INTRODUCTION,

OBJECT
&
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
 A. INTRODUCTION:

In every civilized society there are two sets of laws:

(1) Substantive Laws; and

(2) Procedural Laws.

 Substantive laws determine the rights, liabilities and obligations of parties; whereas

 Adjective or Procedural laws prescribe the practice, procedure and machinery for the enforcement of
such substantive rights, liabilities and obligations.

 Of the two, substantive laws are no doubt the more important.

 However, the efficacy of substantive laws, to a large extent, depends upon the quality of the procedural
laws.
  It is procedural law which puts life into substantive law by providing a remedy and implements the well-
known maxim Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium.

 Unless the procedure is simple, expeditious and inexpensive, the substantive laws, however good, are
bound to fail in their purpose and object.

In Halsbury’s Laws of England, it has been stated:

“There is at the outset a vital and essential distinction between substantive law and procedural law.
The function of substantive law is to define, create or confer substantive legal rights or legal status or
to impose and define the nature and extent of legal duties. The function of procedural law is to provide
the machinery or the manner in which the legal rights or status and legal duties may be enforced or
recognised by a court of law or other recognised or properly constituted tribunal”.

 Procedural law is an adjunct or an accessory to substantive law.

  Nothing can be provided by a procedural law that is not already sought to be given by a substantive law;
and nothing can be taken away by a procedural law that has been given by a substantive law.

 However, the two branches are complimentary to each other and interdependent. The interplay between
them often conceals what is substantive law and what is procedural law.

For example, some provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are substantive in nature and not procedural at all,
like Sections 96, 100, 114 and 115 providing for a right of appeal, review and revision. The other provisions
are generally procedural in nature. Likewise in the Indian Evidence Act certain provisions such as
Presumptions and Estoppel are substantive in nature while other provisions are procedural in nature.

Referring to Salmond’s Jurisprudence (12th Edition, pg. 462), the distinction between substantive law and

procedural law has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Shravan

Kumar Swarup, (1994) 6 SCC 623, thus:

 “What, then, is the true nature of the distinction? The law of procedure may be defined as that branch
of the law which governs the process of litigation. It is the law of action - jus quod ad actions pertinent
— using the term action in a wide sense to include all legal proceedings, civil or criminal. All the residue
is substantive law, and relates, not to the process of litigation, but to its purposes and subject-matters.
Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seeks, procedural law
deals with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates the
conduct and relations of courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself; the former determines their
conduct and relations in respect of the matters litigated .”

Examples of Substantive Law: Indian Contract Act, Indian Penal Code, Company Law, Transfer of Property
Act, Industrial Disputes Act, etc.

Examples of Procedural Law: Indian Evidence Act, Code of Civil Procedure, Code of Criminal Procedure,
Limitation Act, etc.
*****
 B. INTERPRETATION OF PROCEDURAL LAWS

Since the function of procedural law is to facilitate justice and further its ends, the rules of procedure must be

construed liberally and in such a manner that renders the enforcement of substantive right effective.

Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for the Supreme Court, has summarized concisely the principle underlying

interpretation of procedural laws in State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719, and observed

that:

“We must always remember that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction
but an aid to justice. It has been wisely observed that procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and
not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. Where the non-
compliance, though procedural, will thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing of justice to parties, the
rule is mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just disposal
of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a dominant desideratum. After, all
Courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end product on technicalities.”
In Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3SCC 46, it has been held that:

“It (the CPC) is therefore merely a part of the adjective law and deals with procedure alone and must
be interpreted in a manner so as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat
it……… Our laws of procedure are based on the principle that “as far as possible, no proceeding in
a court of law should be allowed to be defeated on mere technicalities .”

In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr., [1955 AIR 425] Justice Vivian Bose, in his
illuminating language dealing with the Code of Civil Procedure said:

“It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment
for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of
sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded
against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the
furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.
In Saiyad Mohd. v. Abdulhabib, (1988) 4 SCC 343, it has been stated by the Supreme Court that:

“A procedural law is always in aid of justice, not in contradiction or to defeat the very object which is
sought to be achieved. A procedural law is always subservient to the substantive law. Nothing can be
given by a procedural law what is not sought to be given by a substantive law and nothing can be
taken away by the procedural law what is given by the substantive law.”
 C. OBJECT & PURPOSE OF THE CODE

1. CONSOLIDATION & CODIFICATION

The preamble of the Code states that the object of the Code is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to

the procedure of Courts of Civil Judicature.

In Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal, (1895) 22 Cal 788 (PC); and Santha Nand v. Devanand,

AIR 1930 All 225 (FB), it has been observed that, to consolidate means to collect all the laws relating to a

particular subject and to bring it down to date in order that it may form a useful Code applicable to the

circumstances existing at the time when the consolidating Act is enacted.

In Nagendra v. Kamal Basini, (1896) 23 Cal 563 (PC): 23 IA 18; and Gulab Chand v. Kudilal, AIR 1951

MB 1 (FB), it has been observed that, the very object of codifying a particular branch of law is that, on any

point specifically dealt with, the law should thenceforth be ascertained from the language used in the

enactment and not from the preceding Act.

Since the Code of Civil Procedure is both, a consolidating and an amending enactment, where it plainly

amends, resort cannot be had to the earlier law.

It has been observed by the Patna High Court that CPC is a complete code in itself. Once proceedings are

initiated under the Code, rights and remedies have to be looked thereunder. All other manner and/or procedure

are impliedly prohibited.

 2. PURPOSE:
Implementing the fundamentals of substantive law is the purpose of procedural law. It ensures justice through

the enforcement of rights and obligations.

Law of civil procedure is an indispensable part of the machinery of justice and operates as an essential tool

towards:

(i) Enforcing legal rights and claims;

(ii) Redressing or preventing legal wrongs;

(iii) Asserting legal defences; and

(iv) Other ancillary purposes, notwithstanding its apparent complexity and its occasional technicality.
 D. Essential Characteristics of Civil Procedure:

The essential characteristics of the law of civil procedure can be categorized into three classes, namely: (i)

Complimentary; (ii) Protective; and (iii) Remedial or Practical.

 In its complimentary character, the law of civil procedure compliments the substantive laws. It gives life

to substantive law by providing its remedy and effectiveness and bringing it into being.

 In its protective character, it represents the public functioning of the legal machinery and the operation

of “due process of law”. Due process of law means nobody ought to be condemned unheard. Every

person has a right to approach a court of law if he has a grievance for which the law provides a remedy.

It includes an opportunity for the defendant to file pleadings and documents and defend against the

allegations and averments made against him/her. Thus, law of civil procedure safeguards every person
 and his right to life, liberty, reputation, livelihood and property. It also ensures that no person shall suffer

any deprivation of rights, except in accordance with the accepted rules of procedure.

 In its remedial or practical character, it deals with the actual litigation process itself, in accordance with

the practice and procedure of the courts and enhances the importance and application of the rules,

practical and procedural modes and methods of conduct of the judicial process.
 E. Scope of the Code, Whether Exhaustive?

A perusal of Section 151 of the CPC, 1908 makes it abundantly clear that the Code is not exhaustive.

Section 151 of the Code reads as under:

“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to
make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of
the Court.”

While interpreting Section 151 of the CPC, in Padam Sen v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 218,

the Supreme Court observed as under:

“The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court
by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is
free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those
powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the
 intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised
in a manner which will be contrary or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

The above judgment was also referred by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC

527, wherein the Supreme Court observed and held that:

“It is well-settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the
Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future
litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them……….

The inherent powers are to be exercised by the Court in very exceptional circumstances, for which
the Code lays down no procedure.

The Code of Civil Procedure is undoubtedly not exhaustive: it does not lay down rules for guidance
in respect of all situations nor does it seek to provide rules for decision of all conceivable cases which
may arise. The civil courts are authorised to pass such orders (as may be necessary for the ends of
 justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of court, but where an express provision is made to meet a
particular situation the Code must be observed, any departure therefrom is not permissible……….
Inherent jurisdiction of the court to make order ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by s. 151
of the Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code. Where
the Code deals expressly with a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as
exhaustive.

Ex Debito Justitiae - means “from or as a debt of justice.”

The principle is founded on a recognition of a debt that the justice delivery system owes to a litigant to correct

an error in a judicial dispensation.

Emphasizing on the principle, the Supreme Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine

SC 1337 observed that no man should suffer a wrong by the technical procedure of irregularities.

*******
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

 The Royal Charter of 1726 provided for establishment of civil and criminal courts in the Presidency

Towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, which derived their authority from the King instead of the East

India Company.

 The English rules of procedure and evidence derived from common law and statute law, which prevailed

in England before 1726, were followed in the courts established by Royal Charter.

 Between 1772 and 1785, Governor General, Warren Hastings, introduced several judicial reforms.

