Moral Nihilism

1. Moral nihilism – The belief that there are no moral facts, truths, or knowledge.
2. Moderate nihilists – Those who argue that moral judgments express approval or disapproval
rather than describing facts.
3. Ethical naturalism – The view that moral facts can be reduced to natural facts, such as
interests, roles, and functions.
4. Moral facts – Statements about what is morally right or wrong.
5. Moral knowledge – Knowledge or understanding of moral truths.
6. Natural facts – Facts about the world that help explain observations, such as physical
characteristics.
7. Interests – Naturalistic aspects used to explain human behavior, particularly related to roles
and functions.
8. Reductionism – The approach of explaining complex phenomena by reducing them to their
simpler components, in this case, reducing moral facts to natural facts.
9. Utilitarian criterion – A principle in which moral decisions are based on maximizing the
satisfaction of interests.
10. Color facts – Used as an analogy to discuss how moral facts might be reduced to natural
facts, similar to how colors can be reduced to physical characteristics.
11. Observation – The process of seeing or experiencing something that might provide evidence
for moral or natural facts.
12. Hume's law (is-ought problem) – The idea that one cannot logically move from descriptive
statements (what is) to prescriptive statements (what ought to be).
13. Ethical relativism – The belief that morality varies from culture to culture, with no absolute
moral facts or truths.
14. Ethical objectivism – The belief that there are objective moral facts that are independent of
human beliefs or perceptions.
15. Open question argument – An argument against ethical naturalism which claims that any
naturalistic reduction leaves the question of "ought" open and unanswered.
16. Naturalistic fallacy – The error of trying to derive moral obligations from natural facts.
17. Ideal observer theory – A theory suggesting that moral facts could be determined by the
perceptions of an ideal, fully rational, and informed observer.
18. Definitional naturalism – The belief that moral judgments are definitionally equivalent to
natural judgments.
19. Redefinitional naturalism – The view that moral terminology is unclear and should be
replaced with better, more precise terminology.
20. Utilitarianism – A moral theory that suggests actions are morally right if they maximize
happiness or satisfaction of interests.
21. Room 306 example – A thought experiment used to discuss the application of utilitarian
principles in moral decision-making.
22. Moral views – Individual or cultural beliefs about what is morally right or wrong.
23. Moral sensibility – The ability to perceive or feel what is morally right or wrong.
24. Moral terminology – The specific words and concepts used in ethical discussions and moral
judgments.
25. Color perception analogy – An analogy comparing moral facts to color facts, showing how
complex reductions are involved in understanding each.
26. Moral observations – Perceptions or judgments about moral situations or actions.
27. Reduction of color facts – The process of explaining color perception by reducing it to
physical characteristics of objects, light properties, and perception.
28. Moral explanations – Explanations that attempt to justify or clarify why certain actions are
morally right or wrong.
29. Moral truths – Statements that are true about moral situations, independent of individual
beliefs.
30. Ethical facts – Another way of referring to moral facts, or statements that express what is
morally right or wrong.
31. Moral judgments – Assessments or evaluations of actions or behaviors as morally right or
wrong.
32. Extreme nihilism – The view that there are no moral facts at all, rejecting any pretense of
ethics.
33. Average American citizen (analogy) – An analogy used to explain how moral facts might
be reduced to simpler components, simin lar to how facts about an average citizen can be
reduced to facts about individual citizens.

Comprehensive Reviewer for Gilbert Harman's "The Basic

Problem with Ethics"
Overview of the Article
Gilbert Harman's "The Basic Problem with Ethics" addresses the complexity of moral
philosophy, particularly focusing on ethical naturalism and moral nihilism. Harman delves into
the issue of whether moral facts exist, the potential reduction of moral facts to natural facts, and
the challenges involved in such reductions. Throughout his exploration, he assesses the
arguments of both ethical naturalists and moral nihilists, presenting various critiques and
counterarguments regarding the viability of moral facts and judgments.

Introduction to the Basic Problem with Ethics

1. The Nature of Moral Judgments
- Harman introduces the key question in ethics: Do moral judgments describe moral facts, or do
they merely express attitudes?
- He draws a comparison between scientific observation and moral observation, emphasizing that
while science relies on empirical observations, it is unclear if moral judgments can be based on
observable facts.
- Ethical naturalism claims that moral judgments are factual and can be reduced to natural,
observable facts. In contrast, nihilists believe that moral judgments are not about facts but
express approval or disapproval.
2. Ethical Naturalism and the Challenge
- Harman explains that ethical naturalists argue moral judgments can be true if they describe
facts that can explain observations, like scientific facts do.
- He introduces the idea of reduction: ethical naturalism attempts to reduce moral facts to natural
facts in the same way that facts about color are reduced to physical properties of objects and the
perceptual apparatus of the observer.
- Harman criticizes this view, suggesting that moral judgments might not explain any
observations and, therefore, might not describe facts in the way scientific statements do.
