3.

Page 1: Introduction to Jayanta Bhatta and Nyāyamañjarī

Jayanta Bhatta:

Jayanta Bhatta is highlighted as a significant scholar in Indian philosophy, particularly in the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika school.
He belonged to the Gauda Brāhmana community of the Bharadvāja gotra, with ancestral roots in Bengal,
though his family later settled in Kashmir.

Imprisonment and Writing:

It is noted that Jayanta wrote Nyāyamañjarī during his imprisonment, which was due to his refusal to
comply with a king's demand regarding the wealth of a temple.
Jayanta's work is influenced by earlier scholars like Vācaspati Miśra, suggesting a timeframe of his
flourishing between AD 850 and 910.

Scholarship:

Jayanta was known for his profound knowledge across various Indian philosophical systems.
His work, Nyāyamañjarī, serves as a commentary on Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra but is considered an
independent and unique exposition.
The text addresses numerous philosophical problems, presenting the Nyāya standpoint with logical
precision and critique.

The view of the Cārvākas who admit that the body is self
(śarīratma-vādi-cārvaka-mata)
The term "śarīratma-vādi-cārvaka-mata" refers to the materialistic philosophy of the Cārvāka (or Lokāyata)
school of thought in ancient Indian philosophy. This school is known for its radical materialism and rejection of
metaphysical concepts such as the soul (ātman) and the afterlife. Let's break down and understand the
components of this term and the Cārvāka philosophy:

Components of the Term

Śarīratma-vādi: This term can be broken down into "śarīra" (body) and "ātma-vādi" (one who asserts the
self). It implies a belief that the body itself is the self, rejecting the idea of an eternal, separate soul.
Cārvāka-mata: "Cārvāka" is the name of the philosophical school, and "mata" means doctrine or view.
Hence, Cārvāka-mata refers to the doctrine of the Cārvāka school.

Key Tenets of Cārvāka Philosophy

1. Materialism (Śarīratma-vāda):
Cārvāka holds that the body and the self are identical. There is no soul distinct from the physical
body. Consciousness and all mental states are considered to be by-products of physical processes.
This viewpoint is called śarīratma-vāda, meaning the belief that the body itself is the self.
2. Empiricism:
Cārvāka philosophy emphasizes direct perception (pratyakṣa) as the primary means of knowledge. It
is skeptical of inferences (anumāna) and rejects scriptures (śruti) as sources of knowledge.
According to Cārvāka, only what can be perceived by the senses is real.
3. Rejection of the Afterlife:
The Cārvāka school denies the existence of an afterlife, rebirth, karma, and liberation (moksha). It
posits that once the body dies, consciousness ceases to exist.
This leads to a focus on enjoying life and seeking pleasure in the present moment (hedonism).
4. Critique of Religious Practices:
Cārvāka critiques the rituals and sacrifices promoted by other schools of thought, particularly those
upheld by Vedic traditions. It views such practices as exploitative and superstitious.

Historical Context

Sources: The original texts of the Cārvāka school have not survived. Most of what is known about
Cārvāka comes from references and critiques by other philosophical schools, such as Nyāya, Vedanta, and
Buddhism.
 Influence: Despite being a minority view, Cārvāka philosophy has played a significant role in the history
of Indian philosophy by providing a counterpoint to the more spiritual and metaphysical traditions.

Modern Relevance

Cārvāka's emphasis on empiricism and skepticism can be seen as an early form of scientific thinking,
challenging unverified beliefs and encouraging critical inquiry. In contemporary times, Cārvāka's materialism
and hedonism might resonate with secular and humanistic viewpoints that prioritize human experience and
happiness in the present life.

Page 2: Carvaka/Lokāyata and Dehātma-Vāda (Body as Self)

Nyāyamañjarī and Carvaka Critique:

Jayanta critiques the Carvaka/Lokāyata views, focusing on their materialistic understanding of the self and
their denial of a separate soul (dehātma-vāda).
Carvakas argue that the body itself is the self, rejecting the idea of a non-material soul.

Examples and Arguments:

Jayanta refutes the Carvaka position by questioning the logical consistency of their arguments.
He discusses the twelve prameya-s (objects of knowledge) from the Nyāya-sūtra, emphasizing the
importance of right knowledge in achieving liberation (moksha), which is the ultimate cessation of
suffering.
Incorrect knowledge leads to doṣa (evil), and its removal leads to the removal of doṣa.

