A look upon Turkey’s Future Nuclear

Weapons Policy
On 4th September 2019, President Erdoğan announced that it was unacceptable for
nuclear-armed states to forbid Ankara from obtaining its own nuclear weapons.
With this statement, many questions sparked upon Turkey’s motivations for a
potential nuclear weapons programme. Turkey, as an early signatory to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, is obliged to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to
further the goals of nuclear disarmament. It is, however, allowed to cooperate in
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

While this statement underlines Erdoğan’s willingness to be more independent on

its defence strategy rather than staying under radar and cooperate, Turkey’s
domestic policies upon nuclear industry isn’t so clear. With the rising tension upon
Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Israel’s continuous allegations
upon unofficial nuclear arms threat; Turkey is inevitably a part of this proliferation
question.

In this regard, this paper aims to look upon Turkey’s past nuclear policies that have
been taken by governments, as well as a future probability of becoming a
proliferation domino after President Erdoğan’s statement.

A historical rebound for Turkey and Nuclear Sharing of NATO

The presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey is an issue related to Turkey’s

membership in NATO since 1952. In 1955, Turkey’s will for nuclear energy
showed its presence by joining the Atoms for Peace Program. In this perspective,
Turkey’s first interaction within a nuclear crisis took place upon Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1961, with the presence of American Jupiter Ballistic Missiles located in
Çiğli, Izmir. After the decision to retire Jupiter missiles, Turkey integrated into a
new nuclear sharing system of NATO alongside with four other countries:
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. This system of nuclear sharing,
which was constructed during (the) early cold war, was conceived to prevent
further independent proliferation among the western allies. Following these events,
Turkey ratified the NPT in 1979 and has had a safeguards agreement in force with
the IAEA since 1981.

Today, according to different sources, Turkey hosts 60 to 70 missiles in Incirlik

Air Base under NATO umbrella and invests on different nuclear power plants as a
key aspect for country’s economic boost.

Past Turkish Policies upon Nuclear

Unlike Europe, Turkish politics do not include an environmental policy or

approach. In this perspective, Turkish government invests in the field to develop
nuclear power generation but not for actual nuclear weapons.

While this lack of clear policy upon nuclear weapons doesn’t say much about
Turkish citizens’ perspective, governments had different policies upon years. For
example, between 1983 and 1987, the 45th Turkish Government or first civilian
government after 1980 Turkish Coup d’État, was active under Turgut Özal’s prime
ministry. Özal, was a representative of The Motherland Party of Turkey (ANAP),
based on centre-right, neoliberal foundations and encouraging free-market reforms.
Under this government, there were plans for establishing a nuclear power
generation since 1970, which were interrupted after the event of Chernobyl in
1986. Chernobyl has changed the public opinion and slowed down government’s
investment on this issue. Even Kazım Koyuncu (one of the main anatolian rock
singers in the country back then and died later on due to cancer) started a resistance
movement against the unhealthy effects of nuclear power plants. Upon
developments after Chernobyl, administration showed its concern upon decrease
on tourism and commerce specifically on tea and nut exports coming from Black
Sea region. Later on, Özal, several ministers and General Kenan Evren, who was
the main designated person in Military Junta of 1980, made explanations to
comfort the situation and intenseness in general.

In the matter of nuclear weapons threat on one occasion, in 2006, military chief of
staff Gen. Himi Özkök referred implicitly to the nuclear option. He stated, ”The
presence of countries possessing or suspected of possessing weapons of mass
destruction on the axis from North Korea all the way to the Middle East is a
serious and determining threat for our country today”. Furthermore, he said, “If the
problem [of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction] cannot be resolved
despite the intense diplomatic efforts of the international community, I see a strong
likelihood that we will face some important decision stages in the near future.
Otherwise, we will face the prospect of losing our strategic superiority in the
region.” Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the Iranian government
under President Ahmadinejad is no longer present and the premises of JCPOA
seems to be crumbling.

However, certainly after the question of S-400 systems, the geopolitical context
has changed for Turkey. While US sanctions have not applied for the missile
purchase, Turkey’s changing role in the alliance as well as in the region are raising
many questions, including a potential proliferation dilemma.

Alongside these past developments, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry

currently accentuates that “Turkey’s active participation in international efforts in
these areas, adherence to relevant international instruments and their full
implementation”. Plus, it openly states that “Turkey has also welcomed the UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 regarding the prevention of the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”. It is highly
interesting that, while the foreign ministry openly stays objective and shows
Turkey’s commitment on non-proliferation, President’s recent statement seems to
open a door for a complicated paradox.

What hesitations in the future?

Today, Turkey’s current policymaking related to nuclear weapons and nuclear

proliferation is highly dependent on NATO Umbrella. Although nuclear deterrence
lost the majority of its reliability since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey
keeps hosting U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Incirlik as a part of ‘burden sharing
principle’. It is true that Turkey has been investing nuclear energy and
collaborating with Russian and Japanese leading firms such as Rosatom. However,
in a matter of launching a national nuclear weapons programme, Turkey has
different challenges to face.

Different scholars and analysts state that the probability of launching such
engagement in nuclear weapons is far long for Turkey. Kadri Gürsel explains that
while Erdoğan called out for “no nuclear weapons in the region” before, with the
current crisis of S-400 and deprivation of F-35 warplanes, geopolitical context has
changed. Sinan Ülgen, on the other hand, hints that the statement is filled with
populism. He argues that “Erdoğan went a step further, insinuating that Turkey
was making preparations, yet it is difficult to imagine Turkey going down this
path”.

Additionally, according to the White Book that has been published in 1998,
Turkey’s military strategy in the 21st century is aiming four initial articles:
Deterrence, Military Support to the Crisis Management, Defending from Forward
and Collective Security. What is interesting in those four articles is the statement
of “Being an active participant in international and regional alliances/organizations
such as NATO and BAB and existing European Security and Defense Identities
(ESCK), remains as one of the key elements of the Turkish National Military
Strategy”. With this statement, it is observed that Turkey is ready to commit to its
alliances in the long term and even plans its national security strategy accordingly.
Therefore, the government announces its commitment to the international
community; which is far away from President Erdoğan’s statement.

Besides the financial, political and social aspects of such proliferation, Turkey’s
engagements in the international arena and treaties such as NPT are crucial aspects
that the government probably cannot afford to violate. The signal that President
Erdoğan was giving to the world might have been harsher that in sounded in this
matter. Without no legitimate financial or social research support, it mentioned that
as Turkey was concentrating on a nuclear program, however, in the overall security
context in the region it is hard to see such a route for Ankara.

