Coalition Governments in Pakistan: An Analytical Assessment of

Deliverance During the PTI Era (2018-2022)

Presented By

Mohsin Hassan

Roll No. 10

Supervised by

Prof. Dr Sara Gul

Session; 2023-2026

The Islamia University of Bahawalpur

Department of Pakistan Studies

Coalition Governments in Pakistan: An Analytical Assessment of Deliverance
During the PTI Era (2018-2022)

Introduction:

A coalition government consists of two or more parties who must compromise on principles and
share a mandate. This mostly occurs due to a single party unable to gain a majority of seats in
parliament. Coalitions are mostly formed through elections but coalition governments can also
occur in times of national difficulty, such as in WWII from 1939-1945. (Richard Bellamy, 2012)
Coalition governments arguably divide opinion, but those in favor of proportional representation
believe it can lead to consensus politics, and it is also seen by many as the more favourable
option in times of national crisis, moreover, coalitions can also be better than having a minority
government. However, many believe that they are undemocratic and can lead to drastic policies
being put through, upon a mandate that was not agreed on, with problems also on proportionality.

The distinction between single-party and coalition government

The differences between single-party and coalition governments raise many important questions.
These tend to contrast the identifiability, clarity and capacity to govern of single party
administrations with the representativeness and fairness of coalition administrations. (Powell,
2000: 3-20) The United Kingdom has, for a long time, been one of the main exemplars of the
‘majoritarian’ system of democracy. The principal feature of this model is that executive power
tends to be held by a single party and not shared between parties (Lijphart, 1999). By
contrast, governments in many other countries are formed by two or more parties in coalition. It
is true that, for a significant part of the twentieth century, the UK has been governed by
coalition administrations. But this experience has always taken place in the context either of
wartime or economic crisis or as a prelude to mergers between political parties (Bogdanor,
1983: 10-12). Two or more parties have never come together to share power outside these
circumstances.

Coalition Governments in Pakistan:

Forming political alliances is a process of organizing parties collectively in pursuit of a common
goal or objective. The elements or actions that entail this process include among others the
pooling of resources, forming binding commitments and an agreement on the distribution
arrangement of the product that may result from achieving this goal. A political alliance is a
“temporary combination of groups or individuals formed to pursue specific objectives through
joint action”. In other words; it is “the union of different political parties or groups for a
particular purpose, usually for a limited time.
Party alliances may be forged either by giving serious considerations to ideological positions of
respective parties on political chessboard or by ignoring them altogether. The precise actors that
make up such political alliances consist mainly of individual legislators and political parties
seeking purposely to control the executive. But this does not mean that alliances are not forged
for any other purpose. They are also formed to safeguard the interests of smaller parties by
providing them representation in the legislature, to overthrow a government, to protect the
opposition from the repression and pressure of the government or to struggle for
democratization.
In multi-party systems no single party can win a majority of seats. The necessary majority forms
of political alliance may normally occur in two ways. One, pre-electoral alliance occurs before
the elections and is made openly with the goal of informing the public about what the parties will
do if they win enough seats. Two, post-electoral alliance formed after the elections when the final
distribution of seats or votes is known. In this case no explicit information about coalition
membership or leadership is given to the public before elections. This type of alliance may
also occur when the previous government has failed but new elections have not been called.
In such situations bargaining occurs between different parties capable and interested in
potentially forming a governmental alliance.
Alliances are also structured by smaller parties in post-colonial states purely for the
sake of their survival. In countries where dominant party system emerges the smaller
parties enter into alliances to increase the chances of their success in elections. Thus, they
send a message to the electorate that they are alternate to the incumbent. India and Ireland
have been ruled by dominant parties for quite long time. Their positions were finally
challenged by coalitions of smaller parties. During the first few years the Muslim League
also enjoyed the dominant party status in Pakistan.
Alliances between parties vary greatly in form and degree. Some are short-lived and
unorganized while others are strongly organized and lasting. Organized and lasting
alliances, usually formed by ideologically identical parties, may stay intact for quite long
time by preserving their unity in all situations. The unorganized alliances, product
of ideologically distant parties, disintegrate soon as a result of confusion and clash of
interests between the allied parties. The former type of alliance portrays itself as a durable
and stable body while the latter type presents itself as a fragile and ephemeral entity.

