VOTE BUYING

International IDEA Electoral Processes Primer 2

© 2022 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

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VOTE BUYING
International IDEA Electoral Processes Primer 2

Oliver Joseph and Vasil Vashchanka

International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE–103 34 Stockholm
SWEDEN
+46 8 698 37 00
info@idea.int
www.idea.int
4 CONTENTS VOTE BUYING

Contents
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 5

Chapter 1
What is the issue? ........................................................................................................... 9

Chapter 2
Vote buying and related concepts ................................................................................. 11
2.1. Legal framework ....................................................................................................... 13

Chapter 3
Drivers of vote buying.................................................................................................... 15
3.1. Supply-side drivers.................................................................................................... 15
3.2. Demand-side drivers.................................................................................................. 23
3.3. Institutional enablers................................................................................................. 26

Chapter 4
Vote buying in practice.................................................................................................. 28

Chapter 5
Design considerations to counter vote buying................................................................ 31
5.1. Constitutional and electoral system reform............................................................ 32
5.2. Election management reform................................................................................... 33
5.3. Enforcement of legislation........................................................................................ 35
5.4. Campaign finance regulations.................................................................................. 37
5.5. Public information campaigns.................................................................................. 42

Chapter 6
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 44

References.................................................................................................................... 46
Further reading.......................................................................................................................... 50

About the authors.......................................................................................................... 51

About the Primer series............................................................................................................ 52

About International IDEA............................................................................................... 53

INTERNATIONAL IDEA 5

INTRODUCTION

Vote buying is an electoral campaign violation that occurs in

many countries, which undermines the integrity of elections and is Vote buying is an
detrimental to democratic governance. The practice is illegal in over electoral campaign
90 per cent of countries (International IDEA n.d.),1 yet it persists in violation which
large part because of limited state capacity, a lack of political will undermines the
by political parties to comply with legislation or the politicization of integrity of elections
oversight bodies. and is detrimental
to democratic
Vote buying is defined in this Primer as the offer of financial or governance.
material inducements to voters by candidates or political parties
during an election campaign period and/or on election day in
exchange for electoral support. The financial or material inducements
are funded from private resources, as opposed to administrative
resources or other public goods. The definition used in this Primer
includes the distribution of inducements between the supporters of a
party or candidate to encourage their turnout (also known as ‘turnout
buying’, Nichter 2008). This practice targeting a group of supporters
also entails the contrary practice of paying inducements to the
supporters of rival contestants to abstain from voting, sometimes
referred to as ‘negative vote buying’ or ‘abstention buying’ (Schaffer
and Schedler 2007). The vote-buying practices described here relate
to a voter’s willingness to either accept a bribe for their vote or not
cast their vote for a specific candidate through forced coercion, such

1 Globally, 91.7 per cent of countries have a ban on vote buying; 4.4 per cent do not have
a ban; data is not available for 3.9 per cent of countries. Data are correct as of 2020,
according to the International IDEA Political Finance Database, Question 38: ‘Is there a
ban on vote buying?’ (November 2022).
 6 VOTE BUYING

as intimidation or threats. Furthermore, this Primer focuses on voters

casting their vote in a polling station; it does not explore vote-buying
practices related to absentee voting, such as postal voting.

This Primer does not cover buying the votes of legislators or

lobbying. It defines vote buying as separate from political clientelism,
a form of political patronage in which elected public office holders
offer (often) asymmetric public goods or public sector employment
to groups of voters in exchange for political support cultivated over
time. However, vote buying may be practised to sustain a clientelist
relationship between elected politicians and citizens.

Many factors beyond electoral politics drive vote buying. Such factors
Many factors beyond influence the ‘supply side’ (political actors’ decisions to engage in
electoral politics drive vote buying), the ‘demand side’ (voters’ willingness to participate
vote buying. in vote buying) or both. Politicians’ efforts to cultivate a clientelist
relationship with their constituents by offering exclusive benefits in
exchange for political loyalty is among the supply-side drivers of vote
buying. The electoral system may enable vote buying, particularly if
it has single-member districts or promotes intraparty competition
between candidates from the same party in the same electoral
constituency, which may incentivize candidates to pursue personal
electoral strategies. Voters may also drive vote buying through
an expectation to receive money, gifts or other handouts from
candidates standing for election to public office, which such voters
may regard as a source of revenue.

Vote buying derives from competitive electoral processes, but it

often encompasses social and economic cleavages in society.
Voters’ willingness to accept benefits in exchange for their vote is
principally a consequence of poverty and social exclusion. Since the
same financial incentive is likely more valuable to poorer voters than
to their wealthier counterparts, it costs less for political actors to
buy the votes of the poor. Such voters may also be more politically
marginalized and therefore more inclined to discount future benefits
on which programmatic election campaigns are fought. A further
consideration may be that voters who are not interested in politics
and do not attach importance to civic values are more disposed to
engage in vote-buying offers. Some voters accept electoral handouts
because doing so resonates with their sense of social justice.
 INTRODUCTION 7

Acceptance of vote buying may also be rooted in cultural norms, such

as the social norm of gift giving, in which an item of value is given
without an explicit agreement regarding immediate rewards, but with
some expectation of reciprocity. Systemic shortcomings are also
significant enablers of vote buying, including ineffective enforcement
of legislation banning the practice, inadequate legislation or
insufficient protection of secret ballots.

Eliminating or reducing the incidence of vote buying requires

understanding the modalities by which it operates. Political Eliminating or
actors engaging in vote buying commonly employ networks of reducing the incidence
intermediaries (brokers) to conduct the transactions with voters. The of vote buying requires
brokers may be political party operatives or free agents who offer understanding the
their services to multiple parties and candidates. A candidate may modalities by which it
only deal with a trusted group of professional brokers, who manage operates.
a group of mid-level brokers, who in turn manage individual brokers.
A large-scale vote-buying operation constitutes a significant financial
undertaking without a guaranteed return since the political actors
have few effective means of monitoring their brokers. Brokers often
appropriate a portion of these funds for themselves, which hampers
the efficiency of the practice. Typically, brokers are selected for their
personal networks and knowledge of their communities, since they
have the necessary opportunities to approach people in their social
group to accept inducements in exchange for their vote. Vote buying
is frequently reported as occurring close to or on election day to
minimize the risk that voters will be persuaded by offers from rival
candidates’ brokers.

Vote buying is notoriously difficult to detect and ban. In certain

contexts, this challenge may lessen institutional motivations to
mitigate the practice, or even provide disincentives in the form of
oversight, control and subsequent law enforcement. The scope of
a country’s legislative framework and the strength of its regulatory
institutions will enhance the enforcement of anti-vote-buying laws
and practices. The independence of judicial institutions, electoral
management bodies (EMBs), and anti-corruption and political finance
oversight agencies should be codified in a country’s constitution
to place these institutions in the strongest position to deter and
defend against political interference. A country’s electoral system
should also be considered to understand the causes and identify
8 VOTE BUYING

solutions related to vote buying. For example, electoral systems that

emphasize candidates over parties (i.e. first-past-the-post (plurality),
alternative vote or two-round systems (majoritarian), or open list or
single transferable vote (proportional)) may incentivize individual
candidates between and within parties to pursue personal electoral
strategies.

This Primer outlines what vote buying is (and what it is not) and
analyses the drivers behind the practice from both the supply side
(political actors who engage in it) and the demand side (voters who
agree to participate and enter a transaction). The Primer provides
insights into vote-buying strategies and practices before considering
options for policy interventions to effectively counter the practice.
It also offers an analytical framework for a strategic approach to
support such efforts to stakeholders seeking to gain comparative
insights into vote buying and mitigation.
INTERNATIONAL IDEA 9

Chapter 1

WHAT IS THE ISSUE?

Vote buying is electoral corruption; in most countries, it is a criminal

offence. It undermines electoral processes but is notoriously Solutions should
difficult to prove. As a form of political corruption that occurs as a address voters’
transaction that is often conducted through personal contacts and willingness to engage
acquaintances, the difficulty of detecting and proving illegal activity in vote buying as
further removes vote buying from legal and regulatory oversight. well as parties’ and
For this reason, legislation has a limited impact in prohibiting the candidates’ tendency
practice. Furthermore, the root causes of vote buying lie deeper in to employ it as an
society. Solutions should therefore address voters’ willingness to election-winning
engage in the practice as well as parties’ and candidates’ tendency to strategy.
employ it as an election-winning strategy.

One-third of voters in Bulgaria, Indonesia, Kenya and the Philippines,

a quarter of voters in the Dominican Republic and Sierra Leone, and
one-fifth of voters in Argentina have admitted to being offered cash,
food or other goods in exchange for their vote during an election
campaign (Transparency International 2020; Muhtadi 2019: 62–63;
Stoychev 2016). The actual incidence rate of vote buying is likely to
be far higher since voters are unlikely to admit to engaging in the
practice because of its unlawful nature or their sense of personal
moral conflict for having sold their vote.

Vote buying disproportionately affects the most vulnerable groups

in society, such as poorer and socially marginalized voters. Social
inequality is therefore placed in the political arena, although not
necessarily on the political agenda. Wealthy officeholders who
obtain their positions through vote buying are less likely to represent
the interests of poorer voters or to be held accountable for their
 10 VOTE BUYING

performance in office (Hasen 2000; Stokes 2007). Vote buying may

also contribute to the persistence of poverty (Gersbach and Mühe
2011), increase rent seeking by politicians (Leight et al. 2020) and
keep corrupt politicians in office, leading to a decline in social wealth.

Vote buying occurs in both urban and rural areas, although it is more
prevalent in smaller communities. In some countries, individual
candidates in specific constituencies engage in the practice. In other
countries, it may be highly organized and widespread, deployed as an
electoral strategy alongside the misuse of administrative resources
and complicit with corruption and serious organized crime. In the
latter context, vote buying moves beyond an equal transaction to an
asymmetric transaction, underpinned by persuasion and coercion,
which at its worst may contribute to electoral violence. Vote buying
also has adverse effects beyond the immediate outcome of an
election by increasing the cost of electoral campaigns and creating a
barrier to entry into politics by individuals without significant wealth
(Kramon 2013; Muhtadi 2019).