3. The Reduction of Moral Facts
- Ethical naturalism, according to Harman, requires that moral facts be reducible to facts about
interests, roles, or functions. However, the reduction would be complex and difficult to specify.
- For example, if moral facts are reducible to interests (such as an individual's interest in
survival), it is unclear how moral judgments about justice or fairness fit into this framework.
- Harman suggests that while facts about color might be reducible to facts about light and
perception, the reduction of moral facts to natural facts is much less straightforward.
4. Nihilism vs. Ethical Naturalism
- Nihilists believe there are no moral facts, arguing that moral judgments only express subjective
approval or disapproval, not objective facts.
- Harman points out that the extreme nihilist argues that morality as a whole is false because it is
based on the belief that moral facts exist. Moderate nihilists, on the other hand, believe that
moral judgments do not describe facts but express attitudes or emotions.
5. The Challenge of Observation in Ethics
- One of Harman's central concerns is whether moral observations are similar to scientific
observations. He notes that moral observations (e.g., seeing something as wrong) do not seem to
help explain other observations.
- Unlike scientific facts, which help us understand and explain the natural world, moral facts
seem disconnected from observable reality. This raises the question of whether moral facts truly
exist or whether moral judgments are simply expressions of personal attitudes.

Further Exploration into Ethical Naturalism and Nihilism

4. The Open Question Argument
- Harman introduces the open question argument, which challenges ethical naturalism by
claiming that no matter how much we describe an act in natural terms, it will still be an open
question whether the act ought to be done.
- The argument suggests that ethical naturalism involves a naturalistic fallacy—that is, reducing
moral judgments to natural facts cannot capture the normative aspect of morality.
- Ethical naturalists may claim that moral facts can be reduced to natural facts, but moderate
nihilists argue that the question "Ought P to do D?" remains open, even after we describe the
natural characteristics of an act.
- Harman critiques this argument, suggesting that the open question might not always remain
open, depending on how well we can specify the relevant natural characteristics.
5. Definitional Naturalism
- Harman discusses a specific version of ethical naturalism called definitional naturalism, which
assumes that moral judgments are equivalent to natural judgments.
- The open question argument targets definitional naturalism, claiming that if it is always an open
question whether an act ought to be done, even when its natural characteristics are fully
described, then the naturalistic definition of morality must be incorrect.
- Harman draws a parallel between this and the scientific definition of water as H2O. He argues
that, just as the open question does not disprove the scientific definition of water, it does not
necessarily disprove ethical naturalism.
- However, he acknowledges that the open question argument is powerful against definitional
naturalists who claim that moral judgments are synonymous with natural judgments.
6. Redefinitional Naturalism
- A different kind of naturalism is redefinitional naturalism, which argues that our current moral
language is vague and incoherent, and that we should replace it with clearer and more precise
terminology.
- For example, redefinitional naturalists might propose defining "ought" as maximizing the
satisfaction of interests—a utilitarian criterion. Under this definition, actions should be evaluated
based on their ability to maximize overall satisfaction, even if this contradicts our ordinary moral
intuitions (e.g., cutting up a healthy patient to save others).
- Harman points out that while this approach offers a clearer definition, it does not capture our
ordinary moral notions, which are often complex and resistant to reduction.
7. The Problem with Ethics
- Harman concludes that ethics is problematic because we have not yet found a clear way to
reduce moral facts to natural facts.
- He explains that while there may be a naturalistic reduction for scientific facts (such as facts
about colors), it is not clear that moral facts can be reduced in the same way.
- Moreover, while facts about the average American citizen can be reduced to facts about
individual citizens, no such precise reduction seems possible for moral facts.
- Harman suggests that this lack of a clear reduction makes it problematic to assume that moral
facts exist in the same way that scientific or social facts do.
Key Terms and Concepts
1. Ethical Naturalism: The belief that moral facts exist and can be reduced to natural facts, such
as facts about interests, roles, or functions.
2. Moral Nihilism: The view that there are no moral facts and that moral judgments are merely
expressions of approval or disapproval.
- Moderate Nihilism: Argues that moral judgments express attitudes but do not describe facts.
- Extreme Nihilism: Claims that morality is entirely false because it is based on the
assumption that moral facts exist.
3. Open Question Argument: A challenge to ethical naturalism, which argues that even after
describing an act in natural terms, the question of whether the act ought to be done remains open.
4. Definitional Naturalism: The view that moral judgments are definitionally equivalent to
natural judgments.
5. Redefinitional Naturalism: Proposes replacing current moral language with clearer, more
precise terminology (e.g., defining "ought" as maximizing satisfaction of interests).
6. Naturalistic Fallacy: The error of trying to define moral terms like "good" or "right" in terms
of natural characteristics.

Conclusion
Gilbert Harman's exploration of the basic problem with ethics highlights the difficulty of
reducing moral facts to natural facts. He carefully examines the arguments for and against ethical
naturalism, particularly through the lens of the open question argument and the challenges posed
by moral nihilism. Ultimately, Harman leaves us with a nuanced understanding of why ethics is
problematic and why the existence of moral facts remains an open question in philosophical
discourse.