After independence the Muslim League’s lack of experience to run democratic institutions
and policy of marginalization of certain key political figures produced many disgruntled

elements that formed opposition. The failure of League to satisfy the masses and
sidelining those who were opposed to its policies cost her heavily. She lost some very
capable and influential leaders along with their supporters. Suhrawardy was one of those
skilful and popular leaders who felt that the League’s ruling clique had failed to
accommodate political aspirants to play their role in national politics. Soon he obtained
the central position as leader of the opposition in both wings of the country. Most
important disgruntled figures that joined him in those early days included Pir of Manki,
Ghulam Muhammad Khan of Lundkhwar and Pir Zakori from NWFP, Nawab Mumdot and
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan from Punjab, Mehmud-ul-Haq Usmani from Sindh and
Maulana Bhashani, Ataur Rehman Khan and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman from East Bengal. This led
to the formation of All Pakistan Awami Muslim League, which later became a popular
political party of opposition.
It is often observed that, governments formed on coalition partners whether at National level or
in provinces in Pakistan remain busy in safeguarding their coalition governments rather than
doing their actual job of delivering on public services to people. From 2002 to onward till 2013
General Elections, all governments save few at center and in provinces were coalition
governments. The basis of coalition governments is in multiparty system of elections in Pakistan.
As against two party system prevailing in different democratic countries such as USA, Jamaica,
and Malta, in multiparty system, citizens have different choices of political parties and individual
independent candidates to elect a candidate of their choice. This practice is delivering good
democratic trends in countries such as Germany, India, Finland, Brazil, Japan, New Zealand,
Pakistan, and so on and so forth. It is also observed that despite the fact that in some countries
with multi-party system, two major political parties remain in power largely by turns. For
instance, in UK, Germany, India, and also in Pakistan only major political parties’ form
governments. In Pakistan, a similar exercise is being observed since 1970 and two political
parties such as Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim League with different flavours
remained in power. However, the politics of conflict prevailing in the 90s ended and political
parties started forming coalition governments even with political rivals. The best example of this
practice is observed in 2008, and 2009 when the People's Party formed coalition governments
with PML-N and then PML-Q. However, the drawback of this practice was observed that such
coalitions were based on give and takes. The governments now remain busy in protecting their
coalition partners in any cost. Based on this fact people have now started blaming that these two
parties have made collusion to form governments in alternate turns and intend not to deliver
public services. The practice of coalition government will remain in Pakistan under a multiparty
system until there are changes in the system.

Coalition Government of PTI:

Coalition governments have been a recurrent feature of Pakistan's political landscape, reflecting
the nation's fragmented political fabric and diverse sociopolitical makeup. Since its inception,
Pakistan has struggled to consolidate a stable democratic system, often characterized by political
alliances and coalitions formed to secure parliamentary majorities. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
(PTI) era (2018-2022) represents a critical period in this continuum, marked by a coalition
government under the leadership of Prime Minister Imran Khan. This period warrants an
analytical exploration to assess the efficacy and challenges of coalition governance within the
context of Pakistan's evolving political and administrative landscape.

The PTI’s ascension to power in 2018 was facilitated by strategic alliances with smaller political
parties and independent candidates, underscoring the fragmented electoral outcomes of the
general elections. The coalition comprised diverse political entities, including the Muttahida
Qaumi Movement (MQM), Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), and the Balochistan
Awami Party (BAP), among others (Akhtar, 2019). While this coalition enabled the PTI to
secure a parliamentary majority, it also introduced significant governance challenges stemming
from ideological differences, policy disagreements, and demands for provincial autonomy.

