United Nations Security Council

Yemeni Civil War

Introduction

The Yemeni Crisis started with the revolution against president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011 which occurred
during the Arab Spring and ultimately failed to secure a political transition from the authoritarian ruler. Saleh
had been in power for over 30 years but eventually resigned in 2012 as part of a mediated agreement between
the government and various opposition groups. His deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi took over the
government but struggled due to frequent attacks from jihadists and various separation movements in the
south. Further issues were problems of corruption and food insecurity, as well as the continued loyalty of the
security forces to former President Saleh.

Most prominently, the Houthi movement, a Shia

Muslim minority group, took advantage of Hadi’s
weakness and took control of the northern
heartland of Saada province and neighboring
areas in late 2014. However, not only Shias, but
also many disappointed Sunnis supported the
movement. Furthermore, the security forces which
were still loyal to former President Saleh also
joined ranks with the Houthi movement, because
they hoped it would help them regain power.

In 2015 the conflict escalated after the Houthis

seized control of big parts of the country and
forced President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi to flee. Upon this, a coalition of Saudi Arabia and seven other
Arab states intervened in an attempt to restore the government. Their motivation to get involved was rooted in
the fact that the Houthis were seen as pawns of the Iranian (Shia) government. In order to achieve their
mission the coalition of Arab states received logistical and intelligence support from the US, the UK and
France. Unlike Saudi predictions, the conflict did not last a mere number of weeks but is still ongoing and has
caused the death of at least
6,475 civilians and injured another 10,231.5 Most of the civilians have died from preventable causes like
malnutrition or disease. Particularly alarming is furthermore the humanitarian situation of at least 22.2 million
people. Due to a partial blockade they have been left without aid, food or medication which caused wide scale
starvation and outbreaks of diseases like cholera which have affected another 1.1 million people.
Additionally, 11.3 million civilians are in acute need in all sectors including health, food, sanitation and water,
housing and protection.

Militant jihadist forces from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well as the rival Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have used the military stalemate between the coalition forces and the Houthis and
started seizing territory in the south as early as April 2015. Notable in particular is the seizure of Aden, a port
city and the interim capital of Yemen in February 2016. Various missiles launched towards Riyadh in
November 2017 lead to a Saudi-led tightening of the blockade of Yemen. Whilst the blockade was justified
with attempting to stop smuggling, it mainly led to an increase in food prices which in turn worsened the
humanitarian situation in Yemen. Only in December 2018 the UN managed to bring the government and
coalition forces as well as the Houthis to attend talks in Sweden. The parties agreed to a ceasefire in the port
area.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, coalition forces have been responsible for most
of the documented civilian casualties. A so-called Group of Experts, which is cited in the High
Commissioner’s report, published a report in which coalition air strikes were made responsible for the
destruction of residential areas, markets, funerals, weddings, civilian and in particular medical facilities. They
further allege they “have reasonable grounds to believe that individuals in the government of Yemen and the
coalition may have conducted attacks in violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality and
precaution that may amount to war crimes”.

However, Houthi forces have also been accused of targeting civilians, including women and children. In a
number of instances civilians were hit by shelling and snipers while in their homes or seeking medical
attention. This accusation aligned with broader concerns that the Houthis are using force indiscriminately in
urban settings which constitutes a war crime.

Evidence that suggests ill-treatment and torture as well as sexual violence perpetrated by progovernment
forces and UAE personnel has also been put forward. Other war crimes, such as enlisting children in military
roles, have also been observed. All parties involved have enlisted boys as young as eleven and used them to
participate in hostilities.