Furthermore, vote buying weakens the trust that voters and citizens
Vote buying weakens have in their elected representatives and restricts the opportunities
the trust that voters for society to protest and examine corruption in a transparent
and citizens have and secure environment. Social acceptance of vote buying over
in their elected successive electoral cycles can institutionalize the practice, as
representatives candidates who win elections with the help of a vote-buying strategy
and restricts the are likely to adopt a similar approach in future elections. Where
opportunities for politicians and citizens tolerate vote buying, this impedes the
society to protest and normative principle that elected representatives are accountable to
examine corruption their electorate.
in a transparent and
secure environment.
INTERNATIONAL IDEA 11

Chapter 2

VOTE BUYING AND RELATED

CONCEPTS

Vote buying is the offer of money, material goods or services to

voters by election contestants (political parties or candidates) in Vote buying is the
exchange for votes. Within this broad concept, there are several offer of money,
fundamental distinctions. The first relates to the timing of vote-buying material goods or
inducements. Vote buying in this Primer refers to inducements made services to voters by
on election day or during the voting period. To secure an electoral election contestants
advantage, vote buyers in some countries visit voters the night (political parties
before or the morning of an election (Schaffer 2007; Muhtadi 2019). or candidates) in
Accordingly, the definition excludes handouts outside the electoral exchange for votes.
period.

It is also necessary to clarify what may be covered by the vote-buying

offer. While money is included, some goods and services may not.
However, handouts of essential items such as grain, sugar or fuel
are no less effective as incentives to vote for a particular candidate
than cash. But is the same true of refreshments at campaign
rallies? What about transporting voters to the polls? Evaluating the
relative strength of incentives is inherently difficult as they have
different values for different voters. Guided by the normative ideal
of democratic competition between policy proposals rather than
contestants’ financial ability and willingness to bribe potential voters,
the distribution of any inducement should be deemed undesirable
and regarded as vote buying.

The extent that any offer of future benefits should be regarded as

vote buying is also an important consideration. Candidate promises
of benefits made on the campaign trail are not usually considered
problematic and are seen as an acceptable campaign strategy.
 12 VOTE BUYING

However, specific commitments to provide money or other rewards

after election day, especially to voters who supply proof of their vote,
qualify as vote-buying inducements.

Vote buying may target specific individuals or groups of voters

(Nichter 2014). The boundary of particularistic treatment—politicians’
favourable treatment of a particular group in society—may be unclear.
The benefits of vote buying may be available to a wider variety of
voters, for example communities or villages. Goods and services
delivered by contestants during election campaigns for community
consumption, such as essential services, infrastructure or additional
public spending, may also be considered particularistic from the
normative perspective. However, such benefits are often delivered
without voters’ direct participation.

Vote buying necessarily entails a commitment—or, at a minimum, an

expectation—that a voter will deliver electoral support in exchange
for payment if it is to be a worthwhile endeavour for a candidate to
engage in both systematically and across elections (Nichter 2014).
While a systematic approach with a tangible benefit may be relevant
for vote buying carried out by powerful and organized political parties,
it may be less (or not at all) applicable for vote buying by candidates
in weak party systems (Kramon 2013; Muhtadi 2019). In this context,
it is sufficient for money and other incentives to be offered with the
intention to buy a person’s vote. The extent to which vote buyers
can secure a commitment and monitor voters’ compliance varies by
context.

The voter’s role in the success of any vote-buying strategy should

The voter’s role in the not be overlooked. The transaction requires two parties, and a
success of any vote- voter’s willingness to engage may be driven by a single factor, or a
buying strategy should combination of several factors. Voters will make a rational choice
not be overlooked. calculation to participate in vote buying to obtain either what they
perceive to be a financial benefit that is greater than the value of their
vote, or an exchange that forms part of a cultural or social norm. A
rational choice calculation could derive from several causes, both
conscious and unconscious, such as social marginalization or voter
ignorance.
 2. VOTE BUYING AND RELATED CONCEPTS 13

Vote buying should be distinguished from other related concepts.

For example, the definition used here does not include the provision
of public goods, such as improvements to basic state infrastructure
negotiated by a community leader in exchange for electoral support
by community members. Furthermore, providing particularistic goods
and services in exchange for political support is considered political
or electoral clientelism, which is generally defined as a ‘lasting
personal relationship between individuals of unequal socio-political
status’ (Hilgers 2011). Vote buying is often associated with the
context of political clientelism.

This Primer focuses on vote buying targeted at voters, but the term
has also been used in relation to legislators, which is a distinctly
different phenomenon. This type of vote buying entails offering
inducements to legislators from partisan leaders in exchange for
an agreement or ‘deal’ between legislators to trade their votes for
each other’s proposals, also known as ‘horse trading’ or ‘logrolling’.
Similarly, vote buying by member states in multilateral and
international organizations is excluded.

2.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK Many countries

explicitly outlaw vote
Many countries explicitly outlaw vote buying in national legislation, buying in national
either in a single law or in multiple laws. Legislation in some countries legislation, either
is limited to banning the offer of money, goods, or services from a in a single law or in
candidate or broker in exchange for a person’s vote. In other countries, multiple laws.
the legislation extends to prohibiting voters from accepting such an
offer or selling their vote. National political finance regulations should
prohibit candidates from engaging in vote buying during election
campaigns. Campaign finance regulations may require candidates
and parties to disclose donors’ identities, the amount of money
donated (any donation or an amount above a specified threshold),
and the funds spent during campaigns. Generally, such regulations
are designed to promote and ensure a level playing field between
candidates, but specific to countering vote buying, transparency in
candidate and political party spending allows regulators and law
enforcement agencies to ascertain whether a candidate has used
campaign funds to bribe voters. For example, in the United Kingdom,
‘a voter shall be guilty of bribery if before or during an election he
 14 VOTE BUYING

directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf

receives, agrees, or contracts for any money, gift, loan or valuable
consideration, office, place or employment for himself or for any other
person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to
refrain from voting’. Additionally, ‘a person shall be guilty of bribery
if after an election he directly or indirectly by himself or by any other
person on his behalf receives any money or valuable consideration
on account of any person having voted or refrained from voting
or having induced any other person to vote or refrain from voting’
(Representation of the People Act, 1983, articles 5 and 6).

International obligations
Election-specific treaties and resolutions do not explicitly reference
vote buying as an electoral irregularity. However, if election
contestants offer voters money, material goods or services in
exchange for votes, this is difficult to reconcile with a free and
fair electoral process that is underpinned by other international
obligations and instruments. The most significant is the principle
of a voter’s right to cast their ballot in secrecy, which is designed
to protect voters from being subject to any corruption, coercion or
intimidation while casting their vote.

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)

Secrecy of the ballot obliges signatories to guarantee a ‘secret vote’, and the UN
guarantees that voters International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states
can cast their vote that elections must be held by ‘secret ballot’. These obligations
freely. are intended to prohibit voters’ identities from being connected
to their vote before, during or after their ballot is cast. The ICCPR
prohibits ‘any abusive interference with registration or voting as
well as intimidation or coercion of voters’. Secrecy of the ballot
guarantees that voters can cast their vote freely. The right to a secret
ballot covers the electoral campaign period up to election day. The
ICCPR emphasizes that voters should be: ‘able to form opinions
independently, free of […] inducement or manipulative interference of
any kind’ (General Comment No. 25 article 25, paragraph 19) and ‘free
from any coercion or compulsion to disclose how they ‘intend to vote
or how they voted’ (paragraph 20). It also states that voters cannot
waive their right to a secret vote. Furthermore, UN General Assembly
Resolution 72/164 (2017) explicitly condemns ‘any manipulation
of election processes, which should be interpreted to exclude
manipulative interference in the form of vote buying’.
INTERNATIONAL IDEA 15

Chapter 3

DRIVERS OF VOTE BUYING

Candidates and parties use vote buying as an electoral strategy for

multiple reasons, which are often specific to a country or societal Vote buying is driven
context. The practice is driven by supply-side factors (election by supply-side factors
contestants’ motivation to engage in vote buying) as well as (election contestants’
demand-side factors (why voters agree to engage in and accept motivation to engage
the transaction). The latter are often driven by a voter making a in vote buying) as
rational choice to sell their vote, or a cultural or social norm related well as demand-side
to practices of gift giving. Vote buying is likely to be facilitated by factors (why voters
other context-relevant circumstances, referred to as ‘institutional agree to engage
enablers’, such as inconsistent legislation. However, it is important in and accept the
to reiterate that the drivers behind vote buying are highly context transaction).
specific, as is their interplay. It is also challenging to determine
causality, and any claims of a cause should be made with caution.
Necessary generalizations and occasional simplifications should not
be interpreted as definitive assertions of causal relationships.

3.1. SUPPLY-SIDE DRIVERS

Why do electoral candidates engage in vote buying? The simple

answer is because it works for them, usually because they have no
other cost-efficient means of influencing voters or manipulating
election results (Lehoucq 2007). Politicians who seek to gain an
electoral advantage through manipulation or coercion will choose
the forms of malpractice that are most readily available to them
(Birch 2011). If they are not able to manipulate the electoral rules,
falsify the voter register, coerce voters, or commit electoral fraud at
the ballot box, vote buying may be one of the few remaining options.
 16 VOTE BUYING

In countries that are implementing electoral reforms to enhance

the integrity of their electoral processes, the vote-buying incidence
may even increase in successive elections. This is because reforms
that successfully mitigate electoral irregularities and bad practice
may cause candidates to engage in vote buying as one of the few
remaining options to illegally influence an election. Such reforms will
likely include policies and practices designed to create a transparent
and accurate voter registration and verification process, ensure the
political and operational independence of the EMB, and eradicate
ballot-box stuffing.

Vote buying may be intended to mobilize a candidate’s known

supporters, attract undecided voters, suppress turnout among an
opponent’s supporters, or a combination of these and other goals. If
political players regard vote buying as a cost-effective way to achieve
these aims, it will remain attractive. Therefore, the more complex
question is what conditions and factors cause politicians to choose
vote buying over other available electoral strategies.

