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Editor's Note: This article was originally written for Japan Society's previous site for
educators, "Journey through Japan," in 2003.
Change was the currency of the Meiji era (1868–1912). From the day the teen-aged
Mutsuhito claimed power on January 3, 1868 in a relatively tranquil coup called the “Meiji
Restoration” (after his reign name) until his death forty-five years later, Japan experienced
an evolution so rapid that one Tokyo expatriate said he felt as if he had been alive for 400
years. An isolated, feudalistic island state in 1850, Japan had become a powerful colonial
power with the most modern of institutions when Meiji’s son, the Taisho emperor, took the
throne in 1912. Both the sources of these changes and the way in which they made Japan
“modern” provide the material for one of human history’s more dramatic stories. They also
laid the groundwork for the turbulence of Japan’s twentieth century.
To understand the dynamism of the Meiji years, one must begin with the factors in the
Tokugawa era (1600–1868) that made Japan a unique and sophisticated nation. The first
thing about which historians often comment is the period’s stability. Founded by the
warrior Tokugawa Ieyasu at the conclusion of centuries of samurai warfare, the Tokugawa
bakufu (tent or military government) ruled for more than 250 years in the city of Edo
(today’s Tokyo), during which time the most serious fighting consisted of localized peasant
riots. The Tokugawa created a centralized “feudal” system in which more than 200 domains
or han maintained fiscal and military autonomy, while their lords served an authoritarian
government in Edo. Even the Europeans, who had participated in some of the sixteenth
century conflicts, were tightly controlled in these years, with most of them excluded from
Japan altogether and the Dutch alone allowed to maintain a limited trading presence at
Nagasaki, nearly 1,000 miles away from the capital. It is hardly surprising that observers
refer to this period as the “pax Tokugawa.”
Undergirding this political stability were unusually high levels of political and educational
sophistication that would make rapid, peaceful change possible in the decades after the
Restoration. Though critics talk about the inflexibility and inefficiency of the Tokugawa
government, the political system nonetheless ranked among the world’s most effective in
tying more than 30 million people together and stimulating an energetic national life.
Perhaps the most effective feature of that government was the “alternate attendance”
(sankin kotai) system that required most of the 250 domain lords to spend every other year
in Edo, serving the shogun, and thus stimulated not only national consciousness but an
extensive system of roads (for the travel of the lords’ large retinues), towns (for their
lodging), trade, and cultural diffusion.
The system also encouraged the growth of important national institutions. Thousands of
schools tied to temples, government offices, and private scholars gave Japan a literacy rate
of perhaps 40 percent for boys and 10 percent for girls in the early 1800s, ranking it near
the top of the world. They also provided a leadership class committed to the Confucian
ideal of public service. Industry and trade flourished, even as the samurai class and the
Tokugawa government languished economically, giving Japan high levels of capital
accumulation. And the culture of the cities was among the most innovative in the world,
producing a combination of woodblock prints, kabuki theater, novels, haiku poetry, fashion
fads, and lending libraries—much of it tied to the geisha or female entertainers who
presided over each city’s entertainment quarters. Scholars have noted that Japan in the
early 1800s ranked near the world’s forefront in almost every quantifiable level of
development.
At the same time, a set of specific developments (historians would call them contingencies)
made late-Tokugawa Japan ripe for change. Many of the country’s leaders grew quite
interested in the ways of the West, as they began learning about the industrial revolution
and the imperialist adventures that were bringing countries from China to the Philippines
under the European sway. At the same time, American and European seaman began
visiting Japan’s ports after the early 1800s, seeking an end to the country’s isolation policy.
And perhaps most important, the balance between Tokugawa and domain governments
began shifting, with large and distant domains such as Satsuma (in southern Kyushu) and
Choshu (on western Honshu) experiencing political and economic growth even as the
shogunate sunk ever more deeply into a kind of inflexibility caused in part by old age. Thus,
while many regions of the country were full of energy and increasing self-confidence in
1850, the Edo government was in decline, staffed by cautious bureaucrats described by one
young official as “wooden monkeys.”