Page 3: Critique of Carvaka/Lokāyata

Materialistic View of the Self

The Carvakas believe that since the body is sentient (able to perceive or feel things), there is no need for
an additional concept of a distinct self.
They reject concepts like rebirth and merit (dharma/adharma), arguing that death marks the end of one's
existence.
Perception and Inference:

Carvakas argue that the self cannot be perceived by external senses or internal organs like pleasure.
They hold that perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) do not prove the existence of a self distinct
from the body.
Perception is contingent on physical attributes (e.g., color), which the self lacks.
Inference depends on observable concomitance (the fact of existing or occurring together with something
else) which cannot be established for a distinct self.

Example of Transformation:

Carvakas use the example of intoxicating power in liquor:

Just as ingredients without intoxicating power can produce it through a specific transformation (e.g.,
fermentation), unconscious material elements can produce consciousness when forming a body.
This transformation explains why consciousness appears in the body but not in objects like jars.

Refutation by Jayanta:

Jayanta challenges the Carvaka position by highlighting the lack of logical basis for their claims.
He argues that if consciousness in the body comes from material elements, it contradicts the principle that
effects (conscious body) must resemble their causes (unconscious matter).

Inference and Scriptural Validity:

Carvaka points out that inference is invalid for proving a distinct self without perceptual verification.
They critiques the reliance on scriptural statements, Carvakas dismiss them as having no real validity.
Carvakas cite a scripture stating that consciousness arises from and dissolves into material elements,
further denying the existence of an eternal self.
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, in the "Nyāyamañjarī," defends the validity of inference against the Cārvāka school, which
primarily accepts perception (pratyakṣa) as the only reliable means of knowledge. The Cārvākas argue that
inference is unreliable because it is dependent on perception, which is limited and can be deceptive. Jayanta
counters this by arguing that:
 Inference, though based on perception, extends knowledge beyond the immediately perceptible.
The reliability of inference is established through consistent and repeated observations of the relationship
between the sign and the inferred object (e.g., smoke and fire).
Dismissing inference undermines practical and everyday reasoning, which even Cārvākas implicitly rely
on.

Detailed Analysis with Examples:

1. Jayanta Bhatta's Argument on Prameya-s and Pramāṇa-s:

Jayanta discusses the twelve prameya-s (e.g., self, body, senses) and the importance of understanding them
correctly.

In Nyāya philosophy, prameya refers to the objects or entities that are known through pramāṇa-s. These
include physical objects, mental states, universals, individual souls, and other entities that can be the focus
of knowledge.

Example: Right knowledge of prameya-s leads to liberation, while false knowledge leads to doṣa.
Pramāṇa-s (means of knowledge) like perception and inference are critical in establishing right knowledge.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's arguments in the "Nyāyamañjarī" emphasize the importance of the twelve prameya-s (objects of
knowledge) and the reliable means of knowledge (pramāṇa-s) in achieving liberation (apavarga):

1. Prameya-s (Objects of Knowledge): Understanding the true nature of these objects is crucial:
- Correct knowledge leads to liberation (apavarga).
- Misunderstanding leads to faults (doṣa) and perpetuates suffering (duḥkha).

1. Ātman (Self): The individual soul or self, which is distinct from the body and is the experiencer of pain
and pleasure.
2. Śarīra (Body): The physical body, which serves as the locus for the soul's experiences.
3. Indriya (Senses): The sensory organs that facilitate the perception of external objects.
4. Artha (Objects of Sense): The external objects that are perceived through the senses.
5. Buddhi (Cognition): The mental faculty responsible for knowledge and decision-making.
6. Manas (Mind): The internal organ that coordinates the sensory inputs and supports cognition.
 7. Pravṛtti (Activity): The actions performed by an individual, driven by desires and volitions.
8. Doṣa (Defects): The mental afflictions such as attachment, aversion, and ignorance that lead to suffering.
9. Pretyabhāva (Rebirth): The concept of the soul being reborn into a new body after death, influenced by
past actions (karma).
10. Phala (Result): The fruits of actions, which can be positive or negative, experienced in this life or future
lives.
11. Duḥkha (Suffering): The various forms of pain and suffering that beings undergo.
12. Apavarga (Liberation): The ultimate goal of human life, which is the cessation of all suffering and
liberation from the cycle of birth and death

2. Pramāṇa-s (Means of Knowledge):

- Perception (Pratyakṣa): Direct sensory experience.
- Inference (Anumāna): Logical reasoning based on observation.
- Comparison (Upamāna): Understanding through analogy.
- Verbal Testimony (Śabda): Knowledge from reliable sources like scriptures.