Political clientelism
Vote buying is Vote buying is closely associated with political clientelism, which
closely associated is broadly defined as the provision of particularistic benefits
with political in exchange for political loyalty. Under programmatic politics,
clientelism, which formalized public criteria instead shape resource distribution (Stokes
is broadly defined et al. 2013). In addition to private goods and services, clientelist
as the provision of benefits may include employment in the public sector (often referred
particularistic benefits to as ‘patronage’) and targeting public spending to constituents
in exchange for (also known as ‘pork-barrelling’). Incumbent political actors typically
political loyalty. employ these strategies, which require access to public resources.

The relationship between vote buying and political clientelism

depends on the definition of both concepts; the terms are often used
interchangeably, which contributes to conceptual ambiguity (Nichter
2014). In some instances, vote buying is considered a variation
of political clientelism directed at voters instead of patronage
targeting party members (Stokes et al. 2013). However, clientelism is
usually defined as a lasting relationship (Hilgers 2011) that extends
beyond the electoral period. Vote buying and political clientelism
are analytically distinct (Hagene 2015), although the former can be
deployed as an instrument to sustain political clientelism as a lasting
 3. DRIVERS OF VOTE BUYING 17

relationship. It may also be used where a lasting relationship does

not exist as a single transaction.

Clientelism is thought to originate in pre-modern social relations, but

it also appeared in modern settings, such as Italy following World
War II (Warner 2001). Clientelism has strong links with low economic
development because it is less costly for patrons (political players)
and more attractive to clients (voters) in such settings (Hicken 2011).
It has also been argued to result from politicians’ inability to make
credible policy commitments (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008).

Campaign finance
Political candidates require adequate financial resources to organize Approximately half of
their election campaigns, which involves formulating policy, countries around the
producing advertisement materials and holding campaign rallies. The world limit the amount
financial resources a candidate and their political party receives— a candidate can
public subsidies, private donations or both—may be insufficient (or spend on an election
perceived as insufficient) to finance their campaign, thus motivating campaign.
a candidate to accept unregulated (illegal) donations or loans from
donors. Such extra-regulatory donations are often provided with
conditionality attached based on the donor’s narrow and personal
interests. Globally, national legislation exists to level the electoral
playing field. Approximately half of countries around the world limit
the amount a candidate can spend on an election campaign; parties
in one-third of countries routinely receive public subsidies to help
finance their operational campaign costs and activities, while those
in another third of countries receive no routine direct public subsidies
(International IDEA n.d.).2

For example, in Nepal, candidates standing in provincial elections

(parallel voting electoral system) are permitted to spend a maximum
of NPR 250,000 in a closed-list proportional representation

2 Globally, 33.9 per cent of countries have provisions for regular direct public funding to
political parties; 27.8 per cent have provisions for regular and campaign-related direct
public funding to political parties; 28.3 per cent do not offer any public funding; 7.8 per
cent provide public funds only for campaigns; data are not available for 1.7 per cent
of countries. Data are correct as of 2020, according to the International IDEA Political
Finance Database, Question 28: ‘Are there provisions for direct public funding to
political parties?’ (November 2022).
Additionally, 36.1 per cent of countries limit the amount of money a political party can
spend on an election campaign, while 61.1 per cent do not; data are not available for 2.2
per cent of countries. Data are correct as of 2020, according to the International IDEA
Political Finance Database, Question 39: ‘Are there limits on the amount a political party
can spend?’ (November 2022).
 18 VOTE BUYING

constituency or up to NPR 150,000 if contesting the election in

a first-past-the-post single-member constituency. Candidates
regard this sum as insufficient to cover the basic requirements of a
meaningful campaign, and therefore illegally draw on their personal
finances or raise funds from local business donors. Business owners
who provide such donations often seek preferential treatment
or particularistic benefits from candidates who are ultimately
elected. Elected candidates therefore serve their donors’ interests
ahead of (and even instead of) their constituents. Breaches of
campaign finance regulations are often undetected, and detected
violations often go unpunished, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of
dependence between business donors and candidates. Furthermore,
donors often expect their candidate to win ‘at any cost’, which
strengthens their combined vote-buying strategies in order to win
(Nath Mishra , Pandey and Yolkey Rai 2022; Asia Foundation 2017).

Electoral system
The design of the The design of the electoral system is often a significant factor
electoral system is driving the use of vote buying as an election strategy. For example,
often a significant Indonesia’s change from a closed-list to an open-list proportional
factor driving the use representation system spurred intraparty competition in an
of vote buying as an environment where political parties generally lack solid societal roots
election strategy. and distinct ideologies (see Box 1). Moreover, in highly competitive
elections, where contests are decided on narrow margins, vote buying
emerges as an effective electoral strategy for candidates who need
to cultivate their individual voter base to defeat their opponents and
co-partisans.

The example of Indonesia illustrates how electoral systems that only

offer voters a choice between political parties cause candidates to
rely more heavily on party-centred strategies. By contrast, electoral
systems in which voters choose between individual candidates
or cast multiple votes tend to encourage candidates to cultivate a
personal vote, potentially based on specific incentives (Carey and
Shugart 1995; Hicken 2007). Intraparty competition, such as when
members of the same party campaign against each other in the
same district, makes it more difficult for candidates to distinguish
themselves from each other by appealing to a party ‘label’ and
platform. Electoral systems that feature intraparty competition,
such as open-list PR, preferential voting and single transferable vote,
 3. DRIVERS OF VOTE BUYING 19

Box 1. Indonesia: Electoral system as a structural driver of vote buying

Following the fall of the Suharto regime in list. This high threshold allowed only 2 out
1998, Indonesia experienced exponential of 550 Members of Parliament to be elected
growth in the number of political parties: 48 through preference votes in 2004. In 2009,
parties contested the 1999 elections. The the parliament legislated to reduce the
subsequent tightening of party registration requirement to 30 per cent of the full seat
requirements led to a gradual reduction; 12 quota, but the Constitutional Court annulled
parties contested the national legislative this law and introduced a full open-list
election in 2014. Except for the Islamist vs. proportional representation system.
secular orientation, ideological divisions
between political parties are not strong, Legislative elections are held in multi-
and parties have typically competed on member electoral districts, which in 2014
clientelist rather than programmatic grounds. numbered 77 for parliamentary elections,
Party loyalty has also declined significantly: ranging between 3 and 10 seats. Over 6,600
whereas 86 per cent of voters identified as candidates from 12 parties competed in the
being affiliated with a particular party in 1999, 2014 elections, with an average of nearly
only 15 per cent did so in 2014. 12 candidates per seat. As parties rarely
win more than two seats in a district, the
For the 1999 elections, Indonesia adopted a winning margins are small. In 2014, 69 out of
closed-list proportional representation (PR) 77 constituencies were decided by margins
electoral system: voters cast their ballot for of less than 4 per cent of votes cast in the
a list of candidates, and parties determined district. Seats were decided by no more than
each candidate’s place on the list. Candidates 2.5 per cent of the party’s vote within each
in winnable positions at the top of the list party. The open-list system encouraged
became known as nomor topi (hat number), candidates from the same party to engage
while lower-ranking candidates were called in intense campaigning for personal votes.
nomor sepatu (shoe number). There was a Many candidates resorted to vote buying
perception that wealthy candidates were to distinguish themselves from their co-
bribing party leaders for top positions on partisans and secure individual votes.
party lists. In 2003, partially in response While the efficiency of vote buying was not
to these concerns, the electoral system estimated to be particularly high (around
was changed to a semi-open one. Voters 10 per cent of voters were thought to cast
were given an opportunity to express their ballots in response to vote buying), this
preference for a particular candidate, and strategy was nevertheless more efficient and
candidates who obtained preferences equal attractive for candidates than the available
to or over the party’s full seat quota could alternatives.
be elected regardless of their place on the

Source: Muhtadi, B., Vote Buying in Indonesia: The Mechanics of Electoral Bribery (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3>.
20 VOTE BUYING

thus provide incentives for candidates to pursue personal electoral

strategies over, or in addition to, those of their party.

Candidates’ strategies to cultivate personal votes are not necessarily

limited to vote buying. They may also seek to emphasize their policy
differences within the party, rely on personal popularity, use media
advertising to increase their appeal, target particularistic benefits to
constituents, and even resort to violence and intimidation, among
other options (Hicken 2007). However, depending on other factors
such as party organization and campaign financing, vote buying may
be a more efficient personal strategy for candidates, as was the case
in Indonesia.

Historical examples of a decline in vote buying when constituency

magnitude is increased suggest that smaller electoral districts may
be conducive to a rise in vote buying, such as in the United Kingdom
in the 19th century. A fixed amount of money available to a candidate
with which to bribe voters would buy a smaller proportion of votes in
a larger constituency. The Representation of the Peoples Act 1832,
also known as the Great Reform Act, abolished small districts and
redistricted seats in the House of Commons to larger metropolitan
boroughs in the English West Midlands and North of England. The
expansion and redelineation of constituency boundaries limited the
extent to which wealthy landowners and prospective Members of
Parliament could buy votes by making vote buying too expensive
(Cox 1987). The relationship between electoral district size and
the prevalence of vote buying is not straightforward and depends
on additional factors. Increasing the district size decreases the
incentives for personal reputation seeking in closed-list electoral
systems, but in open-list systems, the effect is the opposite: larger
districts increase intraparty competition, which drives candidates
to pursue personal electoral strategies (Carey and Shugart 1995).
However, smaller district magnitudes (the number of seats contested
in the electoral district) may be associated with an increase in the
incidence of vote buying (Jensen and Justesen 2014). This pattern
is consistent with examples of contestants engaging in vote buying
in nationwide constituencies, for example in presidential elections or
legislative elections with a single electoral district.
 3. DRIVERS OF VOTE BUYING 21

Voters’ expectation
Voters’ expectations at least partially drive the persistence of vote Voters’ expectations
buying, which is often a response to the demand for it. Voters may of vote buying may
expect handouts in clientelist settings, where vote buying may be rooted in their
indicate voters’ willingness to continue the clientelist relationship sense of entitlement
(Kramon 2013). Beyond that, voters’ expectations of vote buying may and understanding of
be rooted in their sense of entitlement and understanding of social social justice.
justice.

