CSS
STRATEGIC AND MILITARY STRATEGIC
BRIEFING PAPERS
LESSONS FROM EAST TIMOR Volume 2: Part 1:
February 2000.
Context Conventional Deterrence Works
The 1999 crisis in East Timor was provoked by Intervention in East Timor was supported by a
international reaction to mass killings of hundreds of combination of economic and military deterrence. Direct
people, the destruction of an estimated 80% of property, United States threats to suspend International Monetary
and the forced migration of at least a third of the East Fund loans to Indonesia pressured Jakarta to agree to
Timorese population to West Timor and other parts of an immediate United Nations sanctioned intervention
Indonesia, this following a referendum in which almost (authorised unanimously by Security Council resolution
80% of the population voted in favour of independence. 1264) by the Australian led INTERFET.
Around 130,000 people have now returned to East
Timor, but 100,000-150,000 remain displaced in West The Indonesian Cabinet agreed to the intervention, but
Timor and others unaccounted for. at the time did not achieve control over its armed forces.
Indonesian military commanders (and their militia
Defence Needs To Be Taken More Seriously By allies), operated independently. The Indonesian military
Australia and New Zealand threatened to attack INTERFET (especially the
Australians) with high tech conventional forces and
East Timor may represent a model for the future where lower capacity militias supported by Special Forces.
smaller states, unencumbered with global While the purpose of these threats is clear, i.e. to
responsibilities and the accompanying negative destabilise and unnerve INTERFET– the exact
connotations, will take the lead in organising a coalition responsibility for the co-ordination of these threats
of the willing to respond to crises. remains uncertain.
The East Timor crisis illustrates that those states which The Indonesian maritime and air threat (see Fig. 1) to
assume the responsibility for leading humanitarian INTERFET was capable of inflicting serious damage to
intervention will be expected by other contributors to its warships, logistic support ships, and unarmed
provide the core of the combat force and its protection transport aircraft.
(including the deterrence of military threats).
Fig. 1 - Indonesian Threat to INTERFET
No other state was willing to match either Australia or System Qty Deployed
New Zealand’s combat contributions to East Timor in T209 2 One in waters off East
the crucial first weeks of the operation. Australia and Submarine Timor the other
New Zealand together underpinned International Force unaccounted for.
East Timor (INTERFET) with their forces making up four Frigates/ 17 Small numbers
fifths of the early operational capacity of the force. The Corvettes/ 24 Shadowed INTERFET
Missile Craft
United States, with military resources over-stretched by
Combat Air 19 A4 Small numbers
other long standing commitments, and unwilling to risk
Force Skyhawk deployed forward,
casualties by deploying ground forces, limited its 10 F16 Darwin within range,
contributions to a warship and logistic support of the 46 Hawk threats to shoot down
core force provided by Australia and New Zealand. RAAF fighters.
Air Defence 51 Rapier Possibly deployed in
42 RBS 70 West-Timor
Australia and New Zealand cannot assume others KOPASSUS 6,200 200-300 deployed
will shoulder the burden of their defence. Both states Militia 10,500+ 2000 hard-core. Small
need to take defence more seriously and develop a groups ambush/
genuinely self-reliant military capacity. skirmish with INTERFET
6 Militia KIA
Centr
Centree for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of W
Victoria ellington, PO Box 600, W
Wellington, ellington, New Zealand.
Wellington,
Tel: 64 4 463 5434 Fax: 64 4 463 5437 Email: css@vuw .ac.nz http://www
css@vuw.ac.nz .vuw
http://www.vuw .ac.nz/css/
.vuw.ac.nz/css/
Page 2.
Warships And Fighters Played a Crucial Role The full role of RAAF combat forces remains classified.
The RAAF were used to send a powerful message to
The display of maritime and air power (see Fig. 2 and Indonesia that Australia possessed an air combat
3) succeeded in deterring a conventional air/sea attack, capability of such quality that any Indonesian air or
ensured that INTERFET forces were successfully maritime attack on INTERFET would carry a heavy cost.
protected, encouraged the Indonesian military to RAAF F18s, F111s and PC9s (in the forward air control
withdraw air/sea force elements while concurrently role) were on standby, available at readiness and issued
laying the basis for military to military co-operation with daily tasking orders. RNZAF Skyhawks transiting
between INTERFET and local Indonesian commanders. through the area were immediately available to support
The display of force backed by a large ground the RAAF. Other Skyhawks, maintained at a high state
commitment was able to deter large-scale coordinated of readiness, could have been used to supplement the
militia/special forces operations in East Timor. RAAF maritime strike and close air support capabilities
had the intensity of conflict in East Timor escalated a
Fig. 2 - INTERFET Combat Maritime Forces notch. RAAF Orions flew anti-submarine patrols. Other
air forces positioned aircraft. These details remain
Submarines Cruisers Destroyers Frigates classified.
