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 Md. Jn. ofAgri. Econ.
Vol. 57, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2002

REVIEW ARTICLE

Land Reforms - A Bus that India Missed Which

May Never Come Again*
M.V. Nadkarni**
d:
Three decades ago, Simon Kuznets (1973) in a perceptive address observe
in the less develop ed countrie s may require
....a substantial economic advance
greater
modifications in the available stock of material technology and probably even
specific characte ristics will
innovations in political and social structure.... and many
innovati ons that
be so dependent upon the outcome of the social and political
extrapolation from the past is extremely hazardous"(emphasis added.)
this
Indian political leadership at least at the top was not unaware of this. In fact,
dence.
awareness in respect of agrarian reforms' was in evidence even before Indepen
that such reforms were needed both in the interest of fast
It was rightly perceived
economic growth and social justice, and to release the producti ve capacity of peasants
is
as well as to eliminate their poverty. Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842-1901), who
recognis ed that develop ment of
described as the father of Indian Economics, clearly
ed
Indian agriculture had to be based on small peasant capitalism for which he suggest
end the helpless ness
the necessary agrarian reforms. These reforms were intended to
ial
of tenants through suitable tenancy legislation to secure their rights, substant
reduction in land tax and provision of cheap credit (see Dasgupta, 1993, pp. 100-
107). His ideas left a deep mark on the Indian political leadership. The Indian
y
National Congress even before Independence had to have its base among peasantr
and announced its commitment to abolish feudal intermed iaries and initiate land
and
reforms. Other political parties too, particularly the left parties, were deeply
actively interested in land reforms. It reflecte d a good consens us on ending feudali sm
and making agrarian structure more egalitarian and democratic, besides making it
more productive. Legislative measures were initiated in all the states soon after
Independence - a process which continued for several decades.

are: Land Reforms in India: Interventionfor Agrarian Capitalist

* The three books covered by this review article
by Surjit Singh Gill, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New
Transformation in Punjab and Haryana. Vol. 6, Edited
India: Issues ofEquity in Rural Madhya Pradesh, Vol.7, Edited by
Delhi, 2001, pp. 249, Rs. 495.00; Land Reforms in
Delhi, 2002, pp. 427, Rs. 680.00 and Land Reforms in India:
Praveen K. Jha, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New
in Gujarat and Maharasht ra, Vol. 8, Edited by Ghanshyam Shah and D.C. Sah, Sage
Peiformance and Challenges
Rs. 880.00.
Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2002, pp. 520,
Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore-560 072.
** ICSSR National Fellow; Hon. Visiting Fellow,
 752 INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

A voluminous literature has been generated in the country

to assess the
implementation of land reforms and their impact on agrari
an structure and
agricultural development. The Indian Council of Social Scien
ce Research (ICSSR)
sponsored a survey oftrends and perspectives in land perspectives
and research in the
field as early as 1970s, which was ably accomplished by P.C.
Joshi (1975). Joshi's
work covered the first phase ofland reforms before the 1970s
, while the second phase
of land reforms initiated since the 1970s needed a critical and compr
ehensive survey.
This need must have prompted the Lal Bahadur Shastri Natio
nal Academy of
Administration (LBSNAA), Mussoorie, to launch a series of
very useful studies on
Land Reforms in India, which have been very well receiv
ed by academics. The
volumes under review here are sixth, seventh and eighth in the
Series respectively on
Punjab and Haryana together [Gill (Ed.), 2001], on Madhya
Pradesh [Jha (Ed.),
2002], and on Gujarat and Maharashtra together [Shah and Sah
(Eds.) 2002]. Like
other volumes in the series, these are also edited volumes bringi
ng together a
collection of perceptive articles on the respective states and amoun
t to very useful
contributions to the literature on the theme. They give a good backg
round of land
reforms by presenting the variety of systems of land tenure, critica
lly examine the
provisions of the land reforms legislations and their implementation
and also the
factors behind implementation, and analyse how the agrarian structure
has changed as
a result in the respective states. The states covered by the earlier
volumes in the
Series are Bihar, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka. One of
these volumes,
viz., the fifth, covers the country as a whole [Sinha and Pushpendra
(Eds.), 2000].
Studies by authors other than under the Series are also significant and
are too many to
be named here. States like Kerala and West Bengal, which are
relatively more
successful cases, have been covered by them. This is not an occas
ion to review them
all. They will, however, be kept in the mind while reviewing these
three volumes
together.2
It may be useful to recapitulate that the first few years ofland refor
ms in different
states had a thrust towards abolition of Zamindari and other
similar dysfunctional
feudal systems. This was followed by abolition of hereditary titles
to village offices
like Patel, Shanbhog and Patwari (Krishna, 1997, pp. 17-18). These
early legislations
abolished only the upper layers of feudalism, who were
urban based, and recognised
the superior tenants as the legal cultivators or owner
s. The 'inferior' tenants who
were tenants-at-will lost whatever tenancy rights they
had (Das, 2000; Joshi, 1975).
The more parasitical layer of feudalism which had
strong rural roots and had a firm
hold over land could not be touched, and these were
the persons whose support was
vital for most of the political parties except proba
bly the Communist parties. Social
justice was not probably uppermost in the mind
of legislators. It was more urgent to
get rid of unproductive and even dysfunctiona
l landlords.
But social justice could not be ignored for
long, thanks mainly to peasants'
movements in many parts ofthe country and the suppo
rt they received from the leftist
parties. It was felt necessary to take the wind out
of their sails. The next step in land
 REVIEW ARTICLE:LAND REFORMS IN INDIA 753

