STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FRANCE, THE

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND

NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE
2015 TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
REVIEW CONFERENCE

1. As Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),

the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America
reaffirm our enduring commitment to the NPT, which remains indispensable to
the maintenance of international peace and security. For forty-five years, the
NPT has served as the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation
regime, a conduit for expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy amongst
Parties to the Treaty, and the foundation for the collective pursuit of nuclear
disarmament.

2. Every NPT State Party benefits from a strong and effective NPT regime and
each can contribute to its implementation by helping to prevent proliferation,
foster the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and
create conditions conducive to nuclear disarmament. The purposes for which the
NPT was established remain valid and continue to unite efforts to address
current nuclear challenges. We look forward to joining with all States Parties in
pursuit of common goals and pledge our strongest efforts toward a successful
outcome at this ninth NPT Review Conference (RevCon).

3. We are committed to strengthening each of the NPT’s mutually reinforcing

pillars – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
These are complementary goals and should be pursued together, systematically
and with equal determination across all three pillars by all States Parties. The
consensus Action Plan from the 2010 RevCon was unprecedented and a result
of the strengthened NPT review process adopted in 1995. We support the fullest
implementation of all Action Plan recommendations and we call on all States
Parties to continue working toward that end. The 2015 RevCon presents the
opportunity to reaffirm that the Action Plan remains valid as a road-map, to take
stock of its implementation, and to consider where consensus may be possible
for further measures building upon the 2010 Action Plan.

4. As NPT nuclear-weapon States, we reaffirm the shared goal of nuclear

disarmament and general and complete disarmament as referenced in the
preamble and provided for in Article VI of the NPT. In this regard, we remain
steadfast in our commitment to seeking a safer world for all and achieving a
world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT. We
continue to pursue progressive and concrete steps towards this end, including
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the relevant recommendations of the Action Plan, in a way that promotes
international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of
increased and undiminished security for all. We continue to believe that an
incremental, step-by-step approach is the only practical option for making
progress towards nuclear disarmament, while upholding global strategic security
and stability. This goal is what motivates our concerted efforts to pursue
practical steps toward nuclear disarmament. All States can help fulfill this goal
by creating the necessary security environment through resolving regional
tensions, tackling proliferation challenges, promoting collective security, and
making progress in all areas of disarmament.

5. As detailed in our respective national reports to the 2015 Review Conference,

there has been very substantial progress on Article VI. The Cold War nuclear
arms race has ended. Global stocks of nuclear weapons are at their lowest point
in over half a century as the result of unprecedented efforts on the part of the
nuclear-weapon States. When fully implemented, the New START Treaty will
result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the United States
and Russia since the 1950s.

6. We underline the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear

disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and Action 3 of the 2010
Action Plan in a manner that promotes international stability and security. We
stress that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require
taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. We also
stress the importance of engaging in frank and constructive dialogue to that end,
and confirm our readiness to do so. While we continue to work towards our
common goal of nuclear disarmament, we affirm that our nuclear forces should
be maintained at the lowest levels needed to meet national security
requirements. We further reaffirm the importance of full compliance with existing,
legally-binding arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and
obligations as an essential element of international peace and security.

7. We are ever cognizant of the severe consequences that would accompany the
use of nuclear weapons. We affirm our resolve to prevent such an occurrence
from happening. We each give the highest priority to ensuring the safety,
security, and effective control over nuclear weapons, and we each implement
technical and procedural measures in this area that we continually assess and
improve. We further affirm that we do not target any state with nuclear weapons.
We note the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national
security strategies. We will continue to pursue dialogue and cooperation in
support of such efforts as appropriate.

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8. Since the UK initiated the P5 process in 2009, we have held six conferences to
foster dialogue, transparency and common approaches to strengthening the
NPT. France plans to host the seventh conference. Each conference has built
on the last and helps lay the groundwork for further steps. We continue to
implement Action 5 of the Action Plan to “further enhance transparency and
increase mutual confidence” through P5 dialogue and action. In this regard, we
agreed on a common reporting framework in 2014 under France’s leadership and
completed a first edition of a Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms under China’s
leadership. This edition will be released during the Review Conference and a
side event will be held to introduce our efforts in this regard. The P5 intend to
revise and update the Glossary as appropriate in due course. Also in this regard,
we have increased our engagement with the wider disarmament community,
including by meeting with non-nuclear weapon states as part of the most recent
P5 Conference in London and continuing P5 engagement with civil society.

9. Our commitment to nuclear disarmament extends to efforts to bring the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force at an early date. We
look forward to the 9th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the
CTBT to be held in September in New York. We urge all states that have not
done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible to bring about its entry
into force. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our own moratoria on nuclear
weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the CTBT’s
entry into force, and call on other states to do likewise. The CTBT constrains the
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and thereby
provides an effective disarmament and nonproliferation measure. We further
note that nuclear stockpile maintenance programs are and will remain consistent
with NPT obligations. We emphasize the very substantial efforts made in
achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race as called for in Article VI of the
NPT and affirm our intention never to resume such an arms race.