Conclusion

Even though nuclear arms might be seen as a source of national prestige, Turkey
has no intentions to pursue such program in a near future, as it is included in
NATO’s burden-sharing principle. Furthermore, in such case, Turkey would have
to leave many international treaties that has signed such as NPT and might bow to
further sanctions like Iran. However, changing regional context upon Israeli
relations, Iran’s failed JCPOA and purchase of S-400 missiles shape President
Erdoğan’s statements as well. In this perspective, while Erdoğan’s claims seem
mostly unrealistic, it might be a signal for a change in the country’s future.
Turkey’s Geostrategy: Opportunism and
Dissonance
Under AKP rule, Turkey has attempted to chart an independent course,
focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and Africa while
not shying away from confronting the West. But there are limits to this
strategy.
Sinem Adar

Turkish foreign policy has undergone a massive transformation during the

past two decades under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Today, Turkey is diplomatically, economically, and militarily active in its
immediate and wider neighborhood. Ankara has a high potential to
disrupt thanks to heavy investment in soft- and hard-power instruments.
Turkish decision-makers, starting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at
the top, are less reluctant today to act independently of their Western allies.

But is there a grand strategy behind Turkey’s foreign policy activism? A

simultaneous look at Turkish policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black
Sea, and Africa shows that Turkey’s goals and actual capacity are not always
compatible. Ankara’s aspirations to gain influence are confined by its
economic woes, fragile relations with its Western allies, and the limited
ability to mobilize partners and allies in line with its interests.

Eastern Mediterranean Tensions: “Old” Problems,

Regional Realignment
Long-lasting threat perceptions drive Turkish policy in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Ankara’s priority is to prevent Kurdish autonomy under the
leadership of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People’s Protection
Units (YPG) in northern Syria, which Turkey sees as an extension of
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The United States, the European Union,
and Turkey regard the PKK as a terrorist organization. Since the collapse in
2015 of the so-called peace process with the organization, Ankara has largely
pushed its affiliates and offshoots to Northern Syria and Northern Iraq. The
aim is to weaken—if not eliminate—the organization’s senior leadership
and infrastructural capacity by military means.

Meanwhile, Ankara is trying to mobilize its NATO allies to designate the

PYD/YPG as a terrorist group. Not only does the Turkish government regard
the support it receives from its allies in its fight against the PKK as
insufficient, but it also sees the US partnership with the PYD/YPG in
northern Syria as a hindrance to its policy. Turkey’s initial objection to the
NATO membership bids of Sweden and Finland was driven by the urge to set
a marker in this regard. Yet, initial negotiations yielded an outcome in which
Sweden and Finland only confirmed their recognition of the PKK as a
terrorist organization, in line with EU policy. The memorandum of
understanding signed by Turkey and the two Nordic countries describes
PYD/YPG as a “threat to [Turkey’s] national security.”

Ankara’s Eastern Mediterranean policy is also motivated by efforts to re-

integrate Turkey into a changing regional order. Turkey’s support for Sunni
Islamists in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in 2011 and its increasingly
confrontational foreign policy and expanding military footprint since 2016
has led to cooperation among Turkey’s partners, old and new rivals. Turkey
found itself excluded from the EastMed Gas Forum, while military and
diplomatic cooperation between Greece, Cyprus, France, Egypt, and
the United Arab Emirates increased.

To break its nearly decade-long isolation and to repair its economy, Ankara
has been on a charm offensive since 2020. Accordingly, it signed cooperation
agreements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in various sectors, including
defense,while distancing itself from Sunni Islamists. Ankara has also shifted
gears in Libya, engaging with political actors in the country’s eastern and
western parts. Lastly, beyond Erdoğan’s rhetorical outbursts about Israel’s
war on Gaza in the aftermath of the gruesome attacks by Hamas, its policy so
far has largely aligned with the official position of the Arab League.

If Ankara has been careful in mending ties with the Arab states, it is equally
persistent in its support for a two-state solution in Cyprus. After almost five
decades, the Cyprus conflict remains unsolved and is today an even more
challenging stumbling block in Turkey’s relations with the EU. Having
steadily expanded its grip over northern Cyprus, the Turkish strategy
involves rallying support within the international community to recognize the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

Black Sea Opportunities: Transcontinental

Connectivity
In November 2023, the ruling parties of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Northern
Cyprus were reported to have signed a cooperation agreement based on the
motto “three states, one nation.” Ankara announced in late 2022 that
the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) had granted Northern
Cyprus observer status. The EU swiftly rejected the announcement, and the
issue remains a contested topic in the EU’s relations with Central Asian
states. No representative from Northern Cyprus seems to have attended the
OTS summit in November 2023.

The OTS emerged from the Cooperation of the Turkic Speaking States
founded in 2009. It includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey,
and Uzbekistan as member countries—and Hungary (since 2018),
Turkmenistan (2021), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (2023) as
observers. Turkey’s economic woes, potential reconfiguration of global
supply chains, and Russia’s war against Ukraine have renewed Ankara’s
interest in a region that it has long considered kin to itself due to linguistic
and cultural affinities.

Ankara sees the OTS as essential to its alliance-building efforts and, as such,
to its ambitions to make Turkey the center of transcontinental connectivity.
Amidst the unknowns triggered by a prolonged confrontation between Russia
and Europe, the AKP leadership is capitalizing on the narrow window of
opportunity created by the European efforts to decrease energy dependency
on Moscow. Turkey recently signed agreements with Bulgaria, Romania,
and Hungary for gas deliveries to position Turkey as an essential player in
Europe’s energy supply and security. Yet, the widely shared view that
Ankara is helping Moscow circumvent sanctions is weakening
its credibility in the eyes of its Western allies.

Still, Turkey’s ruling elites are determined to reap the benefits that arise from
geopolitical uncertainties. Its efforts to develop the Trans-Caspian-East-West
Corridor, the so-called Middle Corridor, linking China and Europe through a
network of railways and roads passing through Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia is a case in point. Various diplomatic and
military steps have been taken to this end. In March 2022, the governments of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey signed a declaration to
improve transport routes in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia as an
alternative to the northern route via Russia. A few months later, a working
group comprising Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan was established on the
Trans-Caspian-East-West corridor.

These diplomatic moves were as much encouraged by Russia’s war against

Ukraine as they were by the change in the status quo between Azerbaijan and
Armenia during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. Azerbaijan’s military
offensive in September 2023 that resulted in its capture of Nagorno-
Karabakh brought Turkey and Azerbaijan one step closer to building
the Zangezur Corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan with the small
Azerbaijani enclave of Nakchivan to Armenia’s west, which borders Turkey
and Iran. In late 2020, the ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia foresaw
the establishment of a land corridor between mainland Azerbaijan and
Nakchivan and left its security to Russian peacekeepers. Still unable to agree
with Armenia on establishing the Zangezur Corridor, Azeri officials and
Turkish decision-makers appear open to replacing the corridor with a route
passing through Iran. Turkey’s proposal for a 3+3 initiative to include the
three South Caucasus countries together with Iran, Turkey, and Russia
was embraced by Tehran.