One can conclude that all parties involved in the Yemen conflict committed and continue to commit war
crimes. Furthermore, all parties involved need to “allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of
humanitarian relief, including medicine, food and other survival items.” according to the UNHRC.
Nevertheless, it is also apparent that foreign involvement first triggered the escalation of the conflict and
continues to destabilize the region.
Definitions

Houthi Movement

The Houthi movement is a religious and political militia that emerged as an opposition to Yemeni President
Saleh following several corruption scandals in the 1990s. They started as a movement for tolerance and peace
and originally held modern educational and cultural views. It transformed to a more military movement in
2004 on grounds of self-defense when the tensions with the Yemeni government increased. The founder of the
movement, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, was killed by the Yemeni army in 2004. Since then, Abdul-Malik
al-Houthi, a brother of the deceased, has been leading the movement. The Houthis mainly, but not exclusively,
attract Shia Muslims and have made fighting corruption the main point in their political program. They claim
that the Yemeni government is a puppet of the United States of America and are opposed to any outside
influence. The Houthi movement has long asked for more power in the federal government and capitalized on
people’s opposition to the current government. The movement has been accused of being a proxy of the
Iranian government, an accusation the Houthis continue to deny.

Hadi/government forces

The government, often referred to as ‘Hadis’ after their current President, is the main opposition. They are
backed by a Saudi-led coalition of Arab States and represent the legitimate Yemeni government. President
Hadi expressed that he believes in a military rather than a political solution. For this, he blames the allegedly
Iran Backed Houthis, accusing them of having obstructed all chances for peace. He nevertheless pointed out
that the government repeatedly offered their hand in peace and will continue to do so. They demand however,
that the Houthis hand over their weapons and join a political reconciliation process.

AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)

A local ‘franchise’, if you will, of Al-Qaeda is the so called AQAP. It is a regionalised, thriving terrorist group
that was enabled to grow and become more active due to the weak government, growing sectarianism, security
vacuums and war economy. Before the first uprisings in 2011, AQAP was a small group that primarily
focussed on attacking Western targets (mostly US targets).
It only had several hundred members and was considered a ‘sideshow’ that most Yemeni citizens, as well as
the government, gladly ignored. AQAP however emerged somewhat as the main winner of the failed political
transition that followed the uprising in 2011 and in particular of the ongoing civil war. The movement is now
an insurgent movement that showed it is capable of controlling territory and challenging state authority; in
particular the government of President Hadi.
From the roots of the conflict to the status quo: A comprehensive analysis

The following section will further analyze the historical roots of the conflict as well as examine the various
actors and key issues. The conflict is ongoing and it is possible that the situation changes after the time of
writing. A current map (as of January 2019) that details who currently controls what territory can be found
below.

Years after the withdrawal of the British and the subsequent decades of rule under the PDRY the differences
between the two parts deepened. Nevertheless, in 1972 the two Yemens declared that unification would
eventually occur. It took another 18 years, two armed conflicts and a civil war in the PDRY, before the
Republic of Yemen declared its independence on 22 May 1990. Ali Abdullah Saleh, last President of the
YEAR, became the first President of Yemen. A constitution was ratified in 1991 and the first parliamentary
elections were held on 27 April 1993.

Historical background

Throughout its history, Yemen has rarely been under the rule of a single government. Culture and politics in
the north are coloured by over 1000 years of theocratic rule while the south was influenced by a century under
British rule. The modern history of Yemen begins with the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 from
North Yemen, forming the northern Kingdom of Yemen. Following a revolution in 1962, the Yemen Arab
Republic (YAR) was formed.

South Yemen was under control of the British from

1839 to 1967, who first set up a protective area
around the port of Aden which in 1937 formed the
center of the Colony of Aden. As the British left
Yemen on 30 November 1967, South Yemen became
independent as the People’s Democratic Republic of
South Yemen (PDRY).

Conflicts within the government resulted in the

self-imposed exile of the Vice President and a
deterioration in the general security situation. Despite
continuous negotiations between northern and
southern leaders a civil war broke out in May 1994 as
southern leaders declared secession. Supporters of the
last president of the PDRY greatly assisted military operations and the civil war ended on 7 July 1994 as Aden
was occupied. Following political reformations, Yemen held its second multiparty parliamentary elections in
April 1997 and its first direct presidential elections in September 1999. Constitutional amendments adopted in
2000 extended the presidential term to 7 years and the parliamentary term of office to 6 years. On 20 February
2001 another amendment created a bicameral legislature.