To create a detailed and comprehensive reviewer based on the text from "A Symposium upon
Ethical Objectivity" from the *International Journal of Ethics*, let's break down the concepts,
ideas, and terms provided in the material:

Overview of Ethical Objectivity

The article explores the concept of ethical objectivity by arguing that although moral judgments
are relative to the knowledge and experience of an age, there is still a line of moral development
that progresses over time. It posits that ethical principles evolve but have some degree of
objectivity based on human instincts and social organization, which persist through the ages.
Key Ideas and Concepts:
1. The Test of Moral Systems: Utilitarianism and Kantianism
- Utilitarian and Kantian tests: The content of "the good" can be evaluated using tests like
utilitarianism (judging actions by their consequences) and revised versions of Kantian ethics
(emphasizing duty and universal moral law). These tests can guide moral judgments, but
decisions are limited to the knowledge available at the time.
- Moral progress: We benefit from the moral traditions of the past, while future generations will
build upon our own moral decisions. This progress is cumulative, suggesting that moral
knowledge grows over time.
2. The Role of Comparative Ethics
- Comparative ethics: By comparing moral judgments across different times and places, it
becomes clear that while no era has absolute moral finality, there is a general moral development
or progress. The "common good of humanity" becomes clearer over time, suggesting a trend
toward better moral understanding.
3. Humility Toward Future Generations
- Judgment by future generations: While we judge past moral systems by current standards, we
must acknowledge that future generations will judge our ethics with a more refined
understanding. The passage emphasizes that moral finality is relative, subject to revision as
human society advances.
4. Instincts and Human Nature
- McDougall's Instinct Theory: The author refers to Professor William McDougall's argument
that humans inherit a set of instincts (e.g., fear, pugnacity, self-assertion) from their animal
ancestors. These instincts are constant across time, meaning that future generations will be born
with similar emotional and instinctive traits as those today.
- Implication for ethics: Changes in social organization and education cannot alter these innate
tendencies. Ethical education, therefore, must work with these instincts, guiding them into
socially beneficial behaviors.
5. The Inheritance of Instincts
- No inheritance of acquired characters: The text argues against the inheritance of acquired
characters, which means that traits developed during one's lifetime (like moral virtues) are not
passed genetically to the next generation. Each child is born with the same natural instincts as
previous generations, and these instincts must be shaped by society.
- The persistence of human instincts: Basic instincts like fear, pugnacity, acquisitiveness, and
constructiveness remain constant over time, meaning that the ethical challenges society faces
(such as managing aggression or selfishness) will be ongoing.
6. Social Organization and Ethics
- The principle of citizenship: Referring to Professor Hobhouse, the author argues that social
organization will continue to be based on a form of citizenship, balancing individual rights with
the common good. This form of organization will persist into the future, requiring similar virtues
from individuals to maintain social harmony.
7. The Cardinal Virtues
- Cardinal virtues: Virtues are defined as sentiments cultivated from our instincts that benefit
both individuals and society. The article identifies key virtues that need to be nurtured for a well-
functioning society:
- Wisdom (curiosity rationalized)
- Economy (acquisitiveness, constructiveness, and self-assertion rationalized)
- Temperance (self-restraint in appetites)
- Courage (rationalized pugnacity, including prudence in avoiding unnecessary risks)
 - Justice, benevolence, honor, loyalty, and reverence are also important virtues that individuals
must develop for the common good.
8. The Role of Instincts in Forming Character
- Varied instincts and personality types: Different people have varying strengths of instincts,
which results in different personalities or characters. For instance, individuals with strong
pugnacity might become radical champions for social causes, while those with strong fear
instincts may become conservative, cautious defenders of stability.
- Social cooperation: Despite these differences, society requires cooperation among all types of
people to function effectively. Each person must develop virtues in accordance with their
instincts, ensuring both individual fulfillment and social welfare.
9. Rationalization of Instincts
- Rationalization of instincts into virtues: The transformation of raw instincts into socially useful
virtues is a key process in ethical development. This rationalization process is guided by both
individual efforts and moral education provided by society. Instincts are to be shaped into virtues
through conscious cultivation.
10. The Future of Ethics
- Moral progress over time: Over the next thousand years, human biological instincts will remain
the same, and ethical principles will largely stay consistent in their broad outlines. However,
moral judgments will evolve as science and social organization advance, leading to changes in
economic and social conditions.
- Objective ethical foundation: Ethics, therefore, has an objective basis rooted in two factors:
1. Moral development across generations, which shows an increasing refinement of ethical
understanding.
2. The permanence of human instincts and the social structure of citizenship, which requires
the same virtues across time.
11. Metaphysical Considerations
- Practical ethics over metaphysical speculation: The article touches on the metaphysical debate
of whether absolute moral values exist in a Platonic realm, but dismisses this as irrelevant to
practical ethics. Instead, it emphasizes that moral values must be learned through reflection on
human experience, both personal and historical.