Expansion into Africa: Exploring New Markets,

Confronting the West
Africa is another region where Turkey is actively involved. Dating back to
the late 1980s, Turkish interests in the continent have been primarily driven
by the quest for new markets and business opportunities. Turkey’s trade
volumewith African countries increased from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $34.5
billion in 2021, with North African countries constituting the highest share.
Turkish construction companies are active in the region, first and foremost in
Algeria and Libya, but lately, they are also increasingly present in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In 2021, the value of projects undertaken by Turkish
contractors in Sub-Saharan Africa was $5 billion, constituting 17.8 percent of
Turkish building projects abroad and ranking third after Eurasia and the
Middle East (compared to 0.3 percent in 2008).

Meanwhile, defense exports have become essential to Turkey’s economic

relations with African countries. According to figures from the Turkish
Exporters Assembly, Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports to Africa
reached $461 million in 2021, compared to $83 million the previous
year. While exports to the continent ranked fifth in Turkey’s total exports
during the first 11 months of 2021, African countries were second after the
US during the first two months of 2022. Defense exports to African countries
are part of “a mutually reinforcing policy design of arms exports, military
training, and defense diplomacy.” Turkey has signed defense industry
cooperation agreements with various countries, including Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Kongo, and Mali. Nigeria and Turkey also have a military training
agreement.

Turkish policy in Africa is also intertwined with Ankara’s quest to position

Turkey as the defender of the globally disenfranchised. The AKP leadership
presents the motto “African issues require African solutions” as the driving
principle of Turkey’s approach toward the region. This slogan aligns with
Ankara’s criticism of Western states for their colonial past, one of the talking
points in Turkish foreign policy. In the wake of the coup d’état in Niger in
July 2023, for instance, Erdoğan described the coup as “a response to the
years-long oppression by France” and noted that Turkey “will continue to
develop positive relations with Africans.”

For government officials and pro-government commentators, Turkey’s

perceived lack of colonial past and its Muslim identity is a competitive
advantage in foreign policy (particularly in Africa but also in Syria). When
the African Union was granted G20 permanent membership status in
September 2023, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that Ankara
“will continue its support for Africa to reach its deserved position in the
international system” and “to make Africa’s voice heard.”

Limitations to Aspirations for Influence

This statement is not isolated from the AKP leadership’s calls for an
international order that “treats every nation on equal footing, and in which
every country can feel safe and an equal partner.” Hakan Fidan, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, recently described Turkey as a “system-transformative”
power seeking “to contribute to a more inclusive and effective international
system.” Unsurprisingly, Ankara often presents Turkey’s growing defense
industry, military operations, mediation efforts, and constant criticism of
Western supremacy as proof of the elevation of the country’s international
standing over the past two decades.

Certainly, its geographical location gives Turkey leverage in international

relations. Its NATO membership enables the AKP officials to enact their so-
called balancing act between Turkey’s Western allies and Russia. At the
same time, its rhetorical confrontation, particularly vis-à-vis the US and the
EU, helps Ankara position itself as an actor that can play hardball with global
powers. Moreover, Turkey’s increased economic connectivity with different
regions accentuates its visibility.

Still, Ankara’s goals and actual capacity are not always perfectly aligned.
Given the financial dependencies of the Turkish economy, Ankara’s
aspirations for an independent foreign policy are not readily achievable.
Moreover, fragile relations with its Western allies accrue costs given
Turkey’s deep integration into Western economic and security structures.
Overtly confronting its Western allies might help enhance Turkey’s soft
power in its neighborhood. Yet, it also weakens its credibility.

Equally important, Turkey’s efforts to gain independence from its Western

allies have not been accompanied by building sustainable alliances
elsewhere. This is clear in Turkey’s waning influence in the Eastern
Mediterranean. It is also salient in the seeming difficulties in mobilizing
partners toward recognizing Northern Cyprus. Overall, Turkey’s continuing
financial dependence, increasingly fragile relations with the US and the EU,
and limited ability to establish alternative alliances narrow Ankara’s room for
maneuver.

As narrow as it may be, however, the mounting geopolitical pressure inflicted

by an emerging multipolar disorder in the face of the US’ “retreat from global
dominance”, the EU’s insufficient capacity to assume a leadership role, and
the revival of revisionism will continue to give Turkey leeway. Turkey is too
big, too close, and too intertwined with Europe for the EU to engage Ankara
only hesitantly. Brussels and Ankara should prioritise managing their
disagreements by setting common rules for engagement. This could increase
the likelihood of practical cooperation in trade, investments, migration, and
defense.

The geopolitics of Turkey

Location, location, location.

A former ambassador to whom one of us worked in Moscow once said that, to

understand any country’s foreign policy, you must understand its geography, its
geology and its history.

The effect of geography on Turkey is especially powerful.

At the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Turkey - or Türkiye to its friends - acts as
the proverbial bridge between East and West. Consequently, it plays a strategic
role in both regions. And Turkey’s foreign policy often revolves around
balancing its interests in the “world heartland”.

Turkey is bounded on the north by the Black Sea and on the west by the
Mediterranean and Aegean, both major shipping routes. It has control of critical
waterways through the Bosphorus Strait and the Dardanelles - as well as
obligations under international law to keep traffic open.

Turkey shares land borders with Georgia and Armenia (on the northeast),
Azerbaijan and Iran (on the east), Iraq and Syria (on the southeast) and Greece
and Bulgaria (on the northwest). Many of these frontiers have seen significant
conflict in the previous decade and some are home to Kurdish separatists,
terrorist threats (both Western-defined ISIL and Turkish-defined PKK) and
significant refugee flows. Turkey hosts more refugees than any other country -
3.4 million of these are Syrian - and the desire to avoid hosting any more
influences its policies in Syria as well as with Russia.
Turkey’s geography makes it a natural transit stop for energy. Situated between
the oil-rich areas of the Middle East and the Caspian basin, and the energy-
consuming markets of Europe, Turkey has become a middleman for fossil fuels,
especially natural gas. It is also home to a tangle of cross-border pipeline
connections.

In recent decades, Turkey has amped up its transit ambitions, opening new
infrastructure such as the TurkStream pipeline from Russia (its third from that
country), and the Trans-Anatolian pipeline from Azerbaijan.

Turkey’s geology has recently begun to offer benefits too, with new fields
starting low-level production – about three per cent of domestic consumption –
in 2023.

But until (or unless) production increases, Turkey will continue importing
almost half of its energy from Russia and around 10% from Iran, which is a
dependence that shapes its diplomatic relations with both nations.

And while geologists believe, and sometimes politicians proclaim, that Turkey
is home to the “rare earths” and “critical minerals” essential to the modern
global economy, few have been found or made it out of the ground. That said,
Turkey does have 73% of the world’s elemental boron reserves, mostly
untapped, and refines about 50% of global boron supply.

Back to the future.

Turkey’s history also shapes its foreign policy.

Most prominent is the legacy of the modern state’s founder, Mustafa Kemal
‘Atatürk’. His alignment with Western values, for example, persisted through
subsequent ‘Kemalist’ governments, leading to Turkey’s early membership of
NATO (1952) and later its aspirations to the EU.