3. Establishing Right Knowledge:

- Perception provides immediate knowledge.
- Inference reveals deeper connections.
- Verbal testimony supports knowledge beyond direct experience.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that correct understanding of prameya-s through these pramāṇa-s is essential for spiritual
liberation, defending Nyāya epistemology against materialistic and skeptical views.

2. Carvaka's Materialistic Explanation:

Carvakas argue that consciousness arises in the body through a specific transformation of material
elements.
Example: Ingredients of liquor undergoing fermentation gain intoxicating power, analogous to
unconscious elements forming a conscious body.

The Cārvāka school, also known as Lokāyata, presents a materialistic explanation for consciousness and the
nature of the self. Their philosophy centers around the following key points:
2.1. Materialistic Viewpoint: Cārvākas assert that consciousness (chetana) arises from a specific arrangement
and transformation of material elements. They propose that just as the fermentation of certain ingredients
produces intoxicating liquor, similarly, unconscious material elements can give rise to a conscious body.

2.2 Mechanistic Analogies: They often use analogies from everyday experience to support their arguments. For
instance:
- Fermentation Analogy: They compare the fermentation process, which transforms inert ingredients into an
intoxicating substance, to the emergence of consciousness from material elements.
- Fire and Smoke Analogy: Similar to how smoke indicates the presence of fire, they argue that consciousness
is merely a by-product of the functioning of the physical body.

2.3. Denial of Metaphysical Concepts: Cārvākas reject metaphysical concepts such as the existence of the soul
(ātman) and the afterlife. They hold that there is no need to postulate the existence of an eternal soul or
consciousness independent of the body.

2.4. Epistemological Skepticism: They are skeptical of traditional epistemological sources like perception,
inference, and scriptural authority. Instead, they rely heavily on empirical observation and rational argumentation
to support their materialistic worldview.

2.5. Ethical Implications: Their rejection of metaphysical concepts extends to ethics as well. Cārvākas advocate
for a hedonistic ethic, emphasizing the pursuit of pleasure (kāma) as the primary goal of life, since they do not
believe in consequences after death.

In summary, the Cārvāka philosophy provides a materialistic explanation for consciousness, likening it to the
result of specific material transformations rather than a metaphysical or spiritual entity. Their arguments are
grounded in observable phenomena and seek to undermine traditional religious and philosophical concepts
prevalent in ancient Indian thought.

3. Jayanta's Refutation:

Jayanta refutes the Carvaka claim by challenging the logical consistency.

 Example: If the body can be conscious due to specific transformation, why don't other material
assemblages (like jars) exhibit consciousness?
Jayanta argues that effects generally resemble their causes; thus, consciousness should not arise from
unconscious matter.

4. Inference and Scriptural Validity:

carvaka argues that without perceptual evidence, inference cannot prove a distinct self.
Example: Fire is inferred from smoke due to perceptual evidence of their concomitance, but no such
evidence exists for a distinct self.
Carvakas dismiss scriptural statements on the self as illogical, citing scriptures that state consciousness
arises from material elements and ceases with the body.

This detailed examination shows Jayanta Bhatta's critical analysis of Carvaka materialism, focusing on their
arguments and his logical refutations, while employing various examples to illustrate key philosophical points.

Analogies Used by Cārvāka

1. Musical Instrument Analogy:

Analogy: The relationship between the body and consciousness is likened to that between a musical
instrument and the music it produces. Just as the music is produced by the physical structure and
functioning of the instrument, consciousness arises from the physical structure and functioning of
the body.
Argument: This analogy suggests that consciousness is a by-product of the material components
and processes of the body. When the instrument (body) is in proper condition, it produces music
(consciousness). When the instrument is damaged or destroyed, the music ceases, just as
consciousness ceases when the body ceases to function.
2. Fermented Liquor Analogy:
Analogy: The production of consciousness is compared to the fermentation process in making
liquor. Just as liquor is produced through the fermentation of physical ingredients, consciousness is
produced through the combination and functioning of physical elements in the body.
 Argument: This analogy illustrates that consciousness is a result of physical processes and not
something that exists independently of the body. Just as liquor cannot exist without the fermenting
ingredients, consciousness cannot exist without the physical body.
3. Red-Hot Iron Ball Analogy:
Analogy: The Cārvāka liken the body and consciousness to a red-hot iron ball. Just as heat and light
are properties that emerge from the iron ball when it is heated, consciousness is a property that
emerges from the body when it is alive and functioning.
Argument: This analogy supports the view that consciousness is an emergent property of the body,
dependent on its physical state. When the iron ball cools down, the heat and light disappear, just as
consciousness disappears when the body ceases to function.
4. Mixture Analogy:
Analogy: The Cārvāka compare the body and consciousness to a mixture of elements like earth,
water, fire, and air. Just as a mixture of these elements can produce new qualities, the combination of
physical elements in the body produces consciousness.
Argument: This analogy emphasizes that consciousness is a result of the right combination and
interaction of physical elements. It argues against the existence of a non-material soul, proposing
that consciousness is entirely material in origin.