The current conflict in Yemen has its roots in the time following the Arab Spring uprising, which initially
focused on unemployment, economic conditions, corruption and on the government proposed modifications to
the constitution. The demands then escalated to calls for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. After
backing away hours before the scheduled signing of his resignation for the third time on 22 May 2011, the
following day the head of the Hashid tribal federation, one of the most powerful in the country, declared
support for the opposition. Heavy street fighting ensued, culminating in a rocket attack on the presidential
compound on 3 June, injuring Saleh. While Saleh
flew to Saudi Arabia to be treated, his deputy
Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi took over as president
and a cease-fire was brokered by Saudi Arabia’s
King Abdullah. Following this, by the beginning
of July the government had repeatedly rejected the
opposition’s demands.

Struggling to tackle a number of pressing issues,

including the continuing loyalty of many military
officers to Saleh, corruption, unemployment, food
insecurity as well as attacks by al-Qaeda and a separatist movement in the south of the country, the brewing
conflict between the Houthis and the Yemeni government culminated. This conflict between the government
and the Houthis originated in the 1990s, when the Houthi movement was formed by and named after Hussein
al Houthi, as a resistance to the corruption of Saleh. In addition, they criticized Saudis and Americans for
supporting a dictator. The American invasion of Iraq radicalized the movement, which then officially named
itself Ansar Allah or supporters of God. Following a number of military campaigns of Saleh’s government
supported by the Saudis against the Houthis, Hussein al Houthi was killed in 2004. Nevertheless the Houthis
ultimately defeated the coalition.
Disillusioned with the transition, the Houthis took control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in September 2014
collaborating with Saleh against Hadi in a remarkable reversal of alliances; afterwards swiftly proceeding to
advance towards the country’s second-largest city, Aden, in the south. In response, Saudi Arabia formed a
coalition of a dozen countries to restore Yemen’s internationally recognized government and pushed back the
Houthis in August 2015.
On 4 December 2017 Saleh was killed by the Houthi rebels after apparently switching sides again. AQAP is
considered one of al-Qaeda’s most effective and dangerous groups, consisting of many returning fighters from
Afghanistan and Iraq. Amidst the chaos following the 2011 uprising, the group was able to extend its control
of territory in southern Yemen. Since the beginning of the war, al-Qaeda as well as the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) have launched several attacks on the Houthis, whom they view as infidels. In 2015
al-Qaeda seized control over al-Mukalla, a provincial capital and fifth largest port of the country, backed by
allied local forces. Although the Saudi coalition managed to force al-Qaeda to give up control of the city in
spring 2016, the group retains a strong presence in many areas of the country.

Coalition involvement

When the Houthis took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa a coalition of Arab states entered the conflict on the
side of the opposing government forces by launching a military attack against the Houthis. While Saudi
Arabia formed the coalition, it is comprised of eight more states: Kuwait, the United

Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan and Senegal. While not part of the coalition itself, the
US, the UK and France have also supplied it with weapons and intelligence. The United States, still under
President Obama, had authorized logistical and intelligence support. The authorization for their own airstrikes
on Yemeni targets to fight off al-Qaeda and
ISIL was issued later.

This intervention was invited by President

Hadi, who on 25 March 2015 even called on
the Security Council to authorize ‘willing
countries that wish to help Yemen to provide
immediate support for the legitimate authority
by all means and measures to protect Yemen
and deter the Houthi Aggression.’