District Diwani Adalats (Civil courts), Sadar Diwani Adalat (Civil Appeal Courts), District Fauzdari

Adalats (Criminal Courts) were established. For the approval of capital punishment and property

acquisition the Sadar Nizamat Adalat was established at Murshidabad.

  From 1786 to 1793, Lord Cornwallis conducted several changes in the judicial system (he abolished the

Fauzdari Courts and established Circuit Courts). He also established civil courts for both Hindus and

Muslims such as Munsiff Court, Registrar Court, District Court, Sadar Diwani Adalat and King-in-

Council.

These Courts were governed by various systems of the civil court procedure and different customs, norms,

special acts, rules and regulations, which kept changing and evolving from time to time on the basis of needs

and circumstances.

 Under the Regulating Act of 1773, the Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta was established and by

the Letters of Patent issued in 1774 the Supreme Court at Calcutta, was declared to be a Court of

Record, with full power & authority to hear and determine all complaints for any crimes and also to
 entertain, hear and determine any suits or actions against any of His Majesty’s subjects in Bengal, Bihar

and Orissa.

 The Supreme Courts at Madras and Bombay were established by King George – III on 26th December,

1800 and on 8th December 1823 respectively.

 Under Governor-General, William Bentinck, the first Indian Law Commission, chaired by Lord

Macaulay, was established under the Charter Act of 1833 for the compilation of Indian laws, which

recommended codification of the Indian Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and a few other laws.

 Thereafter, the second, third and fourth Law Commissions were constituted in 1853, 1861 and 1879

respectively. The Code of Civil Procedure, the Indian Contract Act, the Indian Evidence Act, the Transfer

of Property Act. etc. are products of the labour of the first four Law Commissions.
 In the aftermath of the Revolt of 1857, the British Crown formally took control of India and made her a

British colony under Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858. This gave a strong boost to the codification

of laws and it was civil procedure which was first off the mark. Although the Indian Penal Code, often

considered to be a crowning achievement in law making had been in the works since 1837, but came to

be enacted as law only in 1860.

The 1st Code of 1859:

 Before 1859, the law of Civil Procedure was in a chaotic condition. Not only was there no uniform law

of Civil Procedure applicable to the whole of the country, but in the same area different systems of

procedure prevailed. For example, in Bengal alone there were as many as nine systems of procedure

simultaneously in force.

 The first effort in the direction of evolving a uniform procedure was made when Sir Charles Wood, then

President of the Board for the Affairs of India, directed the Second Law Commission to address

themselves to the preparation of “a Code of simple and uniform procedure” applicable to all the courts.

 The Commission prepared four draft Codes of procedure, which were intended to apply to ordinary civil

courts of the lower provinces of Bengal, the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay and the North-Western
 Provinces. The four Bills based on these drafts were ultimately amalgamated and enacted as the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1859.

 The Code of 1859, however, failed to serve its intended purpose as it was made applicable only to

Mofussil Courts. The 1859 Code was not applicable to the Supreme Courts in the Presidency Towns and

to the Presidency Small Cause Courts.

 The procedure of the Supreme Courts was under their own rules, orders and certain Acts, for example

Act 17 of 1852 and Act 6 of 1854. By the High Courts Act of 1861 the Supreme Courts and the Courts

of Sadar Diwani Adalat in the Presidency towns were abolished in 1862, and the powers of those courts

were vested in the chartered High Courts.

 The Letters Patent of 1862 establishing the High Courts extended to them the procedure of the Code of

Civil Procedure 1859 in the exercise of their civil, intestate, testamentary and matrimonial jurisdiction.
 The new Letters Patent of 1865, however, modified this position, and empowered the High Courts to

make their own rules and orders for regulating civil proceedings. At the same time, it imposed a duty on

them to be guided by the provisions of the Code of 1859, as amended from time to time. The following

amendments were made to the Code of 1859:

Act 4 of 1860; Act 43 of 1860; Act 23 of 1861; Act 9 of 1863; Act 20 of 1867; Act 7 of 1870;

Act 14 of 1870; Act 9 of 1871; Act 32 of 1871; and Act 7 of 1872.

 The Civil Procedure Code of 1859 was divided into 12 Chapters and contained 388 Sections. It was soon

found to be “ill-drawn, ill-arranged and incomplete”.

 The operation of the 1859 Code had thrown up numerous challenges, therefore rather than amending the

1859 Code, it was thought prudent to enact a new Code which could deal with civil procedure more

comprehensively.
The 2nd Code of 1877:

 In 1863-64, a comprehensive Bill was prepared by Mr. Heway Harrington (later Sir Heway Harrington)

to replace the Code of 1859. But, for some reason, the enactment of the Bill into law was deferred. In

the meantime, Acts dealing with specific branches of law were enacted, and these necessitated

corresponding changes in the Code.

