, the ATMAS should maintain its service and automatically change to a degraded
mode of operation. The degraded mode should allow controllers to maintain the
provision of air traffic control service using limited system functionalities for a short
period of time while the system issues are being fixed by maintenance staff or switching
over to the Fallback system is still underway.

Under FDP failure, the ATMAS would be unable to process new incoming flight plans
and existing flight data records in the system. Silent coordination across controller
working positions may be unavailable as well. To mitigate the impact, controller
working position should keep a local copy of system flight plan data at individual
workstations so that flight plan association to the surveillance tracks could be
maintained using local flight plan copy upon FDP failure. In this case, controllers could
continue to identify tracks under their jurisdiction in their air situation display and
maintain the control of traffic.

For SDP failure, the processed multi-surveillance track data from SDP would be
unavailable in ATMAS. The system should maintain the display of air traffic situation
to the controllers by automatically switching to direct surveillance access mode in
which individual sources of surveillance data are directly fed to the controller working

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positions without the need for an SDP. In this case, controllers can continue the air
traffic control operation using directly fed surveillance data while the SDP issue is being
investigated and fixed by the maintenance team.

In case of other failures, the system should display impacted functions and operate
smoothly in the absence of degraded functions. When the failed function recovers,
controllers are allowed to manually upgrade to the normal mode on the position.

4.4.2 Main and Fallback Modes

For the case with Main and Fallback systems in place, the system should be capable of
configuring between Main and Fallback modes. In the Main operation mode, the system
would be responsible for processing AFTN messages, assigning SSR codes, responding
to controllers’ input, communicating with external systems, and synchronizing data to
the Fallback system. In the Fallback operation mode, the system would not process
carry out the above processing but would receive synchronization data from the Main
system and keep the system database up-to-date for operation switchover at any time.
Since the Main-Fallback switchover involves the coordination across different
controlling streams and technical maintenance team, it is suggested that user should
manually switch the Main/Fallback modes at the dedicated position of ATMAS for
centralized coordination on the switchover.

Regarding the HMI design, the operational modes should be shown at the controller
working positions and technical maintenance positions with prominent indications in
case of any degradation of system functionalities. For cases with Main and Fallback
systems in operation, the ATMAS should clearly indicate the current mode of operation,
Main or Fallback, in its HMI to ensure that controllers are working at the correct system.

4.5 Capacity and Performance

4.5.1 System Capacity

Normally, system capacity is used to describe the maximum processing capabilities,

which is determined by the air traffic flow, operation requirements and system
architecture, etc. It is suggested to include the following items at least:

a. System area.
b. Maximum number of sectors.
c. Maximum number of positions.
d. Maximum number of tracks displayed/correlated/under-controlled.
e. Maximum number of flight plans existing in the system.
f. Maximum number of flight plans activated simultaneously.
g. Maximum number of surveillance sensor inputs.
h. Maximum number of adjacent centers with AIDC protocol.

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4.5.2 Response Time

Response time is used to measure the speed, stability and resource usage of hardware
and software in the system, the following recommended criteria are listed by experience,
States/Administrations are encouraged to consider during the system planning stage.

a. The duration to start up a single node should be not more than 5 minutes.
b. The duration to cold start up whole system should be not more than 30 minutes.
c. MTBF of surveillance data processing should be not less than 100,000 hours.
d. MTBF of a single workstation should be not less than 10,000 hours.
e. Maximum deviation of clock synchronization should be not more than 100
milliseconds.

4.5.3 Performance of Surveillance Data Processing

Performance of surveillance data processing is used to measure the accuracy and ability
of the system surveillance data processing, the following suggested values would be
considered for system planning.

Adhering to the RSUR-5NMSEP_ER_Tier- A in the RSUR manual as attached in

Appendix C, recommended surveillance performance requirements for 5 NM
horizontal separation are mainly as follows:
a. The surveillance Data Update Interval (DATUI) should be less than or equal to
5 seconds.
b. The Probability of Update (PoU) of horizontal position and pressure altitude
should be greater than or equal to 97%.
c. The Horizontal Position RMS error (HPERMS) should be less than or equal to
230 m or the Horizontal position error distribution at 95% (HPE95%) should
be less than or equal to 400 m.
d. The Pressure Altitude INTegrity (PAINT) and Mode A code Identity. (IDINT)
should be less than 0.1%.
e. The Pressure Altitude INTegrity (PAINT).should be less than 0.1%.
f. Maximum Data Age of a parameter of Horizontal Position (HPMDA) should
equal to 15s and Maximum Data Age of a parameter of Mode A code Identity.
(IDMDA) should equal to 30s.
Adhering to the RSUR-3NMSEP_TMA_Tier- A in the RSUR manual as attached in
Appendix C, recommended surveillance performance requirements for 3 NM
horizontal separation are mainly as follows:
a. The surveillance Data Update Interval (DATUI) should be less than or equal to

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5 seconds.
b. The Probability of Update (PoU) of horizontal position and pressure altitude
should be greater than or equal to 97%.
c. The Horizontal Position RMS error (HPERMS) should be less than or equal to
150 m or the Horizontal position error distribution at 95% (HPE95%) should
be less than or equal to 260 m.
d. The Pressure Altitude INTegrity (PAINT) and Mode A code Identity. (IDINT)
should be less than 0.1%.
e. The Pressure Altitude INTegrity (PAINT).should be less than 0.1%.
f. Maximum Data Age of a parameter of Horizontal Position (HPMDA) should
equal to 15s and Maximum Data Age of a parameter of Mode A code Identity.
(IDMDA) should equal to 30s.

4.5.4 Capacity of Recording and Playback

Generally, the capacity of recording and playback refers to the storage time of data in
the system, and the following proposed values would be used as information during
system design.

a. The minimum period for recording data archived in the system should be not
less than 31 days.
b. The minimum period for system traces should be not less than 31 days.
c. The minimum period for raw surveillance data archived in the system should
be not less than 7 days.

4.6 External Interfaces

External interfaces are used to communicate with other systems, including receiving
and transmitting messages.

The selection, configuration, and design of external interfaces can be determined by

environmental conditions, operational requirements, and long-term schemes.

States/Administrations can determine the external interface of the ATMAS. In general,

ATMAS includes the following external interfaces:

a. Surveillance data interface

➢ Radar interface
The system is recommended to manage dual inputs from individual radar
with serial or Ethernet interface and be able to receive and process the
plots/tracks in a standard format, including ASTERIX.

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➢ ADS-B interface
The system is suggested to manage dual inputs from individual ADS-B
with serial interface or Ethernet and be able to receive and process ADS-
B data in a standard ASTERIX CAT021format.

➢ WAM interface
The system is recommended to manage dual inputs from WAM data
processing center with Ethernet, and be able to receive and process WAM
data in a standard format, including ASTERIX CAT020from Ethernet.

b. ICAO message interface

The system should be able to receive and transmit the ICAO messages
automatically in IA5 or ITA2 format with the asynchronous serial interface.

c. AIDC Interface
The system should be able to exchange the AIDC messages compliant with the
standard AIDC protocol on the AFTN line and/or dedicated line.

d. Meteorological interface

➢ QNH interface
The system should be able to process the QNH data from the AWOS
system with an asynchronous serial interface.

➢ GRIB interface
The system should be able to receive and process the GRIB message from
Ethernet.

e. Data synchronization and exchange interface

➢ System track interface

The system should be able to receive and transmit the system tracks with
serial interface and Ethernet in ASTERIX CAT 062.

➢ Flight data exchange interface

The system should be able to receive and transmit flight data with serial
interface and Ethernet in the message format agreed.

➢ Audio playback interface

The system is recommended to be able to provide the interface to
synchronize the playback activities with the audio in an agreed data format
through a serial interface or Ethernet, which can keep the playback of
audio and situation awareness synchronization in time.

f. GNSS time interface

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The system should be able to receive the GNSS time from the time reference
system with Ethernet NTP protocol or serial interface.

g. CPDLC interface
The system is suggested to enable communication with external CPDLC
equipment in compliance with the FANS1/A, ATN B1 data formats through
Ethernet or serial interface.

4.7 Systems Interoperability

The system interoperability function enables ATMAS to exchange messages with other
external systems to implement information sharing, and it is recommended to include
the followings：

a. Data synchronization with fallback ATMAS

Please refer to Chapter 3.2.9.
b. Messages exchange with Tower systems
The system is recommended to be able to exchange messages with the
integrated tower system, A-SMGCS, and tower electronic flight strip system.
The followings are the major exchanging messages:

➢ flight plan message

Providing synchronization information of flight plan messages between
ATM system and tower system, including flight plans creation,
modification, deletion, cancellation and flight plan life evolution, etc.

➢ SSR assignment message

Providing synchronization information of SSR allocation and release
between ATM system and tower system.

➢ Runway operational state

Providing synchronization information of runway operational states
between ATM system and tower system, including DEP, ARR CLOSE,
and additional information such as inspection and construction
temporarily, etc.

4.8 Cyber Threats and Mitigation

4.8.1 General Description

With the extensive deployment and closer interconnection of Commercial-Off-The-

Shelf (COTS) Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Systems which is
built on common standards rather than on the conventional proprietary equipment, Air
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) have been facing increasing challenges in

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protecting their critical infrastructure and manage potential risks arising from cyber
security threats.

To address the growing concerns on cyber security threats, ICAO has extended its
SARPs with Annex 17 on Security, with the supplement as in ICAO Doc 8973
“Aviation Security Manual” which sets out the aviation security requirements,
including cyber security in ATMAS. In addition, ICAO published Doc 9985 “ATM
Security Manual” setting out the principles and guidelines for protecting ATC system
infrastructure from cyber attacks. States/Administrations are encouraged to pursue the
appropriate level of compliance to the cyber security control requirements as stated in
the ICAO documents and make collaborative efforts to effectively address cyber
security threats. ICAO and other international organizations have been promoting the
importance of cyber security in ATC systems via their website, such as ICAO’s
Thematic Website on Cyber security (www.icao.int/cybersecurity) and CANSO’s
website on Standard of Excellence in Cyber security.

4.8.2 Cyber Security Management

States/Administrations are encouraged to develop cyber security management, which

adopts a proactive and systematic approach for protecting the increasing digitization of
ATS against cyber threats, through the establishment of Cyber Security Manual, Cyber
Security Handbook and User Account Management Policy. The above-mentioned
documents should be developed in accordance with relevant provisions in ICAO Annex
17 and Doc 9985 to provide protection of the safety-critical ATMAS against cyber
threats and interference. Key elements of enhanced controls on cyber security are as
follows for reference:

a. Cyber Security Policy

States/Administrations should establish their own Cyber Security Policy to
mitigate cyber threat. Dedicated committee or working group on cyber security
with regular meetings is encouraged to set up for reviewing policies and
steering the implementation of cyber security control measures throughout the
whole life cycle of ATMAS.

b. Network Infrastructure Protection

Interoperation among ATMAS and other ATS systems for information
exchange is inevitable. Proactive protection of the backbone data network of
ATMAS is essential to ensure its operation. Multi-tier defence-in-depth
scheme for external TCP/IP unicast communication to other systems,
comprising network equipment, firewalls, Network Intrusion Detection (NIDS)
or Network Prevention System (NIPS), is suggested to strengthen the
protection of the network ATMAS against cyber threats from external
connections. To further strengthen the above-mentioned scheme, data diode
gateway could be utilized to leverage on unidirectional communication for the
dissemination of data from ATMAS to other systems.

During the project implementation stage of ATMAS, Virtual Private Network

(VPN) is often suggested by the system manufacturer to allow their personnel
to assist in the installation and configuration of the system remotely. Since the
system is not yet in operational use and is isolated from other operational ATC

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systems, an external VPN connection to ATMAS is considered acceptable in
general for facilitating the project implementation. States/Administrations
should assess the cyber security risks involved in remote VPN access during
the integration of data interfaces to other ATC systems and ensure that all the
security risks have been mitigated to an acceptable level.

