24 1 Zhang-TICLJ
24 1 Zhang-TICLJ
Mo Zhang*
ABSTRACT
The rule of law both as a legal concept and as a practice in China has become
the subject of great attention. There is increasing international pressure on China
to build a legal system that is premised on the “rule of law.” Domestically, the
three-decades of economic reform generated a growing demand for the production
of a legal system that will secure justice and restore the public confidence in the
judiciary. China’s commitment to the rule of law is implicated by its effort to
develop a socialist legal system that maintains Chinese characteristics.
The specifics of what is a socialist legal system and what constitutes Chinese
characteristics in terms of the rule of law are subject to further debate. The
Confucian heritage rooted legal tradition and the single party ruling system have
significantly shaped the legal landscape of the country, making the route to the rule
of law in China a long and thorny one. Despite China’s socialist laurel, the civil
law influence apparent since the late 19th century remains highly visible in the
modern Chinese legal system.
China is determined to develop a legal system under the banner of the rule of
law that is consistent with its unique philosophy of governance. Whatever
difference there may exist between China’s rule of law discourse and the rest of the
world’s, the development of a rule of law in China that incorporates Chinese
characteristics signals China’s determination to move the country toward a sound
legal system meaningful for China and for the international community as well.
Among many challenges, however, the biggest one is perhaps how to reconcile the
role of the ruling communist party and the “rule of law.”
TABLES OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 2
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHINA ........................................... 7
A. Chinese Legal History in Brief................................................................ 8
B. Classic Chinese Legal Philosophy ........................................................ 13
1. The Confucian School of Thought ............................................. 15
2. The Legalist School of Thought ................................................. 18
C. The Traditional Chinese Legal System ................................................. 20
1
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1.
The Dominance of Confucian Philosophy and the
Integration of Li and Fa with Li as the Core .............................. 20
2. The Chinese Criminal Law-Focused Legal Tradtion
and the Subordination of the Judiciary to the
Administration............................................................................ 25
D. Civil Law Influence and a Change of Tradition.................................... 27
E. Building a Socialist Legal System in Modern China ............................ 32
III. THE RULE OF LAW IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT.................................................. 35
A. The Chinese Meaning of the Rule of Law ............................................ 36
B. Law as Defined and Understood in China............................................. 38
C. Law and Government............................................................................ 41
D. Law and Confucian Impacts.................................................................. 43
E. Law and Social Harmony...................................................................... 44
IV. CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: THE SPIRIT OF THE SOCIALIST LEGAL
SYSTEM IN CHINA AND A CONCEPT YET TO BE FURTHER DEFINED ................... 47
A. The CPC’s Leadership .......................................................................... 49
B. Socialism............................................................................................... 52
V. CRITICAL ISSUES FACING THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM AND
CHINA’S MOVE TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW.................................................... 55
A. The Theme of a Legal System:
Rights-Based v. Obligations-Base......................................................... 55
B. The Role of the CPC:
Supremacy of the Party v. Supremacy of the Law ................................ 58
C. The Dominance of Public Ownership:
Public Domain v. Private Interest ......................................................... 61
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 63
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the onset of vast economic reform in 1979, China has
attempted to build its legal system according to the rule of law theory. In 1997, the
ruling Communist Party of China (“CPC”) made it a goal to establish a “socialist
legal system with Chinese characteristics” by 2010.1 This goal was intended to
serve a two-fold purpose: to demonstrate China’s commitment to the rule of law
and to differentiate China’s legal system from the rest of the world’s.2 This
1. Jiang Zemin, Report at the 15th National Congress of the CPC: Hold High the Great
Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of Building
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to the 21st Century, Sept. 12, 1997,
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2002-10-22/1404777724.html. For an English translation, see
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.htm.
2. See SUN GUOHUA, A STUDY IN THE SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEM WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS, CONCEPT, THEORY AND STRUCTURE 24-26 (China Democracy and Legality
1 - ZHANG_TICLJ 12/1/2010 5:03:42 PM
Press 2009). All translations of sources written in Chinese are the work of the author. The author
has verified the corresponding citations and footnotes.
3. Under the term of its accession to the WTO, China was obligated to further undertake
reform to bring its legal and regulatory system in line with those of other WTO members.
Decision, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc #01-5996, WT/L/432, an
English text of the accession, available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
4. Wu Banguo, Report on the Work of the Standing Committee of the 11th National
People's Congress (NPC), Mar. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Speeches/2009-03/16/content_1493447.htm (“Since the
reform and adoption of the opening-door policy, through the joint efforts from all aspects, toward
the end of the term of the 10th NPC, the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics… had
basically been established”).
5. Press Release, Office of the State Council of China, White Paper on the Rule of Law in
China, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-02/28/content_6494029.htm
[hereinafter White Paper].
6. Id.
7. See Randell Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools
Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 474-75 (2001-2002)
[hereinafter Debating Rule of Law in China]; see also Jiangyu Wang, The Rule of Law in China:
A Realistic View of the Jurisprudence, the Impact of the WTO, and the Prospects for Future
Development, SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 348-49 (2004).
8. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 1 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2d ed.,
1985).
9. Id. at 4-5.
10. See Wejen Chang, Foreword to THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA, at vii
(Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman & R. Kent Guy eds., Univ. of Washington Press 2000).
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11. Jonathan Ocko, Using the Past to Make a Case for the Rule of Law, in THE LIMITS OF
THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 65 (Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman & R. Kent Guy eds,
Univ. of Washington Press 2000) (citing Yuanyuan Shen, Conceptions and Receptions of
Legality, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA & Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and
Discretion in the Modern Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA)
(discussing the challenges in the implementation of the rule of law in China and the different
scholarly views on the success of the rule of law in China).
12. James Feinerman, In China, Justice in Reserve, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 18, 2008
at A25.
13. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2002) [hereinafter CHINA’S LONG MARCH].
14. The “Long March” started in Yudu in the province of Jiangxi in October of 1934 and
ended one year later in Yan An of Shanxi Province. The retreat lasted approximately 270 days
and the Red Army traveled by foot some 12,500 kilometers (8,000 miles) along a road full of
snow-capped mountains and swaps. See The Long March of the Communist Party in China,
available at http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/longmarch.htm.
15. Eric Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L, 43, 44 (2001).
16. Wang Chenguang, From the Rule of Man to the Rule of Law, in CHINA’S JOURNEY
TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW: LEGAL REFORM 1978-2008, 6-8 (Cai Dingjian & Wang Chenguang,
2008).
17. The 1999 Amendments added a new paragraph to Article 5, which reads: “The People’s
Republic of China governs country according to law and makes it a socialist country ruled by
law.” XIAN FA, art. 5 (1982) (P.R.C.), translated in Constitution of the People’s Republic of
China, available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
18. Deng Xiaoping, Speech at the Closing Session of the Central Working Conference:
Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future (Dec. 13,
1978), in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, Vol. II, translated in
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1260.html.
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of the nightmare of “lawless” left by the ten-year chaos of the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976).19 This policy was once asserted as the official definition of the “rule
of law;” however, it has been replaced with the idea of “ruled by law” today.20 The
premise on which the development of the rule of law in China is based is the
socialist legal system that bears Chinese characteristics.
In the West, although the traditional idea of “the rule of law is rooted in
Aristotle’s dictum that law must be granted greater authority than the will of any
individual,”21 it remains an “essentially contested concept.”22 Therefore, there is a
gap in the literature on the rule of law, and no concise lexicon detailing the precise
elements comprising the rule of law exists.23 In an attempt to offer a clearer
definition, one theorist describes the rule of law in terms of a “thin” and “thick”
dichotomy.24 The “thin” theory focuses on the formal aspect of the rule of law,
stressing that formal rules are the most efficacious and legitimate way to protect
substantive value.25 The “thick” theory looks beyond mere rules, believing that
“the existence of pre-announced, objectively-knowable and impartially-applied
rules must be supplemented by relating such formal virtue to a substantive account
of democratic justice.”26
The rule of law as developed in China does not seem to follow any traditional
Western patterns27 but rather it is encumbered by Chinese legal traditions that
might make many Westerners uncomfortable.28 Some legal scholars have come to
the conclusion that “neither traditional history nor the policies of the past two
decades offers strong evidence that a system following the principles of the rule of
19. Id.
20. HE QINGHUA & REN CHAO, PURSUIT OF THE RULE OF LAW, A COMPARATIVE STUDY
ON CONCEPTIONS, PATHS AND MODELS, 8-10 (Peking Univ. Press 2005); see also White Paper,
supra note 5.
21. Karen Turner, Introduction to THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 65 (Karen G.
Turner, James V. Feinerman & R. Kent Guy eds., Univ. of Washington Press 2000).
22. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 791 (1989).
23. BARRY HAGER, THE RULE OF LAW, A LEXICON FOR POLICY MAKERS (The Mansfield
Center for Pacific Affairs 1999). For a more detailed discussion on the rule of law, see David
Kairys, Search for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 307 (2003).
24. See CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 14, at 3.
25. Id.
26. ALLAN HUTCHINSON, THE RULE OF LAW REVISITED: DEMOCRACY AND COURTS, IN
RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER, 196, 199 (David Dyzenhaus ed.
Hart Publ’g, 1999). For a general discussion about the “thin” and “thick” theories, see CHINA’S
LONG MARCH, supra note 14, at 8. See also Wang, supra note 7, at 348.
27. SUN GUOHUA, A STUDY IN THE SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEM WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS, CONCEPT, THEORY AND STRUCTURE 24-26, 490 (China Democracy and
Legality Press 2009).
28. See William Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System, in
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 40-41 (Stephen Hsu, New York Univ. Press 2003);
see also Wang, supra note 7, at 348 (“Given China’s current authoritarian ruling regime, the
possibility of adopting a liberal democratic version of the rule of law in the near future is dim.
However, the realization of a “thin” version of the rule of law in China is also challenged as being
insufficient on a variety of grounds.”).
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law will emerge in China in the near future.”29 Nonetheless, there has been
considerable evidence during the past decades that China is shifting toward a
system that complies with the basic elements of a “thin” rule of law.30
In addition, under Western legal theory, the rule of law is viewed as a concept
distinct from that of the “rule by law.”31 The “rule of law” is said to emphasize “the
ability of law and legal systems to impose meaningful restraints on the state and
individual members of the ruling elite,”32 and the “rule by law” refers to “an
instrumental conception of law in which law is merely a tool to be used as state
sees fit.”33 In China, the general understanding of the rule of law may vary, but no
distinction seems to have been made between the “rule of law” and the “rule by
law.”34 In fact, the two terms are used interchangeably to mean a legal environment
in which the country is governed according to the law.35
It is also important to note that China does not regard the rule of law as
having universal application.36 Instead it insists that the rule of law in a country is
determined by and conforms to its national conditions and social system.37 In
China, the national conditions and social systems are inclusively prescribed by the
term “Chinese characteristics.”38 Governing the country according to law and
building a socialist country under the “rule of law” are being interpreted as the
Chinese people’s demand, pursuit, and practice.39
This article addresses how the “rule of law” is adopted and practiced in China
in light of the modern Chinese legal framework, namely the socialist legal system.
It analyzes what the incorporation of Chinese characteristics might implicate for
the rule of law and articulates the major issues facing the nation in its pursuit of the
rule of law. The article argues that China’s discourse for the rule of law is heavily
influenced by its legal tradition and yet closely interwoven with the country’s
modern reform initiatives. The article is not intended to discuss the rule of law
theories in general, but rather offers a case study in a Chinese version of the rule of
law, with a focus on the socialist nature of the legal system that China is
determined to build.
Part II of the article provides an overview of the legal system in China. It
begins with an analysis of the historical doctrines that influenced the country for
centuries and then discusses the Chinese legal tradition and its development. It
also examines the influence of the civil law on the Chinese legal system and the
building of this system under socialist ideology. Part III focuses on the Chinese
conception of the rule of law and explores the implications of the rule of law in
China’s socialist legal system. Part IV analyzes the relationship of Chinese
characteristics as applied in the nation’s commitment to the rule of law and offers a
critical view as to which Chinese characteristics are being employed. Part V seeks
to identify major issues facing China on its way toward the rule of law.
In Part VI, this article concludes that China has learned much from past
experience about the dangers associated with a lack of a sound legal system, but it
remains at a critical stage in the development of a legal system where “rule of law”
is meaningful both domestically and abroad. This article does not suggest that
China should embrace the Western conception of rule of law in order to create a
functioning legal system. It does, however, argue that a legal system that adheres
to the rule of law would require China to further depart from authoritarianism and
to move toward democracy in its social, political, and legal structures. With this in
mind, it is hoped that the building of the socialist legal system with Chinese
characteristics will help develop the rule of law in the nation.
40. See Natalie Lichtenstein, Law in China’s Economic Development: An Essay From Afar,
in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 28, at 274.
41. See XU ZHONGMING AND REN QIANG, LEGAL SPIRITS OF CHINA 1-10 (Guangdong
People’s Press, 2007).