In this mix, the Tokugawa decision to open Japan to foreigners in 1854, in compliance with
American demands, touched off one of Japan’s most tumultuous periods. With newly
arrived Westerners demanding trade, showing off new customs (including the scandalous
tendency of women to accompany men to public events), practicing the forbidden Christian
religion, and taking sides in Japan’s political disputes, the country’s political life changed
irrevocably. Opposition to the Tokugawa arose from several quarters. At one level, lower-
ranked samurai called shishi or “men of spirit” began agitating for the ouster of the
Westerners almost as soon as Matthew Perry and his followers had been admitted. They
were too much on the outside to topple the government, but their terrorist acts disrupted
the tranquility of political centers in ways that had not been seen for centuries. More
directly threatening to the Tokugawa were the growing challenges after the late 1850s
from establishment scholars and political leaders of major domains. The shogunate reacted
as aggressively as any regime-under-attack might be expected to, but by the mid-1860s,
Choshu was in the hands of an anti-Tokugawa administration, and by late 1868, Shogun
Tokugawa Keiki concluded that the best way to preserve order was to resign as shogun and
create a system in which he likely would share power as the chief among a council of
leaders. His scheme failed, however, and on January 3, 1868, a coup d’état in Meiji’s name
brought to power a group of young, visionary samurai from the regional domains.
The government that came into being in 1868 had three overriding characteristics: its
leaders were young; its policies were pragmatic; and its hold on power was tenuous. The
emperor in whose name the new governors ruled was just seventeen years old; the major
samurai power-holders from Satsuma and Choshu domains ranged in age from the upper
20s to the “senior” Saigo Takamori, who was just 41; and Iwakura Tomomi, the most
important nobleman in the leadership clique, was 43. By Japanese leadership standards,
these men were mere juveniles—unbound by the networks and mores of traditional
leadership. This, perhaps, is what made them so pragmatic; they developed policies without
the restraints of ideology or custom—or of any overriding vision of where Japan should go.
Confucian tradition discouraged commerce, but they moved Japan as forcefully and quickly
as possible into the world of international commerce. Whereas they once had supported the
idea of national seclusion, sometimes fanatically so, now they made the West their model
and pursued internationalization with a vengeance. Samurai and nobles all, they abolished
the class and status systems and disbanded the feudal domains. One of their central
slogans, kuni no tame (“for the sake of the country”) said it all: their overriding
commitment was simply to national strength, regardless of what customs or ideologies had
to be violated in the pursuit of that goal.
The tenuousness of their power was illustrated by the Boshin War, a violent conflict
between the new regime and the Tokugawa followers, which raged for a year and a half
after the Restoration. Though the coup often has been called bloodless, and though the
carnage was indeed lessened by Keiki’s surrender in February 1868, thousands of his
supporters resisted in a civil war that left more than 8,000 dead by the time the fighting
ended in Hokkaido in June 1869. It was little wonder that journalists predicted the
imminent collapse of the Meiji government well into the 1870s.
All of this meant that the first Meiji years were characterized by a seat-of-the-pants, try-
this-try-that style of governing. A “charter oath,” issued in April 1868 promised to unify the
classes and seek knowledge from around the world in order to strengthen the emperor’s
rule. No one seemed, however, to know just what that meant initially, as the government
grappled with inadequate revenues, challenges from imperialist nations, threats from the
regional domains, conspiracies by disgruntled samurai across the nation, and a complete
lack of precedents for the organizational structures the modern era demanded. One result
was that the government structure was reorganized repeatedly in the first years. Another
was that membership in the leadership faction kept shifting. Still a third was that policies
were revised often. At the same time there was a single, clear direction: toward
centralization, solidarity, and involvement in the broader world. And always there was a
commitment to making Japan a modern nation, accepted as an equal by the world powers.
Internationalization showed up in two ways. First, the new leaders studied Western models
with a zeal born of deep fear that weakness might invite invasion. They sent missions to the
West, including a 50-member group headed by head of state Iwakura Tomomi in 1871–
1873, to negotiate and to study institutions such as banking, schools, political systems, and
treaty structures. They also dispatched young people to study in European and American
educational institutions. And they brought hundreds of Westerners, called yatoi (or, in
some scholars’ telling, “live machines”) to Japan every year until the late 1870s, to teach
English, build railroads and buildings, create an educational system, edit newspapers (for
foreign consumption), and teach science. The result was an urban craze for things Western
—everything from men’s haircuts to drinking milk, from the solar calendar to ballroom
dancing—that made city life heady.