After the ATMAS is put into operational use, external VPN access by the
system manufacturer is, in general, not recommended. If there are operational
needs to keep the VPN access by system manufacturer, States/Administrations
should assess the cyber security risks and safety risks involved and
implemented all the necessary measures to mitigate the risks to an acceptable
level.

c. User Account Management

To protect the ATMAS from the cyber security risk of access control,
States/Administrations should establish a systematic and traceable process for
the administration of user accounts applicable to authorized access to ATMAS.

d. System Development Life Cycle

To achieve the viability and sustainability of cyber security protection, the
protection from cyber threats in mind throughout the system life cycle of the
development of ATMAS is indispensable. States/Administrations could
formulate a project procedures handbook, which includes cyber security
requirements, to safeguard against cyber threats from an early concept and
design stage of a project. Besides, Independent Network Security Risk
Assessment (INSA) for ATMAS is encouraged to conduct at a different stage
of the project cycle to assess the adequacy of the cyber security measures
applied to the system development.

e. Removable Media Control

Removable media provides a common route for importing malicious content
into an information system. To mitigate the potential risk posed by the use of
removable devices or media in ATMAS, States/Administrations should
consider refining their workflow to strengthen the security control, such that a
removable media should be scanned for malicious content by the machine prior
to uploading data to ATMAS.

f. Software Security Patch Management

Patching vulnerabilities for ATMAS is a key challenge maintaining the
balance between security and performance. States/Administrations could set
up a scheme to work closely with system manufacturers to evaluate system
patches when considered appropriate.

g. Physical Security Measures

While cyber security measures are in place for dealing with cyber threats,
States/Administrations should implement physical security measures to
physically protect the infrastructure of ATMAS from physical threats. The
physical security provision includes facility management, security guards,
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CCTV surveillance, access control, physical lock, USB blocker, etc., from
perimeter security down to console/rack level.

h. Response to Cyber Security Incidents

States/Administrations are encouraged to collaborate with the relevant local
authority responsible for the investigation and prevention of cyber crime
closely. A direct reporting mechanism is recommended to establish in order to
seek swift assistance from the local authority for handling cyber security
incidents. States/Administration is encouraged to seek relevant authority for
an independent assessment of cyber security measures implemented on
ATMAS. Periodic drill exercises should be arranged to upkeep staff awareness
and the robustness of the reporting mechanism

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5. System Transition

There are several scenarios in which ATMAS transition normally happens, ranging
from minor to major changes, including:

a. Major software and/or hardware upgrade, including operating system upgrade

and important modules upgrade such as SDP or FDP to provide new or
enhanced functionalities. These cases may influence the system stability, so it
is recommended to take a transition to guarantee the operation safely.
b. Overall system upgrade with new software and hardware equipment.
For a more complex transition that involves multiple stakeholders and equipment,
change management, safety risk management, transition plan, rehearsal, and post-
transition support are the key elements to ensure a smooth system transition.

5.1 Phases of System Transition

There are mainly four transition phases: transition preparation, transition rehearsal,
system transition and post-transition operation.

a. Transition preparation: the necessary preparation for transition in this phase,

transition scheme, safety assessment, equipment preparation, staff training, an
manual update shall be completed.
b. Transition rehearsal: The main objective of this phase is to build confidence in
the new changes and flag any possible issues before the actual transition. It can
be achieved by running an online test of the new system during off-peak hours
or in the backup system in parallel with the operational system. During the
online test, the new system could be connected with external interfaces and
systems progressively. The operational users and engineering staff will test the
main functions and interfaces, and record necessary optimization to the system
as well as the rehearsal procedure. The frequency and duration of rehearsal
shall be adjusted according to the complexity of the system transition.
c. System transition: In this phase, the new system will be put into operation. If
the transition is complex with software and hardware upgrade, shadow
operation is suggested, and the shadow operational period could last 1 or 2
weeks or even longer where appropriate. And according to the result of the
shadow operation, the time point to start the transition shall be determined. If
the transition fails, a decision on whether to repeat or roll back needs to be
made.
d. Observing operation: In this phase, the new system operates on line, and an
observation period of one month or more is suggested, depending on the
complexity of the changes.

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5.2 Transition Preparation

5.2.1 Transition Scheme

A complete transition scheme is necessary for a successful transition. Depending on the

scale of the transition, the transition scheme is suggested to contain the followings:

a. The preliminary work to be finished, including:

➢ Review of acceptance testing results and equipment preparation.
➢ Review of the adequacy of change management and safety risk
management.
➢ Review of training, including the competence of operational and
engineering staff.
➢ Review of the change in ATC Procedures and update the operation manual.
➢ Other relevant work required.
b. Transition steps, procedures, and key points.
c. Checklist: used to check the system transition operation and verify system
functions and performance during transition rehearsal and system transition.
d. Decision mechanism: transition institution shall be established to determine on
the transitional key point.
e. Contingency plan: used to cope with the emergency situations and include the
decision mechanism about roll back or transition delay, roll back plan, and the
emergency support team.

5.2.2 Scheme Evaluation

The scheme evaluation is necessary and proposed to include scheme feasibility, scheme
completeness, scheme presumption, equipment and staff preparation, the stability of the
new system, and the solutions to bugs discovered during the on-site test. According to
all these elements, some improved suggestions should be raised to make the scheme
more perfect. After the evaluation, recheck should be made to ensure the
implementation of the suggestions.

5.2.3 System Deployment

To ensure the system rehearsal and transition smoothly, the technical staff should
validate the new software version on the test platform to ensure the new version can
work well. And then, the system maintenance department should deploy the new
software and hardware in advance. Making sure all the new software and hardware
deployed in the system will shorten the time of transition sufficiently.

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5.2.4 Table Pre-rehearsal

Table-top exercise refers to the process in which the participants use maps, sand tables,
flow charts, and other auxiliary means to interactively discuss and deduce the transition
steps and emergency decision-making in the transition scheme.

Table-top exercise is recommended to ensure the feasibility of system switch steps, the
smoothness of cooperation, the completeness of checklist, and the rationality of time
arrangement.

5.2.5 Other Preparations

The operational and engineering manual should be updated, including system

information, technical manual, notification process, and emergency plan.

Before the rehearsal, thesystem maintenance department should train staff about the
transition scheme and the updated manual to help them understand the system transition,
collaboration matters among departments and system new functions.

5.3 System Rehearsal/Pre-Transition Verification

The transition scheme, including the detailed transition procedure and steps, should be
made familiar to the team through training activities prior to the system transition.
Depending on the complexity, several system rehearsals are suggested to be performed
during the off-peak hours. The purpose of the system rehearsal is to verify the transition
procedure as well as to validate the functionality, reliability, and stability of the new
system in a real operational environment.

5.3.1 System Switch Steps Validation

The transition procedures are recommended to be validated according to the overall

transition rehearsal scheme. The procedure to be validated includes at least the
following: system switching steps, operating contents, transition team, and
reasonability allocation, notification and reporting process. A checklist is suggested to
be developed and optimized according to the result of each rehearsal. The optimization
should be verified at the next rehearsal.

During the rehearsal, the time spent on each step is advised to be verified and be used
as a reference to support the decision making during the formal transition.

5.3.2 System Functions and External Interfaces Validation

The system functions and external interfaces are suggested to be tested and to ensure
that they are functional as intended during the rehearsal. To ensure a smooth transition,
the problems identified during the transition should be recorded in detail and corrected
with the support of the SP.

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5.4 System Transition

At the end of the above preparation activities, the transition management organization
is suggested to decide to approve the date and time of the formal transition, based on
the transition scheme evaluation report, the transition preparation status, and the result
of the transition rehearsals.

For major system replacement or overall system upgrade transition, the shadow period
is recommended to put the new system into operation during an off-peak time, to verify
the system performance in a real operational environment, and to allow staff to gain
familiarity and confidence in operating the new system. The duration of the shadow
period is determined by controllers. 1~2 weeks shadow period is suggested to make
every shift familiar with the new system. Appropriate rostering of staff is required such
that all staff will be given the opportunity to gain experience in operating the new
system.

Finally, the transition is recommended to be performed based on the pre-defined

procedure at the pre-defined transition time. The new system should be put into
operational use after the verification of the functioning of the system is confirmed
following its transition.

However, suppose there are blocking or critical issues, such as ssues affecting safe
operation occurring during the transition. In that case, decisions should be made
according to the decision making strategy defined in the transition scheme, which may
result in rollback or delay of the transition.

5.5 Post-Transition Operation

The post-transition operation phase is suggested as the run-in period of the system,
which preferably requirs additional staffing from the MSP as well as SP to resolve
teething issues. The issues identified during this phase should be timely analyzed,
corrected, and reviewed. In addition, the maintenance experience of the new changes
will be accumulated.

The duration of the post-transition operation phase is recommended to be one month or

longer. A formal assessment is suggested to be performed at the end of this phase. The
assessment is proposed to include:

a. Issues reported during the observation period.

b. The cause analysis and possibly the avoidance and corrective methods of the
issues.
c. Recommendations for future operation, matters-needs-attention, etc.
The system will enter the stable operation phase after the observation period.

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6. System Maintenance

The ATMAS goes to the system maintenance phase after being put into operation.
System maintenance is necessary for the entire service life of the system. Critical
functions and equipment should normally work even as the environment changes
through planned and organized maintenance. The purpose of system maintenance is to
guarantee stable and continuous operation and to improve the performance of the
system.

6.1 System Maintenance Participants

To handle the maintenance of complex and safety-critical ATMAS, robust and

systematic maintenance management, and practice should be set up with close
cooperation among system suppliers, Maintenance Service Provider (MSP), and the Air
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) to ensure the operation of the system.

Under the maintenance framework for ATMAS, the system supplier, MSP, and ANSP
form a close coordination trio in operating and supporting the maintenance framework.

Air Navigation Service

Provider

Maintenance Service System Supplier

Provider

Figure7.1-1: Trio for Maintenance Framework

6.1.1 System Supplier

The design of system plays a critical role in the ease of maintenance during the
operation stage of the system. Before system commissioning, the system supplier, as
the entity with the most comprehensive know-how on the system, should provide
sufficient maintenance documentation and training to ANSP and MSP, including
complete information for proper installation, setup, use, operation, support, and
maintenance of the system.

The ystem supplier should provide documentation to the ANSP and MSP for aiding the
use, application, and maintenance of the system and individual equipment, which
should include:

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a. Operation handbooks and user manuals for operating procedures and system
functionalities for use by controllers, supervisors, assistants, and support
specialists.
b. Technical literature for the full technical description of configuration and
operation in the system as well as full details of each system component, block
diagrams with data flow, mechanic and wiring schematic diagrams, as-built
drawings, etc.
c. Service and maintenance manuals, including system setup, optimization and
parameterization, preventive maintenance procedures (system checking and
rebooting, calibration, cleaning, housekeeping, etc.) with recommended
frequencies, and troubleshooting procedures in hardware and software
(recommended solution and flow chart to identified issues, handling of alarms
and error messages, etc.).
All documentation should be reviewed and endorsed by the relevant authority prior to
use.

The system supplier should prepare training plans and training course materials for
ANSP and MSP for review with sufficient time prior to critical milestones, such as
commencement of design review, factory/site acceptance tests, and ATC operational
train-the-trainer course. ANSP, in coordination with MSP, should set out the required
training topics, which should be specific to different user groups, in the system contract.

Subject to actual needs, after ANSP and MSP have built up their own training capability,
on-site maintenance review and assessment on MSP should be conducted by the system
supplier after commissioning on a regular basis, with more frequent
training/assessments during the start-up and run-in period after commissioning.

As ATMAS is a complex system, it is unavoidable that unexpected technical issues

might emerge, especially teething issues during the early stage of operation. As such,
the system supplier should be required to respond to requests from ANSP or MSP to
provide timely assistance in dealing with and rectifying all faults or deficiencies in
software and hardware within pre-defined response time according to the criticality of
such faults or deficiencies as specified in the contract. Repeated faults should be
handled and investigated with high priority by the system supplier to identify the root
cause and implement corrective measures.

Since technology is changing rapidly, some system components might become obsolete
and become difficult to source in the market. The system supplier should provide a list
of obsolete equipment and its replacement models on a regular basis, and the
replacement model should be evaluated on-site for its compatibility prior to use as a
spare for operation.

The performance of the system supplier has to be regularly reviewed in suitable forums,
such as performance review meetings in conjunction with ANSP and MSP
representatives.

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The system supplier could consider forming user groups to allow sharing of users’
experiences and gather feedbacks. The system supplier should facilitate regular hosting
of user group meetings.