42. See QINGHUA & CHAO, supra note 20, at 15-17.
43. See Alan Watson, Legal Changes: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 1121, 1122 (1983) (discussing why legal history offers the best prospects for understanding
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believed that “legal tradition itself plays an important role in shaping legal
changes,”44 and to a certain extent determines the pattern of the changes.45 Thus, it
is necessary to take a look at Chinese legal history, as well as classic Chinese legal
philosophy, which still retains influence in the country.
legal change).
44. Id. at 1152.
45. Id. at 1134.
46. LIHUI YANG & DEMING AN, HANDBOOK OF CHINESE MYTHOLOGY 253-66 (ABC-
CLIO, Inc. 2005). Since the “Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors” were mythological rulers of
China during the period of pre-history, Chinese historians have offered various interpretations of
who they were. One well accepted interpretation is that the “Three Sovereigns” were “Nüwa,”
“Fuxi,” and Shennong (also called “Yan Di”), and the “Five Emperors” were “Yellow Emperor”
(or “Huang Di”), “Zhuanxu,” “Ku,” “Yao” and “Shun.”
47. Subhuti Dharmananda, Chinese Dynasties, http://www.itmonline.org/arts/dynasties.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010). This dynastic history and time periods were based on the “Table of
Dynastic Periods of Xia, Shang and Zhou” published in 2000 by the Research Group organized
through then State Commission of Science and Technology under the State grant.
48. ZHANG ZHONGQIU, A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN CHINESE AND WESTERN LEGAL
CULTURES 5 (China Univ. of Pol. Sci. and Law Press 2006) [hereinafter A COMPARATIVE
STUDY].
49. HISTORY OF CHINA, VOL. I (Haiyan Press 2001).
50. ZHANG JINFAN, EVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE LEGAL CIVILIZATION 14 (China Univ. of
Pol. Sci. and Law Press 1999).
51. Id. at 20.
52. See XIN CHUNYING, CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM AND CURRENT LEGAL REFORM 2, 310
(Law Press 1999).
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behavior rules of the state.53 The etiquette rules, taken together, were called Li
(commonly translated as “the rules of propriety” or “rites”) which later developed
into the “standardized and systemized” social norms called Zhou Li in the West
Zhou.54
Closely related to Li was the concept of Xing which also emerged during the
Xia dynasty.55 Xing, meaning punishment, was used to implement Li. In Xia
dynasty, a violation of Li would constitute a criminal offense upon which a penalty
would be imposed.56 In Chinese legal history, Xing is considered the initial form of
criminal law because it is mainly comprised of penalties for criminal offenses.57
For example, by the time of Zhou Dynasty, there had developed so-called Wu Xing
(Five Punishments) to help maintain Li and social orders. The Wu Xing included
Mo (tattooing the face), Yi (chopping off the nose), Yue (cutting off the feet), Gong
(castration), and Dapi (death penalty or decapitation).58
The most distinctive feature of the legal system in the Xia, Shang and Zhou
Dynasties was the intimate entanglement of Li with Xing, effectively the country
was “ruled by Li and run by Xing.”59 Specifically, whatever was not allowed by Li
would be prohibited by Xing and anything in compliance with Li would necessarily
be permissible by Xing.60 In other words, Li was not only the source of Xing but
also enforced by Xing.61 Thus, with Li taking a dominant role at that time, the law
was basically a combination of “Li” and “Xing”.62
The second period of Chinese legal history is referred to as the imperial
period, stretched over two thousand years from the founding of Qin Dynasty (221
B.C.) to the fall of Qing Dynasty (1911). During that period, China witnessed
more than a dozen dynasties that encompassed both feudal and semi-colonial
societies.63 During this time the tradition of combining Li and Xing remained in the
53. ZHANG JINFAN, THE TRADITION AND MODERN TRANSITION OF CHINESE LAW 4 (Law
Press 2005).
54. Id.
55. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 25-27.
56. See ZHANG ZHONGQIU, LEGAL CULTURES IN A COMPARATIVE VISION 52 (Law Press
2003) [hereinafter LEGAL CULTURES].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See GAO MINXUAN & ZHAO BINGZHI, EVOLUTION OF CHINESE CRIMINAL
LEGISLATION 1 (Law Press 2007).
60. Id. at 2.
61. Id.
62. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 3-22.
63. MINXUAN & BINGZHI, supra note 59, at 5-29 (describing the legislations of feudal
societies). Those dynasties were Qin (221 B.C. to 206 B.C.), Han (206 B.C. to 220), Three
Kingdoms and Wei (226-280), Jin (265-420), Southern and Northern Empires (420-589), Sui
(581-618), Tang (618-907), 5 Imperia and 10 Kingdoms (907-960), Song (960-1279), Yuan
(1206-1368), Ming (1368-1644), and Qing (1644-1911). Id. Note that among those dynasties,
some coexisted in difference areas, and some were overlapping because when the new dynasty
was founded the existing dynasty had not yet been completely ruled out. Id.
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legal system and developed into a synergy of Li and Fa (Law).64 In addition, the
codified statutes became the primary source of law.65 Among all of the legal codes
that were enacted in that period, the Tang Code was regarded as the most
influential.66
The major development of the Chinese legal system in the second period of
legal history was that Li became the mainstay of the system, while Fa was used
secondarily to supplement Li.67 During imperial times, the heart of Li was to
protect the authority of the emperor.68 In addition, the patriarchal, kinship-
premised social system and tradition made the emperor the ruler of the country and
ultimate source of law.69 Because of this imperial China was commonly classified
as being ruled by men rather than by law.70 Another distinction of the imperial
legal system was that the majority of laws were criminally oriented and there was
no distinction between criminal law and civil law.71
The third period of the Chinese legal system spanned from 1911 to 1949.
During this time, the imperial system ended and a republic system was
established,72 so that the third period is also called the republic period. The most
significant characteristic of the republic period was that the traditional chain
between Li and Fa broke, and a new legal system was formed.73 For these reasons,
the third period is deemed a transitional period.74
The dramatic changes in the republic period were driven by two
unprecedented forces: one external and one internal. Externally, the Opium War in
1840 signaled the death of China’s long held policy of self-seclusion and forced
China to open its door to the Western world.75 As a result of foreign occupation,
Western ideologies were ushered into the country and clashes occurred between
those ideologies, Li, and the patriarchic Chinese tradition.76 Hence, China entered
into an era of social changes that eventually led the country away from both
feudalism and the imperial system.77
Internally, China’s unexpected defeat by foreign forces during the Opium
War of 1840 and other subsequent losses, emphasized the fading glory of imperial
power. A group of political elites within the central government tried to revive
China by calling for “learning from the West.”78 They opined that in order to make
China strong again it was necessary to imitate the Western countries both
politically and economically.79 To that end, they launched a campaign historically
called the Westernization Movement (Yangwu Yundong) in the nation, aimed at
developing national industries and an army.80
In the late nineteenth century, another group of reformists emerged, leading
the 1898 Legal Reform (Wuxu Bianfa).81 They believed that in order to remove
China from its state of backwardness, political and legal reform was necessary.82
With that in mind, they studied Western political systems and attempted to
introduce some aspects into China as a means of revitalizing the nation.83 They
hoped that their efforts would establish a constitutional monarchy in the country.84
In the face of strong resistance from the ruling conservative power in the
Forbidden City, neither the Westernization Movement, nor the 1989 Legal Reform
succeeded.85 Nevertheless, these scholars inevitably brought Western political
concepts and democratic ideologies to China, which in part planted the seeds for
the 1911 Revolution (Xinhai Revolution).86 It was this Revolution that relegated
China’s more than two-thousand-year old imperial system into the annals of
history.87
One significant achievement of the 1911 Revolution was the establishment of
a republican government formed under the Three Principles of the People88 and the
theory of The Constitution of Five Powers advocated by Dr. Sun Ya-tsen,89 the
founder of the Republic of China. In the meantime, the 1911 Revolution marked
the fall of the Li-based classic Chinese law and offended the imperial power
centered legal system.90 Unfortunately, due to constant internal conflicts, China’s
war against Japanese occupation, and its civil war, the newly born republic was
never actually stabilized. Consequently, the ideas of Three Principles of the
People and the Constitution of Five Powers were barely implemented.91 Although
under the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek, a set of laws known as
The Six Codes were compiled and promulgated, they were not applied as intended,
and eventually were abolished by the communist government in 1949.92
The fourth period of Chinese legal history started with the founding of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949. This period, commonly referred to as the
socialist period, can be further divided into Mao’s era (Mao Zedong) and the post-
Mao era. During Mao’s reign from 1949 to 1976, China adopted Soviet-style
socialism which Mao later transformed into the “revolutionary movements,” in
which he sought to keep the color of China “red” or, in other words, to resist
capitalism.93 In the legal fora, Mao annulled all laws enacted by the Nationalist
government before 1949 and attempted to replace them with socialist laws or “the
people’s laws” to be enacted thereafter.94
Unfortunately, due to Mao’s zealotry in the “class struggle,”95 the country’s
endeavor to establish legality was entirely shelved in 1957 when the nation-wide
Anti-Rightists movement was lunched to suppress intellectuals.96 After that, the
legal work in China stalled and during the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), the
country actually had no law at all. For that reason, many regarded Mao’s era as the
era of “lawlessness.”97 According to a foreign observer, under Mao’s reign, the
vast land of China existed in a legal vacuum for thirty years.98
Autumn and Warring States period was so significant that it commands a lengthy
discussion in all history books.107 In this period, China transitioned from a slavery-
based society to a feudal one.108 Because of its nature, this period was full of
substantial social changes that led to the boom of new theories.109
The most significant social change during this period was the emergence of
independent “little kingdoms” (dukedoms), comprised of former territories ceded
by the king (Son of the Heaven) to the nobles, including relatives and family
members of the king.110 Because of this change, the king’s power was substantially
weakened and the “little kingdoms” each functioned as a state independent from
the king.111 One major phenomenon resulting from this change was the “collapse”
of Zhou Li, which had been employed to maintain the absolute authority of the
king.112
Corresponding with the collapse of Zhou Li was the flourishing of new
theories and ideas. Many intellectuals affiliated with the different “little
kingdoms” competed to find a “good theory and philosophy” to govern their state
and make it stronger.113 As a result, there grew a diverse intellectual force known
as the “hundred intellectuals” (zhu zi mai jia), and each of the intellectuals not only
actively developed its own thoughts and ideas, but also openly debated with
others.114 The intellectual debates about politics and social order gave rise to a
historical social environment—one in which the “hundred intellectuals”
contended.115
The intellectual debates yielded four major schools of thought (the “big four”)
that had a tremendous impact on Chinese legal philosophy and jurisprudence. The
big four were comprised of the Confucianists (Ru Jia), Taoists (Dao Jia), Legalists
(Fa Jia), and Mohists (Mo Jia).116 Much of the significance of these four schools
of thought is due to the fact that each school was directly associated with some
China’s most famous philosophers.117 Among the big four, the Confucianists and
the Legalists were the most influential on the development of the traditional
Chinese legal system.118
119. See HISTORY OF CHINA, supra note 49, at 114-15. Confucius, named Qiu and styled
Zhongni (social name), was born in the state of Lu, today’s Shandong Province. A poor
descendant of a dispossessed noble family, he had a tumultuous childhood―his father died when
he was three years old and his mother passed away when he was seventeen. Upon reaching
adulthood, he had to support himself by undertaking such petty jobs as keeping a warehouse and
caring for livestock. He always had an interest in politics, but it was not until age 50 that
Confucius was made a city magistrate of Lu. He was subsequently appointed as the Secretary of
Justice of Lu and eventually achieved the status of Lu’s Chief Minister. Although Confucius had
great ambition to serve the state of Lu, his political career was not successful. Since his political
views were at odds with the Duke of Lu, Confucius resigned from the post of Chief Minister at
age fifty-five and left Lu to travel around to different states. He returned to Lu in 484 B.C. and
spent the rest of his life teaching and writing. Confucius’ early life was strongly influenced by
his mother, who taught him how to appreciate and practice rites during his childhood. From a
young age, he extensively studied the rites of Zhou, and was reputed to be a man of fairness,
politeness, and possessed of a love of learning. He was also an avid music lover, believing that
music could help instill kindness and uprightness of character. As noted, one of the most
important parts of Confucius’ life was his love of teaching. He taught not only rites and
philosophy, but also poetry and music. Confucius died in 479 B.C. Id. at 72.
120. See generally, ALAN K.L. CHAN, MENCIUS: CONTEXTS AND INTERPRETATIONS (Univ.
of Hawaii Press 2002). Mencius, named Ke, was a well-known philosopher in the period of the
Warring States, and a loyal advocate and defender of the Confucian School against rival
philosophic doctrines. Mencius is believed to have studied with Confucius’ grandson Zisi. Like
Confucius, Mencius traveled from state to state and tried to use his philosophy to influence
politics. While not successful, he made great contributions to the Confucian School of thought by
explicitly interpreting Confucianism and developing the theory into a system of philosophic
thinking. Both Confucius and Mencius were regarded as the great intellectuals and philosophers
in China’s history, and they were commonly referred as “The Sages” of the nation. In addition,
Confucius hailed as a great educator because he devoted much of his life to teaching, legendarily
inspiring seventy-two bright disciples (Xianren) and three thousands followers (Dizi). The
philosophy and ideology held by Confucius and Mencius as well as their followers was called
The Doctrine of Confucius – Mencius (Kong-Meng Zhidao), which was branded as “Ru,” or
collectively as Confucianism.
