- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•

German WW2 ECM

(Electronic Countermeasures)

Adam Farson
VA7OJ

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 1

Glossary of terms

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 Common acronyms:
 SIGINT: SIG
SIGnals
nals INT
INTelligence
elligence
 COMINT: COMmunications
COMmunications INT INTelligence
elligence (communications between people or
entities)
 ELINT: EL
ELectronics
ectronics INT
INTelligence
elligence (electronic signals not directly used in
communications e.g. radar, radio-
radio-navigation)
 ECM: Electronic Counter
ounterM
Measures
 ECCM: Electronic Counter
ounter--Counter
ounterMMeasures
 EW: Electronic Warfare (encompasses all the above)
 System designators:
 AI: Airborne Interception radar
 ASV: Air to Surface Vessel radar
 CD: Coastal Defence radar
 CH: Chain Home radar (CHL = Chain Home Low)
 D/F: Direction Finding
 Huff--Duff: High Frequency D/F
Huff
 H2S: British 3 GHz radar with PPI (plan-
(plan-position indicator) display
 (possible abbreviation for “Home Sweet Home”
Home”)
 H2X: US 10 GHz variant of H2S

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 2

Scope of presentation

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 Detection, interception & analysis
 Communications vs. radar monitoring
 Direction
Direction--finding
 Examples of COMINT, ELINT, SIGINT sites
 Radar detection
 VHF/UHF & microwave radar detectors & threat receivers
 Land, shipboard & airborne systems
 Notes on German microwave technology
 Jamming & spoofing:
 Radio communications: HF, VHF
 Navaids:: GEE, OBOE
Navaids
 Radar: VHF/UHF, 3 GHz, 10 GHz
 Equipment examples
 A case history
history:: Operation Channel Dash (Cerberus)

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 3

COMINT/ELINT/SIGINT

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 Communications monitoring
 HF and VHF land, sea and air radio interception
 Decryption; content analysis, distribution to client agencies
 Analysis of signals and equipment signatures
 Radar monitoring
 Signal evaluation; pulse rate, spectral & signature analysis
 Location of fixed radar sites
 Identification of land, sea and airborne radars
 COMINT/ELINT/SIGINT clients
 Countermeasures developers and operators
 Tactical and strategic intelligence agencies
 Field signals and radar formations
 Naval and air force ECM units

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 4

Comms vs. radar monitoring
a question of bandwidth
- • - • - - • - - ••
• • • • - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 Comms emissions & nominal bandwidths (in WW2)
 A1A (CW), ≈ 150 Hz
 A3E (AM) voice, 6 kHz
 F3E (FM), 36 kHz
 F1B (FSK) RTTY, 350 Hz
 Radar emissions & nominal bandwidths
 CW/FM: 100 kHz – 1 MHz
 Doppler: 100 kHz – 1 MHz
 Pulsed: 1 – 10 MHz
 Receiver requirements differ radically:
 Comms
Comms:: freq. ranges 0.1 – 75, 100 – 156, 225 – 400 MHz (typ.)
 CW, AM & FM detectors
 VHF/UHF radar: 20 – 40, 100 – 400, 400 – 800 MHz (typ.)
 CW, FM & pulse detectors
 Microwave radar: 3 – 18 GHz; pulse detectors

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 5

Direction--finding (D/F)
Direction
an essential part of SIGINT
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 Interceptors needed to locate the source of the enemy
signal as accurately as possible
 Omni--directional and highly directional antennas were used
Omni
in combination to read bearing of signal
 Two or more sites could obtain position fix
 Same RX & antenna served for D/F and monitoring
 Comms D/F antennas:
 HF: Adcock (4 verticals & goniometer
goniometer))
 HF: Rotatable loop
 VHF: Yagi or corner reflector on rotatable mount
 Radar D/F antennas:
 “Mattress” dipole array (rotary or fixed to ship superstructure)
 Rotatable corner reflector (VHF/UHF)
 Yagi array on aircraft nose
 Microwave: horn, dielectric (polyrod), parabolic dish
 Rotatable, or fixed to land vehicle

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 6

An early ELINT mission
- and its failures
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 On 2 August 1939, LZ130 Graf Zeppelin flew one of the first ELINT
missions ever, off the British east coast with 25 RF engineers aboard. She
was fitted with fairly broadband receivers covering 2 -100 MHz.
 Believing that Britain was developing radars in the same 100-150 MHz
range as Germany, the team concentrated on that band. They never
imagined that the British, limited by their tube technology, had developed
a radar system (Chain Home, CH) working around 30 MHz.
 They picked up signals from the new 100 MHz R/T under development for
the RAF, but strangely never followed this up!
 The German researchers picked up pulsed signals modulated by mains
hum in the 20-50 MHz range, but discounted these as ionosonde signals or
EMI from the UK national grid.
 In fact, as the British grid was synchronous, the 250 kW peak pulse CH
transmitters were keyed from different points on the 50 Hz mains cycle to
avoid co-channel interference between stations.
 This clever synchronization scheme totally misled the Germans!