In the Philippines, many lower-income people view handouts

from candidates as a sign of attention and care, an indication of
generosity and an exemplification of how ‘good’ politicians should
behave (Schaffer 2008). In Benin, voters who generally assume that
politicians are corrupt see the payment of money for votes as a form
of reparation for public funds that politicians have stolen, whether
or not this is the case (Bratton 2008). In many countries, elections
represent one of the few opportunities for poorer voters to benefit
from those in power. They expect candidates for public office (who
are presumed to be wealthy) to share some of their spoils. Voters’
sense of entitlement and demands to receive handouts may be so
strong that they border on extortion (Lindberg 2003).

Since vote buying incurs a financial cost to electoral contestants,

it would benefit all contestants if the practice did not occur.
However, the risk of not buying votes while others are doing so is
too high. Candidates and their brokers in Indonesia have claimed
that voters often behave opportunistically and take money from
different contestants, so they feel the need to outbid their opponents
and ‘secure’ their votes (Muhtadi 2019). In Paraguay, local party
operatives acknowledged to international election observers that
voters expect to receive cash or basic products (EU EOM 2018). In
Ghana, a candidate claimed that not giving gifts to voters during an
election campaign would be political suicide (Lindberg 2003).

In some contexts, vote buying is an entrenched feature of electoral

campaigns and resembles an accepted norm. For example, in
Papua New Guinea, clientelist politics and cultures of competitive
exchange are a longstanding aspect of societal relations in the
remote Highlands region, but vote buying is now widespread across
the country, including in areas without a history of competitive
 22 VOTE BUYING

exchange. Some voters negotiate the price for their vote with
candidates’ brokers. Papua New Guinea uses a limited preferential
voting electoral system for parliamentary elections (voters rank three
candidates in order of preference). In the 2007 and 2012 general
elections, brokers offered cash payments to voters in descending
value for their top three preferences (Haley and Zubrinich 2015).
The widespread prevalence of vote buying in Papua New Guinea has
been attributed to several possible factors, including a change in the
electoral system in 2003 (first-past-the-post to limited preferential
voting) and the growth of extractive industries and associated
business interests combining with political decision making. In rural
districts of Nepal during successive elections, some voters refrained
from casting their ballots until approximately an hour before the polls
closed; brokers waited outside polling stations to bid for votes.

Trust in electoral process

Public trust in Public trust in electoral processes and the institutions that administer
electoral processes them is an often overlooked but increasingly important characteristic
and the institutions of electoral integrity and election outcomes. Voters must perceive
that administer an electoral process and its outcome as legitimate. Trust in public
them is an often institutions to function effectively and fairly underpins acceptance
overlooked but of the election results and weakens voters’ willingness to engage
increasingly important in vote buying. The legitimacy of elections and electoral integrity
characteristic of more broadly originate from the reliability and ethical behaviour
electoral integrity and of the institutions that manage them (Coglianese 2016; Drahos
election outcomes. 2017)—namely EMBs and other institutions enforcing anti-vote-
buying legislation. Elections are high-stakes events due to political
actors’ short-term interests. Voters may be reluctant to trust an EMB
or regulatory and judicial system that is not considered competent,
and therefore view an election as an opportunity for immediate and
personal gain. Similar concerns may arise if EMBs are perceived as
lacking a complete understanding and oversight of the systems in
use. However, public institutions cannot uphold trust on their own and
are not sufficient to solve more deeply rooted crises of confidence.
Citizens must recognize that vote buying breaches the norm of ballot
secrecy and ‘one person, one vote’ in order for the practice to lessen
during election campaigns.
 3. DRIVERS OF VOTE BUYING 23

Programmatic political parties

The policy offering, or lack thereof, made by political parties and Parties that commit
candidates may also make voters more willing to engage in vote to implementing
buying. Programmatic political parties in a strong party system a clear set of
better represent different groups in society by aggregating their policies if elected
preferences and are therefore accountable to citizens. Parties that make themselves
commit to implementing a clear set of policies if elected make accountable to the
themselves accountable to the people to deliver on their promises. people to deliver on
In many contexts, parties pursue other strategies to secure voters’ their promises.
support, such as vote buying. The legitimacy of representation
achieved through vote buying is likely highly contingent on the
historical, political and economic context. Citizens often hold political
parties with poor policy performance and a lack of accountability
in low esteem (Cheesman et al. 2014). In these contexts, voters—
particularly those who are poor or socially marginalized—may be
more willing to sell their vote.

In countries without a strong political party system, voters may be

more attracted to a candidate-focused political landscape, which
politicians willing to engage in vote buying can exploit to their
advantage. An absence of programmatic political parties and a
mutual acceptance by both candidates and voters of vote buying are
self-perpetuating and hamper the development of an inclusive and
accountable political system.

3.2. DEMAND-SIDE DRIVERS Vote buying and

pervasive poverty are
Poverty and social vulnerability inextricably linked,
Vote buying and pervasive poverty are inextricably linked, although although not all voters
not all voters living in financial hardship would necessarily sell living in financial
their vote. Poor voters are more likely to be offered (and to accept) hardship would
monetary or other benefits for their votes (Jensen and Justesen necessarily sell their
2014; Kramon 2013). The same amount of cash has greater value vote.
to a poorer person than to a wealthier one—referred to as the
‘diminishing marginal utility of income’. It is thus cheaper for political
actors to buy the votes of the poor (Stokes 2007). Poor voters
may also be more likely to discount the future benefits on which
programmatic election campaigns are built. Since poorer voters are
more likely to live at or near subsistence levels, they may be more
24 VOTE BUYING

inclined to reward a small welfare transfer made directly to their

household with their vote, rather than a promise of the future delivery
of public goods (Khemani 2010). Poverty is therefore regarded as one
of the key enablers of political clientelism (Hicken 2011).

In countries or electoral districts that have a significant number of

voters who are socially, economically or politically marginalized,
poorer voters living in densely populated neighbourhoods (or slums)
may be regarded as ‘vote banks’. Many who live a largely subsistence
existence are only concerned with handouts they can receive from
politicians during an election campaign. The scale of vote buying
in districts with such large numbers of voters has the potential to
significantly undermine a democratic election; a polity, particularly at
the subnational level, could be captured through actionable ‘banks’ of
voters living in such neighbourhoods (Björkman 2014).

Lower educational attainment, regarded as a proxy for socio-

economic vulnerability in developing countries (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç
2015), may increase the potential to be approached by candidates’
brokers seeking to engage in vote buying. In the Philippines,
vote-buying brokers target low-income voters by leveraging their
vulnerability and dependence, including with offers of essential items
(Canare, Mendoza and Lopez 2018).

Civic stance and cultural norms

Voters may engage In addition to socio-economic vulnerability, voters may engage in
in vote buying due vote buying due to various civic and cultural or social characteristics.
to various civic and Voters who are uninterested in politics and attach limited importance
cultural or social to civic values may be more prone to agree to vote buying offers
characteristics. (Carlin and Moseley 2015). As noted above, some voters are thought
to accept electoral handouts because they resonate with their sense
of social justice. They may regard inducements as a rightful claim to
the resources of those in higher social strata and an opportunity to
achieve a measure of dignity (Schaffer and Schedler 2007).

Acceptance of vote buying may also be rooted in cultural or social

norms. For example, in Indonesia, candidates distribute handouts to
voters on the campaign trail as part of the social norm of gift giving.
Such handouts are not perceived as bribes, but rather as appropriate
gestures of generosity and goodwill (Muhtadi 2019). Similarly, vote-
 3. DRIVERS OF VOTE BUYING 25

Box 2. Cultural norms and vote buying in kinship-based communities

Some communities in Papua New Guinea constituency. This legal right permits voters
and Solomon Islands are structured around to register in a constituency other than where
traditional wantok kin networks. Strong they usually reside. Incumbent candidates
social obligations exist between members of entice voters to register in constituencies
wantoks, based on a responsibility to assist other than where they usually reside through
and support other members of the group and promises of gifts, cash or direct Constituency
to share material goods in times of need. A Development Fund benefits, such as the
person’s obligation to support their wantok payment of fees for public services including
remains if they assume a position of privilege education and healthcare (Batley et al. 2019;
or enter public life, such as political office NDI 2021).
(Cook and Winn 2012; Wood 2014).
Nepal also has strong family kinship groups
The intersection between kinship groups with expected obligations between members.
and vote buying may be institutionalized In many rural Hindu communities that are
through government public policies. In socially and economically marginalized,
Solomon Islands, Members of Parliament extended family kinship groups form the
receive annual allocations of discretionary basis of established political and economic
Constituency Development Funds from alliances. Before an election, the leader
the Ministry of Rural Development of a kin group will meet with candidates’
for development programmes in their brokers to negotiate a cash fee for an agreed
constituencies. Moreover, a voter can register number of votes. The fee paid in local and
in any constituency if they either reside provisional elections in 2017 and 2022 was
there, are eligible to reside there or are a approximately NPR 2,000 for 50 votes (Nath
member of a group or tribe indigenous to the Mishra, Pandey and Yolkey Rai 2022).

buying brokers visiting voters in their homes in Thailand offer their

gifts in the culture of respect for the host, where guests would be
considered impolite if they came empty handed (Schaffer 2007).