 The work of revision was taken up seriously when Dr. Whitley Stokes, at that time Secretary to the

Government of India in the Legislative Department, was permitted by a Law Member to recast the draft

Bill prepared by Mr. Harrington.

 Dr. Whitley Stokes rearranged the provisions of the Code of 1859 in a systematic manner. He introduced

a number of new provisions based on orders and rules made in England under the Judicature Acts. He

also borrowed some provisions of the New York Civil Code.

 Sir Arthur Hobhouse (later Lord Hobhouse), who was then Law Member, made substantial contribution

to the draft Bill. With certain modifications, the bill was enacted as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877.

The Code of 1877 was twice in volume compared to the Code of 1859. It contained 652 Sections.
The 3rd Code of 1882:

 Soon after the enactment of the Code of 1877, it was realized that the new Code required several

amendments. Despite being well-intentioned and an exceptionally detailed law, the 1877 Code had a

short-lived existence of about 5 years.

 In 1879, as many as 130 Sections of the Code were amended. It was then decided, that the code should

be completely re-cast. Further amendments were proposed in 1882.

 It was in these circumstances that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 was enacted. The 1882 Code was

once again a gargantuan legislation containing over 650 Sections.

The 4th & Final Code of 1908:

 Experience of a quarter of a century of the working of the Code of 1882 showed that the general lines

on which it proceeded were sound.

 It was, however, discovered, that in respect of some matters the provisions of the Code were too rigid to

sufficiently meet the varying needs of different areas of the country. Moreover, there was some conflict

of judicial opinion on the interpretation of some provisions of the Code.

 To remedy these and other defects, a comprehensive revision of the Code was undertaken in the first

decade of the 20th Century. The revision was undertaken by a Select Committee, which collected valuable

material on the subject and prepared a draft Bill.

 A Special Committee chaired by Sir Erle Richards, which included as members Dr. Rashbehary Ghose,

Francis Maclean, Lawrence Jenkins and Stanley Ismay, examined the Bill carefully.
 The Special Committee recognized that every Code so far was beset with problems because they were

not dynamic laws and could not quickly respond to the ever-changing nature of the controversies that

arose in civil trials.

 Every time problems arose, the courts would flag them and everyone would then have to wait for the

Legislature to respond and make necessary changes.

 Further the sheer size of each Code showed that the procedure governing civil trial was extraordinarily

intricate. But despite their size, these laws could not always cover every contingency and eventuality.

 The Committee realized that it was necessary to create a system in which civil procedural laws could

quickly adapt to the new challenges that it faced. If this were not done, then each Code would in a matter
 of years become unworkable, if not obsolete. So the framework devised by the Special Committee was

that the CPC must contain two broad heads.

 The Special Committee rearranged all the provisions of the Code into two parts –

I. “the body of the Code”; and

II. “the Schedule”

 In the proposed revised Code the provisions pertaining to details of procedure and other matters of minor

character were relegated to rules contained in a Schedule.

 The object of the re-arrangement was to separate the fundamental and basic provisions, which could not

be amended except by the legislative process, from the comparatively minor and detailed provisions in

respect of which it was desirable to provide a “more elastic and speedy machinery for modification

than the tardy process of legislation.”

Sir Erle Richards, Law Member, while moving for leave to introduce the Bill which ultimately became the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, observed that:

“They (the Special Committee) do not desire to do away with uniformity in the main
principles…….But they think that, with due regard to those considerations, it is possible to confer a power
to change the less important provisions of the Code in order that defects in them can be remedied at once
as they are discovered and in order that in special circumstances the courts may have power to simplify our
legal machinery and to make it more adapted to the wants of less advanced communities.”

 It was accordingly proposed, that the new Code should empower the High Courts to make rules for

regulating their own procedure and the procedure of subordinate courts and to modify the rules contained

in the first Schedule to the Code. Provision was also made for a Rules Committee to report to the High

Court on all proposals for making new rules or modifying the existing rules.
 The Special Committee recommended that all those matters which were purely procedural in nature

should be contained in a separate head of the Code. These procedural rules would come to be enumerated

in the First Schedule.

 The Special Committee’s Report dated August 31, 1907 was accompanied with a draft of the new Code.

The Bill, as settled by the Special Committee, was enacted as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, without

any substantial modifications.

