International Studies Quarterly (2017) 61, 337–351

De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011)

ADRIAN FLOREA
University of Glasgow

De facto states—polities, such as Abkhazia (Georgia) or the Donetsk People’s Republic (Ukraine), that appropriate many
trappings of statehood without securing the status of full states—have been a constant presence in the postwar interna-
tional order. Some de facto states, such as Northern Cyprus, survive for a long period of time. Others, including Tamil
Eelam in Sri Lanka, are forcefully reintegrated into their parent states. Still others, such as Aceh in Indonesia, disappear as
a result of peacemaking. A few, such as Eritrea, successfully transition to full statehood. What explains these very different
outcomes? I argue that four factors account for much of this variation: the extent of military assistance that separatists re-
ceive from outside actors, the governance activities conducted by separatist insurgents, the fragmentation of the rebel
movement, and the influence of government veto players. My analysis relies on an original dataset that includes all break-
away enclaves from 1945 to 2011. The findings enhance our understanding of separatist institutional outcomes, rebel gov-
ernance, and the conditions that sustain nonstate territorial actors.

From Somaliland in the Horn of Africa to, more recently, failed to “fit in” and disappeared (Caspersen 2012; Pegg
the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics in Eastern 1998). It is the variation in de facto state trajectories that
Ukraine, de facto states function as alternative structures of lies at the core of this study. Specifically, I ask two questions.
authority in a post-1945 international order dominated by First, why do some de facto states disappear while others
recognized nation-states. De facto states are separatist survive? And, second, what explains the fate of those that
polities that rule autonomously over portions of territory, do disappear? Why do some end up being forcefully or
establish governance structures, but lack international le- peacefully reintegrated into their parent states while others
gitimacy. De facto states bestride the realm between rebel- make the transition to full statehood?1
lion and statecraft; they raise important questions about My explanation for the variability in de facto state out-
the conditions under which state and nonstate actors comes focuses on the commitment problems engendered
share authority in the contemporary system. These entities by four factors: the extent of military support that separat-
attempt to exercise a legitimate—although not legal— ists receive from outside patrons; the degree of state build-
monopoly on violence, acquire concrete attributes of ing in the breakaway region (the extent of governance
statehood, and institutionalize alternate socio-political activities conducted by rebels);2 the level of fragmentation
orders. Dismissed by some as fleeting buffer enclaves and within the separatist insurgency; and the influence of gov-
heralded by others as viable alternatives to nation-states, ernment veto players. Each of these factors shapes the
de facto states exercise practical sovereignty over swaths of power configuration between the parent state and the sep-
seemingly anarchic spaces. Their existence highlights the aratists as well as the power balance among actors within
need to depart from static conceptions of authority and the parent state and the separatist insurgency, and, in so
look at the full range of actors that appropriate sovereign doing, creates commitment issues that push a de facto
functions (Ahram and King 2011; Bartleson 2001; Clunan state toward a particular trajectory.
and Trinkunas 2010; Florea 2014). Using an original dataset with all de facto states from
Despite their resilience alongside recognized countries, 1945 to 2011, I find that these territorial nonstate actors
de facto states receive comparatively less attention. We are less likely to be peacefully reintegrated into their par-
know a lot about when states are born or die (Coggins ent states when they receive substantial military assistance
2014; Fazal 2007; Hale 2008; Roeder 2007; Spruyt 1994; from foreign sponsors, when they are fragmented, and
Tilly 1990; Wimmer 2013), but our understanding of the when they engage in extensive state building (govern-
conditions under which de facto states survive or perish re- ance) activities. Perhaps counterintuitively, the results also
mains partial. The current international order places a great show that a negotiated reintegration of separatist enclaves
deal of importance on recognition as a condition for sover- is more likely when the parent state government has
eign statehood. This makes the persistence of de facto states
puzzling. Also surprising is the fluidity in their lifespan. 1
Forceful reintegration occurs when the parent state reasserts control over
Some, like Western Sahara, have adapted quite well to in- the de facto state through violent means. Peaceful reintegration occurs when par-
auspicious systemic conditions and have survived for a long ent state and de facto state leaders reach an autonomy agreement. Transition
period of time. Others, like Biafra, Nigeria (1967–1970), to statehood also amounts to de facto state “disappearance” because it marks
the polity’s transition to a different institutional status. Irredentism, full annex-
ation of a de facto state by another country, is another possible trajectory.
Adrian Florea is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of
During the analytical timeframe (1945–2011), there was no instance of de
Glasgow. His areas of research include civil war, political violence, rebel gover-
facto state annexation.
nance, state (un)making, and international security. 2
Rebel state building and rebel governance are used interchangeably through-
Author’s note: I am grateful to Karen Rasler, William R. Thompson, Robert out this article, and refer to the ensemble of activities aimed at enforcing
Urbatsch, three anonymous reviewers, and the ISQ editors for their comments socio-political order, implementing collectively binding rules, and providing
and suggestions. public goods in insurgent-held territory (Risse 2011).

Florea, Adrian. (2017) De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011). International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1093/isq/sqw049
C The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
V
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 338 De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011)

multiple veto players. Moreover, de facto states that are in- De facto states warrant investigation for multiple rea-
ternally fractured and build solid statelike structures find sons. For one, they illuminate the diversity of units popu-
themselves better positioned to make the transition to lating the international system. De facto states are polities
statehood. At the same time, statehood emerges as a less that have adapted well to a world of recognized countries
likely outcome when separatists receive considerable ex- while staying outside their grasp. They vividly illustrate the
ternal military support and when the parent state is in- need to regard political order in ways other than sover-
ternally divided. eign statehood (Acharya 2014; Lemke 2006; Paul 1999;
The article proceeds as follows. The first section offers Sharman 2013; Staniland 2012; Vinci 2008). Sovereignty is
an operational definition of the de facto state which situ- divisible both as a matter of principle and as a matter of
ates it among the larger population of nonstate actors that experience, and is shared by state and nonstate actors
operate violence monopolies. The second section de- alike (Krasner 1999). By recognizing no higher authority
velops a credible commitment explanation for de facto and creating spaces of self-rule, de facto states project an
states’ resilience which yields several hypotheses about the image of sovereignty as a malleable and variable concept
conditions which precipitate or inhibit de facto states’ dis- (Florea 2012). As alternate structures of political organiza-
appearance. The third section tests these hypotheses em- tion, these entities fulfill roles often considered the exclu-
pirically and addresses the main implications of the find- sive preserve of states; they emerge as contenders for
ings. Finally, the fourth section proposes an important authority in an era of contested sovereignty. Their resili-
direction for future research. ence alongside state units in the post-1945 environment
indicates an inherent distribution of practical authority
De Facto States as Nonstate Actors between state and nonstate actors.5
De facto states are separatist polities that exercise a mon- Relatedly, de facto states help us better understand the
opoly over the use of violence in a given area but lack provision of governance in areas beyond state control.
international legal sovereignty. Yet, various types of insur- These polities institutionalize alternative modes of govern-
gent actors—for example, militias, terrorists, or war- ance and, in some cases (such as Somaliland), prove more
lords—institutionalize monopolies of force. To under- effective at developing administrative structures than does
stand what de facto states are, and are not, we need to the nominal territorial sovereign. De facto separation
locate them among the population of rebel organizations marks a disjuncture between the locus of (international
that hold monopolies on violence. Thus, I define de facto legal) authority and the locus of governance. In most of
states as polities that: (1) belong to (or are administered these statelets, separatists completely dislodge the sover-
by) a recognized country, but are not colonial possessions; eign power and assume the burdens of government: they
(2) seek some degree of separation from that country, set up separate institutions, maintain order, levy taxes,
and have either declared independence or demonstrated and administer justice.
aspirations for independence—for example through a ref- De facto states also capture the dynamic character of
erendum or a sovereignty declaration;3 (3) exert military separatism. Recent scholarship reveals that de facto separ-
control over a territory, or portions of territory, inhabited ation does not amount to successful secession, but consti-
by a permanent population; (4) are not condoned by the tutes a “near miss” (Laitin 2007, 17). This observation
governments that hold juridical sovereignty over their ter- underlies a tension in current works: though historical evi-
ritory; (5) perform at least basic governance functions, dence suggests that separatism is a matter of degree, we
such as provision of social and political order; (6) lack typically analyze this phenomenon in binary terms—separ-
international legal sovereignty;4 and (7) exist for at least ation either succeeds or fails (Saideman 2001; Sambanis
24 months. 2004; Tir 2005; Toft 2010; Walter 2009). Separatism in-
The operational indicators yield a population of 34 de cludes demands for the creation of separate states as well
facto states (Table 1), and distinguish these enclaves from as for broad measures of autonomy or quasi-
territories controlled by other types of rebel actors. De independence (Horowitz 2000, 231). This perspective
facto states are different from warlord areas (for example conveys a dynamic process of bargaining that can yield
spaces ruled by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda), various institutional forms of separation that are more or
where the goal of the insurgency is not self-determination less stable.6 Yet, most of the literature remains focused on
and where there is little governance beyond the produc- a dichotomous outcome: unsuccessful or successful separ-
tion of violence. De facto state rebels resemble the ation. Conventional explanations for why some separatist
Olson’s (1993) “stationary bandits” who control and gov- struggles succeed while others fail focus on the character-
ern territory rather than the “roving bandits” who roam istics of the actors involved in the dispute (separatist or-
and pillage. Also, de facto states differ from territories gov- ganization, ethnic group, government), the environment
erned by rebels who aim to overthrow the government, in which these actors interact, the violent or nonviolent
like UNITA-controlled areas in Angola (1975–2002). tactics employed to pursue their objectives, or outside
While these organizations may share with de facto states intervention (Sorens 2012; Regan 2000; Toft 2003; Walter
some characteristics, like territorial control and govern- 2002). Degrees of separation rarely enter the analysis.
ance, the goal of the insurgency is regime change rather With some exceptions (Chapman and Roeder 2007;
than self-determination. Finally, de facto states are separ- Roeder 2007; Seymour 2008), separatism is black-boxed:
ate from areas ruled by pro-state paramilitary groups, such
as government-sponsored anti-FARC militias in Colombia. 5
Vinci (2008, 297) claims that autonomous armed groups inside frag-
mented states “should be seen as being units in the international system
3
A declaration of independence is a key attribute in Caspersen’s (2012, proper.”
6
11) definition of “unrecognized states,” and a main characteristic in Coggins’s Chapman and Roeder (2007) probe the effect of four institutional ar-
(2011, 454) definition of secessionist movements. rangements—partition, de facto separation, autonomy, unitarianism—on the
4
In this study, international legal sovereignty refers to recognition from a sim- likelihood of recurring violence, and find that partition and de facto separ-
ple majority of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members ation are less likely to lead to reescalation of conflict while autonomy and uni-
plus recognition from a simple majority of UN members. tarianism widen the menu of escalatory options.
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 A DRIAN F LOREA 339

Table 1. Population of de facto states (1945–2011)

De facto state Parent state Emergence Disappearance Type of disappearance

Katanga Congo (DRC) 1960 1963 forceful reintegration

Biafra Nigeria 1967 1970 forceful reintegration
Krajina Croatia 1991 1995 forceful reintegration
Chechnya Russia 1991 1999 forceful reintegration
Anjouan Comoros 1997 2008 forceful reintegration
Tamil Eelam Sri Lanka 1984 2009 forceful reintegration
Rwenzururu Kingdom Uganda 1963 1982 peaceful reintegration
Ga g
a uzia Moldova 1991 1995 peaceful reintegration
Bougainville Papua New Guinea 1975 1997 peaceful reintegration
Eastern Slavonia Croatia 1995 1998 peaceful reintegration
Ajaria Georgia 1991 2004 peaceful reintegration
Aceh Indonesia 2001 2005 peaceful reintegration
Karen State Burma 1949 — alive
Kachin State Burma 1961 — alive
Taiwan China 1971 — alive
Mindanao Philippines 1973 — alive
TRNC a Cyprus 1974 — alive
Western Sahara Moroccob 1974 — alive
Cabinda Angola 1975 — alive
Casamance Senegal 1982 — alive
Abkhazia Georgia 1991 — alive
Kurdistan Iraq 1991 — alive
Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan 1991 — alive
Puntland Somalia 1991 — alive
Somaliland Somalia 1991 — alive
South Ossetia Georgia 1991 — alive
Transnistria Moldova 1991 — alive
Republika Srpska Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 — alive
Palestine Israelc 1995 — alive
Gaza Palestined 2007 — alive
Eritrea Ethiopia 1964 1993 statehood
East Timor Indonesia 1975 2002 statehood
Kosovoe Serbia 1998 2008 statehood
South Sudan Sudan 1956 2011 statehood
a
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, bAdministered by Morocco, cUnder Israeli occupation, dUnder Hamas control, eNot a UN member.

current works leave unmeasured and theoretically unex- 1995). Ample case study evidence indicates that de facto
plored much of the variation in institutional outcomes states operate in information-rich environments
that lie between unsuccessful and successful separation. (Caspersen 2012; Caspersen and Stansfield 2010; Lynch
This article attempts to bridge this gap by investigating 2004; Pegg 1998). Prior episodes of conflict or contention,
the conditions that make a particular type of separatist geographical contiguity, frequent interactions at the de
outcome, de facto separation, more or less durable. facto border, and mutual monitoring reduce the uncer-
Specifically, it seeks to explain why some de facto states tainty that actors have about their capabilities and re-
survive while others disappear. Drawing inspiration from solve.7 Similarly, issue indivisibility is unlikely to emerge as
the larger literature on civil war and separatism, and the the main obstacle to successful bargaining between the
specialized works on de facto states, I offer below a cred- separatists and the parent state. This is because, compared
ible commitment account for de facto state trajectories. to disputes over government, disputes over territory are
The central contention is that the power distribution be- more amenable to resolution since there exists, in prin-
tween and within the government and the separatist insur- ciple, a division of the territory that both parties would be
gency produces different kinds of commitment problems content with (Walter 2002, 2009). Viewed through this
that translate into different types of outcomes for these lens, indivisibility is not an inherent property of the dis-
enclaves. The next section develops this argument. puted territory but a by-product of bargaining failure
(Goddard 2009). Hence, credible commitment
Credible Commitment and De Facto State Outcomes
I begin with the premise that credible commitment func- 7
Cunningham (2010, 118) argues that covert external assistance to rebels
tions as the key mechanism that shapes bargaining be- is not easily detectable and exacerbates informational asymmetries. De facto
tween separatists and governments and, therefore, causes separation encapsulates a situation of military stalemate where the rebels and
much of the variation in de facto state outcomes (forceful the government have sufficient information about each other’s resolve and
reintegration, peaceful reintegration, transition to state- capability. With the passage of time, informational asymmetries will likely dissi-
pate because “after a few years of war, fighters on both sides of an insurgency
hood). Bargaining breakdown in conflicts over de facto
typically develop accurate understanding of the other side’s capabilities, tac-
states is less likely to be triggered by other rationalist driv- tics, and resolve” (Fearon 2004, 290). Powell (2012, 44) contends that, even if
ers of war—informational asymmetry (uncertainty about informational problems persist, they cannot explain the duration of the con-
capabilities and resolve) or issue indivisibility (Fearon flict or the way in which it might end.
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 340 De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011)

mechanisms are likely to play a key role in complicating reverberate throughout the strategic environment in
bargaining between separatists and governments. which the de facto state and the government operate, im-
Commitment problems emerge in most warring group pinge on actors’ discount rate (the rate at which they dis-
interactions (Christia 2012; Cunningham 2014; Pearlman count future benefits), and raise barriers to successful bar-
2011). Antagonists often prove unable to commit them- gaining. With a relative power balance in flux, neither
selves to abide by an agreement. They also face incentives side has the incentive or the ability to commit to a
to renege on agreements. Recent works overwhelmingly settlement.
focus on commitment problems as barriers preventing I make two assumptions about the power distribution
rebels from entering into or reneging on an agreement between the de facto state and the government. First, I as-
with the government. This line of inquiry holds that the sume that this power distribution varies, depending on
proliferation of civil war participants expands the range of actors’ military resources and mobilizational effectiveness.
preferable agreements and reduces actors’ willingness, or Second, I assume that commitment problems become
ability, to abide by a deal (Bakke, Cunningham, and more acute when the power distribution is altered by the
Seymour 2012; Cunningham 2011). By disaggregating the capabilities of the de facto state rather than by those of
number of conflict parties, this approach marks a wel- the parent state. Thus, even with a change in the power
come departure from the unitary actor assumption that distribution in government’s favor (through external as-
undergirds commitment-centered explanations of warfare. sistance, for instance), it will retain a preference for peace-
It provides a more realistic view of the conditions that ful resolution. After all, warfare is costly and comes with a
lead to bargaining collapse in internal conflicts. baggage of uncertainty about the evolution of hostilities
Nonetheless, key challenges remain: “not to identify com- and the contours of the post-conflict environment.8 The
mitment problems per se, but rather to identify mechan- larger literature on the politics of self-determination and
isms that provide important insights into the forces the more specialized works on de facto states suggest that,
underlying. . .persistent inefficient behavior” (Powell 2012, in an attempt to maintain military parity with the govern-
46). Without attention to its origin, a commitment prob- ment, separatists engage in both external and internal bal-
lem becomes nothing but a “catch-all label” that doesn’t ancing behavior. The former strategy involves attracting
tell us much about why some conflicts last more than external military support while the latter centers around state
others unless we examine the relationship among differ- building activities that allow separatists to acquire domestic
ent kinds of commitment problems and the outcomes they legitimacy and maintain mobilization against the govern-
generate (Powell 2012, 51). ment. The next section explores the processes through
In conflicts over de facto states, the preference struc- which these two factors might alter the dyadic power dis-
ture for the government and the rebels tends to shift in tribution, exacerbate commitment problems, and propel
relation to the dyadic power distribution and internal a de facto state toward a particular path.
struggles. The relative power distribution operates at in-
terrelated levels—the dyadic/interaction level and the External Military Support
actor level (government, de facto state)—to produce dif-
ferent kinds of commitment problems with varying impli- As actors interested in their survival, de facto states have a
cations for outcomes. Stated otherwise, the power distribu- fundamental need to mobilize resources. De facto states’
tion between the government and the insurgency (a survival hinges on their capacity to balance militarily
structural bargaining condition) as well as the power against the parent state. Functionally, they are undifferen-
struggles within each of them (a structural organizational tiated from sovereign countries in that the survival im-
condition) alter the strategic environment in unique ways perative compels them to balance both externally and in-
to generate various commitment problems and produce ternally. Securing military support from an external patron
divergent trajectories for de facto states. The relative cap- is a common form of external balancing that allows separ-
ability between the separatists and the parent state as well atists to maintain mobilization. Military support can come
as these actors’ internal struggles are really doing the in various forms: arms, communication technologies, and
work behind de facto state survival or disappearance by hardware; personnel; training for rebel troops; provision
shaping incentives to commit to a deal or continue fight- of safe havens (Carter 2012; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and
ing. The ultimate fate of a separatist statelike entity re- Cunningham 2011).
volves around dynamics of two-level power “games” For the de facto state, military assistance galvanizes
(Putnam 1988)—power “games” at the dyadic/interaction hopes of sustained self-rule. For the parent state, outside
level and power “games” at the actor (government, separ- support for the insurgency alters its incentives to resolve
atist) level—which affect actors’ willingness or ability to the dispute peacefully. To forestall adverse shifts in the
commit to an agreement. power distribution triggered by external assistance for the
rebellion, the government might contemplate military ac-
Power Distribution and Commitment Problems at the Dyadic tion. At the same time, military aid from sponsors injects
Level vital lifeblood into the arteries of a de facto state by pro-
viding rebels with the resources needed to prevent force-
Anticipated shifts in the power distribution function as ful reintegration. Outside support enables de facto state
major obstacles to credible commitment across all types of leaders to resist attempts at forceful reintegration, and
conflict. Expectations about adverse changes in the rela- amplifies commitment problems because, in the presence
tive power balance reduce actors’ desirability of striking a of military assistance, rebels will likely radicalize their de-
deal or committing to an agreement that has already been mands (Jenne 2007). When negotiating with the parent
reached. Applied to de facto states, this logic suggests that state, separatists may promise “not to seek independence
a settlement that is preferable in the present cannot be
sustained for the long term because changes in the power 8
Robustness tests included in the supplementary materials show that the
distribution between the separatists and the government relaxation of this assumption with the inclusion of controls for government as-
alter the appeal of a deal. Shifts in the power balance sistance produces similar conclusions.
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 A DRIAN F LOREA 341

if greater territorial autonomy is granted, but may have external military support can jeopardize a de facto state’s
difficulty convincing the government that they will not es- survival prospects. For instance, separatists in Krajina, a
calate their demands” if they benefit from external spon- Serb enclave of Croatia that declared independence in
sorship (Walter 2009, 37). De facto state leaders are less 1991, could not consistently rely on Serbia’s military sup-
likely to accept an autonomy deal when they are confident port because Belgrade pursued its own interests and was
of resources that will allow them to maintain military par- more interested in controlling the decision-making pro-
ity with the government. Essentially, with extensive exter- cess in the province than ensuring its survival. Serbian
nal sponsorship, rebels have few incentives to credibly patronage was more of a curse than a blessing because it
commit to a settlement that gives them anything less than was intermittent and encouraged splintering within the
the status quo. rebel movement. By supplying rival factions with both co-
Some argue that we should observe less support for ercive and economic resources, Belgrade actually contrib-
separatists because separatism threatens established uted to the demise of the de facto state since divisions
boundaries and, hence, the stability of the international among separatists stymied their efforts to coordinate mili-
system (Saideman 2002, 28). However, many de facto tary activities against the government (Caspersen 2012,
states receive substantial assistance, which indicates that 104). Unsurprisingly, in 1995 Krajina was forcefully rein-
third parties are more concerned with immediate tegrated into the parent state.
geopolitical goals than with larger systemic consider- The Krajina example conveys a straightforward mes-
ations. In many situations, such as Russia’s support for sage: external patronage can be a two-way street. It may
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria (Blakkisrud enhance a de facto state’s survival prospects, but it may
and Kolstø 2011; Caspersen 2012; King 2001; Kolstø also limit its room for maneuver. Strategic interests
2006; Lynch 2004; Pegg 1998), powerful sponsors throw fluctuate—international, regional, or domestic consider-
their weight behind a de facto state ostensibly to protect ations frequently lead patron states to rethink their pri-
ethnic kin but in reality to pursue larger geostrategic ob- orities and recalibrate their policies toward friends and
jectives such as destabilizing host regimes (Jenne 2007, foes alike. The unpredictability of external assistance
126). Sponsorship lowers the probability that the de coupled with concerns for loss of autonomy and legitim-
facto state will be forcefully reintegrated into the parent acy make rebels aware that they also need a domestic
state, and hinders the prospects for a settlement. With a resource base, one generated through state building (gov-
strong supporter in their backyard, separatists will gain ernance) activities. The imperative of balancing against
confidence at the negotiating table, and will likely escal- the government forces de facto states to centralize
ate their demands rather than acquiesce to autonomy power, expand the institutional apparatus, and extract
offers made by the government. resources. The threat of war with the parent state pushes
While sponsorship enables de facto states to survive for rebels to create an alternative order with state making
longer periods of time, it can also undermine separatists’ consequences. Beneath the apparent chaos of de facto
independence aspirations. With external patronage for separation lies a reconfiguration of political order with
the rebellion, the parent state will be less inclined to com- processes functionally equivalent to state formation.
mit to a final agreement through which it recognizes the State building can substantially affect de facto states’ via-
de facto state’s independence. In a scenario of external bility. This form of internal balancing has important con-
military assistance for the separatists, the government will sequences: if it is large and sustained, it leaves behind
likely oppose any agreement that grants independence to solid institutional structures that create material bases
the breakaway enclave. Additionally, other countries for mobilization against the government. Many de facto
might be reluctant to recognize the independence of states, such as Abkhazia or Transnistria, exhibit a sprawl-
these entities since they will perceive them as mere “pup- ing bureaucracy akin to a sovereign country (Blakkisrud
pets” of regional or global powers (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Kolstø 2011): they have a separate government with
and Cunningham 2011, 717). For instance, in their quest functional ministries, separate health and education in-
for independence, Abkhaz separatists have unsuccessfully stitutions and, in some cases, a separate central bank and
tried to dissociate themselves from Moscow’s patronage by local currency.
projecting the image of a legitimate right for statehood The establishment of a statelike architecture in rebel-
based on prior separate existence (Bakke et al. 2014). held territory provides the actors with a mix of incentives.
Although Abkhaz politics often unfolds contrary to Russia’s Governments may prefer a peaceful deal with the rebels,
preferences (Kremlin-backed presidential candidates have but cannot commit to it when the latter become “rulers of
twice been defeated at the polls in 2004 and 2011), the the domain” (Olson 1993). To forestall the institutional-
close military and economic cooperation between Moscow ization of separate rule on their territory, governments
and Abkhazia casts an aura of patron–client dependence may contemplate violence as a mechanism for dispute
that delegitimizes the Abkhaz independence struggle in resolution. However, rebel governance likely inhibits a de
the eyes of the international community. Therefore, these facto state’s forceful reintegration because it facilitates re-
rationales suggest that: cruitment (the local population becomes invested in the
alternative order) and resource mobilization (Arjona
2014). Rebel governance also decreases the prospects of
H1: The greater the extent of external military support for the peaceful reintegration. State building lowers the likeli-
separatists, the lower the likelihood of de facto state reintegra- hood that de facto state leaders will accept an agreement
tion (peaceful or forceful) or transition to statehood. that does not represent an improvement over the status
State Building quo. Decisions to develop a complex governance architec-
ture signal resolve: by engaging in onerous state building
De facto state leaders face a paradox: reliance on external projects, insurgent leaders communicate that nothing
patrons strengthens them militarily, but also makes them short of de facto separation would be acceptable in the
vulnerable. For various reasons, sponsors may be unwill- long run. The opportunity costs of governance signal
ing or unable to bolster a de facto state. Fluctuations in commitment to local rule, and affect the bargaining range
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 342 De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011)

such that separatists’ preference structure may exclude Rebel Movement Fragmentation
any deal that involves the enclave’s reintegration into the
Despite public claims of unity, many rebel movements in-
parent state. In Northern Cyprus, for instance, over the
clude multiple factions with varying origins and agendas
past four decades external support from Turkey coupled
(Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). As Pearlman
with a robust governance apparatus have made separatist and Cunningham (2012, 4) aptly note, “the norm in more
leaders less willing to accept agreements that give them recent civil wars is not coherent antagonists as much as
something less than what they already have (quasi- shifting coalitions of groups with malleable allegiances
independence). and, at times, divergent interests.” Fragmentation among
A high degree of state building could also increase the separatists complicates the bargaining environment and
likelihood of transition to statehood. Governance consoli- exacerbates commitment problems. With radical rebel fac-
dates the enclave’s separation, and sends a powerful signal tions intent on undermining autonomy negotiations, gov-
that nothing short of independence would satisfy the reb- ernments cannot commit to pursuing peaceful solutions.
els in the long run. The establishment of a separate state- In fact, insurgent splintering provides parent states with
like apparatus punctures any link that may remain be- incentives to destabilize the de facto state, playing one fac-
tween the parent state and the local population, and tion against the other. When the separatist enclaves suffer
bolsters the enclave’s legitimacy for both domestic and from internal schisms, they will be less successful in their
international audiences. Separatist state builders claim attempt to balance against the government, and will be
that successful governance legitimizes their bid for inde- more vulnerable to forceful reintegration.10
pendence and international recognition (Caspersen Fragmentation is particularly pernicious in the context
2012). State building has historically been a key condition of autonomy negotiations between the separatists and the
for admission into the club of internationally recognized parent state because it expands actors’ preference dimen-
states. In many cases of state emergence, polities claiming sion and, thus, shrinks the range of possible deals. Rebel
a right to statehood had to first demonstrate that they dis- factionalism creates a double-commitment problem, and
played statelike characteristics: control over territory, gov- makes peaceful reintegration elusive. On the government
ernance provision, and capacity to enter into relations side, leaders might be reluctant to sign on to an agree-
with other units (Fabry 2010). In the contemporary envir- ment since, under conditions of acute splintering, rebels
onment where statehood is mutually constituted, earned cannot commit to abide by it. On the rebel side, some fac-
tions might have rational incentives to continue their
sovereignty is no longer a sine qua non. A recent example
struggle rather than acquiesce to a deal with the parent
is South Sudan, which in July 2011 entered the state sys-
state. In particular, those splinter groups with lower lever-
tem with inchoate governance structures. As exemplified
age over decision-making in the larger separatist move-
by Kosovo’s case, however, earned sovereignty remains a ment worry that, if they partake into a deal with the gov-
valuable ticket of admission into the international arena. ernment, the dominant faction cannot commit that it will
Kosovo’s independence was recognized by a plurality of not try to eliminate them in order to get a larger piece of
UNSC-permanent members (the United States, France, the post-settlement “pie” (Christia 2012). Many de facto
Great Britain) only after meeting certain standards of states display splintering dynamics wherein various armed
good governance delineated by the international commu- factions crystallize around competing centers of author-
nity.9 Hence, these arguments give rise to the second ity.11 For example, in 1991 the Sudan People’s Liberation
proposition: Army (SPLA) split into two main factions, each claiming
to be the “true” representative of the South Sudanese: a
H2: The greater the degree of state building in the de facto Dinka-dominated group led by John Garang (SPLA-Main/
state, the lower the likelihood of reintegration (forceful or peace- Torit) and a Nuer-dominated group (SPLA-United) led by
ful) and the higher the likelihood of transition to statehood. Riek Machar and Lam Akol. Garang favored extensive au-
tonomy for South Sudan (not least in deference to his
Power Distribution and Commitment Problems at the Actor Ethiopian patron who was engaged in a protracted strug-
gle against Eritrean separatists) while SPLA-United openly
Level
sought an independent state. During the 1990s, SPLA’s ef-
Issues of commitment also arise with the variability in the forts to reach a comprehensive autonomy deal with the
power distribution at the actor level (the rebel movement government were hampered by splinter groups, such as
and the government), and have ramifications for whether SPLA-United, that were opposed to any deal involving re-
a de facto state survives or disappears. One the one hand, integration into the parent state.
fragmentation among the separatists—an indicator of the Fragmentation can also hamper de facto states’
relative power of various factions comprising the insur- independence aspirations. For example, a fragmented
gency—can create insurmountable commitment hurdles. movement faces more difficulty than a cohesive one in its
On the other hand, obstacles to successful bargaining can efforts to maintain full control over the territory and en-
equally emanate from divisions within the parent state, gage in effective governance activities. Both of these are
more precisely from veto players—central government often, but not always, key conditions for advancing a legit-
actors with potential for preventing change in policy. imate claim to statehood. In addition, rebel factions often
gain more from the continuation of the struggle than
Below, I examine mechanisms through which rebel move-
from peace. In an independence scenario, the stronger
ment fragmentation and central government veto players
shape the bargaining environment, and might catapult de 10
Akcinaroglu (2012, 884) suggests that fragmentation might actually help
facto states toward a certain trajectory. the polity survive because the government faces a constant war of attrition
from different factions in different places.
9 11
The international community’s “standards before status” approach ex- In highly institutionalized de facto states, such as Abkhazia and
pressly stated that Kosovo’s ultimate status would be determined by the entity’s Transnistria, splintering is visible through the presence of political parties ra-
capacity to acquire functional attributes of statehood. ther than armed groups.
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 A DRIAN F LOREA 343

organization in the rebel movement cannot guarantee will also be averse to any kind of change.14 With such an
that it will not turn on its weaker partners in order to cap- array of veto players with potential to block agreements,
ture complete control of the polity (Christia 2012, 21). the government’s ability to enter negotiations and commit
Finally, other states, particularly those located in the prox- to a deal will be severely diminished. Therefore, the last
imity, may be reluctant to recognize a fragmented polity expectation is:
out of fear that factional infighting could morph into
post-independence civil war with spillover potential, as is H4: The higher the number of government veto players, the
the case with South Sudan. Taken together, these ration- lower the likelihood of reintegration (forceful or peaceful), or
ales produce the third hypothesis: transition to statehood.

H3: The greater the level of fragmentation in the de facto state, Empirical Analysis
the higher the likelihood of forceful reintegration, and the lower The hypotheses are tested with an original dataset of 34
the likelihood of peaceful reintegration or transition to de facto states in the post-WWII period (1945–2011).15
statehood. The unit of analysis is the de facto state-year, for a total of
780 observations. The dependent variable is de facto state
Government Veto Players duration—time in months from de facto state emergence
Parent state veto players—individual or collective actors until de facto state disappearance. De facto state emer-
that have institutional or extra-institutional means of pre- gence is observed in the month where a self-
venting change (Tsebelis 2002)—can also block negoti- determination polity in an officially recognized country
ated agreements. Any solution to conflicts involving de exhibits empirical sovereignty (military control over a ter-
facto states inexorably involves redistribution of state ritory), lacks universal recognition, is not condoned by
power. Reintegration and transition to statehood have dis- the government, and engages in at least basic governance
tributional implications for the relative power position of activities. If a de facto state was already in place before the
various groups within the parent state. Peaceful reintegra- declaration of independence of a newly formed parent
tion can upset the domestic balance of power since the state, then this date marks its emergence.16 The median
cooptation of de facto state leaders within central or local survival time for de facto states is 345 months. The
government structures, which generally accompanies such shortest-lived de facto state is Eastern Slavonia (Croatia),
agreements, might lead to a reshuffling of the ruling co- with a survival time of 25 months. The longest-lived de
facto state is Karen State (Burma), with 756 months at the
alition. Faced with the prospect of a change in the ruling
end of the observation period (December 2011).
coalition, veto players have rational incentives to spoil
agreements. The 2004 Annan Plan for Northern Cyprus
provides a telling example of such a pattern: the plan Variables
failed mainly because it was rejected by Greek Cypriot The first hypothesis posited that outside military assist-
leaders who were concerned about its distributional impli- ance exacerbates commitment problems and entrenches
cations. The mechanism linking government veto players the continuation of the status quo. Sponsorship lowers
to commitment failures can operate irrespective of regime the probability that a de facto state will be forcefully rein-
type. Democracies typically exhibit multiple veto players, tegrated into the parent state. External military support
such as legislators or regional administrators, who might hinders the prospects for peaceful resolution by reducing
dislike the distributional consequences implicit in a de separatists’ incentives to sign on to an agreement. An
facto state’s peaceful reintegration. Non-democratic re- ideal measure for external Military Support would be an
gimes can also include a variety of veto players who might estimated dollar amount of military assistance a de facto
oppose a negotiated settlement that redistributes domes- state gets from other countries. The covert nature of mili-
tic power and influence.12 tary interactions between de facto states and external pa-
Paradoxical as it may seem at first sight, several actors trons limits the availability of such data. To circumvent
within democratic or authoritarian parent states may have this problem, I resort to a second-best measurement.
entrenched interests in preventing the disappearance of a Specifically, I construct a proxy that captures how much
de facto state: politicians may veto a negotiated solution external military assistance a de facto state gets in any
for fear that it might alter the composition of the ruling given year from state sponsors (Byman et al. 2001; Carter
coalition; the army’s modal reaction is to oppose self- 2012). This variable is a score composed of five types of
determination demands;13 and those bureaucrats (tax offi- military external support, where each type of support re-
cers, inspectors, border guards) who accrue substantial ceives equal weight: (1) weaponry and military hardware,
benefits from the lucrative trade in consumer goods, (2) foreign military personnel, (3) foreign military ad-
arms, narcotics, or even people across the often porous visors, (4) training for de facto state troops abroad, and
borders between the de facto state and the parent state (5) safe havens. The mean value for this covariate is 2.78,
14
Domestic actors can also pressure the government to resist a transition
12
Just like democracies, autocratic regimes display great variation in veto to statehood imposed by others. At the same time, a dysfunctional parent state
points. In some cases, dictators create domestic institutions and, thus, poten- might, theoretically, be unable to resist a transition to statehood imposed
tially expand the number of veto players, as a strategy to maintain power. For from the outside. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
15
example, Gandhi (2008, 184) argues that autocrats often “co-opt the potential The codebook (see the supplementary materials) provides details about
opposition in an attempt to broaden their bases of support and increase their coding procedures, variable measurement, and the sources consulted.
16
power relative to other political actors.” On the other hand, authoritarian For example, while Nagorno-Karabakh exhibited de facto state character-
leaders could also use the continued threat posed by separatists to consolidate istics prior to Azerbaijan’s independence, the date of emergence is the month
their rule and stifle domestic dissent. when Azerbaijan became a sovereign state (October 1991). The emergence
13
As an organization with its separate corporate interests, the military date for Taiwan is October 1971, when the People’s Republic of China
might prefer a continuation of the separatist dispute in order to amass re- replaced Taiwan as a UN member and took its seat on the UN Security
sources and bolster its power within the parent state bureaucracy. Council.
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 344 De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011)

while the median value is 3. For example, Tamil Eelam de facto state (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012;
registers a score of 4 for the period 1984–1988 when the Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). The higher the
LTTE received substantial support from India, and a score number of factions, the higher the level of fragmentation
of 1 after 1988 when New Delhi withdrew its military within the rebel movement. A faction is an organization
assistance.17 that claims to represent the population of the de facto
The theory suggested that state building activities state and makes demands regarding the status of the en-
conducted by separatists can also affect a de facto state’s clave, such as reintegration into the parent state, limited
survival prospects in two ways. First, they provide the re- autonomy, broad autonomy, no change in status, inde-
sources needed to mobilize against the government. pendence, (re)union with another state, or membership
Second, they confer a sense of legitimacy to the separatist in a supra-national entity. A faction can be a political
movement. Both diminish separatists’ incentives to com- party, military organization, or civic group that operates
mit to an agreement that offers anything less than de facto within or outside the de facto state. The fragmentation
separation. To gauge the effect of State Building on out- variable ranges from 1 to 21, with a mean of 3.95 and a
comes, I construct a variable that captures the number of median of 3. Ajaria, Gagauzia, and Rwenzururu Kingdom
statelike institutions that a de facto state exhibits in any are the only de facto states with a single faction through-
given year. This variable captures the number of govern- out their entire existence, while Palestine displays the larg-
ance institutions that are present in each de facto state, est number of factions—21 at the end of 2011.
and includes the following indicators: (1) an executive— One final theoretical expectation posited that central
coded as present if there is an executive authority that government Veto Players can block changes in the status
makes decisions in the de facto state, (2) a legislature quo. To assess the influence of veto players, I include a
and/or regional councils—coded as present if there is a variable that measures the degree of veto opportunities in
legislative body in the de facto state capital and/or re- the parent state. I use Polity IV’s “executive constraints”
gional councils, (3) a court or semi-formalized legal sys- variable as a proxy for the degree of veto opportunities.
tem—coded as present if there is a formal or semi-formal This indicator captures institutionalized constraints on
juridical authority that adjudicates disputes between indi- the decision-making powers of the chief executives,
viduals or institutions in the de facto state, (4) a civilian whether individuals or collectivities. The advantage of this
tax system—coded as present if there are institutions for proxy is that it encompasses constraints on decision-
regularized extraction of taxes from the local population making from both within and outside the government
and/or from the diaspora, (5) an educational system— (constraints on decision-making can originate with legisla-
coded as present if the authorities in the de facto state es- tures, political parties, powerful advisers, private corpor-
tablish a system of education that functions in parallel ations, the army, or judicial bodies).18 The executive con-
with or in lieu of the one provided by the government, straints variable is created on a 7-point scale, with 1
(6) a welfare system—coded as present if the authorities representing unlimited decision-making authority (no
in the de facto state establish a system of welfare (health- limitations on executive’s decisions) and 7 representing
care and/or pensions) that replaces or complements the
highly constrained decision-making authority (several veto
one provided by the parent state, (7) institutions for for-
players can block a decision). In the middle, a value of 3
eign affairs—coded as present if the authorities in the de
represents slight to moderate limitation on decision-
facto state conduct diplomacy by establishing missions
making authority, while a value of 5 represents substantial
abroad and engaging in contacts with IGOs and/or for-
limitations on decision-making authority. The values 2, 4,
eign governments, (8) a media or propaganda system—
and 6 are intermediate categories, bridging the gap be-
coded as present if the authorities in the de facto state es-
tween adjacent values. The mean value for this covariate is
tablish media or propaganda outlets, (9) a police and/or
4.03, while the median is 3.
gendarmerie system—coded as present if the authorities
In addition to the main predictors, I control for factors
in the de facto state establish a system of domestic control
that can affect both the independent variables and the
(police and/or gendarmerie) that operates separately
outcomes. One such factor is the de facto state’s Prior
from the army, (10) a central banking system—coded as
present if the authorities in the de facto state establish a Status as an independent or autonomous territory.
central banking system that functions separately from the Although de facto states coalesce around concentrated
parent state’s banking network. The mean for this variable minorities, their boundaries do not map neatly onto mi-
is 5.95, while the median is 6. For instance, Transnistria nority groups’ spatial distribution; instead, their frontiers
(Moldova) registers a value of 7 for its emergence year tend to correspond to previous administrative units. For
(1991) and a value of 10 for the period 1992–2011. example, Somaliland’s borders roughly coincide with the
Gagauzia, a short-lived de facto state in the same country, eponymous British protectorate (1884–1960) and short-
registers a value of 2 on this variable for its entire survival lived independent republic that on July 1, 1960, united
period (1991–1995). with the former Italian Somaliland to form modern-day
Another expectation held that the level of Fragmentation Somalia.19 When South Ossetia first declared independ-
in the rebel movement can shape de facto state outcomes. ence from Georgia in May 1992, it claimed sovereignty
Splintering can be perilous to a de facto state because over the territory of the former South Ossetian
military and political resources might be redirected to- Autonomous Soviet Region (Oblast). Similarly, the
ward internal power struggles rather than organized resist- Abkhaz de facto state formally encompasses the territory
ance against the government. Additionally, fragmentation
18
erodes actors’ incentives or ability to commit to an agree- The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) provides an alternative meas-
ure of veto players. However, DPI collects data starting with 1975, which pro-
ment. To measure the level of fragmentation, I look at the duces missing observations for the period 1945–1974. The correlation
number of factions that make demands on behalf of the between the Polity IV and DPI veto player measures is 0.53.
19
Somaliland functioned as an independent state between June 26 and
17
Descriptive statistics are included in the supplementary materials. June 30, 1960, and was recognized by 35 countries.
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 A DRIAN F LOREA 345

of the defunct Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist that can influence a polity’s survival prospects. Fazal
Republic. (2007, 83) finds that international recognition strongly in-
Prior status can emerge as a powerful determinant of fluences unit longevity: the more recognition a would-be
separatist claims for at least two reasons. First, past insti- state receives, the greater its chances of survival. Shelef
tutional experience leaves behind institutional remnants, and Zeira (forthcoming, 3) argue that recognition in-
of formal or ideational fabric, that enable rebels to rally creases the appetite for secession and decreases support
the local population around the separatist claim and mo- for a negotiated compromise. There is large variability in
bilize resources. Prior existence as an independent/au- recognition patterns for de facto states: some (like
tonomous territory enhances the domestic legitimacy of Somaliland) lack any kind of recognition or are
the self-determination struggle, and lowers the cost of recognized only by a patron state (like Northern Cyprus),
collective action. Institutional legacies not only reinforce while others receive recognition from many countries (for
ethnic identities and facilitate coordination, but also in- example, Western Sahara—recognized by 48 countries at
culcate a territorial identity that is distinct from that of the end of 2011). Nonrecognition reduces de facto states’
the core (Siroky and Cuffe 2015). Prior independence or long-term viability, as it prevents them from enjoying key
autonomy gives de facto states ready-made institutions benefits of statehood (Coggins 2011, 448). Membership in
and networks of cooperation that increase separatists’ the club of recognized states confers not only legal privil-
willingness, cohesion, and capacity to act against the gov- eges but also more tangible gains such as access to inter-
ernment (Brancati 2006, 651; Lynch 2004, 24). Second, national trade, investment, loans, and arms purchases that
past institutions can serve as focal points or ready-made enable countries to boost their military wherewithal (Fazal
solutions for future cooperation between the rebels and and Griffiths 2014). A country’s decision to recognize (or
the government. As the post-Soviet experience indicates, withdraw recognition from) a de facto state is rarely based
de facto states typically emerge out of lower-level jurisdic- on legal principles, but is primarily driven by strategic ob-
tions, which may limit their capacity to organize a self- jectives.21 Regardless of countries’ reasons for supporting
determination challenge. Roeder (2007, 10) holds that a de facto state’s independence, recognition is essential
successful separations tend to be associated with higher- because it signals support for separatists’ aspirations at
order jurisdictions, such as union republics, rather than both the domestic and international level. Domestically,
with lower-level jurisdictions, like autonomous republics countries that recognize a de facto state often provide as-
or autonomous regions. This logic suggests that institu- sistance that bolsters rebels’ military arsenal and govern-
tional legacy may leave some de facto states structurally ance activities. For example, after Algeria recognized the
disadvantaged in their attempts to mobilize against the independence of Western Sahara on March 6, 1976, it im-
parent state. Operating with an impaired ability to mediately offered extensive military and political support
mount a sustained resistance in an environment so that has allowed the de facto state to survive to this day.
averse to unilateral separations, de facto state leaders Internationally, even limited recognition confers legitim-
may use the territory’s institutional legacy as a building acy to separatists’ independence aspirations, and imparts
block for a future agreement with the government. A de a veneer of statehood (Ker-Lindsay 2012).
facto state’s prior status can thus serve as a focal point
for rebel–government cooperation because it minimizes Estimation Procedure
uncertainty and costs for both sides. As Carter and
Goemans (2011, 284) note, previous administrative boun- To assess the relationship between variables and de facto
daries coordinate actor expectations about bargaining state outcomes, I estimate a series of competing risks haz-
outcomes. A legacy of autonomy, for instance, mitigates ard models. Competing risks refer to the probability of
coordination problems related to the range of possible any type of de facto state disappearance relative to the
institutional configurations that can be produced by probability of de facto state survival. Competing risks as-
negotiations. sess the relationship between covariates and the dis-
Relatedly, the historical legacy of a de facto state as a appearance rate or the corresponding probability of any
former Colony can also impact its trajectory. A de facto one of the possible types of de facto state outcomes allow-
state may inherit institutional vestiges dating from the co- ing for competing risks from the other types of out-
lonial period that can serve as material and ideational comes.22 These models estimate cause-specific hazards;
bases for sustained mobilization. Colonial legacy is also a hence, the effect of covariates may be different for each
powerful tool for forging a separate identity for the de type of de facto state disappearance.
facto state population, acquiring legitimacy, and attracting Competing risks models compute sub-hazards—cause-
military support from outside actors. A colonial past has specific hazards for the outcome of interest as well as for
the potential to affect both the degree of state building in the other possible, or “competing,” outcomes. The sub-
the de facto state and the extent of military support separ- hazard for outcome i at time t gives the instantaneous
atists get from third parties—two key factors that, in turn, probability for a de facto state to experience outcome i
are expected to lower the likelihood of reintegration. 21
Additionally, I control for the presence of Peacekeepers The case of Northern Cyprus, for instance, reveals that recognition can
be a tool for inflicting costs on a rival. Ankara’s support for Northern Cyprus
on the territory of the de facto state20 and for the number cannot be disentangled from the Greek–Turkish rivalry. Coggins (2014) finds
of countries that officially recognize a de facto state in any that countries are more likely to recognize separatist movements that weaken
given year (Recognition). Prior scholarship suggests that their rivals and less likely to do so with movements that weaken their friends.
22
while peacekeepers may prevent conflict recurrence, their These models assume that competing risks are independent. The inde-
presence can also reinforce the status quo (Fortna 2008). pendence assumption implies that, for example, a de facto state that dis-
appeared by forceful reintegration was neither more nor less likely to
By determining which units are legitimized as states, rec-
experience other outcomes (peaceful reintegration or transition to statehood)
ognition functions as a powerful selection mechanism had it not disappeared by forceful reintegration (i.e., at the time of disappear-
ance, the de facto state was at risk of experiencing all possible types of
20
Data for this variable are based on Fortna (2008). outcomes).
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 346 De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011)

Table 2. De facto state outcomes

(1) Forceful reintegration (2) Peaceful reintegration (3) Statehood

Prior status 1.234 0.515

(1.103) (0.639)
Colony 0.860 0.243
(1.250) (0.316)
Peacekeepers 3.072 7.125 7.430**
(4.477) (11.328) (6.653)
Recognition 0.998**
(0.001)
Military support 0.995 0.990* 0.986***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
State building 0.997 0.997** 1.015***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Fragmentation 1.003 0.986** 1.002***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Veto players 1.001 1.005** 0.993***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Subjects 34 34 34
Failures 6 6 4
N 780 780 780
Hazard ratios are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.

Table 3. Percentage change (per year) in the hazard of each de facto state outcome

Recognition Military support State building Fragmentation Veto players De facto state outcome

–0.2% insig. insig. insig. insig. Forceful reintegration

n.e. –1.0% –0.3% –1.4% þ0.5% Peaceful reintegration
n.e. –1.4% þ1.5% þ0.2% –0.7% Statehood
Results significant at the .10 level or above. insig. ¼ effect is statistically insignificant. n.e. ¼ not estimated (outcome perfectly predicted or insuffi-
cient variation).

given that it has survived up to time t and that all types of recognition. The hazard ratio is 0.998, showing that
outcomes are possible. Sub-hazards have a similar inter- international recognition decreases the risk of forceful re-
pretation to hazard ratios, where values greater than 1 in- integration by roughly 0.2 percent per year. Recognition
dicate a higher likelihood of an outcome and values lower from UN member countries may not single-handedly offer
than 1 a lower probability of an outcome. The conven- a de facto state an entry pass into the international com-
tional approach to analyzing competing risks data is to munity, but may provide a ticket for survival. To get a bet-
run a Cox model for each event separately—in this case, ter sense of the effect of recognition on the likelihood of
for each type of de facto state disappearance—while the a de facto state’s forceful reintegration, Figure 1 plots
other “competing” types are censored.23 (smoothed) hazard estimates for forceful reintegration at
different values for the recognition covariate. As we can
Results and Discussion see from the graph, the likelihood of forceful reintegration
seems to be lower for those de facto states that manage to
Table 2 presents the results of the competing risks mod- secure recognition from a larger number of countries. This
els, one for each type of de facto state outcome.24 Table 3 pattern is noteworthy because it provides cross-case valid-
summarizes the substantive effect of key variables on ation of small-N works that regard recognition as a critical
outcomes. ingredient for the long-term viability of de facto states
The results are supportive of some propositions and (Caspersen 2012; Kingston and Spears 2004; Lynch 2004).
less so of others. Model 1 explores the forceful reintegra- The results under Model 2 focus on peaceful reintegra-
tion outcome. The covariates fail to achieve standard tion and reveal multiple trends. The theory postulated
levels of statistical significance, with one exception: that rebels have few rational incentives to sign on to an
agreement with the government when they benefit from
23
I estimate nonparametric Cox proportional hazards models that make external military assistance (H1). The findings corrobor-
no assumption about the baseline hazard. The Cox model formula is com- ate this expectation: the hazard ratio for the Military
posed of two parts: a baseline hazard function and an exponential function.
The former is a function of time but not of covariates, while the latter involves
Support variable is 0.990, showing that each additional type
the covariates but does not involve time. Yet, predictors of de facto state dis- of external support lowers the risk of peaceful reintegra-
appearance (military support, state building, fragmentation, veto players) are tion by about 1 percent per year. This result lends cre-
time varying. This requires adjustment for duration dependence, where the dence to accounts that hold that separatists have few in-
time-varying covariates are interacted with a function of time. A Cox model centives to commit to an agreement with the parent state
with time-varying variables assumes that the effect of such variables on the sur- when they benefit from a constant flow of military assist-
vival probability at time t depends on the value of these variables at that spe-
cific time t.
ance (Jenne 2007, 12). Figure 2 offers a window into how
24
The supplementary materials indicate that the findings are robust to a important external support is for the prospect of peaceful
more expansive conceptual definition of the de facto state, alternative meas- reintegration. As depicted in the graph, each additional
urements for key variables, and the inclusion of additional controls. type of outside assistance substantially reduces the
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 A DRIAN F LOREA 347

The results also support the expectation that rebel state

building lowers the prospects for peaceful reintegration
(H2). For each type of governance activity rebels engage
in, the probability of a negotiated solution decreases by
0.3 percent per year. Rebel governance is costly, and sig-
nals long-term commitment to separate rule. The institu-
tionalization of alternate structures of governance seems
to shape separatists’ preferences away from autonomy ar-
rangements. Figure 2 reveals that the more sophisticated
the governance apparatus established by separatists, the
lower the likelihood of an autonomy deal. Where rebels
establish complex architectures of separate rule, the chan-
ces of peaceful reintegration are minimal. The third hy-
pothesis (H3) anticipated that fragmented de facto states
are less likely to be peacefully reintegrated. The result for
rebel movement fragmentation under Model 2 seems to
support this conjecture. The hazard is 0.986, indicating
Figure 1. International recognition and forceful
that an additional faction in the rebel movement reduces
reintegration
the risk of a negotiated deal by 1.4 percent per year. This
finding falls squarely in line with the literature that
stresses the commitment problems posed by an internally
likelihood of peaceful reintegration such that the prob- divided insurgency. Rebel leaders presiding over a frag-
ability of a negotiated deal for those de facto states that re- mented movement have greater difficulty committing to
ceive extensive military support (three or more types of an agreement with the government in the presence of
support) is close to 0. The message here is straightfor- splinter groups that might renege on the deal and con-
ward: as long as separatist enclaves such as Transnistria or tinue the self-determination struggle. As shown in Figure
South Ossetia continue to be backed up by external pa- 2, extremely fractionalized de facto states are unlikely to
trons, the chances for a negotiated agreement remain reach autonomy deals with the government. Where separ-
slim, if not inexistent. atist enclaves encompass 8 or more factions, the

Figure 2. The effect of military support, rebel governance, rebel fragmentation, and government veto players on the
likelihood of peaceful reintegration
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 348 De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011)