Second, the movement onto the international scene made treaty revision one of the
government’s central goals. The treaties of the 1850s had limited the tariffs Japan could
charge on imports to an average of about five percent and had required that foreigners
who committed crimes in Japan be tried in the courts of the foreign consulates (a system
called extraterritoriality). Beside being humiliating, the restrictions deprived Japan of both
sovereignty and tariff revenues, money desperately needed for modernization programs. As
a result the government sought endlessly to secure fairer treaties during the 1870s. The
British consistently blocked reform, however, and extraterritoriality was not ended until
1894, tariff limits until 1911. The treaties thus served as a constant reminder of just how
important modernity and power were to Japan’s success in the international arena. Without
being regarded as “modern,” Japan would not be taken seriously by Britain and the other
imperialist powers; without strength, it could not challenge the foreign gunboats.
The movement toward centralization was illustrated partly by a raft of new regulations: the
1871 decision to replace the semi-feudal domains with modern prefectures, the issuance in
1872–1873 of laws to create a military draft and to require three years of school for all boys
and girls, and the standardization of a land tax. It was illustrated more dramatically by two
major crises, both centering on the role of the old samurai class. In the first, the Crisis of
1873, the leadership faction was rent asunder by a bitter foreign policy dispute. After
Japanese diplomats in Korea had been spoken to rudely by Korean officials, the state
council decided to send Saigo Takamori as an emissary to demand an apology, realizing
fully that such a mission could precipitate war. When progressive officials, who had been
abroad with Iwakura, heard about the plans, they were aghast—not so much at the idea of
war as at the potential cost. They managed through intensive maneuvering to get the
decision reversed, and the popular Saigo quit office in a rage, taking a number of followers
with him. The result was a leaner government, and a less popular one.
The second crisis, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, was even more serious. After the
government had abolished the samurai class in order to save the huge cost of paying
annual stipends to every member of the class, a civil rebellion broke out in the southwest—
headed by Saigo. The results were devastating, on every level. Word that Saigo was leading
the rebellion sent shudders through the country. Former samurai everywhere questioned
the government’s policy of using a commoner army to fight the rebels. And the cost was
staggering: eight months of bloody fighting, millions of yen, 10,000 men injured, more than
6,000 deaths, and a powerful sense of national loss. Historically, however, the Satsuma
Rebellion marked a positive watershed for the Meiji government. With Saigo’s defeat, the
country was unified as it had not been since the Restoration; the government’s legitimacy
was established; the transitional decade was over.
Few would have considered the Restoration era complete, however, until a new political
system was in place, a system approved as “modern” by the international powers. Only
after creating the new structures noted above and defeating the recalcitrant samurai could
the rulers focus their energies in that direction.
Before looking at that process, however, a word must be said about the impact of the many
changes on the country’s broader populace. If the new system was hard on the traditional
samurai class, it was devastating for vast numbers of people: the fishermen, the rickshaw
pullers, the construction workers, miners, prostitutes, and newspaper sellers who made the
rapid changes possible by doing the hardest work and receiving the least remuneration.
The largest such group lived in more than 60,000 villages, where some 28 million farmers
(out of a population of 35 million in the late 1870s) provided the country not only with its
food but with the bulk of its taxes. The cost of modernizing and expanding the government
was placed overwhelmingly on land taxes, which meant that farmers had to bear the brunt,
either through direct taxation or in the rents they paid to landlords. When the
government’s fiscal retrenchment led to depression in the early 1880s, rice and silk prices
plummeted, and bankruptcies soared, pushing many into destitution and thousands into
local uprisings against the system. Another group hurt by modernizing policies were
Japan’s factory workers, particularly the tens of thousands of girls and women who were
forced by poverty into working in the expanding silk and cotton factories. Their willingness
to work under inhuman conditions for pittance pay helped Japan compete on the world
market; it also produced surprising amounts of resistance, with workers absconding,
engaging in work stoppages, and even striking.
A more positive result for the general populace was the diffusion of new ideas and
practices into every nook of society. The 1870s saw former samurai in the northeast offend
the Buddhist spirits by beginning to eat meat; they saw the rise of barbering and dairy-
farming in the Tokyo region; they saw the spread of railroads, modern postal networks,
fire-resistant brick buildings, a banking system, public schools, language institutes, modern
hospitals—in short, every “modern” institution known in the world’s most progressive
cities. The arts also changed, as Western style painting took root. Novels and fiction
became increasingly popular, though complex characterization would have to wait until
late in the century to become the norm. And literate Japanese by the tens of thousands
began reading newspapers. While it would take several more decades for modernity to
penetrate the countryside, cities were literally transformed by the drive toward
international respect and domestic centralization in this first Meiji decade.