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 7

Naval shipboard SIGINT/ELINT
centre
Source: Fritz Trenkle

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
Prinz Eugen ECM
centre in foretop.

Table: R&S SAMOS

receiver (80 – 480 MHz)
& W.Anz g2 spectrum
analyzer (146-
(146-254MHz).
Bulkhead above table:
3 Naxos radar detectors
(3 GHz).
Source: Fritz Trenkle
Trenkle..

Spectrum analyzer display

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 8

Typical mobile COMINT station
Images courtesy LA6NCA

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Interior: Operator at EP2a RX (75 kHz - 3.3 MHz).

The interceptors passed their data to the ECM

(jamming) unit via HF CW, with Enigma
encryption. This was often most helpful to Allied
ECCM if the traffic was decrypted in time.
Left: D/F antenna. Right: HF TX antenna.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 9

Early radar detectors:
Metox, Naxos
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 From 1940, RAF sub-hunter aircraft were fitted with 1.5m Mk. II ASV (Air to
Surface Vessel) radar (180-210 MHz).

 Mk. II ASV could detect a U-boat at 20 km range. For night ops, a Leigh
light (a powerful searchlight steered by the radar) was also fitted. The
radar operator switched on the light when radar returns were lost, trapping
the U-boat and allowing visual attack.

 Metox beeped on detecting radar pulses. The beep rate doubled when the
radar operator switched to a higher PRF at closer range, alerting the U-
boat to imminent attack. This allowed the boat to crash-dive in time.

 Rumours that the Allies were locating U-boats via Metox LO leakage
proved untrue – but triggered orders to shut the system down fleet-wide!

 The advent of 3 GHz H2S radar in 1943 neutralized Metox, so the German
side developed the Naxos series. The US 10 GHz H2X radar deployed by
the RAF in 1945, rendered Naxos useless.
 This is the nature of EW; measure, countermeasure, counter-countermeasure without end.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 10

Examples of radar SIGINT:
FuMB 1 Metox
Source: Fritz Trenkle
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FuMB 1 Metox
Metox:: fitted to U-
U-boats to detect British ASV radar (180-
(180-210 MHz)

Receiver

Newer U-boat mounted Bali

circular dipole (90-470 MHz).
RX interior
Biscay Cross antenna: erected above
conning-tower hatch & taken below
prior to dive! Bali antenna replaced it.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 11

 FuG 227 Flensburg detector:
countermeasure to RAF Monica
(FuG
FuG:: Funkger
Funkgerät
ät = radio equipment)

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Brightness

Focus

Flensburg cockpit display

Flensburg was a threat receiver fitted to Luftwaffe night-fighters in Spring 1944, and tuned to the 300 MHz
emissions of the RAF Monica tail-warning radar. It had good sensitivity and angular discrimination, and
enabled the fighter pilot to pick out a single bomber even in a stream, radiating multiple Monica signals.

Flensburg caused such an escalation in bomber losses that RAF Bomber Command ordered withdrawal of
Monica from all its aircraft. Similar measures reduced the use of H 2S radar sets until the bombers were within
25 km of their targets.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 12

 Examples of radar SIGINT:
FuMB 11 – 17 Korfu ground stations
(FuMB
FuMB:: Funkme
Funkmeßßbeobachtung = radar monitoring)

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FuMB 11 – 17 Korfu was a superhet system
• ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
covering the microwave bands 1.6-7.5 GHz,
later 7.5-11 and even 11.5-17.7 GHz. It was
developed by Blaupunkt Radio GmbH. It gave
bearings of aircraft operating H2S/H2X radar.

Kornax-X, with a rotating polyrod antenna,

covered the 10 GHz band and was able to
detect RAF and USAAF bombers assembling
over the English coast, 550 km away. Another
variant, Naxburg, used the Würzburg ground
radar dish to increase gain.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 13

 Korfu microwave radar
threat receiver
Source: Arthur O. Bauer

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Plug-in tuning units
cover 3 and 10 GHz bands.