121. J.Y. Tan, Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, 4 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 95
(2003), available at http://www.jonathantan.org/essays/Chinese-NCE-Confucianism.pdf. In
Chinese history, there is a well-known collection of classics called Four Books and Five Classics
(Si Shu Wu Jing). The Four Books are comprised of The Great Learning (Da Xue), The Doctrine
of the Mean (Zhong Yong), The Analects of Confucius (Lunyu), and The Mencius (Mengzi). The
Five Classics are “The Book of Songs” (Shijing), “The Book of Documents” (Shujing), “The Book
of Changes (Yijing), “The Book of Rites” (Liji), and “The Spring and Autumn Annals” (Chunqiu).
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Five of the Four Books and Five Classics are related to Confucius and Confucian doctrines.
122. See generally XINZHONG YAO, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFUCIANISM (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000).
123. See CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS bk. 12.11 (Raymond Dawson trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1993).
124. Because of his strong support of Confucian doctrines, as well as his creative work in
expounding Confucianism, Mencius became the “master” after Confucius, lauded as the “second
sage” (Ya Shen). CHAN, supra note 120, at 3.
125. ZHONGMING & QIANG, supra note 41, at 60-62.
126. SHUCHENG, supra note 64, at 150.
127. n Mencius’ view, an infant instinctively knows how to love his parents, and when he
grows up, he naturally knows how to respect his older brothers. Loving one’s parents is
benevolence and respecting one’s older brothers is rightness – these principles resonate with all
people. See JIN XIN, MENCIUS, Book 7A. It was also Mencius’ proposition that the goodness of
human nature akin to the downward tendency of water: just as water has a down-running
tendency, all people have a tendency toward goodness. See MENCIUS, GAO ZHI, BOOK 6A. For
an English translation of MENGZI, see MENGZI WITH SELECTIONS FROM TRADITIONAL
COMMENTARIES (Bryan W. Van Norden, trans., Hackett 2008).
128. SHUCHENG, supra note 64, at 150.
129. See MENGZI, supra note 127, at 187.
130. Id.
131. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: Xunzi,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/274068/Xunzi (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). Also
known as Hsun Tse, named Kuang and styled Qing.
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state power.144 For example, Xunzi’s political views included a desire “to esteem
those who are knowledgeable and to employ those who are capable.”145 Thus, in
Xunzi’s opinion, the appointment of any public officer should be made on the basis
of merit rather than family status.146
of Lord Shang and Han Feizi were the principal sources of Legalist doctrine. The
Book of Lord Shang recorded Shang Yang’s reform initiatives and addressed both
the origin and the role of law.150 It emphasized the importance of law in governing
a country and promoted the idea of “equal punishment” (Yi Xing): that the
imposition of punishment should not take into consideration the social status of the
person being punished.151 Han Feizi essentially restated the previous Legalist
ideologies and advocated a system of laws that would enable a ruler to govern
efficiently, even ruthlessly.152 Thus, the striking difference between Confucianism
and Legalism is that the former upheld “rule by Li” while the latter strove for “rule
by law.”
Han Feizi was also significant because the book explicitly described the
political strategies of governance.153 It synthesized the Fa, Shu, and Shi into a
general scheme for ruling of the country.154 Fa encompasses the laws, rules, or
legal norms, which helped establish the desired social standards, regulate human
behavior, and maintain the power of the ruler and the state.155 Shu denoted the
strategies or measures by which the ruler’s power was exercised and his decisions
were carried out.156 Shi represented the authority and power that rested with the
ruler and commanded the full respect and obedience of the ruled.157
According to Han Fei, the Fa, Shu, and Shi were indispensable components of
being a ruler. Without the Fa, the country would become uncontrollable since the
Fa made governance possible; short of the Shu, the Fa would not be effectively
implemented resulting in the mismanagement of the country; absent the Shi, the Fa
would not be respected and the ruler’s role would be diminished. Thus, it was Han
Fei’s belief that if the ruler could rely on the Fa and live with the Shi, the country
would remain under control.158 He also emphasized that a ruler could not afford to
lose either the Fa or the Shu because the Fa served as the premise of the Shi, and
the Shu functioned as the means to realize and maintain the Shi.159
In short, Legalism advanced the idea that the law was designed to support the
ruler and the state.160 The Legalists advocated that law should be given absolute
authoritativeness so that it would become the sole criterion by which to judge right
from wrong.161 They favored heavy punishments because they considered it vitally
Dao (d. 315) of the state of Zhao, and Shen Buhai (d. 337 BC) of the state of Chu.
150. YANG SHANG, THE BOOK OF LORD SHANG (J.J.L. Duyvendak trans., The Commercial
Press 2006).
151. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 95.
152. Id. at 96-98.
153. Id. at 97.
154. SHUCHENG, supra note 64, at 142.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. YONGDONG, supra note 138, at 176-200.
160. SHUCHENG, supra note 64, at 140-41.
161. Id.
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important to equip the law with great “deterrent force.”162 However, the Legalists
also promoted equal application of the law, positing that if the punishments were
harsh and the law equally applied, neither the powerful nor the weak would be able
to escape the state’s control and the authority of the ruler.163
Currently, many in China view Legalism as an early incarnation of the rule of
law concept that placed the law above all else, in terms of state power and
administration.164 However, it is important to note that the rule of law advanced by
the Legalists had a clear focus on punishment and maintenance of the ruler’s
power.165 Conceptually, it differed from the Western notion of rule of law, in that
Legalism had nothing to do with constitutionalism or an independent judiciary,166
rather, the rule of law theory, as employed in ancient China, was intimately related
to upholding of the supremacy of the imperial authority.167
of Books and Burying of Intellectuals (212 B.C.).173 But in the Han Dynasty, under
the suggestion of Dong Zhongsu,174 Emperor Wudi adopted a state policy that
“proscrib[ed] hundred[s] of other schools of thought and espous[ed] Confucian
ideology only.”175 As a result of that policy, Confucianism emerged again,
becoming the orthodox ideology of the country that lasted for almost the entire
period of Chinese imperial history.176
Of all the factors credited for the dominance of Confucianism, three are the
most notable. First was the Confucian system of social estate that was aimed at
maintaining the imperial power.177 Based on the Confucian “three cardinal guides
and five virtues,”178 the social estate system was an imperial power-centered social
and political order under which the country operated. The second factor was the
clan-based ethnic standard established by Confucianists,179 which served as an
ideological device to unify the country around the emperor, granting him
exclusively absolute power.180 The third factor was the authoritarian structure of
bureaucracies created under the imperial power to govern the country.181 Although
Confucianism advocated a benevolent government, its conception of the
superiority of imperial power in fact formed a theoretical basis to justify the
authoritarian nature of the government.182
At the heart of Confucianism was the idea of Li. In general, Li is a classic
Chinese social construct, used extensively to refer to norms of social behavior and
moral standards.183 Deemed a Chinese ideograph, Li is a complicated concept
because it iembodies the entire spectrum of interaction with humans, nature, and
even material objects.184 Indeed, in Chinese history, Li played a significant role in
173. The Burning of Books and Burying of Intellectuals refer to a policy and sequence of
events in which the Qin Dynasty suppressed all schools of thought other than the Legalism. See
SIMA QIAN, RECORDS OF THE GRAND HISTORIAN: QUIN DYNASTY xiii (Burton Watson trans.,
The Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong 1993). Full Chinese text available at
http://guji.artx.cn/Article/2201.html.
174. Dong Zhongsu (179-140 B.C.) was a famous scholar in the Han Dynasty who was
instrumental in establishing Confucianism as the official ideology of ancient China. As chief
minister to the emperor Wu, Dong was responsible for the dismissal of all non-Confucian
scholars from the government. Encyclopedia Britannica, Dong Zhongshu,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/608995/Dong-Zhongshu (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
175. JINFAN, supra note 51, at 147-48.
176. Id. at 144.
177. ZHONGQIU, supra note 48, at 134-35.
178. The “three cardinal guides” included that of “the ruler over subject, the father over son,
and the husband over wife,” and the “five virtues” comprised of “benevolence, righteousness,
ritual, wisdom and honesty.” WarriorTours, Confucianism,
http://www.warriortours.com/intro/religion_confucianism.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
179. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 5-6.
180. ZHONGQIU, supra note 48, at 134-35.
181. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 3.
182. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 5-6.
183. Id. at 3.
184. See generally CONFUCIAN PERSONALITIES (Arthur Wright & Denis Twitchett eds.,
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both the regulation of human activities, and in defining the relationship between
humans and nature. The conception of Li and all theories developed under its
sacred rubric constituted the main theme of traditional Chinese legal culture.185
At its inception, Li originated from the religious rites that were used to
worship heaven and the ancestors.186 Li began transitioning to systemized norms of
conduct when the Lord of Zhou stipulated Zhou Li, infusing Li with political
functions to serve as a primary means to govern the state.187 At that time, as noted
earlier, the very purpose of Li was to help build a political and social system under
which a hierarchical order was established and maintained.188 Pursuant to that
order, people were ranked on the basis of their social status and were generally
classified as the noble, respected, inferior, or lowly. Thus, upon the enactment of
Zhou Li, Li evolved from religious rites to social norms.189
According to Zhou Li, the order of hierarchy was to be strictly followed and
no one could violate it.190 Thus, in a state, everyone was subservient to the king.
Additionally, the inferior could not offend the noble, and the poor could not be
treated the same as the wealthy.191 Similarly, in a family, the younger was obedient
to the elder, the son was servile to the father, and the lowly had to listen to the
respected.192 From the viewpoint of the Lord of Zhou, when Li was observed,
everything in the state would be well ordered and the country would be strong,
otherwise the whole society could descend into chaos.193
Social upheaval during the periods of Spring-Autumn and Warring States, led
to a movement to abandon Zhou Li.194 However, believing that Li was essential to
the stability and development of the state, Confucius focused much of his effort on
restoring Zhou Li.195 On the one hand, Confucius stressed the importance of
maintaining the Zhou Li social order. On the other hand, he introduced into Li his
idea of Ren (benevolence),196 making “Li” and “Ren” the two key elements of
Confucianism.
According to Confucius, if a person lacked Ren, he would fail to observe
Li.197 Thus, in order to comply with Li, it was essential to possess morals such as
filial submission, brotherliness, righteousness, good faith, and loyalty, basic norms
Stanford Press 1962) (describing how the concept of Li permeated Chinese society and was a
pillar of Confucianism).
185. ZHONGMING & QIANG, supra note 41, at 47-60.
186. Id. at 39-47.
187. Id. at 59.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 45-47.
190. JINFAN, supra note 53, at 11-13.
191. Id. at 12.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. ZHONGMING & QIANG, supra note 41, at 60-61.
197. CONFUCIUS, supra note 123, bk. 1.2.
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of virtue.198 To that end, Confucius strongly advocated the concept of the rule of
virtue by emphasizing the political approach of “guiding with virtue and regulating
with Li.”199 When speaking of Li, Confucius and his followers believed that
adherence to Li would lead people to abide by the virtues and follow the rites
appropriate to their social, political, and personal status.200
Hence, Li basically served two major functions, acting both as a moral
standard and norms of conduct. The whole idea of Li was to promote a social
scheme of “three cardinal guides” and “five virtues,” and to help establish a king-
centered aristocratic political system.201 However, from the beginning, the
Legalists were vehemently opposed to Confucian ideology. For a long period of
time, especially during the Qin Dynasty when Legalism was the ruling force,
Confucianism was considered merely a scholarly doctrine and did not play much
of a role in the social and political arena. It was in the Han Dynasty that
Confucianism became more influential and ultimately was made the state
orthodoxy.202
A historical reason for Confucianism’s acceptance in the Han Dynasty was
the swift fall of the Qin Dynasty, in which tyranny was commonplace.203 The
lesson the Han learned from the Qin was that in order to rule the country, all
policies must be tempered with benevolence and mercy.204 For that reason,
Emperor Wudi took Dong Zhongsu’s advice and adopted Confucian Li as the basic
means of governance in order to create a benevolent government. Since then, Li
became an important part of Chinese legal system.205
198. Steve Stegeman, Book Note, 14 CHINA REV. INT’L, 394, 394-400 (2007) (reviewing
KIM-CHONG CHONG, EARLY CONFUCIUS ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND ARGUMENTS (2007).
199. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 88.