Cārvāka Arguments and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Criticisms

The Cārvāka school, known for its materialistic philosophy, posits that the body itself is the self (dehātma-vāda).
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a philosopher from the Nyāya school, provides a systematic critique of this view in his work
"Nyāyamañjarī." Here are some key arguments from the Cārvāka perspective and Jayanta’s corresponding
criticisms:

1. Cārvāka Argument: Consciousness Arises from the Body

Cārvāka View:

Consciousness is a product of the physical body, similar to how intoxicating liquor results from the
fermentation process. Just as the combination of physical ingredients leads to the emergence of liquor, the
combination of bodily elements results in consciousness.
 The body is made of elements like earth, water, fire, and air. When these elements combine in a particular
way, consciousness arises as an emergent property.

Jayanta's Criticism:

Dependence on Physical Conditions: Jayanta argues that if consciousness were merely a product of
bodily elements, it would cease to exist if the body undergoes changes or disintegration. However, the
persistence of personal identity and self-awareness even through bodily changes suggests that the self is
not identical to the body.
Non-physical Experiences: He points out that experiences like dreams and memories cannot be
adequately explained by purely physical processes. These experiences indicate the presence of a conscious
entity that is not entirely dependent on the current physical state of the body.

2. Cārvāka Argument: No Evidence of Separate Soul

Cārvāka View:

There is no empirical evidence for the existence of an eternal soul separate from the body. All observed
phenomena, including mental states, can be explained by physical interactions within the body.
Since we cannot perceive a soul directly, the assumption of its existence is unnecessary and unscientific.

Jayanta's Criticism:

Inference and Testimony: Jayanta argues that not all knowledge comes from direct perception; valid
knowledge can also be derived from inference and testimony. Just because the soul is not directly
perceptible does not mean it does not exist. We infer the existence of the soul from its effects, such as
consciousness and moral agency.
Philosophical Consistency: He points out that many accepted phenomena (like causation and universal
properties) are not directly perceived but inferred. Rejecting the soul on the grounds of non-perception
undermines the validity of many other important philosophical concepts that rely on inference.

3. Cārvāka Argument: Death of the Body Ends Consciousness

Cārvāka View:

When the body dies, consciousness ceases. This is analogous to the cessation of the light when the lamp is
extinguished. The cessation of consciousness upon death indicates that consciousness is entirely dependent
 on the living body.

Jayanta's Criticism:

Continuity of Identity: Jayanta argues that the continuity of personal identity and memory through
various bodily changes suggests the presence of a persistent self that is not destroyed by bodily death. The
self maintains its identity and continuity beyond the mere physical components.
Moral and Ethical Considerations: He also points out that if consciousness ceased entirely with bodily
death, it would undermine the basis for ethical responsibility and moral agency. The persistence of a moral
self is necessary for ethical judgments and accountability.

4. Cārvāka Argument: The Self is Sensory and Material

Cārvāka View:

The self is nothing but the sensory and material experiences we have. The physical body and its sensory
mechanisms are sufficient to explain all aspects of what we consider the self.

Jayanta's Criticism:

Higher-order Consciousness: Jayanta contends that the self is capable of higher-order consciousness,
such as self-reflection and abstract thinking, which cannot be fully explained by sensory and material
experiences alone. These capabilities suggest a deeper, non-material aspect to the self.
Memory and Personal Continuity: He also emphasizes that memory and personal continuity over time
indicate a self that transcends the immediate sensory and material experiences. The self can reflect on past
experiences and anticipate future events, which requires an enduring entity beyond mere physical
processes.