Conclusion: Ethical Objectivity and Development
The text concludes that while human ethics are not absolutely objective in the metaphysical
sense, they have an objective foundation in human nature and social organization. The instincts
and social principles that govern human life are relatively permanent, meaning that ethical
principles will not change drastically over time, though their application will evolve with societal
progress. Ethical objectivity thus lies in the consistent need for virtues across different periods of
history, driven by the same basic human instincts.
Important Terms and Their Definitions:
- Utilitarian tests: Moral evaluations based on the consequences of actions.
- Kantian ethics: A moral theory focusing on duty and universal moral law.
- Comparative ethics: The study of moral systems across different times and places.
- Instincts: Inherited tendencies that drive human behavior, such as fear, self-assertion, and
acquisitiveness.
- Sentiments: Instincts that have been shaped into moral feelings or virtues.
- Cardinal virtues: Key virtues essential for ethical living, including wisdom, courage,
temperance, and justice.
- Rationalization of instincts: The process of shaping raw instincts into socially beneficial
virtues.
- Moral tradition: The accumulated moral knowledge passed down through generations.

Here is a list of all the important terms and concepts from the provided text, A Symposium Upon
Ethical Objectivity:
1. Ethical Objectivity – The central theme of the symposium, referring to the idea that moral
judgments can have objective validity or truth, not merely subjective opinions.
2. Utilitarian and Kantian Tests – Refers to the utilitarian approach (focused on consequences
and maximizing happiness) and the Kantian approach (focused on universal moral principles) as
tools for deciding the content of the good in ethics.
3. Reflective Application – The process of thoughtfully applying ethical tests like utilitarianism
or Kantian ethics to determine what is morally right, based on available knowledge and
consequences.
4. Moral Tradition – The accumulated moral knowledge and judgments from past generations
that current generations build upon.
5. Comparative Ethics – The comparison of moral judgments across different ages and cultures
to reveal the evolution and progression of moral standards.
6. Moral Development or Progress – The idea that moral judgments and ethics improve over
time, becoming more refined and aligned with the common good of humanity.
7. Line of Moral Development – Refers to the historical progress in defining the common good
of humanity more clearly over time.
8. Common Good of Humanity – A moral principle that ethical progress helps define, focusing
on the well-being and rights of all people.
9. Philosophers of Decadent Periods – Refers to philosophers in periods of cultural decline
who tried to preserve moral insight from earlier classical periods.
10. William McDougall – A psychologist mentioned in the context of supporting the idea that
humans inherit instincts from animal ancestors, which play a role in moral behavior.
11. Instincts – Refers to inherited tendencies like fear, pugnacity, self-assertion, tenderness,
sociability, acquisitiveness, and constructiveness, which are thought to influence human behavior
and ethics.
12. Social Organization – The arrangement of society, which includes a principle of citizenship
and an ethical ideal of balancing individual rights with the common good.
13. Principle of Citizenship – The ethical framework that balances individual rights and duties
with the welfare of the society as a whole.
14. Unsociable Sociableness – A term from Kant, describing the paradoxical nature of humans
who both seek social interaction and resist it at the same time.
15. Virtue – A rationally cultivated sentiment formed from instincts, such as wisdom, courage,
temperance, justice, benevolence, etc., which are necessary for both personal fulfillment and
social welfare.
16. Sentiments – The emotional responses or dispositions that grow from human instincts and
must be rationally guided to develop into virtues.
17. Cardinal Virtues – Key virtues necessary for a full life and social cooperation, including
courage, honor, temperance, benevolence, justice, wisdom, economy, loyalty, respect, and
reverence.
18. Rationalization of Instincts – The process of guiding and controlling natural instincts to
develop them into socially beneficial virtues.
19. Pugnacity – One of the human instincts, associated with aggression and assertiveness, which
when rationalized can lead to courage and other virtues.
20. Fear – Another instinct, often balanced with pugnacity to form courage in individuals.
21. Economic Equality – The concept discussed in relation to the psychological impossibility of
achieving complete equality due to the differences in individual instincts like acquisitiveness and
constructiveness.
22. Educational Problem – The challenge in education, stemming from the lack of intellectual
curiosity in most individuals, a problem that persists across generations.
23. Moral Education – The process through which society helps individuals cultivate their
instincts into virtues that benefit both themselves and the common good.
24. Instinctive Appetites – Basic human desires and impulses that must be controlled for ethical
and social well-being.
25. Curiosity (Instinct) – The instinct that, when rationalized, becomes the virtue of wisdom.
26. Economy (Virtue) – The virtue that arises from rationalizing instincts like acquisitiveness,
constructiveness, and self-assertion.
27. Temperance – A virtue associated with the control of instinctive appetites, promoting
moderation.
28. Courage – A virtue formed from pugnacity and prudence, balancing boldness with rational
risk-taking.
29. Psychological Impossibility of Communism – The idea that communism or complete
economic equality is impossible due to the unequal distribution of acquisitive and constructive
instincts.
