The print, electronic and social media are engaged in an emotive discussion, pro and contra, over the

formation and motives of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of parties representing
different shades of political ideologies.

Proponents of the PDM argue that the alliance has been formed with an avowed objective to remove
the incumbent government — “a product of political engineering” — through a democratic process in
order to ensure and protect federal, democratic, parliamentary supremacy of parliament and the
Constitution and to put an end to the intrusive role of institutions not ordained by law and the
Constitution.

In this context, the PDM has, with consensus, already formulated a 12-point agenda, the crux of which
has already been mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph. The other points on the charter include calls for
establishing an independent judiciary; carrying out reforms for free and fair elections; ensuring the basic
and democratic rights of the public; protecting provincial rights and the 18th Amendment; setting up an
effective mechanism for local governments; allowing free speech and independent media; eliminating
extremism and terrorism; introducing an emergency economic package to eliminate poverty, inflation
and unemployment; and protection and ensuring implementation on the Islamic sections of the
Constitution.

On the other hand, critics of the PDM call it an alliance of strange bedfellows with nothing in common.
They believe their only motive is to dislodge an elected government in order to escape accountability
and the due process of law; and that they are crying hoarse to gain national reconciliation dubbed as
NRO. However, the Prime Minister has vowed not to let them off the hook in matters of corruption.

The critics say that the member parties of the alliance are all at cross purposes. For example, Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) is a religio-political party that advocates a puritan Islamic model for the
country with its own interpretation of history; the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan National
Party (PNP) support secular parties; and the PML-N is a centre-right party. With their ideologies at
variance with each other, their inner and inherent contradictions are highly likely to unfold at some
point.

Now let’s see what has led to these political parties, which have mostly rivaled each other, to get form
an alliance.
Our political history tells us that the PDM-like alliances are not new in our country — not even
elsewhere in the world for that matter. On the contrary, whenever political and democratic forces stood
divided against a common enemy, it resulted in the elimination of opponents, one by one. For instance,
the rise of fascism and Nazism in Germany and Italy are the portrayal of the division of the Germans on
religious, democratic and Communist lines. The alliance — later comprising the United States,
Communist USSR, and the UK to roll back the onslaught of Germany, Italy and Japan — is another fact of
history, though Communism diametrically opposed the ideals of the other allies.

Similarly, soon after the establishment of Pakistan, we observed the emergence of alliances against the
governments of the Pakistan Muslim League, accused of clamping down on dissenting voices, muffling
the press and indulging in undemocratic acts like denying rights to the people and the regions.

In 1953, the Awami League, Krishak Sramik Party, the Nizam-i-Islam, and other parties forged an alliance
and fought elections under a 21-point manifesto, which routed the Muslim League in the elections.

The formation of the Combined Opposition Parties in 1964; the fielding of Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah
against General Ayub Khan for the presidential election; the establishment of Pakistan Democratic
Movement under Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and its conversion into the Democratic Action Committee;
the emergence of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in 1977; the formation of the Movement for
Restoration for Democracy; and the creation of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) against the PPP and the
Alliance for Restoration of Democracy against General Musharraf are illustrations of the history of the
political alliances either formed by democratic forces themselves without any external influence or at
the behest of forces alien to the Constitution.

No doubt, most of these alliances have acted as a propelling force against the dictators, forcing them to
abdicate power, paving the way for democracy. However in 1977, the PNA was considered detrimental
to the democratic ethos and resulted in the wrapping up of the constitutional rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
abrogation of the Constitution, and eventually the hanging of the most popular leader of the country by
General Ziaul Haq, with a devastating effect on the political and social fabric of the country.

The IJI is also alleged to have been masterminded by extra-constitutional forces, with the intent to
browbeat the PPP — a progressive political force — for not toeing their line.

Most of these alliances in the past had been triggered by the ruthless and dictatorial polices of the
regime in place then. These regimes could not respond to the democratic aspirations of the people and
relied on the kinetic energy of the state. Such polices had set in motion a chain reaction which was tried
to be controlled through central and bureaucratic machinations ultimately resulting in the crashing of
the system. Coercive means had not worked in the past and are not likely to work now or in the future.

The PDM leaders have also been loud and clear that every constituent of the alliance would contest
election under its own symbol.

The PDM opponents believe that the PTI has no moral ground to criticise them as it has itself allied with
the Pakistan Awami Tehrik of Allama Tahir-ul Qadri and the Awami Muslim League of Sheikh Rasheed for
staging a sit-in in Islamabad during their time in the opposition.

The political history of Pakistan suggests that political alliances are justified as long as the democratic
process is not derailed. The political forces must learn from the history by setting rules of the political
game and affording space to each other for the cause of democracy.

It is time for the government to reach out to the opposition so as to avoid any grave consequences.

PAKISTAN is no stranger to coalition governments. In the current scenario, the possibility of such a
dispensation is once again gaining currency. The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, which lasted
from August 1947 to October 1954, saw various political parties forming alliances within the legislature
to run the affairs of the state. Since then, coalition governments have been a recurring phenomenon in
national politics, reflecting the country’s diverse political landscape and complex socioeconomic
dynamics.
Coalition governments in Pakistan are typically formed after elections when no single party secures a
clear majority in the National Assembly. Political parties engage in post-election negotiations and
alliances to form a government. These alliances are often based on shared ideological interests, regional
considera- tions, and power-sharing agreements.

Once formed, coalition governments also face the challenge of balancing the interests and demands of
coalition partners while maintaining stability and governance. Decision-making processes can be
complex, requiring consensus-building and compromise among coalition partners.

Coalition governments in Pakistan encounter several challenges that can impact their stability and
effectiveness. One of the primary challenges is the risk of internal discord and defections within a
coalition that can destabilise the government and lead to early elections or political crises.

Moreover, coalition governments often face criticism for being prone to horse- trading, nepotism and
corruption. This ends up undermining public trust and confidence in the entire political system.

The prevalence of coalition govern-ments in Pakistan has had both positive and negative implications for
political stability and democratic consolidation, but the latter cateogry seems to have left the former
way behind in competition. A coalition government, for instance, has never quite become a government
reflecting national consensus.

Frequent changes in government and coalition realignments can, and often do, lead to political
uncertainty and gover- nance instability, undermining institu- tional trust and democratic norms.
Therefore, striking a balance between coalition politics and governance effec- tiveness is essential for
strengthening the political stability structure of the country.

Coalition governments are a defining feature of Pakistani politics. In the wake of the recent elections, it
is imperative to critically examine the dynamics of coalition politics and its implications for political
stability, governance effec- tiveness and democratic consolidation.
By addressing the challenges and harnessing the potential of coalition governments, Pakistan can
strengthen its democratic institutions and can advance socioeconomic development in the years to
come. The bif question is, will we

1965 Pakistani presidential election

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Pakistan's first presidential elections were held on 2 January 1965. The voting was to be indirect, as the
President had to be elected by the 80,000 "basic democrats", who made up the Electoral College. These
Basic Democrats were democratically elected public representatives who served in the Divisional,
District, Tehsil or Union councils. There have been multiple accusations of Pakistan’s military
establishment rigging the election in favor of General Ayub Khan.