reforms therefore was aimed at imposing ceilings on large holdings, siphon off the
surplus land and transfer it to the landless and marginal farmers. If this step were
successful, it would have substantially reduced poverty, given of course comple-
mentary measures like cheap credit to support the weak. This phase of legislation was
during the period 1955-71. Its implementation, however, was hypocritical and
insincere. There were many loopholes in the Ceiling Acts, and nothing significant
was achieved by way of transfer of surplus land to the landless and marginal farmers.
The failure of land reforms from the point of social justice was attacked widely
both by academics and leftist parties. Both the Central and State Governments
seemed too weak to enact and implement any radical legislation as the political
parties depended on the support of the dominant castes which controlled both land
and votes. By 1972, however, the political situation qualitatively changed. Indira
Gandhi had succeeded in riding back to power with a landslide victory on the slogan
of Garibi Hatao. The victory over Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh made her
powerful to an unprecedented degree. The whole country was at her feet as it were.
The eminent artist, M.F. Hussain, painted her picture as goddess Durga. Even
Jawaharlal Nehru himself could at no time have so much power. To her credit, Indira
Gandhi realised that this was the right time to push through more radical land
reforms. Calling a conference of Chief Ministers in July 1972, she made them to
commit themselves to such reforms, and National Guidelines were framed for the
ensuing legislations in the states. It was thus that the second phase of land reforms
were initiated since 1972. This was really a golden opportunity to significantly
reduce poverty, if not eliminate it altogether. The political situation was most
favourable because Indira Gandhi seemed to derive her political strength directly
from the masses, without having to depend on the rural political bosses. On the
contrary, it was the latter who depended on her for political survival. Such a
favourable situation for implementation of Land Reforms was never to occur again.
The main feature of the land reforms in the post-1972 phase was a considerable
lowering of the ceilings compared to the earlier phase. The National Guidelines
(1972) suggested the ceilings at as low a level as 4.05 to 7.28 hectares in government
irrigated lands growing two crops, 10.93 hectares in irrigated lands growing one crop,
and 21.85 hectares for dryland. A provision for a slightly higher ceiling was
suggested in privately irrigated lands. The legislations in the states conformed to
these Guidelines. However, they also had significant loopholes which allowed
retrospective transfers, division of family on paper to circumvent ceilings, and
exemptions for plantations. What such ceilings achieved by way of transfer ofsurplus
land to the landless and marginal farmers can be seen from official figures
themselves: At the national level, only 2.09 per cent ofnet operated area was declared
as surplus by the year 2000, of which only 1.51 per cent of net operated area was
actually distributed (quoted in Deshpande, 2002, Table 5).
As far as tenancy was concerned, the National Guidelines did not insist on the
abolition of tenancy, but only on providing security of tenure, fixing fair rent and
 754 INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

keeping record of tenancy. The oral or informal tenancy was to be abolished as it