30. Utopia – A term for an ideal society, which the text suggests is impossible due to the
unchanging nature of human instincts.
31. Instinctive Tendencies – The natural impulses that drive human behavior, which must be
coordinated for social control and ethical behavior.
32. Co-ordination of Instinctive Tendencies – The social and individual process of guiding
instincts to develop virtues like wisdom, courage, justice, etc.
33. Ethical Development – The idea that human moral judgments and virtues improve over
time, leading to better social cooperation and individual character.
34. Platonic Realm of Objective Moral Values – A metaphysical concept of absolute moral
values existing outside of time and space, which is dismissed as irrelevant to practical ethics in
the text.
35. Reflection on Human Experience – The process of deriving moral values and judgments by
considering both personal and historical experiences of humanity.
“Ethical Objectivity”
The text delves deeply into the idea of “ethical objectivity”, or the notion that moral judgments
can be grounded in something more stable and universally valid than mere subjective opinion.
Ethical objectivity argues that while personal or cultural preferences might influence moral
judgments, there is an overarching basis for determining what is right or wrong, good or bad, in
human conduct.
To illustrate this, the text explores how the “utilitarian” and “Kantian tests”—both classic
ethical frameworks—can be applied to derive the content of what is considered good or ethical.
The “utilitarian approach” focuses on the consequences of actions, where the goal is to
maximize happiness or the greater good. In contrast, the “Kantian approach” is centered on the
idea that moral actions must follow universal principles that respect the autonomy and dignity of
all individuals. The text argues that when these tests are applied “reflectively”, based on
available knowledge and consideration of consequences, we can determine the ethical course of
action. However, the judgments made are bound by the limitations of the knowledge of the age,
meaning no decision can be absolutely final or universally true for all times and places.
The text underscores the importance of “moral tradition”—the accumulated moral knowledge
handed down from previous generations. By considering past experiences and judgments, each
generation refines its own ethical consciousness. While we may not have perfect answers to
moral dilemmas, the development of ethics is a “progressive process”, allowing each generation
to improve upon the moral insights of those who came before.
The concept of “comparative ethics” is introduced as a tool for understanding ethical
objectivity. This method involves comparing the moral judgments of different eras and cultures,
which reveals that moral standards are neither static nor absolute. Yet, through comparison, we
can detect a “line of moral development” that suggests progress over time. This means that while
past moral systems might have been flawed or incomplete, there is a discernible trend toward
better understanding the “common good of humanity”. The idea of the “common good of
humanity” emphasizes ethics that serve the interests and well-being of all people, a principle that
has become clearer over the centuries.
The text notes that while it may seem as though we are simply judging past ethical systems
through the lens of our own values, the fact remains that we are better equipped than earlier
generations because of the “moral tradition” we have inherited. However, there is also humility
in this view, as future generations will likewise surpass our understanding. They will “judge
more wisely”, just as we judge more competently than those who came before us. This ongoing
refinement of moral judgment shows that ethical objectivity is not about absolute finality but
rather about “relative progress” based on experience and knowledge.
Despite this progress, the text acknowledges the possibility of “periods of decadence and
decline”, in which societies regress ethically. However, even during these times, philosophers
often strive to preserve and build upon the moral insights of classical periods. In this way, the
“moral tradition” continues to evolve, even if societal conditions worsen.
“Human Instincts in Morality”
A significant portion of the text shifts focus to the role of “human instincts” in moral behavior.
“William McDougall” is referenced for his belief that humans inherit a set of instincts from
their animal ancestors, and these instincts play a critical role in shaping our moral behavior.
These instincts are part of our “native inheritance”, and they remain relatively constant over
time. According to McDougall, man’s biological makeup—including basic instincts—cannot
change drastically unless there is some form of biological mutation that would transform human
nature.
Among the primary instincts listed are “fear”, “pugnacity” (aggression), “self-assertion”,
“tenderness”, “sociability”, “sex”, “acquisitiveness”, and “constructiveness”. These instincts
form the raw material of human behavior, but they need to be controlled and shaped through
education and social organization. The text insists that while “social organization” and
education can influence how these instincts manifest, they cannot fundamentally change our
“innate mental constitution”.
The instincts themselves are not inherently good or bad, but they need to be “rationalized” or
controlled in ways that promote the “common good”. For example, “curiosity” is an instinct
that, when guided by rational thought and education, can become the virtue of “wisdom”.
Similarly, the instincts of “acquisitiveness”, “constructiveness”, and “self-assertion” can be
transformed into the virtue of “economy”, which involves the responsible management of
resources for the benefit of both the individual and society.
“Virtue” plays a key role in this transformation. A virtue is described as a “sentiment” that
grows through both the efforts of the individual and the “moral education” provided by society.
Virtues represent the rational coordination of instinctive tendencies to serve society and promote
individual fulfillment. The “cardinal virtues” listed in the text—”courage”, “honor”,
“temperance”, “benevolence”, “justice”, “wisdom”, “economy”, “loyalty”, “respect”, and
“reverence”—are essential for social cooperation and personal development.