10. We are working closely with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT
Organization in Vienna on the development of the Treaty’s verification regime,
including its International Monitoring System, International Data Centre, and On-
Site Inspection. Since the 2010 Review Conference, we have contributed
extensively to the development of the Treaty’s on-site inspection element,
supplying personnel, equipment, and research. This has been in addition to our
long standing efforts to reinforce the organization’s detection capability through
contributions in-kind and expert participation in Working Groups. Against this
backdrop, we welcome the highly successful Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan
late last year. We also call for all signatories to support efforts to complete the
necessary preparation for the effective implementation of the CTBT’s verification
regime on its entry into force. In this regard, we recall our joint statement, issued
following the 2015 P5 London Conference, on minimizing the impact of medical
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isotope production on the global radioactive monitoring activity, while recognizing
that medical isotope production is critically important.

11. In keeping with the Action Plan, we reaffirm our support and readiness
immediately to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (FMCT)) in the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of CD/1299 and
the mandate contained therein, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive
and balanced Program of Work. We welcome the in-depth discussions that took
place in 2014 in the CD in the framework of the Schedule of Activities. We
welcome the efforts undertaken by the UN Group of Governmental Experts
established pursuant to UNGA Resolution 67/53 and commend the final report
adopted by consensus. We are convinced that this report will facilitate future
negotiations in the CD.

12. We are cognizant of the role security assurances play in strengthening the
NPT regime. We reaffirm our commitment to existing security assurances
regarding the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons and recall our statements
on negative and positive security assurances as noted in UNSCR 984, and as
revised since then. We stand ready to engage in substantive discussions on
security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament, within the context of an
agreed, comprehensive and balanced Program of Work. We also continue to
regard protocols to existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone treaties as an
appropriate mechanism for providing legally binding negative security
assurances. We welcome the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Central
Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) in May 2014 and its ratification by
China, France, Russia, and the UK. We note that consultations also continue
with the State Parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
(SEANWFZ) Treaty and encourage the Parties to that Treaty to continue to
engage constructively in order to find solutions to outstanding issues. We remain
ready to sign the SEANWFZ Protocol.

13. We continue to reiterate the importance of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle
East and the progress made on this issue at the 2010 RevCon. We commend
the efforts of the conference facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, and note the efforts
of the co-conveners to advance consultations among regional states, particularly
the five rounds of consultations held among the parties, so that the Helsinki
conference on a Middle East WMD free zone can be held at the soonest possible
time. We also commend the contribution of regional States who demonstrated a
constructive approach and readiness for certain compromises. We look forward
to the convening of this conference once the states of the region reach
consensus on an agenda and related arrangements. We affirm our commitment
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to work with all states of the region and other relevant partners to advance this
important action, which would be a concrete step toward realization of the 1995
Middle East Resolution.

14. While realizing all of the objectives of Article VI of the NPT, we reaffirm that
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery,
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. We reiterate our call for
further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security. We
urge all countries which have yet to do so to ratify or accede to, and implement
the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention.

15. The 2010 Action Plan underlines the importance of compliance with
nonproliferation obligations in order to uphold the integrity of the NPT and the
authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system.
We reaffirm that all States Parties must ensure strict compliance with their
nonproliferation obligations under the NPT. We remain deeply concerned by the
challenge that non-compliance by States Parties poses to the integrity of the NPT
and emphasize the importance of bringing it to the attention of the UN Security
Council, which will determine if a situation constitutes a threat to international
peace and security. We emphasize the Security Council’s primary responsibility
in addressing such threats. We continue to call for prompt and diplomatic
solutions to challenges to the non-proliferation regime.

16. We welcome the fact that the P5+1 and Iran have reached solutions on key
parameters on 2 April in Lausanne, Switzerland laying the agreed basis for the
final text, and we highlight our continued commitment to complete successfully
negotiations by 30 June on a comprehensive settlement that would ensure the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s program. Regarding the interaction between
the IAEA and Iran, we note the continuing need for full cooperation in order to
resolve all outstanding issues, including those related to possible military
dimensions. We welcome Iran’s continuing implementation of its nuclear-related
commitments under the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and the essential role the
IAEA is playing in verifying them. Accordingly, we pledge to continue to
implement our commitments under the JPOA.

17. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of the 2005 Joint
Statement of the Six-Party Talks and call on the DPRK to do the same. We urge
the DPRK to respond to diplomatic efforts aimed at the eventual resumption of
the Six-Party Talks, and achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

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18. We underscore our support for actions to sustain and strengthen IAEA
safeguards, which remain of fundamental importance to the NPT. We recognize
that IAEA safeguards not only prevent nuclear proliferation but also facilitate
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We reiterate that the
Additional Protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement,
should become the universally recognized standard for international verification
of safeguards obligations under the NPT. As stated in the 2010 Action Plan, we
call on all States that have not yet done so to bring into force IAEA safeguards
agreements in accordance with Article III of the Treaty, as well as Additional
Protocols and updated Small Quantities Protocols where applicable at an early
date. We have each brought into force a voluntary offer safeguards agreement
with an Additional Protocol applying to peaceful nuclear activities as a
demonstration of our readiness to accept safeguards on civilian nuclear activities
like those in place for non-nuclear-weapon states. We remain prepared to assist
any state requesting help in the implementation of its safeguards agreements,
including the Additional Protocol, in particular through our national support
programs to IAEA safeguards. We further stress the importance of maintaining
the credibility, effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of the IAEA safeguards
system and support efforts aimed at improving them further.