His state policy of secularism was also retained, which let Turkey avoid the
sectarian squabbles common in the Middle East and maintain a balance of
relations with both Western and Muslim countries. Yet the Kemalists were also
responsible for Turkey’s uncompromising brand of nationalism, under which
Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were driven out, and millions of Kurds banned
from so much as speaking their own language until 1991 (it is still illegal as a
language of instruction).

There are obvious implications for Turkey’s rapport with Greece and Armenia
in this history. And a fear of Kurdish nationalism still prevails in Turkish
foreign policy, both in the region – in Syria, Iraq, and Iran – and outside it – see
Sweden’s present struggle to join NATO and various altercations with the US.

Erdogan’s dream.

Unlike every other modern Turkish ruler before him, current leader Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has added a neo-Ottoman patina to the Kemalist dream -
invoking the legacy of both the pre-1922 Ottoman Empire and Islam.

In particular, Erdogan’s model is Sultan Selim I, under whose rule (1512-1520)

the empire more than doubled in size to dominate the Middle East and eastern
Mediterranean, gained control of the world’s most important trade routes, and
earned the title of caliph after conquering Mecca and Medina.

Like other neo-imperial countries, Erdogan’s Turkey is marked by elevated

regional ambitions, growing religiosity, and sustained public appeals to national
greatness. It is also moving away from its “western”, “secular” and “modern”
face that Turkish leaders have generally tried to present to the world.

Such appeals resonate with the people of Turkey’s Anatolian heartland, who are
pious, conservative and fiercely proud. Theirs is a humble, soldierly pride,
harking back to the national mythology of a warrior caste of nomadic Turkics
who conquered Constantinople, and culminating in Atatürk’s ferocious
repulsion of much larger imperial powers in the ‘Independence Wars’ of the
early 20th century.
Put simply, Erdogan wants Turkey (and himself) to be seen as big and important
and tough: a country (and a man) of consequence, befitting of its warrior genes
and glorious past.

Turkish delight.

And, it’s true to say, Turkey is indeed a country of consequence.

Turkey has the 11th most powerful military in the world. It is an essential
member of NATO. And it has an enormous defence industry.

Though its spending as a share of GDP is low by the standards of smaller states,
Turkey has developed its own sophisticated weapons, having been cut off from
buying American technology for decades. Today, it exports to over twenty
countries. These ties colour its bilateral relations.

Turkey also matters economically - and not just as a trading hub. Despite its
well-known problems with inflation and monetary policy, Turkey has the 17th-
largest economy in the world (and the 7th in Europe). It has a major state-
subsidised construction industry, an “aid” agency that mostly promotes Turkish-
led infrastructure developments in the region, and an outsized influence in
certain African countries (particularly Somalia and Ethiopia).

n an increasingly multipolar world, Turkey is able to flex its muscles.

Turkey’s growing influence derives from being one of the few countries able to
maintain good relations with both Russia and the West. Turkey is a
longstanding ally of the US, which tends to give it a free ride on human rights
and foreign policy, despite frequent antagonisms. In recent years, Ankara has
made serious efforts to improve relations with neighbours (including Israel after
several years of severed relations following the IDF killing Turkish activists
aboard the original “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” in 2010). And Turkey remains less
reliant on Chinese investment and less subject to its influence than many other
so-called “geopolitical swing states”.
Free of ideological pretensions (besides a patina of Islam), relentlessly
pragmatic, and needed by both the West and its foes, Turkey can be a
diplomatic bridge. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres turned to Erdogan to
help broker the Black Sea Grain Initiative, not only because Turkey had a stake
in the region, but because it was possibly the only country in the world able to
transact with both Russia and Ukraine.

Similarly, while Russia is focused on Ukraine and distracted from Central Asia,
Turkey has been acting to offer the Turkic states a “third way” - a relatively
easy sell given a common cultural, linguistic and ethnic heritage.

But even pragmatism has its limits. The Turkic connection with China’s
Uighurs has created a lack of trust with Beijing and is a principal reason for the
relatively underdone bilateral relationship. Despite its geographic advantages,
Turkey remains the weakest link in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Balancing act.

Turkey’s pursuit of EU membership has been a feature of its foreign policy

since the 1980s. For now, however, it is definitely on hold. Neither side appears
ready to grant what the other side wants (for Turkey, better visa outcomes for its
citizens and lower tariffs; for Europe, adherence to its democratic governance
standards, especially as Erdogan centralises power and erodes civil liberties).

But neither seem to worry too much. Accession has been put on the backburner
and the EU and Turkey still maintain transactional relations, even if those are
sometimes fraught. And the status quo suits both parties quite well. Most EU
states are happy not to have a giant Muslim country join their club. And
Erdogan doesn’t want to give up any control to Brussels.

Turkey does not need to be a full member of the EU.

While fewer trade restrictions with Europe would be desirable, more important
for Ankara is being able to balance its foreign policy and extract concessions -
from East or West - in its interests. Ditto for its NATO membership, which
Turkey uses as leverage both with Russia and European countries - as Sweden
found out recently when Turkey protested its inclusion on the grounds it was not
doing enough to deal with what Turkey considers Kurdish terrorists.

Ankara, on the other hand, has had less success balancing its economy of late.

Erdogan’s early tenure was marked by quickly improving economic conditions

following radical structural reforms, imposed by the IMF and World Bank. But
in more recent years, Turkey has adopted unorthodox economic policies, under
the president’s supervision, leaving the economy in bad shape. Living standards
have declined, the middle class has been squeezed, and inflation has frequently
exceeded 100 per cent.

Observers often struggle to understand why Ankara kept interest rates low while
inflation was high. Explanations for ‘Erdonomics’ range from the theoretical –
in which Erdogan genuinely believes, as he says he does, that high interest rates
are a cause of inflation rather than its remedy – to the theological – born of a
Muslim distaste for interest rates.

They also include the conspiratorial: Erdogan was intentionally devaluing the
lira and buying up foreign currency for his family, or for venal interests, or that
he was swapping favours for investment opportunities. Elsewhere, many
pragmatists argue the Turkish president, as a businessman, thinks low
borrowing costs spur economic growth, jobs, and attract foreign investment,
while keeping exports competitive; which is all sound when the economic cycle
is favourable, but disastrous when it is not.

Whatever the reason, following Erdogan’s re-election in May and several new
economic appointments, the government appears to be returning - albeit slowly -
to more traditional economic management. Thursday’s move to raise rates by 5
percentage points to a hawkish 40%, are a case in point. With the winter months
approaching, Turkey needs to give its citizens more spending power for their
lira and more food on the table.
Mapping The Rise
of Turkey’s Hard
Power
Until recently, Turkey has relied on trade and diplomacy, as well as its key
geographic location between Europe and the Middle East, to project power. But
amid a decade of volatility brought on by the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011,
Ankara has shifted to a hard-power approach to secure itself from threats in and
achieve its aspirations of becoming a regional power.