Reliance on such norms embeds vote buying in the context of

reciprocity, engendering a sense of obligation on the part of the
voter to return the favour. Communities based on traditional kinship
systems may be particularly susceptible to vote buying, since the
practice may be considered an extension of an established network
of support for extended family, ‘tribe’ or ‘clan’ members.
 26 VOTE BUYING

Vote buying is 3.3. INSTITUTIONAL ENABLERS

prohibited by law
in most countries, Lack of law enforcement
yet inadequate Vote buying is prohibited by law in most countries, yet inadequate
law enforcement law enforcement frequently enables its persistence. An inclination by
frequently enables its criminal justice systems, particularly the police, to allow vote-buying
persistence. activities to occur in some countries permits brokers to engage in
the practice with few obstructions. For example, Taiwan’s ruling
party has a history of blocking the investigation and prosecution
of its politicians for vote buying (Wang and Kurzman 2007). A
country’s procedural framework may also render its legal prohibition
ineffective. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, the police and prosecutors
have not investigated vote buying because the law categorized
this offence as a matter of ‘private prosecution’. A case could only
proceed if the victim of vote buying submitted the complaint and
evidence against the perpetrator directly to the court (OSCE ODIHR
2018).

In addition to police investigations, vote buying may also be

detected through the rigorous enforcement of comprehensive
campaign finance regulations, including the reporting, auditing and
scrutiny of campaign donations and expenditure. Expensive vote-
buying operations may be difficult to hide where political finance
reports are correctly submitted to the responsible regulator and
subsequently audited. Campaign finance expenditure reports may
reveal cash disbursements or the procurement of supplies used
in vote buying. However, opaque campaign finance legislation and
weak enforcement in some countries make vote buying difficult to
detect and do not deter candidates from circumventing reporting
requirements.

Insufficient safeguards of ballot secrecy

Vote buying is a more attractive electoral strategy to candidates who
view disbursements to voters as beneficial to their electoral success.
The secret ballot was historically devised as a safeguard to protect
voters’ freedom of choice from bribes and intimidation. Political
actors may use a variety of approaches to undermine ballot secrecy
to allow them to monitor voters’ compliance with the vote-buying
bargain. Party agents use their community connections to observe
voter behaviour, accompany voters to polling stations, assist voters
 3. DRIVERS OF VOTE BUYING 27

who falsely claim to be illiterate, pre-mark ballots and ask voters

to photograph ballot papers with mobile phones. Some polling
arrangements may facilitate these efforts. In Argentina, where party-
produced ballots were in use, brokers would supply voters with such
pre-marked ballots, which voters could not easily replace without
being detected (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2004).

Vote-buying operatives may also benefit from a perception among

voters that their ballots are not secret; candidate or party agents may Vote-buying
spread false information to this effect. Where voters are ill-informed operatives may
about their right to ballot secrecy, some candidates and their also benefit from a
agents capitalize on this to persuade or intimidate voters to believe perception among
their votes are not secret (Cruz 2019). Historical or other societal voters that their
considerations can also influence this perception, for example where ballots are not secret.
there is a history of credible accounts of voter fraud in previous
elections or new electoral systems or voting practices have been
introduced with limited public awareness or understanding of such
changes.
 28 INTERNATIONAL IDEA

Chapter 4

VOTE BUYING IN PRACTICE

Vote buying is difficult to accurately identify in practice, primarily due

Vote-buying to its illicit nature. The intended outcome—a vote for a candidate
operations may differ or party engaging in the practice—is difficult to prove because of
between political the principle of ballot secrecy. Furthermore, vote-buying operations
actors, depending may differ between political actors, depending on their strategy and
on their strategy and resources, even in the same election.
resources, even in the
same election. Vote-buying transactions differ depending on the societal and
political context, the extent of enforcement of the law by the
police and judicial institutions, and the electoral administration
arrangements. For example, when a voter is compensated with cash
or larger items of high value, the payment is usually made in advance.
Agreements between a broker and a voter, and the subsequent
transaction, will be made in person, often when a broker cannot
verify that a voter cast their ballot for the promised candidate. In
contexts where a broker has greater control over a voter honouring
their commitment to vote for a particular candidate, either genuine
or perceived, the payment may be made in two instalments, one
in advance and the other after election day. This strategy may be
deployed if the broker can verify (to a certain level of accuracy) that
a voter indeed cast their ballot for the candidate they promised.
Prior to election day, voters may share their personal data with the
broker and be subject to in-person visits at their address reminding
them to honour their agreement. The broker may also monitor the
polling station to witness a voter cast their ballot, or require voters to
photograph their completed ballot paper with their mobile phone.
 4. VOTE BUYING IN PRACTICE 29

Box 3. Implicit vote-buying strategies

Vote-buying strategies are not always (items beyond attainment for people living in
possible to definitively identify, especially poverty in Nepal) during campaigns for the
if benefits or gifts are provided in kind and parliamentary elections in 2017 and local
without voters’ direct participation in the elections in 2022. Candidates also provided
transaction. The vote-buying transaction financial contributions and in-kind benefits,
in this circumstance is implicit, yet not such as electricity generators, refrigerators
necessarily any less effective than when and food to community and social groups,
voters directly engage in a transaction. such as women’s institutions, with the implied
intent that group members cast their vote for
Political parties and candidates campaigning their candidate in return. The benefit is not
across Lebanon in parliamentary elections intended, or received, as payment for social
in 2022 distributed essential food items and development or a gesture to suggest that
medical supplies, as well as generators and such community groups would be supported
fuel. In some of the poorest districts in rural if the candidate were elected, but simply as
Nepal, several candidates held private parties inducement for a vote in the forthcoming
offering attendees meat, rice and alcohol election.

Sources: Nath Mishra, I., Pandey, C. and Yolkey Rai, B., International IDEA mentors in Nepal, participation
in a workshop with a co-author, 30 May 2022; European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM),
‘Nepal, House of Representatives and Provincial Assembly Elections, 26 November and 7 December 2017,
Final Report’, 2017; EU EOM, ‘Lebanon, Parliamentary Elections, 15 May 2022, Preliminary Statement’,
2022.

Electoral candidates engaging in vote buying generally operate

through networks of intermediary brokers who transact with voters.
Brokers may be party operatives or free agents who offer their
services to multiple parties and candidates. In some contexts,
candidates may only deal with a trusted group of top-level brokers,
who each manage a group of mid-level brokers. For example, in
Taiwan in 1993, at a county election with approximately 21,000
voters, a party recruited 26 top-level, 99 mid-level and 522 ground-
level brokers, each of whom was responsible for procuring
approximately 24 votes for the party (Wang and Kurzman 2007). In
Indonesia in 2014, candidates for provincial legislative elections were
estimated to employ between several dozen and several hundred
brokers (Muhtadi 2019). These examples demonstrate that a large-
scale vote-buying operation can be an expensive endeavour requiring
a significant level of effort. Vote buying also carries a financial risk
for political players engaging in the practice, since they have few
30 VOTE BUYING

Box 4. Nigeria: Political agents enforcing vote-buying transactions

Vote buying is illegal in Nigeria (Electoral Act During the country’s 2022 gubernatorial
2010, article 130, supplemented by anti-money elections, political party agents paid voters
laundering legislation, Money Laundering NGN 1,000–10,000 for their vote, depending
Act 2011, amended 2012), but widespread on the size of the political party paying.
in several electoral districts. Unenforced Voters displayed their completed ballot paper
legislation often results in vote-buying to party agents inside the polling station to
political parties and candidates operating demonstrate they voted for the candidate of
with impunity, not requiring the use of the vote-buying agent.
brokers’ services, and publicly viewing voters’
completed ballot papers in polling stations.

Source: Centre for Democracy and Development, ‘Fact check: Did APC not engage in vote buying as Ekiti
Governor-elect claimed?’, 21 June 2022, <https://cddwestafrica.org/fact-check-didnt-apc-engage-in-vote-
buying-as-ekiti-governor-elect-claimed>, accessed 28 June 2022.

effective ways to monitor their brokers. Appropriation of funds by

brokers contributes to the inefficiency of vote buying.

Political parties or candidates often select a broker for their personal

networks and knowledge of their community. Brokers approach
people in their close social networks, such as relatives, friends,
neighbours, co-workers or colleagues in other social activity groups.
Buying strangers’ votes is less common, but the strategy adopted
depends heavily on the specific country and societal context. Vote
buying generally occurs close to or on election day to minimize
the risk that rival brokers will offer voters other deals. However,
recruitment may be less well structured in contexts where vote-
buying practices are conducted in public settings or anti-vote-
buying legislation is not enforced. For example, brokers may be
poorly educated young men with limited skill sets or meaningful or
sustainable employment opportunities.
INTERNATIONAL IDEA 31

Chapter 5

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS TO
COUNTER VOTE BUYING

Vote buying may be rooted in the systemic shortcomings of political

institutions and the socio-economic environment, which pose a A significant factor
daunting challenge for even the most ambitious policy interventions behind the success
to enact reform. A significant factor behind the success of vote of vote buying in
buying in numerous contexts is poverty, social, economic and political numerous contexts
marginalization, and entrenched social or cultural norms, which will is poverty, social,
require a longer-term whole-of-society approach to overcome. In the economic and political
short to medium term, vote buying is an expensive electoral strategy marginalization, and
for candidates; they risk being caught performing an illegal act, and it entrenched social or
is often ineffective. Political actors should acknowledge this, even as cultural norms, which
some benefit from the status quo. will require a longer-
term whole-of-society
A range of measures may decrease the attractiveness of vote buying approach to overcome.
relative to other electoral strategies. This section outlines different
entry points for such measures, from constitutional and electoral
reform to law enforcement efforts to public information campaigns.
The effectiveness of each entry point depends on the country
context. A combination of complementary interventions may have a
greater cumulative effect than each separate action. For example, in
India’s 2014 general election, approximately 120,000 federal police
were deployed to prevent the procurement and transportation of
resources for vote buying, which included enforcing bans on the
sale of alcohol and limits on cash withdrawals, installing vehicle
checkpoints and shadowing candidates in their campaign activities.
 32 VOTE BUYING

5.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

REFORM

Relevant electoral campaign and anti-corruption legislation may

be codified in a national constitution, which therefore may require
amendment. Constitutional reform is by no means a straightforward
undertaking for any government. However, implementing significant
reforms offers opportunities to transform the design of institutions
with the aim of reducing, and ultimately irradicating, vote buying.
The independence of courts, EMBs, and anti-corruption and political
finance oversight agencies, and guarantees of impartial law
enforcement need to be adequately safeguarded in the constitution.
For example, in Costa Rica, generating the political will to improve
electoral integrity began with the establishment of the Supreme
Tribunal of Elections, codified in the Constitution (article 9) as the
sole body responsible for the organization of elections, tabulation of
votes and interpretation of electoral law (Lehoucq and Molina 2002).
Establishing institutions in a constitution rather than in statutory law
highlights their value and better insulates them from present and
future political interference.