made the tenants vulnerable and such contracts had to be recognised and made
official. This at least was the spirit of law. But the states enacted legislations in
different ways, and some of them like Karnataka, Gujarat and Bihar - abolished
leasing subject to certain exemptions as in the case of persons with disability, public
servants with a salary not exceeding Rs. 250 and widows. Madhya Pradesh abolished
only the past leases, but not the future ones.3
Regulation of tenancy had a great potential to reduce poverty, since most of the
tenants-at-will and other small tenants were vulnerable and poor and tenancy
legislation was to provide them security. What actually took place, however, was
quite the opposite. Poverty actually increased as a result of such tenants losing
whatever rights they had. The legislation intended to provide security to actual tillers
ended up by making them absolutely insecure. Where, however, tenants or 'peasants'
movements were strong, the benefits of land reforms did go to them. One can see a
variation even within a state in this respect. Narinder Singh Sandhu's paper (Gill,
2001) on peasant movements in PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States' Union)
shows clearly that land reforms were more effective there in bringing benefits to
actual tillers both in respect oftenancy reforms and in the implementation of ceilings.
In Karnataka also, land reforms were more successful in Uttara Kannada and
Dakshina Kannada districts for the same reason (see Joshi, 2000). Across the states
also, the same factor played an important role in making Kerala and West Bengal fare
better than other states. Shah and Sah (2002) in their editors' Introduction, therefore,
rightly observe: "One of the important reasons for the failure of various land reforms
measures is relatively weak pressure from below"(Shah and Sah, 2002, p. 28).
Not only did tenancy legislation fail on the whole, except for success here and
there in pockets as observed above, it did not even anticipate a new development that
was taking place under its very shadow - the reverse tenancy! The traditional pattern
of tenancy was that of a landlord leasing out land to several small cultivators. A
radical and social justice oriented tenancy legislation should have not only provided
security to such small tenants, but should also have enabled them to lease in land
from larger holders so that the former could enlarge their holdings and make them
viable. What actually happened in the wake of capitalist transformation of agriculture
[as Gill's (2001) volume confirms] was that the dominant land holders themselves
started leasing in land from small holders to reap economies of scale from
mechanisation of agriculture. This new development was witnessed right in the early
1970s or even a little earlier (Nadkarni, 1976). It is interesting that this development
took place along with the tendency to resume land for self-cultivation by the owners
which was allowed in law. Both these developments became a prominent feature of
the agrarian scene in Punjab and Haryana, especially with the onset of the Green
Revolution as Gill's(2001) volume reveals. Between the two, reverse tenancy seems
to be less harmful from poor tenants' point of view, because they are not outright
evicted as in the other development. It appears that outright eviction of tenants was
 REVIEW ARTICLE:LAND REFORMS IN INDIA 755

more prominent in the initial years upto at least the mid-1960s. It is not clear whether
reverse leasing was initially voluntary or under compulsion/strong persuasion by
bigger holders. Anyway, the small and marginal farmers soon found that such leasing
out provided a scope to seek more viable job opportunities outside their meagre
holdings (granting of course that these opportunities were available). In Punjab and
Haryana, such opportunities were available within agriculture itself, thanks to their
success in Green Revolution.
In contrast to the Punjab-Haryana situation, Madhya Pradesh conforms to the
classical pattern of tenancy. This is seen from the informative and well documented
paper by Mihir Shah and P.S. Vijay Shankar in the volume edited by Jha(2002)(see
especially p. 374, Table 15.3). It is the small holders who lease in relatively more
there, but the total area under lease is itself small (7.3 per cent of owned area).
Abolition of tenancy only led to concealing it in Madhya Pradesh. This is not
surprising because in a situation where even land ownership records have large gaps,
how could one expect systematic and updated records of tenancy? As per law, a
tenant working in Madhya Pradesh with the same landowner for more than one year
is entitled to occupancy right and if he works with the same landowner for a period of
three years, he is entitled to ownership right. It is hardly surprising that this could not
be implemented, as revealed through the study by the Land Reforms Unit. Three
factors were responsible for it: "administrative apathy", "absence of voluntary and
activist organization" among peasants, and lack of awareness among tenants about
legal provisions (Jha, 2002, p. 130). The Land Reforms Unit recommends that the
relevant provisions of law should be widely disseminated in Hindi. Even if this is
done, unless both political leadership and administrative machinery are committed to
it and unless tenants themselves are organised, the landowners may lease out land for
only a short term if at all, or conduct cultivation through only casual hired labour, to
circumvent the law. The same motive of landowners also explains the prevalence of
concealed tenancy.
The agrarian structure of Madhya Pradesh does not seem to have responded to the
economic forces of Green Revolution as much as Punjab and Haryana. The Green
Revolution itself has not been as prominent in Madhya Pradesh as in the Punjab and
Haryana. It appears from both the volumes that the more agriculturally advanced
regions have a larger extent of tenancy than the less advanced, apparently because of
the prominence of capitalist reverse tenancy. This is seen both from a comparison of
Punjab and Haryana, on the one hand and Madhya Pradesh, on the other, and also
from a comparison between regions within Punjab (see R.P. Singh and S.S. Grewal's
paper in Gill, 2001, p. 205). R.S. Deshpande's paper on Maharashtra shows clearly
that the state is similar in this respect to Punjab and Haryana. He observes that 73 per
cent of the leased in area is in the holdings of above 4 hectares. Almost all land
leased in (98 per cent, to be more precise) for more than 12 years is also in these
larger holdings (Shah and Sah, 2002, p. 110). However,K. Gopal Iyer points out that
the overall incidence of tenancy is low in Maharashtra. This statement is problematic
 756 INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