The coalitions’ main targets are fighter jets, air

bases, Houthi camps and other Houthi
positions. The first operation to that effect was named ‘Decisive Storm’ and focused mainly on air raids on
belligerent targets. The mission ended on 21 April 2015. Additional naval operations were used to
complement the efforts of Operation Decisive Storm.
Following the cessation of Operation Decisive Storm, Saudi Arabia announced a new Operation named
‘Restoring Hope’. On 22 April the government of Oman presented a seven-point peace treaty to both parties.
It primarily entailed the reinstatement of the Hadi government and a promise to evacuate Houthi fighters from
major cities. A truce was informally agreed and the Houthis signaled agreement to the peace treaty on 10 May
2015. However, airstrikes commenced on 18 May when Saudi Arabia blamed the Houthis for a failure to
renew the truce and abide by their agreements. Coalition ground forces were able to seize the region around
the port city Aden and consequently took back control from the Houthis who had previously dominated that
area.

The previously enacted naval and air blockade on Yemen has been severely tightened since the Coalition took
control of Aden, the most important port in the country. This enabled the Coalition to severely limit the flow
of goods into the country. While it is argued that this is necessary to stop weapons deliveries to the Houthis, in
reality it also impacts the delivery of food, medicine and other necessary goods to the civilian population. This
was only slightly loosened in late November 2017 when the Saudi-led forces allowed humanitarian flights to
resume to Sanaand Aden alike.

International observers such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) criticized Saudi Arabia for
blocking Iranian humanitarian aid and for targeting airports and seaports because this complicates their efforts
to reach all Yemenis with their relief efforts. Apart from few and short ceasefires, the fighting has been
ongoing since early 2015 and no peace talk has been successful as of yet.

The military strength of the coalition is as follows:

Saudi Arabia: 100 warplanes and 150,000 troops, additional navy units
UAE: 30 warplanes
Kuwait: 15 warplanes
Bahrain: 12 warplanes and 300 troops
Qatar: 10 warplanes and 1,000 troops (until 2017)
Sudan: 4 warplanes and 6,000 troops
Egypt: 4 warships and an unknown number of warplanes and naval vessels
Jordan: 6 warplanes
Morocco: 6 warplanes and 1,500 troops
Senegal: 2,100 troops
It is also important to note that there has been
significant Western involvement. As mentioned
before, the UK and US support the coalition
through technical, logistical and intelligence
assistance. Furthermore, the aforementioned
countries as well as France, Finland, Germany,
Sweden and Spain have sold weapons to Saudi
Arabia.

On 28 August 2018, the UN Human Rights

Council pointed out that both sides committed
war crimes and urged all states to stop providing arms to any country if they could be used in the conflict in
Yemen.

Terrorist Activity

There has been considerable terrorist activity both for the duration of the conflict as well as immediately
beforehand. AQAP emerged in Yemen in 2009 and has since then increased its activity. AQAP benefited from
the destabilization of the government and state since the outbreak of the civil war. It is believed to pose a
significant threat to international peace and security, even more so than the general Al-Qaeda branch. The
so-called Islamic State has also been active in the region. During the conflict both AQAP and the so-called
Islamic State considered themselves anti-Houthi (as well as anti-government). AQAP was able to seize the
port city Mukalla and has established control of the region around it and attempts to expand its territory
westward towards Aden.
AQAP in particular views this civil war as an opportunity to appeal to Sunni Muslims in Yemen. It provides
security, basic governance, water, electricity and jurisprudence to gain support from the local population. ISIL
has so far limited itsattacks on Houthi targets as well as government officials in Aden. They have been known
to also attack Mosques in Sanaa Peace talks.

The most recent attempt of peace talks between the warring parties was organized in late November 2018.
Government and rebel forces announced on 19 November 2018 their intentions to agree on a ceasefire and
convene for peace negotiations in Sweden. The talks in Sweden are still ongoing. Is it however unclear
whether they will be able to be continued after the UN faced pressure to suspend them following Houthi
attacks on the Yemeni government high command in January 2019 within the UNadministered ceasefire zone
in Lahj province.
Previously, as early as December 2015 former UN Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed attempted to negotiate
an end to the conflict in Switzerland. However, the process stalled in August 2016 when the Houthis rejected
the UN’s plan and the government negotiators consequently walked out of the talks.