The text also explains that different people have varying levels of instinctive tendencies, which
leads to diversity in personality and character. For instance, someone with a strong “pugnacious”
instinct might become a bold advocate for social change, while a more timid individual might be
a cautious “conservative”. Both types of individuals have a role to play in society, and both can
exhibit “courage”, though their expressions of this virtue differ. This diversity of characters is
necessary for a healthy society, but it is equally important that all individuals develop virtues that
enable them to contribute to the “general welfare”.
The text also discusses the “psychological impossibility of communism”, arguing that the
unequal distribution of instincts like “acquisitiveness” and “constructiveness” makes complete
economic equality unattainable. Some individuals will always have stronger tendencies toward
acquiring and building wealth, while others will not, and this variation in human nature makes a
truly equal society impossible.
In the context of education, the text notes the persistent “educational problem”, which is the
general lack of “intellectual curiosity” in most people. This problem has existed for centuries and
will continue to present challenges for educators, who must find ways to cultivate intellectual
virtues in individuals who may not naturally possess a strong curiosity.
The “rationalization of instincts”—the process by which raw instincts are transformed into
socially beneficial virtues—is seen as a continual necessity. This process helps individuals
become more “socialized” while retaining their unique personalities. However, despite progress
in moral education and social organization, no “Utopia” is expected. Human instincts, such as
“fear”, “pugnacity”, and “acquisitiveness”, will remain relatively unchanged, and these instincts
will always require careful management to avoid disrupting the “principle of citizenship” and the
“common good”.
In conclusion, the text argues that “ethics” has an “objective basis” in two ways: (1) through the
progressive “line of ethical development” that allows each generation to refine and improve upon
the moral insights of the past, and (2) through the “permanent native inheritance” of human
instincts, which creates a constant need for virtues that serve both the individual and society.
While the question of whether moral values exist in a “Platonic realm” outside of time and space
is interesting, the text suggests that this issue has no practical bearing on ethics. The only moral
values we can know or seek are those derived from “reflection on human experience”, both our
own and that of previous generations, who have passed down a rich “moral tradition”.

Moral Nihilism
Moral Nihilism by Gilbert Harman
Gilbert Harman is one of the modern philosophers most associated with the idea of “moral nihilism”, a
theory that challenges the very foundation of ethical or moral norms. His view questions the existence of
objective moral truths, suggesting that morality is not something inherent in the world but is rather a
human construct. Below is a comprehensive discussion of “moral nihilism” based on Harman's work.
“Understanding Moral Nihilism”
Moral nihilism is the view that no objective or universal moral facts exist. This theory suggests that
statements about morality—like "lying is wrong" or "helping others is good"—do not refer to any
intrinsic truths but are expressions of human emotions, preferences, or social constructs.
Harman's version of moral nihilism is rooted in “ethical relativism”, which suggests that moral norms are
created by societies and are thus relative to different cultures, times, or individuals. He argues that
morality does not have a foundation in reality in the way that physical laws (like gravity) do. For
example, a statement like "murder is wrong" is not inherently true in the same way that "water boils at
100°C" is. Moral statements, according to Harman, do not describe facts about the world but are
contingent upon human perspectives.
“Ethical Relativism and Harman’s View”
One of Harman’s central arguments involves ethical relativism, where he asserts that moral judgments are
not absolute but rather dependent on one's cultural, historical, or individual context. In other words, what
is considered right or wrong varies from one society to another and across time. Harman's “ethical
relativism” claims that there is no ultimate moral authority or universal moral law that applies to all
people at all times. Instead, moral rules are societal agreements that can differ vastly between
communities.
For example, in one society, certain practices might be viewed as morally acceptable (like polygamy or
ritual sacrifice), while in others, they might be condemned. Harman uses this variability to support the
idea that there is no objective moral reality. If morality were objective, we would expect to find consistent
moral standards across all cultures, which clearly isn't the case.
“Subjectivity of Moral Judgments”
Harman also contends that moral judgments are expressions of our internal emotions, desires, or attitudes
rather than reflections of any external reality. This leads to a “subjectivist” interpretation of moral values,
where saying something is "good" or "bad" merely reflects a personal or cultural attitude towards a
particular action rather than an objective truth. For instance, when someone says, "Stealing is wrong,"
what they really mean is, "I (or we) disapprove of stealing." This claim only holds significance within the
subjective framework of that person's or society's moral views.
“Moral Observation and Scientific Method”
Harman challenges the idea that we can "observe" moral truths in the same way we observe scientific
facts. In science, observations allow us to confirm or falsify theories. For instance, observing that the sun
rises every morning supports the theory of Earth's rotation. However, according to Harman, there is no
comparable process for moral observations. If you see a group of people harming someone, you might
feel that it's wrong, but this feeling comes from your own psychological or cultural background, not from
some universal moral fact.