Coalition governance during this era was shaped by key policy decisions and legislative
undertakings, particularly in areas such as economic reforms, anti-corruption initiatives, and
foreign policy recalibrations. However, the government faced significant hurdles, including
managing conflicting interests among coalition partners, political instability, and a polarized
opposition. Scholars argue that coalition governments often prioritize survival over performance,
leading to compromises that may dilute governance effectiveness (Raza & Ahmed, 2021).
Furthermore, the PTI era coincided with a series of unprecedented challenges, including the
COVID-19 pandemic, an economic downturn, and regional security dynamics. These factors
further strained the coalition government’s capacity to deliver on its electoral promises. Critics
contend that the coalition’s inability to foster consensus on key issues undermined its overall
effectiveness, highlighting the structural weaknesses inherent in coalition governance in Pakistan
(Khan, 2022).

This thesis seeks to analyze the performance of coalition governments during the PTI era by
examining their achievements, shortcomings, and broader implications for Pakistan's political
and governance systems. By employing a multi-dimensional analytical framework, the study
aims to contribute to the scholarly discourse on coalition politics and its impact on governance in
developing democracies like Pakistan.

Problem Statement

Coalition governments have become a norm in Pakistan’s political system due to the fragmented
nature of its electorate and the absence of dominant political parties capable of securing absolute
majorities. This phenomenon, while facilitating inclusivity, has led to significant governance
challenges. The PTI coalition government (2018-2022) exemplified these difficulties, as it was
marked by internal discord, policy inconsistencies, and an overarching struggle to balance
conflicting priorities among diverse coalition partners. Despite forming alliances with parties like
the MQM, PML-Q, and BAP, the coalition’s inability to achieve consensus on critical
governance issues often resulted in legislative gridlocks and diluted policy outcomes (Akhtar,
2019).
Furthermore, external challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, economic instability, and
shifting regional dynamics compounded the coalition’s governance difficulties. These crises
exposed the structural vulnerabilities of coalition politics, where survival often takes precedence
over performance. Critics argue that the PTI government’s reliance on temporary compromises
and its failure to address foundational governance issues highlight the limitations of coalition
frameworks in Pakistan (Raza & Ahmed, 2021).

This study addresses the critical question of whether coalition governments, particularly during
the PTI era, are capable of delivering effective governance. By analyzing the interplay between
coalition dynamics and governance outcomes, the research aims to identify the structural and
operational shortcomings of coalition governments and propose strategies to enhance their
efficacy in Pakistan’s context.

Thematic Exposition of Coalition Government:

The first set of theories on coalition politics like the Power Maximization and the
Policy Based theories are specifically concerned with coalition experiments and trace
their nature. The second set of theories viz. the Electoral Systems theory and The Social
Cleavage theory primarily deals with theories of the party system. The inclusion of the
second set is pertinent because it is insufficient to analyze the complexity, dynamism and
plurality of Indian coalition era singularly rather restrictive Western theorization. Since the
scope of the present study extends to the broad study of the impact upon the federal
nature of Pakistan polity, the resultant theoretical vastness is unavoidable.
The two theoretical sets adopt different approaches to coalitions and within each set the
two theories present opposing perspectives on coalitions as discussed in the following
text.

Power Maximization and Policy-Based Theories:

Power maximization theories predict minimum winning coalitions; while policy- based
theories predict minimum connected winning coalitions. The basic underlying idea
is that in coalitions formed under compulsions of power, each party within the
coalition would be indispensable to the formation/survival of t h e coalition. This is
because t h e lesser the number of parties sharing the coalition, the larger the payoffs
guaranteed to each member. On the other hand, policy-based coalitions celebrate the
coming together of like-minded political parties - which lie adjacent on the ideological scale
and are at least not incompatible on major issues. This reduces the number of coalition
partners and hence, restricts the number of total coalition partners in the government.
One of the most intriguing questions in t h e theoretical analysis of coalition situations
remains as to why hung parliament situations across the globe, fail to produce minimum
winning power theory or minimum connected winning policy theory coalitions. This is
an anomaly which requires us to discuss the two set of theories in detail in order to
derive a deeper understanding of the reasons behind such aberrations or to
disqualify the non existence of (the limited set of) predicted patterns as aberrations.