since he also points out that there is considerable concealed tenancy at least in parts
of Maharashtra (Shah and Sah, 2002, p. 215). Tenancy provides the necessary
flexibility to attain viable size of holdings and take advantage of economies of scale
without sacrificing ownership and the sense of security and prestige that comes from
ownership. It is market driven and when it is banned it only results in a black market.
If this is so, we have a significant lesson to learn from these books. In the
advanced and growing areas at least, it would appear to be a retrograde, unfair and
also unrealistic step to abolish tenancy altogether. It is more important to recognise it
and provide security of ownership to small holders leasing out land, so that those who
cannot cultivate their small holdings do not have to lose them but can still benefit
from them. In the less advanced areas, on the other hand, where labour is relatively
more abundant and small and marginal farmers do not have work opportunities
outside their holdings, forcing them to continue to cultivate them however tiny they
may be, they should have incentives and encouragement to enlarge their holdings by
leasing in more land to make them viable. In fact, such measures are necessary in the
advanced regions as well, so that the small holders lease in more than the large
holders and a more egalitarian agrarian structure develops through leasing in.
Abolition of tenancy pre-empts such a possibility. Though of course the market
forces tend to prefer reverse tenancy, abolition of tenancy makes the small holders
only more vulnerable. The role of state intervention should be to protect the small
holders and to encourage them to end their poverty, and not to make them more
vulnerable.
On the whole, as Gill's volume shows, the political factors were clearly
favourable to big landlords who could easily thwart land reforms. S.S. Gill and R.S.
Ghuman's paper quotes the late D.C. Pavate, Ex-Governor of Punjab, who observed
in 1974 that "despite ceiling laws, there exist 500 big landlords owning and
cultivating land between 200 acres and 1000 acres each"(Gill, 2001, p. 42). Even as
late as 1987, the Punjab unit of Bharatiya Khet Mazdoor Sabha(BKMS) estimated
that "there were 1725 landlords, each owning land between 75-100 acres and 744
landlords each owning 100-125 acres and 588 landlords each owning land above
125
acres"(Gill, 2001, p. 42). Since this was mostly irrigated land, a substantial surplus
in
excess of ceilings would have resulted for transfer to the landless and marginal
farmers. In an inequitable situation already, reverse tenancy made the land shift
even
more to big holders' control. Not surprisingly, according to Gill, the basic
goal of
land reforms in Punjab and Haryana was to facilitate capitalist transfor
mation of
agriculture and improve its productivity, and not redistributive justice (Gill,
2001,
editor's Introduction, p. 18).
The story of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra could not have
been very
different in this respect. The Land Reforms Unit's Report frankly admits:
"The
administrative machinery has been able to identify a few large landowners
owning
ceiling-surplus land, but a number of big landowners have not been adequate
ly
 REVIEW ARTICLE:LAND REFORMS IN INDIA 757