Turkey’s complex geographic position — between Europe and Asia, the

Black Sea and the Mediterranean — puts it at the center of a geopolitical
environment tied to several different geographical, political, and cultural
landscapes. This complexity has tremendous impact on the country’s internal,
foreign, and defense policies and makes Ankara sensitive to emerging security
threats in its neighborhood.

Conventional wisdom is that geography privileged Turkey to be a genuine bridge

between the East and West, but often overlooked is the fact that that same
geography exposes Turkey to numerous unique challenges and threats, which has
elevated territorial integrity, security, and interests to a central position in the
thinking of the Turkish political, security, and defense establishment. These
challenges have compelled Turkey to adopt a strong state model, increasing its
hard-power projection to meet them.

Foreign discourse on Turkey often alienates such considerations, which creates a

gap not only in terms of understanding what Turkey is doing or trying to do
but also, most importantly, why it is doing it and what its end goals are.

Shifting from Soft Power to Hard

During the first decade of the 21st century, the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) managed to chart a middle path for itself away from both the
traditional radical secularism enforced by military rule and strident religious
dogmatism. Its efforts to harmonize democracy, secularism, and Islam drew
great attention to a rising modern nation with a liberal economy. At the time, its
experience constituted a “model” and generated enormous soft-power capacity.
This soft power rested on three primary pillars:

 Democratization experience and reforms

 Substantial and sustained economic growth of a rising trade state
 Visionary, engaging, and proactive foreign policy (the so-called “zero
problems” policy, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and
interdependence, security for all, multicultural coexistence)

As a result, Turkey managed to establish and assert its soft power, deploying it
effectively in its regional environment and beyond. This soft power sought
to inspire people of the region and thus was one of the main factors that shaped the
ambitions and aspirations of the uprisings that began in 2010. But those
same revolutions drastically changed the regional security environment for
Turkey, posing serious threats to Ankara on a scale that had not been witnessed in
recent memory.

When the Syrian revolution erupted on March 11, 2011, Turkey’s foreign minister
at the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu, spent months trying to convince Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad to stop using unjustified overwhelming force against peaceful
protesters and alter his course in return for Turkish support for reforms in Syria.
Al-Assad instead turned his ear to Iran, leaving decision makers in Ankara to have
intensive discussions on what to do next. The majority opinion was that Ankara
could still depend on its vast soft-power reservoir to influence events beyond its
borders and reshape the region in a way that would help advance democracy and
genuine stability, which would ultimately serve Ankara’s interests.

The main goal of Damascus was to deter Ankara. When the Assad regime decided
to withdraw its regular forces from areas of Northern Syria, it enabled the
Kurdish Democratic Political Union party to fill the vacuum and create a buffer
zone between Syria and Turkey. As a result, the discussions within Turkey shifted
to whether it should militarily intervene given the rise of the activities of
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in that region and the threat it
posed to Turkey’s national security as a designated terrorist organization. The
political and military establishment resisted the idea of using Turkey’s hard
power, but the decision to put Turkey on defense allowed enemies, rivals, and even
allies to intervene and shape events in a way that Ankara believed disregarded its
interests and posed a serious threat to its national security.
Iran’s military support to the Assad regime prolonged, sectarianized, and
radicalized the conflict and turned Syria into a failed state, thus posing various
security threats to Turkey. Meanwhile, then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s failure
to enforce his famous red lines to appease Iran on the nuclear deal and strike a deal
with Russia on al-Assad’s chemical weapons consolidated the pro-Assad, anti-
Turkey bloc in Syria. Furthermore, the alliance between the
U.S. administration and Kurdish militias in Syria alarmed Ankara and raised
fears of a spillover of the possible disintegration of Syria and separatist
ambitions. The Russian military intervention in 2015 prevented the Assad regime
from falling, reversed the tide of the revolution, and reshaped the power balance of
the struggle in a way that made it even harder for Turkey to pursue its interests in
Syria.

In 2013, an Egyptian coup d’état that ended with the ouster of President
Mohammed Morsi – who had a positive relationship with Turkey – altered the
geopolitical balance in the region. At the end of 2014, geopolitical transformations
led to the emergence of three regional blocs. The first includes Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Egypt; the second encompasses Iran and its pro-Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Shiite regional proxies along with
governments of Iraq and Syria; and the third comprises Turkey and Qatar. The last
bloc experienced pressure from two critical developments in 2015: a military
intervention by Russia in Syria and the U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement, both of
which Turkey perceived as ways to empower its neighbor and historic rival, Iran.

After a 2015 incident where a Turkish F-16 downed a Russian Su-24 jet over
airspace violation claims on the Turkey-Syria border, the situation in Syria turned
into a struggle of wills and hard power. While NATO released statements of
support for Ankara and called for de-escalation, Turkey felt the alliance’s inaction
was a sign of abandonment by its NATO allies and Western partners. This
convinced some Turkish officials that overdependence on soft power and reliance
on foreign partners and allies undermined Turkey’s security interests and
constrained its ability to be proactive. Its exclusive dependence on soft power in a
defensive orientation and the reliance on others to cooperate regionally proved
costly.
The main goal of Damascus was to deter Ankara. When the Assad regime decided
to withdraw its regular forces from areas of Northern Syria, it enabled the
Kurdish Democratic Political Union party to fill the vacuum and create a buffer
zone between Syria and Turkey. As a result, the discussions within Turkey shifted
to whether it should militarily intervene given the rise of the activities of
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in that region and the threat it
posed to Turkey’s national security as a designated terrorist organization. The
political and military establishment resisted the idea of using Turkey’s hard
power, but the decision to put Turkey on defense allowed enemies, rivals, and even
allies to intervene and shape events in a way that Ankara believed disregarded its
interests and posed a serious threat to its national security.
Iran’s military support to the Assad regime prolonged, sectarianized, and
radicalized the conflict and turned Syria into a failed state, thus posing various
security threats to Turkey. Meanwhile, then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s failure
to enforce his famous red lines to appease Iran on the nuclear deal and strike a deal
with Russia on al-Assad’s chemical weapons consolidated the pro-Assad, anti-
Turkey bloc in Syria. Furthermore, the alliance between the
U.S. administration and Kurdish militias in Syria alarmed Ankara and raised
fears of a spillover of the possible disintegration of Syria and separatist
ambitions. The Russian military intervention in 2015 prevented the Assad regime
from falling, reversed the tide of the revolution, and reshaped the power balance of
the struggle in a way that made it even harder for Turkey to pursue its interests in
Syria.

In 2013, an Egyptian coup d’état that ended with the ouster of President
Mohammed Morsi – who had a positive relationship with Turkey – altered the
geopolitical balance in the region. At the end of 2014, geopolitical transformations
led to the emergence of three regional blocs. The first includes Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Egypt; the second encompasses Iran and its pro-Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Shiite regional proxies along with
governments of Iraq and Syria; and the third comprises Turkey and Qatar. The last
bloc experienced pressure from two critical developments in 2015: a military
intervention by Russia in Syria and the U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement, both of
which Turkey perceived as ways to empower its neighbor and historic rival, Iran.