The choice of electoral system adopted by a country or other

Since electoral system jurisdiction may also affect the prevalence of vote buying. Electoral
reform affects the systems that encourage intraparty competition provide incentives
nature of political for candidates to pursue personal electoral strategies, as occurred
competition and in Indonesia. Reverting from an open-list to a closed-list proportional
political institutions, representation system would therefore remove an important supply-
reform efforts should side driver of vote buying (Muhtadi 2019). It is important, however,
also consider the to consider how a policy intervention to counter one irregularity
compromises involved (vote buying) may, without appropriate legislation and enforcement,
in the choice of facilitate other irregularities (intraparty corruption to obtain a higher
different electoral position on the closed list). Since electoral system reform affects
systems the nature of political competition and political institutions, reform
efforts should also consider the compromises involved in the choice
of different electoral systems (see also Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis
2005).

Changes to institutions’ design should be grounded in the socio-

economic context. The 1997 Constitution of Thailand provides
a cautionary insight into a failed anti-corruption reform attempt.
 5. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS TO COUNTER VOTE BUYING 33

The Constitution aspired to end corrupt politics and vote buying.

It introduced several measures designed to strengthen executive
power and political parties, at the expense of individual politicians
and their factions. The electoral system for Members of Parliament
was changed from a bloc vote to a mixed system of single-member
plurality and list proportional representation. Voting was also made
compulsory. A new directly elected upper chamber, the Senate,
was designed to be impartial and above the often-contentious
nature of party politics. Senate candidates could not belong to a
political party and were restricted in their ability to campaign. The
Senate’s impartiality was intended to guarantee the selection of the
best qualified candidates for the newly established regulatory and
oversight agencies—the Constitutional Court, National Counter-
Corruption Commission and Election Commission (Kuhonta 2008).

Prior to the first elections held under Thailand’s new Constitution

in 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, one of the country’s wealthiest
businessmen, used his personal wealth to establish the Thai Rak
Thai Party (TRT) in 1998, which exploited the new constitutional rules
to its electoral advantage, winning in the three general elections it
contested. Vote buying was less prevalent in the 2001 election than
in previous elections, but it adopted new practices, such as TRT
canvassers paying voters to join the party. The new Senate was not
impartial, and Shinawatra used his influence to capture the regulatory
agencies. His increasingly authoritarian rule ended with the 2006
military coup (Kuhonta 2008). The 1997 Constitution did not address
the root causes of vote buying—such as corruption in the public
administration and the inequitable distribution of resources to rural
areas (Callahan 2005).

5.2. ELECTION MANAGEMENT REFORM Vote buying is more

attractive to political
Vote buying is more attractive to political actors if they can monitor actors if they can
compliance and are confident that a majority of voters who monitor compliance
committed to a vote-buying bargain will uphold their pledge. Voters’ and are confident
commitments can be monitored by exploiting weaknesses in the that most voters who
polling process that undermine ballot secrecy. For example, several committed to a vote-
countries do not use a single integrated ballot paper, but separate buying bargain will
ballot papers for each party or candidate. In some countries, political uphold their pledge.
 34 VOTE BUYING

parties are permitted to print and distribute individual ballot papers

before election day and outside polling stations on election day
(e.g. Argentina, France, Panama, Spain, Sweden). This approach can
jeopardize the principle of ballot secrecy and helps brokers monitor
voters’ compliance with vote-buying deals. The model allows brokers
to accompany voters to the polling station with their pre-filled ballot
papers and to monitor, or even enforce through intimidation, voters
as they queue to cast their vote. While the polling booth remains
accessible only to the voter, who could replace the ballot paper
provided by the broker with a different party ballot, the opportunity for
a voter to do so is likely to be limited (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes
2004). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, allegations of vote buying have
been reported in several federal and local elections; international
election observers have reported that voters frequently do not mark
their ballots in secret, groups of voters vote together and party agents
monitor voters leaving polling stations (OSCE ODIHR 2019). While
this evidence may be construed as incidental, these actions are
consistent with vote buying.

Where brokers lack the capacity or need to monitor individual

voters, the former may resort to aggregate monitoring. In Colombia,
vote buying has been more frequent in polling stations with fewer
registered voters. The lowest level of aggregated ballots and
published results (at the polling station level) gave brokers a more
accurate estimate of voter compliance. Knowing that brokers monitor
these results, voters in small polling stations had more reason to
fear the negative consequences of reneging on their vote-buying deal
(Rueda 2017).

The process of designing policy interventions to counter vote

The process of buying should include an assessment of the election administration.
designing policy Specifically, polling procedures should be reviewed to strengthen
interventions to the protection of ballot secrecy. A single integrated ballot paper
counter vote buying should be printed and distributed only by the EMB, on election day
should include or during the legal voting period in the polling station (excluding
an assessment absentee voting such as postal or proxy voting), to the registered
of the election voter. Additional regulation of partisan agents’ activities in and
administration. around polling stations should also be considered. Increasing the
number of voters assigned to each polling station could provide an
additional measure of protection against vote-buying monitoring and
 5. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS TO COUNTER VOTE BUYING 35

effectiveness. Alternative methods of allocating voters to polling

stations could also make it more difficult for brokers to monitor them.
In Colombia, voters residing in an electoral district are assigned
to polling stations alphabetically based on their name rather than
their address. The benefits of aggregating and reporting results at a
level higher than a single polling station (for example, pairing polling
stations for counting and reporting results) should be considered, but
weighed against the possible shortcomings. Furthermore, the use of
cameras inside polling stations should be made illegal to empower
polling station staff to stop voters photographing their completed
ballot paper, which brokers request as evidence of compliance with a
vote-buying commitment.

Brokers also benefit from voter perceptions that their ballots are not
secret. Moreover, brokers are known to spread false information,
particularly among socially vulnerable or marginalized voters.
Public information campaigns launched by EMBs and other actors
should counter such misinformation and utilize every opportunity to
instil and maintain confidence among voters that ballot secrecy is
protected, both legally and in practice.

5.3. ENFORCEMENT OF LEGISLATION

The pervasiveness of vote buying, despite legislation in multiple

countries banning the practice, suggests that the relevant legislation
and its enforcement is inadequate. Legislation should remain relevant
to different vote-buying methods and strategies deployed by brokers
and political candidates. These strategies, and their relationship to
a particular societal context, constantly evolve. A review of existing
bans may reveal a need for their modification or the consideration of
additional prohibitions. Such considerations may include the type of
payment that brokers offer to voters, such as a decline in cash and
an increase in specific material goods, or an increase in voters live
filming (vs. photographing) a completed ballot paper with a mobile
telephone to circumvent legislation prohibiting photography in polling
stations.

Vote-buying strategies are often highly context specific, varied

and potentially difficult to prove as a breach of anti-vote-buying
36 VOTE BUYING

legislation. For example, during a 2011 gubernatorial election

campaign in Mexico, a candidate offered voters personal access to
state services if they won the election. Brokers provided pre-payment
or ATM (automatic teller machine)-style cards to voters with a
guarantee of credits deposited onto the card to be used to access
state-wide programmes that the candidate vowed to initiate if they
won the election. The programmes included healthcare support, food
provision, scholarships, pensions, home improvement projects and
agricultural subsidies. The candidate’s campaign distributed more
than 2 million payment cards (Stokes et al. 2013). In Moldova in 2021,
a political party was promoted through a chain of discount grocery
shops targeted at socially vulnerable voters (Box 5). It is important
to note that while these examples fit the Primer’s definition of vote
buying, these practices were legal under the respective countries’
anti-vote-buying legislation.

Box 5. Moldova: If it looks like vote buying, is it?

A wealthy businessman and founder of a a voter of money, property, services or other

political party named after himself, Ilan Şor, benefits, to induce the voter to exercise
funded a parallel project of ‘social shops’ electoral rights or refrain from exercising
called MeriŞor. An expansive chain of shops such rights during parliamentary, presidential,
throughout Moldova, MeriŞor stores offer local elections, or a referendum’. MeriŞor
groceries and household goods and target shops are operated by a business entity
socially vulnerable groups, including the that is legally separate from the Şor Party.
poor, the elderly and people with disabilities. Party representatives are confident that the
Holders of MeriŞor loyalty cards receive arrangement does not breach any laws. In
discounts in the shops. The Şor Party the snap parliamentary elections held in July
promotes MeriŞor shops on its website as 2021, the Şor Party was one of only three
exemplifying its social responsibility. MeriŞor election contestants to cross the electoral
shops feature the Şor Party’s logo, and during threshold, gaining 6 seats in the 101-member
election campaigns, additional mobile ‘pop- legislature. Complaints of vote buying by
up’ shops operate from trailers across the other parties made to the Central Election
country. Commission and to law enforcement bodies
have not been pursued due to a lack of
Moldova’s penal law prohibits vote buying, evidence the law was broken.
which is defined as ‘an offer or provision to

Sources: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights, ‘Republic of Moldova, Early Parliamentary Elections of 11 July 2021. Final Report of the
OSCE ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Warsaw’, 22 December 2021.
 5. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS TO COUNTER VOTE BUYING 37

Even well-designed and well-drafted anti-vote-buying legislation will

be ineffective if law enforcement bodies do not pursue investigations Even well-designed
and prosecute offenders. A lack of enforcement may be the result of and well-drafted anti-
multiple causes. In some contexts, law enforcement bodies may be vote-buying legislation
cautious of the political consequences of rigorously pursuing vote will be ineffective
buyers. This may be due to a lack of political independence in law if law enforcement
enforcement bodies, a fear of accusations of political interference bodies do not pursue
or a combination of both. These risks are more pronounced in investigations and
competitive political environments. For relevant legislation and prosecute offenders.
enforcement to be effective, strong political support to counter vote
buying is needed.