Power Theory:

The major theorists in this tradition are these of Riker Gamson, and Dodd. According to
Riker ‘minimum winning coalitions’ may be defined as a coalition in which each party is
indispensable to the coalition's prospect of winning a simple majority of seats. In such
coalitions, each member's share of the payoff is maximized. This is called the size
principle. Size principle theories can have variants because there can be more than one
minimum winning coalition in many distributions of seats. Therefore, one can have
variants of minimum winning coalitions such as minimum size coalitions in which the
number of legislators of the winning coalition is minimized to a number just enough to
win a majority, or minimum- number- of parties’ coalition in which the number of
coalescing parties necessary to win a majority is minimized.
An important corollary of size principle theories is that pivotal parties are especially
strongly placed to extract rewards disproportionate to their size, particularly those that
can threaten to leave and enable the formation of an alternative coalition in which they
are also pivotal. Thus, in certain circumstances, very small parties which are pivotal to
coalitions can extract disproportionate rewards and hold much larger partner and parties
to ransom.
Riker-Dodd theory is generally applicable to multi-party parliaments because the
important constituents of this theory - the bargaining conditions and cabinet
coalition status can be perceived more clearly. It may also be applied to the parliaments
which have dominant one- p a r t y majority rule, in which case the single party
formed cabinet can be considered as essentially a minimum winning cabinet. It has
both a low level of bargaining constraints and high information certainty and is also more
durable.
Policy Based Theories:
Policy-based theories, on the other hand, predict minimum connected winning
coalitions, i.e., coalitions that are composed of member parties adjacent on the ideological
scale and at least are not incompatible on major issues, thus, minimizing the coalition's
ideological span, and within this limiting condition, the minimum number of parties needed
for a majority.
Policy-based theories were developed by later game theory proponents. This theory
assumes that parties that are congenial in policy terms can only make coalitions. They
need to share elements of ideological similarity or what Robert Axelrod stated - a
successful coalition should consist of parties that are spatially connected, i.e.,
ideologically similar. The empirical evidence available on comparative literature on
coalition politics stands to support policy- b a s e d theories, not merely for the sake of
compatibility of coalition formation, but also far more importantly, for coalition
longevity.

Robert Axelrod, Abram De Swaan, Michael Leiseison and Seven Groennings are some
of the theorists belonging to this school of thought. In short, policy- b a s e d theory
postulates that coalition cabinets, realistically speaking, must agree on a package of
proposed government policies. This is so because policy is an intrinsic end value for itself
rather than as an instrument used by the politicians to gain office. Thus, through this
theory the role of cleavage conflict in coalition formation is highlighted. Also, it
is suggested that parties must seek to minimize the policy range between themselves and
their partners. A variant of this is the minimal policy range coalition, one that minimizes
the policy distance between the coalition’s extremes.
Indeed, policy based theories of coalitions have been extended to see coalition formation not as
an episodic event but as a stage in a continuous cycle of elections, government formation, policy
implementation and all such activities in which party competition takes place. Empirical
evidence from the comparative literature on coalition politics tends to weigh in favour of policy
based theories. Hence, often the stress is on the element of compatibility for coalition formation
and even more for coalition.
Another way of looking at power maximization and policy-based theories is the one which
divides the motivations of politicians and the political cultures of societies into opportunistic and
partisan politics. A society's politics is said to be opportunistic if the pursuit of political office is
primarily for the fruits of power of the office for one’s own sake. Partisan politics, on the other
hand, is the one where the pursuit of office is for changing public policy in the direction desired
by the contestant party's ideology and social constituency. Likewise, manipulation of policy
whilst in office to serve the purpose of getting reelected (the ultimate goal of a political party) is
the characteristic feature of opportunistic parties and politicians.