Pakistan's Presidential Election, 1965

2 January 1965 1988 →

80,000 Basic Democrats

40,001 votes needed to win

Turnout

79,700 (99.63%)[1]

Nominee Ayub Khan Fatima Jinnah

Party CML COP

Electoral vote 49,951 28,691

Percentage 62.43% 35.86%

Ayub Khan

CML

Elected President

Ayub Khan

CML

There were two major parties contesting the elections: the Convention Muslim League and the
Combined Opposition Parties. The Combined Opposition Parties consisted of five major opposition
parties, and had a nine-point program, which included the restoration of parliamentary democracy and
introduction of direct elections and adult franchise. The Combined Opposition Parties had no single
leadership and were therefore, unable to select a presidential candidate from amongst themselves.
Hence, they chose Fatima Jinnah as their candidate who was seen as an undisputed leader due to her
relationship with Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Meanwhile, the candidate for Convention Muslim League was
the incumbent President Mohammed Ayub Khan.

Contents

Election campaign

edit

There were four candidates: Ayub Khan, Fatima Jinnah and two independent candidates, K.M. Kamal
and Mian Bashir Ahmed.[2][3]There was a short campaigning period of one month, which was further
restricted to nine projection meetings that were organized by the Election Commission and were
attended only by the members of the Electoral College and members of the press. The public was barred
from attending the projection meetings, which would have enhanced Fatima Jinnah's image.[4]

Ayub Khan

edit
Since then, he had been serving as a President. He consolidated his position as a Constitutional ruler by
drafting the 1962 constitution. At the time the elections were held, Ayub had introduced a number of
Economic reforms that had increased the growth rate of the country and had also pulled it out of the
severe economic crisis that had begun after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. This made
Ayub a popular ruler. Moreover, being the Commander in Chief of Army, he took several steps to turn
the odds in his favour. He didn't even hesitate to legislate on electoral matters, giving him an edge over
rival candidate, Fatima Jinnah.

Fatima Jinnah

edit

The campaign of Fatima Jinnah suffered from a number of setbacks. An unfair and unequal election
campaign, poor finances, and indirect elections through the Basic Democracy System were some of the
primary problems she faced. However, she had overwhelming support among the public. Many had
sympathies with her as she was the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, whilst others saw her as an
excellent figure to challenge Ayub Khan's Military Dictatorship. Although many clerics had denounced
her with the view that a woman cannot lead a Muslim state, several religious leaders also supported
her. The Jamaat-e-Islami led by Maududi, was a keen supporter of Ms. Jinnah's campaign as she was a
conservative motivated by religious views, as compared to secular Ayub Khan.[5]

Results and aftermath

edit

The election results came in favour of the incumbent President Ayub Khan, who, despite losing the
popular vote, won 62.43% of the Electoral vote. Fatima Jinnah won 35.86% of the electoral college
votes.[6] Jinnah was however extremely successful in some areas of the country. She had swept across
major urban centres such as Karachi and Dhaka. Ayub also faced disappointing results in East Pakistan.
However, Ayub had decisively triumphed in rural Pakistan. As majority of the Electoral College consisted
of representatives from the rural setup, Ayub was able to win a clear majority.

The election results were not accepted by the Combined Opposition Parties, who accused Ayub Khan of
rigging. The COP staged demonstrations and protests, however, didn't gain much public support as
Jinnah, accepted the election results. The Election had an effective result. It further strengthened the
role of Women in politics in Pakistan. Earlier there were only a handful of women politicians, however
since this election women began to enter politics in large numbers and even started to contest for
higher posts
Pakistan National Alliance

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Not to be confused with National Alliance (Pakistan).

The Pakistan National Alliance (Urdu: ‫پاکستان قومی اتحاد‬, Acronym: PNA), was a populist and
consolidated right and left political alliance, consisting of nine political parties of the country. Formed in
1977, the country's leading right-wing parties agreed upon to run a political campaign as a single bloc
against the left oriented PPP in the 1977 general elections.

Pakistan National Alliance

‫پاکستان قومی اتحاد‬

Presidium

Abul Maududi (JI)

Ahmad Noorani (JuP)

Zahoor Illahi (PML)

Asghar Khan (TeI)

Founded

5 January 1977

Dissolved

24 January 1978

Ideology

Conservatism

Capitalism
Political position

Right-wing

Colors

Green

Slogan

Nizam-e-Mustafa (1977)

Party flag

Politics of PakistanPolitical partiesElections

Despite each parties standing with a different ideology, PNA was noted for its large physical momentum
and its right-wing orientation, originally aimed to oppose Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP.
[1] Despite its right-wing populist agenda, the alliance performed poorly in the 1977 general election
and levelled accusations of rigging the elections. After months of spontaneous violent political activism,
the martial law came in effect under chief of army staff General Zia-ul-Haq who made call for a political
retribution. By 1978, the alliance met its end when parties diverged in each of its agenda. The left-wing
parties later would form the MRD alliance under PPP to oppose President Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s and
the right-wing forming the IDA alliance under PML.

The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), Urdu: ‫رئ بحالی جموریت‬ ‫اتحاد ب ا‬, was a political
alliance in Pakistan founded in 1981 by the political parties opposing the military government of
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the sixth president of Pakistan. Headed by Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan
People's Party, its objective was the end of martial law and restoration of the democracy.

Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

Presidium

Rasool Bux Palijo (Awami Tahreek)

Benazir Bhutto (PPP)

Shaheed Fazil Rahu (Awami Tahreek)

Jam Saqi (CPP)

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI(F))

Founded

8 February 1981

Dissolved

24 August 1988

Ideology

Left-wing populism

Socialism

Political position

Left-wing

Colors

Red

Party flag

Politics of PakistanPolitical partiesElections

Formed in February 1981, the alliance was noted for its left-wing populism orientation and had Pakistan
Peoples Party (PPP), Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan Muslim League (Khwaja Khairuddin group),
Pakistan Democratic Party, Tehreek-e-Istiqlal, Awami Tehreek, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, and Mazdoor
Kisan Party. The alliance was rooted in rural areas of Sindh Province and remained mostly nonviolent,
was strongest among supporters of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Though it launched one of the
most massive nonviolent movements in South Asia since the time of Gandhi, failure to expand beyond
its southern stronghold combined with effective repression from the military led to its demise a year and
half later. The alliance dissolved within a week after the death of Zia which marked its way for general
elections, outlined the return of Pakistan Peoples Party in national power.[1]