Classified USS HMS HMNZS Te Kaha
Mobile Glasgow HMNZS Ground Force Role
Bay Canterbury
FNS Vendemiaire
FNS Prairial
HMAS Adelaide
Ground forces do not operate in isolation, but
HMAS Darwin
require the security shield and support provided
HMAS ANZAC by fighter cover, surface warship protection and
HMAS Sydney sea/air transport. East Timor was a truly joint
operation in all respects.
The display of force centred around a coalition maritime
force (from Australia, Britain, France, United States and Ground forces played an important role in deterring
New Zealand) that included submarines, a cruiser, a attacks from militias/special forces and in restoring
destroyer, frigates, attendant support ships and was peace and security for the people of East Timor. This
supported by Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) air role has been described extensively elsewhere.
combat and support aircraft.
East Timor reinforced lessons learnt on other
The roles of the maritime force deployed to East Timor peacemaking operations. These lessons include the
included escort and close protection for transport ships, importance of maintaining deployable (with sufficient
the identification and monitoring of all shipping and logistic and strategic transport) forces at a high state of
air contacts around East Timor, afloat combat support readiness; that ground forces must provide their own
for ground forces, and use of embarked helicopters on protection, mobility and fire power and be able to call
reconnaissance patrols of shorelines and coastal waters. in heavier naval gun fire support and close air support
As well, maritime forces provided large-scale at short notice; all ground forces must be able to
humanitarian assistance, which included medical aid, interoperate with forces from other states as well as the
restoration of electrical power, the cleaning and other services (navy and air force).
reconstruction of damaged buildings and repair of
infrastructure. East Timor Worked Because Force Elements
From Diverse Countries Could Work Together
Fig. 3 - Combat Air Forces Supporting INTERFET
INTERFET functioned in the crucial first week because
Maritime Strike the Australian armed forces could interoperate with
Fast Jet Fighter diverse contingents drawn from Britain, France, New
Reconnaissance Ground/Attack Maritime Patrol Zealand and the United States. These states provided
RAAF FA18 RAAF FA18 RAAF P3 the core of both the maritime and ground contribution
F111 PC9 to INTERFET. This capacity to interoperate is the
RNZAF A4K consequence of years of shared training, exercising, the
© Centre for Strategic Studies CSS Strategic Briefing Papers
ISSN 11175-1452
175-1452 Volume 2: Part 1: February 2000
Page 3.
standardisation of doctrine and operating procedures effect on performance though maintenance rates were
and the operating of compatible equipment. higher than for refurbished or new aircraft).
All Services Relevant
Defence Lessons For New Zealand
The NZDF’s Single Services each provided contributions
Only Balanced Forces Have The Flexibility to East Timor that were self reliant and relevant in the
Needed For Peacekeeping face of the threat to INTERFET from Indonesian naval,
ground and air elements, could work in a demanding
Each of the Single Services (navy, army, air force) environment isolated by sea and air, and in a total joint-
maintains a balanced (combat, combat support and combined operating environment.
logistics) force structure and capabilities. Each of the
Single Services force structure and capabilities provides
the cornerstone that underpins Joint (that is where the Approximately 70% of RNZN, 45% of the
one or more Services works with each other) Combined (regular) NZ Army and 56% of RNZAF
(where a Single Service works with counterparts from
capabilities were directly used in East
another country) Operations. East Timor emphatically
reinforced the enduring relevance of this approach to
Timor.
force structure and capability planning. The most
A very small proportion of the NZ Army’s Territorial
important contributors to INTERFET maintain balanced
forces. Force (mainly medical specialists) was used in East
Timor. East Timor illustrates that the RNZN needs a
four frigate navy to maintain two frigates on station at
any one time (the RNZN was tasked to simultaneously
If New Zealand did not have balanced provide a frigate to East Timor and another to the
forces it could not have meaningfully Multinational Interception Forces in the Gulf), and that
contributed to East Timor. the full range of the RNZN’s, NZ Army’s and RNZAF’s
capabilities would have been relevant to INTERFET had
the conflict escalated.