Social Cleavage Theory:

Social cleavages theory helps to explain few features of the Indian complexity. It implies that the
party system reflects the principal cleavages in society, e.g., those in ‘ethno-culturally
homogeneous industrialized societies’ and that the cleavages between the labour and capital are
reflected through parties being positioned on a Left-Right spectrum'. In brief, this theory predicts
a high cognizance relation between political parties and social cleavages in deeply segmented
societies. This theory shall be useful in the explanation of the ‘social essence’ of the Indian
coalitional reality because it underlines the belief that politics is a mirror reflection of the society.
Since the coalition era has come to stay Indian political arena, it is essential to understand the
nature of this political development which has deep socio-cultural and economic implications.

Literature Review:
A good number of scholarly works have been written on political parties and coalition
governments during the 20th century based on the experiences of Britain and European
countries. But the classical works have been mostly based in favour of single-party majoritarian
governments and they have regarded multi-party. More objective and comparative transnational
studies appeared towards end of the century and they seemed to take the coalition phenomenon
as natural and related to political culture. The growth of the scientific interest in the study of
European Coalition politics led to the development of two approaches; the European politics
tradition and the game-theoretic tradition. The Chief Contributor to the latter tradition has been
William Riker whose Theory of Coalitions (1962) has become the source of the theory of
minimum winning Coalition.
The major sources upon which this study draws include the declassified cabinet record held by
the National Documentation Centre and Cabinet Secretariat Library in Islamabad, private papers,
interviews, State Reports and publications, as well as memoirs, books and academic studies. An
important drawback in the published sources about Pakistan is that their focused is primarily on
politics or policy and the sources upon which they are themselves based or the public statements
and posturing of important players. When it comes to memoirs or other firsthand accounts,
practically all of them engage in self justification and generalizes from personal experience. It is
interesting to contrast their perspectives with official record or with assessment made by the
commissions and committees constituted to submit reports on the administrations during their
period of associations with the political executives. For instance Barbara Hinckley has
categorized the major approaches to the coalition study in three broad classes, e.g. the social
psychological approach, game theoretic approach and the empirical political approach.
The most important contribution of the game theory to the study of coalition politics is size
Theory or Size principle. Riker says: "In n-person, zero sum games, where side payments are
permitted, where players are rational and where they have perfect information, only minimum
winning coalitions occur. Here, n-person means that number of persons participating in a game
should be more than two. Zero sum condition implies that loss and gains of the participating
players are equal. Rationality conditions mean that all players are rational beings and will
therefore try to maximize their gains and minimize losses. Condition of perfect information
implies the knowledge regarding the move, counter move, pay offs, and bargaining alternatives
of the players.
Lawrence C. Dodd challenges the time-old theory that a durable Cabinet (Coalitions in
Parliamentary Government, 1976) requires a majority party government and argues for a
fundamental alternation in the existing conceptions. Vernon Bogdanor (Coalition Government in
Western Europe (ed), 1983) describes the working of coalition governments in the democracies
of Western Europe. The influence of coalition politics on Cabinet, Parliament policy outputs, etc.
are studied here in the context of countries like West Germany, Norway Sweden, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Ireland. Lan Budge and Hans Keman (parties and Democracy-
Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in twenty States, 1990) analyze the actual
behavior of some four hundred governments in twenty post-war democracies and try to find
questions relating to the formation of governments, distribution of portfolios and how parties
influence policy. Michael Laver and Norman Schoefield (Multy Party Government the Politics of
Coalition in Europe, 1990) have tried to reconcile the theoretical approaches to the study. Their
work offers an accessible approach that bridges the distance between the `European Politics‟ and
`game theory‟ tradition of political science.
M.B. Naqi in his book “Pakistan at Knife’s Edge” presented the role of the PPP Government
during 2008-13. In this book the authors had tried to explain the hurdles faced by Prime Minister
Yousuf Raza Gilani as head of the government. The authors briefly examined the General
Elections as well as the Presidential Elections of 2008.
Kamila Hayat in her book “Journey to Democracy” argued that some people familiar to the
political scenario of Pakistan commented, “No one can break the PPP-PML-N alliance, even
though based on too much mistrust, because they have no other option but to stick together at this
critical juncture. “They are moving forward according to the script and nothing is out of the
script so far. PPP-PML-N alliance is tuned well and they know reality on the grounds and their
unity can help them a lot to fight the mighty establishment.”
Between the history of politics and the politics of history little efforts has been made to explain
the actual behavior of the state apparatus and the structure through power has been exercised in
Pakistan. What has been attempted is by way of ‘Development’ or “Democratic’ change /
transformation and is heavily influenced by American patronage and tutelage.