Islami Jamhoori Ittehad

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The Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (lit. 'Islamic Democratic Alliance'; acronym: IJI; Urdu: ‫)اسالمی جمہوری اتحاد‬
was a right-wing conservative alliance formed in September 1988 to oppose the democratic socialist
Pakistan Peoples Party in elections that year.[2] The alliance comprised nine parties, of which the major
components were the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), National Peoples Party (NPP) and Jamaat-e-Islami
(JI), with PML accounting for 80% of the IJI's electoral candidates. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
agency, under director Hamid Gul, had a major role in forming the right-of-centre political alliance.[3][4]
Care had been taken to ensure that the alliance comprised nine parties to generate comparison with the
nine-party Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) that had campaigned against PPP in 1977.[5]

Islami Jamhoori Ittehad

Islamic Democratic Alliance

‫اسالمی جمہوری اتحاد‬

Abbreviation

IJI

IDA

Leader

Nawaz Sharif

President

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi

Chairman

Nawaz Sharif

Secretary-General

Abdul Ghafoor Ahmed

Founder

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi

Founded

November 8, 1988; 35 years ago

Dissolved

July 18, 1993; 30 years ago

Succeeded by

PML-N

Headquarters

Islamabad

Ideology

Conservatism

Neoliberalism

Political position

Right-wing

Religion

Islam

Slogan

Nau Sitaray Bhai Bhai Benazir ki Shamat Aai[1] (lit. 'Nine Stars are brothers, here comes Benazir's
trouble')

Seats in the National Assembly (before dissolution)

111 / 207

Party flag

Politics of PakistanPolitical partiesElections

The head of the party was Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, but its most resourceful leader was Nawaz Sharif, a
young industrialist whom Zia ul-Haq had appointed chief minister of Punjab. Sharif was vying for control
of the Pakistan Muslim League, which was headed at that time by former Prime Minister Muhammad
Khan Junejo.[6]

It won only fifty-three seats in the National Assembly, compared with ninety-two won by the PPP. Most
IJI seats were won in Punjab. Nawaz Sharif emerged from the 1988 elections as the most powerful
politician outside the PPP. In December 1988, he succeeded in forming an IJI administration in Punjab
and became the province's chief minister. It was from this power base that he waged the political battles
that eventually led to his becoming prime minister in 1990. In the supercharged atmosphere of the 1990
elections, the electorate surprised observers. Neither the IJI nor the PPP was expected to come up with
a firm mandate to rule. Yet the IJI received a strong mandate to govern, winning 105 seats versus forty-
five seats for the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA), of which the PPP was the main component in the
National Assembly.[7] Opposition groups alleged large scale selective rigging of seats to not just ensure
an IJI victory but also prevent those opposed to Military influence from being elected.[8]

In the 1993 national elections, the IJI coalition no longer existed to bring together all the anti-PPP forces.
The religious parties expended most of their energies trying to form a workable electoral alliance rather
than bolstering the candidacy of Nawaz Sharif, the only person capable of challenging Benazir Bhutto.

Islami Jamhori Ittehad was an establishment-backed political alliance against the Benazir Bhutto-led
PPP , formed after doling out money to the politicians, which caused the PPP's defeat in the said general
elections. In 1993, former Air Chief Asghar Khan had moved SC against foul play in the 1990 general
elections. The case is also known as Mehrangate scandal.

Alliance for Restoration of Democracy

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The Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) was an alliance of the two then largest political
parties in Pakistan - the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) formed on 3
December 2000. The two parties had been known to be Pakistan’s mainstream moderate parties, and
together represented the majority of Pakistan’s electorate at that time.[1]
The ARD was created to campaign for Pakistan’s return to civilian rule after the 1999 military coup led by
General Musharraf and was reported to include over a dozen political parties.[1] The alliance believed
that the people of Pakistan deserve nothing less than an opportunity to freely elect leaders that
represent their views and ideals.[1]

There had been corruption cases and allegations against both political party leaders, but they continued
to remain unproven and widely accepted to be politically motivated. Makhdoom Amin Fahim resigned
from presidency of ARD on 24 March 2008, and Rao Javed Ali Khan became the acting Chairman of ARD.
The ARD was later disbanded because it was never able to mobilize popular support against the Pervez
Musharraf government. Later, both major parties of Pakistan, PML (N) and PPP, contested the 2008
Pakistani general election independently.[1][2]

The Pakistan Democratic Movement (Urdu: ‫ ;پاکستان ڈیموکریٹک موومنٹ‬PDM) was a coalition of
political parties in Pakistan.[6] It was founded in September 2020 as a opposition movement against
Imran Khan, accusing his administration of poor governance, political victimization of opponents, and
mismanaging the economy and foreign policy. Imran Khan often rebuked such allegations, during and
after his tenure as Prime Minister [7]

Pakistan Democratic Movement

President

Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI-F)

Secretary-General

Shahid Khaqan Abbasi (PML-N)[1]

Spokesperson

Hafiz Hamdullah (JUI-F)[2]

Vice President

Mahmood Khan Achakzai (PkMAP)[3]

Senior Vice President

Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (QWP)[4]

Founders
Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI-F)

Asif Ali Zardari (PPP)

Shehbaz Sharif (PML-N)

Founded

20 September 2020; 3 years ago

Dissolved

September 2023[5]

Ideology

Anti-PTI

Political position

Big tent

Colors

Green

Politics of PakistanPolitical partiesElections

All Parties Conference on 20 September 2020 in which PDM was founded

The coalition was also joined by several dissident members of Khan's own party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf (PTI).[8]

On 10 April 2022, the coalition succeeded to oust Khan through a no-confidence motion,[9][10][11] after
which the PDM formed its own government, choosing the opposition leader Shehbaz Sharif as the
country's prime minister.

The president of PDM was Fazal-ur-Rehman and the spokesperson was Hafiz Hamdullah, both from
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUIF).[2] Shahid Khaqan Abbasi of the Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN) was the
Secretary-General, Mahmood Khan Achakzai of the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) was the Vice
President, and Aftab Sherpao of the Qaumi Watan Party (QWP) was the Senior Vice President of the
alliance.[3][4][1] PDM's former Senior Vice President was Raja Pervaiz Ashraf of the Pakistan Peoples
Party (PPP), while the former spokesperson was Mian Iftikhar Hussain of the Awami National Party
(ANP).[12][13]

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THE RISE OF THE OPPOSITION?

Does the newly formed PDM have the street power, the tenacity and, most of all, the unity to force a
hybrid regime to its knees?

Zahid Hussain Published October 4, 2020

The opposition has finally thrown down the gauntlet, challenging not only the ruling PTI government but
also its military backers. But does the newly formed Pakistan Democratic Movement have the street
power, the tenacity and, most of all, the unity to force a hybrid regime to its knees? And what can the
history of previous anti-government alliances tell us about what the future holds in store for the
country?

While PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif’s aggressive virtual address from London at the opposition’s All
Parties Conference (APC) on September 20 has set the narrative for the new multiparty alliance, under
the banner of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), it has also generated a political maelstrom.
The ruling party, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), took no time in declaring the three-time former
prime minister ‘anti-state.’