The successful investigation and prosecution of vote buying require

cooperation with voters as informants and witnesses. If selling
votes is a punishable offence, which is often the case, victims and
witnesses have few incentives to cooperate with law enforcement
bodies. The benefits of criminalizing vote selling should therefore
be weighed against the negative impact on the effectiveness of law
enforcement efforts. In Taiwan during the 1990 election, an important
aspect of the successful crackdown on vote buying was rewarding
private citizens for information leading to the conviction of vote
buyers (Box 6).

5.4. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS

Campaign finance regulations may be regarded as providing limited

scope to counter vote buying because of the obvious criminal nature,
but importantly because the practice is usually highly personal,
taking place between a broker and a voter in a private space. Since
vote buying is illegal, it would not be expected to be reflected in
accounting records and political party or candidate campaign finance
reports. However, a functional framework of campaign finance
rules that encompasses specific electoral law as well as other anti-
corruption and anti-money laundering legislation, and their oversight,
should contribute to detecting and investigating vote buying as
parties and candidates require resources to buy votes. The transfer
of (often large amounts of) financial resources or the unexplainable
procurement of goods and services may be detectable through
financial audits conducted by campaign finance oversight bodies. An
38 VOTE BUYING

Box 6. Taiwan: Decisive law enforcement action against vote buying

Vote buying was widespread in Taiwan in appeal. The campaign against vote buying
the early 1990s. Surveys estimated that at gathered even greater momentum after the
least a quarter of voters accepted cash or election of opposition candidate Chen Shui-
goods from candidates and their brokers. bian of the Democratic Progressive Party
In 1993, President Lee Teng-hui appointed (DPP) as president in 2000. He appointed a
a justice minister who declared fighting new minister of justice, widely respected for
electoral corruption his highest priority. The his integrity. On the new minister’s watch,
minister oversaw the indictment of 436 prosecutors frequently used wiretapping and
politicians for vote buying within 5 months; forensic accounting techniques and rewarded
half were convicted. The political signal was private citizens for information leading to
particularly powerful since nearly all those the conviction of vote buyers. During the first
indicted belonged to the ruling Kuomintang three years of the DPP administration, the
(KMT) party. number of vote-buying cases prosecuted
almost quadrupled compared to the previous
Between 1995 and 1998 prosecutors three years. Opinion polls and election
won 4,375 convictions for vote buying observers noted a marked decline in vote
in southwest Taiwan alone. Political buying. Some observers assessed the 2001
interference reportedly led higher courts to election as the cleanest in the country’s
overturn the convictions of several prominent history.
KMT members, but most were upheld on

Sources: Schaffer, F. C., The Hidden Costs of Clean Election Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2008); Wang, C.-S. and Kurzman, C., ‘The logistics: How to buy votes’, in F. C. Schaffer (ed.), Elections for
Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying (Boulder, CO: Rienner Publishers, 2007).

oversight body with field monitoring capacity should identify signs of

vote buying, such as the offer of services or goods, during visits to
campaign offices and events.

Sanctions against violations of campaign finance regulations will

serve as an additional deterrent to vote buying by raising the cost
of being caught. For example, in Mexico, political parties can be
sanctioned with a reduction of 50 per cent of their allocated public
funds (General Law on Electoral Institutions and Procedures, 2020,
article 456). In the Republic of Korea, political parties and candidates
face a financial penalty up to KRW 10 million or imprisonment and
are forbidden from standing for public office for 10 years following
conviction (Political Funds Act, 2021, articles 45 and 57). Wide-
ranging electoral reform in Mexico in 2014 included constitutional
 5. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS TO COUNTER VOTE BUYING 39

reform to encourage stringent adherence to campaign finance

regulations. For example, a winning candidate found to have violated
political finance rules, such as exceeding the spending limit or
obtaining illegal funding, required the annulment of an election
and a new election to be organized. The candidate that won the
annulled election (and was proven to have breached campaign
finance regulations) would not be permitted to run in the new election
(Constitution of Mexico, article 41 (VI)).

Enforcing campaign finance regulations is a challenge for many

oversight bodies, as determining whether money or gifts in the Enforcing campaign
possession of a suspected vote-buying broker are destined to finance regulations is
buy votes is difficult to prove and must be balanced against an a challenge for many
individual’s personal liberty in a democratic society. In India, ahead oversight bodies.
of parliamentary elections in 2019 and State Assembly elections
in 2022, the Electoral Commission of India (ECI) and several
state electoral commissions deployed ‘flying squad teams, static
surveillance teams and video surveillance teams’ during the election
campaign period. The ‘flying squads’ were mandated to seize cash
from any individual carrying more than INR 50,000; cash seized by
these squads was deposited in the State Treasuries. The ECI set
a campaign expenditure limit of INR 308,000 for each candidate
and established a monetary value for 150 items that could be used
in a vote-buying transaction. A no-cost telephone line and mobile
telephone apps were established for voters to report instances of
vote buying to the flying squads (The Tribune India 2021; The Hindu
2022; The Indian Express 2022).

Campaign finance regulations that prohibit vote buying comprise

three components: (a) implementation of transparency and
accountability measures to restrict the source of donations to
political parties and candidates; (b) the amount of money a political
party or candidate can accept; and (c) the amount they can spend on
an electoral campaign.

Additional campaign finance regulations include a ceiling on

campaign expenditure made by political parties and candidates
and the extension of this regulation to donors, or ‘third-party’
campaigners—an organization or person that supports a political
party or candidate but does not stand for election. A ceiling on
40 VOTE BUYING

campaign expenditure could be imposed to facilitate equity between

candidates in an election, prohibit undue influence, and limit the
increase in the cost of election campaigns for parties and candidates,
while strengthening provisions to regulate campaign finance.
Globally, approximately 50 per cent of countries limit the amount of
money a candidate can spend on an election campaign and 45 per
cent do not (International IDEA n.d.).3 Limiting the cost of electoral
politics can also help reduce the barriers for less well-financed
political players to contest an election, irrespective of the strength
of their support among the electorate. (See Box 7 for an example of
campaign finance expenditure regulation in the United Kingdom.)
A ceiling on campaign expenditure alone may have minimal effect
on mitigating vote buying, as spending on the practice would be
unreported because of its illegal nature. However, the requirement for
all campaign expenditure transactions to be conducted electronically
through a bank account and a ban on cash-based transactions would
enhance the ability of campaign finance oversight bodies to monitor
compliance with regulations.

Campaign finance regulations may offer solutions for ‘marginal’

cases where vote-buying bans are ineffective or specific regulation is
missing. For example, the legal frameworks do not always expressly
address charitable activities by political parties and candidates. Such
activities may have to be regarded as campaign spending and be
subject to the same requirements, including reporting and spending
limits. For example, in Armenia’s 2012 parliamentary elections, a
company affiliated with a businessman who was also the leader
of the Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP) distributed approximately
500 tractors to rural communities as part of the PAP’s campaign.
Following an investigation, the Central Election Commission did
not find that any laws had been breached, but the tractors were not
accounted for in the PAP’s campaign expenses, raising legitimate
questions about the effectiveness of campaign spending limits
(OSCE ODIHR 2012). In some countries social expectations and
cultural norms related to gift giving make the identification of vote
buying challenging, even within a legal framework. An appropriate

3 Nearly half (49.7 per cent) of countries limit the amount of money a candidate can
spend on an election campaign, while 45.8 per cent do not; data are not available for
2.8 per cent of countries. Data are correct as of 2020, according to the International
IDEA Political Finance Database, Question 41: ‘Are there limits on the amount a
candidate can spend?’ (November 2022).
 5. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS TO COUNTER VOTE BUYING 41

Box 7. United Kingdom: Regulating candidate campaign finance expenditure

Campaign expenditure is regulated in the general election. All expenditure for regulated
UK during the period before an election. The activities must be reported to the Electoral
length of this ‘regulated’ period for individual Commission within three months of an election
candidates depends on the type of election, if a party spent less than GBP 250,000 or
but it covers the period that an individual is within six months if it spent more. Furthermore,
formally a candidate. For general elections, donations and loans to candidates and political
this period starts the moment the former parties above GBP 500 can only be made by a
parliament is dissolved, which is usually defined type of donor and must be reported to
approximately five weeks. The amount the Electoral Commission.
candidates can spend on campaigning is
limited and restricted to certain activities. In Political parties in the UK are eligible to receive
the regulated period prior to the 2019 general an annual direct public subsidy through
election, the spending limit for candidates was the Policy Development Grant, paid by the
GBP 8,700.00 plus GBP 0.06 per registered UK Parliament and disbursed through the
voter in urban constituencies and GBP 0.09 per Electoral Commission. The grant consists of
voter in rural constituencies. Expenditure on a total of GBP 2 million to be spent across all
advertising—including posters, television and eligible political parties. The subsidy supports
online adverts, leaflets sent to voters, public parties to develop policy to be included in
rallies, and operational and administration their manifestos. It is only available to political
costs—are regarded as ‘candidate spending’ parties with two or more seats in the lower
and must fall within the limit and be declared to chamber of the Houses of Parliament. The
the Electoral Commission. amount each party is allocated has a ceiling.
Payments are split: 75 per cent of the grant is
Political parties’ campaign spending is paid at the beginning of a financial year, and the
regulated by separate rules, as is spending remainder is disbursed upon the submission
by non-political party (or candidate) and verification of a report outlining a
campaigners—third-party’ campaigners party’s final and eligible expenditure. Parties
on behalf of a party or candidate. Parties, and candidates also receive regular public
candidates and third-party campaigners subsidies for ordinary operational costs but
must all be registered with the Electoral not electoral campaign costs. Basic financial
Commission. Expenditure by political parties assistance, known as ‘short money’, is paid to
or other groups on activities that support a opposition parties in the lower chamber. These
candidate is generally regarded as candidate funds are paid to parties that won either two
spending. seats, or one seat and more than 150,000 votes
in the previous general election.
The regulated period for party spending is
longer, usually beginning 365 days prior to a

Sources: Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000; Elections Act 2022; The UK Electoral
Commission, ‘Public funding for political parties’, [n.d.], <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-
are-and-what-we-do/financial-reporting/donations-and-loans/public-funding-political-parties>.
 42 VOTE BUYING

solution in such circumstances is to define what constitutes an

acceptable contribution from a political party or candidate to
prospective voters. The defined contribution would be reported to the
campaign finance oversight agency as a campaign expenditure.