captured within the ceiling net, due to the gaps in the land records and also due to the
apathy ofthe revenue administration"(Jha, 2002, p. 116).
The story of how the ceiling legislation was subverted in Maharashtra is quite
interesting as it is typical of how ceilings were implemented in the country at large.
This story is told here by R.V. Bhuskute (Shah and Sah, 2002). When faced with
resolute instructions by Indira Gandhi for strictly implementing the ceiling law, the
Vasantrao Naik Ministry simply declared in advance that the Ceiling Act was going
to be amended, giving a welcome hint to the big landholders to transfer their excess
lands and evade the law before the law was passed (Shah and Sah, 2002, p. 76). It is
now common knowledge that these transfers were only on paper, being benami and
fictitious, and the real control was unaffected. Another way to evade the ceiling law
was for the cash rich ministers, doctors, lawyers, and political leaders to simply
purchase land in different villages, thus exploiting an important loophole in land
records. The village being a unit for land records, they have information only about
how much land a person has in a particular village but not what he or she has in other
villages. If farmers have lands in different villages all below the ceiling limit in each
village, there is simply no way of knowing who has excess land and how much.
Bhuskute thus calls the ceiling law a mere formality (Shah and Sah, 2002, p. 73). In
the circumstances, it is a wonder that some little land was indeed identified as
surplus. This could perhaps be at least partially explained by the fact that in this
wonderful land of ours such laws can be selectively implemented in the case of
political adversaries and political light-weights - which can demonstrate that we do
mean to implement law where we want! If some credit could be given to tenancy
legislation for achieving at least a partial success, the ceiling legislation was by and
large a dismal failure. It was not so much a case of mere inefficiency as it was of
deliberate mischief and hypocrisy.
Even where some surplus lands were declared as we noted above and distributed
to the landless, the impact of such land transfers on ending the poverty of
beneficiaries was problematic. First, lands so transferred were of low quality and
higher risk, and needed significant investments to cultivate. Secondly, adequate
support to the beneficiaries in making extra investments needed was not forthcoming.
This fact comes out clearly in the volume edited by Shah and Sah (2002).
The role of the caste factor in the implementation of land reforms (and their
failure) receives considerable attention, especially in the Shah-Sah (2002) volume.
Ghanshyam Shah's own article in this volume is perceptive. Land reforms were so
implemented as to suit the convenience and interests of the numerically and
politically dominant castes. The urban based and politically weak 'high caste'
absentee was easily eliminated, but the benefits of tenancy -reform and ceilings did
not go to those at the lowest rungs of the caste hierarchy who were politically the
weakest as it did not suit the interests of the dominant 'intermediate castes'. The
central leadership may have been strongest in the early 1970s, but it was still not
 758 INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

strong enough to change the political structures at the local levels. These
structures
were hardly serious about land reforms.
The land situation in Punjab and Haryana is different from that
of Madhya
Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra in important respects, apart from
dissimilarities in
the tenancy situations. First, the bulk of agricultural land in Punjab
and Haryana is
irrigated, allowing intensive cultivation. In the other three states,
drylands dominate,
agriculture is more unstable, yields are lower, and cropping intensi
ty also is low. The
volumes under review do not, however, bring out the implications
of such diversity
for land reforms. Secondly, while forests and common lands
are insignificant in
Punjab and Haryana, it is not so in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat
and Maharashtra.
Thirdly, there is also a significant proportion of tribal population
in the latter three
states dependent on forests and common lands, which is not the case
in Punjab and
Haryana. These factors raise different issues in Madhya Pradesh,
Gujarat and
Maharashtra, not found in Punjab and Haryana.
Thus Jha's (2002) volume as also the volume edited by Shah and Sah
(2002)
devote considerable attention to these issues also, apart from conventional
issues of
land reforms. In fact the former issues have now become more relevant
and urgent.
The issues of displacement by dams, dispossession, and rehabilitation
also get
attention. B.D. Sharma's paper (Jha, 2002) in this respect is especially
enlightening
and useful. Harsh Mander's paper on tribal land alienation is also equall
y valuable.
N.C. Saxena's paper critically reviews forest policy since Independence
. Ensuring
access to forests and common lands for those dependent on them for
livelihood and
also their sustainable use require evolving innovative institutional mecha
nisms like
the Joint Forest Management, beyond what was envisaged under conven
tional land
reforms. This is not an easy task, given the inequitable agrarian structu
re, thanks to
the failure of land reforms. There is thus a link between conventional
issues of land
reforms and the issues of common lands. In the volume edited by Shah
and Sah
(2002), there are as many as eight papers out of fourteen, covering the
problems of
tribal alienation, displacement and deprivation of people including mainly
the tribals,
and their struggles for justice. These problems emerged both in
Gujarat and
Maharashtra more so in the former. These papers are all well documented,
analytical
and also touching as they involve intensely human issues. It is
to the credit of both
Jha's(2002) volume and the one edited by Shah and Sah (2002
)that the conventional
as well as the new land related issues are brought together and
discussed in depth.
One cannot help feeling depressed at the end of reading
the three volumes,
certainly not because of any shortcoming in them, but
because of their success in
vividly exposing the failure of land reforms in delive
ring social justice. Indian
leadership had been vociferously talking of land reform
s and social justice much
before Independence. No other programme in India perhap
s received as much
political and legal attention. There were quite a few excellent
opportunities in terms
of favourable political situation, particularly so in the early
1970s. Yet these
opportunities were missed. Failure of land reforms is an under-s
tatement. What the
 REVIEW ARTICLE: LAND REFORMS IN INDIA 759