Front end consists of

semiconductor diodes
(NF > 26 dB!) and a split-
anode magnetron LO.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 14

The Naxos Z Series:
U-boat, surface ship & airborne variants
Sources: Fritz Trenkle, Arthur O. Bauer

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Directional display Rotating polyrod antenna

Distant

Near

(Clear plastic radome removed)

Naxos Display & Receiver

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 15

The Naxos Z Series:
Block diagram
Source: Fritz Trenkle

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Naxos was a wideband, untuned
detector-type receiver – in effect,
a crystal set. Initially, a ceramic
HPF was fitted as shown, but this Coax
was later removed to improve
sensitivity and reliability.

The polyrod antenna rotated at

1200 rpm to ensure capture of
H2S RF pulses. The detector out-
put was modulated by the radar
PRF and contained a 22 Hz com-
ponent from the rotation.

The CRT was deflected circularly

in sync with the antenna rotation,
A 120 dB gain LF amplifier after
the detector drove the CRT grid
(Z-axis) to create a bright spot on
the display when a signal was
picked up.
(System diagram)

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 16

No limit to the engineers’
imagination - a body-
body-worn detector!

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Telefunken FuMB 33 Liliput 1 body-worn detector (2.5-3.75 GHz) for

use in small craft without on-board power. The belt-worn amplifier was
fragile and had poor sensitivity. Due to the 50° beamwidth, the operator
“scanned” by constantly turning his head back and forth. Deployed in
September 1944; 300 units built. Also issued to U-boats.
Indicator, amplifier & batteries

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 17

Notes on microwave
radar technology
- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 It has been reported* that Hitler personally ordered the cessation of all microwave
research in 1941-42. Early in WW2, German scientists tried to get his permission to
work on the development of microwave radar. When told this might take several
years, Hitler refused. His policy required that scientific research produce usable
applications for the military within 6 months' to a year's time. Telefunken even closed
their microwave research laboratories!

 Still, German intelligence and scientific personnel were desperate to discover what
the Allies were using. They combed downed Allied bombers for radar equipment,
hoping to piece together a working radar set, or even a recoverable microwave radar
system. Ultimately they succeeded in salvaging enough of an RAF H2S 3 GHz set
(including the cavity magnetron) from the wreckage of a Stirling bomber in Rotterdam
to build a workable system (Rotterdam-Gerät).

 The development of the FuG 350 Naxos family of radar detectors was undoubtedly
one of the spinoffs from the H2S capture. (The modern term is “threat warning
receivers”). The ever-increasing numbers of Allied bombers using 3 and 10 GHz
drove German researchers into a frenzied effort to develop microwave radar
countermeasures. *Source: Fritz Trenkle, "Die deutschen Funkmeßverfahren bis 1945"

05 March 2009 NSARC – German WW2 Radar 18

*
Limitations of German WW2
microwave receiver technology
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 A standing Führerverbot blocked all semiconductor research until 1944.
As a result, the best German solid-state mixer/detector diodes had NF >
26dB. For critical applications, thermionic diodes were used (NF ≈ 16dB).
 Frequency generation above 1 GHz was also a major problem due to
vacuum-tube limitations. The split-anode magnetron was used as LO at 3
and 10 GHz, but was unstable and limited in power output.
 The Allies used reflex klystrons as radar LO‘s, but Germany acquired this
technology only after WW2.
 An irrational fear of LO leakage and consequent detection by Allied SIGINT
inhibited deployment of VHF/UHF and microwave superhet detectors. This
was later proven to be largely unfounded.
 Microwave test equipment was all but non-existent right up to war’s end.
The best lab signal generator used a buzzer as a signal source!
 Constant Allied bombing of electronics R&D and manufacturing sites, plus
ongoing sabotage at sites in occupied Europe, created extreme shortages
of specialized components such as tubes, RF tuning assemblies etc. Inter-
organizational secrecy also created enormous difficulties.
05 March 2009 NSARC – German WW2 Radar 19
Jamming objectives:
comm//nav
comm nav,, radar & broadcasting

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 Communications
 Tactical ground radio (HF, VHF)
 Airborne R/T (VHF)
 Naval CW and R/T (LF, HF)
 Navigational aids
 GEE (British VHF hyperbolic navigation)
 OBOE I & II (VHF & UHF blind-
blind-bombing aids)
 Radars
 VHF ground radar (CH, CD, CHL)
 VHF airborne (AI, ASV)
 Microwave airborne (H2S, H2X)
 Naval shore radars (VHF & microwave)
 Broadcasting
 BBC services to Germany & occupied Europe
 Responsibility of Post Office, not armed forces

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 20

Communications jammers

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 HF: In general, the German monitoring sites preferred to glean COMINT
from strategic HF comms links than to jam them.
 Example: German “cracking” of London-
London-New York R/T link used by FDR and Churchill.