Then came a litany of disclosures about the opposition leaders regularly meeting the army chief.
Seemingly upset with Sharif’s tough anti-establishment stance, the military spokesman also joined the
controversy, revealing a recent backroom meeting of a senior PML-N leader with the army chief. Such
meetings between politicians and the army leadership are not unusual in this country, where the
establishment is seen as all-powerful. But making those interactions public is aimed at rupturing the
alliance before it has taken off the ground. The game is on.
The 26-point resolution adopted by the APC vows to oust, what it describes as, the “selected prime
minister” through a mass movement, and calls for an end to the establishment’s role in politics. There
had been many attempts over the last two years to bring the fractious opposition groups together on a
common anti-government agenda but they had so far failed until now.

This was mainly because the two largest parties — the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and PML-N — didn’t
want to take actions that could derail the political process put in place after the departure of Gen
Musharraf in 2008. But the relentless persecution of opposition leaders in the name of accountability
seems to have pushed the two parties to the wall.

The anti-establishment agenda of the newly formed alliance also signifies a marked shift in the
opposition’s stance. The focus is now on the security establishment, that is believed to be the real
power behind the Imran Khan government. In the words of the ousted three- time prime minister, it’s
the “state above the state” that needs to be taken on.

This narrative may have become a clarion call for the newly formed alliance, but it remains to be seen
whether it could also help galvanise the masses. Taking on a government that is fast losing its support
base is one thing, but directly challenging the all-powerful security establishment will be a serious test
for the motley coalition. The alliance has announced a phased plan to oust the PTI government through
mass action. But it will be a real test for these parties to bring the people out on the streets and confront
the security establishment.

Political parties in Pakistan have found themselves at similar junctures in the past. Revisiting this
chequered history can reveal lessons to be learnt and may even provide glimpses of what might lie
ahead.

ANTI-GOVERNMENT ALLIANCES

Making and breaking of alliances has been a prominent feature of party politics in Pakistan for the past
seven decades.
In most cases, alliances were formed when political parties were inadequately represented in the
parliament and the democratic process was stalled under authoritarian rules. The alliances would
invariably break up once the objective was achieved and the component parties would go back to their
old rivalries and engage in battle for political power.

However, the circumstances of the formation of PDM are different. Although the opposition parties are
adequately represented in the legislative assemblies and even have a stake in the power structure, it is
the shrinking democratic space that seems to have brought the opposition parties together.

Pakistan’s political history has seen many alliances being formed with strange bedfellows. For example,
Combined Opposition Parties (COP) in 1964, the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) in 1968, the
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in 1977, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in
1983, and the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) in 2002.

AYUB KHAN VS COP / DAC

It was in 1964 when five main opposition political parties formed an alliance under the banner of
Combined Opposition Parties (COP) against Pakistan’s first military rule, led by Gen Ayub Khan, who had
seized power in a coup in 1958. It was a rare coalition of the left, right and centrist parties, united on a
nine-point agenda, that included restoration of direct elections, adult franchise and democratisation of
the 1962 Constitution. The parties that formed COP included the Pakistan Muslim League (Council), the
Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the National Awami Party (NAP) led by Maulana
Bhashani, the NAP faction led by Wali Khan, and the Jamaat-e-Islami. It was a formidable alliance, with
mass roots in both East and West Pakistan.

In the same year, the alliance put up Fatima Jinnah as its candidate for president against Ayub Khan. The
orthodox religious political parties, including the Jamaat-i-Islami, modified their stance and supported a
woman candidate for the country’s highest political office.

Miss Fatima Jinnah during her campaign in late 1964 leading to the presidential elections in Chittagong,
East Pakistan, as a candidate for the Combined Opposition Party whose main opponent was President
Ayub Khan. She was supported, among others, by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (left) and his Awami League |
Dawn/White Star Archives

It was an indirect election and the vote was held amongst the 80,000 “basic democrats.” These basic
democrats were members of the urban and regional councils, and constituted the Electoral College for
Presidential and Assembly elections. During the campaign, Ayub Khan went on to declare the sister of
the founder of Pakistan a ‘foreign agent’ — a tactic those after him have continued to use to discredit
opponents. Although the general won the election held on 2 January 1965, amid allegations of
widespread rigging, his stranglehold on power had started eroding.

Two years later, in 1967, five opposition parties got together, forming a group incidentally also called the
Pakistan Democratic Movement, to continue the struggle for restoration of democracy. Nawabzada
Nasrullah Khan, a veteran politician, led the alliance. The alliance was later renamed as the Democratic
Action Committee (DAC).

In October 1968, Ayub Khan celebrated 10 years of what his supporters described as a ‘Decade of
Development.’ But the celebrations triggered a nationwide movement against the authoritarian rule.
Led by student and labour unions, the protests turned into a mass uprising. Later joined by opposition
political parties, it became the most powerful democratic movement in the country’s history.

Ayub Khan reacted by alternating conciliation and repression. The army was called into Pakistan’s major
cities to suppress the protests. And, as the situation went out of control of the local authorities, curfews
were imposed in large parts of the country. But all those repressive measures became ineffective in
front of a people’s revolt.

In February 1969, Ayub Khan released political prisoners and invited the DAC for negotiations. He agreed
to hold fresh elections under a new constitution and not to stand for re-election in 1970. But it was too
late for him to reach a political settlement, as violence continued. Meanwhile, he had lost the
confidence of his generals.

General Ayub Khan, Supreme Commander and Chief Martial Law Administrator, smiling after having
addressed the nation on Radio Pakistan on October 8, 1958 – a day after he abrogated the Constitution
and imposed Pakistan’s first Martial Law. He is flanked here by senior bureaucrat Aziz Ahmed (left) and
Lt-Gen Majeed Malik (right) who was instrumental in making it all happen. Seen behind them are Lt-Gen
Yahya Khan (extreme left) and Zulfiqar Ali Bukhari (second from left) | Hasan Bozai
On March 25, 1969, martial law was again proclaimed and Gen Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the army
commander in chief, took over the reins of power. The 1962 constitution was abrogated. The new
military ruler promised to hold elections on the basis of adult franchise to the National Assembly, which
would draw up a new constitution. He also entered into negotiations with the DAC and leaders of other
mainstream political parties.

The opposition alliance demanded the lifting of the state of emergency and the cancelling of the criminal
law amendment, which had been invoked against political leaders. The Yahya government agreed to the
DAC demands. However, it was hardly a complete victory for the opposition alliance; when it came to
the election time, all that was promised by the Yahya government was not delivered.

BHUTTO VS PNA

That period also saw the emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former foreign minister in the Ayub
government, as the main opposition voice. His populist socialist slogans galvanised the youth, workers
and urban middle classes. In 1969 he formed the PPP, which soon became the most powerful political
force in the then West Pakistan.