Najam Sethi's book, Same Page: Pakistan Under Imran Khan (2018-2022), provides a
comprehensive analysis of the political landscape in Pakistan during Imran Khan's tenure as
Prime Minister. The book offers a detailed narrative of the events leading to Khan's rise to
power, his governance style, and the eventual challenges that led to his downfall. This literature
review synthesizes key themes and insights from Sethi's work, contextualizing it within the
broader discourse on Pakistani politics and governance.
Sethi's Same Page is structured around the concept of the "Same Page" narrative, which refers to
the initial alignment between Imran Khan and the military establishment, particularly Army
Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa. The book chronicles how this partnership was instrumental
in facilitating Khan's ascent to power and maintaining his government amidst various political
challenges. Sethi argues that this alliance began to fray over time, leading to significant political
miscalculations that ultimately culminated in Khan's ousting through a no-confidence motion in
April 2022.

Methodology:

The nature of the research is qualitative that is based on theoretical generalizations about the
coalition government. This qualitative mode of research is descriptive and explanatory while
focusing on the interpretive method of research. The present study tries to deal with facts and
patterns of behaviors and structures that modify them when people are placed in positions of
powers.

Data Collection

1. Primary Data:
o Semi-structured interviews with political analysts, bureaucrats, and
parliamentarians.
o Surveys targeting citizens to gauge their perception of governance under the PTI
coalition.
2. Secondary Data:
o Analysis of parliamentary records, government reports, and policy documents.
o Review of media coverage and expert commentaries.

Data Analysis

1. Qualitative Analysis:
o Thematic analysis of interviews and policy documents.
o Case studies on key governance challenges.
 2. Quantitative Analysis:
o Statistical analysis of economic, social, and political indicators (e.g., GDP growth,
Human Development Index, political stability indices).

Research Objectives

1. To analyze the performance of the PTI-led coalition government in Pakistan (2018-2022).

2. To evaluate the impact of coalition politics on governance, policy-making, and stability.
3. To identify the strengths and weaknesses of coalition governance during the PTI era.
4. To provide policy recommendations for improving coalition governance frameworks in
Pakistan.

Research Questions

1. What were the key challenges faced by the PTI-led coalition government?
2. How did coalition dynamics influence policy decisions and governance outcomes?
3. To what extent did the PTI coalition deliver on its electoral promises?
4. What lessons can be drawn from the PTI era for future coalition governments?

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study on "Coalition Governments in Pakistan: An Analytical Assessment

of Deliverance During the PTI Era (2018-2022)" lies in its potential to enhance understanding of
the complexities and dynamics of coalition governance in a politically fragmented environment.

Firstly, this research provides critical insights into the functioning of coalition governments
during a pivotal period in Pakistan's political history. By examining the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
(PTI) era, the study highlights how coalition dynamics influenced governance outcomes, policy
implementation, and political stability. Understanding these factors is essential for assessing the
effectiveness of governance in a country where no single party often secures a majority.

Secondly, the study addresses significant economic implications resulting from coalition politics.
The PTI government faced substantial economic challenges, including rising inflation and
unemployment rates. By analyzing these economic indicators within the context of coalition
governance, the research will contribute to discussions on how political alliances impact
economic policy and public welfare.