200. Jeffrey Riegel, Confucious, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Sept. 5, 2006)
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/confucius/. In Confucian texts, Li was stated explicitly in
various rites. The book of Li Ji (Records of Li) was the most influential work containing texts of
Li. In accordance with Li Ji, Confucius addressed the scope of Li extensively, including some
“300 major and 3000 minor rules of ritual.” In fact, Confucius extended his discussion about Li
to a wide range of topics, from eating and drinking, women’s walking, clothing, and mourning; to
learning, appropriate attitude towards elders, loyalty to superiors and ultimately to the ruler of the
state.
201. See JOSH MCDOWELL & DON STEWART, HANDBOOK OF TODAY’S RELIGIONS:
Confucianism (1992), available at
http://www.greatcom.org/resources/handbook_of_todays_religions/03chap04/default.htm. It was
Confucius’s strong belief that if the ruler acted like a ruler, the subject like a subject, the father
like a father, and the son like a son, the order of the society and the stability of the state were
readily attainable.
202. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 144.
203. EMuseum @ Minnesota State University, Han Dynasty,
http://www.mnsu.edu/emuseum/prehistory/china/early_imperial_china/han.html (last visited Mar.
5, 2010).
204. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 144-46.
205. Id. at 144.
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legal system, the same code contained both criminal and civil law, placing criminal
punishment at the center.225
What followed was the creation of a judiciary that prioritized criminal law
and punishment. At the central level, there were three legal branches: the Board of
Punishment (Xing Bu), the Central Judicial Court (Da Li Si), and the Office of
Censors, or Censorate (Yu Shi Tai).226 This three-branch format was established
during the Tang dynasty, and subsequent dynasties largely adhered to it.227
The Board of Punishment was in charge of drafting and examining laws and
regulations, and classifying criminal punishment. Although it functioned more like
a legislative body, it had the power to review judgments concerning the death
sentence and exile.228 The Central Judicial Court was responsible for adjudicating
all cases, except for the death penalty and exile cases that were subject to the
Board of Punishment’s review and approval.229 The Office of Censors mainly dealt
with supervision of officials at the central and local level, but was also authorized
to adjudicate certain cases.230
The Board of Punishment was the most powerful of the three branches, since
it was the top body of criminal law legislation and enforcement. Notwithstanding
the division of power between these branches, the power of final adjudication
rested with the emperor.231 The emperor was the ultimate source of law not only
because his words had binding legal effect, but also because he possessed ultimate
judicial power. Thus, the emperor possessed all the powers of the legislature,
executive, and judiciary.232
In addition, although the Central Judicial Court was much like the supreme
court of a nation, the judiciary was not independent.233 Rather, it was generally
subordinate to the administration for several reasons. First, the emperor had the
final say in all cases, and the imperial edict was the supreme law of the land.234 In
addition, the Central Judicial Court was less powerful than the Board of
Punishment and was often influenced by the Office of Censors. The so-called
“joint hearing by three branches” (San Tang Hui Shen) was a common
occurrence.235 Finally, there were no local courts, an executive officer handled
everything at the local level.236
Beginning with the Qin Dynasty, the local administration was divided into
three levels: province, prefecture, and county—all under the direct control of the
central government.237 Each of these local administrative offices was called Yamen
because it served as both the executive office and the courtroom. As such, the
executive officer was empowered with judicial authority and a considerable
amount of his daily work involved adjudicating civil and criminal cases.238
The combination of the executive and the judiciary into one local office was a
peculiar system that appeared throughout the feudal period of Chinese history.
The underlying rationale was to ensure that the imperial power was not
compromised and the emperor retained control of the reins of the nation’s
judiciary.239 Unfortunately, as a consequence of the system, the executive was
superior to the judiciary and enjoyed the privilege of being able to interfere with
judicial proceedings. Given this two-fold authority, executive and judiciary, a
local chief official was often venerated as “parental officer” (Fu Mu Guan), giving
him the right and authority to determine the life of any particular person.240 Many
officers took advantage of this power.
237. Id. at 214. During the Qin Dynasty, there were two levels: prefecture and county.
During the East Han Dynasty (25-220 A.D.), province was created above the prefecture and
county.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 315.
242. Id; WILLIAM L. TUNG, CHINA AND THE FOREIGN POWERS: THE IMPACT OF AND
REACTION TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 7 (Oceana 1970).
243. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 315.
244. COHEN, supra note 75, at xi. These “unequal treaties” benefitted other nations at the
expense of China’s sovereignty and “judicial and administrative integrity[.]” TUNG, supra note
243, at 8. For example, under the Treaty of Nanking, which ended the Opium War, Great Britain
took possession of Hong Kong, opened several ports to “British trade and residence[,]” and
forced China to pay a twenty-one million dollar indemnity. Id. at 20. By 1905, nineteen
countries “had entered into unequal treaties with China.” Id. at 30.
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state, through these treaties, Western countries, later joined by Japan, established
extraterritorial spheres of influence on Chinese soil.245 In these extraterritorial
spheres of influence, Western nations established their own civil and criminal
courts,246 and Western citizens in China were not subject to Chinese law.247 In
other words, extraterritoriality allowed these foreign nations to administer
“Western justice” by establishing “treaty ports” or “spheres of influence” within
China.248
After the Opium Wars, Western influence began to take hold in China. Faced
with the unpleasant experience of foreign occupation, many in the Forbidden City
sought a cure to revitalize the ailing country and began to desire political and legal
reform.249 Responding to an influx of Western capital, China began revising its
laws in 1902.250
One significant revision included the use of foreign laws as a reference, for
the first time basing a great deal of the legal revision on Western legal models.251
In fact, many in China even believed that the country should follow the lead of
powerful European counties and adopt a constitutional government.252 As part of
the effort to investigate foreign laws, many foreign legal books and articles were
translated into Chinese.253 In addition, scholars who had trained overseas
introduced foreign laws and legal culture.254 During this time, an increasing
number of students were provided with government grants to study foreign law
and, as a result, many students received their legal education overseas, mainly in
Europe.255
This legal reform further fortified the concept of “learning from the West” in
China. In 1907 a national body—the Office of Legal Revision—was created and
became responsible for making legal revisions and drafting new laws.256 The
Office of Legal Revision consisted of Chinese students who had returned from
studying abroad in Japan, Europe, and the United States. Further, illustrating its
intent to learn from the west, the Office of Legal Revision hired a Japanese jurist
as an advisor on legal drafting for the imperial government.257 At that time, Japan
had completed its civil and commercial codification, which was modeled primarily
on the German codes.258 In December 1910, the first draft of the Civil Code was
complete and it was finalized in 1911.259
The draft of the Civil Code was based primarily on German and Japanese law
models.260 It contained five chapters, the first three of which were drafted by the
Japanese jurist in the Office of Legal Revision.261 In addition, many civil law
concepts were borrowed and incorporated into the draft; these concepts were also
addressed in the legal writings and legal textbooks as well.262 Moreover, Chinese
legal scholars translated a number of European laws and legal books into
Chinese.263
Despite the progress made on the Civil Code, it was never enacted into law.
In 1911, the Xinhai Revolution (named after the Chinese year of Xinghai) stormed
China.264 The Revolution brought the end to the Qing Dynasty and led to the
establishment of the Republic of China.265 Despite the Civil Code’s doomed fate,
the Revolution resulted in historic changes. The emperor was dethroned and
imperial power was destroyed.266 The traditional Chinese legal system, centered on
imperial supremacy, ended in the country.
Nevertheless, after the 1911 Revolution, the government used many of the
provisions in the unfinished Civil Code while drafting work resumed.267 The
religion, their widespread presence in China made it possible to significantly increase the
exposure of the country to the foreign ideology and social value. Id.
256. See WANG, supra note 252, at x-xi.
257. The Japanese jurist was Mr. Y.M. Matsuoka. Id. at 18. During that reform period,
anxious to follow Japan’s emergence from the old feudalism into a modern country, hundreds of
Chinese students went to Japan to study, a significant number of them went to Japanese law
schools. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 16-20.
260. Jones, supra note 28, at 20.
261. WANG, supra note 252, at 16-20.
262. See WANG JIAFU, CIVIL LAW OBLIGATIO 17-18 (Law Press 1991). See also
ZHUONGMING & QIANG, supra note 41, at 340-42.
263. JIAFU, supra note 262, at 17-18.
264. See CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 322; see also ZHUONGMING & QIANG, supra note
41, at 357.
265. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 322.
266. Jones, supra note 28, at 19.
267. GUOHUA, supra note 2, at 23.
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second draft, completed in 1925, essentially followed the blueprint of the first draft
while enhancing its civil law characteristics.268 Unfortunately, power struggles
amongst warlords created considerable political chaos during this period and the
second draft met the same fate as the first, never being completed.269
The enactment of China’s Civil Code finally came to fruition in 1930,270
under the National Government led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) who ruled
the country from 1927 to 1949.271 The 1930 Civil Code consisted of five Parts,
including the “General Principles, Obligations, Rights over Things, Family, and
Succession.”272 Since the Code was devised on the foundation of the first two
drafts, it necessarily inherited the civil law tradition.273 In addition to its civil law
style of division between general principles and specific provisions, the Code was
replete with civil law concepts. For example, Part III of the Code dealt with
property rights, but it used the name of “Rights over Things.”274 “Things” is a term
for property in civil law countries.275
In addition to the 1930 Civil Code, five other major codes were promulgated
between 1928 and 1937.276 All together, these compositions were called “The Six
Codes” or the “Code of Six Laws” (Liu Fa Quan Shu) and were compiled in a
corpus of law.277 Like the 1930 Civil Code, the other five codes relied heavily on
civil law tradition, and contained many legal principles taken from Germany and
Japan.278 The major categories of law, both conceptually and structurally,
paralleled those commonly used in the civil law countries. For example, even the
term, Six Codes, was borrowed from the French “Five Codes” enacted after the
1789 French Revolution.279
The adoption of the Six Codes altered the Chinese legal system from a single,
unified code focused on criminal law to a function-driven system of separate codes
for separate areas of law.280 Note that the word “altered” is used here to mean that
the Chinese legal tradition was changed, but not eliminated, as a result of
embracing Chinese civil law.281 Perhaps at this level, enactment of the Six Codes
could be heralded as the complete reception of the civil law tradition in China.
In fact, the Six Codes retained quite a number of legal principles and rules
from the Qing Code.282 One example is the use of “forced analogy” (Bi Fu) to help
determine criminal offenses that were not readily found in the provisions of the
code.283 Despite the strong influence of civil law tradition, mainly in the areas of
legal philosophy and jurisprudence, no clear cut distinction was ever made
between Chinese legal tradition and the contemporary legal system, especially with
respect to the deeply-rooted concept of Li.284 In addition, the clan-based ethic
standard and the authoritarian structure of bureaucrats remained influential.285
Since the Qin Dynasty (221 B.C. to 206 B.C.), each dynasty in China
followed a pattern of highly centralized state power with an expansive reach over
every corner of the country.286 After the last Emperor was dethroned in 1911, many
revolutionaries, including Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of
China, still believed that it was necessary to establish a government that had an
“all-purpose” function, with each individual under government power, ready to
sacrifice personal interests in order to preserve such power.287 Although Dr. Sun
Yat-sen premised his idea of revolution on the Three People’s Principles
(nationalism, democracy, and equalization), he actually tried to promote a “guided
democracy.”288 Under this guided democracy, the state would undergo a brief
period of military dictatorship while the people were “trained to exercise
democracy.”289
But indeed, between the legal reform in late Qing Dynasty and the adoption of
the Six Codes by the Nationalist government in 1930s, China’s legal system
evolved, developing traits of a civil law system.290 First, codes and statutes became
the primary sources of law, while case law precedent was not generally given
binding effect.291 Although court decisions may have supplemented statutes by
creating binding decisions, under the system of the Six Codes, such decisions had
to meet two requirements: (1) the Supreme Court had to make the decisions; and
(2) the Judicial Council of Central Authorities (Si Fa Yuan) had to review the
decisions and approve them as “precedent.”292
Second, the laws or statutes were enacted in the common pattern of a civil law
system.293 The manifestation of this pattern related to the structural layout of the
laws or statutes and consisted of two major parts: the general principles and the
specific provisions.294 Although the general principles appear vague, they serve a
dual function: they set the tone for the law and provided guidance for its
application, and they could be used directly as legal authority to determine cases,
especially when no specific provision could be readily applied.295
Therefore, in terms of legal structure and terminological origin, the modern
Chinese legal system bears a stronger resemblance to the civil law system than to
that of the Chinese tradition.296 However, this observation does not indicate that
the traditional Chinese legal system has no influence in the modern time; rather,
the legal philosophy and ideology that developed over the nation’s thousand-year
history has had a strong impact on today’s legal system.297
292. Id. The Judicial Council of Central Authorities (JCCA) was the highest judicial body
of the nation and now still exists in Taiwan. Judicial Yuan, The Judiciary Under the Five-Power
Constitution and its Epochal Significance,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/en/english/aboutus/aboutus04/aboutus04-01.asp (last visited Feb. 21,
2010). Currently, the JCCA, consisting of 15 judges, is mainly responsible for interpreting
constitution, laws and regulations. Judicial Yuan, Structure and Functions of the Judicial Yuan,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/en/english/aboutus/aboutus04/aboutus04-03.asp (last visited Feb. 21,
2010).