6.1.2 Maintenance Service Provider

The engagement of an MSP to perform frontline maintenance under the supervision of

ANSP is a practical solution in leveraging skill sets and the latest technology available
in private sector in order to facilitate the provision of reliable services with cost benefit.

Under the regime of compliance to all applicable ordinances and regulations, Safety
Management System and Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel (ATSEP), the
maintenance services provided by MSP should include watch-keeping of equipment,
preventive/corrective maintenance, system/equipment minor modification/
replacement works, staff training, and procurement of spares and test equipment/ tools.
Support services such as record-keeping on maintenance activities, preparation of
statistics and reports and inventory control, etc., could be provided as part of the
package from MSP.

MSP needs to perform maintenance according to the system supplier’s established

procedures at recommended intervals, including health checks on the system, servers,
equipment and workstations, critical data backup, and log capture/review for hardware,
software, user management, and other activities, system parameters and user preference
checks and backup, regular clean-up, and reboots of hardware including servers and
workstations, etc. Proactive system housekeeping procedures adopting industry best
practices with the recommendation from system supplier and expertise from MSP,
together with close monitoring of system healthiness/system resources and
housekeeping of servers/workstations on a regular basis to upkeep the system
performance, should be in place.

There could be cases that due to the local specific environment/operational status of the
ATMAS, it would require extra steps or more frequent maintenance, e.g., more frequent
clean-up/reboot of servers and workstations, on top of recommended maintenance
procedures by system supplier.MSP, who looks after the system day-by-day and is
familiar with local environment, would contribute their expertise in adapting the
maintenance procedures to fit into the local needs after consulting the system supplier.

In addition, like any critical system running on a round-the-clock basis, ATMAS has no
exception that it might encounter system fault where immediate attention from MSP is
required. For example, a server breakdown after a software bug is hit with no or little
pre-alerts. It is important that MSP has geared up with a full deck of operational
instructions for their watch-keeping staff to handle all sorts of foreseeable system
scenarios with proper initial and refresher training/drills on such scenarios. The build-
up of know-how and experience for MSP in dealing with urgent scenarios is crucial to
smooth operations of the ATMAS.

Similar to system suppliers, the service level of performance of MSP has to be

constantly monitored to meet the target levels set out in the contract and regularly
reviewed in suitable forums, such as operations & maintenance review meetings in
conjunction with ANSP representatives to ensure maintenance provisions could meet
the service needs.

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6.1.3 Air Navigation Service Provider

As the party to govern maintenance service performance by MSP and system supplier
through various means discussed above, ANSP has to ensure the necessary support and
resources to be provided to MSP and system supplier for fulfilling or even exceeding.
The baseline maintenance requirements are set out in the contracts with these parties.
Payment deduction might be incorporated into the contract to handle cases where
performance does not meet requirements, but it might bear impacts on maintaining a
good relationship with MSP or system supplier.

ANSP has to ensure the services provided by MSP and system suppliers are in
compliance with ICAO standards and international best practices. ANSP is encouraged
to share experience and best practices gained from ICAO and international meetings/
symposia/ seminars, as well as overseas facts-finding visits, with MSP and/or system
suppliers with a view to enhancing the maintenance regime.

To allow ATC professionals to perform their work safely and satisfactorily, it is highly
desirable for ANSP’s engineering professionals to understand the operational needs
such that the ATMAS could fully support their work. As such, constant communications
with ATC professionals in addressing their needs via suitable steering forums and
communication channels would be critical to the smooth operations of ATMAS.
Following the system commissioning, a technical team comprising ANSP engineering
professionals, system supplier, and MSP, could be established with ATC professionals
to oversee system performance and deployment of new software builds and system data
updates to ensure smooth operation of the ATMAS.

6.2 Resources Requirement

Necessary resources are mandatory for system maintenance, and the main
considerations are as follows:

6.2.1 Staffing

MSP should ensure sufficient staff is employed to form a maintenance team and provide
24-hour operation and maintenance.

Before stepping into the system maintenance phase, MSP and ANSP should ensure the
personnel is fully trained by the SP or certified trainers. This ensures that the personnel
involved in the maintenance work grasp knowledge and skills related to the system. It
is also recommended to arrange on-site training by SP for MSP and ANSP after system
installation. Before the training, the training plans and training course materials should
be fully reviewed by ANSP/ MSP in accordance with contract requirements and define
training topics for different users.

Before the system is put into operation, MSP and ANSP are recommended to send
personnel to work in different phases for technical reserves in advance and enhance
their comprehension and familiarity with the system, which will be conducive to the
subsequent maintenance work:

a. System design phase

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MSP and ANSP are recommended to send personnel to participate in the
design of the system to track the project development progress in SP factory,
check the rationality and applicability of the design of each functional module
of the system and put forward suggestions, and review technical
documentation at the milestone, including the consistency of requirements,
product design, handbooks, and acceptance test book.

b. Factory acceptance test phase

MSP and ANSP shall send personnel to participate in factory acceptance test
in accordance with the contract requirement. MSP and ANSP personnel shall
review the acceptance test books provided by SP in advance. The acceptance
test shall be executed according to the approved test book in the test
environment, such as platform, signal, instrument, etc., prepared by SP, and
the result shall be recorded in the report.

c. Installation phase
After the work of on-site equipment installation starts, MSP should send
personnel to participate in the whole process of hardware installation, software
debugging, on-site acceptance tests, flight inspection, etc. At this stage,
personnel should be well familiar with important information such as
equipment installation location, cabling, signal routing, position layout, label ,
signs, etc. They also need to learn software debugging and testing methods,
and master the knowledge of system’s functions and performance during on-
site testing and flight inspection.

Besides above all, MSP and ANSP should set up their own maintenance personnel
training systems, maintenance personnel access mechanism, and regular assessment of
personnel skills to ensure that qualified personnel can perform the operation,
maintenance, and management of the system.

6.2.2 Documents

Before the start of the system maintenance phase, MSP and ANSP should make sure
necessary documents are in place to run the system. The documents should include at
least the following:

a. System Design Specification: a set of technical documentation including

system architecture, interface control documents, function module principle,
etc.
b. Operational manual: an instruction manual that describes the function,
performance, and user interface of the system software in detail so that the
maintenance can understand how to use the operate the system.
c. Maintenance Manual: the service and maintenance manual includes system
installation, parameters setting, maintenance suggestions, as well as
troubleshooting procedures in hardware and software (it is recommended to
provide a flow chart to locate and solve the problems and a method to identify

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the alarm and error, etc.)
d. User guides documentation: detailed description and operation guide of HMI
for controllers, FIO, Flow.
e. Installation documentation: including details of each component of the system,
cabinet layout, figure with data flow, mechanical and wiring schematic
diagram, as-built drawing, etc.
f. Training documentation: including training materials or documents related to
factory and on-site training.
g. Testing documentation: including achievement of acceptance criteria and
identification of outstanding issues
h. Emergency response process documentation: in the event of sudden equipment
failure, effective countermeasures can be taken in time to minimize the impact
of equipment failure on air traffic control operations.
Besides, MSP and ANSP should work out their working procedures, maintenance plans,
and contingency plan for unning the system.

All documents should be reviewed and approved before application which should be
updated continuously to keep the accuracy according to the changes in system behavior
during the long-term operation.

6.2.3 Maintenance Tools

MSP and ANSP are recommended to be equipped with instruments and maintenance
tools required for system maintenance, for example, a simulator used to simulate track
and message for system test, a software management tool for installation, rollback, and
backup operation to software patch and release. Training for maintenance personnel
shall cover the use of instruments, maintenance tools, and simulators by MSP and SP.

6.2.4 Spare parts

Sufficient hardware spare parts shall be reserved for the ATMAS, including servers,
workstations, monitors, network equipment, etc. The percentage of spare parts is related
to the scale of the system. The mechanism of spare parts management should be set up,
including periodically testing and checking the reserve status to make sure that the spare
parts are sufficient and available.

Since it is very common that computer hardware will be updated frequently,

ANSP/MSP should review the list of hardware and confirm with the SP a list of obsolete
hardware and replacement solutions regularly. The replacement hardware should be
reserved as spare parts after finishing the site compatibility assessment.

If conditions allow, ATMAS Test and Validate System (TVS) is recommended to be

deployed for supporting new software testing, system parameter adjustment, personnel
training, etc.
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6.3 Maintenance Content

System maintenance is recommended to include the following at least:

6.3.1 Periodic maintenance

Periodic maintenance including daily, weekly and monthly, etc. Which maintenance
matters should be worked out according to the real operational requirements. It is
recommended to cover the followings:

a. Check the running status of the system software, dual nodes redundancy.
b. Check the running status and health of the system hardware, including network
load and the usage of resources such as CPU, memory, and disk of servers,
workstations, and network devices. Please refer to section 4.5.2 for the
inspection standards.
c. Check the validation of external data, including surveillance data, AFTN,
AIDC, meteorological data, GNSS, and the status of data interaction with the
external system, if any.
d. Check the integrity of the recorded data to prevent the data lost.
e. Check the status of basic function on bypass server.
f. Perform active/standby switch between the redundant servers to ensure both
servers can operate normally.
g. Backup critical files and data periodically, including the system configuration
parameters, database, log, etc.
h. Manually clean and reboot the server and workstation regularly.
i. Check the physical system operating environment regularly, including
temperature, humidity, equipment grounding, electromagnetic environment,
etc.
j. Switch the backup system to operational mode regularly to achieve a balanced
use for both main and backup systems.

6.3.2 Troubleshooting

MSP should promptly execute troubleshooting, correct system errors, and ensure that
the system work normally by replacing components, updating software or parameter
configuration, and other methods.

SP should respond in time to the requirements of MSP or ANSP after a failure occurs
and assist MSP in handling and correcting the failure within the predetermined response
time according to the severity.

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MSP needs to record all the system problems in different kinds and problem-solving
processes, and collect necessary system logs for analysis.

When a problem is judged as a software defect, MSP needs to register and track the
problem. It is recommended to use a fixed PCRs form to register the system software
problems, including supplier name, site location, software version number, failure time,
failure content description, user investigation of relevant logs, the severity of the
problem, etc.

After being confirmed by ANSP, MSP sends the PCRs to SP in time for problem
analysis and software repair.

According to the information in PCRs, SP establishes the problem database, checks

software code, locates and repairs software defects, and provides problem analysis
reports.

The software defect repair plan is discussed by SP, MSP, and ANSP, and they jointly
determine the delivery and implementation schedule of the software patch.

6.3.3 Software Version and Requirement Management

After the software is approved in site acceptance and put into operation, the software
version and requirement management are managed by SP, MSP, and ANSP together
throughout the service life of the system.

6.3.3.1 Baselines Establishment

Usually, SP will select a stable ATMAS software version defined as a Baseline, before
SP develops a set of ATMAS based on the requirement of customers. The Baselines
are defined for further software life cycle process activity and allow reference to,
control of, and traceability between configuration items.

Baselines establishment is recommended to consider the factors as follows:

a. Baseline should be established for each set of ATMAS.

b. ATMAS Baseline is a stable software version that has been approved.
c. Once a Baseline is established, it should be protected from change.
d. In the service life of the system, the Baseline should have the check code and
check method of the corresponding program to ensure the traceability
consistency, and uniqueness of the program.
After the baseline version of the automation system is established, the customization of
the automation system functions need to be fully discussed, researched, and agreed
upon by SP, MSP, and ANSP. Then the SP carries out systematic research and
development, and finally delivers the system software to users after passing factory
acceptance and site acceptance.

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6.3.3.2 System Requirement Management and Software Upgrade

The system function requirements usually come from the change of ATC procedures,
the application of new technologies, etc., and the new functions are put into operation
through software version upgrades.

ANSP may formulate a standard software requirements library according to operational

needs, regularly maintain and update the requirements library, and guide the upgrading
of software versions and the construction of new systems.

MSP is responsible for recording function requirements, analyzing and evaluating the
description and scheme of the requirements, and submitting them to SP for development
after being verified by ANSP.

SP completes the system software change and delivers it to MSP after passing the self-
test, attaching the analysis of the impact scope of the software change.

MSP need to carry out functional improvement test and system stability test for
software change. After ensuring that there is no defect, MSP shall jointly agree with
ANSP on the effective time of software upgrade and implement the upgrade.

During the implementation of the software upgrade, MSP is recommended to backup

the operating software. If there is any problem in the upgrading, MSP need to roll back
the software to the previous version in time.