 By contrast, tactical situations e.g. transmission of critical orders, reports

on German force dispositions, emergency calls from convoys under U- U-
boat attack etc. called for ad hoc jamming.
 FuG10 HF transmitters (S 10 K, 70W) were modified to jam Soviet HF airborne R/T, but were
never deployed. Ancient spark transmitters were even “dusted off” in a few cases!

 Land and shipboard HF transmitters (typ. 200W – 1.5 kW) were tuned to
the target frequency and either keyed rapidly and irregularly or noise-
noise-
modulated. A spectrum analyzer served as a tuning aid in some systems.
 Examples: holding the mic to the HV dynamotor PSU, mic in aircraft engine housing.

 Allied VHF air/ground R/T

R/T in 100-
100-156 MHz band was attacked by Caruso
(30W), later by Karl I (400W) & Karl II (2 kW) jammers (90-
(90-150 MHz),
Starnberg II (98
(98--156 MHz, 20W) and FuG40 Nervtöter (Gadfly, 25W)
covering 90-
90-140 MHz.
MHz. Lower-
Lower-powered units were probably airborne. US
deployment of UHF (225-
(225-400 MHz) R/T largely eliminated this problem.
 Modulation: Caruso: 150 Hz triangular wave. Karl: sawtooth
sawtooth..

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 21

Telefunken AS60 HF transmitter
- suitable for jamming service
Source: Arthur O. Bauer

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
The AS60 may have been
designed by the same group
as the E52 Köln receiver.

Bandswitched VFO drive unit

with optical projection freq.
display allowed precise tuning
onto target signal. Freq. stabi-
lity 5 * 10-6 per °C.

The AS60 was intended as a

fixed or shipboard HF comms
transmitter, but its high power
and stability made it very sui-
table for jamming missions.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 22

Jamming of navigational aids
GEE
- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 GEE was a hyperbolic navigation system in which a receiver aboard an
aircraft or vessel measured the time delay between two pulsed radio
signals to yield a “fix”. Operational until 1970.

 The system operated in the 20-

20-30, 40-
40-50, 50-
50-70 and 70-
70-90 MHz bands. The
on--board receiver had plug-
on plug-in RF units for rapid QSY in the event of
jamming.

 The Germans captured receivers from downed bombers, and devised

effective jamming systems in which “spoof” ground stations in France or
Holland transmitted fake pulses.

 Using D/F receivers and loops, Allied radio operators could often identify
false signals.

 The Breslau I (22

(22--28 MHz) and Breslau II (40
(40--50 MHz) jammers were very
effective against GEE. Each had 5 1 kW PA’s (2 LS180 triodes in push-
push-pull)
and a complex pulse modulator synced to the British GEE pulses.

 AM at 20 kHz could also be applied to the RF pulses for further confusion.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 23
Breslau II jamming transmitter
- against GEE & British low-band radars
Source: Fritz Trenkle

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•

Exciter CU
Mod
PSU

TX 4 TX5
TX 3
TX 2
TX 1

1 kW transmitter chassis
(2 X LS180 in push-pull)

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 24

Jamming of navigational aids
OBOE I & II (German codename Bumerang
Bumerang))

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 OBOE was a transponder-
transponder-based aerial blind-
blind-bombing system using two
fixed stations in England. These stations transmitted a signal to a
Pathfinder bomber fitted with a transponder which repeated the signals to
the ground stations.

 The signal transit times enabled the ground stations to guide the bomber
on a circular path to the target. A computer at one of the stations
determined the bombs-
bombs-away point, and transmitted the bomb-
bomb-release
signal to the bomber.

 OBOE 1 operated on 200-

200-250 MHz with PRF ≈ 133 Hz. It was vulnerable to
jamming and “spoofing” by ABG (Anti
(Anti--Bumerang
Bumerang--Ger
Gerät
ät)), an interrogator-
interrogator-
repeater system.

 ABG repeated the airborne transponder’s downlink signal back to the

bomber on its uplink frequency at 25 kW peak pulse power and 200 Hz
PRF, thus capturing the transponder in a feedback loop.

 OBOE II, operating at 3 GHz, evaded this jamming. Several Marks ot 3 GHz
ABG were built, but never seriously compromised OBOE.
17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 25
ABG (Anti
(Anti--Bumerang
Bumerang--Ger
Gerät)
ät) A
- against OBOE I
Source: Fritz Trenkle

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•

ABG A antenna mast

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 26

Jamming of British radars
VHF/UHF: CH, CHL, CD, AI, ASV
Microwave: H2S, H2X, newer AI & ASV
- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 Chain Home (CH) operated in the 20-
20-55 MHz band; Chain Home Low (CHL)
and CD (Coastal Defence) radar used the180-210 MHz band, as did
Airborne Interception (AI to Mk V) and Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radars.

