Review
Reviewed Work(s): Bangsa and Umma: Development of People-grouping Concepts in
Islamized Southeast Asia by Yamamoto Hiroyuki
Review by: Abu Talib Ahmad
Source: Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society , June 2012, Vol.
85, No. 1 (302) (June 2012), pp. 118-122
Published by: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24894139
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BOOK REVIEWS
Bangsa and Umma: Development of People-grouping
Concepts in Islamized Southeast Asia
YAMAMOTO HlROYUKI et al. (eds)
Kyoto/Melbourne: Kyoto University Press/Trans Pacific Press, 2011. 279 pp. ISBN-10:
1920901523
The book is a collection of essays based on workshops and a symposium in 2007
held at three Japanese universities, organized by the Islamic Area Studies, Local
Cultures in the Malay World Study Group, Jawi Study Group and the Joint Study
Group on Social Order and Relations in Muslim Populated Southeast Asia. Six of
the nine contributors are Japanese, with the remaining three from Australia, the
US and Malaysia.
Bangsa is the Malay word for race, while the Arabic nmma (umat) refers to the
Muslim brotherhood. The book examines people-grouping concepts—how people
classify others/themselves and how people react to these classifications. The focus
is on the concept of race and ethnicity (bangsa), while nationality is treated as one
of the many people-grouping concepts found in the Malay world. For bangsa and
umma the idea of civilization is crucial to the groupings, as are the ideas of equality
and homogeneity among members. The book is divided into three parts: Part 1
deals with Melayu and Jaivi, two inclusive people-grouping concepts during the
pre-colonial period; Part 2 deals with the substantiation of bangsa Melayu and how
it changed during colonial rule and thereafter to become more exclusive; Part 3
customizes bangsa with umma in regions beyond the Malay states like Sabah, Aceh
and Mindanao. Each section is composed of three essays, while a short introduc
tion, weaving all three parts (and the nine essays) together, is useful to the general
reader.
The concept of bangsa Melayu has become a subject of considerable debate in
recent years. In Chapter 1 Anthony Milner revisits some of the debated issues.
According to Milner, before the advent of colonial rule there were a number of
people-grouping concepts in the Malay world, including the people-grouping
concepts of bangsa Melayu, kerajaan, Jawa which convey a sense of religious
community and of the community of the 'people beneath the wind'. These
concepts, in particular bangsa Melayu — closely associated with the Melaka
sultanate—convey a sense of a particular civilization that was not restrictive and
incorporated other bangsa, notably the Javanese. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the more restrictive concept of Melayu emerged from definitions con
cocted by Europeans based on their ideas of race. By the late eighteenth century
Melayu began to appear in European scholarly writings, notably through Raffles
in the early nineteenth century. However, the European-derived idea of race,
according to Milner, was transformed with emphasis on common descent down
played and the capacity of bangsa Melayu to absorb others highlighted even after
1963.
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BANGSAAND UMMA
Equally significant are the views of the Malays on the issue. To Abdulla
Munshi (mid-nineteenth century) or Mohd Eunos Abdullah (early twentiet
century), the concept of bangsa Melayu was in sharp contrast with the kerajaan
ruler. Eunos saw the ruler as grounded in the adat, which is the property of t
bangsa. Increasingly, Islam has become a pillar of Malayness, as indicated by th
wide usage of umat Islam which has become an alternative people-grouping
concept. As in the past, Milner believes bangsa Melayu has the potential to
reformulated again in the future.
In Chapter 2 Michael Laffan discusses jawi, another important concept which
refers to some form of linguistic and religious unity among peoples of the Islamized
world. Its origin remains obscure, but the term began to appear in thirteenth
century Arab sources. By the fourteenth century there were individuals who wer
described as connected to the Jawi, which refers to the Malay world, although i
Southeast Asia the term ]awi is associated with Islamic culture, especially throug
the use of the Arabic scripts. In the sixteenth century Hamzah Fansuri chose baha
Jawi as the medium for his writing as it was more widely understood than Arab
or Persian. By the seventeenth century there were variants of the Jawi languag
with Pasai and Aceh representing a plurality of people who embraced the Jawi
ecumene. The Jawi identity ended with the Dutch and English who began to impo
their own categories although the Jawi communality expanded further into th
hinterland along with Islam. At present the Jawi ecumene still exists as a distinc
civilization component of the Muslim world although its precise form, accordi
to Laffan, defies categorization.
In Chapter 3 Nishio Kanji discusses statecraft in the port polities of Johor-Ria
and Riau-Lingga and the people-grouping concept among the Malays and Bugis.