Note: If SP is responsible for the maintenance of system software throughout the service
life of the system, the specific software maintenance contents may be defined in the
contract which is agreed upon by all related parties.

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Appendix A

ATMAS IGD Request for Change Form

RFC Nr:

1. SUBJECT:

2. REASON FOR CHANGE:

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL: [expand / attach additional pages if

necessary]

4. REFERENCE(S):
5. PERSON INITIATING: DATE:
ORGANISATION:
TEL/FA/X/E-MAIL:

6. CONSULTATION RESPONSE DUE BY DATE:

Organization Name Agree/Disagree Date

7. ACTION REQUIRE :

8. AIGD EDITOR DATE REC’D :

9. FEEDBACK PASSED DATE :

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Appendix B

Table 3.2.10-1A Flight Specific Flight Data

No. of Danger No. of Downlink No. of Delivery

Aircraft Traversed Controlled Flight Flight No. of Uplink Messages
Area Messages Timeouts
ID Sector/s Airspace Rule Type
Infringements Rejected Accepted Rejected Accepted Uplink Downlink

[Selected Time Period]

Aircraft No. of AIDC Messages No. of AIDC Messages

ID
Rejected Accepted Transmitted Received

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Table 3.2.10-1B Collective Flight Data

Airspace Sector No. of Uplink No. of Downlink No. of Delivery

No. of Danger
Total No. of Messages Messages Timeouts
Day/Week/Month Area
Flights N W E S Downli
Infringements Rejected Accepted Rejected Accepted Uplink
nk

Controlled Airspace Flight Rule Flight Type

Day/Week/Month
ARR DEP OVF DOM I V Y Z S N G M X

Table 3.2.10-2 Flight Specific Surveillance Data

[Selected Time Period]

Surveillance Track Type Source of Surveillance Track Quality of Surveillance Track

Aircraft
ID
ADS-
Secondary Mode S Multilat ADS-B Secondary Mode S Multilat ADS-B Secondary Mode S Multilat
B
  x  1 2 - 2 Coast Normal - High

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Appendix C

Performance of Surveillance Data Processing in RSUR

RSUR Specifications define technical performance requirements of ATS surveillance systems

used in support of a particular ATS application in a given airspace.

The RSUR-5NMSEP_ER_Tier-C specification are applicable to the delivery of surveillance

data at the output of a surveillance system that is used to support 5 NM Separation service in
en-route environment as described in PANS ATM (Doc 4444) section 8.7.3 in a Tier C
environment.

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The RSUR-5NMSEP_ER_Tier-B specification are applicable to the delivery of surveillance
data at the output of a surveillance system that is used to support 5 NM Separation service
as described in PANS ATM in en-route airspace (ICAO Doc4444) section 8.7.3 in a Tier B
environment .

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The RSUR-5NMSEP_ER_Tier- A specification are applicable to the delivery of surveillance
data at the output of a surveillance system that is used to support 5 NM Separation service as
described in PANS ATM (ICAO Doc4444) in en-route airspace section 8.7.3 in a Tier A
environment.

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The RSUR-5NMSEP_ER_Tier-C specification are applicable to the delivery of surveillance
data at the output of a surveillance system that is used to support 3 NM separation service in
TMA environment as described in PANS ATM (Doc 4444) section 8.7.3 in a Tier C
environment.

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The RSUR Specification defines the performance of ATS surveillance systems used
in the provision of Terminal Control Area TMA (see definition in PANS-ATM) (Doc4444) in
Terminal Area section 8.7.3 in a Tier B environment.

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The RSUR Specification defines the performance of ATS surveillance systems used
in the provision of Terminal Control Area TMA (see definition in PANS-ATM) (Doc4444) in
Terminal Area section 8.7.3 in a Tier A environment.

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 CNS SG/26
Appendix K to the Report

REPORTING FORM ON AIR NAVIGATION DEFICIENCIES IN THE CNS FIELDS IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION

Identification Deficiencies Corrective Action

Requirement States/facilities Description Date first Remarks Description Executing Target date for Priority for
reported body completion action
1. Site visits in Pakistan by expert CAA.
Reliable ground to Afghanistan and Unreliability of AFS September A follow-up COM from the VSAT service provider were Afghanistan June 2020 A
ground Pakistan communication between 2010 coordination made in February and March 2016. and CAA.
communication as Afghanistan and meeting held in July Remedial recommendations were Pakistan
specified in the Pakistan was brought to 2019 discussed way provided to CAA. Pakistan. Pakistan
regional Air the notice of forward requested ICAO to provide assistance
Navigation Plan APANPIRG/21. Lack of in establishing VSAT link in 2022.
(Doc.9673) reliability in the AFS
including data 2. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan
Tables CNS II-1; communication between agreed to as first step to recover the
CNS II-2 & Kabul and Karachi and VSAT connection by upgrading
CNS II-3 ATS voice terminals in Lahore and Karachi.
communication between Afghanistan will provide assistance
Lahore and Kabul was and does the Network Configuration
identified. settings;

3. A VPN link was established between

Karachi and Kabul through UK. Now
the VPN link between UK and Kabul is
un-serviceable.

4. Both States also agreed to implement

CRV as soon as practical to resolve the
existing COM deficiencies. Pakistan
Civil Aviation Authority has conveyed
ICAO its intention to join CRV by
December 2022. Pakistan requested
ICAO to coordinate with Afghanistan
regarding their tentative timeline to join
the CRV.
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CNS POINTS OF CONTACT

(Key: ADM – Administration; URG –Urgent Matters)

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

AFGHANISTAN
ADM / Eng. Mohammad Shaker Popal CNS Acting Director Tel: +93(0)799601095 (Mobile)
URG Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority Fax: -
E-mail: engpopal@gmail.com

* Suggested to include Mr. Toryalai Himat, Head of

AIS and training, httoryal@gmail.com in emails with
Afghanistan POC

AUSTRALIA
ADM Airservices Australia – International Airservices Australia Tel: -
Engagement team Fax: -
E-mail: International@AirservicesAustralia.com

URG Airservices Australia – Airservices Australia Tel: +61262685555 option 1

Service Desk Airways (H24) Fax: -
E-mail:
Cc TOCBNATM@AirservicesAustralia.com
Cc TOCMLATM@AirservicesAustralia.com
Cc International@AirservicesAustralia.com

BANGLADESH
ADM Md. Mahabubur Rahman Director (CNS) Tel: +88 02 41091032
(2022.09.07) Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh Fax: +88 02 8901411
Mobile: +88 0189 490 8400
E-mail: dcnshq@caab.gov.bd

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CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

URG Md. Mahabubur Rahman Director (CNS) Tel: +88 02 41091032
(2022.09.07) Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh Fax: +88 02 8901411
Mobile: +88 0189 490 8400
E-mail: dcnshq@caab.gov.bd
Please copy
Fax: +88 02 8901411
Mobile: +88 0189 490 0000
E-mail: chairman@caab.gov.bd

BHUTAN
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

CAMBODIA
ADM Mr. Neang To Chief of CNS Bureau Tel: +855 12820811
(2022.09.08) State Secretariat of Civil Aviation Cambodia Fax:
(SSCA) E-mail: Neangto.ans@gmail.com

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Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

URG Mr. Heng Mengkong Deputy Chief of CNS Bureau Tel: (+855) 16 398 599 Smart
(2022.09.08) State Secretariat of Civil Aviation Cambodia Fax:
(SSCA) E-mail: hengmengkong@gmail.com

CHINA
ADM Zhang De Principal Staff/ Air Traffic Regulation Office, CAAC Tel: +86 18610256306
Fax: +86 64092677
E-mail: zhangde@caac.gov.cn

URG Wang Pengyu Assistant/ Air Traffic Management Bureau, CAAC Tel: +86 18511663906
Fax: +86 010-87786964
E-mail: wangpengyu.caac@foxmail.com

HONG KONG, CHINA

ADM Lau Kin Hei, Arthur Electronics Engineer Tel: +852 2910 6519
Civil Aviation Department Fax: +852 2845 7160
E-mail: cns_icao@cad.gov.hk

URG Hui Man Ho Assistant Director-General of Civil Aviation Tel: +852 2910 6501
(Acting)/ Fax: +852 2845 7160
Civil Aviation Department E-mail: cns_icao@cad.gov.hk

MACAO, CHINA
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

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Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

FIJI
ADM Sereima Bolanavatu ANS Inspector (CNS) Tel: +679 999 5217
Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji (CAAF) Fax: +679 672 1500
E-mail: sereima.bolanavatu@caaf.org.fj

URG Sereima Bolanavatu ANS Inspector (CNS) Tel: +679 999 5217
Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji (CAAF) Fax: +679 672 1500
E-mail: sereima.bolanavatu@caaf.org.fj

FRANCE
FRENCH POLYNESIA
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

NEW CALEDONIA
ADM Mr. Jérôme Patoureaux Chief of Technical Division Tel:
(2022.05.09) DSNA / France Fax:
E-mail: dac-nc-sna-chef-dt@aviation-civile.gouv.fr

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

ISLANDS
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

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Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

INDIA
ADM G. S. Rao ED (CNS-OM)/ Airports Authority of India Tel: +91 (11) 2081 8210
Fax: +91 (11) 2465 4142
E-mail: edcnsom@AAI.AERO

URG G. S. Rao ED (CNS-OM)/ Airports Authority of India Tel: +91 (11) 2081 8210
Fax: +91 (11) 2465 4142
E-mail: edcnsom@AAI.AERO

INDONESIA
ADM Budi Fathoni Air Navigation Inspector of CNSA/ Tel: +628563356444
DGCA of Indonesia Fax:
E-mail: bfathoni@yahoo.com
ADM Muhammad Ryan Meteorological Information Dissemination Officer, Tel: +6281343160168
BMKG/ Indonesian Meteorology, Climatology, and Fax:
Geophysical Agency. E-mail: muhammad.ryan@bmkg.go.id
ADM Subhan Bin Awad Syawie Junior Manager of Communication Facility Tel: +6285240490004
Readiness/ Airnav Indonesia Fax:
E-mail: Subhan2902@gmail.com
URG Arian Nurahman Air Navigation Inspector of CNS/ Tel: +6285695414428
DGCA of Indonesia Fax:
E-mail: ariannurahman@gmail.com
URG Ardhian Riansyah Cono Meteorological Public Operation Management Tel: +6285215039595
Officer, BMKG/ Indonesian Meteorology, Fax:
Climatology, and Geophysical Agency E-mail: ardhian1595@gmail.com
URG Dedy lskandar Junior Manager of Surveillance and Automation Tel: +6285219917747
Facility Readiness/ Airnav Indonesia Fax:
E-mail: dedy.nav7@gmail.com

APX. L - 5
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

JAPAN
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

KIRIBATI
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

LAO PDR
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

MALAYSIA
ADM/ Mr. Azman bin Hitam (2022.09.19) Senior Assistant Director Tel: +60388934175
URG Quality & Standards Division E-mail: azman.hitam@caam.gov.my
Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM)
URG Mr. Sharudin Hashim (2022.09.19) Principal Assistant Director (CNS) Tel: +60385291208
ANS Technical Division E-mail: sharudin@caam.ov.my
Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM)

APX. L - 6
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

URG Mr. Shairyzal Bin Mohamad @ Assistant Director Tel: +60388714387
Azizan (2022.09.19) ANS & Aerodrome Standard Division Fax: +60388714135
Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) E-mail: shairyzal.azizan@caam.gov.my

MALDIVES
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

MALSHALL ISLANDS
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

MICRONESIA (FEDERATED
STATES OF)
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

MONGOLIA

APX. L - 7
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

MYANMAR
ADM MR. ZAW MIN OO DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER (CNS) Tel: +951-7533020, +959-425324449
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION Fax: +9517-533016
MYANMAR Email: zawminoo76@gmail.com,
zawminoo.cns@dcamyanmar.aero
URG MR. AUNG MYO ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER (CNS) Tel: +951-7533052, +959-5414430
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION Fax: +9517-533016
MYANMAR Email: aungmyo.ms@gmail.com,
aungmyo@dcamyanmar.aero
URG MR. HTET ARKAR EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (CNS) Tel: +951-7533024, +959-5213154
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION Fax: +9517-533016
MYANMAR Email: kohtetarkar@gmail.com,
htetarkar@dcamyanmar.aero

