LIMITATIONS ACT, 1966
SECTION 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application,
other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the
applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making
the application within such period.
Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient
cause within the meaning of this section.
HISTORY OF SECTION 166(3) OF THE MVA -
APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATIONS ACT -
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS:
● National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004): The Supreme Court observed that
Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at ensuring compensation for
accident victims. Courts take a lenient view to condone delays in such cases.
● Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (2010): It was held that condonation of delay depends on
sufficient cause, and liberal interpretation should be applied in cases involving social
welfare legislations like the Motor Vehicles Act.
● Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya (1996): The Supreme Court clarified that post-1994,
there is no limitation for filing claims under Section 166. Even if filed after a substantial
delay, tribunals may allow it considering the merits.
● State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company (2010): Section 5 applies to
proceedings under special laws unless excluded by the legislation.
SPECIFIC CASES INVOLVING SECTION 5 -
● New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma (2003): The Madras High Court applied
Section 5 to condone delay in filing a claim petition under Section 166.
● M. Veerappa v. Karnataka SRTC (2006): The Karnataka High Court emphasized that
procedural delays should not defeat substantive justice in motor accident claims.