Key issues and threats

The key issues in Yemen are manifold. The country and the government is unstable due to the ongoing civil
war and heavy shelling and sea blockades disrupt every aspect of civilian life. This situation led to a
catastrophic humanitarian situation with millions starving and in desperate need of medical attention.
Furthermore, the constant and growing terrorist activity through AQAP and IS forces escalate the civil war
further and pose a significant security risk.

The Security Council noted in 2016 that Yemen had the largest numbers of people in need in the world. 21
million people are in urgent need of either medical attention or are severely food-insecure. The Council was
however criticized for not condemning coalition abuses and ‘widespread and systematic attacks on civilian
targets’.

Next to the humanitarian crisis, there is a crisis regarding Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). The Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre counted 2,014,000 IDPs as of 31 December 2017.

The situation in Yemen therefore poses a threat to international peace and security for many reasons: due to a
civil war with significant outside involvement, growing terrorist activities, an unparalleled humanitarian crisis,
and a refugee crisis.

Block Positions

A number of countries have voiced support for the coalition’s efforts. Amongst those are Pakistan and Somalia
who both support the coalition’s mission. However, there are also a number of countries that (previously)
supported the military efforts of the coalition (as outlined above). Those are the United States, the United
Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, Canada, Spain, Malaysia, Brazil, Finland, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Eritrea. It is understood however, that Spain, Belgium, Norway, Germany, Finland and
Canada either canceled or promised not to issue new permits for weapons sales to coalition countries. So far,
there has been no official cancellation of arms deals to coalition forces (in particular to Saudi Arabia) from
France, the UK and the US who are the largest weapons suppliers. No information can be obtained as to the
position of the remaining countries.
States that actively oppose the coalition’s efforts are Iran, Qatar and North Korea. Apart from these three
countries, there is however no information about official or suspected support for the rebels.

The Security Council previously showed unity when addressing the Yemeni conflict and agreed on measures
such as sanctions, the necessity of keeping ports open and functioning and in condemning Houthi attacks
against Saudi Arabia. The Council also supports the sovereignty of the Yemeni government, peace talks and
the peace process and has issued a number of resolutions and statements on that matter.

UN-involvement: Resolutions, Documents, Possible Solutions

There have been 11 Security Council Resolutions on Yemen since 2011, when the political unrest began.
Resolution 2452, 16 January 2019, established a Special Political Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement
in Yemen (UNMHA). Resolution 2451, 21 December 2018, endorsed the Stockholm agreement. It authorized
the Secretary-General to establish and deploy, for an initial period of 30 days, an advance monitoring team on
the ground, to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm agreement.

Resolution 2402, 26 February 2018, unanimously renewing a travel ban, assets freeze and arms embargo
against those threatening peace and security in Yemen.

Resolution 2342, 23 February 2017, renewing until 26 February 2018 a targeted arms embargo, travel ban and
assets freeze against individuals and entities.

Resolution 2266, 24 February 2016, extending the asset freeze and travel ban imposed by resolution 2140
(2015).
Resolution 2216, 14 April 2015, demanding that all Yemeni parties fully implement resolution 2201 (2015),
imposing an arms embargo on selected individuals, and requesting that the Secretary-General intensifies his
good offices role in order to enable the resumption of the political process.

Resolution 2204, 24 February 2015, extending the mandate of the Sanctions Panel of Experts to March 2016.

Resolution 2201, 15 February 2015, deploring the unilateral actions taken by the Houthis to dissolve
parliament and take over Yemen’s government institutions, expressing grave concern over reports of the use of
child soldiers, and urging all parties to continue the transition. Resolution 2140, 26 February 2014, supporting
the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes, reaffirming the need for the full and timely
implementation of the political transition, and establishing a sanctions regime under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. Resolution 2051, 12 June 2012, reaffirming the need for the full and timely implementation
of the Transition Agreement and signaling potential sanctions.