In these polities the peranakan (offspring of Bugis-Malay marriages) catego
became a matter of concern. The Malay-Bugis Oath of Loyalty emphasized t
ethnic division of power sharing and co-operation between Malays and Bugis, y
at the same time the ethnic boundary was rigidly maintained. Despite havin
Malay blood, Bugis luminaries like Raja Haji did not claim themselves as Malays.
Instead, they described themselves as peranakan Bugis. Apparently, a shift in ethn
identity was a contemporary sensitive issue.
In Chapter 4 Tsuboi Yuji looks at how colonial rule nurtured the concept of
bangsa through the interactions between the government and local society, focusi
on the post of penghulu. Through British policy and practice the term bangsa w
gradually adopted into the colonial administration and local society. The commu
nity framework was important to British colonial officials, and the concept of bangsa
was developed along this approach. In Selangor during the late nineteenth centur
the post of penghulu was opened to all natives, which included Malays from othe
parts of the peninsula, Borneo and Sumatra. These natives were regarded as bang
by the British and by themselves. However, by the early twentieth century ther
was a significant change when native headmen became Malay officers to represen
the whole of the Malay race. In each mukim the official framework of Malays sup
seded that of the bangsa.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Shinozaki Kaori, in Chapter 5, looks at how the Chinese in the Straits Set
ments reproduced their own Chinese identity. The discussion focuses on the
troversy over queue-cutting among the Chinese in Singapore in the late ninetee
century and in Penang between 1903-11. The essay highlights the role of loc
environments, notably the inclusive nature of bangsa Melayu, which had a bea
on these polemics. The essay shows that in queue-cutting the sense of civiliz
is inseparable froom kinship. To the Chinese the destruction of civilization wo
lead to the destruction of the family and the severance of ties with ancestors. Bein
Chinese had its attendant socio-political benefits which the Straits Chinese w
unwilling to forgo in an increasingly challenging time.
In Chapter 6 Ariffin Omar analyses Malaysia's struggles in promoting natio
unity since 1948. National unity in Malaysia has been beset with problems, not
the differing views among Malays and non-Malays on what constituted Mala
nationality before and after 1942. The Malayan Union forced the Malays to l
into the future political and social development of the Malay states. Yet its re
ment, the Federation of Malaya of 1948, did not bring about a sense of nation
nor of belonging to the various ethnic groups. Instead, it only ensured M
dominance and its acceptance by the non-Malays. The issue remained a m
stumbling block in the formation of a common nationality. Malay dominance
tinued to be safeguarded in the 1957 constitution which was agreed to by the M
and MIC through the famous 'social contract' or socio-political exchange. Never
less, the average Malay and non-Malay entertained contrasting perceptions of
socio-political exchange. After 1963 Singapore chose to reject or to ignore this
accompli. Malaysia as a nation remains a contested perception among Malaysi
In that sense Ariffin sees the May 1969 riots as stemming from the different perc
tions or lack of agreement on the essence of the Malaysian nation-state and a
tion of the socio-political exchange agreed among the Alliance partners.
In the post-1969 era efforts to achieve national unity remained problemat
In 1995 the bangsa Malaysia concept was promoted by the Mahathir administra
but its key elements—identification with the country, emphasis on the abilit
converse in Bahasa Malaysia and acceptance of the constitution—remain contes
As Ariffin has rightly noted, the issue boils down to this essential question: wheth
the Malay elites and the Malay masses are willing to discard special rights an
privileges as enshrined in the constitution.
Chapter 7 by Yamamoto Hiroyuki looks at Sabah where ethnicity, religion
nationality do not play significant roles within the state's social life, while
concept of bangsa was modified to suit the local situation. Sabah is divided i
three major population groups—the land people (Dusun, Murut and Kadazan),
sea people (Bajau and Malays) and the Chinese. Yet the peranakan cultu
important in Sabah nationalism in the sense that its main proponents w
Peranakans, while the high level of acculturation also contributes to the peran
characteristics within the local society. Yamamoto identifies two types of Sa
nationalism. The first is based on lineage as in the Kadazan nationalism of the
which was able to unite the land people. This type of nationalism was promote
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BANGSAAND UMMA
the peranakan Donald Stephens, who was the leader of the Kadazandusun and th
first chief minister of Sabah after it joined Malaysia. To leaders like Stephens,
Sabahan is a person who was born and brought up in Sabah and who also regard
Sabah as his home. K Bali (Teng Beng Chuan), a Peranakan from Kelantan
provided an ideological underpinning to this nationalism by connecting Sab
Malay as the common language while anak Sabah was equated with bangsa Sabah
or the Sabah nation. By 1961 the land people's nationalism was formalized with t
formation of the United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) which was led
Stephens.