NAURU
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

NEPAL
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

APX. L - 8
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

NEW ZEALAND
ADM Melaia Folaumoeloa National Continuous Monitoring Coordinator /ICAO Tel: +64 4 560 9400
Liaison Fax:
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand E-mail:
Policyand.InternationalRelationsUnit@caa.govt.nz

URG Sean Rogers Manager Aeronautical Services Tel: +64 27 807 4875
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand Fax:
E-mail: aeronautical.services@caa.govt.nz

URG Mark Blanchard Head of Policy and Standards Tel: +64 27 597 5604
(back-up for No. 1 point of contact) Airways New Zealand Fax:
E-mail: PolicyandStandards@airways.co.nz

PAKISTAN
ADM Saeed Ahmed Butt Director CNS Engineering Tel: +92 21 9907 2200
CAA/OF3974 Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Fax: +92 21 9924 2121
E-Mail: Director.CNS@caapakistan.com.pk

URG Engr. Muhammad Asad Khan Niazi Joint Director Radar (Maint/ Plans) Tel: +92 21 99242194
CAA/OF3137 Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Fax: +92 21 34604329
E-Mail: mak.niazi@caapakistan.com.pk

PALAU

APX. L - 9
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

PHILIPPINES
ADM Elmer E. Gomez Acting Department Manager III Tel: +63 (2) 7944 2318
Air Navigation Service Fax:
E-mail: anod@caap.gov.ph

URG Gary M. Jadie Acting Department Manager III Tel: +63 (2) 7944 2205
Air Navigation Service Fax:
E-mail: garymjadie@caap.gov.ph

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
ADM Kyung-Joon Jang Deputy Director Tel: +82 44-201-4350
(2022.09.13) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Fax: +82 44-201-5637
(MOLIT) E-mail: skyjan@korea.kr

APX. L - 10
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

ADM Yu-Jin Kim Assistant Director Tel: +82 44-201-4364
(2022.09.13) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Fax: +82 44-201-5637
(MOLIT) E-mail: kyjin22@korea.kr

URG Kyung-Joon Jang Deputy Director Tel: +82 44-201-4350

(2022.09.13) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Fax: +82 44-201-5637
(MOLIT) E-mail: skyjan@korea.kr

URG Yu-Jin Kim Assistant Director Tel: +82 44-201-4364

(2022.09.13) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Fax: +82 44-201-5637
(MOLIT) E-mail: kyjin22@korea.kr

SINGAPORE
ADM/URG Lee Suk Leng Head (Radar & ADS-B) Tel: +65 6422 7070
(2022.09.15) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore Fax: -
E-mail: Lee_Suk_Leng@caas.gov.sg
ADM/URG Chew Keng Boon Head (Communications) Tel: +65 6422 7005
(2022.09.15) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore Fax: -
E-mail: chew_keng_boon@caas.gov.sg

SOLOMON ISLANDS
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

SRI LANKA

APX. L - 11
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

ADM Mrs. N.S.Casseer Deputy Director General- Airspace Regulations Civil Tel: +94112358821/+94112253496
Aviation Authority Sri Lanka Email: ddgasr@caa.lk

ADM Mr. M.A.K.Prasanna Director Air Navigation Services Civil Aviation Tel: +94112358849/+94112253863
Authority Sri Lanka Email: dans@caa.lk

ADM Eng. Jananath Konara Rathninda Head of Electronics & Air Navigation Engineering, Tel : +94773834032/+94112263600
Airport & Aviation Services Sri Lanka (PVT) limited Fax: +94112252400
Email: head.eane@airport.lk

URG Eng. Mihiri Kumari Senior Electronics Engineer Airport & Aviation Tel : +94768242736,
Services Sri Lanka (PVT) limited Fax: +94112633488,
Email: mihiri.eane@airport.lk

URG Eng. Asanga Bandara Senarath Senior Electronics Engineer Airport & Aviation Tel: +94768242654,
Services Sri Lanka (PVT) limited Fax: +94112252400,
Email: asanga.eane@airport.lk

URG Eng. Vidura Thammitage Senior Electronics Engineer Airport & Aviation Tel : +94768242735,
Services Sri Lanka (PVT) limited Fax: +94112633488,
Email: vidura.eane@airport.lk

URG Eng. Prasanna Wijeratna Electronics Engineer Airport & Aviation Services Sri Tel : +94779975589,
Lanka (PVT) limited Fax: +94112633488,
Email: prasannaw.eane@airport.lk

THAILAND
ADM Mr. Sarawoot Rungruengwajiake Acting Head of Communication, Navigation and Tel: +66 (2)568 8800 ext. 2510
Surveillance Standards Division +66 (89) 066 1313 (mobile)
Air Navigation Services Standards Department Fax: +66 (2) 568 8847
Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT) E-mail: sarawoot.r@caat.or.th

APX. L - 12
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

ADM Dr. Amornrat Jirattigalachote Strategic Planning Manager (Engineering) Tel: +66 (2) 287 8262 (Office)
(2022.09.09) Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. (AEROTHAI) +66 (81) 887 2535 (Mobile)
Fax:
E-mail: amornrat.ji@aerothai.co.th

ADM CDR. Pasgorn Pohom, RTN Navigation Aids Section, Base Operations Division, Tel: 083 978 7459
Naval Air Station, Royal Thai Naval Air Division Fax:
U-Tapao Airport Authority E-mail: tom_pasgorn@gmail.com

URG Lt. JG. Chalor Uthai, RTN Navigation Aids Section, Base Operations Division, Tel: 089 989-6726
Naval Air Station, Royal Thai Naval Air Division Fax:
U-Tapao Airport Authority E-mail: lor_uthai@hotmail.com

URG Mr. Wittaya Chunvattanananon Senior Director Tel: +66 (2) 285 9061 (Office)
(2022.09.09) Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. (AEROTHAI) +66 (89) 039 7425 (Mobile)
Fax:
E-mail: chun@aerothai.co.th

TIMOR LESTE
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

TONGA
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

APX. L - 13
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

TUVALU
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

USA
ADM Mr Shayne Campbell Senior Air Traffic Representative, Asia Pacific Tel: +65 6476 9462
Federal Aviation Administration Fax:
Air Traffic Organization, System Operations E-mail: shayne.a.campbell@faa.gov
American Embassy, Singapore

URG Mr Shayne Campbell Senior Air Traffic Representative, Asia Pacific Tel: +65 6476 9462
Federal Aviation Administration Fax:
Air Traffic Organization, System Operations E-mail: shayne.a.campbell@faa.gov
American Embassy, Singapore

VALUATU
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

APX. L - 14
 CNS SG/26
Appendix L to the Report

CAT STATE/ NAME OF CONTACT TITLE/ORGANIZATION TEL/ FAX / E-MAIL

VIET NAM
ADM Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:
URG Tel:
Fax:
E-mail:

APX. L - 15
 CNS SG/26
Appendix M of the Report

ACTION ITEMS OF CNS SG/26

Action Status / Target
Subject Action Party Status Remarks / follow-up
Item Date

Submit a joint CNS-ATM Working Paper to discuss and highlight the issue
26-1 on alerts of AIDC messaging failure (details in WP/32 Air Traffic ATMAS TF/4 ICAO Secretariat
Management and Airspace Safety Monitoring Outcomes of CNS SG/26 )

Sri Lanka, CRV OG Chairs,

26-2 Provide technical support to Sri Lanka for CRV Implementation CNS SG/27
PCCWG, ICAO Secretariat

Next FF-ICE
Ensure SWIM TF and ACSICG experts are involved in the FF-ICE
26-3 workshop/webinar/seminar to be held by ATMAS TF.
workshop/webinar ICAO Secretariat
/seminar

State Letter for encouraging States to coordinate with ICAO APAC

Regional Office before assigning frequencies for aeronautical
26-4 services in frequency bands of 190-526.5 kHz, 108-117.975 MHz, CNS SG/27 ICAO Secretariat
960 – 1215 MHz and 117.975 to 137 MHz that may affect the use
of aeronautical frequencies in other States.

APAC Member States, ICAO

26-5 Review and propose revise APAC Navigation Strategy, if required. CNS SG/27
Secretariat

Organize a webinar/workshop on Inconsistent ICAO Aircraft Address and Hong Kong China, IATA,
26-6 CNS SG/27
Target Identification between Surveillance Data and Flight Plan ICAO Secretariat

Prepare and share the State Letter to all APAC Member States to provide
26-7 CNS SG/27 ICAO Secretariat
their comments on proposed ICAO ATSEP human factor guidance material.

Share the proposition to identify and incorporate the relevant ASBU

modules in Doc 10057 - Manual on Air Traffic Safety Electronics
26-8 CNS SG/27 ICAO Secretariat
Personnel Competency-based Training and Assessment to the
relevant HQ expert group

APX. M ‐ 1
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

List of Participants
STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL
1. AFGHANISTAN (3)
* 1. Eng. Mohammad Shaker Popal Director of CNS engpopal@gmail.com
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation
Afghanistan

2. Mr. Ihsan Ullah Safi Chief of Telecommunication ihsansafi168@gmail.com

Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation
Afghanistan

3. Mr. Abdullah Mohammadi VSAT Device Care and Maintenance Manager abdullah.mohammadi72@gmail.com
Civil Aviation Authority (ACAA)
Afghanistan

2. AUSTRALIA (3)
4. Mr. Brad Parker Manager CNS/ATM brad.parker@casa.gov.au
Civil Aviation Safety Authority

5. Mr. Jeffrey Bollard Senior SBAS Specialist jeffrey.bollard@airservicesaustralia.com

Airservices Australia

6. Mr. Graceson Scariah Information and Analytics Manager graceson.scariah@airservicesaustralia.com

Airservices Australia

3. BANGALADESH (3)
7. Ms. Afroza Nasrin Sultana Deputy Director (CNS) nasrin.cns@caab.gov.bd
Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh

8. Mr. Prosanta Kumer Shaha Assistant Director (CNS) prosanta102@gmail.com

Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh

ATTM. 1 - 1
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

9. Mr. Md Arif Ur Rahman Assistant Director (CNS) arifur.rahman.bipul@gmail.com
Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh

4. BHUTAN (9)
10. Mr. Karma Gayley CNS Officer kgayley@bcaa.gov.bt
Bhutan Civil Aviation Authority

11. Ms. Sonam Choki Sr. Communication Supervisor schoki@doat.gov.bt

Ministry of Information & Communication

12. Ms. Jerushah Tamang Sr. Communication Supervisor jtamang@doat.gov.bt

Ministry of Information and Communication

13. Mr. Kenzang Tenzin Sr. Communication Supervisor tenzinkenzang@gmail.com

Government

14. Mr. Sonam Dorji Communication/Navigation Engineer sonamdorji@doat.gov.bt

Department of Air Transport

15. Ms. Namgay Dema Communication Assistant ndema@doat.gov.bt

Department of Air Transport/Air Navigation Service
Provider
16. Mr. Tshering Nidup Communication Assistant tsheringneedup209@gmail.com
Department of Air Transport

17. Mr. Sonam Dorji Communication Assistant 1 khengsonam72@gmail.com

Department of Air Transport

18. Mr. Nima Tshering Communication tsheringnima40n@gmail.com

Department of Air Transport

5. CAMBODIA (3)

ATTM. 1 - 2
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

19. Mr. Neang To Chief of CNS Bureau neangto.ans@gmail.com
State Secretariat of Civil Aviation Cambodia (SSCA)

20. Mr. Heng Mengkong Deputy Chief of CNS Bureau hengmengkong@gmail.com

State Secretariat of Civil Aviation Cambodia (SSCA)

21. Mr. Khorn Veasna Technical Staff of CNS Bureau khornveasna82@gmail.com

State Secretariat of Civil Aviation Cambodia (SSCA)

6. CHINA (14)
22. Mr. Li Li Director lili1@caac.gov.cn
Air Traffic Regulation Office
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)

23. Mr. Zhang De Principle Staff zhangde@caac.gov.cn

Air Traffic Regulation Office
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)

24. Ms. Cai Jing Deputy Director caijing@atmb.net.cn

Air Traffic Management Bureau
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)

* 25. Mr. Wang Pengyu Senior Engineer wangpengyu@atmb.net.cn

Air Traffic Management Bureau
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)

