In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually
riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from
the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would
be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress.
From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority
to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of
appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress,
then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such
authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be
exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence,
should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed;
and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and,
hence, cannot be merely recommendatory.
Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up
the Philconsa quandary in this wise: ?Neither would it be objectionable
for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it
may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible.”
As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on
the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially
abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-
enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the
guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises
serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on
the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative.”
Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro
Party List v. Purisima[155] (Abakada) has effectively
overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator
participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These
constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in
greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a
procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases.
In fine, stare decisis would not apply.
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers
principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the
domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the
principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly,
"[o]ne branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s
performance of its constitutionally assigned function”;[171] and
"[a]lternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a
function that more properly is entrusted to another.”[172] In other words,
there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible
(a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s
functions.
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated
in Abakada where the Court held that "[f]rom the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional.”[177] It must be clarified, however, that
since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight
function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role
must be confined to mere oversight.
Any post- enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As
the Court ruled in Abakada:[178]
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been
violated
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in
Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation
is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: ― No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation
because each of them determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund
would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves
also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears
as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal
lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a ―budget within a budget
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which
may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting
the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.
In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature,
the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it
would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This
is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not
readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President‘s power of item veto.