293. See GUOHUA, supra note 2, at 18-19.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 23-24.
296. Id.
297. ZHONGQIU, supra note 56, at 1-17.
298. Id.
299. Tao-tai Hsia & Wendy I. Zeldin, Recent Legal Developments in the People’s Republic
of China, 28 HARV. INT’L L. J., 249, 251 (1987). In February 1949, the CCP issued the
“Directive Regarding the Abolition of the Guomindang’s Complete Book of Six Codes and the
Affirmation of the Legal Principles in the Liberated Areas,” which annulled all of the Nationalist
regime’s laws and regulations. Id.
300. Id. The legal system that Communists had developed in the areas they controlled
before 1949 was simple and “consisted of major principles and rules of conduct concerning the
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1949 experience, the CPC had difficulties determining how the socialist legal
system in China would develop.301
The abolition of the Six Codes, as Mao Zedong himself recognized, left the
Chinese legal system as little more than a blank piece of “white paper.”302
Believing that to build a socialist legal system, it ought to follow Soviet footprints,
China looked to the Soviet Union as a model.303 Consequently, almost all laws and
regulations promulgated in the country in early 1950s, including the 1954
Constitution, evidenced a clear Soviet influence.304
Despite being labeled “socialist,” Soviet law had a notable French
influence.305 In this context, even if the annulment of the Six Codes severed the
socialist legal system from the Nationalist legal system, the civil law feature was
not diminished; instead, it was actually carried over and strengthened in the
modern legal system of China. For example, institutionally, at no time during the
development of the Chinese socialist legal system were courts given any power to
create laws.306
Also worth noting was the Confucian influence on the development of the
socialist legal system. Undoubtedly, the dominance of the Confucian paradigm in
China officially ended with the collapse of Qing Dynasty in 1911.307 But
Confucian tradition as an ideological and social force did not vanish with the
change of the government banner;308 rather, it continued to influence the country in
many ways.309 Although the Communist government claimed that the socialist
legal system had no connection with the imperial legal system, the Confucian
legacy was undeniable. In fact, many of the first generation of CPC leaders were
themselves educated in the old Confucian-style schools.310
Development of the socialist legal system consisted of two stages. During the
first stage, from 1949 to 1976, China created a legal infrastructure under the Soviet
approach, but rapidly descended into political fanaticism.311 The Cultural
Revolution, a ten-year period of turmoil that paralyzed the legal system, was the
suppression of political opposition and common crimes as well as reforms concerning land
holding and the structure of family.” Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J.
COMP. L. 711, 719 (1994).
301. See Hsia & Zeldin, supra note 299 (describing the experimental and provisional nature
of the new laws).
302. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 328-29.
303. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 330.
304. Id.
305. See generally MERRYMAN, supra note 9, at 4, 18, 144.
306. CHENGDE, supra note 99, at 260.
307. See CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 9-10; see also ZHONGMING & QIANG, supra note 41,
at 257-58.
308. ZHONGMING & QIANG, supra note 41, at 359-60.
309. CHENGDE, supra note 99, at 260; see also JINFAN, supra note 50, at 13.
310. For example, Mao Zedong himself was a master of Chinese ancient literature and had
great attainments in Chinese culture and history.
311. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 329-37.
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most devastating episode of the period.312 During this time, only Mao’s philosophy
of political and class struggle remained.313 Law schools closed, and “most of the
traces of a formal legal system disappeared. . . .”314 Thus, many Chinese
commentators describe the Cultural Revolution as a time of legal anarchy.315
On the surface, Mao’s “class struggle” theory seemed to make China a pure
socialist country. Mao’s real motivation for reform, however, was driven by his
strong appetite for power.316 Mao was influenced by his profound knowledge of
the traditional Chinese imperial system to such a great degree that he was receptive
to being portrayed as an “emperor,” particularly during the 1960s, and did not
tolerate any challenge to his authority.317
The second stage of China’s legal development began after Mao’s death in
1976.318 The vast economic reform spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping in 1978
profoundly reversed Mao’s course and set China on track to a market economy.319
Acclaimed as the chief architect of the reform, Deng completely abandoned Mao’s
theory of “class struggle” and sought to modernize China by adopting an “opening-
door” policy to connect the country with rest of the world. Standing firmly on his
“Cat Theory,”320 Deng pushed through the economic reform by setting aside the
debates on whether the market economy, was socialist or capitalist.321
In conjunction with the economic reform there was a massive legislative
reform. Realizing the severe damage caused to the nation by the lawlessness of
Mao’s era, beginning in the late 1970s China entered into a period of rebuilding its
legal system.322 Thus, a great effort was made to swiftly construct a legal
infrastructure by enacting laws and regulations at an accelerated pace.323 The
progress was obvious: from 1979 to 2008, the National People’s Congress (NPC),
the nation’s top legislative body, promulgated over 231 laws, and the State Council
enacted more than 600 regulations.324 In addition, local people’s congresses passed
over seven thousand local regulations, and various ministries and regional
governments issued multiple rules and decrees.325
Chinese counterparts were eager to develop a Chinese version of the “rule of law,”
based the historical, social, and political context of Chinese legal system.330
From the Chinese government’s viewpoint, the lesson learned from the void
of a legal system during the Cultural Revolution is that the building of an effective
legal system in the country is a necessity.331 More importantly, economic reform
and the increasingly international presence require China to commit to the rule of
law. However, there is a growing concern of undue western influence on what the
rule of law should mean in China, especially in the context of civil liberties and
government control, or individual rights as opposed to government power.332
Due to this unique history, the rule of law in China is inevitably driven to take
its own path. It is being employed as a bench mark to help differentiate today’s
China from its ancient image of the rule of man. The rule of man was the old legal
system which was centered on imperial power, leading to the lawlessness of Mao’s
era.333 Today, the rule of law is primarily considered a legal structure instrumental
in building social order and maintaining stability.334 Finally, as noted, the rule of
law is widely used as a synonym for “ruling the country by law.”335
330. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 351-53; Zhu Weijiu, Toward Rule of Law Government,
in CHINA’S JOURNEY TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW, LEGAL REFORM, 1978-2009, 26-27 (Cai
Dingjian & Wang Chenguang 2008). See also Debating the Rule of Law in China, supra note 7,
at 526 (describing the theory that China is “so different from other countries [that] it is likely to
develop its own long term, stable alternative to rule of law.).
331. CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 339-40.
332. Id. at 351-53.
333. See Chenguang, supra note 16, at 4; see also SHU GUOYING, THE LADDER OF
JURISPRUDENCE 283 (Tsinghua Univ. Press 2006) (describing the quest for the rule of law in
China as a hundred year dream).
334. Debating Rule of Law in China, supra note 7, at 498.
335. See ZHUMO & SHUANGYUAN, supra note 35, at 53.
336. See Peerenboom, Ruling the Country in Accordance with Law, Reflections on the Rule
and Role of Law in Contemporary China, in CHINESE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 177, 182 (Perry
Keller ed., Ashgate, 2001).
337. Id. (citations omitted).
338. See ZHUMO & SHUANGYUAN, supra note 35, at 53 (stressing the efforts to improve the
legal system so that the country is ruled by law).
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Ruling the country by law means that the broad masses of the people,
under the leadership of the Party and in accordance with the Constitution
and other laws, participate in one way or another and through all possible
channels in managing state affairs, economic and cultural undertakings
and social affairs, and see to it that all work of the state proceeds in
keeping with law, and that socialist democracy is gradually
institutionalized and codified so that such institutions and laws will not
change with changes in the leadership or changes in the views or focus
of attention of any leader.339
Obviously, this statement is a mixed, if not confusing, expression of the desire to
build a consistent legal system that the government will abide by. Such a system is
a key component of the “rule of law.”340
In fact, the terms of the rule did not receive official policy endorsement by the
Chinese government until 1996.341 From the beginning of the economic reform
movement in 1979, one task of the political platform was to strengthen the legal
system so that the laws would not change every time the leadership changes, or
whenever the leaders change their view.342 In the early 1980s, the Chinese legal
community called for the development of the rule of law in response to the
government’s practice of reviewing and approving cases handled by the
judiciary.”343 This call generated a national debate on the rule of law versus the
rule of man.344 The key issue was whether or not the term rule of law should be
used in the country because it was deemed different from the officially recognized
term “legal system.”345
In 1996, thanks to the unremitting efforts of legal scholars, rule of law as a
legal concept began to appear in government policy, finally becoming an official
term in China.346 The acceptance of the term “rule of law” not only ended the
debate, it also furthered China’s development into a socialist country governed by
347. See CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 14, at 154-56 (discussing the legal reform
movement).
348. Id.
349. Since 1999, there have been three “Five Year Reform” programs: 1999-2003, 2004-
2009, and 2009-2013.
350. CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 14, at 1.
351. See Peerenboom, supra note 338, at 205 (acknowledging that the ends served by rule
of law in China may be different from the ends it serves elsewhere).
352. HAGER, supra note 23, at 1 (stating that some Asian leaders are skeptical of the rule of
law because of its failure to achieve its purported ideal ends in the West).
353. See White Paper, supra note 5.
354. See Yu Xingzhong, Legal Pragmatism in the People’s Republic of China, 3 J. OF
CHINESE L. 29, 31-32 reprinted in CHINESE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 61, 63-64 (Perry Keller
ed., Ashgate 2001) (highlighting the focus on punishment in early forms of Chinese law).
355. Id. at 31.
356. Id. at 41.
357. See ZHONGMING & QIANG, supra note 41, at 60-64; see also JINFAN, supra note 50, at
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emperor in the form of a code.358 This code constituted the central element of the
legal system for almost the entire period of the dynastical time.359 Because law in
traditional Chinese society was made and understood primarily to govern the
behavior of people, it was closely associated with power.360
In recent history, China has absorbed the civil law tradition and, as a result,
European elements are easily identifiable in Chinese law.361 Similarly, the
Nationalist Government adopted a series of laws in the form of the Six Codes,
based on the European civil law model,362 but because China suffered a period of
constant political upheaval and foreign occupations between the fall of the Qing
dynasty in 1911 and the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949,363 these laws
were never fully implemented, and were abolished entirely in 1949 when
Communist Government came to power.364
After 1949, the establishment of socialist law or “people’s law” became a
main pursuit in China. In Mao’s era, however, this pursuit turned into a crucial
“class struggle” that lasted until 1978, when the country again began to focus on its
socialist law endeavor.365 In the modern Chinese jurisprudence, the theoretic
underpinnings of law were, and still are, the doctrine of Marxism.366 Although the
definition of law given by Chinese scholars is similar to the one created by A. Y.
Vyshinsky, a Soviet legal scholar of 1930s,367 many in China are now reluctant to
discuss the Soviet influence on Chinese law.368 Instead, they only consider Marx’s
work to be the original, authoritative source of their conception of the law.369
1-2.
358. JINFAN, supra note 50, at 1-2.
359. Jones, supra note 28, at 9.
360. Xingzhong, supra note 354, at 63-64; see also ZHUMO & SHUANGYUAN, supra note
35, at 3-4.
361. Xingzhong, supra note 354, at 63-64; see also ZHUMO & SHUANGYUAN, supra note
35, at 3-4
362. See discussion supra notes 260-285 and accompanying text.
363. Id.
364. Xingzhong, supra note 356, at 33 (pointing out that the CPC Central Committee issued
an instruction abolishing the Six Codes and mandating that judicial work should rely on the new
laws of the people.”).
365. ZHUMO & SHUANGYUAN, supra note 35.
366. ZHUMO & SHUANGYUAN, supra note 35, at 5-6; see also CHENGDE, supra note 99, at
3-4.
367. See Xinzhong, supra note 354, at 68-69. Under the Vyshinsky’s definition, law is “the
aggregate of the rules of conduct expressing the will of the dominant class and established in
legal order, as well as of the customs and rules of community lift confirmed by the state authority,
the application whereof is guaranteed by the coercive force of state to the end of safeguarding,
making secure and developing social relationships and arrangements advantageous and agreeable
to the dominant class.” See Vyshinsky, The Fundamental Taks of the Social Science of the Soviet
Socialist Law, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 304, 336 (Hugh Babb trans., Harvard 1951).
368. Xinzhong,, supra note 354, at 37.
369. ZHUMO & SHUANGYUAN, supra note 35, at 5; see also CHENGDE, supra note 99, at 3.
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380. See HAGER, supra note 23, at 21 (discussing a Constitution that binds the government
as a core component of the rule of law).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 21-23.
383. Id. at 23.
384. Id. at 25 (concluding that the emphasis in China was on “the need for wise and
benevolent leaders using the law to impose order and achieve the highest good for the whole
society”).
385. Id. at 15 (discussing the reliance in China on the “great man” as the source of good
governance).