After a 2015 incident where a Turkish F-16 downed a Russian Su-24 jet over
airspace violation claims on the Turkey-Syria border, the situation in Syria turned
into a struggle of wills and hard power. While NATO released statements of
support for Ankara and called for de-escalation, Turkey felt the alliance’s inaction
was a sign of abandonment by its NATO allies and Western partners. This
convinced some Turkish officials that overdependence on soft power and reliance
on foreign partners and allies undermined Turkey’s security interests and
constrained its ability to be proactive. Its exclusive dependence on soft power in a
defensive orientation and the reliance on others to cooperate regionally proved
costly.

Extraterritorial Military Operations

Turkey began using military force in northern Syria in August 2016, more than
five years after the beginning of the revolution. It launched a military operation
dubbed Euphrates Shield, followed by Operation Olive Branch in January 2018, in
which it deployed military forces deep into northern Syria to establish a Turkish-
controlled safe zone in the north along the Syrian-Turkish border to both counter
Kurdish insurgents Turkey deemed affiliated with the PKK and the Islamic State
group as well as to deter the Assad regime, Iran, and Russia from encroachment.

In parallel with these operations, Turkey established military points and bases in
northern Iraq and launched Operation Claw in May 2019. Months later, Ankara
launched its third military operation, Peace Spring, in Syria, followed by Operation
Spring Shield in February 2020 against the Assad regime and the pro-Iran allied
militias in Idlib.

These military operations had five primary objectives:

 Safeguarding Turkey’s homeland from cross-border terrorist operations

 Creating a safe zone to protect the civilians and prevent a further influx of
refugees into Turkey, which is already home to world’s largest refugee
population according to UNHCR
 Stabilizing security in border areas
 Preserving the unity of Syria and Iraq
 Pushing back against Assad regime backers – namely Iran and Russia) – and
putting pressure on Assad regime to ultimately achieve a political transition

 Today, Turkey has around 114 military posts in Syria, with the
majority concentrated in Aleppo and Idlib provinces where Assad regime
forces, along with Iran’s IRGC and its affiliated Shiite militias, especially
Hezbollah, have been amassing for a while. Operation Shield in particular
was critical in terms of deterring regime- and Iran-backed militias from
causing a massive refugee influx of more than 3 million Syrians living in
Idlib toward Turkey and Europe.
  Turkey has around 37 military posts in northern Iraq, including a military
compound in Bashiqa, military training facilities to train Iraqi/Kurdish
Peshmerga forces, and posts for its National Intelligence Organization
(MIT). The majority are in the border regions connecting Turkey to Syria,
Iraq, and Iran, but there also are posts in Erbil, Duhok, Soran, and Zakho.
 Notably, the IRGC-backed Shiite militias in Iraq have been increasing the
pressure on Turkey and its troops there under Operation Claw by
implicitly aligning with the PKK and threatening to attack Turkish posts in
Northern Iraq amid what they consider “a far more dangerous presence
compared to the U.S. presence in Iraq.”

In 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2019, Turkey signed multiple defense agreements with
Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, and Libya. These agreements paved the way for Ankara to
establish its first military bases in the Middle East, the Gulf, and the Horn of Africa
with a possibility of opening additional bases on the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean in North Africa.

These forward military bases offer several advantages to Ankara, the most
important of which are:

 Enhanced unique capabilities to respond to contingencies through forward

deterrence and support measures
 Advanced opportunities for strong security cooperation with regional actors
 Defense capacity building within bilateral and multilateral partnerships
 Geostrategic posturing and effective political messaging
 Self-promoting of high professionalism, domestic defense capabilities, and
alliance credibility
 Several tactical and strategic objectives depending on the type of the base
and/or mission including stabilizing the region

When the 2017 GCC crisis erupted, with the perception that the UAE and Saudi
Arabia were reportedly intending to encroach upon Qatar, Turkey swiftly deployed
some of its armed forces units to Tariq Bin Ziyad military base in Doha in
accordance with the 2014 defense agreement between the two capitals. Although
the number of troops was small, Turkey sought to send a strong message to Qatar’s
GCC counterparts to prevent a military escalation of the crisis.

The GCC crisis enabled Turkey’s hard power to return to the Gulf after almost 100
years and to play a role in the Gulf region for the first time since the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire. Two years later, Qatar and Turkey officially inaugurated the
headquarters of the Qatari-Turkish Joint Command at Khalid Bin Al Walid
Military Camp.
In 2017, Turkey secured a foothold in the Horn of Africa when it inaugurated its
largest overseas military training academy in Somalia (Camp TURKSOM). For
years, Ankara has been involved in a lone nation-building effort in Somalia, with
one objective being to build a strong and professional Somali armed forces to
counter terrorism and achieve stability and security in the country. So far, Ankara
has trained more than 2,500 Somali soldiers and more than 1,600 police officers.
Additionally, Ankara is involved in providing military training for several
countries including Libya and Iraq. Turkey has provided training and support for
the Iraqi troops and the Kurdish Peshmerga against the Islamic State since 2015
through its base in Bashiqa, northern Iraq, to protect its interests and gain a
foothold in countering the PKK.

In Libya, the 2019 defense agreement between Turkey and the U.N.-recognized
Government of National Accord granted Ankara extended influence in the oil-rich
North African country. With Libya lacking modern professional army and
institutions, the Turkish Armed Forces provided military training, aid, and
consultancy for the country’s defense and interior ministry institutions. Within a
year, Turkey had trained more than 2,500 Libyan personnel on the use of air
defense systems, mortars, and the annihilation of mines and improvised explosives.
Additionally, Turkey trained Libyan personnel on coast guard, base defense, and
special operations.
Turkey also has been eyeing a possible naval base at Sawakin Island in Sudan. The
island was at one point an important naval station in the Ottoman geography to
secure the Hejaz region (Currently in Saudi Arabia) against raids coming from the
Red Sea. Sawakin occupies a strategic position opposite Saudi Arabia across the
Red Sea and Egypt to the north, which places Turkey in areas of strategic
competition with regional powers.

There also have been reports on Ankara’s intention to establish a naval base
at Misuratah and an airbase in al-Watiyyeh in Libya and naval bases in the Black
Sea and in Cyprus. Ankara already has deployed its domestic unmanned combat
aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in Northern Cyprus and is planning to deploy them on its
floating base soon to be in service, the TCG Anadolu Light Aircraft Carrier.
In this sense, Turkey has been deploying its hard power not only to achieve
defense and security objectives but also to fulfil political outcomes, with the intent
of projecting a message of credibility and commitment to its allies in a volatile
region.
Assertive Naval Doctrine in the Eastern Mediterranean
The Mavi Vatan, or “Blue Homeland” naval doctrine reflects
Turkey’s growing maritime assertiveness. It responds not only to the political shift
in the doctrinal orientation within the Turkish political-military establishment but
also to the changing dynamics in the region after the Arab revolutions. It calls for
turning Ankara into a maritime power and emphasizes the importance of
Turkey becoming less dependent of foreign powers and more self-reliant in terms
of projecting power in its immediate surroundings through proactive rather than
reactionary measures
The doctrine suggests that Ankara must protect and defend its maritime borders,
maritime rights, and national interests in three seas the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea,
and the Eastern Mediterranean depending on political, legal, and hard-power
tools, including a growing naval power and maritime energy fleet.

