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Et Al., Violence and Memory

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Et Al., Violence and Memory

Foi

Uploaded by

Vasco Gonsalves
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© © All Rights Reserved
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From Buoyancy to Gilds, 1900-1997 1B5

arrest of a number of PF-ZAPU leaders and ZIPRA commanders, and the


sacking of PF-ZAPU leaders — including Joshua Nkomo — in the coalition
government.
The brutality of the state in suppressing the few rebels operating in the
regions of Matabeleland and Midlands between 1980 and 1987 not only left
deep scars among the victims but also intensified Matabeleland regionalism.
Bjorn Lindgren has argued that this was one of the more serious consequences
of the Gukurahundi atrocities.' 4 He noted that 'people in Matabeleland accused
Mugabe, the government and the Shona in general of killing the Ndebele' . 8s In
the eyes of the Ndebele public, what was portrayed as a mission to stamp out
dissidents became an anti-Ndebele campaign that deliberately identified Joshua
Nkomo, PF-ZAPU, ex-ZIPRA combatants and every Ndebele-speaking person
with the political rebels. The Fifth Brigade unit was almost entirely Shona, and
justified its violence in political and ethnic terms. For many, this represented a
Shona political crusade against the Ndebele.'
Feelings of marginalisation also fuelled resistance and opposition in the
eastern and south-eastern districts of Chipinge, Chiredzi and Chikombethi, which
lagged behind in infrastructural and economic development for much of the
198os, especially during the days of the Mozambican civil war when RENAMO
rebels attacked Zimbabwean border districts to retaliate against Zimbabwe's
deployment of troops to fight alongside PRELIM° government troops. These
attacks were not only brutal but also retarded economic development by
destroying roads, property, schools, clinics, livestock and lives. 0j Frustrated by
both this lack of development and the Zimbabwe government's handling of the
war, some villagers offered support to RENAMO, while others expressed their
frustration by fanning regionalism and political tribalism against the central
state... ZANU(Ndonga) leaders, for instance, successfully mobilised both Ndau
ethnicity and local feelings of marginalisation in Chipinge to build a regional

es Alexander et al., Violence and Memory, pp. 030-96, Alexander, 'Dissident perspectives on
Zimbabwe's post independence war.
a)
B. Lindgren, The politics of identity and the remembrance of violence: Ethnicity and
gender at the installation of a female chief in Zimbabwe', in V. Brach-Due (ed.), Violence and
Belonging.. The Questfor Identity in Rost-ColonialAfrica (London: Routledge,0005), pp. 156-8.
'is Ibid., p. 5513.
6
. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'The post-colonial state and Matabeleland'; Alexander et al., Violence
and Memory, pp. 0o4-31.
.7 See B. Tanyanago, The Renamo War and its Impact in Smith East Zimbabwe, 1982-1992'
(MA thesis, University of Zimbabwe, goon), pp. 70-95.
ail
See A. Also, Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa (London: Zed
Book., 5994), PP. 120-3.

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