386. CAI DINGJIAN, TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW GOVERNMENT, IN CHINA’S JOURNEY
TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW, LEGAL REFORM, 1978-2009 (Dingjian & Chenguang eds., Social
Sciences Academy Press 2008).
387. See e.g., Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: the Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law
and Protection of Property Right in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. (2008) (discussing the
inability of Chinese courts to enforce property laws with regard to the “Chong Quin Nail House”
case).
388. Despite the change in name, the top-down feature of the system has remained
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unchanged. In addition, the single party controlled system is deemed a sort of Neo-authoritarian
system. See CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 14, at 188.
389. See Chenguang, supra note 17, at 29
390. The current government structure is based on a system of executive responsibility
under the leadership of the committee of the CPC.
391. A very popular slogan in China today is “stability overrides everything.” See “Tech: Is
China Catching Taiwan” BUSINESSWEEK, December 11, 2009 available at
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/eyeonasia/archives/2009/12/tech_is_china_c.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
392. Zemin, supra note 1.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See Hu Kangsheng, Remarks Before the National People’s Congress, Study
Constitution, Be loyal to Constitution and Preserve Authority of Constitution, Feb. 2, 2009,
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2009-02/28/content_1476418.htm (noting that
the People’s Congress system is conducive to safeguarding national unification and national
unity).
396. See, e.g., Press Release, VOA News, China’s Legislature Stresses Social Stability
(Mar. 6, 2009), http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-03-06-voa13-68772437.html.
397. See generally H.H. Lai, Religious policies in post-totalitarian China: Maintaining
political monopoly over a reviving society, 11 JOURNAL OF CHINESE POLITICAL SCIENCE 55
(March 2006).
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398. See generally Jones, supra note 28; see also CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 22.
399. Jerome A. Cohen, China’s Legal Reform at the Crossroads, FAR EASTERN ECON.
REV. 23 (Mar. 2006) available at http://www.paulweiss.com/files/Publication/84c640ce-49b1-
4548-9ad7-586cd0e214bd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8b121247-4f31-4c55-9ce1-
18b0283c5241/FEELR.pdf.
400. See CHINA’S LONG MARCH, supra note 14, at ix-x. See also Lichtenstein, supra note
41, at 286-90.
401. JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1949-1963, AN INTRODUCTION 4 (Harvard Univ. Press 1968).
402. Chenguang, supra note 16, at 7.
403. HAGER, supra note 23, at 13.
404. Chenguang, supra note 16, at 7.
405. See, e.g., XUNZI: A TRANSLATION AND STUDY OF THE COMPLETE WORKS, VOL. II,
175 (John Knoblock trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1990) (Xunzi, the equivalent of Aristotle in
China, stated that “there are men who can bring order about, but there is no model that will ever
produce it”).
406. SHUCHENG, supra note 64, at 154.
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however, upon losing that ruler, it perishes.407 Xunzi concluded that there have
been cases in which chaos occurred despite a good law, but chaos has never ensued
with a good ruler in charge.408
Therefore, although the light of the rule of law has been shed on China today,
pursuit of the rule of law is still proscribed by the country’s long lasting Confucian
tradition, and belief that law must be supplemented by the rule of man.409 In a
broad sense, maintaining absolute leadership amongst the men at the top of the
CPC’s is entrenched as the prerequisite for the exercise of the rule of law. Many
people therefore are driven to conclude that only CPC may bring a bright future to
China.410 Commands or even words from the top CPC leader are weighted most
heavily because political uniformity is a must for all government officials. In
China, the term “uniform” is in many cases a euphemism for “central.”411
way for settling social conflicts peacefully and rationally.417 Echoing Hu’s
remarks, many in China advocate the idea that a harmonious society is a rule of
law society, believing that law is the aggregate of rules of conduct necessary for
social harmony.418 In addition, there are a growing number of advocates in China
that believe that the concept of putting people first is the basic spirit of law.419
The very concept of harmony under the Confucian tradition was the
promotion of tolerance and conciliation among people with different thoughts and
backgrounds, thereby creating a peacefully interpersonal relationship. A civil and
ethic principle considered Confucius’ lifetime motto was “what you do not want
done to yourself, do not do to others.”420 This principle was also meant to be a
social standard for the judgment of people. From the viewpoint of Confucius, a
noble man seeks harmony despite differences while a petty man stays in discord
despite of agreement.421 In addition, Mencius laid out three essential elements for
success, which included “time opportunity,” “topographic advantage,” and
“harmony of people,” viewing the harmony of people as the most critical.422
Today, the drive to form a harmonious society in China serves multiple
purposes. In one respect, it reinforces the need for social order and stability under
the leadership of the CPC, based on the belief that harmony would not be achieved
without an orderly and stable society.423 In another respect, it helps alleviate the
tension caused by the increasing disparity between rich and poor, as well as the
growing public outrage over the unceasing political corruption. More
significantly, it helps justify the “Chinese characteristics” that support the political
system currently in operation.424
The building of social harmony seems to have become a strong ideological
force that is being grafted onto the development of the rule of law, although at
present there have been more words than actions.425 The concept of social
harmony, though still vague in many aspects, is being incorporated in the legal
417. Roundup: Human Rights Issue at 22nd Congress on Law of the World, China Society
for Human Rights Studies, http://211.167.236.236/zt/magazine/200402006215101321.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2010).
418. Zeyuan, supra note 412, at 33; see also Wang Liming, A Harmonious Society Should
be a Rule of Law Society, in RULING COUNTRY ACCORDING TO LAW AND THE BUILDING OF
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY 211 (Li Lin, ed., China Legal Publishing House 2007).
419. Lv Shilun & Gao Zhong, Socialist Harmonious Society and the Rule of Law Spirits of
Putting People First, in RULING COUNTRY ACCORDING TO LAW AND THE BUILDING OF
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY 211 (Li Lin, ed., China Legal Publishing House 2007).
420. Confucius, supra note 123, at 62, para. 24.
421. Id. at 52, para. 23.
422. MENZGI, supra note 127, at 50.
423. Liming, supra note 418, at 211.
424. Li Lin, The Role of People’s Congress System in the Building of the Harmonious
Society, in RULING COUNTRY ACCORDING TO LAW AND THE BUILDING OF HARMONIOUS
SOCIETY 157 (Lin Li, ed., China Legal Publishing House 2007) (remarking that the CPC-led
People’s Congress system is appraised as the “political foundation and institutional safeguard for
the socialist harmonious society in China.”).
425. Id. at 1-3.
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framework of China. It has become imperative that the rule of law be geared
toward creating and enhancing social harmony. Interestingly, the year 2020 is
projected, as the deadline for China to become a harmonious society, whether or
not this is realistic.
The doctrine of putting people first also has its origin in Confucian
philosophy. As noted, Mencius placed a high value on the benevolence of a rule,
believe he must care about the people.426 Xunzi went even further, warning of the
danger of losing the people’s confidence by metaphorically emphasizing that “[i]t
is the water that sustains the boat, and it is the water that capsizes the boat.”427 The
message both Mencius and Xunzi intended to send was clear: the ruler should not
be too cruel to the ruled. Unfortunately, at most times in the history of China this
message was merely a hope.
The Chinese now see putting people first as progress toward appreciating the
value of people both as individuals and as a social force.428 It is also considered an
indicator that the country is moving toward respecting personal liberty and human
rights.429 Practically, however, putting people first is both a pragmatic and political
strategy, aimed at retaining public support for the CPC. In this regard it is fair to
say that putting people first does not change the bureaucratic tradition but rather it
revives the Confucian belief in benevolence of government over people.
For example, in order to spur into motion the doctrine of putting people first,
some courts in China initiated to reproduce a trial format called “Ma Xiwu Trial
Method” (Ma’s Method) that was used mainly in the late 1940s and early 1950s in
the liberal areas of China. The highlight of the Ma’s Method was “trial at the edge
of a field,” which actually entailed a bench trial at the corner of a farm or in the
courtyard of a household.430 Driven by his belief that the judiciary must serve the
people and that party policy was the most direct law, Ma Xiwu (a non-legally
trained government bureaucrat turned judge himself) took the position that such a
trial, out of a formal courtroom and with no legal jargon, was easiest for people to
understand.431 He preferred to call his trials mediation rather than adjudication.432
It was also his view that the satisfaction of people was the major criterion to for
measuring the outcome of the trial.433 The Ma Method was hailed by many top
leaders of China and Ma Xiwu himself was praised by Chairman Mao as a person
closest to the people.434
426. See MENGZI, supra note 127 (discussing benevolence as a qualification of a good
ruler).
427. Knoblock, supra note 405 at 262.
428. Shilun & Zhong, supra note 419, at 24-25.
429. See Li Buyun, Doctrinal Highlights of the “Social Harmony,” in RULING COUNTRY
ACCORDING TO LAW AND THE BUILDING OF HARMONIOUS SOCIETY 7 (Lin Li, ed., China Legal
Publishing House 2007).
430. The Biggest Controversy over Judicial Reform - the Revival of Ma Xiwu ,SOUTHERN
WEEKEND (CHINA), June 11, 2009, at A8.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
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435. Supreme Court News Report, Vice President Shen Deyong’s Written Message to the
Conference on “People’s Court Serves People,” July 29, 2009,
http://www.court.gov.cn/news/bulletin/release/200907290004.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010)
(noting that the “People’s court serves people” was a slogan the current President of the Court
prompted as a concrete step to carry out the notion of “putting people first.” It is deemed by the
Supreme People’s Court as an incarnation of a scientific outlook on development in the
judiciary).
436. The High Court President of Henan Province Actively Pursues the Ma Xiwu Trial
Method, TAKUNGPAO NEWSPAPER, July 24, 2009, available at
http://henan.takungpao.com/news/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=37747.
437. See Li Zhen & Huang Xiaozhen, Upholding the Flag of Ma Xiwu Trial Method
Unwaveringly, http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200907/23/366557.shtml (criticizing
Western-style practices, including wearing robes and wigs).
438. Do Not Return to Ma Xiwu Rigidly, SOUTHERN WEEKEND (CHINA), June 11, 2009,
A3; see also Zhang Weiping, What Do We Need to Go Back to Ma Xiwu, Method or Spirit?
http://news.ifeng.com/opinion/200906/0613_23_1201152.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
439. White Paper, supra note 5, at 4.
440. See generally, XIAN FA (2004) (P.R.C), available at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). The
Constitution now effective in China was adopted on December 4, 1982, and was amended
respectively on April 12, 1988, March 31, 1992, March 15, 1999, and March 14, 2004.
441. In China, the legislation passed by the National People’s Congress are called “law,”
the legislation made by the State Council and Provincial People’s Congress are termed
“regulations,” and legislation adopted by various government ministries/agencies and by local
government are termed as “rules or decrees.” See White Paper, supra note 5, at 4.
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the (a) Constitution and related law, (b) civil and commercial law, (c)
administrative law, (d) economic law, (e) social law, (f) criminal law, and (g)
litigation and non-litigation procedure law.442
The hallmark of the modern Chinese legal system is the Chinese
characteristics— a term seemingly indefinable, although it generally refers to
distinctive features of Chinese law and its legal system. Quite often the term is
employed to justify the discord of Chinese legal practices with those commonly
accepted elsewhere, and to explain the relative weakness of Chinese legal order
when compared to the administrative power. In addition, as often seen, the lack of
understanding of Chinese characteristics can serve as a handy defense against
foreign criticism of the Chinese legal system.
The simplest way to understand the meaning of the term “Chinese
characteristics” is by noting that the Chinese legal system stands on socialism
while it reflects the Chinese reality. However, neither the meaning of “socialism”
nor the substance of “Chinese reality” is well defined or coherently stated.
Further, despite its socialist theme, the current Chinese legal system is still affected
by the Chinese legal tradition, as well as its experimentation with foreign law.443
Some in China would support the claim that the socialist legal system with
Chinese characteristics has been preliminarily formed. They argue that the
adoption of the policy of “governing country by law” and the enactment of a
comprehensive set of laws demonstrates the existence such a system.444 While
adhering to the CPC’s carefully selected wording to describe the socialist legal
system, they have endeavored to further explain the Chinese features of the
system.445 Unfortunately, this explanation offers little meaningful substance, but
instead is simply a political slogan.
Nevertheless, modern China’s socialist legal system may be classified as a
civil law system governed by socialist ideology with Confucian ethos representing
Chinese tradition. This classification acknowledges the fact that the modern
Chinese legal system falls within the family of civil law due to its origin of
development and in its pattern of legislation.446
Undoubtedly, it is difficult to understand the modern Chinese legal system
without knowledge of the Chinese characteristics. But the term itself is
troublesome. Even within China there is considerable difficulty with it, because of
its abstract concept, confusing nature, and the politically sensitive debates amongst
legal scholars regarding its precise definition.447 However, although many lines
might be drawn in the sand, there are two features that are fundamental: leadership
of the CPC and socialism.
455. Chenguang, supra note 16, at 29; see also Weijiu, supra note 332, at 92-93. First
456. Chenguang, supra note 16, at 29.
457. See Qin Qianhong, The Impacts of the Communist Party of China on Legislation,
Beijing University China Law Info., available at
http://article1.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=23338.
458. The document was named Several Opinions of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China on the Strengthening of the Leadership over the State Legislative
Work, CCP Central Committee Document Number 8 (1991). Under the Opinions, the Central
Committee of the CPC shall retain a control of the legislative process in the following four ways:
(a) any amendment to the constitution and certain drafts of political importance or of vitally
economic or administrative importance, must be examined by the Poliburo of the Central
Committee of the CPC before being submitted to the National People’s Congress for review, and
all other proposals for constitutional amendments must also be submitted through the party
organization of the NPC to the Central Committee of CPC for review; (b) for any law in political
area, before it is drafted, the Standing Committee of the NPC must have the legislative thought
and principles of the law reported to the Central Committee of the CPC for approval; (c) any draft
law of political area or of important economic and administrative areas must be reported to the
Poliburo or Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC for approval before it is
submitted to the NPC for review; and (d) Central Committee of the CPC shall exercise its
leadership uniformly over all law drafting work. All laws drafted by the NPC and its Standing
Committee must be reported by the party organization at NPC to the Central Committee of the
CPC for approval, and all laws drafted by other competent government departments, if the review
of the NPC is required, must also be reported to the Central Committee of the CPC for approval.
See id. In order to implement the Opinion, the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of
Zhejiang issue “matching opinions” entitled “Opinions of the Committee of the CPC of Zhejiang
Province on Further Advancement of Local Legislation” in order to assure the party’s leadership
over local legislation. Opinions of the Committee of the CPC of Zhejiang Province on Further
Advancement of Local Legislation, FindLaw.cn, available at
http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/gj/22/16011.html.
459. See id.
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December 12, 2003, the Central Committee of the CPC made a proposal to the
Standing Committee of the NPC to amend the 1982 Constitution.460 An important
amendment in the proposal included the addition of the “Three Represents”
concept, put forth by former President Jiang Zemin,461 together with Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory as the governing
ideology of the country.462 This proposal was met with overwhelming criticism,
especially from legal scholars.463 Critics argued that the “Three Represents”
concept was no more than an ethic norm or political guide applicable only to the
CPC and its members, and therefore should not be included in the Constitution,
which governs the country as a whole.464 Some critics also pointed out that the use
of abbreviations in the Constitution would cause confusion and set a bad precedent
of legal vagueness.465
During the NPC’s “reading process” of the proposed amendment, these
criticisms were ignored, and all voices against the proposal were silenced from the
published materials and media.466 Then, at its national session in March 2004, the
NPC adopted the CPC’s proposal without changing a word.467 Among the 2,903
delegates present at the meeting, 2,863 voted in favor, ten voted against, and
seventeen abstained.468 In order to ensure the passage of the amendment, the
provision of the “Three Represents” concept was bundled with other important
provisions (e.g., protection of private property and safeguarding human rights) and
the vote was taken on an “all or nothing” basis.469
Structurally, from the central level to the grass roots, the leadership of the
CPC is secured through so-called “party branches” or party committees, depending
on the site of particular work units.470 Thus in almost every employment sector,
including businesses and universities, behind the executive head there is a party
chief who actually exercises ultimate control.471 Even a Chinese law firm is no
exception. For example, in order to achieve party control over the practice of law,
the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) makes it imperative that each law firm form a party
branch or a quasi-party organization.472 According to the MOJ, as of July 31, 2009,
out of approximately 14,662 Chinese law firms, 3,895 have formed a party branch,
and 8,075 have established a total of 2,692 joint party branches, meaning that one
party branch deals with several law firms.473 For the remaining 2,741 law firms
that have no party member, each has an “in house” party instructor or party liaison
dispatched as a watchdog by the local justice bureau.474
B. Socialism
Since the CPC came to power in 1949, socialism has become a national brand
for China. During Mao’s era, it served as a weapon to exterminate all capitalist
and other non-socialist elements as labeled by Mao without offering any rational
basis. In other words, Mao pushed the socialist ideology to such an extreme that
anything he deemed “socialist,” even poverty, was a good thing. For instance, a
very popular slogan in the Cultural Revolution was “we would rather have socialist
weeds than have capitalist seedling,” symbolizing a resolved mind for socialism.475
Ironically, however, a vast majority of people did not fully understand the socialist
ideology.
The economic reform dramatically changed China’s approach toward
socialism. Most visibly, China became more pragmatic than ideological with
regard to the socialist belief. Specifically, based on his Cat Theory, Deng
Xiaoping made a monumental impact on socialism in 1992, declaring that
socialism also needed a market.476 In 1993, the notion of “the preliminary stage of
socialism” was adopted for China to, at least in part, justify the transition from a
planned economy to a market economy,477 resulting in the eventual abandonment
of the planned economy.
471. Only in certain circumstances, are both the executive and party posts assumed by one
person. Id.
472. See A Full Coverage of Party Organization and Work over Lawyers, Legal
Popularization Net, Aug. 9, 2009, http://www.moj.gov.cn/2008rdgz/2009-
08/06/content_1134646.htm.
473. Id.
474. See id. See also Andrew Jacobs, Arrest in China Rattles Backers of Legal Rights, NY
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at A1.
475. See Cultural Revolution Slogans,
http://www.stnn.cc:82/global/wg/wg5/200605/t20060512_211255.html. The slogan denotes a
preference for all things socialist, even with the knowledge that an alternative model might
provide more economic comfort. It reflects the Maoist philosophy that even though socialism
might provide less economic benefit, it would still be preferable to the alternatives.
476. ee Xiaoping, supra note 19, Vol. III at 373. During his famous southern tour in 1992,
Deng Xiaoping made the follow remark: “The essential difference between the socialism and
capitalism is not whether to weigh more on plan or on market. Planned economy is not equal to
socialism since capitalism also has a plan; market economy is not equal to capitalism because
socialism needs market as well.”
477. IAN FA (1982) (P.R.C.).
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Despite this change, China has not moved away from socialism, but has rather
kept the socialist brand and applied it in a more expansive way. Consequently,
China’s market economy is described as a socialist market economy, although
many doubt that socialism and market economy can really coexist. By the same
token, the legal system is crowned with the socialist laurel.478
The socialist influence is seen in many different aspects of the Chinese
economy, most apparent is the concept of “public ownership,” an economic
mainstay of socialism in China.479 There are two basic forms of public ownership
in China: whole people ownership and collective ownership.480 Under Article 6 of
the 1982 Constitution (as amended 2004), the basis of China’s socialist economic
system is public ownership of the means of production― namely, sole ownership
by the people and collective ownership by the working class.481 Article 7 further
describes whole people ownership as the state-owned economy, and designates it
as the leading force in the nation’s economy.482
Collective ownership refers to the public ownership other than the state
ownership. In accordance with Article 8 of the 1982 Constitution (as amended
2004), collective ownership by the working class includes all forms of cooperative
economy in rural areas, such as producer’s supply and marketing, credit and
consumer’s cooperatives.483 Pursuant to Article 8, rural collective economic
organizations are controlled by a dual operation system that combines centralized
and decentralized operation, based on operation by households under a contract.484
Recently, there has been a shift of attention to private ownership. Until 1988,
public ownership was the only type of ownership that was legally recognized and
protected in China. Historically, socialism was interpreted and understood in
China as a system that would not tolerate private ownership.485 This sentiment was
influenced by Lenin’s proposition, translated into Chinese, meaning “we do not
recognize private law,” and was thus considered a sacred tenet.486 The non-
recognition of private ownership also came from Mao’s revolutionary doctrine that
private ownership was the source of all evil, and the ultimate goal of the
communist party was to eliminate it.487
However, the attitude toward private ownership in China changed with the
economic reform. The official recognition of private ownership in the nation came
in 1988 when the 1982 Constitution was amended for the first time.488 The 1988
Amendment, however, did not use the term private ownership; instead, it used
“private sector of the economy.”489 Further, according to Article 11 of the 1982
Constitution (as amended in 1988), the private sector of the economy was only
deemed as “a complement to the socialist public economy.”490 In the 1999
Amendment, the private sector of the economy was advanced as “a major
component of the socialist market economy.”491
The adoption of the Property Law in 2006 was a further move towards private
ownership in China, but it did not change the preferred status of public ownership.
Thus, while the practice of market economy in China opened the door for private
ownership and created the need to provide legal protection for private property,492
socialism made public ownership a top priority and boundary, limiting the reach of
private ownership. In this context, although the socialist market economy in China
may evade precise definition, it possesses the Chinese characteristics that allow
diverse forms of ownerships to co-exist, with public ownership as the pinnacle.493
The notion of rights may differ from country to country, but for purposes of
discussion, it can be divided into two major categories. One category is called
“universalism” or “egalitarianism,”501 and the other is referred to as
“authoritarianism” or “hierarchism.”502 The former is the modern conception of
rights, which holds that equal rights are granted to all people.503 The latter
represents the historical notion that different rights ought to be granted to different
people depending on status, and as a result some should have more rights than the
others.504 In addition, there are two main modern conceptions of rights, namely
natural rights and legal rights.505 The idea of natural rights holds that there is a
certain list of rights enshrined in nature that cannot be legitimately modified by
any human power.506 Legal rights, however, are considered to be human
constructs, created by society, enforced by governments and subject to change.507
China is a country in which obligations are weighed significantly over rights,
and hardly any right may be deemed natural.508 The Confucian creed that “the ruler
must be like a ruler, the subject like a subject, the father like a father, and the son
like a son”509 set an insurmountable boundary that defined the propriety of a
person’s behavior, in reference to their status.510 As noted, the very focus of the
creed was on the obligations of both loyalty and filial piety, upholding the
principle that to be loyal, one must commit his life to serve, and to be filial, one
must devote all he could.511 Thus in regard to the law, the theme was mainly to
impose duties and obligations through punishment rather than to recognize rights
and protect entitlements.
In Mao’s era, the obligation-based theme became a political force. And as
such, no one dared to mention individual rights; rather, the focus was on the
interest of the society as a whole.512 Pursuant to Mao’s proletarian theory, people
in the working class should have nothing claimed as their own.513 Therefore, for
many decades, all of China was subject to social and public interest, and all
individuals had to subordinate their rights to the “great cause of socialism.”514
The development of the market economy in China, however, has generated a
drive to reverse the order of rights and obligations. Since the 1990s, there has been
an increasing demand for the respect and protection of individual rights or human
rights. In the late 1990s, a national debate began among scholars, regarding
whether the modern Chinese legal system should be premised on rights instead of
obligations.515 Those who opposed the obligation-based legal scheme argued that
the pursuit of a market economy in China raised a great necessity to place civic
rights ahead of obligations. They believed that modern law in China should rest
with a basic assumption that rights should take priority over obligations.516
Although the debate did not produce an immediate institutional change in
favor of rights-based legal system and no consensus was reached, it undoubtedly
helped increase public awareness as well as consciousness of civic and civil rights.
Partly for those reasons, the debate was considered a major breakthrough from the
conventional ideology China that overly stressed obligations and belittled rights.517
In addition, many saw the legislative trend in recent years toward protection of
consumer rights as a sign of change in the legal framework appreciating the
importance of rights.518
Moreover, the commitment made by the CPC to “putting people first” and
“building of a harmonious society,” though very policy-driven, also implicates a
change in the government attitude towards concern for the people.519 This
commitment responds to the growing anger of the public over the spreading
corruption in the government, including the judiciary. Its purpose is to alleviate
the public concern over the degeneration inside the communist party, and to help
maintain the society’s stability.520 Nevertheless, it demonstrates that more
importance is being attached to the rights of people. Another indication of the
recognition of these rights was the 2004 amendments to the 1982 Constitution,
which strengthened the constitutional protection of private property rights and
expressed respect for and safeguarding of human rights.521
Regardless, the theme of the legal system in China has not yet shifted to a
rights-based system. Many institutional hurdles found in the CPC522 make it
extremely difficult to routinely put people first or duly respect the rights of
people.523 For instance, government officials at any level are appointed and, in
many cases, are hand-picked by the communist party committee at the responding
level. Those officials, once appointed, are only responsible to their superiors and
are most concerned with satisfying them.524
For Chinese officials, there is no concept of constituency or a constituent.
Given that their power is unchecked and directly linked to all government
privileges and benefits, legal or illegal alike, an officer’s rank or status carries
significantly more meaning than anything else.525 Therefore, despite the
commitment repeatedly made by the Central Committee of the CPC to respect the
rights of people, the general public at large somehow remains skeptical of it.
Regarding the theme of rights contained in the legal system, two fundamental
questions remain unresolved. What are the basic rights that are unalienable to
people? And how will these rights be effectively protected?