 Prior to the cavity magnetron (early 1941), 200 MHz was the most widely-
widely-
used band in Allied radar. Düppel, the German version of Window (chaff)
used 75cm foil strips (λ (λ/2 at 200 MHz). A variety of German jammers e.g.
Breslau II, Karl II etc. covered 200 MHz.

 Microwave radar jamming was more problematical; the power levels

required to jam effectively were beyond German capabilities. Transmitters
using LMS 10 cavity magnetrons were unreliable and ineffective.
Postklystron,, a 100W transmitter using a water-
Postklystron water-cooled klystron with horn
or dish antennas, was deployed in 1943-
1943-44 against 3 GHz radars (H2S,
newer AI & ASV) but had no strategic impact.

 By war’s end, there was still no effective German 10 GHz jammer.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 27
General principles of radar
jamming
- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 “Brute-force” method, where an unmodulated or “wobbulated
“Brute- “wobbulated” ” carrier
swamps echoes at radar receiver, is effective but requires very high ERP.

 Carrier modulated by triangular pulses with PRF slightly higher than that
of target radar generates false echoes.

 Pulsed microwave jamming transmitter with pulse-

pulse-shaping to enhance
false echoes at target radar receiver, at PRF close to that of target radar,
can “trash” PPI (plan-
(plan-position indicator) displays.

 The pulsed microwave jammer can be even more effective if AFC derived
from a receiver capturing the target radar’s emissions holds the jammer
exactly on the target’s frequency.

 Despite some early successes, German radar jamming was strategically

ineffective in the end as Allied technology was advancing too rapidly.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 28

Karl I jamming transmitter(2 kW)
- against 200 MHz radars
Source: Fritz Trenkle

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•

PA stage w/tuned anode lines

Modulation: Triangular
waves at 150 kHz

LS1500 triode
(1 kW dissipation)

Tube sockets
Arrows: cooling air for grid circuit & output coupling loop

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 29

Examples of jammed radar
displays
Source: Fritz Trenkle
- • - • - - • - - ••
PPI jammed by pulsed magnetron TX
• ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• •
A-scope jammed by 30 kHz pulses, almost masking echo
-•

A-scope jammed by high-power noise-modulated signal

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 30

Operation Channel Dash (Cerberus)
- a case history of radar jamming

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 Operation Channel Dash (German: Unternehmen Cerberus
Cerberus)) was the planned escape
of the battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen from the French port of
Brest, up the English Channel to the North Sea and thence to Germany.

 A key component of the plan was the jamming of British CH and CD (CHL) coastal
radars by multiple jamming sites along the Normandy coast. German accounts hold
this up as key to the plan’s success, but the Germans were unaware of co-
co-sited 3 GHz
CD Mk. IV (NT 271) radars which were thus not jammed. These radars detected and
duly reported the escaping fleet.

 Ultimately, Channel Dash succeeded because of a number of snafu’s on the British

side; inter-
inter-service information barriers, RAF Coastal Command patrols with non-
non-
working ASV Mk. II (200 MHz) radar and radio silence rules blocking timely reporting
of sightings. Inexplicably, the ASV’s were not jammed.

 Despite their escape, all 3 battleships were effectively neutralized. Scharnhorst &
Gneisenau were damaged beyond use, and Prinz Eugen was “stuck” in a Norwegian
port until the end of WW2.

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 31

Acknowledgements & references

- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
1. Foundation for German Communications
2. Fritz Trenkle (many images)
3. Fritz Trenkle, „Die deutschen Funkstörverfahren
bis 1945“, AEG-Telefunken
4. Alfred Price, “Instruments of Darkness”,
Greenhill Books
5. Louis Brown, “A Radar History of World War II”,
IoP Publishing
6. Werner Niehaus, „Die Radarschlacht“,
Motorbuch-Verlag
17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 32
Links for further study
- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 http://www.radarworld.org/germany.html
 Foundation for German Communications
 Aspects of German Airborne Radar, 1942-45
 http://www.cdvandtext2.org/ADIK380all.pdf
 The Effects of Interception Procedures
 Interesting video on German ECM/EW, in German, notes in Dutch

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 33

Future Presentations on
German WW2 RF Topics
- • - • - - • - - •• • ••• - • - - • •• - • ••• • -•
 Radio Direction Finding: Allied & German
land, airborne & naval D/F, including British
“Huff-Duff”

17 October 2013 NSARC – German WW2 ECM 34