Resolution 2014, 21 October 2011, calling for implementation of a political settlement based upon the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and requesting the Secretary-General to continue his good offices.

Further Security Council documents including Presidential Statements, Meeting Records, Press Statements
and Sanction Committee reports can be found on the Security Council Report.

Short timeline

2012 Hadi remains unable to counter the ongoing Al-Qaeda attacks in the capital Sanaa

2014 Presidential panel approves for Yemen to become a federation of six regions to accommodate Houthis

2014 Hadi sacks his government in August following two weeks of anti-government protest

2014 Houthis seize control of the capital and reject draft constitution

2015 Houthis appoint presidential council to replace Hadi who fled to Aden

2015 ISIL carries out major attacks in Yemen killing 137 people in March alone

2015 Civil war breaks out when Saudi-led coalition launches air strikes against Houthi targets and imposes

naval blockade

2016 IS claims responsibility for various attacks in the Aden region

2017 Outbreak of cholera kills 2,100 and affects 900,000

2017 Former President Saleh is killed in the capital Sanaa

2018 Southern Yemeni separatists (backed by the UAE) seize control of Aden in January

2018 Both parties agree to conduct negotiations in Sweden

Both the BBC and Medecins Sans Frontieres offer excellent and even more detailed timelines.
Questions a Resolution should answer

What can the Security Council do to help solve the conflict and alleviate the humanitarian crisis?

How should the Council deal with AQAP activity in the region?

Should the Council support and/or authorize military action?

Should the Council address and condemn the war crimes committed by both sides? Should any action be taken
regarding this?

Would a peacekeeping mission (with possibly strong enforcement powers; a.k.a. ‘peacemaking’) help?

Could the Council facilitate a peace agreement and transition period?

Suggested reading.

OSESGY. ‘Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen: Security Council Resolutions’,
online at: https://osesgy.unmissions. org/security-council-resolutions (25 January
2019).
MSF. ‘Yemen: A timeline of more than three years of war’, online at:
https://www.msf.org/yementimeline-more-three-years-war.
Riedel, Bruce. ‘Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them?’, 18 December 2018, online at:
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-whyare-we-at-war-with-them/
(24 January 2019).
Security Council Report. ‘Chronology of Events. Yemen’, online at: https://www.securitycouncil-
See for everything: Security Council Report. ‘Chronology of Events. Yemen’, online at:
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/yemen.php (15 January 2019).
For a more detailed account see: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14704951 (15 January 2019);
https://www.msf.org/yemen-timeline-more-three-years-war (15 January 2019
Bibliography:

1. BBC. ‘Yemen crisis: Why is there a war?’, 18 December 2018, online at:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29319423 (8 January 2019).
2. Ibid.
3. BBC. ‘Yemen conflict: UN experts detail possible war crimes by all parties’, 28 August 2018, online at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45329220 (6 January 2019).
4. HRC. Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014,
A/HRC/39/43, 17 August 2018, paras 27-45; see also:
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/YEIndex.aspx (8 January 2019).
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violations and abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/39/43, 17 August 2018, para 26.
6. HRC. Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014,
A/HRC/39/43, 17 August 2018, para 95. The UN Secretary-General has reported 842 verified cases of
recruitment of boys in Yemen in 2017 alone (A/72/865-S/2018/465). Two thirds of the cases were found with
the Houthi forces.
7. HRC. Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014,
A/HRC/39/43, 17 August 2018, para 46.
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(15 January 2019).
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online at:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaed
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11. S/Res/2266 (2016).
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15. S/Res/2140 (2014).
16. S/Res/2051 (2012).
17. S/Res/2014 (2011).
18. Security Council Report. ‘UN Documents for Yemen’, online at:
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/yemen/ (25 January 2019).