19. We recognize the substantial contributions made by the IAEA in support of

the NPT and urge all States Parties to provide their full support to the IAEA,
including by ensuring the Agency has sufficient resources to meet its
responsibilities.

20. We reaffirm the right of NPT Parties to pursue peaceful use of nuclear energy
without discrimination and in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations.
We are committed to continuing to broaden access of NPT Parties to peaceful
uses of nuclear energy in ways that respect the highest nuclear safety, security,
and nonproliferation standards. Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
substantially contributes to the sustainable development of humanity. When used
in consistency with the highest standards of safety, security, and non-
proliferation, nuclear energy promotes economic development of states and
represents an important element of the world energy mix that provides energy
security, addresses the challenges of climate change, and ensures vital non-
power applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture, water resources
management and industry. We note our long tradition of support for international
cooperation on peaceful uses, both bilaterally and internationally, including the
IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program and Peaceful Uses Initiative, the IAEA’s
International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, and the
International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation.

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21. We strongly support measures to assure access to nuclear fuel, such as the
IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Reserve in the Russian Federation, the American
Assured Fuel Supply, and the UK Assurance of Supply of Enrichment Services.
We note the importance of establishing the IAEA low-enriched uranium (LEU)
bank. These contributions promote achievement of sustainable development and
energy security goals and benefit all NPT States Parties.

22. We reaffirm our support of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger
Committee. These two international export control mechanisms play an
important role by providing the assurance that nuclear suppliers need to facilitate
the greatest possible exchange of nuclear material, equipment, and technology
for peaceful purposes. It is essential that export control lists and guidelines are
kept up-to-date, taking into account the evolution of nuclear technology and
nuclear proliferation developments. We welcome the efforts of the NSG in this
regard. We encourage all States Parties to adopt export control guidelines and
reiterate our readiness to provide assistance as States Parties may request.

23. Nuclear safety and security are critical to the future of nuclear energy. We
reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of states in accordance with their
respective obligations and the central role of the IAEA in international
cooperation in these fields. We welcome the efforts to draw lessons from the
tragic Fukushima accident, offer our full support to implementation of the IAEA’s
Nuclear Safety Action Plan, and welcome the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear
Safety, adopted 9 February 2015. We further recognize the substantial efforts
undertaken to improve nuclear security, including through the Nuclear Security
Summits held in Washington in 2010, in Seoul in 2012, and in The Hague in
2014, and the upcoming 2016 Summit to be hosted by the United States, as well
as the IAEA Ministerial Conference for Nuclear Security in 2013 and the
upcoming IAEA Ministerial Conference for Nuclear Security in 2016. We also
welcome the contribution made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism within its respective mandate and membership. These efforts have
served to accelerate work to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism and to
provide further impetus to efforts by states and the relevant international
institutions and organizations to strengthen nuclear security worldwide. In
particular, we underline the need for universal support for the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as well as the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the entry into
force as soon as possible of the 2005 Amendment thereto. We stress the
importance of a culture of nuclear safety and nuclear security, both for States
Parties with established nuclear energy programs and those developing nuclear
energy programs, and encourage universal support for all relevant international
conventions, institutions, and organizations. We underline the need to
strengthen and optimize international cooperation, in coordination with the IAEA,
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to better meet the growing needs in capacity building, in particular to train the
necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

24. While States Parties have the right to withdraw from the NPT, such a
withdrawal must be done in accordance with Article X of the Treaty. States
Parties should support recommendations to prevent abuse of the NPT withdrawal
provision. We note in this regard the role of the UN Security Council in
addressing without delay any state’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, and
recall that a state remains responsible under international law for violations of the
NPT committed prior to its withdrawal, and such withdrawal would not affect any
other legal obligation of the withdrawing state to other States Parties. At the
same time, we are convinced that any decision taken by this Conference in
relation to withdrawal from the NPT should not lead to the revision of Article X,
re-open the text of the Treaty, or undermine the commonly recognized principles
and norms of international law. P5 have agreed to make efforts to broaden
consensus among NPT State Parties on issues of procedures and consequences
of withdrawal at the 2015 RevCon.

25. We attach great importance to achieving the universality of the NPT. We

urge those States that are not Parties to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-
weapon States and pending accession to the NPT, to adhere to its terms. We
stand ready to work with Parties to engage the non-Parties with a view to
achieving this goal.

26. As we rededicate ourselves to the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing
pillars – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
– we also pledge our support for efforts to ensure the Review Conference builds
on the success of the 2010 Action Plan and encourages further cooperation on
steps to strengthen all three pillars of the NPT.