Public information 5.5. PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

campaigns are a
common intervention Public information campaigns are a common intervention to address
to address the demand the demand side of vote buying. The messaging strategy may differ,
side of vote buying. but usually resembles one of two variations. In the first, campaigners
may seek to convince voters not to accept money or other offerings
from parties and candidates. The second urges individuals to vote
with their conscience and not to allow money and gifts to sway their
judgment. For example, a Ugandan public information campaign
against vote buying conducted during the 2016 general election by a
coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) advised voters
to ‘eat widely but vote wisely’. While the choice of the messaging
strategy is context-specific, it should convey messages that resonate
with the recipients.

While the campaign did not decrease the extent of vote buying,
with regard to either offers or their acceptance, it appeared to
influence voters’ attitudes to reciprocity and empowered more
voters to make their choice regardless of the gifts they received.
While the social norm of refusal was not established, the social
norm of reciprocity appeared to have been weakened. In addition,
the campaign empowered new and opposition candidates to
challenge the advantage of incumbent candidates by campaigning
more widely (including through vote buying) and in the incumbents’
strongholds. The campaign’s effect was thus increased support
for new candidates challenging incumbents and a reduction of the
incumbency advantage (Blattman et al. 2019).

In India, during the 2014 general elections, several radio

advertisements with dramatized conversations between voters
conveyed the message that vote-buying parties were less likely to
deliver on their promises of public services and urged citizens to vote
for non-vote-buying candidates. The radio campaign reduced the vote
share of vote-buying parties by 4–7 per cent. Its effects were more
 5. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS TO COUNTER VOTE BUYING 43

pronounced in areas with more non-vote-buying parties (Vasudevan

2019). The campaign was conducted primarily during the ‘silent
period’ before election day, giving parties little or no time to adapt
their strategies. In the Philippines, during municipal elections in 2013,
voters were provided with information about the mayoral candidates’
spending plans for public funding in their area, which helped them
compare candidates’ policy proposals. Incumbent mayors responded
to this information campaign with intensified vote-buying efforts
(Cruz, Keefer and Labonne 2016).

As with most public policy, context is significant for its success.

Public information campaigns should reflect an understanding of the Public information
social norms that are likely to inform voter behaviour and different campaigns
voters’ perspectives in society. Campaigns against vote buying should reflect an
that have had only limited success may be the result of differences understanding of the
between voters’ attitudes. For example, voters concerned with social norms that
anti-corruption efforts in an election may regard vote buying as an are likely to inform
outcome of the ignorance of voters who engage in this practice. voter behaviour and
Voters who sell their vote may regard it as a commodity that they different voters’
can sell to corrupt politicians. Additionally, some voters may believe perspectives in
clientelist politicians understand their socio-economic position or society.
desire for enhanced dignity (Schaffer 2008). Furthermore, public
information campaigns should be conducted in conjunction with the
exposure of political actors to the electoral practices and conduct of
political parties in countries regarded as having limited incidences
of vote buying. For example, through international political party or
parliamentarian exchange programmes to facilitate the transfer of
global anti-vote-buying norms and knowledge (Mccoy 2001).

An important consideration in the design and implementation of any

public information campaign is to determine why voters are willing
to engage in vote buying. Where vote buying is the consequence
of a cultural or social norm, any public information campaign must
seek to shift the narrative regarding societal relations and practices
of interaction between community members, particularly regarding
ballot secrecy and the act of casting a vote, which may contribute to
an acceptance of vote buying.
 44 INTERNATIONAL IDEA

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

This Primer offers an overview of vote buying, including its causes

and how to design effective strategies to address the practice and
improve the integrity of electoral processes. The ambition and
scope of any strategy will necessarily depend on the legal powers,
and financial and human resources at the disposal of politicians,
law enforcement bodies and regulatory institutions, as well as their
collective political will.

Political actors engage in vote buying if they believe it works better

Political actors engage than other strategies to win an election. The attractiveness of vote
in vote buying if they buying will decrease by making it less reliable and subject to rigorous
believe it works better enforcement and appropriate punishment. A government-devised
than other strategies action plan can afford to be more ambitious than an EMB or an NGO
to win an election. coalition in enacting reforms to mitigate electoral fraud. However,
unless the social, cultural and economic conditions in a society that
drive corruption are addressed, efforts to reduce vote buying will be
curtailed. Decision makers devising strategies to counter vote buying
may consider the following framework to identify weaknesses and
design relevant policy interventions.

• A political or electoral system that is less conducive to making

vote buying an attractive electoral strategy, such as an electoral
system that encourages intraparty competition and produces
narrow margins of victory or has small electoral districts.

• Remove procedural or institutional weaknesses that can be

exploited to undermine ballot secrecy. For example, politicians
or agents engaging in vote buying may exploit specific electoral
 6. CONCLUSION 45

procedures to monitor voters’ compliance or create a perception

among voters that their ballot is not secret.

• Focus anti-electoral-fraud legislation on the organizational

structures of vote buying and remaining relevant with the various
vote-buying schemes employed. Inadequate law enforcement
may be due to structural barriers such as political influence
on law enforcement bodies. It may also be due to procedural
deficiencies or a lack of resources. Consideration should include
the perspectives of the law enforcement personnel responsible for
investigating and prosecuting vote buying.

• Rigorous enforcement of adequate campaign finance regulations

that includes penalties that exceed the benefit of engaging in vote
buying for political actors. Registration of third-party campaigners
with the EMB or political finance oversight agency according to
the same rules as political parties and candidates. Expenditure by
political parties or third-party groups on campaign activities that
support a candidate is regarded as candidate spending. The body
mandated to enforce campaign finance regulations, as well as
the sanctions for non-compliance, should be an independent legal
entity with adequate powers, financial resources and the human
capacity to fulfil its purpose.

• Develop and promote public information campaigns prior to and

during the pre-election period, as well as in the post-election
period. Public acceptance of vote buying may be rooted in cultural
or social norms or voters’ expectations of how politicians should
behave. Understanding how these attitudes vary among different
social strata, and how they are formed by voters’ experiences,
may enable more effective deployment of public information
campaigns that shift publicly held views about voting in elections.

• Identify alternative measures to reduce the attractiveness of vote

buying as an electoral strategy. For example, during an electoral
campaign period, election contestants should be provided with
equal and no-cost access to TV and radio, as well as online
platforms.
46 VOTE BUYING

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-en/​topics/​ei/​default>, accessed 23 November 2022
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.int/​publications/​catalogue/​funding​-political​-parties​-and​-election​-campaigns​-handbook​
-political​-finance>, accessed 23 November 2022
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 51

About the authors

Oliver Joseph works in the Electoral Processes Programme at

International IDEA. He oversees research and technical assistance
covering a portfolio of election-related topics, specializing in electoral
management, electoral systems and absentee voting. Oliver has
experience conducting electoral assessments and has authored and
contributed to several knowledge resources on electoral processes
and electoral integrity. He has served as a seconded election expert
on technical assistance missions and as an election analyst and
observer on several international election observation missions. Prior
to joining International IDEA, Oliver managed the voter registration,
ballot paper, and postal ballot paper design and production process
for local electoral management bodies in the UK. He also coordinated
good governance programmes at two international development
finance institutions. Oliver holds a Master of Arts degree in
International Relations and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Science, both from University College London (UCL), UK.

Vasil Vashchanka holds a Master of Laws degree from Central

European University (Budapest, Hungary) and is currently an external
researcher at the Research Centre for State and Law of Radboud
University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands), where he focuses on
corruption and political finance. Vasil worked on rule of law and
democratization at the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland) between 2002 and 2012 and was
a programme officer with International IDEA’s Electoral Processes
team (Stockholm, Sweden) between 2012 and 2014. Vasil has served
as a consultant on legal and electoral issues for the OSCE, Council
of Europe and the UN. He has taken part in international election
observation missions, authored expert reviews of legislation and
published academically.
52 VOTE BUYING

ABOUT THE PRIMER SERIES

International IDEA’s Electoral Processes Primers are arranged

around various thematic aspects of the electoral cycle. The Primers
are intended to explain existing issues as well as emerging trends
in elections to policymakers, practitioners, public officials and civil
society organizations.
About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

(International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the
mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human
aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this
by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of
democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision
is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are
inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

WHAT WE DO

In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral

processes; constitution-building processes; and political participation
and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, conflict
sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all
our areas of work.

International IDEA provides analyses of global and regional

democratic trends; produces comparative knowledge on democratic
practices; offers technical assistance and capacity-building on reform
to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue
on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy
building.

WHERE WE WORK

Our headquarters are located in Stockholm, and we have regional

and country offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin
America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent
Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union
institutions.
<https://www.idea.int>
 International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE-103 34 Stockholm
SWEDEN
+46 8 698 37 00
info@idea.int
www.idea.int

Vote buying is an electoral campaign violation that occurs in

many countries, which undermines the integrity of elections and is
detrimental to democratic governance. Many factors beyond electoral
politics drive vote buying. Such factors influence the ‘supply side’
(political actors’ decisions to engage in vote buying), the ‘demand side’
(voters’ willingness to participate in vote buying) or both.

This Primer outlines what vote buying is (and what it is not) and
analyses the drivers behind the practice. It provides insights into
vote-buying strategies and practices before considering options for
policy interventions to effectively counter the practice. It also offers an
analytical framework for a strategic approach to support such efforts
to stakeholders seeking to gain comparative insights into vote buying
and mitigation.

ISBN: 978-91-7671-581-9 (PDF)