FELICIANO, J.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional
validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec")
and its corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers.

On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:
"x x x xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Comelec Space. - The Commission shall procure free print

space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper
of general circulation in every province or city for use as 'Comelec
Space' from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and
from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said
newspaper, 'Comelec Space' shall be obtained from any magazine
or periodical of said province or city.

Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. - 'Comelec Space' shall be allocated

by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to
enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their
stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of
government.

'Comelec Space' shall also be used by Commission for

dissemination of vital election information.

Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. - (a) 'Comelec Space' shall be

available to all candidates during the periods stated in Section 2
hereof. Its allocation shall be equal and impartial among all
candidates for the same office. All candidates concerned shall be
furnished a copy of the allocation of 'Comelec Space' for their
information, guidance and compliance.

(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of 'Comelec Space' from

newspapers or publications based in the Metropolitan Manila Area
shall submit an application therefor, in writing, to the Committee on
Mass Media of the Commission. Any candidate desiring to avail
himself of 'Comelec Space' in newspapers or publications based in
the provinces shall submit his application therefor, in writing, to the
Provincial Election Supervisor concerned. Applications for availment
of 'