Mansabdari and Jagirdari System under the Mughals

Objective and Learning Outcome

1. The lesson would apprise students about the core element of the Mughal administrative
structure- mansab and jagir.
2. Students would identify uniqueness of the mansab system vis a vis pre-Mughal
administrative institutions.
3. Students would get awareness about the evolution of the mansab system under Akbar
and circumstances that brought about changes in the system under the subsequent
Mughal rulers.
4. Students would be able to critically analyse various historiographical interpretations
related to crisis in the mansab and jagir system

Introduction
Mansabdari or mansab system was the basis of Mughal administrative structure and a very
effective mechanism to organise and control culturally diverse and religiously heterogeneous
nobility. Despite some distant similarities with the military system under the Pre-Mughal Islamic
state in India and that of the Mongols and Timurids, there is no reference to ‘mansab’ in India
prior to coming of the Mughals. Therefore, we can safely conclude that the Mansab system was
introduced in India by the Mughal rulers the origin of which can be attributed to Akbar. While
the basic feature of this system that developed under Akbar remained same throughout the
time period of the Mughal Empire some important changes were introduced in the Mansabdari
system by the subsequent Mughal rulers ostensibly to deal with some contradictions in its
working. Jagirdari system was closely linked with the functioning of the mansabdari system as
majority of the mansab rank holders were paid their salary through a grant of land called jagir.
But beyond disbursing salary through a grant of land, another important objective of the
Mughal state was to ensure collection of land revenue from large parts of the empire. Naturally
therefore, any crisis in the working of these institutions was bound to adversely impact the
empire administratively, politically, socially as well as economically.

Mansab: Origin and Evolution

Broadly, the term ‘mansab’ denoted office, position and rank of its holder (mansabdar) in the
Mughal administrative hierarchy even though it did not constitute any office in itself. Mansab
rank was largely used to determine position of its holder in the official hierarchy as well as to fix
his military obligations towards the state. Few scholars have traced origin of the Mughal
mansab system from decimal system of the Mongols and the military system followed by the
Turks in India which too was modeled on the Turko-Mongol practices. Ziauddin Barni, while

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talking about military practices of the Delhi Sultans, refers to a system where 10 horsemen or
sawars were put under the command of a sar-i khail; 10 sar-i khail under one sipahsalar; 10
sipahsalars under one amir; 10 amirs under one malik and 10 maliks under one khan. However,
M Athar Ali (1997) and others have pointed out an anomaly in Barni’s account on the ground
that the decimal system worked under the principle of lowest military officer commanding 10
and the highest commanding 10,000 troopers (where lower ranking officers were direct
subordinate of their superiors), whereas in Barni’s account the total number of troops to be
commanded by khan (the highest military officer) comes to 1, 00,000. An Arab account of the
14th century however, refers to a khan commanding 10,000 troopers, the malik 1000 and amir
100 and the sipahsalar less than that in the Indian army. The Mughals followed the military
practices adopted by the Mongols where ten horsemen were under one officer, ten such
officers under the commander of 100, ten such commanders under an officer of 1000 and ten
commanders of 1000 under the commander of 10,000.

The Mughals mansab system, although somewhat similar with this decimal system of military
organisation, was fundamentally different in many respects. Firstly, the mansab system included
civil officers too and no distinction was made between military and civil service. Secondly, the
mansab system had a dual rank represented by numerals i.e. zat (personal rank) and sawar
(military rank) and thirdly, and perhaps more important was the fact that each Mansab holder
(mansabdar) was directly subordinated to the king unlike the decimal system of subordination
to the immediate superior. Thus, each noble holding a mansab rank became dependent on the
ruler for his existence as it was the ruler who granted his appointment, promotion as well as
demotion. In the long run these mansabdars became the instruments of royal will. The
uniqueness of the Mansabdari system can also be established by the fact that no such system of
numerical ranks has been found in the contemporary Islamic states of Central Asia or Middle
East.

The evolution of the mansab system under Akbar has been a matter of little debate among the
scholars particularly with regard to the year of its institution. While analysing this debate one
must keep in mind that experimentation was at the back of every administrative measure taken
by Akbar and therefore mansab system could not have been an exception. W H Moreland
(1936) was of the opinion that the mansabdari system was introduced in the 11th year (1566-67)
of Akbar’s reign when sawar rank was introduced as the nobles failed to keep the required
quota of the troops assigned to them. But A J Qaiser (1961) has challenged Moreland’s view on
the ground that no numerical ranks existed before Akbar. She has argued that the zat and sawar
ranks were introduced in the 18th year (1573-74) of Akbar’s reign which has also been supported
by Irfan Habib (1966). However, Shireen Moosvi (1981) on the basis of several 16th and 17th
century sources including Abul Fazl’s Ain-i Akbari, Abdul Qadir Badayuni’s Muntakhab-ut
tawarikh, Nizamuddin Ahmad’s Tabaqat-i Akbari and Mutamid Khan’s Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri has

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argued that both zat and sawar ranks were introduced in the 4ist year (1596-97) of Akbar’s
reign. She has put the debate to rest by summarizing the different stages of the evolution of
mansab system during the reign of Akbar which is as under:

1. There were no fixed standing military obligation in terms of the size of the troopers
during the first decade of Akbar’s reign and salaries were paid to the nobles in an
arbitrary manner.
2. In the 11th year of Akbar’s reign, an attempt was made to fix the size of the military
obligation and the nobles were asked to maintain troops based on revenues of their
assignments (jagir).
3. In the 18th year of Akbar’s reign, a single numerical rank (mansab) was introduced. This
single rank determined the salary as well as the number of sawars and animals that
were to be maintained by the rank holder (mansabdar).
4. In the 40th year, mansabdars were categorised on the basis of number of sawars
maintained in proportion to the mansab rank.
5. In the 41st year (1596-97), zat and sawar ranks were introduced and mansab became
dual in nature. The zat represented the personal rank of the holder and fixed his pay and
the number of animals to be maintained whereas the sawar rank indicated the number
of horsemen the mansabdar was required to maintain.

Appointment of Mansabdars
It is generally said that Mughal nobility was the creation of Mughal emperor and perhaps
nowhere is it more applicable than the Mansabdari system which was not only an attempt to
systematise administration through which all individual nobles were classified into definite
categories but was also aimed at making the nobles subservient to the will of the ruler. All
mansabdars were appointed by the emperor on the recommendations of the Mir Bakshi (Head
of the Military unit) who used to present nobles from the heterogeneous racial group
comprising Turani, Irani, Pathan, Indian Muslim (Shaikhzada), Rajput and other Hindus. Princes
of the royal families, leading nobles of the empire as well as governors of the provinces also at
times recommended the names of individuals to be appointed as a mansabdar whose
recommendations were generally accepted by the emperor. There were several stages of checks
and formalities before the final letter of appointment was given to a mansabdar.

Although khanazads (descendants of the families who had served the Mughal state earlier) had
brighter chance of getting a mansab but the contemporary sources like Ain-i Akbari inform us
that merit was the sole criterion adding that the emperor (Akbar) had discerning eye for merit.
While we may not fully agree with Abul Fazl’s account, appointment of a number of individuals
as mansabdar who did not belong to the elite khanazad family or ruler of an independent
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Rajput principality is a testimony to the priority given to merit in the appointment of
mansabdars. Another important aspect related to the appointment of mansabdars was the
condition of surety (zamin) which according to Athar Ali was rigorously enforced. A person who
stood for surety was held responsible not only for good behaviour of the recruited mansabdar
but had also to meet the claims of the state unmet by the mansabdar. This made surety difficult
to obtain and Athar Ali informs us that this practice therefore had to be abandoned as large
number of nobles from Deccan were included in the mansab system during the reign of
Aurangzeb.

Zat and Sawar Ranks

The dual rank i.e. zat and sawar, introduced in the 41st year of Akbar’s reign, was the
fundamental feature of the mansab system. The basic objective of Akbar behind introducing the
dual rank was to ensure that his officers maintain the troops as specified. In Fact, mansabdars
were classified into three categories on the basis of their respective zat and sawar ranks. A
mansabdar having equal zat and sawar ranks was placed in category I; those having sawar rank
equal to half or more of the zat rank in category II and those having their sawar rank less than
half of the zat rank was placed in category III. Although diverse interpretations have been
forwarded regarding the nature of zat and sawar ranks, it has been conclusively established
now that zat represented the personal rank of the mansabdar, fixed his salary and indicated his
status in the administrative as well as social hierarchy. Whereas sawar rank represented the
number of cavalry men a mansabdar was required to maintain along with horses, elephants and
other beasts of burden. The table below based on Ain-i Akbari would substantiate the above
statement.

Zat Rank Sawar Rank Category Salary per month(Rs)

5000 5000 I 30,000
5000 2500/3000 II 29,000
5000 2000 III 28,000
3000 3000 I 17,000
3000 1500/2000 II 16,800
3000 1200 III 16,700
2000 2000 I 12,000
2000 1000/1200 II 11,900
2000 900 III 11,800
1000 1000 I 8,200
1000 500/600 II 8,100
1000 400 III 8,000
Based on M Athar Ali (1997), The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb

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The above table very clearly suggests that the personal salary (khasa) of a mansabdar was fixed
on the basis of his zat rank as despite reduction in the category of a mansabdar in the table
there is no significant variation in his salary. An important feature of the zat rank during the
reign of Akbar was it could be equal to or more but never less than the sawar rank. While his
successors continued to follow this principle, the second half of Aurangzeb’s reign saw deviation
from this and reportedly a limited number of mansabdars had sawar ranks higher than their zat
rank. However, Athar Ali has pointed out that this measure was based on expediency (shortage
of able commanders or economic considerations) and was not a deliberate reform. While
granting the zat rank, Akbar followed the principle of dahbashi (commander of 10) to
dah-hazari (commander of 10,000). But the highest zat rank that could be granted to Mughal
nobles was 5000 (panch-hazari) even though there were few exceptions like Raja Man Singh and
Mirza Aziz Koka under Akbar, Mahabat Khan and Asaf Khan under Jahangir and Raja Jaswant
Singh and Sawai Jai Singh under Aurangzeb, who were granted a rank of 7000. Theoretically
however, rank beyond 7000 was reserved for the royal princes. Even though a Mughal noble
could reach a maximum of 5000 rank, the contemporary sources suggest that majority of the
mansabdars including some district and provincial level officers remained below the rank of
1000 and there were very few who could reach the rank of 1000 and above.

The sawar rank, as mentioned earlier, specified the number of cavalrymen to be maintained by
a mansabdar. To break the racial and religious exclusivity, mansabdars were asked to maintain a
mixed contingent which can be considered as a part of Akbar’s assimilative practice. However, if
a mansabdar requested for specific group of contingents (Mughal or Rajput) he was permitted
to do so for reasons of political expediency. During the reign of Akbar, measures were taken to
ensure that mansabdars actually maintained the number of sawars as mentioned in their
respective ranks. To ensure this as much as possible, Akbar introduced the dagh (branding of
horses) with the imperial seal and chehra (descriptive rolls) of the sawars and mansabdars were
mandatorily expected to present their contingents for muster. Payment of full salary to a
mansabdar was also linked to him presenting his contingent for muster. Failure or delay resulted
in monetary punishment. This exemplifies the royal attempt to bring the mansabdars into
further subservience.

The conditional rank (mashrut) was an additional feature of the mansab system which was
added to the original zat and sawar rank of the mansabdar. The mashrut rank was given to
fulfill the additional requirement of a post held by a mansabdar. For example, if a mansabdar
was appointed to the post of a faujdar of a particular district, and if was felt that for effective
discharge of his duties he needs additional soldiers, then additional 100 was added to his sawar
rank along with the zat rank. However, after the transfer of the incumbent or once he
relinquished the said post, the additional mashrut rank was withdrawn. But in some cases the

5
additional conditional rank was made permanent as a mark of favour or promotion to the
mansabdar.

Salary and Deductions of the Mansabdars

Payment to the mansabdars was based on the principle of a clear distinction between zat and
sawar ranks. The pay for the zat rank (khasa) to the mansabdar was separated from payments
due to him for his sawar rank (tabinan). For the zat rank a mansabdar was paid salary either in
cash or through land assignment known as Jagir. As displayed in the table above, differential
salary was paid to the mansabdars based on their categories I, II or III as the case may be.
Mansabdars getting salary in cash were known as naqdi mansabdars whereas those getting land
grants were known as jagirdars. While a large number of mansabdars received cash salaries
from the imperial treasury majority were paid through grant of jagir. Since the salary for the zat
rank was meant for maintenance of the mansabdar and his family along with his household
establishment, the size of the jagir granted in lieu of salary had to be in commensurate with the
salary claim of the mansabdar i.e. the annual income of the jagir had to match the annual salary
claim of the mansabdar.

For maintenance of the troops or the sawar rank, mansabdars were paid separately on the basis
of pay fixed per unit of sawar rank. The pay of the sawars in the central Mughal army varied
depending upon the types of horses they used as well as their expertise in the war fare which
ranged between Rs 200-350. However, for the purpose of payment to the mansabdars for their
contingent, a fixed rate per unit of sawar was established which also kept on varying. While
during the reign of Akbar, a complex method was adopted to fix the rate per sawar, at the
beginning of Jahangir’s reign per unit sawar rank was fixed at 9600 dams per annum (1 copper
dam being equal to 40 silver rupees), which was reduced later to 8,800 dams per annum and
finally to 8000 dams per unit of sawar under Shah Jahan. If for the purpose of illustration, we
use the rate of 8000 dams or Rs 200, a mansabdar of 5000 sawar rank would be paid
5000*8000=40,000,000 dams or Rs 1,000,000 for maintenance of the sawars. Thus the
payment for the sawar rank always was much higher than payment for personal upkeep (zat
rank) of the mansabdar. While during the reign of Akbar, salary of a mansabdar was expressed
in terms of Rupees, in the subsequent period, for the sake of uniformity, salary was invariably
expressed in dams as the annual revenues of the jagirs came to be assessed in dams.

Another important aspect connected with the payment to the mansabdar was that from the
later years of Akbar’s reign and particularly from the reign of Shahjahan onwards, there were
deductions made in the salary of the mansabdars (both naqdi as well as those holding jagirs) on
some pretext or the other. Among the various types of deductions one was on account of
khurak-i dawwab (‘fodder for animals’) which effectively meant deduction in personal salary of
the mansabdars for upkeep of specified number of emperor’s animals( horses, elephants,
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camels and carts) by them. Subsequently, deductions were even made from mansabdar’s salary
for khurak of the animals kept in royal stables. However, documents from the reign of
Aurangzeb’s reign suggests that such obligations were imposed only on mansabdars of higher
ranks and no such obligation was imposed on those below the rank of 400 zat and those holding
no sawar rank. Another deduction, made mainly from the salaries of mansabdars from Deccan
(such as Marathas, Bijapuris and Hyderabadis) was termed as waja-i dam–i chauthai (‘deduction
of one-fourth in dams’). In addition to these, the mansabdars were also subjected to fines
(jurmana) in case a mansabdar failed to produce actual number of sawars during the muster or
produced new sawars in place of the original sawars by declaring the latter as ‘dead’ or ‘fled’.
Although these deductions did not have significant economic impact on the mansabdars as they
were paid handsomely, it did however, display the extent of central control over them.

Changes in the Mansab system

While the Mansab system continued to function on the basic principles that evolved under
Akbar, few important changes were brought about in the system by the subsequent rulers.
These changes were guided by both military and economic expediencies. During the reign of
Jahangir, a new rank du-aspa sih-aspa (literally ‘two or three horses/horsemen’) was introduced
which was connected with the sawar rank. Since sawar rank could not be more than the zat
rank, the du-aspa sih-aspa rank enabled the Mughal government to increase the military
obligation of a mansabdar without raising his zat rank. There were two variants of the
application of du-aspa sih-aspa rank. In one case, the entire sawar rank could be converted into
du-aspa sih-aspa and in another; a portion of the sawar rank could be turned into du-aspa
sih-aspa. Applicability of these variants can be illustrated by taking one example of a mansabdar
holding a rank of 3000 zat 3000 sawar. In case the whole sawar rank was converted into
du-aspa sih-aspa rank, the official method of expressing this formula was 3000 zat 3000 sawar
hama (all) du-aspa sih-aspa. In such a case, the military obligation of the said mansabdar would
be expressed as 3000*2=6000 sawars. In the second variant, where a portion of sawar rank was
converted into du-aspa sih-aspa, the official expression of the above mansabdar’s rank would
be 3000 zat 3000 sawar 1000 du-aspa sih-aspa. In such a scenario, the military obligation of the
mansabdar was expressed as 2000+1000*2 sawars= 4000 sawars. In the latter case where 1000
sawars were turned into du-aspa sih-aspa, the rest 2000 were termed as barwardi. From the
above illustration, it is clear that the military obligation under du-aspa sih-aspa rank was double
that of the barwardi.

The first noble to be given this rank during the reign of Jahangir was Mahabat Khan whose 1700
sawars were converted into du-aspa sih-aspa rank when he was deputed in Deccan. However,
we do not have many evidences of such a rank being granted in large numbers under Jahangir.
Whereas, as per the figures provided by Athar Ali (1997), there were as many as 25 nobles (out

7
of 253) of the rank of 1000 and above who were granted this rank towards the close of Shah
Jahan’s reign and 70 such noble (out of 575) were granted this rank during the last few decades
of Aurangzeb’s reign. Since with the introduction of du-aspa sih-aspa rank, the military
obligation of a mansabdar holding this rank was increased, the salary on account of this rank
was increased as per the unit rate for each sawar. The introduction of this rank was aimed
at-promotion of the mansabdar (ensuring loyalty in service); for meeting military necessity (as
there were limited numbers of trustworthy military commanders who could be relied with a
larger contingent of troops) as well as for economic considerations (military obligations of a
mansabdar could be increased without increasing his personal salary).

Another significant change in the Mansab system, necessitated due to problems in the actual
functioning of this system, was introduction of month scale (mahwar) by Shah Jahan. The
essence of the problem was growing gap between the revenue assessment (jama) of a jagir and
the revenue collected (hasil) by a jagirdars as a part of his salary claim (talab). It was noticed
since the beginning of his reign that while on paper the jama showed certain amount, actual
hasil was sometime half or one fourth of the salary claim of the mansabdars. While situation in
north India was slightly better, hasil from the Deccan region was invariably one fourth of the
talab of a mansabdar. Month scale was introduced by Shah Jahan in order to bring down this
disparity. Under this system, jagirs that fetched salary equal to six months was termed as
shashmaha (six monthly) and those one-fourth was termed as sihmaha (three monthly). The
salary of the naqdi mansabdars were also reduced through a farman of Shah Jahan, issued in
1653 whereby it was directed that salary of the naqdi mansabdars should not be fixed above
ashtmaha (eight monthly) or less than ‘four monthly’ rates. Exceptions were made to this rule
mainly in case of few high ranking nobles and royal princes, latter’s salary being fixed at ‘ten
monthly’ rates. Under Aurangzeb however, the salary of the naqdi mansabdar was fixed at ‘six
monthly’ rates.

Besides the month scale, another change introduced by Shah Jahan in the Mansab system was
the rule of 1/3rd, 1/4th and 1/5th whereby military obligations of the mansabdars were reduced
depending upon the place they were deployed. This measure was necessitated due to
mansabdars not keeping the specified number of troops as per their sawar rank despite
drawing salary for the entire contingent of sawars. This tendency of the mansabdars can also be
accounted for by the disparity between jama and hasil and this practice was resorted to by
them to compensate for loss in their salary. Shah Jahan, in order to stop this practice ordered
that mansabdars posted in their home state would be required to keep 1/3rd of their sawar
rank; those posted in Deccan 1/4th and those posted in the north-west frontier areas 1/5th of
their sawar rank. The naqdi mansabdars were required to keep 1/5th of their stipulated sawar
rank. The amount paid to the mansabdars for their sawar rank was also reduced in similar
proportion. The system of month scale and proportions were indicators of crisis in the

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functioning of the Mansab system which, as we shall see, had long term implications for the
Mughal Empire.

The Law of Escheat

An important component of Mansab system, which has been much debated, was the law of
escheat (Zabt, not to be confused with the zabti system of land revenue assessment). Under this
system, property of the mansabdar was escheated to the state upon his demise. Subsequently,
an inventory was prepared of the deceased noble’s property and after deductions of the state
dues (mutaliba) rest of the property was distributed to his legal heirs. While the contemporary
medieval Indian writers are largely silent about this condition of service, European travellers like
Purchas, Bernier, Manucci, Careri and Pelsaert have made special mention of it in their
travelogues. These travellers have suggested that the emperor took possession of the property
after the death of the noble and after keeping a portion as his share (state dues) the rest was
distributed to the legal heir of the deceased noble at his discretion without giving due
consideration to Hindu or Muslim family laws of inheritance. The available official Mughal
documents seem to corroborate the above. However, they also indicate that the policy was not
uniformly followed under Akbar and Shah Jahan till Aurangzeb put the system in proper order
through his farmans.

Few examples from the reigns of Akbar and Shah Jahan would substantiate the above use of
discretion of the emperors which was not only confined to distribution of property among the
heirs but also extended to whether some select noble’s property would be escheated at all after
his death. During the reign of Akbar, while the entire property of Munim Khan was escheated to
the state after his death in 1575 (as he died without a legal heir) Abul Fazl’s property was not
confiscated after his murder (1602) as a mark of respect and favour by the emperor. Under Shah
Jahan, after the death of Ali Mardan Khan (1657) the entire property was first confiscated and
then after the deduction of state dues, rest of the property was distributed among his heir in an
uneven manner with the eldest son Ibrahim Khan getting the bulk of it, ignoring the Muslim law
of inheritance. Similarly, after the demise of a Hindu noble Raja Bithal Das similar disregard
towards Hindu law of inheritance was shown when the eldest son was handed over 60 percent
of the property left by his father. These examples clearly suggest that the emperor acted as the
sole heir of the property of his noble and passed on the inheritance to the legal heir of the
deceased as he pleased.

During the reign of Aurangzeb, an attempt was made to bring about uniformity in the system of
escheat although even this was not devoid of deviations from the existing rule. Through a
farman issued in 1666 Aurangzeb set guidelines for application of the system of escheat. These
were- a) if a noble died without any legal heir, his property was to be deposited in a separate
treasury (bait-ul maal) after recovering the state dues; b) if there were no state dues, the entire
9
property was to be deposited in the bait-ul maal; c) if the noble died and had legal heirs, his
property was to be handed over to the legal heir after recovering the state dues; d) if the state
dues exceeded the value of the property, the entire property was to be confiscated by the state;
e) if there were no dues to the state, the entire property was to be handed over to the legal
heirs of the deceased. In another farman, issued in 1691, it was directed that property of those
nobles should not be confiscated upon their death if their heirs were in service of the Mughal
government as the latter could be asked to pay the dues of their deceased father. The available
evidences suggest that while in majority of the cases the above orders were followed in few
others they were violated at the insistence of the state itself.

W H Moreland was of the opinion that the escheat system had created lot of insecurities among
the nobles of the Mughal state and therefore they, unsure of the future of their property after
their death, spent major portion of their income in luxurious consumption and did not try to
save. But Athar Ali, on the basis of some European traveler’s accounts such as Pelsaert and few
others, has argued that on the contrary the nobles amassed huge property as they were sure
that after deduction of state dues rest of the property would be passed on to his legal heir. Ali
concludes that the escheat system had more theoretical than economic significance as it tried
to establish control of the state over the properties of its officers.

Modern Historiography on the Mansab System

In the modern historiography, Mansab system has been variously interpreted. While Percival
Spear (1970) termed mansabdars as “elite within elite”, Stephen P Blake (1979) considered
mansabdars as “patrimonial bureaucrats” in his concept of Mughal Empire being a “patrimonial
bureaucratic Empire” where bureaucrats were extensions of the imperial Mughal household. He
argued that the mansabdars did not receive a fixed salary but were compensated by ‘prebends
or benefices’ (mansab and jagir) and served at the pleasure of the ruler. In the long run such a
system, according to Blake, led to loosening of emperor’s control over his officials. John F
Richards (1996) likened the mansabdari system with the Islamic corporate military service
where the notion of slave (bandah) for imperial servants facilitated a closer relationship
between the Imperial master (emperor) and his servant (officials). A N Rezavi (1998) has argued
that mansabdari was an innovative institution to organise the ruling elite of the Mughal Empire
which generated the centripetal tendencies in linking the remote areas with the heart of the
empire- the king. Douglas Streusand (2001) was of the opinion that although the relationship
between the ruler and mansabdar was primarily defined by the former’s perception of
sovereignty, mansabdari system was also a political compromise between service at the
pleasure of the ruler and service for security of status within his caste and clan. Thus, according
to Streusand, unlike military slave and servants a mansabdar retained his caste and clan
identity.

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 Jagirdari System
Introduction
As mentioned earlier, Jagirdari system was an integral part of the Mansabdari system and was
primarily a mechanism to pay the salary of the mansabdars through grant of land (jagir). Thus,
all mansabdars holding jagir in lieu of their salary were known as jagirdars while those receiving
cash salaries were known as naqdi mansabdars. The term jagir (Persian ‘jai-gir’ meaning ‘holder
of a place’) has been found synonymous with iqta and tuyul which were popular during the
Delhi Sultanate rule in India. Broadly, there were two classifications of land. Land which was
directly managed by the central government was known as khalisa (crown land) and those
earmarked to be given as jagir were known as paibaqi. Income from the khalisa land was used
by the government to pay the central troops, attendants as well as the naqdi mansabdars
whereas income from the paibaqi land was reserved to meet the salary claim of the mansabdar.
Although khalisa consisted of a large part of the Mughal Empire, the land earmarked for
assignment was much higher and covered 4/5th of the total land by the first decade of
Aurangzeb’s reign. In this context, Irfan Habib (1993) has argued that since land revenue
accounted for much of the surplus agricultural produce, the assignment of large portion of
empire in jagirs meant placing in hands of a numerically small class, control of much of the
Gross National Product of the country. This was bound to impact the economy if there ever
developed a crisis in the system, which we shall see was indeed the case.

Types of Jagirs

Since jagirs were allotted in lieu of salary, a mansabdar had to be assigned jagir whose annual
assessed income (jama or jamadami) had to be commensurate with his sanctioned salary claim
(muqarrara talab) for both his zat and sawar ranks. Thus, a jagir which was assigned in lieu of
salary was known as tankhwah-i jagir. The jagirs allotted to the territorial Rajput chieftains or
zamindars in lieu of their salary after their induction in the mansab system was known as
watan-jagir where the term watan denoted their old dominions which remained with their
family. If the income of the watan did not meet the salary claims of a Rajput mansabdar, he was
assigned additional tankhwah-i jagir outside his watan. For example, Maharaja Jaswant Singh
held watan-jagir in Marwar and was granted additional tankhwah-i jagir in Hissar during the
reign of Aurangzeb. The jagirs that were assigned to a mansabdar conditional upon a particular
post was termed as mashrut (conditional) jagir which was revocable when the former ceased to
be on that position. Another type of jagir, which was assigned to a noble in his native place as
permanent assignment, was known as al-tamgha jagir.

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Rights and duties of a Jagirdar
Jagirdars were imperial servants and therefore their rights were limited to those prescribed in
the imperial regulations. Since the grant of jagir was only a means of payment to the
mansabdars for their services, it did not confer any right of the jagirdar on land or claim to
hereditary position. This was in contrast to the contemporary European nobles who by this time
had established hereditary rights over the ‘fiefs’ granted to them. A jagirdar in Mughal India
was only entitled to collect land revenue and other authorized taxes (mal-i wajibi) along with
other state claims (huquq-i diwani) that too in conformity with imperial regulations. The
writings of Abul Fazl and the farmans of Aurangzeb very clearly state the obligation of the
jagirdars and their agents to follow these regulations while collecting the taxes. Similar rule
applied to collection of cesses levied by the state. However considering the disparity between
jama and hasil, these orders were violated more often than not.

The jagirdars used to collect land revenue and other taxes with the help of their agents
(gumashtas) employed by them. There was indeed a difference in the number of officials
appointed by bigger and smaller jagirdars for collection of taxes. A bigger jagirdar had a number
of officials including amil/shiqdar (chief agent) assisted by amin (revenue assessor), a fotadar
(treasurer) and a karkun (accountant) for the purpose of collection of taxes. In case of smaller
jagirdar, duties of two officials were at times combined. Still smaller jagirdars, with limited
means and staying away far from their allotted jagirs, resorted to revenue farming (ijara)
wherein the tax collection was auctioned out to the highest bidder or parceled out their jagirs
to the troops to manage their pay through collection of land revenue from the specified area.
Later on, ijara was also resorted to by the bigger jagirdars as the most convenient and
beneficial mechanism to manage their salary. Evidence of such a practice has been found from
Awadh in case of smaller jagirdars and Kashmir in case of bigger jagirdars. Agents of the big
jagirdars had to execute a bond for payment of collected revenue to the latter. At times,
security money (kabz) was collected from the amils by the bigger jagirdars and this gradually
led to a tendency where those paying the highest security were appointed as amils by the latter.
Since the practice of revenue farming proved to be oppressive for the peasants, the state did
intervene at times to try and curb these tendencies. Such action often resulted in jagir land
being converted to khalisa as it happened in case of Kashmir during the reign of Aurangzeb.

Besides collection of land revenue, the jagirdars were also expected to assist the local officials
in maintenance of law and order and also help in implementing the agricultural plans of the
state including extension of cultivation and irrigation facilities and to promote augmentation of
cash crop (jins-i kamil). The state interest in the pargana, where the jagir was located, was
looked after by a set of centrally appointed officials such as qanungo and chaudhary who had
the onus to ensure faithful adoption of imperial regulations by the jagirdar. In this Mughal

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system of checks and balances, waqia navis (intelligence officer at the district level), had a
major role to play as he kept a close watch over both jagirdars and zamindars.

Transfer of Jagirs
The system of jagir transfer was embedded into working of the mansabdari system. Several
European travelers have highlighted transferability of the jagir which can be corroborated with
contemporary Persian sources like Ain-i Akbari and official letters such as Nigar Nama-i Munshi.
There were technical as well as political reasons behind the introduction of jagir transfer.
Usually a mansabdar entered the Mughal service at a lower rank and was gradually promoted.
We also know that the size of a jagir to be given to a mansabdar was commensurate with
latter’s salary claim. It follows from this that if a mansabdar was promoted with higher zat and
sawar rank which obviously denoted increase in his salary, the present jagir would fall short of
meeting his salary claim. In such a scenario he had to be moved from his present jagir and
shifted to a bigger jagir necessitating transfer of such an incumbent. As for political reasons, the
Mughal government tried to ensure that none of the jagirdars stayed at one place for more
than three or four years lest they develop regional ties and become foci of local power in
opposition to the center. Exceptions to this rule of transfer were the watan and al-tamgha jagirs
which were considered as hereditary and permanent. Transfer of jagir was thus another
mechanism to obviate any chances of opposition to the state by the nobility. Moreover as Athar
Ali (1997) points out, the system of jagir transfer prevented mansabdars from calling any part of
the empire as their own and remained dependent on the will of the emperor for their existence.

This system of transfer however, created its complexities particularly from the point of view of
the jagirdars. We have already pointed out earlier that there was a gap between jama and hasil
since the very beginning and by the second half of Aurangzeb’s reign this gap, as the sources
suggests, had grown wider. A sudden transfer of the jagirdar in mid-year when he had not been
able to collect the revenue meant losing his salary although in some cases the new assignee was
asked to collect the baqaya (arrear) and hand over to the old assignee. Moreover, for the
purpose of transfer, it was presumed that except for Bengal and Orissa, the value of kharif and
rabi crops were same throughout the empire which was far away from reality. So if a jagirdar
was posted in an area in kharif season and then transferred to another in rabi season and if
neither happened to be the favorite crop of these areas, he was likely to suffer heavy losses. J F
Richards (1996) points out that in such an uncertain situation jagirdars had to rely upon local
money lenders, local bankers and currency dealers (sarrafs) who often advanced money to the
mansabdars pending arrival of funds from their jagirs. These complications related to jagir
transfer were not likely to induce the assignee to bring about agricultural development in his
jagir but on the contrary as Irfan Habib (1993) argues, his personal interest would sanction any
act of oppression on peasantry if it conferred on him immediate benefit.

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Crisis in Mansab and Jagir system
While the institution of mansab and jagir functioned without many complications under Akbar
and Jahangir, the inherent contradiction in these started coming to the fore during the reign of
Shah Jahan and by the second half Aurangzeb’s reign a crisis developed in the system with far
reaching consequences for the existence of the empire itself. The reforms brought about by
Shah Jahan in the form of month scale and the rule of 1/3rd, 1/4th and 1/5th was a response to
the growing crisis in the system. These reforms were indicators of official acceptance of the
lacunae in the system. But while the introduction of month scale tried to grapple with the gap
between jama and hasil, application of the rule of 1/3rd, 1/4th and 1/5th reduced the military
strength of the mansabdars affecting the latter’s ability to assist in maintenance of law and
order and collection of land revenue but more importantly it adversely affected the military
strength of the Mughal Empire.

Several scholars have given varying interpretations on crisis in the mansab and jagir system.
Athar Ali (1997) saw the problem from the point of view of the mansabdars particularly during
the last twenty six years of Aurangzeb’s reign when the increasing strain of Deccan wars on the
financial resources of the empire and dislocation of administration due to absence of the
emperor from north India greatly reduced efficiency of the jagir system. In particular, he refers
to shortage of jagirs (be-jagiri) which arose out of shortage of paibaqi land caused by the large
influx of nobles from the Deccan. This made it increasingly difficult for the mansabdars to get a
jagir despite being long in service making influence and money as the only source to get jagirs.
In addition, the struggle for jagirs also created a factional conflict at the Mughal court between
the old (khanazads) and the new (Deccanis) nobility which demoralized the administration. The
official orders related to Jagir Transfer were violated by the jagirdars due to uncertainty of
getting another after relinquishing the present one. By the beginning of the 18th century,
according to a contemporary writer Anand Ram Mukhlis, allotment of jagirs had become mere
paper orders affecting routine working of the system. J F Richards (1975) has questioned the
issue of be-jagiri and has argued that there was no shortage of paibaqi lands as after the
conquest of Bijapur and Golconda sufficient land was available to be assigned as jagir. But the
major problem for the mansabdars, according to Richards, was the imperial decision to keep the
lucrative jagirs (sair hasil) under khalisa leaving the mansabdars with unproductive jagirs.

Irfan Habib (1993) has linked jagirdari crisis with the ‘agrarian crisis’ holding the system of jagir
transfer squarely responsible for creating such a situation. The uncertainty of their tenures,
according to Habib, forced the jagirdars and his agents to exploit the peasantry, already under a
heavy tax burden, through ijara and other means. This prompted peasant reaction (refusal to
pay the land revenue and peasant flight) and individual acts of oppression on the part of the
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jagirdars also goaded them into rebellion. Net result was decline in agricultural production
bringing about financial crisis for the empire.

Satish Chandra (1959) was of the opinion that stability of the Mughal state depended upon
efficient working of the mansab and jagir system which in turn rested upon availability of
revenue to be assigned and ability to collect the revenue. But towards the latter half of
Aurangzeb’s reign due to lack of available resources, inability of the jagirdars to collect their
share of the revenue along with political crisis encountered by Aurangzeb, the mansab and jagir
system failed to work efficiently. Later, Satish Chandra (1982) connected jagirdari crisis with a
social crisis which affected the socio-economic balance of the empire. He argued that stability
of the Mughal administrative structure depended to a great extent on balancing of a tripolar
relationship between jagirdar (representative of the central government), zamindars and the
cultivators (particularly khud kasht). The increase in central authority and the Mughal ruler’s
emphasis on justice had created a situation where zamindars and various categories of
cultivators looked towards the central government to resolve their grievances. But the inability
of the jagirdars to collect salary in the form of land revenue leading to disenchantment among
them, reduction in the military strength of the mansabdars due the reforms of Shah Jahan
which impaired the ability of the cavalry and increasing rural tensions disturbed the social
balance of this tripolar relationship. Thus, according to Chandra “central to the growth of crisis
in the jagir system was its increasing non-functionality i.e. its inability to maintain law and order
and collection of the central share of the land revenue over large parts of the empire”. In his
recent study Satish Chandra (2012) has reiterated that instead of looking at it as
financial-cum-administrative crisis, the jagirdari crisis should be seen as deep seated social
crisis. He, like J F Richards, also points out that there was no shortage of jagirs but rather a
shortage of productive (sair hasil) jagirs which forced the jagirdars to contend with zor talab
areas from where it was difficult to collect revenue due to recalcitrant zamindars and peasants.

Conclusion

Mansab and jagir was the basis of the administrative structure of the Mughal Empire.
Introduced by Akbar, it aimed at organising and controlling heterogeneous nobility as well as to
ensure collection of central share of the revenue from large parts of the empire. The
fundamental features of the mansab and jagir system continued to be operational with minor
modifications by succeeding rulers to deal with economic and military needs. While the system
operated smoothly till the reign of Jahangir, contradictions in the working of these started
emerging from the time of Shah Jahan which assumed proportion of a full blown crisis by the
last quarter of Aurangzeb’s reign. Crux of the problem was increasing gap between jama and
hasil which increased the discontentment among the ruling class. This, added with factional
conflict within the nobility, political opposition to the empire rising from several regions,

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financial drain due to prolonged Deccan wars, inability of the central government to bring about
changes in the rural relationship and ever-increasing rural tensions brought down the efficacy of
the mansab and jagir system.

Long Questions

1. Discuss the evolution and chief features of the mansab system under Akbar.
2. What factors were responsible for changes introduced in the mansab system by the
successors of Akbar?
3. Who were jagirdars? Describe the types of jagirs and functioning of the jagirdari system.
4. Account for the crisis in the mansab and jagir system from the second half of 17th
century onwards.

Suggested Readings

1. S Athar Ali (Revised 1997) , The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb, OUP
2. J F Richards (1996), The Mughal Empire, Cambridge, CUP
3. Shireen Moosvi (2014), ‘The Evolution of the Mansab System under Akbar
until 1596-97’ in Nirmal Kumar (ed), History of India 1600-1800, Research
India Press
4. Percival Spear (2009), ‘The Mughal Mansabdari System’ in Edmund Leech
and S N Mukherjee (eds) Elites in South Asia, Cambridge University Press
5. Irfan Habib (1966), ‘The Mansab System (1595-1637)’, PIHC, 29th Session,
pp 228-249
6. A J Qaisar (1961), ‘Note on the date of institution of Mansab under
Akbar’, PIHC, 24th Session, pp155-157
7. Aniruddha Ray (1984), Some Aspects of Mughal Administration, Kalyani
Publishers
8. S A N Rezavi (1998); ‘The Empire and the Bureaucracy: The Core of
Mughal Empire’ in PIHC, Vol 59, pp 360-382
9. Douglas E. Streusand (1989), The Formation of the Mughal Empire, OUP
10. S P Blake (1979), ‘The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic State of the Mughals’
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 19 (1), pp 77-94
11. Satish Chandra (2002/1959); Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court,
1707-1740, OUP, New Delhi.
12. Satish Chandra (1982); Medieval India: Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the
Village; Macmillan, New Delhi.
13. Satish Chandra (2012); State, Society and Culture in Indian History, OUP,
New Delhi.

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 Rakesh Kumar
(Ram Lal Anand College, University of Delhi)

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