 It was published in the Gazette of India on September 7, 1907. The CPC, 1908 became a law in March

1908 and on January 1, 1909, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 came into force in India.

 The Code of 1908 is a product of well-thought out efforts and experimentation extending over more than

half a century. The Code has stood the test of time. It has on the whole worked satisfactorily and smoothly

and has evoked the admiration of many distinguished authorities.

Justice M.C. Chagla while he was Chief Justice of Bombay High Court had observed that:-

“The more you study the Civil Procedure Code the more you realize what an admirable piece of

legislation it is.”
NECESSITY OF THE RULES:

We may take a couple of instances to understand this separation of Sections and Orders with Rules:

 In the present CPC, only one statutory provision i.e., Section 26 deals with how a suit must be instituted.

But the particulars of what a plaint must contain, who can be arrayed as co-plaintiffs, defendants, the

kinds of claims that can be raised in a suit are dealt with in Orders I, II, IV and Rules thereunder.

 Then again, in Part II of the CPC, execution of decrees is dealt with in around 30 Sections, however, the

details of the procedure for executing a decree are contained in Order XXI which contains over a 100

Rules. Order XXI Could virtually be a legislation in itself.

 It is therefore not surprising that the statutory principle provisions in the 1908 CPC are heavily

outnumbered by the Orders & Rules that have been framed to implement these provisions.
POWER OF HIGH COURTS TO AMEND THE RULES:

 With regard to the amendment of the Rules of the Code, both the legislature as well as the High Courts

have been given concurrent powers. As the Special Committee observed, there was an urgent need to

ensure that as and when shortcomings in the functionality of the CPC came to light they were “remedied

as they are discovered without resort to the tardy process of legislation.”

 This was an innovative solution to an agonizing problem which had plagued the law of civil procedure

for almost half a century.

 The broad architecture of the law which governs important aspects of a civil suit such as:
(a) institution of a suit,
(b) appeals,
(c) rights of executing a decree, and
(d) injunctions
 are broadly dealt with in the legislative portion of the Code.

 However, the rules governing each of these aspects and how a civil court is to deal with them are

contained in the ‘Orders’ and ‘Rules’ in the First Schedule.

 This framework is a rare example of how the High Courts were conferred with the power to make laws

which would have legislative force.

 In the CPC of 1908, this framework is contained in Part X. Section 121 declares that the Rules contained

in the First Schedule of the CPC “shall have effect as if enacted in the body of the Code.”

 Immediately thereafter, Section 122 declares that High Courts possess two distinct powers when it

comes to the making of Rules:

 - Firstly, the High Courts can make their own Rules governing their own procedure as well of the courts

subordinate to such High Courts.

- Secondly, the High Courts are specifically empowered to make whatever changes they deem fit to the

Rules enumerated in the First Schedule, including framing new Rules altogether.

 However, there is also a degree of superintendence over how changes are made to the Rules, which is

what the Special Committees had recommended in its Report.

 A High Court must constitute a Committee with broad-based representation, which will frame the

proposed Rules (Sections 123, 124).

 And before the Rules can take effect, the government must grant its approval to the proposed Rules

(Section 126).
 Finally, when the new Rules are approved, after their publication in the Gazette, they take effect “as if

they had been contained in the First Schedule.” (Section 127).

An example from the High Court of Delhi will illustrate the farsightedness of the CPC.

 In December of 2011, the High Court, acting under Section 122, notified that a new Order XX-B must

be inserted after Order XX-A. This new Order XX-B pertained to the “Recognition of Electronically

Signed Orders, Judgments and Decrees.”

 The two Rules contained in Order XX-B stipulated that an e-signature of a judge of a High Court on any

order, judgment or decree will be treated as if it has been physically signed by the judge themselves

(Rule 1) and that such a decision which carried the e-signature of the judge shall be treated as a certified

copy for the purposes of filing any proceedings against such a decision (Rule 2).

 This new Order XX-B was a step towards ensuring that litigants did not lose out on their rights merely

because the decision of the High Court of Delhi carried an e-signature of the judge.
 Now imagine there was no Section 122 and the High Court wanted to treat decisions carrying the e-

signature of the judge on par with a decision which was physically signed. The High Court would not

have been able to do so, for this measure would have had to await a legislative amendment. But the

unique scheme of the CPC of 1908 made this possible. This is just one of several examples of how High

Courts have responded to the new demands and challenges which arise in a civil trial.