Figure 3. The effect of military support, rebel governance, rebel fragmentation, and government veto players on the
likelihood of transition to statehood

probability of a peaceful settlement is close to 0. Hence, it covariate can be interpreted to capture regime type
should come as no surprise that many resilient de facto (democracies typically exhibit a larger number of institu-
states, like Palestine or Republika Srpska, are among the tional veto points than autocracies, and are more effective
most fragmented in the population. at making credible commitments) or institutional vari-
As for the impact of government veto players, Model 2 ation across regime types (democracies, hybrid regimes,
suggests a relationship that runs contrary to the hypothe- and autocracies display variability in the number of veto
sized one (H4). The hazard stands at 1.005, indicating points). Since de facto states have endured in democracies
that an additional veto player increases the risk of peace- (for example, TRNC in Cyprus), semi-democracies (for
ful reintegration by about 0.5 percent per year. Recent example, Chechnya in Russia during the 1990s), and dic-
work by Cunningham (2014) and Sorens (2012) helps us tatorships (for example, the Karen State in Burma/
elucidate this apparently counterintuitive finding. Both Myanmar), it appears that the veto player proxy reflects
authors posit that governments with a moderate number the degree of institutional variation across regime types: it
of veto players are better positioned to reach deals with captures constraints on executive decision-making across
self-determination groups because they make for more democracies and non-democracies alike. Hence, the veto
credible bargaining partners. Some level of division within player result suggests that those parent state leaders who
the parent state enhances its credibility as a bargaining are more constrained in their decision-making process, re-
partner because the executive cannot unilaterally renege gardless of regime type, are better situated to credibly
on concessions made to the rebels (Cunningham 2014, commit to a peaceful agreement with separatists in a de
75; Sorens 2012, 123). More generally, Gehlbach and facto state.25
Malesky (2010) demonstrate that contrary to conventional Model 3 presents the results for de facto states’ transi-
wisdom, the presence of multiple veto players might actu- tion to statehood. Overall, the findings are congruent
ally encourage policy change. The rationale behind this with the theoretical expectations. The evidence suggests
reasoning holds that a high number of veto players can that those de facto states that benefit from external
weaken the power of those actors who prefer the status military support are less likely to join the community of
quo (Gehlbach and Malesky 2010, 957). The result for the internationally recognized states (H1). The hazard for this
effect of veto players on a de facto state’s peaceful reinte-
gration prospects needs also to be understood in light of 25
The literature on the domestic institutions of non-democracies argues
the proxy used to measure internal divisions within parent that authoritarian leaders are not credible bargaining partners unless they are
states, Polity IV’s “executive constraints” variable. This constrained by internal veto players. See the discussion in Gandhi (2008, 186).
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 A DRIAN F LOREA 349

variable is 0.986, indicating that each additional type of and multiple players have veto power, governments can-
outside military assistance reduces the risk of transition to not commit to recognize the independence of a separatist
statehood by approximately 1.4 percent per year. In enclave.26
Figure 3, we notice that the probability of independence
for a de facto state that receives substantial military Conclusion
assistance from third parties stands at 0. The chance of in- The nation-state remains the dominant unit in the con-
dependence increases when a separatist enclave receives temporary system, but other political communities and
little or no military aid. External support may indeed be a actors also wield authority. The post-1945 environment
blessing for a de facto state’s survival, but the evidence produced a type of nonstate actor that operates quasi-
presented herein suggests it is a curse for its independ- independently and appropriates aspects of sovereign state-
ence aspirations. As the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan hood—the de facto state. While norms against conquest
show, those de facto states that operate autonomously make state death an unlikely scenario, de facto states are
stand a better chance of being welcomed into the commu- more ephemeral: some, like Northern Cyprus (1974–),
nity of states than those which function under the protec- survive, while others, like Katanga (1960–1963), disappear.
tion of an external patron. Relying on original data, this article found that four key
As expected, state building emerges as a strong pre- factors that affect parent states’ and separatists’ ability or
dictor of a de facto state’s transition to statehood (H2). willingness to commit to an agreement—external military
The hazard is 1.015, suggesting that an additional type of support for the enclave, insurgent governance, rebel frag-
governance structure established by separatists increases mentation, and government veto players—drive de facto
the chance of independence by 1.5 percent per year. state survival and disappearance.
Figure 3 highlights the importance of rebel governance A few results stand out. Military external support re-
for de facto states’ independence prospects. Those break- duces separatists’ incentives to negotiate, while fragmenta-
away entities displaying 4 or fewer governance institutions tion within the de facto state hampers insurgents’ ability
have virtually no chance of joining the international com- to commit to a deal with the government. Additionally,
munity. The statehood prospects rise with the number of rebel governance and independence are intimately inter-
state building institutions erected by separatist rulers. The woven: those de facto states that build statelike structures
longer a de facto state manages to survive and the more prove more likely to make the transition to statehood.
statelike characteristics it acquires, the higher the likeli- Taken together, the findings illustrate that bargaining be-
hood of joining the international community. This is an tween separatists and the government can yield a wide
important finding that adds to recent scholarship on gov- range of institutional outcomes, some of which endure
ernance by nonstate actors (Mampilly 2011). The result is longer than others.
noteworthy because it provides firsthand evidence of sys- A major lesson behind this study on de facto states is
tematic effects of rebel governance on institutional out- that internal conflicts—such as the ones surrounding
comes in internal conflicts. The empirical pattern suggests quasi-independent enclaves—do not simply shatter exist-
that in the long run, building statelike structures augurs ing orders; they also produce alternative orders where
well for separatists’ independence aspirations. By replicat- nonstate actors carve out areas of exclusive authority,
ing the state machinery, de facto state leaders accrue re- regulate local interactions, and institutionalize their rule.
sources necessary to balance militarily against the govern- In the case of de facto states, rebels do not simply talk as
ment, generate civilian support, and gain legitimacy. In if they were leading a separate entity—they enact it
fact, by acting like a “real” country, de facto states may through symbolism, coercion, and governance. While the
have some chance of eventually becoming one. evidence marshaled herein indicates that rebel govern-
Additionally, Model 3 provides support for the idea that ance can shape the outcomes of separatist disputes, future
the presence of international peacekeepers solidifies an inquiries should focus more on the variation in rebel gov-
enclave’s separation and might, eventually, pave the way ernance itself. Why is it that certain rebels are better state
for its independence. builders than others? Some suggest that the goal of the re-
When looking at the result for rebel fragmentation, it bellion, separatist or center-seeking, plays a central role in
appears inconsistent with the theoretical expectation that the provision of governance by rebel organizations
fractionalized de facto states are less likely to make the (Mampilly 2011). A dominant argument in previous works
transition to statehood (H3). The hazard for this variable is that separatist rebels are more likely to build statelike
is 1.002, showing that an additional faction in the rebel institutions than rebels who aim to overthrow the govern-
movement increases the chance of independence by 0.2 ment. The data on de facto states uncover great variation
percent per year. Figure 3 reveals that extremely divided in governance activities among separatist groups. Why is
de facto states exhibit a higher probability of making the it, then, that some separatist movements acquire more ac-
transition to statehood. This finding warrants further coutrements of statehood than others?
investigation. Speculatively, one might conjecture that This article also carries with it broader implications for
splintering could represent an early indicator of political the way in which we think about authority in international
competitiveness and subsequent democratization in the politics. De facto states endure in a twilight zone as pariah
post-independence environment (Huang 2012). Another entities. They raise critical questions about the viability of
plausible mechanism suggests that while factions may alternate units in a system dominated by sovereign coun-
complicate commitment in the short term, they can also tries. Their limbo-like status—neither independence nor
make long-term enforcement easier (Driscoll 2012). assimilation—seems to be more durable than we might
Finally, the results under Model 3 validate the claim that think. This study revealed that de facto states’ survival is
government veto players can prevent a de facto state’s in-
dependence (H4). The hazard for this covariate stands at 26
Since the veto player covariate also provides an indirect measure of dem-
0.993, indicating that an additional veto player reduces ocracy, the result could be an artifact of political dynamics in democratic re-
the chance of transition to statehood by approximately gimes. Democracies tend to be more accommodative of separatist claims,
0.7 percent per year. When institutional divisions abound which lowers the risk of independence.
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 350 De Facto States: Survival and Disappearance (1945–2011)

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