In 1970, general elections were held on the basis of adult franchise. But the military regime refused to
transfer power to the East Pakistan-based Awami League, which had emerged as the largest party in the
parliament. A military operation in the then East Pakistan led to the disintegration of the country. The
military handed over power of the truncated country to Bhutto, whose PPP had won the largest number
of seats from West Pakistan.

Perhaps the biggest achievement of the Bhutto government was to give the country a new federal
constitution. The 1973 Constitution, as it is known, was the first one in Pakistan to be framed by elected
representatives. It was passed unanimously. It provided the framework for a functioning democracy.

After the completion of his five-year terms, Bhutto held parliamentary elections in 1977. But the polls
were marred by allegations of massive rigging.
Making and breaking of alliances has been a prominent feature of party politics in Pakistan for the past
seven decades.

Several opposition parties had formed an electoral alliance, called the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)
before the elections. The alliance, which mostly comprised right-wing groups, rejected the election
results and launched countrywide protests against the alleged election rigging and demanded fresh
elections. It also galvanised the support of the urban middle classes.

Some left-wing groups that had suffered persecution under the Bhutto regime also joined the anti-
government protests, which continued for months. The PNA’s main strength came from the trading and
business classes and industrialists, who had been affected by Bhutto’s sweeping nationalisation of
industries and private enterprises. The PNA movement paralysed the government.

It was different from previous opposition alliances, which had all been against military rule. It was a
movement against a civilian government accused of curbing democratic rights and turning the country
into a police state. It was widely believed that the movement was backed by certain ‘elements’ in the
security establishment, who were unhappy with Bhutto’s populist politics.

As protests swept the country, Bhutto finally agreed to hold talks with the PNA. After weeks of
negotiations, the two sides did reach an agreement on holding fresh elections. But soon after the accord
was finalised, the military moved in and overthrew the Bhutto government on July 5, 1977. The Chief of
Army Staff, Gen Muhammad Ziaul Haq, became Chief Martial Law Administrator. The PNA movement
too ended in a military takeover, like those before it.

GEN ZIA VS MRD

Less than six years after the end of Gen Yahya’s government, the military was back at the helm. Some
members of the alliance also joined Gen Zia’s military government. The military regime put the
constitution in abeyance and arrested Bhutto and other PPP leaders.
Zia promised to hold elections within 90 days but he never did. Fearing that polls would not deliver
results in their favour, most PNA leaders also called for their postponement. Their support for military
rule brought into question the PNA’s supposed democratic credentials. In 1979, the military government
executed Pakistan’s first elected prime minister on what were widely considered trumped up murder
charges. Gen Zia established a harsh rule.

Many still maintain that this was the darkest period of Pakistan’s history.

Zia was not only an authoritarian; he also aspired to turn Pakistan into an ideological state ruled by strict
Islamic sharia laws. He pursued a broad policy of ‘Islamisation’ of a particularly reactionary orientation.
He was an unpopular and controversial leader, whose survival in power largely owed to the external
factors that had emerged after the invasion by Soviet forces of Pakistan’s north-western neighbour,
Afghanistan, in 1979. Pakistan became a frontline state and a bulwark in the West’s war against
communism.

Bhutto’s execution triggered protests across the country. The reaction was much more severe in Sindh.
Thousands of PPP supporters were jailed, and many of them remained imprisoned for the next decade.
The first organised opposition movement against Zia’s military regime emerged in 1981, when 11
diverse political parties formed an alliance called the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
(MRD).

Besides the PPP, the coalition included the Awami Tehrik, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, NAP, the National
Democratic Party, the Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party, the Pakistan Muslim League, the Pakistan National
Party, the Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi and the Tehreek-i-Istiqlal. Interestingly, some of them were part of the
PNA movement against the PPP government, but were now united in opposition to the military
government.

This tradition of political foes forming temporary friendships continues to this day, as seen by the
coming together of the opposition at the recent APC.

Given the lessons of the past alliances, PDM may not be able to bring down the government or weaken
the establishment’s hold on politics but, it could well build resistance to any attempt to establish an
authoritarian regime.
It took some time for the alliance to organise the resistance. It gained some momentum when, in 1983,
it launched a civil disobedience movement. The movement took a violent turn when the MRD workers
attacked the Dadu jail and freed scores of prisoners. Government properties were attacked and, in some
areas, protesters engaged in armed confrontations with the law enforcing agencies.

This movement lasted for almost three months and its effects were mainly felt in the interior of Sindh. It
was the first time in Pakistan’s history that rural areas became the centre of a political movement. The
military regime resorted to brute force, killing scores of people in interior Sindh.

The movement, however, failed to mobilise people in other parts of the country and, particularly, in
urban areas. It largely remained a Sindh-based movement. The Zia regime tried to portray MRD as an
Indian-backed conspiracy to destabilise Pakistan, and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s statement in
support of the movement was used by the military regime to malign MRD. The regime arrested all top
MRD leaders, including Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto. Its shortcomings notwithstanding, the
movement eventually forced the military ruler to announce a plan to hold general elections in 1985.

In 1984, Zia called for a referendum, seeking approval for his authoritarian brand of ‘Islamisation’. The
MRD boycotted the referendum, and only 10 percent of eligible voters participated. Nonetheless, Zia
declared a sweeping victory and hung on to office. In 1984, the military regime allowed Benazir Bhutto
to leave for London.

The movement lost momentum after the non-party-based general elections in 1985. The PPP and other
allied parties boycotted the polls. But the decision to boycott the 1985 elections proved to be a serious
miscalculation.

Contrary to MRD’s expectations, the voter turnout was substantial. A large number of PPP members also
participated in the elections, defying the party decision. Following the elections, Zia lifted martial law
but remained president in military uniform.

When Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan in April 1986, she received an unprecedented public
reception. But her attempt to launch a movement for fresh elections failed. The death of Gen Zia in a
mysterious air crash in August 1988 brought an end to Pakistan’s longest-serving military government.
But his legacy lives on.

Gen Zia not only ushered Pakistan into its longest period of military rule, but had also extended the
army’s role in domestic politics much further than earlier military rulers. Previously, the military was
seen as the ultimate guarantor of the country’s territorial integrity and internal security. But Zia
expanded its role as the defender of Pakistan’s ideological frontiers as well.

His death left the generals with the choice of either imposing martial law again or holding elections and
transferring power to a democratically elected civilian government. They went for the second option,
realising that a perpetuation of military rule might provoke public resistance and exacerbate the turmoil
in an already highly polarised society. However, the generals were not prepared to pull out completely
and leave the political field solely to the politicians, particularly to Benazir Bhutto.

BENAZIR AND NAWAZ VS THE MILITARY

Screengrab

In an effort to contain PPP, the military cobbled together the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), uniting
all the right-wing parties under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif. The military leadership justified the
move by saying it was necessary for the viable functioning of a democratic system. The main objective,
however, was to ensure the military’s continued role in the new system.