26. Mr. Li Guang Senior Engineer liguang@atmb.net.cn

Technical Center of Air Traffic Management Bureau
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)

27. Mr. Wang Yu Deputy Director wangyu@atmb.org

Middle & South China Regional Air Traffic
Management Bureau
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)

ATTM. 1 - 3
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

28. Mr. Zhu Yanbo Deputy General Manager zyb@adcc.com.cn
Aviation Data Communication Corporation (ADCC)

29. Mr. Tang Yeyang Senior Engineer tangyy@adcc.com.cn

Aviation Data Communication Corporation (ADCC)

30. Mr. Song Xitong Senior Engineer songxt@chinacfi.net

Flight Inspector
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)

31. Ms. Cui Jie Deputy Director cuij@chinacfi.net

Flight Inspection Center
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)

32. Mr. Wang Zhipeng Professor wangzhipeng@buaa.edu.cn

Beihang University

33. Ms. Li Xiao Senior Engineer lixiaojt@126.com

Beihang University

34. Mr. Fang Kun Senior Engineer fangkun@buaa.edu.cn

Beihang University

35. Ms. Zhao Jingjing Senior Engineer jingjingzhao@buaa.edu.cn

Beihang University

7. HONG KONG, CHINA (7)

36. Mr. Richard Wu Deputy Director-General of Civil Aviation rckwu@cad.gov.hk
(Chair of CNS/SG)
Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

ATTM. 1 - 4
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

* 37. Mr. M.H. Hui Assistant Director-General of Civil Aviation (Air mhhui@cad.gov.hk
Traffic Engineering Services)
Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

38. Mr. George Wong Chief Electronics Engineer gtywong@cad.gov.hk

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

39. Mr. Raymond Chan Senior Electronics Engineer rwhchan@cad.gov.hk

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

40. Mr. Arthur Lau Electronics Engineer akhlau@cad.gov.hk

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

41. Ms. Silvia Mak Senior Aeronautical Communications Supervisor wymak@cad.gov.hk

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

42. Ms. Agnes Ka Aeronautical Communications Supervisor ywka@cad.gov.hk

Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong, China

8. MACAO, CHINA (4)

43. Mr. Lo Veng Tong, Freeman Senior Safety Officer freemanlo@aacm.gov.mo
Civil Aviation Authority Macao, China

44. Mr. Pun Sio Kuong Safety Officer samsonpun@aacm.gov.mo

Civil Aviation Authority Macao, China

45. Mr. Sun Keng Chong Head of IT, CNS Division sonnysun@macau-airport.com
Macau International Airport Co., Ltd.

46. Mr. Lau Chi Hei, Hayes IT & CNS Engineer hayeslau@macau-airport.com
Macau International Airport Co., Ltd.

9. FIJI (2)

ATTM. 1 - 5
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

* 47. Ms. Sereima Bolanavatu ANS Inspector (CNS) sereima.bolanavatu@caaf.org.fj
Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji

48. Mr. Ilimeleki Navula Controller standards/SAR - ATM ilimelekiN@fijiairports.com.fj

Fiji Airports

10. FRANCE (1)

* 49. Mr. Jérôme Patoureaux Chief of Technical Division (ANSP) jerome.patoureaux@aviation-civile.gouv.fr
Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC)

11. INDIA (14)

50. Mr. Umesh Yadav CNS Inspector umeshyadav@aai.aero
Directorate General of Civil Aviation - India

51. Mr. Rajiv Badoni CNS Inspector rajivbadoni@aai.aero

Directorate General of Civil Aviation - India

52. Mr. Ajay Kapur General Manager akkapur@aai.aero

Airports Authority of India (AAI)

53. Mr. Venkateswar L General Manager (ATSEP) vlavla81@gmail.com

Airports Authority Of India (AAI)

54. Mr. S K Mallick General Manager (CNS-OM) gmcnsauto@ aai.aero

Airports Authority of India (AAI)

55. Mr. K. Anbarasu General Manger (CNS) kanbarasu@ aai.aero

Airports Authority of India (AAI)

56. Mr. Vasundara General Manager (CNS) vasundara@ aai.aero

Airports Authority of India (AAI)

ATTM. 1 - 6
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

57. Mr. Sver Naidu General Manager (CNS-PLNG) sevrnaidu@ aai.aero
Airports Authority of India (AAI)

58. Ms. Susmita Maiti Joint General Manager (CNS) susmita@aai.aero

Airports Authority of India (AAI)

59. Mr. Ritesh Kumar Gupta Joint General Manager (CNS) g.ritesh@aai.aero
Airports Authority of India (AAI)

60. Mr. Hemanth M. Ramchandani Joint General Manager (CNS) hemantr@aai.aero

Airport Authority of India

61. Mr. Sankar V. Deputy General Manager (CNS) sankar@aai.aero

Airports Authority of India (AAI)

62. Mr. Ram Kishan Deputy General Manager (CNS) ram_kishan@aai.aero

Airports Authority of India (AAI)

63. Ms. Suman Bhutani ATSEP sumanbhutani@aai.aero

Airports Authority of India (AAI)

12. INDONESIA (31)

64. Mr. Dian Wahyudi Head of Engineering Division dianwhy2014@gmail.com
Directorate of Air Navigation
Directorate General of Civil Aviation - Indonesia

65. Ms. Waya Fadini Air Navigation Evaluator waya_fadini@dephub.go.id

Directorate General of Civil Aviation - Indonesia

66. Mr. Arian Nurahman Air Navigation Inspector arian.nurahman@gmail.com

Ministry of Transportation of Indonesia

ATTM. 1 - 7
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

67. Ms. Suyanti Aviany Air Navigation Inspector aviany25@yahoo.com
DGCA Indonesia, Directorate of Air Navigation

68. Ms. Rosleli Eva Susanti Saragih Air Navigation Inspector roslelisaragih@yahoo.com
DGCA Indonesia, Directorate of Air Navigation

69. Mr. Abdul Aziz Air Navigation Inspector azizsabdul@gmail.com

DGCA Indonesia, Directorate of Air Navigation

70. Mr. Maruli Tua Edison Saragih Air Navigation Inspector edisonsaragih@yahoo.com
Directorate General of Civil Aviation - Indonesia

71. Ms. Dwi Yuliansari Air Navigation Inspector dwi.yuliansari@yahoo.com

Directorate General of Civil Aviation - Indonesia

72. Mr. Chaidir Anwar Air Navigation Inspector chaidir.kemenhub@gmail.com

Directorate General of Civil Aviation - Indonesia

73. Ir. Ahmad Nurdin Aulia Technical Director auliahmad03@gmail.com

Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

* 74. Mr. Dedy Iskandar Head Office dedy.nav7@gmail.com

Surveillance and ATM Facility Readiness
AirNav Indonesia

75. Mr. Bayu Dewangga Manager Teknik bayudewangga@gmail.com

Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

76. Mr. Rudy Kuntadi Manager of Data & Evaluation of CNSA r.kuntadi@airnavindonesia.co.id
Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

77. Mr. Dedy Hidayat Manager dedyhidayat76@gmail.com

Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

ATTM. 1 - 8
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

78. Ms. Diah Setiorini Manager of Facilities Readiness Junior d.setiorini@gmail.com
Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

79. Mr. Eman Sutranaya Junior Manager System Recording Switching & eman_sutranaya@yahoo.com
Jaringan
Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

80. Mr. Y. Zulfan Fadli Junior Manager yzulfanfadli82@gmail.com

Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

81. Mr. Imam Nurdin Junior Manager Planning & Evaluation ACC in.daffy@gmail.com
AirNav Indonesia

82. Mr. Edy Hasmuni Junior Manager FDPS-RDPS edyhasmuni@gmail.com

AirNav Indonesia

83. Mr. Rizka Alfarisi Surveillance Engineer rizkaalfarisi@gmail.com

Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

84. Ms. Kholifatul Azizah Air Traffic Controller azizahkholifatul2@gmail.com

Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

85. Mr. Melki Pandapotan Sitorus SST melkysitorus@yahoo.co.id

Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

86. Ms. Adhayanti Nur SPV adhayantinur@gmail.com

Perum LPPNPI (AirNav Indonesia)

87. Mr. Agit Prasetiyo Air Traffic Controller agitprasetiyo@gmail.com

AirNav Indonesia

88. Mr. Zainal Arifin Harahap VP Information Technology zainal.arifin@airnavindonesia.co.id

AirNav Indonesia

ATTM. 1 - 9
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

89. Mr. Juny Munandar Network Infrastructure juny.munandar@airnavindonesia.co.id
AirNav Indonesia

90. Mr. Said Fauzul Information Technology said.fauzul@airnavindonesia.co.id

AirNav Indonesia

91. Mr. Rama Aditya Air Traffic Controller Ramzes_atc@rocketmail.com

AirNav Indonesia

92. Mr. Lanang Wibisono Planning of System and Service Facility lanang.wibisono@gmail.com
Requirements
AirNav Indonesia

93. Mr. Irvan Irvan Aeronautical Telecommunication Engineer tar.irvan@yahoo.co.id

AirNav Indonesia

94. Mr. Eko Saputro Staff eko.saputro@airnavindonesia.co.id

AirNav Indonesia

13. JAPAN (18)

95. Mr. Takeya Miyakawa Director for Future Air Traffic Systems miyakawa-t2zd@mlit.go.jp
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

96. Mr. Tomokazu Morii Deputy Director morii-t2up@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

97. Mr. Hideaki Murakata Chief of Flight Information 1st Section murakata-h446b@mlit.go.jp
Operations Division
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

98. Mr. Kuniyuki Matsuda Special Assistant to Director matsuda-k489t@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

ATTM. 1 - 10
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

99. Mr. Fuchinoue Satoshi Special Assistant to Director futinoue-s46pu@mlit.go.jp
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

100. Mr. Yukinobu Ryu Special Assistant to Director ryuu-y2ea@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

101. Mr. Go Chiba Special assistant chiba-g10w2@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

102. Mr. Takahiro Aso Special Assistant to Director asoh-t97dr@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

103. Mr. Katsuyuki Arakawa Air Traffic Services Engineering arakawa-k24fe@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

104. Mr. Fujita Shunsuke Flight Inspector fujita_shunsuke@icloud.com

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

105. Mr. Yasushi Iwasawa Special Assistant to Director iwasawa-y28j@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

106. Mr. Masato Nomiya Special Assistant to Director nomiya-m97ib@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

107. Ms. Hanae Noda Assistant to Director noda-h46nk@mlit.go.jp

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

108. Mr. Makito Ohashi Special Assistant to Director oohashi-m07ys@mlit.go.jp

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

ATTM. 1 - 11
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

109. Mr. Setsuya Nagahata Special Assistant to Director se2ya.7ga8ta@gmail.com
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

110. Mr. Tasuku Mohara Air Navigation Service Engineer mohara-t24uw@mlit.go.jp

Network Performance Assessment Center
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)

111. Mr. Susumu Saito Principal Researcher susaito@enri.go.jp

National Institute of Maritime, Port, and Aviation
Technology

112. Mr. Junichi Naganawa Senior Researcher naganawa@mpat.go.jp

Electronic Navigation Research Institute

14. MALAYSIA (4)

113. Mr. Mohd Fitri Bin Ishak Principal Assistant Director fitri@caam.gov.my
Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM)

114. Mr. Muhammad Firdaus Ismail Principal Assistant Director firdaus.ismail@caam.gov.my

Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM)

115. Mr. Shairyzal Mohamad @ Azizan Assistant Director shairyzal.azizan@caam.gov.my

Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM)

ATTM. 1 - 12
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

116. Mr. Sharudin Hashim Air Traffic Controller sharudin@caam.gov.my
Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM)

15. MONGOLIA (7)

117. Mr. E. Turbayar Director of Air Navigation Service Department turbayar.e@mcaa.gov.mn
(ANSD)
National Civil Aviation Center (NCAC)
Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia

118. Mr. P. Gantugs Manager of Air Navigation Service Department gantugs_pn@mcaa.gov.mn

(ANSD)
National Civil Aviation Center (NCAC)
Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia

119. Mr. E. Bulgan Head of Communication Section bulgan@mcaa.gov.mn

Communication Navigation Surveillance Division
(CNSD)
National Civil Aviation Center
Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia

120. Mr. M. Erdenesukh Head of Technical Planning Section erdenesukh.m@mcaa.gov.mn

Communication Navigation Surveillance Division
(CNSD)
National Civil Aviation Center
Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia

121. Mrs. J. Bolorchimeg Engineer of Communication Section bolorchimeg.j@mcaa.gov.mn

Communication Navigation Surveillance Division
(CNSD)
National Civil Aviation Center
Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia

ATTM. 1 - 13
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

122. Mr. Puntsag Ganbaatar Senior Inspector ganbaatar@mcaa.gov.mn
Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia

123. Mr. E. Enkhmunkh Specialist of Air Navigation and Airports Policy enkhmunkh.e@mcaa.gov.mn
Regulation Department
Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia

16. MYANMAR (4)

* 124. Mr. Zaw Min Oo Deputy General Manager (CNS) rzawminoo76@gmail.com;
Department of Civil Aviation, Myanmar zawminoo.cns@dcamyanmar.aero

125. Mr. Yan Aung Oo Deputy Director CNS Inspection yanaungoo.nav@gmail.com

Department of Civil Aviation, Myanmar

126. Mr. Aung Myo Assistant General Manager (CNS) aungmyo.ms@gmail.com

Department of Civil Aviation, Myanmar

127. Mr. Htet Arkar Executive Engineer (CNS) kohtetarkar@gmail.com

Department of Civil Aviation, Myanmar

17. NEPAL (9)

128. Ms. Reenu Mool Deputy Director rmool@hotmail.com
Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN)

129. Mr. Pravin Neupane Deputy Director pravinneupane@gmail.com

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN)

130. Mr. Upaj Dhakal Deputy Director upaj.dhakal@caanepal.gov.np

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

131. Mr. Manohar Rajbhandari Deputy Director manohar.rajbhandari@gmail.com

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

ATTM. 1 - 14
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

132. Mr. Devendra Joshi Deputy Director dswoyambhu@yahoo.com
Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal, TIACAO

133. Mr. Dinesh Ram Baidya Deputy Director drbaidya@hotmail.com

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

134. Mr. Rajeev Prajapati Manager rajeevpraja85@gmail.com

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

135. Mr. Basu Dev Aryal Engineer (Manager) basud.aryal@caanepal.gov.np

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

136. Mr. Krishna Prasad Ghimire Senior Officer krishnap.ghimire@caanepal.gov.np

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

18. NEW ZEALAND (3)

137. Mr. Andy Alford Senior ANS Operations (Surveillance) Specialist andy.alford@airways.co.nz
Airways Corporation of New Zealand Limited
Airways International Training Facilities

138. Mr. John McKinlay Senior Technical Specialist john.mckinlay@caa.govt.nz

Aeronautical Services
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand

139. Mr. Edmund Heng Technical Specialist Aeronautical Services edmund.heng@caa.govt.nz

Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand

19. PAKISTAN (8)

140. Mr. Khurram Shahzad Akram Director SQMS director.sqms@caapakistan.com.pk
Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority -
SQMS Directorate

141. Mr. Abdul Manan Deputy Director (ATS) Mannan.mba@hotmail.com

Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority - Ops. Directorate

ATTM. 1 - 15
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

142. Mr. Abdul Musawwer Deputy Director (ATS) Abdul.Musawwer@caapakistan.com.pk
Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority - Ops. Directorate

143. Mr. Syed Munir Mahmood Senior Joint Director (CNS) muneer.mehmood@caapakistan.com.pk
Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority - DAAR

144. Mr. Shahid Hussain Senior Joint Director, Com-Ops shahid.hussain@caapakistan.com.pk

Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority - Ops. Directorate

145. Ms. Asma Akhlaq Senior Joint Director CNS asma.akhlaq@caapakistan.com.pk

Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority

146. Mr. Nauman Zahid Assistant Director Communion Operations nomanzahid0@gmail.com

Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority

147. Mr. Saad Qaisar Assistant Director saad.qaisar@caapakistan.com.pk

Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority

20. PHILIPPINES (3)

148. Mr. Elmer E. Gomez Department Manager III anod@caap.gov.ph
Civil Aviation Authority of Philippines

149. Mr. Gary M. Jadie Department Manager III garymjadie@caap.gov.ph

Air Navigation Service
Civil Aviation Authority of Philippines

150. Mr. Leandro R. Varquez Acting Department Manager elbotvarquez@gmail.com

Civil Aviation Authority of Philippines

21. REPUBLIC OF KOREA (12)

151. Mr. Jang Kyung Joon Deputy Director skyjjan@korea.kr
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
Republic of Korea

ATTM. 1 - 16
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

152. Mr. Junuk Park Assistant Director junuk0312@korea.kr
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport,
Republic of Korea / Air Traffic Management Office

153. Mr. Byung Hun Lee Assistant Director bhlee22@korea.kr

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport of the
Republic of Korea (MOLIT)

154. Mr. Jong Il Oh Assistant Director qweras24@korea.kr

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport of the
Republic of Korea (MOLIT)

155. Ms. Yujin Kim Assistant Director kyjin22@korea.kr

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport of the
Republic of Korea (MOLIT)

156. Ms. Lee Youngju Assistant Director lyj8108@korea.kr

Air Traffic Management of Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport ROK

157. Mr. Lee Soo Ho Manager ish1208@airport.co.kr

Korea Airports Corporation

158. Mr. Yoon Tae-Yeon Manager tyyoon13@airport.co.kr

Korea Airports Corporation

159. Mr. Won Jeongjae Manager hautie@airport.kr

Incheon International Airport Corporation

160. Mr. Pak Seongjoon Engineer sjpak@airport.kr

Republic Of Korea/Incheon Airport

ATTM. 1 - 17
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

161. Ms. Lee Haeun Public Officer tlssorj1@korea.kr
Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs,
Republic of Korea

162. Ms. Soomin Song Public Officer suumin@korea.kr

Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs,
Republic of Korea

22. SINGAPORE (14)

163. Mr. Kim Hee Chua Deputy Director (CNS) chua_kim_hee@caas.gov.sg
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS)

164. Mr. Henry Foo Deputy Director henry_foo@caas.gov.sg

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS)

165. Mr. Wee Sin Ho Deputy Director ho_wee_sin@caas.gov.sg

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS)

166. Mr. Wee Jui Chua Senior Chief (Systems Planning & Development) joe_chua@caas.gov.sg
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS)

167. Mr. Joel Ng Chief (Systems Planning) joel_ng@caas.gov.sg

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

168. Mr. Victor Lee Principal Manager (CNS Regulation) victor_lee@caas.gov.sg

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

169. Mr. Shin Hwah Leow, David Head (Air Traffic Management Software david_leow@caas.gov.sg
Engineering)
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

170. Mr. Shu Gao Head (Navigation and Meteorology) gao_shu@caas.gov.sg

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

ATTM. 1 - 18
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

171. Mr. Hon Yu Sia Head (CNS/MET Regulation) sia_hon_yu@caas.gov.sg
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

172. Mr. Keng Boon Chew Head (Communications) chew_keng_boon@caas.gov.sg

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

173. Ms. Suk Leng Lee Head (Radar & ADS-B) lee_suk_leng@caas.gov.sg
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

174. Ms. Mei Chin Ng Head (Aerodrome) ng_mei_chin@caas.gov.sg

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

175. Mr. Dennis Song Senior Engineer dennis_song@caas.gov.sg

Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

176. Mr. Cheng Nam Yeo Consultant (Aeronautical Telecommunications & yeo_cheng_nam@caas.gov.sg
Engineering)
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

23. SRI LANKA (6)

177. Mr. Hakmana Witharanage Upulsiri Manager Aeronautical Communication upulsiri.ans@airport.lk
Airport & Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd

178. Mr. Antony Dinesh Manager Aeronautical Communication dinesh.ans@airport.lk

Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd.

179. Mr. Asitha Herath Manager Aeronautical Communication asitha.ans@airport.lk

Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd.

180. Mr. Chamara Liyanage Senior Electronics Engineer chamara.eane@airport.lk

Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd.

181. Mr. Vidura Thammitage Senior Electronics Engineer vidura.eane@airport.lk

Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd.

ATTM. 1 - 19
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

* 182. Mr. Prasanna Wijeratne Electronics Engineer prasannaw.eane@airport.lk
Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd.

24. THAILAND (9)

* 183. Mr. Sarawoot Rungruengwajiake CNS Senior Officer sarawoot.r@caat.or.th
Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand

184. Mr. Takdanai Wuthisen CNS Officer takdanai.w@caat.or.th

Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand

185. Mr. Chaiwat Saekhew Officer chaiwat.s@caat.or.th

Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand

186. Mr. Phichpawis Plengsiriwat Officer phichpawis.p@caat.or.th

Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand

187. Mr. Wittaya Chunvattanananon Senior Director chun@aerothai.co.th

Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. (AEROTHAI)

188. Dr. Amornrat Jirattigalachote Strategic Planning Manager (Engineering) amornrat.ji@aerothai.co.th

Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. (AEROTHAI)

189. Mr. Pramuk Rungrojaree Air Traffic Engineering Manager pramuk.ru@aerothai.co.th

Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. (AEROTHAI)

190. Mr. Nattapong Siansawasdi Air Traffic System Engineer nattapong.si@aerothai.co.th

Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. (AEROTHAI)

191. Mr. Pattharasit Phankrawee Engineer phankrawee@gmail.com

Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. (AEROTHAI)

25. USA (5)

ATTM. 1 - 20
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

* 192. Mr. Shayne A. Campbell Senior Air Traffic Representative, Asia Pacific shayne.a.campbell@faa.gov
Federal Aviation Administration
Air Traffic Organization, Mission Support

193. Mr. Doug Arbuckle Chief Scientist doug.arbuckle@faa.gov

Federal Aviation Administration
Surveillance & Broadcast Services Program
194. Mr. Hoang Tran International Telecommunications Lead hoang.tran@faa.gov
Federal Aviation Administration

195. Mr. Chris Lester FAA International Telecommunications chris.lester@faa.gov

Federal Aviation Administration
OCC Subteam A

196. Mr. Alejandro Alex Rodriguez Technical Advisor – Surveillance alejandro.rodriguez@faa.gov

Air Traffic Organization - Program Management
Office
Federal Aviation Administration

26. VIET NAM (13)

197. Mr. Tuan Vu Ngoc CNS Official vungoctuan@caa.gov.vn
Civil Aviation Authority of Viet Nam

198. Mr. Nghia Trinh Deputy Manager of Technical and Quality nghiatv@attech.com.vn
Management Department
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management Corporation
(VATM)

199. Mr. Loc Trinh CNS System engineer trinhdinhloc@vatm.vn

Viet Nam Air Traffic Management Corporation
(VATM)

ATTM. 1 - 21
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

200. Mr. Nguyen Hong Hiep IT Specialist nguyenhonghiepbk@vatm.vn
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management Corporation
(VATM)

201. Ms. Minh Khanh Nghiem Thi International Relations Official minhkhanh@vatm.vn
Viet Nam Air Traffic Management Corporation
(VATM)

202. Mr. Giang Hoang CNS Technician giangh@attech.com.vn

Air Traffic Technical Company (ATTECH)

203. Mr. Nguyen Hai Viet Deputy Director haivietatsc@gmail.com

Noi Bai International Airport

204. Mr. Thanh Hai Le Tu Manager ltthai@vietnamairport.vn

Danang International Airport

205. Mr. Thach Canh Hai Deputy Manager of Airport Operation Department thachcanhhai@gmail.com
Airports Corporation of Viet Nam (ACV)

206. Mr. Huy Nguyen Aviation Operator nthuy@vietnamairport.vn

Airports Corporation of Viet Nam (ACV)

207. Mr. Minh Pham Software Engineer minh@phminh.com

Airports Corporation of Viet Nam (ACV)

208. Ms. Đỗ Thị Hồng Gấm Expert gamacv76@gmail.com

Airports Corporation of Viet Nam (ACV)

209. Mr. Thanh-Minh Phan Lecturer minhpt@vaa.edu.vn

Vietnam Aviation Academy

27. CANSO (1)

ATTM. 1 - 22
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

210. Mr. Poh Theen Soh Director, Asia Pacific Affairs CANSO Poh.Theen.Soh@CANSO.org
Civil Air Navigation Services Organization
(CANSO)

28. IATA/AIRLINE INDUSTRY (3)

211. Mr. John Moore Assistant Director, Safety and Flight Operations - moorej@iata.org;
ASPAC
International Air Transport Association (IATA)

212. Ms. Jullada Chullapant Flight Operation Officer jullada.c@thaiairways.com

Thai Airways

213. Mr. Pongsakorn Sirisaway Senior Flight Operation Officer pongsakorn.s@thaiairways.com

Thai Airways
29. IFATSEA (3)
214. Mr. Senthilvel Balasubramanian Regional Director, APAC senthilvel.balasubramanian@ifatsea.org
International Federation of Air Traffic Safety
Electronics Associations (IFATSEA)

215. Mr. Prabodh Biswal Observer prabodh129@aai.aero

International Federation of Air Traffic Safety
Electronics Associations (IFATSEA)

216. Ms. Neelima Patel Observer neelima_p@aai.aero

International Federation of Air Traffic Safety
Electronics Associations (IFATSEA)

30. CDATC (1)

217. Mr. Yun Liu Department Manager liuyun@cdatc.com
Chengdu Civil Aviation Air Traffic Control Science
& Technology

31. GLARUN TECHNOLOGY (4)

ATTM. 1 - 23
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

218. Mr. Jin Zhou Department Manager zhoujin@glarun.com
Glarun Technology Co., Ltd.

219. Dr. Yuan Wan UASDS Project Manager yuan.wan@chinney-eng.com

Chinney Alliance Engineering

220. Mr. Jingxing Xian Department Assistant Manager xianjingxing@glarun.com

Glarun Technology Co., Ltd.