The driving force in all of this lay with the government during the early Meiji years, but one
of that force’s most exceptional features was the role of private, popular groups in shaping
the political evolution. Indeed the drive toward creating a constitutional system—which
everyone agreed was the essential characteristic of a “modern” state—was fueled by a
constant, fierce struggle between popular and official forces. (Refer to the Enactment of
the Meiji Constitution.) In the mid-1870s, for example, a vigorous “movement for freedom
and rights” (jiyu minken undo), led by both former samurai and commoners, stirred the
national political life mightily with rallies and petition drives demanding a national
assembly, a constitution, and broader participation in the government. When a financial
scandal prompted massive protests against the government in 1881, the officials responded
in part by promising that a constitution would be granted within a decade. And when
Japan’s first political parties were created in response to that promise, the government
seriously set about the task of drafting that constitution.
The political intensity quieted in the mid-1880s, but not the drive toward constitutional
government. Ito Hirobumi, one of the youngest Restoration leaders and now a dominating
force in official circles, led a group to Europe to study political systems, then headed a task
force that created several new institutions (including a peerage, so there would be a pool
for selecting a House of Lords) and drafted Asia’s first national constitution. His models
and chief advisors were German statists, and when the constitution was promulgated on
February 11, 1889, it placed sovereignty solely in the emperor and gave Japan a relatively
weak legislature and a strong, transcendent cabinet, with the prime minister appointed by
the emperor. But the impact of the freedom and rights forces was apparent in the
constitution too, because it also assured limited freedom of speech, religion, and assembly,
gave the legislature veto power over the budget, and created an independent judiciary. It
was, in short, a middle-of-the-road document that placed Japan in the mainstream of the
world powers politically. Papers from London to Shanghai hailed the arrival of
constitutional government in Asia, while commoners across the nation celebrated with
fireworks and speeches this evidence that the Meiji Restoration’s promise had been
fulfilled.
The Restoration Legacy
Though dramatically changed, Japan would not have been called modern yet in 1889 by
most observers. The two post-Restoration decades had, however, planted all of those seeds
that would mature into full-fledged modernity and imperialistic vigor at the beginning of
the twentieth century. At least three legacies of the Restoration decades merit discussion.
The first is nationalism. The rise of nationalism—often called the most important feature of
the late 1880s and early 1890s—showed up in many ways: in the widely-heralded pride
over the constitution, in the issuance in 1890 of the Imperial Rescript on Education, a
stirring document in which school students regularly recited their loyalty to country and
emperor, in the increasing public discussions by young writers of Japan’s greatness. One of
the most articulate vehicles for the new nationalism was a journal named simply Nihon
(Japan), launched the day the constitution was promulgated, for the express purpose of
reviving the “unique spirit of the Japanese people.” The seeds of the new national pride lay
in the early-Meiji soil, when the government had worked so hard to make the entire
populace aware of their Japaneseness, creating national holidays, making the emperor both
sovereign and high priest, sending Tokyo newspapers to every part of the country,
instituting compulsory education and military service. By the twentieth century, the
nationalism would become worrisome, as it propelled Japan into aggressive actions abroad.
At the end of the Restoration period, however, people saw it merely as an effective means
of getting people to support the state’s drive to modernity and power.
The second departure of the 1890s was the rising importance of military affairs in national
life. In 1894, Japan launched its first major foreign war since the 1500s (and its second
foreign war ever), thrashing China in the Sino-Japanese War and beginning its experience
with empire by securing Taiwan as a colony. A decade after that, it defeated Russia, one of
the European powers, setting the stage for colonies in Korea and Manchuria. And with
those wars, the army and navy became central actors in nearly every national decision,
major factors in the country’s political and economic life. Again, the early Meiji years had
set the stage. One of the earliest slogans of the Restoration era was fukoku kyohei (rich
country, strong army); in 1872 Japan had begun drafting men into the army; and in 1874, it
had sent 3,000 troops to Taiwan, for a short, victorious engagement with aboriginal groups
who had killed some 54 shipwrecked Okinawans. The nation also had begun the acquisition
of territory in these years, taking over the Ryukyu Islands to the south in 1879, three years
after negotiating with Russia to gain control of the Kuril Islands to the north. All of these
were relatively minor episodes, but they confirmed a fundamental approach. Convinced
that military strength alone would assure respect and security in an imperialist world, the
early-Meiji leaders had set the nation on a course toward military might, a course that
would make war and empire central facets of national policy by the turn of the century.