 It is this design of the CPC – of granting High Courts equal powers in changing the ‘Rules’ of civil

procedure whenever it was necessary to do so – that has ensured that the 1908 CPC endured. And this is

borne out by one fact alone: since 1908, there has never been the need of enacting yet another Code of

Civil Procedure.
SCHEME OF THE CODE:

As discussed above the Code has been divided into two parts:

(i) the “Body of the Code” comprising of 158 Sections which lay down the general principles of

jurisdiction; and

(ii) the First Schedule, containing 51 Orders with Rules (numbered in Roman numerals from I to LI)

and Appendices which contain Model Forms of Pleadings, Processes, Decrees, Appeals, Execution

Proceedings, Supplemental Proceedings, Appeal, Reference, Review and Miscellaneous.

ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS & ORDERS:

Sl. Section / Orders Subject Matter/Provisions

No.
1. Sections 1 to 8: Preliminary in nature.

Section 1 provides for commencement and applicability of the

Code.

Section 2 provides definitions of important terms used in the

Code.

Sections 3 to 8 deal with constitution of different types of courts

and their jurisdiction.

2. Part I Deal with suits.

Sections 9 to 35-B Section 9 enacts that a civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits

& of a civil nature unless they are barred expressly or impliedly.

Corresponding
Section 10 provides for stay of suit i.e. Res Sub Judice.
Orders I to XX

Section 11 deals with the well-known doctrine of Res Judicata

i.e. matter once adjudicated, cannot be re-adjudicated.

Sections 13 and 14 relate to Foreign Judgments.

Sections 15 to 21-A Regulate the place of suing.

They lay down provisions as to jurisdiction of courts and

objections as to jurisdiction.
Sections 22 to 25 Make provisions for transfer and withdrawal of suits, appeals

and other proceedings from one court to another.

Section 26 Deal with institution and frame of suits, parties to suit and

& recognized agents and pleaders.

Orders I to IV

Sections 27 to 32 Contains provisions as to issue and service of summons.

&

Order V

Order VI Deals with Pleadings.

Orders VII & VIII Relate to Plaints, Written Statements, Set-Offs and Counter

Claims.
Order IX Requires parties to the suit to appear before the court and

enumerates the consequences of non-appearance.

It also provides the remedy for setting aside an order of

dismissal of the suit of the Plaintiff and of setting aside an ex

parte decree against a Defendant.

Order X Enjoins the Court to examine parties with a view to

ascertaining matters in controversy in the suit.

Orders XI & XII Deal with Discovery & Inspection of Documents.

Order XII Admissions by parties

Order XIII Production, Impounding & Return of Documents

Order XIV Requires the Court to Frame Issues.

Order XV Enables the Court to pronounce judgment at the “first

hearing” in certain cases.

Orders XVI to XVIII Contain provisions for Summoning, Attendance and

Examination of Witnesses and Adjournments.

Order XIX Empowers the Court to make an Order or to prove facts on the

basis of an affidavit of a party.

Section 33 & Order Deal with Judgments & Decrees.

XX

Section 34 Makes provision for interest.

Sections 35, 35-A, 35- Deal with Costs.

B & Order XX-A

3. PART II Cover Execution Proceedings. The principles governing

Sections 36 to 74 execution of decrees and orders are dealt with in Sections 36 to

& 74 and Order XXI is the longest Order containing 106 Rules

Corresponding

Order XXI

4. PART III Make provisions as to issue of Commissions.

Sections 75 to 78

&

Corresponding

Order XXVI
5. PART IV & V Lay down procedure for suits in special cases; such as suits by

Sections 79 to 93 or against Government or Public Officers; suits by or against

& aliens, foreign rulers, ambassadors and envoys; suits by or

Corresponding against soldiers, sailors and airmen; suits by or against

Orders XXVII to corporations; summary suits, etc.

XXXVII

6. PART VI Supplemental Proceedings - Provides for arrest of defendant

Sections 94-95 and attachment before judgment.

& Procedure for issuing temporary injunction and passing

Corresponding interlocutory orders.

Orders 38 - 40 Appointment of Receivers.

7. Part VII & VIII Contain detailed provisions for Appeals, Reference, Review

Sections 96 to 115 and Revision.

&

Corresponding

Orders 41 to 47

8. Part IX Special Provisions Relating to High Courts

Sections 116 to 120

9. Part X Enables High Courts to frame rules for regulating their own

Sections 121 to 131 procedure and the procedure of civil courts subordinate to the

High Court.

10. Part XI Miscellaneous Proceedings.

Sections 132 to 158

THANK YOU

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