221. Mr. Jun Yuan Senior Engineer yuanjun@china.com

Glarun Technology Co., Ltd.

32. HUAWEI (12)

222. Mr. Moussa Huang Director of Huawei Global Aviation moussa.huang@huawei.com
Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

223. Mr. Hugh Lin Director of Huawei APAC Transportation linxiuduan@huawei.com

Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

224. Mr. Evan Yu Director of Huawei Thailand Transportation yuchenglang@huawei.com

Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

225. Mr. Anthony Arokiasamy Director of Huawei Malaysia Transportation anthony.raymond@huawei.com

Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

226. Mr. Jiang Li Account Director of Huawei Hong Kong Aviation lijiang305@huawei.com
Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

227. Ms. Stephanie Liang Account Director of Huawei Singapore Aviation liang.lin1@huawei.com
Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

228. Mr. Pipat Charoenwutilap Account Director of Huawei Thailand Aviation pipat.charoenwutilap@huawei.com
Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

ATTM. 1 - 24
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

229. Mr. Siti Shadia Account Director of Huawei Malaysia Aviation sitis.mustapha@huawei.com
Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

230. Mr. Filbert Siddik Account Director of Huawei Indonesia Aviation filbert.siddik@huawei.com
Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

231. Mr. Andy Bien Chief Digital Officer Global Aviation andy.bien@huawei.com
Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

232. Mr. Dennis He Senior Expert of Huawei Global Aviation dennis.he@huawei.com

Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

233. Mr. Tianming Bai Senior Expert of Huawei APAC Aviation bai.tianming@huawei.com
Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.

33. PCCW Global (1)

234. Mr. Hao Wang, David Product Develop Manager dhwang@pccwglobal.com;
PCCW Global Ltd.

34. SAAB ATM (1)

235. Mr. Fedrik Lindblom VP Business Development Asia Pacific fredrik.lindblom@saabgroup.com
SAAB ATM

35. SEARIDGE (1)

236. Mr. Pat Urbanek VP Business Development APAC & MEA pat@searidgetech.com
SEARIDGE Technologies

36. WISESOFT (1)

237. Mr. Bin Bin Liang Assistant of Civil Aviation Block Manager liangbinbin110@126.com
Wisesoft

37. ICAO (10)

ATTM. 1 - 25
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

238. Mr. Michael Goodfellow Technical Officer MGoodfellow@icao.int
International Civil Aviation Organization
Headquarters

239. Mr. Peter Dunda Regional Officer MET/ENV pdunda@icao.int

International Civil Aviation Organization
Asia and Pacific Office

240. Mr. Shane Sumner Regional Officer ATM ssumner@icao.int

International Civil Aviation Organization
Asia and Pacific Office

241. Mr. Vijay Kumar Mishra Regional Officer PBN vkmishra@icao.int

Asia & Pacific Regional Sub-Office (APAC RSO)

242. Mr. Luo Yi Regional Officer CNS yluo@icao.int

International Civil Aviation Organization
Asia and Pacific Office

243. Ms. Soniya Nibhani Regional Officer ANS (CNS) Implementation snibhani@icao.int
International Civil Aviation Organization
Asia and Pacific Office

244. Mr. How Sze Lung, Derek Regional Officer CNS show@icao.int
International Civil Aviation Organization
Asia and Pacific Office

245. Ms. Zhong Wenhan Regional Officer CNS wzhong@icao.int

International Civil Aviation Organization
Asia and Pacific Office

246. Ms. Pornrudee Ruthapichairak (Paula) Business Development Officer pruthapichairak@icao.int

International Civil Aviation Organization
Asia and Pacific Office

ATTM. 1 - 26
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 1 to the Report

STATE/NAME TITLE/ORGANIZATION E-MAIL

247. Ms. Thita Pongdara Programme Assistant tpongdara@icao.int
International Civil Aviation Organization
Asia and Pacific Office

ATTM. 1 - 27
Note: * - CNS Points of Contact
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 2 to the Report

LIST OF WORKING/INFORMATION PAPERS

WP/IP/SP Agenda Subject Presented by

Number

WORKING PAPERS

WP/01 1 Provisional Agenda Secretariat

WP/02 2 Outcomes of APANPIRG/32, APANPIRG/32 Midyear Secretariat

Review and 9th PIRG-RASG Regional Coordination
Meeting on CNS

WP/03 2 Updates on CNS SG/25 and APANPIRG/32 Secretariat

Conclusions/Decisions and Action Items

WP/04 2 Relevant Action Items of 57th Conference of Directors Secretariat

General of Civil Aviation

WP/05 3.1 Review Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Aeronautical Secretariat
Communication Services Implementation Coordination
Group (ACSICG/9)

WP/06 3.2 AMHS Readiness Status for Supporting IWXXM Traffic Secretariat
of the States/Administrations

WP/07 4.1 Review Report of the Sixth Meeting of System Wide Secretariat
Information Management Task Force (SWIM TF/6)

WP/08 5.2 Review Report of the Sixth Meeting of Spectrum Review Secretariat
Working Group (SRWG/6)

WP/09 5.3 Potential Impacts from 5G Implementation on Aircraft Secretariat

Radio Altimeters – Outcomes in Relevant Meetings and
Regional Updates

WP/10 6.1 Review Report of the Ninth Meeting of Secretariat

Performance Based Navigation Implementation
Coordination Group (PBNICG/9)

WP/11 6.2 Review of Report of the Fourth Meeting of GBAS/SBAS Secretariat

Implementation Task Force (GBAS/SBAS ITF/4)

WP/12 15 Tracking CNS-related APANPIRG Conclusions/Decisions Secretariat

WP/13 7.1 Review Report of Seventh Meeting of the Surveillance Secretariat

Implementation Coordination Group (SURICG/7)

WP/14 8.1 Review Report of the Third Meeting of ATM Automation Secretariat
Systems Task Force (ATMAS TF/3)

WP/15 9.1 & 9.2 Review of Regional CNS Requirements in ICAO APAC e- Secretariat
ANP, Seamless ANS Plan and Updates on National Air
Navigation Plan (NANP)

ATTM. 2 - 1
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 2 to the Report

WP/IP/SP Agenda Subject Presented by

Number
WP/16 9.4 Updates on Beijing Declaration Implementation Related to Secretariat
CNS

WP/17 10 Review Status of CNS Deficiencies Secretariat

WP/18 11.1 Review Outcomes of Small Working Group Study on Secretariat and
Human Factor Issues of ATSEP IFATSEA

WP/19 14 Impact of COVID-19 to CNS Works in 2021 Secretariat

WP/20 15 CNS Points of Contact Secretariat

WP/21 16 Future Meeting Plan Secretariat

WP/22 7.2 Surveillance and DCPC VHF Coverage Maps Update Thailand, Hong Kong
China and Secretariat

WP/23 3.3 AMC Updates Secretariat

WP/24 5.3 Amendment 91 to Annex 10 Volume III on Selective Secretariat

Calling Codes

WP/25 11 Standardizing the ATSEP Training for the Successful Nepal

Implementation of the GANP

WP/26 5.1 CAAC'S Support for the Enhancement of AEROMACS China

SARPS and Technical Manual

WP/27 13 Trial Flight and Standard Establishment of UAS-Based China

Flight Inspection in China

WP/28 6.3 Update of Flight Inspection Guidance Material (FIGM) China & Hong Kong,
China

WP/29 13 Provision of a Digital Tower and APRON Management Hong Kong, China
System to Support Safe and Efficient Operation of the
Hong Kong International Airport and Its Expansion

WP/30 7.2 Inconsistent ICAO Aircraft Address and Target Hong Kong, China
Identification Between Surveillance Data and Flight Plan

WP/31 12.2 Ensuring Cyber Resilience for Air Navigation Service in Hong Kong, China
Hong Kong International Airport and Its Expansion

WP/32 2 Air Traffic Management and Airspace Safety Monitoring Secretariat

Outcomes

WP/33 9.1 Updates on Seamless ANS Plan Secretariat

WP/34 4 Review Outcomes from MET SG/26 Secretariat & Chair of

MET SG

ATTM. 2 - 2
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 2 to the Report

WP/IP/SP Agenda Subject Presented by

Number
INFORMATION PAPERS

IP/01 - Meeting Bulletin Secretariat

IP/02 3.1 Outcomes of Webinar on CRV Implementation Secretariat

IP/03 5.2 Survey Result of the introduction of 50 kHz channel Secretariat

spacing for ILS and VOR facilities in the APAC region

IP/04 5.3 Outcomes of 5G/RA Webinar co-host with APT Secretariat

IP/05 6.4 ITU Circular Letter on Prevention of Interference to GNSS Secretariat

IP/06 9.2 Update on ICAO GANP Study Group related to CNS Secretariat

IP/07 5.3 5G Network within Airport Boundary Malaysia

IP/08 13 Development of Digital Tower Prototype at Changi Airport Singapore

IP/09 5.1 Verification of Air Traffic Control Services Based on Data- China
Link for All Flight Phases in China

IP/10 5.3 Implementation and Application of VHF SELCAL in China

China

IP/11 6.4 BDS Standardization Status in ICAO China

IP/12 6.4 LEO Navigation Augmentation Concept, Constellation China

Construction Status and Civil Aviation Application
Research in China

IP/13 15 Flight Inspection Capability Building of CAAC for CNS China

Facility

IP/14 7.2 Research on ADS-B Position Verification Japan/ENRI

IP/15 6.4 A Case of GNSS Signal Outage in the Oceanic Airspace in Japan
Japan

IP/16 6.4 Research and Development Activities related to GBAS in Japan

Japan

IP/17 6.4 SBAS Status Update in Japan Japan

IP/18 9.1 The Long-Term Vision for the Future Air Traffic Systems Japan/ENRI
of Japan (CARATS)

IP/19 3.1 Challenges Faced in Joining CRV AASL/Sri Lanka

IP/20 5.3 Outcome of APG23-4 Secretariat

ATTM. 2 - 3
 CNS SG/26
Attachment 2 to the Report

WP/IP/SP Agenda Subject Presented by

Number
IP/21 4 Status of Proof of Concept Based SWIM Project for India
Exchanging Aeronautical Flight and Weather data

IP/22 3.1 Current Status of CRV Implementation in India India/AAI

IP/23 15 IATA’s aircraft Equipage and Capability Survey IATA

PRESENTATIONS

P/01 12.1 Updates on ICAO International Aviation Trust Framework Secretariat

P/02 9.3 Global Developments Related to CNS Secretariat

P/03 13 Comprehensive Applications of the Radar-based GLARUN Technology

monitoring systems in Airport- Final

P/04 13 Digital Towers, Resilience, Recovery, Refocus SEARIDGE

Technologies

P/05 4.2 Advanced Digitisation Facilitating Air Traffic HUAWEI

Development

P/06 13 Experience Sharing on Digital Towers SAAB

____________

ATTM. 2 - 4