The third legacy of the Restoration years was the march to modernity. Most students agree
that the period between the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars saw a genuine mass society
emerge in Japan’s cities. These were the years that gave Japan its first major industrial
takeoff, the period that produced mass-circulation newspapers, department stores, publicly
treated water systems, social and class divisions, moving pictures, wristwatches, safety
razors, increasingly popular public intellectual debates, and beer halls—all the trappings of
modern, urban society. (See Sino-Japanese War.) And they were the years in which
commoners, called minshu, began to take an active part in the nation’s public and political
life. To say that this development represented a mere speed-up of the early Meiji programs
is to state the obvious. When the Charter Oath promised in 1868 to seek knowledge from
around the world, it set Japan on a course of studying, emulating, adapting—and finally
surpassing—peoples everywhere, a path that would bring the Restoration era to fulfillment,
even as it launched Japan into the more troubling arena of colonialism and empire.
明治維新、1868〜 1889 年
James Huffman、H。OrthHirt、ウィテンバーグ大学名誉教授
編集者注:この記事は、2003 年にジャパン・ソサエティの以前の教育者向けサイト「JourneythroughJapan」のために書かれたものです。
明治維新の源泉
明治時代のダイナミズムを理解するには、日本をユニークで洗練された国にした徳川時代(1600〜1868)の要因から始める必要があります。 歴史家が
よくコメントする最初のことは、時代の安定性です。 何世紀にもわたる武士の戦いの終わりに戦士徳川家康によって設立された徳川幕府(テントまたは軍
政)は、江戸市(現在の東京)で 250 年以上にわたって統治していました。その間、最も深刻な戦いは局地的なものでした。 農民の暴動。 徳川は、200
以上の領土または漢族が財政および軍事の自治を維持し、その領主が江戸の権威主義政府に仕えるという集中型の「封建」制度を創設しました。 16 世紀
の紛争のいくつかに参加したヨーロッパ人でさえ、近年厳しく管理されており、そのほとんどは日本から完全に排除され、オランダ人だけが長崎から
1,000 マイル近く離れた場所で限られた貿易の存在を維持することを許可されました。 資本。 オブザーバーがこの時期を「パックス徳川」と呼んでいる
のも当然だ。
この政治的安定を支えているのは、王政復古後の数十年で急速で平和な変化を可能にする、異常に高いレベルの政治的および教育的洗練でした。 批評家たち
は徳川幕府の柔軟性と非効率性について語っていますが、それでも政治システムは、3000 万人以上の人々を結びつけ、エネルギッシュな国民生活を刺激す
る上で世界で最も効果的なものの 1 つにランクされています。 おそらくその政府の最も効果的な特徴は、250 人の領主のほとんどが隔年で江戸に滞在し
て将軍に仕えることを要求する「交互出席」(参勤交代)システムであり、それによって国民の意識だけでなく広範なシステムを刺激しました 道路(領主の
大きな従者の旅行のため)、町(彼らの宿泊のため)、貿易、そして文化の拡散。
同時に、一連の特定の進展(歴史家はそれらを不測の事態と呼ぶでしょう)は、後期徳川日本を変化に向けて熟させました。 国の指導者の多くは、ヨーロッ
パの支配下で中国からフィリピンに国をもたらした産業革命と帝国主義の冒険について学び始めたので、西洋のやり方に非常に興味を持った。 同時に、アメ