The doctrine is mainly linked to two former Turkish rear admirals: Cihat Yayci and
Cem Gürdeniz. Gürdeniz served as the chief of strategy department and head of
plans and policy division in the Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters and was once
imprisoned due to alleged links to the “Ergenekon” network that sought to
overthrow the AKP government. He is credited for coining the term “Mavi Vatan”
and contributing to the development of the doctrine.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way
to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control
over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept

safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under
this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the
safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or
special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any
principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by
this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction,
or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or
special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to
any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special
fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner

designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the
economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation
in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of
nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear
material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and
the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements

with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this
Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such
agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of
this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after
the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than
the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than
eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable

right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity
with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to
the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or
together with other States or international organizations to the further development
of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the
territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration
for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and
through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful
applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such
Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any
charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international
agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate
representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall
commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits
pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional
treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text
of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments
which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so
by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall
convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to
consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the

votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is
circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits
its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such
instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments
of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties
which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter
into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of
the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties
to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation
of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the
provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this
effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with
the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does
not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of
this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are
hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the
Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other
States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.
For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited

subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date
of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and

acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument
of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the
date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant

to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the
United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference
shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely,
or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall
be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the
Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
Nuclear Weapons in
Europe: Mapping U.S. and
Russian Deployments
What’s behind Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus?

The move that Putin announced in late March would be the first time since
the fall of the Soviet Union that Russia has stationed nuclear weapons
beyond its own borders, and it raises the prospects for a renewed,
destabilizing nuclear arms rivalry with the United States and its North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.

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Belarus is an authoritarian state that was one of four Soviet republics to

host nuclear weapons. Along with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, Belarus
relinquished its nuclear weapons to Russia in the 1990s in exchange for
security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United
Kingdom (UK). Today, it is militarily allied with Russia, and it has served
as a staging ground for Russian forces that invaded Ukraine from the north
in early 2022.

More on:

Russia
Europe
Defense and Security
United States
Putin said that Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko had long
requested the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons and that storing
them in Belarus would be akin to what the United States has been doing in
Europe for decades. Tactical nuclear weapons are intended to be used
against enemy forces in a theater of conflict and generally have shorter
ranges and lower yields than so-called strategic weapons, which can travel
thousands of miles to destroy enemy population centers. Those are mainly
intended as a catastrophic deterrent and weapon of last resort.

Where in Europe does the United States have nuclear

weapons?

The United States has deployed nuclear weapons at NATO bases in

Western Europe since the 1950s, when Cold War tensions were mounting
with the Soviet Union. The weapons were first transferred to the United
Kingdom in 1954, and later to Germany, Italy, France, Turkey, the
Netherlands, Greece, and Belgium.

Today, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons remain at six bases in five NATO
member countries, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.
The UK and France have their own nuclear forces and no longer host U.S.
weapons.

How many U.S. nuclear weapons are in Europe?

The number of U.S. weapons deployed in Europe peaked at more than

seven thousand in the 1970s and then dropped steeply in the late 1980s
and early 1990s as a result of arms control agreements and the end of the
superpower rivalry with the Soviet Union.

View the Timeline

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control

A major arms control success for European security came in 1987 with the
now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In
accordance with the INF, the United States and Soviet Union eliminated in
a matter of years their entire arsenals of medium-range, nuclear-capable
missiles and launchers. Prior to the INF, both countries had been ramping
up their missile deployments in Europe.

Current U.S. nuclear stockpiles are classified, but security analysts

estimate that the United States has about one hundred nuclear bombs
stored across the six facilities in Europe.
What type of nuclear weapons are they?

The U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe consists entirely of B61 gravity

bombs [PDF], which are designed to be dropped from allied bombers or
fighter aircraft. In service for more than fifty years and modernized many
times, the B61 is the last remaining tactical nuclear weapon the United
States has. It can carry warheads with a wide range of yields, delivering
blasts into the hundreds of kilotons. By comparison, the U.S. bombs that
killed more than one hundred thousand people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
Japan, in 1945 had yields of fifteen and twenty-one kilotons, respectively.

100
B61 tactical nuclear bombs
Source:

FAS

Why are they still in Europe?

U.S. nuclear weapons were originally deployed to deter Soviet aggression,

via conventional military attack or nuclear strike, and to reassure NATO
allies in Western Europe. At the time, NATO members’ conventional
armies were outnumbered by those of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw
Pact allies. The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the continent was
viewed as a means of making up for this deficiency in NATO forces.
However, with the end of the Cold War, many Western military
strategists, peace advocates, and politicians questioned the need to keep
these legacy weapons in Europe. Not only was the Soviet Union gone
and NATO greatly enlarged , they said, but the United States’ strategic
nuclear arsenal—including long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched weapons—served as a
sufficient deterrent against any potential adversary, including Russia.
Moreover, many defense analysts have said that allied aircraft attempting
to drop the bombs would likely be shot down by sophisticated enemy air
defenses.

Yet, proponents of keeping U.S. nuclear forces in Europe say these

weapons continue to provide NATO with a valuable military deterrent and
are an important symbol of the United States’ commitment to its allies.
Withdrawing them would send a dangerous message of U.S. retrenchment
to would-be adversaries in Europe and beyond, they say. Even if these
weapons do have little military value, advocates say they could be used as
a bargaining chip in future diplomacy with Russia, particularly
since Moscow has long pushed for their removal . Therefore, they say, the
United States shouldn’t remove them without obtaining significant
concessions from Russia.

Where does Russia have nuclear weapons?

Western analysts say that Russia has its nuclear forces—ICBMs,

submarines, and heavy bombers—spread across more than a dozen
military bases throughout its vast territory.
Meanwhile, many Western observers have questioned whether it has
nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave located between
NATO members Poland and Lithuania. In 2018, a Russian government
official reportedly confirmed that Russia had sent nuclear-capable
Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad; separately, Western researchers said
Russia was upgrading a nuclear storage site there, although it remained
unclear if nuclear warheads were actually present then. In April
2022, Lithuania’s defense minister said Russian nukes “have always been
kept in Kaliningrad.” At the time, former Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev warned that if Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO,
which they subsequently did, Russia would have to restore the nuclear
balance in the Baltics.