The NZDF’s force structure and capability mix provided
the full range of force elements that were directly usable The planning and movement of combat and logistic
in East Timor (frigates, tanker, special forces, infantry force elements to East Timor absorbed a considerable
group, transport aircraft, maritime patrol and general proportion of each Services planning and logistics
purpose helicopters). Had the conflict escalated a notch, capabilities.
the NZDF possessed the capabilities (artillery, air
combat) to provide essential reinforcement to the
Australian Defence Force.
The NZDF Is Adept At Joint Force
Planning And Operations
Equipment Quality More Important Than Age
Forces deployed on peacekeeping operations should be
A Joint Force Commander appointed by
equipped with world-class equipment. The issue at the Chief of Defence Force undertook
stake is not the age of equipment, but its performance. NZDF planning for East Timor.
The RNZN, NZ Army and RNZAF all deployed some
old equipment into East Timor. HMNZS Canterbury is Cooperation between the NZDF Joint
thirty years old (and performed well), the NZ Army’s Force Commander and his Australian
APCs and radios are of a similar age. The recently
refurbished APCs, while old, were the best performers
counterpart was smooth. All NZDF force
in theatre – thanks to a recent upgrade. In contrast the elements were able to interoperate with
very old radios were inadequate. They were both old force elements drawn from differing Single
and unreliable. The Hercules transport aircraft and
Iroquois helicopters were also very old (without much Services from a wide range of countries.
© Centre for Strategic Studies CSS Strategic Briefing Papers
ISSN 11175-1452
175-1452 Volume 2: Part 1: February 2000
Page 4.
Strategic Realities Of Defending Australia
Closer Defence Relations Middle East, Japan and South Korea, that
collectively cover most of the Northern
New Zealand’s commitment to the Closer hemisphere. The United States is severely
Defence Arrangement (CDR) with limited, by budget constraints, in its
Australia is driven by strategic capacity to support other allies as well. If
imperatives that underpin both countries Australia is directly attacked the United
strategic and defence interests. States may only provide limited military
support. The United States expects
Defending Australia smaller allies, especially in South East
Asia, and Australia to take responsibility
Advocates of an army first approach to New Zealand’s for their own defence.
defence (with the navy and air force reduced to logistics
and transport roles) assume that an army centred East Timor starkly illustrated the limits of the United
contribution will be wanted by Australia. This States capacity to support a smaller ally not covered by
assumption is based on a misreading of the realities that its core security umbrella.
underpin strategic thinking for the defence of Australia.
This is why New Zealand ANZAC frigates, perhaps F16s
Any attack on Australia will have to and Orions are so important to Australia.
traverse the sizeable air-sea gap to its
North West and its North. Australian New Zealand has the capacity to add an
strategic planners have long accepted that extra 20% to Australia’s capacity to defend
the best place to stop an attack on Australia itself.
is as far from its shores as possible.
In this context, if New Zealand decides to commit to a
purely ground force contribution to the defence of
This is why submarines, warships and fighter aircraft Australia, Wellington would be ironically offering a
supported by sophisticated long-range early warning capability that is not central, and takes an enormous
and intelligence-gathering capabilities are central to logistic effort to move and sustain. (There are sound
Australian defence thinking. The role of ground forces arguments for New Zealand strengthening its ground
is to secure from direct attack Australia’s vital forces but these are not directly linked with the defence
infrastructure supporting the defence of the North. of Australia).
Australia has the ground forces it needs for this role.
If New Zealand wants to genuinely contribute to the
Australia’s strategic dilemma is that it has an enormous defence of Australia it should continue to provide sea
sea and land area to patrol but only the resources of a and air combat forces. If New Zealand decides to
smaller state. withdraw from providing sea and air combat
contribution, Australia will be left alone to defend itself.
At the heart of the F 16 issue is a decision. Does New
Australia alone lacks the air and sea power Zealand want to help Australia?
to defend itself. The United States can
fight one large (Gulf war type) and one Ultimately, New Zealand’s defence rests
small (Kosovo type) of war on the defence of Australia. If Australia
simultaneously while also maintaining its goes down New Zealand will surely go
security commitments to Europe, the with it.
© Centre for Strategic Studies CSS Strategic Briefing Papers
ISSN 11175-1452
175-1452 Volume 2: Part 1: February 2000