By creating a counterbalance in the form of IDA, the generals constrained the new government of a
political party that had led the resistance against military hegemony for 10 years. The military-sponsored
alliance comprised a mix of traditional power brokers, religious parties, and politicians who had
emerged on the scene after the party-less 1985 elections.

While the IDA, which carried on Gen Zia’s legacy, could not achieve any significant electoral gains in the
1988 elections in the three smaller provinces, it did relatively well in Punjab and prevented the PPP from
winning an absolute majority in the National Assembly.
The military reluctantly handed over power to Benazir Bhutto at the centre, but prevented her party
from forming the government in Punjab — the biggest and most important of Pakistan’s four provinces.

The formal restoration of civilian rule in 1988 did not reduce the military’s clout. A return to the barracks
did not mean that the military’s structure of control and manipulation had been dismantled. A
hamstrung Benazir Bhutto found herself directly clashing with the army. She survived only 18 months in
power; her government was dismissed in August 1990.

The military leadership did not want to take any chances that time. To ensure the IDA’s electoral victory,
the ISI financed the election campaign of many top leaders of the alliance. In November 1990, Sharif
took over as Pakistan’s new prime minister. He assumed power with much greater advantages than his
predecessor had enjoyed. His accession to power brought a rare harmony to the power troika —
president, prime minister and chief of army staff.

But this harmony was not to last. Sharif sought to wear down constraints on his power imposed by his
old patrons — the military. His government was dismissed midway through his term in 1993. The game
of musical chairs continued, as it was now Benazir Bhutto’s turn to form the government again.

She returned as prime minister for the second time in November 1993, just three years after her
unceremonious exit. But her second term lasted less than three years. Her government was dismissed in
October 1996. This was the third time in eight years that an elected government had been dismissed less
than halfway through its term.

In the subsequent elections in 1997, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif was re-elected with a large
majority. But, predictably, his stay in power was short-lived this time too. He was ousted from the office
in October 1999 by a military coup. He was convicted on treason charges and later sent into exile in
Saudi Arabia.

Gen Musharraf’s military takeover met with no resistance. Ironically, most opposition political leaders,
including Benazir Bhutto — who was then living in self-exile in London — welcomed Sharif’s ouster.
Sharif’s authoritarian style of governance, and his desire to become ‘ameerul momineen’ [leader of the
faithful], had alienated not only political parties but also civil society. While Benazir Bhutto’s husband
Asif Ali Zardari was imprisoned on corruption charges, Benazir Bhutto had been forced into exile. The
divide among the political forces also allowed the military greater space.
MUSHARRAF VS ARD

Eventually, however, Gen Musharraf’s attempt to consolidate his power brought the two rivals — PPP
and PML-N — together. In 2003, the two parties formed the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy
(ARD), to challenge the military-led government. But the alliance never really took off the ground. Both
parties participated in the general elections called by the Gen Musharraf government in 2002. PML-N
had also lost its support base with the formation of a pro-military faction called the Pakistan Muslim
League - Quaid (PML-Q).

In 2006, the two former prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Sharif, signed in London a ‘Charter of
Democracy.’ But soon after signing the charter, PPP entered into negotiations with the military
government. Backroom deals had weakened the political forces. Both parties had flaunted the charter
for their own vested political interests.

Finally, after a year of upheavals and revolt, the 2008 elections saw the return of democracy in Pakistan.
Despite problems, the PPP government completed its five-year term — an unprecedented achievement
in Pakistan. The 2013 elections led to a historic transfer of power from one elected government to
another. But Sharif’s third term as prime minister met the same fate as his two previous stints in power.
Although he was removed by the Supreme Court this time, it was his clash with the security
establishment that led to his downfall.

HYBRID RULE VS PDM

Opposition leaders including Shehbaz Sharif and Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari at an All Parties Conference on
September 17 | Tanveer Shahzad/White Star

The 2018 elections have produced, what many have described as, a ‘hybrid rule’, with the security
establishment propping up a weak civilian administration. It is not surprising that the government has
survived despite a very thin majority that hinges on the support of a few disparate political parties.
The alleged support of the establishment may have given the government some semblance of stability,
but the balance sheet of the Imran Khan government on the completion of its second year in power is
far from being satisfactory. Governance remains the major problem area.

Two years on, there is no sign yet of the PTI government having developed the capability to take rational
decisions on critical domestic and foreign policy issues. The government’s increasing dependence on the
security establishment for survival has further undermined its ability to improve and course-correct.

For many years, the security establishment has been considered the determiner of national security and
foreign policy in Pakistan, but that role appears to have become more pronounced under the PTI
government. So, effectively, it is not a parallel system, or a state within the state, but the state itself that
the newly formed opposition alliance claims to be fighting.

However, there are few precedents in Pakistan’s recent history where governments have been ousted
through street agitation alone. Fighting an administration backed by the security establishment is a tall
order. It is hybrid rule that is being challenged, but the PDM is still not willing to play the most drastic
card of resigning from the assemblies, for obvious reasons.

Both the PML-N and the PPP would not want to lose their foothold in the power structure. The only
thing the alliance can then do is to increase pressure on the government through mass mobilisation on
various issues directly affecting the people. But their capacity to mobilise people to overthrow the
government remains questionable. There is also a question about the democratic credentials of some of
the political parties being represented in the PDM. This is perhaps more of a challenge to the alliance
than to the government.

SO WHAT NOW?

That the formation of the PDM has, once again, brought bitter rivals PML-N and PPP together, is
nonetheless ominous. Indeed, it signifies the shifting sands of Pakistani politics. Although it may be
sheer political expediency that has forced the disparate political groups to join hands, it has already
brought a beleaguered administration under pressure. Jointly, they have already made things more
difficult for the PTI government, which is struggling to come to grips with a dire economic situation.
The PDM has announced a phased plan to organise rallies across the country from October, and
gradually rachet up the momentum. The strategy is to make the final assault some time in March, before
the critical Senate elections, which would give the PTI control of the upper house of parliament. The
alliance seems quite confident that it can create enough public pressure to force the establishment to
pull back from supporting the Imran Khan government.

This narrative may have become a clarion call for the newly formed alliance, but it remains to be seen
whether it could also help galvanise the masses. Taking on a government that is fast losing its support
base is one thing, but directly challenging the all-powerful security establishment will be a serious test
for the motley coalition.

The main battleground is Punjab, the biggest and the most powerful province, that is also the political
stronghold of the PML-N. The party seems to have strengthened its position because of the PTI
government’s lacklustre performance. The relentless persecution of the party leaders in the name of
accountability has led to the closing of the party ranks.

Despite reservations among some party leaders over Nawaz Sharif’s hardline, anti-establishment stance,
there is no sign of any split in the ranks. Opposition leader Shehbaz Sharif’s arrest is likely to push even
the moderates to take a hardline position. The divide between the PML-N hardliners and the
pragmatists seems to be narrowing.