style and substance of implementation did was to aggravate rural poverty among the
bulk of small cultivators by reducing them to the status of insecure landless labourers,
though of course there are success stories here and there, thanks more to peasant
movements than to governments. The opportunity for securing social justice through
land reforms, such as the one we had in the early 1970s, will not come again. The
political as well as the economic situation has drastically changed, becoming even
more unfavourable to land reforms. (This should not be mistaken as growing ir-
relevance of land reforms.) It may be more realistic to say that the political leadership
and bureaucracy in India were hardly interested in catching the bus for social justice
via land reforms, though it was a shorter and a more direct route. What the leadership
and bureaucracy preferred was a more roundabout and longer route through economic
growth. This longer route seems to have been so comfortable for the ruling elite that
the destination of social justice is likely to be conveniently forgotten and the journey
may be continued forever. The journey has become an end in itself.
Is there no scope then for land reforms at all in future? Have they totally lost their
relevance? As contributors in Jha's (2002) volume indicate (see especially Mihir
Shah and P.S. Vijay Shankar), the ownership holdings are becoming smaller,
agricultural labourers with land are increasing in number, and more and more
holdings are becoming econo-mically non-viable, thanks both to population increase
and slow growth of employ-ment opportunities outside agriculture. In the
circumstances, reverse tenancy may prevail more and more even outside irrigated
regions like Punjab and Haryana, as it has already been doing (cf. Nadkarni, 1976;
Jodha, 1981). As Gill (2001) suggests, the task of protecting the small owners thus
becomes urgent to ensure that they do not lose ownership in spite of leasing out.
However, there is now a clamour for Economic Reforms in agriculture too, the main
component of which is stated to be to remove ceilings on holdings and allow big
holders to purchase non-viable holdings. The champions of such Reforms hope/claim
that such a step will bring in so much investment into agriculture that the increased
employment opportunities will take care ofthe displaced small owners. However,this
can also take place without removing ceilings, as reverse tenancy can still achieve the
same purpose. But why sacrifice the security of small owners in the process? They
can as well be allowed to lease out and yet get some benefits of owning the land.
And why should only the big expand? Why not also the small and the marginal?
Why should the state abdicate its responsibility of encouraging them to make their
holdings viable and invest more in agriculture? In the present circumstances of
holdings being more and more sub-divided and becoming smaller, is it not logical
that agricultural policy should be more oriented towards the small and marginal
farmers rather than to the big? Almost every advanced country in the world,
including the high priests of market forces and capitalism, have considered it their
duty to support family enterprise in agriculture especially the small farms and have
significantly subsidised agriculture. Welfare costs of not doing so can be unbearably
 760 INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