Harman draws a sharp contrast between moral and scientific observation. He argues that while scientific
observations provide evidence about the physical world, “moral observations” do not offer evidence
about objective truths. For example, if you see someone kicking a dog and react with moral outrage, that
reaction doesn't prove that kicking a dog is objectively wrong—it only reflects your own ethical
sensibilities or the cultural norms you've internalized.
This is an important point because it reinforces Harman's idea that morality is not something "out there"
in the world that we discover. Instead, it's something we project onto the world based on our feelings,
socialization, and experiences. Moral judgments, then, are not like scientific facts; they don't describe
features of the world but reflect internal or social attitudes.
“Moral Disagreement”
Moral nihilism also explains the persistent “moral disagreements” that exist between individuals, cultures,
and even within a single society. These disagreements can be over issues like the death penalty, abortion,
or war. Harman points out that these disagreements are often irresolvable because there is no objective
moral truth that one can appeal to in order to settle the debate. Instead, each side is operating from its own
framework of moral values, which may be deeply ingrained and culturally specific. The lack of a
universal moral standard means that such debates often come down to clashes of subjective preferences
rather than facts that can be objectively verified.
For instance, consider a debate over capital punishment. One group may argue that it's morally justified as
a form of retributive justice, while another group might contend that it's inherently wrong to take a life.
Harman would argue that both positions are equally valid within their respective moral frameworks, but
neither can be objectively proven or disproven because there are no moral facts to settle the matter.
“Moral Skepticism”
Harman’s approach often leads to “moral skepticism”—the view that we should doubt or suspend
judgment about moral claims. If there are no objective moral truths, then it becomes difficult, if not
impossible, to justify our moral beliefs as true or correct in any meaningful sense. Moral skepticism
doesn’t necessarily lead to moral indifference or immoral behavior. Instead, it calls for a recognition that
our moral beliefs are contingent on various factors and might not hold any objective authority.
“Moral Responsibility and Social Agreement”
Even though Harman is a moral nihilist, he doesn’t advocate for the complete abandonment of moral
systems. While he argues that moral truths are not objective, he acknowledges that societies function
more effectively when people generally agree on a set of moral rules. This leads to a kind of “pragmatic
morality”, where people follow moral codes not because they are objectively true but because they
promote social harmony and cooperation.
For example, most societies agree that stealing is wrong. According to Harman, this isn’t because there’s
an objective truth about the immorality of stealing, but because societies have found that prohibiting theft
helps maintain social order and trust. In this sense, moral systems are useful for regulating behavior and
promoting well-being, even if they don’t have any grounding in objective truth.
“Implications for Moral Philosophy”
Harman's moral nihilism has significant implications for how we think about moral philosophy. If there
are no objective moral truths, then much of traditional moral philosophy—which seeks to discover or
defend universal moral principles—may be misguided. Instead of trying to find the "right" moral theory
(whether it's utilitarianism, Kantianism, or some other system), Harman suggests that we should focus on
understanding the “psychological and social factors” that shape our moral beliefs.
For instance, instead of asking whether it’s morally right to tell the truth, we might ask why humans have
evolved to value honesty, or how social institutions reinforce the importance of truth-telling. This shift in
focus moves moral philosophy away from abstract theorizing and toward a more “descriptive and
explanatory approach” to understanding morality as a human phenomenon.
“Criticism of Harman's Moral Nihilism”
While moral nihilism provides an interesting critique of objective morality, it has faced significant
criticism. One of the main objections is that moral nihilism can lead to moral paralysis or indifference. If
there are no objective moral truths, then why should we care about morality at all? Critics argue that if
taken to its extreme, moral nihilism could undermine the very basis of ethical behavior and lead to chaos
or moral anarchy.
Furthermore, many philosophers believe that moral nihilism overlooks the “shared human experience”
and the common needs and desires that give rise to moral principles. Even if moral truths aren’t
"objective" in the scientific sense, they argue that there are still valid reasons for adopting certain moral
norms, such as the need for cooperation, fairness, and justice.
“Conclusion”
In conclusion, Gilbert Harman’s moral nihilism is a powerful and thought-provoking critique of objective
morality. It challenges the idea that moral facts exist independently of human beliefs and preferences,
suggesting instead that moral judgments are subjective expressions of our emotions and social contexts.
While moral nihilism raises important questions about the nature of morality, it also leaves us with the
challenge of finding a way to navigate moral disagreements and uphold ethical behavior in a world
without objective moral truths. Harman’s work invites us to rethink the foundations of morality and to
recognize the importance of social cooperation and shared values, even in the absence of universal moral
laws.
Refuting Moral Nihilism
Moral nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts, truths, or objective standards that inherently
define what is morally right or wrong. According to moral nihilists, morality is ultimately an illusion or a
construct that humans invented, rather than a set of absolute principles or values.