リカとヨーロッパの船員は、1800 年代初頭以降、日本の孤立政策の終焉を求めて日本の港を訪れ始めました。 そしておそらく最も重要なことは、徳川と
ドメイン政府のバランスが変化し始め、将軍がこれまで以上に深く沈んだとしても、さつま(九州南部)や長州(本州西部)などの大規模で遠いドメインが
政治的および経済的成長を経験したことです。 老年期に一部起因する一種の柔軟性の欠如。 このように、1850 年には国の多くの地域が活気に満ち、自信
が増したが、江戸政権は衰退し、ある若い役人が「木製の猿」と表現した慎重な官僚が配置された。
彼らの権力の希薄さは、新政権と徳川の信奉者との間の激しい紛争である戊辰戦争によって例証されました。そして、それは回復の後に 1 年半の間激怒しま
した。 クーデターはしばしば無血と呼ばれ、1868 年 2 月のケイキの降伏によって大虐殺は実際に軽減されましたが、1869 年 6 月に北海道で戦闘が
終了するまでに 8,000 人以上が死亡した内戦に数千人の支持者が抵抗しました。 ジャーナリストが明治政権の崩壊が 1870 年代に迫っていると予測し
たのも不思議ではありませんでした。
このすべてが意味するのは、明治の最初の年は、パンツの座席、試してみる、そのスタイルの統治によって特徴づけられたということです。 1868 年 4
月に発行された「憲章の誓い」は、皇帝の統治を強化するために、クラスを統一し、世界中から知識を求めることを約束しました。 しかし、政府が不十分な
収入、帝国主義国家からの挑戦、地域領域からの脅威、全国の不満を持った侍による陰謀、そして組織の前例の完全な欠如に取り組んだため、最初はそれが
何を意味するのか誰も知らなかったようです。 現代が要求する構造。 その結果、最初の数年間に政府の構造が繰り返し再編成されました。 もう一つは、
リーダーシップ派のメンバーシップが変化し続けたということでした。 さらに 3 分の 1 は、ポリシーが頻繁に改訂されたことです。 同時に、中央集権
化、連帯、そしてより広い世界への関与という、単一の明確な方向性がありました。 そして常に、日本を現代国家にし、世界の大国に平等に受け入れられる
ようにするというコミットメントがありました。
現代のシステムの作成、1877〜1889
王政復古の時代が完全であると考える人はほとんどいなかったでしょうが、新しい政治システムが導入されるまで、そのシステムは国際的な大国によって
「現代的」として承認されました。 上記の新しい構造を作成し、扱いにくい侍を倒した後でのみ、支配者はその方向にエネルギーを集中させることができま
した。
しかし、そのプロセスを検討する前に、国のより広い人口に対する多くの変化の影響について一言言わなければなりません。 新しいシステムが伝統的な武士
のクラスで難しいとしたら、それは膨大な数の人々に壊滅的な打撃を与えました:漁師、人力車の引き手、建設労働者、鉱山労働者、売春婦、そして最も困
難な仕事をすることによって急速な変化を可能にした新聞売り手 最小の報酬を受け取ります。 そのような最大のグループは 60,000 以上の村に住んでお
り、約 2,800 万人の農民(1870 年代後半の 3,500 万人の人口のうち)が国に食糧だけでなく税金の大部分を提供しました。 政府の近代化と拡大の
費用は圧倒的に土地税に課せられました。つまり、農民は直接税または家主に支払った家賃のいずれかによって、その矢面に立たされなければなりませんで
した。 1880 年代初頭に政府の財政縮小が不況につながったとき、米と絹の価格は急落し、破産は急増し、多くの人々を貧困に追い込み、数千人をシステ
ムに対する地元の反乱に追いやった。 政策の近代化によって傷ついたもう 1 つのグループは、日本の工場労働者、特に貧困によって拡大する絹と綿の工場
で働くことを余儀なくされた何万人もの少女と女性でした。 ピタンスペイのために非人道的な条件下で働く彼らの意欲は、日本が世界市場で競争するのを助
けました。 それはまた、驚くべき量の抵抗を生み出し、労働者は棄権し、仕事を停止し、さらには打撃を与えた。
これらすべての原動力は明治初期の政府にありましたが、その力の最も例外的な特徴の 1 つは、政治的進化を形作る上での民間の人気グループの役割でし
た。 確かに、憲法制度の創設に向けた動きは、「近代」国家の本質的な特徴であることに誰もが同意したが、民衆と公務員の間の絶え間ない激しい闘争に
よって煽られた。 (明治憲法制定を参照。)たとえば、1870 年代半ばには、元武士と庶民の両方が主導する活発な「自由と権利のための運動」(自由民
権運動)が、国の政治生活を強力に刺激しました。 集会と請願は、国会、憲法、および政府へのより広範な参加を要求するものです。 1881 年に金融ス
キャンダルが政府に対する大規模な抗議を引き起こしたとき、当局は、憲法が 10 年以内に付与されることを約束することによって部分的に対応しました。
そして、その約束に応えて日本の最初の政党が結成されたとき、政府はその憲法を起草するという任務に真剣に着手した。


王政復古の遺産