high, which cannot be counted in money terms. We do not have to be more loyal than
the king himself.
Though development strategies for small and marginal farmers have been in
operation for a long time now, they have not had the desired impact. This is because
the odds are against them in production, credit, marketing, population pressure and
probably even in politics. To generate surplus land for transfer to the small and the
landless in agriculture in the present context, one of the ways could be that persons
who may originally have been farmers but have started earning incomes from urban
sources above a certain level (say, a lakh and a half rupees per year), should be made
to surrender the ownership of their holdings in favour of small and marginal farmers
and landless labourers in agriculture.4 However, no seriousness can be hoped for in
any further steps in favour of the rural poor, unless the rural poor themselves
effectively organised to achieve their goal. All the three volumes emphasise this point
eloquently. On the whole, these volumes hold a clear mirror to what has happened to
land policy and land reforms in the country, as the experience of the states analysed
so well by them is also indicative of what happened in the country as a whole. They
are, therefore, immensely interesting, especially for the valuable lessons they offer.
An interesting point about these volumes reviewed here should not go unnoticed.
They contain contributions also by scholars other than professional academicians,
apart of course from those by eminent academicians. I am not referring here only to
distinguished scholar-administrators like N. C. Saxena and NG0s. I was particularly
struck by the clarity, precision, ruthless frankness and scholarship in the article by R.
V. Bhuslcute. Congratulations to the Editors for catching such a person in their net.

Received October 2002.

NOTES
1. Land reforms can be distinguished from agrarian reforms, insofar as the scope of the latter is wider
covering
not only abolition of intermediaries, ensuring security of tenure, and ceiling on holdings which land
reforms cover,
but also consolidation of holdings, providing adequate and inexpensive flow of credit to agriculture, and
reducing the
burden of land tax. Improving the market access for farmers and ensuring them a better share in consumer
price can
also be considered as part of agrarian reforms, though the term is not generally used to include the
market aspect. In
the literature on agrarian/land reforms, the distinction between the two terms is not always clear and
consistent.
2. There are at least three interesting and comprehensive papers giving an assessment and overview
of land
reforms in India: Rao(1992), Das(2000), and Deshpande(2002).
3. For variation in tenancy laws across the states, see Deshpande, 2002,Table 2.
4. I have discussed elsewhere in detail the relevance and scope for land reforms in
the present context
(Nadkarni, 1997).

REFERENCES

Aziz, Abdul and Sudhir Krishna (1997), Land Reforms in India: Karnataka - Promises
Kept and Missed, Vol. 4,
Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.
Das, Sukumar (2000),"A Critical Evaluation of Land Reforms in India: 1950-1995",
in B.K. Sinha and Pushpendra
(Eds.)(2000), Land Reforms in India: An Unfinished Business, Vol. 5, Sage Publications
India Pvt. Ltd., New
Delhi.
Dasgupta, Ajit (1993), A History ofIndian Economic Thought, Routledge, London and
New York.
 REVIEW ARTICLE:LAND REFORMS IN INDIA 761

Deshpande, R.S.(2002),"Integrating Land Issues in the Broader Development Agenda: India Case Study", presented
in the World Bank Workshop on Land Policy at Phnom Penh, June.
Gill, Sucha Singh (Ed.) (2001), Land Reforms in India: Intervention for Agrarian Capitalist Transformation in
Punjab and Haryana, Vol. 6, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.
Jha, Praveen K. (Ed.) (2002), Land Reforms in India: Issues of Equity in Rural Madhya Pradesh, Vol. 7, Sage
Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.
Jodha, N.S. (1981), "Agricultural Tenancy: Fresh Evidence from Dryland Areas in India", Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 52, December 26.
Joshi, G.V.(2000), Tenancy Reform and Agricultural Development, Mohit, New Delhi.
Joshi, P.C.(1975),Land Reforms in India: Trends and Perspectives, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi.
Krishna, Sudhir (1997), "Land Reforms Debate: An Overview", in Abdul Aziz and Sudhir Krishna (Eds.)(1997),
op.cit.
Kuznets, Simon (1973), "Modern Economic Growth, Findings and Reflections", The American Economic Review,
Vol. 63, No. 3, June.
Nadkarni, M.V. (1976), "Tenants from the Dominant Class: A Developing Contradiction in Land Reforms",
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 52, December 25, pp. A-137-A-146.
Nadkarni, M.V. (1997), "Land Reforms: Their Continued Relevance", in Abdul Azii and Sudhir Krishna (Eds.)
(1997), op.cit.
Rao, V. M.(1992),"Land Reform Experiences: Perspectives for Strategy and Programmes",Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 26, June 27, pp. A-50-A-64.
Shah, Ghanshyam and D.C. Sah (Eds.)(2002),Land Reforms in India: Peiformance and Challenges in Gujarat and
Maharashtra, Vol. 8, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.
Sinha, B.K. and Pushpendra (Eds.)(2000), Land Reforms in India: An Unfinished Agenda, Vol.5, Sage Publications
India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.