Among the Muslims another strand of nationalism was nurtured by the
Muslim brotherhood and its local equivalent, the Sabah brotherhood. Under the
leadership of Datu Mustapha Harun—he was coalesced into USNO in 1961 —
USNO successfully wrested political control of the state. However, pan-Islamism
espoused by USNO put the party on a collision course with Kadazan nationalism.
The latter gained an upper hand in 1985 through the cooperation of the Tambunan
Kadazans and PBS, a party championing the rights and position of the Sabahans
even though Sabah's special position was well protected by the various protocols
that governed its entry into Malaysia.
At the grassroots level, however, the situation was different as the land and sea
people depended on each other for many aspects of their social life. This phenom
enon led to the emergence of a possible third nationalism as seen in popular mini
movies shown on television, notably those produced by local artists such as Abu
Bakar Ella. In his portrayal of the reality of Sabah, Abu Bakar downplayed the
differences in religion, ethnicity or nationality as these did not play a major role in
the social fabric of the people. Yamamoto himself appears to readily accept that it
is too early to see this 'Orang Kita' phenomenon as a possible third strand of Sabah
nationalism. However, it is evident that the preceding form of nationalism will not
fade away as lineage and region still play an important role in Sabah.
In Chapter 8 Nishi Yoshimi discusses the position of the bangsa Aceh within
the bangsa Indonesia as covered by the Law on Governing Aceh passed in 2006
(Law no. 11, 2006) as a part of the peace process in the post-tsunami period. This
law was included in the comprehensive solution to the Acehnese struggle for a
complete separation from Indonesia, its rejection of Javanese colonialism and for
control of Aceh's rich resources which has since 1976 been articulated through
GAM. The 2006 law allows Acehnese to utilize multiple channels to access their
local government in Aceh, Indonesian national politics and the international com
munity. This law provides for two types of Acehnese: orang Aceh who are defined
by their birth place and descent; and the penduduk Aceh who are residents of Aceh.
The law covers both the Javanese domiciled in Aceh and the Acehnese residing in
other parts of Indonesia. Clearly, Aceh has been accorded de facto bangsa status
within the framework of bangsa Indonesia.
The final chapter by Kawashima Midori focuses on the Maranao of Mindanao.
Her attention is directed towards a group of reformist Maranao ulama who were
trained in Cairo in the 1950s and 1960s. The study also pays attention to the group's
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BOOK REVIEWS
political thoughts which are identified as a possible source for a viable alternat
to armed revolutionary movements. Some elements of their political thoughts
similar to the post-nation-state concepts of citizenship—multilayered, inclusive
differentiated.
Originally, the term Moros referred to those who opposed the Spanish colonial
rule and Hispanicization. They were labelled by the colonialists as uncivilized. This
derogatory term was later re-appropriated and redefined by the Muslim radicals to
denote separate identity with their own history of having fought the West and the
Japanese. By the 1960s the term bangsa Moro came to denote the Muslims of
Mindanao.
To the Maranao, bangsa originally meant a group of people collectively sharing
a bloodline; it also represents a hierarchical and differentiated social order. The
concept underwent transformation during American colonial rule although its
earlier meaning was not lost. It was further transformed in the 1960s and 1970s by
Muslim intellectuals at the periphery of the nation-state and of the modern world
system who struggled to survive against external forces.
The 1960s and 1970s also saw the merger of those educated in Cairo and the
Middle East with those with secular education but exposed to the ideology of the
left in Manila. The Cairo-educated group, according to Kawashima, was impor
tant—their views of the existing situation in their society, how Islam should be
practised, how they themselves should cope with a larger nation-state and society
made up of non-Muslims and how they envisioned their society in the future. As
a group they advocated a two-front struggle—against foreign aggression and inte
nal threats. They were also influenced by Nasser's brand of Islamic socialism that
focused on the masses, i.e. a people-grouping concept not based on bloodline or
birth. In other words, they imagined themselves as people constituting an umma.
The book discusses the concept of bangsa, its transformation in the colonial
period and its co-existence with the umma in Islamized Southeast Asia. Another
central concept is peranakan; with its multi-culturalism, this concept has affected
the restructuring of the social order in the Islamized Southeast Asia. All studies are
backed by impeccable sources including archival records, manuscripts written in
local languages and oral sources. Some of these researches have been published in
Japanese; in fact the book seeks to introduce the Japanese scholars to a wider inte
national readership. The discussions are thought-provoking and pertinent to con
temporary Southeast Asia where the nation-building process is still being
negotiated. Overall, the book is a welcome addition to the literature on the Malay
world and is highly recommended to those interested in Southeast Asia.
UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA Abu Talib Ahmad
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