Most significant is the resurfacing of Maryam Nawaz on the political stage after a period of hibernation.
She has the charisma and ability to mobilise the public. It may be true that PML-N had been unable to
bring out the people when Nawaz Sharif returned home, but things seem to have changed over the past
two years, especially with the growing public discontent with the PTI government.

Despite its shrinking electoral support base, the JUI-F also has the organisational capacity and ability to
mobilise crowds drawn mainly from religious seminaries. It may not present a major threat to the
system, but it could bring an ineffectual government under severe pressure.

Given the lessons of the past alliances, PDM may not be able to bring down the government or weaken
the establishment’s hold on politics but, it could well build resistance to any attempt to establish an
authoritarian regime. A major challenge for the opposition alliance remains maintaining its unity. But, as
we have seen time and again, when push comes to shove, even the strongest political opponents can
band together to alter the course of history.

Header image: Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, along with other leaders of opposition parties, briefs media
personnel after an All Parties Conference | Irshad Sheikh/APP

The writer is an author and journalist. He tweets @hidhussain

Published in Dawn, EOS, October 4th, 2020

17

Opposition parties form alliance to oust govt

What does Nawaz Sharif want?

'Is this what state of Madina looks like?': Nawaz lashes out at PTI government

Comments (17) Closed

PopularNewestOldest

Ali Sabir

Oct 04, 2020 09:33am

Nawaz is a coward hiding out in London. His crime is lawbreaking not politics.

Recommend 0

ENKY

Oct 04, 2020 01:24pm

Bravo , all the best to democratic forces.

The Truth Spy

Oct 04, 2020 01:41pm

The fall of the opposition by the end of the day

Recommend 0

Iqbal

Oct 04, 2020 03:04pm

No comparison with that era opposition, current opporisition is totally corrupt and immoral and some
are fugitive/absconders. All these will end up in Jails, and there will be NO shows.

Recommend 0

bhaRAT©

Oct 04, 2020 03:13pm

Wishful to expect the rise of corrupt lot. People have had enough!

Recommend 0

Kumar(Varanasi)

Oct 04, 2020 04:09pm

So nothing has changed really from 1958, except fot the change of dramatis personae !

Recommend 0

Asim

Oct 04, 2020 04:50pm

It’s just an effort to get NRO as noose is getting tighter against these so called most Corrupt politicians .
It’s time to give them what they deserve for swindling this nation of its money, resources And
development!

Recommend 0

MONIER

Oct 04, 2020 05:32pm

Recommend 0

Bilal

Oct 04, 2020 05:36pm

Outside the core base, People have had enough of PPP and PMLN and the cocktail of opposition parties.
This will amount to nothing other than some virtual speeches.

Recommend 0

Keenobserver

Oct 04, 2020 06:58pm

Interesting read. 60 yrs of dramatization of alliance under name of democracy, all fir self interest. If on
one side there are authoritarians in establishment, the opposition has always been based on reasons
that served their self interest. So choice we have in Pakistan is authoritarians vs self serving rulers under
name of democracy. I will take current state over the past proven corrupts.

Recommend 0

Twins

Oct 04, 2020 07:27pm

Brilliant article....many thanks to Dawn for publishing it. It was very educative and informative.

Recommend 0

Ahmad Gul Kainth

Oct 04, 2020 07:33pm

They have no ability to make any change in current political landscape. What they really want is a easy
way out no matter how they act.

Recommend 0

Anwar Syed. St.Louis. MO. USA

Oct 04, 2020 08:07pm

Bounty head for Nawaz. I am sure he will be in Pakistan sooner then you think.

Pakistan government is really wanted him back from UK, there should be no problem.
Money talk. There will be many to take this task.

Recommend 0

Dr. Asad Sadick

Oct 04, 2020 08:34pm

This Alliance will die its natural death

Recommend 0

Sameer

Oct 04, 2020 09:58pm

zero chance. opposition is as crooked as they come.

Recommend 0

Naeem Zubair

Oct 04, 2020 11:33pm

This alliance is nothing more than bunch of criminals; looters and thieves. When thugs of an area get to
gather and sing the same song; despite their difference; then be sure that there is an HONEST police
officer in the area.

Recommend 0

Tariq K Sami, MD.

Oct 05, 2020 06:54am

Future Historians will write about the day after the Senate Elections in March.

Recommend 0

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All the administrative or policy decisions the caretakers have taken can be reversed, but their major
offence was providing full support to the establishment in tightening its control and adopting a more
hard-line approach to dealing with dissent in the country, whether from political, nationalist parties, civil
society, or the media. YouTuber Asad Ali Toor was the latest victim of this approach. The caretakers
strengthened the notion of impunity for the security agencies and crafted arguments in their support.

Slightly different from past caretaker set-ups, the last caretakers came from a background of juggling
opinions and provided full support in strengthening the establishment’s doctrine of zero tolerance. This
approach was not only exhibited in the political domain but also in dealing with the issues of Afghan
refugees and Baloch missing persons. They were seen to help the establishment craft arguments to
eliminate mediating forces between the state and insurgents or hard-line nationalists. They vocally
argued that nationalist political actors facilitated the insurgents, and their attitude heavily impacted the
Baloch and Pakhtun nationalist parties, who are still protesting against alleged election rigging. The
underlying approach was to recognise the perceived enemy and deal with them with full force.

This approach prevented state institutions from negotiating with Dr Mahrang Baloch, who led the
missing persons protest sit-in in Islamabad. This was a missed opportunity for the state to open a door
for reconciliation and begin healing the wounds of the Baloch people. It is expected that state
institutions will continue their so-called ‘zero tolerance’ approach with the help of their cronies, leaving
no room for the reconciliation necessary for meaningful engagement with nationalists and civil society.

The problem with the ‘zero-tolerance doctrine’, also referred to as the ‘doctrine of strength’, is that
while it may silence opposition, it cannot offer long-lasting solutions to problems such as the insurgency
in Balochistan, the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and its terrorist affiliates, and the lack of social
and political cohesion between the country’s power centres and peripheries. A nation’s internal strength
does not rely on suppression but on a strong social contract built by including all stakeholders.

Additionally, the ‘doctrine of strength’ is ineffective in addressing external affairs and economic
recovery, which require flexibility and adaptation to ground realities. This was evident during the
caretaker government’s tenure, where they demonstrated considerable flexibility in securing deals with
the IMF and loan rollovers from China and the Gulf countries.

Though the caretakers are leaving behind multiple challenges for the new government, it remains to be
seen how much confidence the establishment will bestow upon the new government to silence its
critics. Internal cohesion, civil liberties, a free media, and democracy would not be the new
government’s priority, and it will leave it to the establishment to deal with it in its own way. Securing
deals with the IMF and economic recovery will be the new prime minister’s priority. Inflation and
interest rates have reached their peak, leaving the new government with little choice but to accept a
new IMF programme on harsh terms.