Moreover, this research has implications for democratic processes in Pakistan. Coalition
governments can either strengthen or undermine democratic institutions depending on their
ability to function cohesively. By evaluating how coalition dynamics affected legislative
productivity and public trust during the PTI era, this study will provide valuable lessons for
future coalitions and their role in fostering democratic governance.

Chapter Scheme

1. Introduction
2. Historical Analysis of the Coalition Government 1947-2018
3. Formation of the Coalition Government 2018
4. Assessing the Achievements of the Coalition Government
5. Assessing the Challenges of the Coalition Government
6. Conclusion

Selected Bibliography

Books

1. Akhtar, N. (2019). The PTI Coalition Government: Challenges and Opportunities.

Lahore: Punjab University Press.
2. Rais, R. B. (2008). Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State in Pakistan.
Lexington Books.
3. Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. A. (1996). Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and
Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge University Press.
4. Müller, W. C., & Strom, K. (2003). Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford
University Press.
5. Sial, S. (2019). Coalition Politics in Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities. Islamabad:
South Asian Studies Publications.
6. Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perception Index. Transparency
International.
7. World Bank. (2022). Pakistan Development Update. World Bank Publications.
 8. Bellamy, R. (2012). Democracy, Compromise and the Representation Paradox.
Cambridge University Press.
9. Cheema, A. (2018). Governance in Pakistan: A Historical Perspective. Oxford
University Press.
10. Nasr, S. V. R. (2001). Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power. Oxford
University Press.
11. Siddiqui, R. (2020). Economic Policy Reforms in Pakistan: Challenges and
Opportunities. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
12. Ahmed, M. (2015). Political Economy of Pakistan’s Development. Karachi: Oxford
University Press.
13. Cohen, S. P. (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press.
14. Haqqani, H. (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
15. Jaffrelot, C. (2002). A History of Pakistan and Its Origins. Anthem Press.
16. Hussain, M. (2021). Political Dynamics in Pakistan: Past, Present, and Future. Lahore:
Vanguard Books.
17. Ziring, L. (1997). Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. Oxford
University Press.
18. Waseem, M. (2019). Democracy and Governance in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford
University Press.
19. Malik, H. (2006). The History of Pakistan. Greenwood Publishing Group.
20. Khan, M. (2022). The Politics of Reform in Pakistan: Achievements and Challenges.
Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

Articles

1. Sial, S. (2019). “Coalition Politics in Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities.” Journal of

South Asian Studies, 34(2), 123-140.
2. Khan, T. (2022). “Governance and Coalitions in Pakistan: Lessons from the PTI
Experience.” South Asian Journal of Political Science, 9(3), 34-50.
3. Akhtar, N. (2019). "The PTI Coalition Government: Challenges and Opportunities."
Journal of Political Studies, 26(1), 45-60.
4. Ahmed, Z. (2021). “The Role of Political Alliances in Parliamentary Democracies.”
Asian Journal of Governance, 12(4), 67-80.
5. Raza, S., & Ahmed, H. (2021). “Coalition Politics and Governance in Pakistan: A Case
Study of the PTI Era.” Asian Journal of Governance, 12(2), 89-102.
6. Bellamy, R. (2012). “Democracy, Compromise and the Representation Paradox.”
Government and Opposition, 47(3), 441-465.
7. Hussain, A. (2020). "Parliamentary Dynamics in Pakistan: A Case Study of Coalitions."
Pakistan Political Review, 15(2), 56-78.
8. Malik, R. (2022). "Coalitions and Governance Effectiveness in Developing
Democracies." Comparative Politics Journal, 10(3), 122-137.
9. Anwar, M. (2020). “Coalition Politics and Economic Reforms in Pakistan.” Journal of
South Asian Studies, 33(1), 88-104.
10. Javed, N. (2021). "Challenges of Coalition Governments in Pakistan's Federal System."
International Review of Public Policy, 9(2), 110-128.