Ways to Refute Moral Nihilism
1. Argument from Moral Experience
o Explanation: People naturally feel and express moral judgments—such as saying murder
is wrong, or that kindness is good. This implies that humans perceive certain actions as
morally unacceptable or praiseworthy, and it’s difficult to disregard these experiences as
meaningless.
o Example: Suppose someone donates all their belongings to help those in need. Most
would see this as a morally good act. Moral nihilism would imply that there is nothing
inherently good about this act, but it seems counterintuitive given our strong moral
intuitions.
2. Argument from Moral Language
o Explanation: People commonly use moral language, such as “right,” “wrong,” “should,”
and “ought to,” which suggests that these terms have meaning and that morality has
practical relevance in our lives.
o Example: Laws often reflect moral standards, like those against theft and assault. If
moral nihilism were true, it would imply that these laws don’t have any real moral
grounding. Yet, society maintains them based on widely accepted beliefs about justice
and fairness.
3. Argument from Social and Cultural Consensus
o Explanation: Across various cultures and societies, people seem to agree on certain core
moral principles, such as prohibitions against killing or stealing. This widespread
consensus suggests that some moral principles might be more than arbitrary conventions.
o Example: In nearly all societies, actions like murder and theft are condemned, and
virtues like honesty and respect are praised. This shared morality could be seen as
evidence against moral nihilism.
4. Argument from Practical Implications
o Explanation: If moral nihilism were true, it would lead to a society where actions like
cheating, lying, or even harming others would have no moral weight. Many argue that
this would create an unlivable world, as ethical standards are necessary for social
cohesion and trust.
o Example: Imagine a society where lying and violence were seen as acceptable because
there’s no moral basis to condemn them. This would make building trust and cooperation
impossible, which are essential for any functioning community.
5. Argument from Moral Progress
 o Explanation: Moral nihilism struggles to explain the idea of moral progress, which
assumes that society can become morally better or worse over time. The abolition of
slavery, for example, is widely seen as a moral advancement. A nihilist perspective can’t
easily account for this because it denies any objective moral standards to measure
progress.
o Example: Consider the civil rights movement, which pushed for equal rights and justice.
Most would agree this represented moral progress. If there were no objective moral
values, it would be difficult to justify this change as “progress.”

Study of Universal and Supervenient Properties

Universal Properties refer to characteristics that hold universally, meaning they apply consistently
across all instances of a certain category. Supervenient Properties are qualities that depend on or are
grounded in other properties but are not directly reducible to them.
Universal Properties
1. Explanation: Universal properties are features or traits that can be applied generally across all
instances in a category. They describe essential aspects that all members of a group share.
2. Example: For instance, consider the property of “triangularity” in triangles. Every triangle has
the universal property of having three sides, no matter the size, angles, or type of triangle. This
property is universal because it applies to every triangle in the same way.
3. Application in Ethics: In ethics, some argue for universal moral values, such as the principle that
“causing unnecessary harm is wrong,” which they believe applies universally across cultures and
contexts.
Supervenient Properties
1. Explanation: Supervenient properties are characteristics that rely on underlying physical or
mental states but are distinct from them. They emerge from other properties and depend on them
but can’t be fully reduced to those base properties.
2. Example: Consider mental states, like feeling happy. Happiness supervenes on certain brain
states or biological conditions. When you’re happy, it’s because of particular neural
configurations, but happiness isn’t identical to any specific brain state.
3. Application in Ethics: Moral properties, such as “goodness” or “justice,” are often considered
supervenient because they depend on non-moral facts but can’t be reduced to them. For instance,
the goodness of an act may depend on specific facts about the action (like helping a person in
need), but the goodness itself isn’t the same as the factual description of the action.
Key Distinctions and Overlap
 Universality in Supervenience: Sometimes, supervenient properties may have universal
applications. For example, honesty could be seen as universally desirable in social relations, but
its expression might supervene on different contexts or situations (like cultural norms around
truth-telling).
  Ethical Application of Supervenience: Ethical theorists often argue that moral qualities
supervene on non-moral facts. For example, the rightness or wrongness of lying may depend on
underlying facts, such as whether the lie protects someone from harm or causes harm.
Why These Concepts Matter in Ethics
1. Ethics and Universality: Debates around universal moral properties question whether there are
ethical standards that apply to all humans, regardless of context. Many ethical systems seek
universal principles that hold across time and culture, like respect for human rights.
2. Ethics and Supervenience: Supervenience in ethics suggests that moral values, while depending
on facts (like intentions and outcomes), have an irreducible quality that gives them unique moral
weight. This framework supports the argument that moral facts are more than just biological or
psychological states.
Examples to Clarify Universal and Supervenient Properties in Morality
 Universal Property Example: If we say “all people have a right to life,” we are proposing that
this moral principle is universal and should apply equally, regardless of who the person is or
where they are from.
 Supervenient Property Example: If someone argues that an action like lying is wrong in a
particular case, the wrongness of the act supervenes on the circumstances (e.g., the harm caused
by lying). The moral judgment (wrongness) is dependent on, but not reducible to, these non-
moral facts (the harm caused).