NATO, Gaza, and the future of US-Turkish relations

Turkey’s backing of Hamas has left it out of diplomatic processes and further
strained its ties with the US. However, its recent decision to approve Sweden’s
NATO membership could be an opportunity for Western diplomats to patch things
up

The Palestinian issue has always been close to Turkish president Recep Tayyip
Erdogan’s heart – and a rallying cry for his conservative base. During his two
decades in power, Turkey’s strongman has had a tumultuous relationship with
Israel, marked by periodic spars with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu
and occasional attempts at normalisation. All the while, Erdogan has never shied
away from publicly displaying his support for Hamas, hosting its leaders in
Istanbul and viewing the group as a legitimate part of the Middle East’s political
map.
But after 7 October, Erdogan gravely miscalculated, failing to condemn its
atrocities against Israeli civilians and reiterating that “Hamas is not a terrorist
organization. It is a liberation movement.” Such strong endorsement of the group
at such a painful time effectively led to Turkey being frozen out of hostage
negotiations, regional diplomacy, and prospects of playing a greater role in a post-
conflict Gaza. Outraged and shaken by Israel’s disregard for Palestinian civilians
in its military offensive in Gaza, Erdogan has since blasted Israel for “war crimes”
and “genocide,” while criticising the West for its perceived double standards and
unequivocal support for Israel.

Had the Turkish president been more measured in his public endorsement of
Hamas, slightly more diplomatic in his tone and less willing to endorse Hamas so
wholeheartedly after 7 October, Ankara would have likely found itself at the core
of international diplomacy on Gaza. In much the same way he did on the Black Sea
grain deal and the prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine, Erdogan could
have led the diplomacy around hostage negotiations and regional de-escalation. He
also could have found a bigger global pulpit to make a case for a two-state solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and grab the international community’s attention
for Turkish proposals such as a trusteeship system for a future Palestinian state.

Instead, 7 October highlighted Turkey’s diplomatic estrangement when it comes to

Arab-Israeli matters, despite Erdogan’s popularity on the Arab street. In the
aftermath of the Hamas attacks, Turkey was all too eager to play a role in regional
diplomacy and emerge as the leader of a regional front that could isolate and
pressure the Israeli government to abandon its hardline policies in Gaza. Instead, it
was largely bypassed in hostage negotiations, and despite its links with the political
leadership of Hamas, Turkey has not emerged as a diplomatic hotspot on the
Palestinian issue nor in efforts to avert regional escalation.
Worse for Ankara, the Gulf states and Egypt – despite their condemnation of
Israel’s disregard for civilian lives in Gaza – have made it abundantly clear that
they are not interested in entering a united anti-Israel front led by Turkey
or abandoning the normalisation track with Tel Aviv.

Ankara’s tepid ties with Washington has not made it any easier for Erdogan. Once
the lynchpin of US policy in the Middle East, for almost a decade now Turkish-US
relations have been a drama shaped by mutual grievances, which range from
Turkey’s objections to US support for Syrian Kurds to Washington’s criticism of
Turkey’s human rights record and its burgeoning relations with Russia. To many in
Washington, Turkey came to be seen as an “unfaithful ally.” Increasingly, Turkish-
US relations look to be on the verge of a slow marital break-up, with deep
suspicions and grievances on both sides.

The Biden administration started off in 2021 with a policy of keeping Erdogan at
arm’s length, initially intended to better manage the relationship after four
confusing years of President Donald Trump. But things have hardly improved
much since then. There is little engagement at the leadership level between
Erdogan and Biden and the strategic divergence between the two capitals on the
emerging world order and its various challenges is stark.

With the war in Ukraine, Washington had to accept Turkey’s balancing act
between Moscow and Kyiv and turn a blind eye to Turkish trade with Russia in
violation of Western-led sanctions. Inside NATO, there is both appreciation
(for closing off the Bosphorus to Russian warships) and frustration (for blocking
Sweden’s membership bid for a time and trading with Russia) with Turkey.

When it comes to the Middle East, Erdogan’s pro-Hamas position has irritated the
Israeli government and its public so much that it has rendered a potential Turkish
role in Gaza is unrealistic, at least in the short-term. For the United States, this
created a new level of regional tension that needed to be managed. The US
secretary of state Anthony Blinken skipped Turkey in his first tour of regional
diplomacy after 7 October, and Erdogan, angry at Washington’s unequivocal
backing for Israel, refused to meet with Blinken when he visited Ankara in
November.

When the two finally met in January, on Blinken’s fourth trip, the conversation
was as much about Gaza as about getting Turkey to ratify Sweden’s NATO
accession – a priority item for the White House ahead of the NATO summit in
Washington this summer. Turkey finally did ratify Sweden’s accession – much to
the relief of Sweden and NATO member states.

The question now is whether or not this provides enough of a basis for a reset in
Turkish-US relations – one where the two allies can work together on a number of
strategic issues, including European security. The period of estrangement has
helped neither side strategically and is particularly glaring at a time when the US is
trying to manage its diplomacy around two major wars – both in Turkey’s
immediate neighbourhood. Amid such geopolitical turmoil, both Turkey and the
US need better relations with one another. But to get there, Washington and
Ankara need to manage their divergences and identify common interests –
especially on the geoeconomic front. They also need to accept that whatever
partnership emerges will be ‘à la carte’ and very different from the perfect
alignment of the post-cold war period.
The period of estrangement has helped neither side strategically and is particularly
glaring at a time when the US is trying to manage its diplomacy around two major
wars – both in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood

Getting the much-delayed ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession through the

Turkish parliament has given a temporary boost to the relationship and created a
feel-good moment within the alliance as it prepares for the 75th anniversary
summit. Sweden’s ratification will now be followed by the US Congress signing
off on the sale of F16s to Turkey – something that Ankara desperately wants.

But the real strategic conversation starts afterwards. Once the give-and-take is
over, the two allies need to sit and talk about the future of Syria and Iraq and the
worsening situation in Gaza. Ukraine and the Black Sea are also burning issues, as
is Iran, and the tightening of sanctions on Russia. The Biden administration is
painfully aware that Turkey is politically and geographically very close to it all –
and more vulnerable than it would like to admit.

All of this ties back to Gaza. At some point, there could be a role for Turkey in the
reconstruction of Gaza or within a multinational peacekeeping force. It is hard to
imagine the current Israeli government agreeing to a Turkish role – but then again
it is hard to see what will happen in the region in a year or two.

For now, Turkey and the US need to take baby steps – learn to talk again,
rediscover each other and build some level of trust to better coordinate in the two
wars raging on Turkey’s borders. This conversation is largely bilateral, but can
benefit Europe and other NATO allies as well. Europeans in particular could
benefit from a Turkey that is on better terms with the US by reaching out to
Ankara off the back of this détente, and focus on nurturing closer cooperation with
Turkey on key security concerns in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood and further
afield in the Middle East. From this, they could also benefit from a deeper
economic partnership with Turkey – both a top market and a production base for
Europe’s. If Turkey manages to tilt towards transatlantic partners in Ukraine, and
can play a constructive role in Gaza, it can once again emerge as a useful partner,
indispensable for the US and for Europe.