Furthermore, the new government will need more space to develop its own economic policies, as the
SIFC is arguably dominating the finance ministry, and influencing other critical departments. This
effectively ensures that any government, regardless of its strength, will be forced to accept all of IMF’s
initial conditions. The risk of not allowing parliament and the new government to formulate their
economic reform agenda lies in potential friction among coalition partners and the triggering of civil-
military tensions.

One possible solution for the new government would be to follow the governance model established by
the caretakers. This would involve visiting campuses and offering explanations and justifications for the
state institutions’ positions on various issues, ranging from defence to the economy.

It is often observed that, governments formed on coalition partners whether at National level or in
provinces in Pakistan remain busy in safeguarding their coalition governments rather than doing their
actual job of delivering on public services to people. From 2002 to onward till 2013 General Elections, all
governments save few at center and in provinces were coalition governments. The basis of coalition
governments is in multiparty system of elections in Pakistan. As against two party system prevailing in
different democratic countries such as USA, Jamaica, and Malta, in multiparty system, citizens have
different choices of political parties and individual independent candidates to elect a candidate of their
choice.This practice is delivering good democratic trends in countries such as Germany, India, Finland,
Brazil, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, and so on and so forth. It is also observed that despite the fact that
in some countries with multi-party system, two major political parties remain in power largely by turns.
For instance, in UK, Germany, India, and also in Pakistan only major political parties forms governments.
In Pakistan, similar exercise is being observed since 1970 and two political parties such as Pakistan
Peoples Party and Pakistan Muslim League with different flavours remained in power. However, the
politics of conflict prevailing in 90s ended and political parties started forming coalition governments
even with political rivals. The best example of this practice is observed in 2008, and 2009 when Peoples
party formed coalition governments with PML-N and then PML-Q. However, the drawback of this
practice was observed that such coalitions were based on give and takes. The governments now remain
busy in protecting their coalition partners in any cost. Based on this fact people have now started
blaming that these two parties have made collusion to form governments in alternate turns and intend
not to deliver public services. The practice of coalition government will remain in Pakistan under
multiparty system until there is made changes in system.

Turbulent waters: Challenges and prospects for a coalition government in Pakistan

JAVED HASSAN

February 27, 2024 18:07

Short Url

https://arab.news/64pp2

In Pakistan’s tumultuous politics, divergent ideologies and competing interests may clash, yet find
themselves forced together. The emergence of a coalition government comprising the Pakistan Muslim
League–Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and other smaller parties presents a daunting
challenge in governance. Tasked with addressing a myriad of economic hurdles ranging from
macroeconomic instability to climate resilience, the fragile coalition will stand at the precipice of reform,
with an impatient public demanding results.

The PML-N and PPP at the heart of the coalition, each with their divergent policy agendas outlined in
their respective manifestos, present a formidable obstacle in charting a coherent economic course.
Compounding this challenge is the issue of legitimacy. Skepticism will loom large over the mandate of
the new government as it finds itself grappling to establish its credibility in the eyes of both domestic
stakeholders and international partners. This crisis of legitimacy threatens to undermine the coalition’s
ability to implement the painful and unpopular reforms that lie ahead.

For the incoming government to succeed, it must negotiate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
for a new extended fund facility (EFF) that will aim to steer Pakistan toward macroeconomic stability.
The IMF is likely to demand a comprehensive overhaul of the country’s economic framework. From
increasing tax revenue to restructuring state-owned enterprises, the laundry list of likely IMF conditions
will present a formidable challenge for a government already stretched thin by internal contradictions.
For instance, would PPP agree on the recalibration of the National Finance Commission award that the
federal government may need to survive fiscally?

The prospect for disparate political interests coalescing to do so appears dim.

- Javed Hassan
Given the borderline debt sustainability of Pakistan, the new government may also have to consider
undertaking domestic and external debt restructuring as part of its efforts to address fiscal challenges.
This could involve renegotiating debt terms with creditors to alleviate financial pressures and create
fiscal space for priority spending on essential services and infrastructure. However, debt restructuring
endeavors will need to be meticulously choreographed to avert adverse repercussions on investor
confidence and sovereign credit ratings.

Expanding on specific measures to increase tax revenue in the Pakistani context, the government will
need to explore several strategies. First, broadening the tax base by bringing more sectors that have
previously contributed little to tax revenues, such as retail and agriculture, into the tax net through
targeted outreach. Increasing retail taxes is likely to be opposed by PMLN and agriculture by PPP.
Second, enhancing tax compliance and enforcement mechanisms to reduce tax evasion and avoidance.
Third, rationalizing tax exemptions and incentives to ensure that they are equitable and do not unduly
burden the state coffers. Finally, overhauling the tax administration to streamline processes and
improve efficiency.

A disconcerting narrative emerges, characterized by a widening chasm in economic competitiveness and

Furthermore, Pakistan is severely lagging behind its comparators in both human capital and climate
resilience, and therefore, the government needs to prioritize investments in education, health care, and
environmental sustainability. This includes expanding access to quality education and health care
services, particularly in underserved areas, and investing in skills development and vocational training to
equip the workforce for the jobs of the future. Additionally, the government should implement policies
to mitigate the impact of climate change, such as improving water resource management and adopting
sustainable agricultural practices.

Among these formidable challenges, the threat of corruption looms large, casting a shadow over the
coalition’s commitment to enact meaningful governance reforms. The IMF must insist on anti-corruption
legislation as part of a broader governance overhaul to address systemic flaws and foster transparency
at all levels of government.
Drawing from international experiences, the successes and failures of coalition governments provide
valuable insights into the potential trajectory of Pakistan’s incoming regime.

In India, the coalition government led by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister
Manmohan Singh in the early 1990s carried out meaningful economic reform to meet urgent exigencies.
Faced with a severe balance of payments crisis and stagnant growth, the Rao-Singh government
implemented a series of liberalization measures, including trade and investment reforms, fiscal
consolidation, and deregulation of key sectors. Conversely, the experience of Italy serves as a cautionary
tale of the perils inherent in coalition politics. Characterized by incessant infighting and political
instability, Italy’s coalition governments have often struggled to enact meaningful reforms or address
pressing economic issues.

Bold and decisive action is required for Pakistan to forge a path forward that balances the imperatives of
economic stability with the aspirations of social justice while navigating the burden of international
obligations. The prospect for disparate political interests coalescing to do so appears dim

coalation goverment
A coalition government is a government formed jointly by more than one political party. Parties may
decide to form a coalition government if there is a hung parliament where no single party has a clear
working majority in the House of Commons following a General Election.A coalition government is a
form of government in which political parties cooperate to form a government. The usual reason for
such an arrangement is that no single party has achieved an absolute majority after an election.