B. The Role of the CPC: Supremacy of the Party v. Supremacy of the Law
The toughest issue facing the development of the modern Chinese legal
system is the position and role of the CPC vis-à-vis that of law. On its face, the
provisions of law seem to be clear and straightforward. Under the 1982
Constitution (as amended in 2004), people of all nationalities, all state organs, the
armed forces, all political parties and public organizations, and all enterprises and
institutions in the country, must take the Constitution as the basic standard of
conduct, must uphold the dignity of the Constitution and ensure its
implementation.526 Also, there is a constitutional requirement that no organization
or individual be privileged beyond the constitution or law.527
It is logical to infer from the Constitution that all parties in China, including
the CPC, shall act under and in compliance with the Constitution. And in this
context, it appears that the Constitution is the supreme law of the country. But in
fact, the power of the Constitution is always challenged by the power of the CPC,
and in many cases, the CPC is placed above the Constitution. People therefore
The essence of the “officer oriented” political culture is that the sole purpose of going to school is
to become an officer, and an officer is the person who has all powers and privilege. According to
Confucius, doing well in study leads to becoming an officer. Under the Confucian philosophy,
government office is a noble position and being an officer is the purpose of study. See
CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS, supra note 123.
523. See discussion, supra notes 449-474 and accompanying text. Because of the strong
influence of the “officer-oriented” culture, the center of attention at the lower level of government
office in most cases is the satisfaction of the superior rather than the people under its
administration. For general discussion, see Shen Xiaoping, the Origin of the “Officer-Oriented”
Phenomenon and Possible Ways to Deal with it, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/theory/2009-03/26/content_11068545.htm. See also Jerome Cohen,
The Great Stonewall of China, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 5, 2006.
524. Id.
525. Id. See also CHUNYING, supra note 52, at 22-23, 26-27.
526. See XIAN FA, pmbl. (1982) (P.R.C.).
527. See Id. at art. 5.
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question which has superiority in China: the Constitution or the CPC. A seemingly
unsolvable puzzle is whether the CPC must also be subject to the law. There are
several attributes to this confusing, but real phenomenon, embedded in the political
structure of the nation.
First, there is the Constitution itself. Although the 1982 Constitution (as
amended in 2004) states that the country is to be governed by law, it emphasizes
the leadership of the Communist Party528 and upholds the single party ruling
system. The amended Constitution firmly states that the CPC-led system of multi-
party cooperation and political consultation shall exist and develop for a long time
to come.529 This creates at least two major loopholes.
One loophole is that the Constitution actually places the CPC above all other
people and provides the CPC with the absolute power. The other is that a lack of
checks and balances under the Constitution renders it impossible to prevent the
CPC from abusing power. Thus, the CPC can become the most binding force,
leading the general public to believe that it is more powerful than the Constitution.
In addition, the unchecked power of the CPC inevitably becomes a breeding
ground for corruption. Although the CPC has been trying to incorporate a
vigorous internal check system against corruption, such self-vigilance has yet to
prove effective.
The second attribute is the official conception of law. As discussed, law in
China is commonly considered a manifestation of the will of the ruling class, and
legislation is the process of turning that will into the will of the state.530 Because
this “will” theory underlies all legislation in China, the CPC holds the real
legislative power, although under the 1982 Constitution (as amended in 2004), the
NPC and its Standing Committee exercise the legislative power over the state.531
The reality is that despite its constitutional power, the NPC must follow the
leadership of the CPC. As noted, the legislative process of the NPC consists of
making the CPC’s opinion the will of the state through NPC’s legislation. In
addition, it is required that the NPC must make all efforts to ensure that all
candidates recommended for various government posts by the CPC are both
elected and appointed.532 For these reasons the NPC is often nicknamed the
“rubber stamp.”
The third attribute is that the CPC controls elections of delegates to the NPC.
Pursuant to the 1982 Constitution (as amended in 2004), the NPC is composed of
delegates elected from the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly
under the Central Government, the special administrative regions, and the armed
forces.533 The facts tell a different story. The direct election of delegates only
takes place at the county level, and all other delegates are elected from the
candidates recommended by the CPC.534 Moreover, the election of delegates to the
NPC is based on a quota determined by the NPC’s Standing Committee under a
framework agreed upon by the CPC.535
Among the total number of delegates to be allocated, about ten percent are
directly controlled by the NPC. Direct control means that the NPC earmarks
certain number of delegates to certain provinces and such provinces ensure that
these earmarked delegates are duly elected, although those delegates have little or
nothing to do with the people of particular province. Another provocative point is
that among the delegates of NPC, a vast majority of them are the members of the
CPC.536 As a general principle, all delegates who are CPC members must vote for
whatever proposals the CPC has made for the NPC.537
In addition, during NPC meetings, delegates indulge in conversations about
how wonderful the CPC leadership is and how significant the achievement made at
all levels of government has been.538 Delegates rarely criticize the work of the CPC
or the government. In the 2009 NPC annual assembly meeting, as one delegate
from Guangdong sharply noted, for every ten minute speech allowed per delegate
during the NPC’s group discussion at the meeting, some eight minutes were used
to offer flattery or praise the work of the government, then to the self achievement,
leaving little time to address any serious and legitimate business concerns.539
The fourth attribute relates to the CPC’s control of judiciary. Prescribed in
the 1982 Constitution (as amended in 2004), the people’s courts of China have
independent power to adjudicate cases in accordance with the law and are not
subject to interference by any administrative agencies, public organization, or
individuals.540 However, it is unclear whether the constitutional power of
independence reserved for the Chinese courts is subject to the challenge by the
CPC. Although the Constitution is vague in this regard, it appears that no judicial
power may trump the authority of the CPC.
The CPC’s control of the judiciary can be easily ascertained. First, all courts
in China are bound by a stated principle that the judiciary’s work must adhere to
the leadership of the CPC.541 The foremost responsibility of the judiciary is to
534. Id.
535. Id..
536. For example, CPC members comprised 54.48% of 1st NPC, 57.75% of the 2nd NPC
57.75%, 54/83% of the 3rd NPC, 76.3% of the 4th NPC, 72.78% of the 5th NPC, 62.5% of the
6th NPC, 66.8% of the 7th NPC, 68.4% of the 8th NPC, and 71.5% the 9th NPC. Ming Xia,
China’s National People’s Congress: Institutional Transformation in the Process of Regime
Transition (1978-98), 4 J. LEGIS. STUD. 103, 129 (1998).
537. See Yang, Zhong Nanshan: Some of the Representatives of 10 Minutes and 8 Minutes
in the Praises, March 11, 2009, http://news.sohu.com/20090311/n262724662.shtml.
538. Id.
539. Id. (“We shall not use 8 minutes to sing the praises during our 10-minute talk in the
Congress.” Zhong is a delegate from Guangdong province and is well-known as a bold speaker
making comments on politics).
540. See XIAN FA, art. 126 (1982) (P.R.C.).
541. See Wang Shenjun, President of the Supreme People’s Court of China, Adhering to the
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provide legal safeguards so that the CPC’s leadership is not tarnished. The
appointment of judges is generally designed to better serve the interest of the CPC.
Particularly, most presidents of the courts, if not all, are political appointees many
of which do not even have a legal background.542 People’s courts at all levels are
directly under the supervision of the political and legal committees of the CPC at
their corresponding levels, and all major cases must be reported to such
committees before a court judgment is made.543
A descriptive catchphrase for the relationship between the CPC and the
people’s courts is the slogan recently adopted by the Supreme People’s Court as its
guiding principle for the courts. The slogan, once featured on the home page of
the Supreme People’s Court website and still present in many courts, pronounces
the “Three Supremacies” in order of importance: “the Cause of the Communist
Party Supreme, the Interest of People Supreme, and the Constitution Law
Supreme.”544 Obviously, under the “Three Supremacies” doctrine, the cause of the
CPC must be a top priority for the courts.
Guiding Principle of the “Three Supremacies” and Driving to Achieve the New Development of
the Court Work, Speech at the National Teleconference of People’s Courts (Dec. 18, 2009),
http://www.court.gov.cn/html/article/200912/21/1557.shtml.
542. See China Economic Net (CE.cn) Report, July 29, 2009,
http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/200907/20/20090720_19577050.shtml. For example, the
current President of the Supreme People’s Court, appointed in March 2008, is not a trained
lawyer. A most recent survey reveals that among thirty presidents of provincial people’s courts,
fourteen are government officials with a little or no legal training, fourteen have some work
experience in legal areas (a few are formally trained lawyers), and two are from academia.
543. See A Brief Introduction to China, LAW INFO CHINA,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
544. Three Supremacies Doctrine, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
12/25/content_7312439.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). The Three Supremacies Doctrine first
appeared in Hu Jintao’s speech at his meeting with the representatives of the National Conference
on Politics and Law and senior judges and prosecutors in Beijing on December 25, 2007.
545. See XIAN FA, amend. 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).The 1988 Amendment to the 1982 Constitution
added to Article 11 the following paragraph: “The State permits the private sector of the economy
to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a
complement to the socialist public economy. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of
the private sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the
private sector of the economy.”
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its desire to maintain social stability.555 Surely, there is nothing wrong with the
government maintaining social stability, but the question is whether stability
should be achieved at the cost of loss of property or violation of the rights of
particular individuals, or if it should be maintained by preventing the misconduct
of government. Unfortunately, the focus in China has been largely on the behavior
of people rather than on government actions.556 And as noted, the lower level
government officials often care more about their job performance and satisfying
their superiors than about the interests of the general public.557
VI. CONCLUSION
The socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics is the legal apparatus
with which the rule of law is to be practiced in China. The system is a mixture of
legal traditions and the modern reality of the country, including a Western
influence. More distinctively, the system is intended to show the world that China
knows well the significance and value of the rule of law, and cherishes the fruit it
has received in building the country under the rule of law.558 But it is also designed
to send a strong message that the rule of law, as developed in China, must be
compatible with the national conditions and social system of the country.559
It is well recognized that no nation has ever produced legislation—
substantive, organizational, and procedural—more quickly than China did in the
past quarter century.560 The volume of legislation was overwhelming and the
amount of law “ballooned.”561 The progress is remarkable. It is perhaps on this
ground that China is eager to proclaim that the socialist legal system with Chinese
characteristics has now been formed. It is also the reason why China seems
confident that it will beat the 2010 timeline for the establishment of the system as
such.
However, the rule of law should mean much more than just legislation. Even
under Deng Xiaoping’s definition of the rule of law, China is now only at the stage
555. Jerome Cohen, China’s Legal Reform at the Crossroads, supra note 401.
556. See Su Sengxiang, How should We Treat “Nail House”?, Mar. 22, 2007,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-03/22/content_5879558.htm. For example, in a “nail
house” situation, the owner of the household is normally blamed for not respecting the
government, and rarely were people led to think that there was something wrong with the
government.
557. See Cai Huihong, Cultural Shackles – on the Slow Pace of the State Owned
Enterprises Reform of China, http://www.myshow.com.cn/class/oBarticle1.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2010); see also Patrick Randolph, Speech at the 2003 Congressional-Executive Commission
on China Roundtable, Ownership with Chinese Characteristics: Private Property Rights and Land
Reform in the People’s Republic of China, http://www.cecc.gov. In China, local, county, and
provincial government overlords all have an interest in power, and were they to coincide, the
power would come down very hard on the neck of the average citizen.
558. White Paper, supra note 5.
559. See id.
560. Cohen, China’s Legal Reform at the Crossroads, supra note 401, at 24.
561. See Orts, supra note 15, at 64.
1 - ZHANG_TICLJ 12/1/2010 5:03:42 PM
of “there must be law to rely on.”562 Therefore, there is still a long way to go.
Although China has learned its lesson from the past experience of lawlessness and
realized how important it is to have a legal system in operation,563 the biggest
challenge that lies ahead is how to develop the legal system so that the rule of law
becomes meaningful to the country and to the rest of the world. To that end, it
would require China to further depart from the authoritarian tradition and move
more toward democracy in its social, political, and legal structures.
What remains lacking in China is the public confidence in the legal system
because the general public still doubts that the current Chinese legal system is
adequate to provide a just result.564 People are constantly plagued by lingering
misgivings that the system will work as it should. There seems to be little doubt
that the establishment of the socialist legal system provides an important legal
infrastructure for the development of the rule of law in China.565 Given the
political hurdles associated with the Chinese characteristics that dictate the
country, the path toward the rule of law in the country will be challenging and
setbacks along the way are certainly not unconceivable.566 It is hoped, however,
that the country is moving in the right direction to establish a sound legal system
so that the rule of law may eventually be fostered.567
While in many cases China turned its eyes to other countries for direction
while drafting legislation, especially in the country’s underdeveloped areas of law,
it would be naive to assume that China should follow a certain legal pattern or
theory that is popular elsewhere to make its legal system better in terms of the rule
of law. China will develop its legal system in its own Chinese way, as is implied
by Chinese characteristics. For example, in response to the growing demand in the
country for a democratic government,568 the CPC repeatedly forecloses the
possibility of following the Western political system with a basis of separation of
power.569 The Central Committee of the CPC shut the door by criticizing the
Western separation of power as a “rival show” which is not suitable to China
because there are no “rivals” in China between the party and government, or its
branches.570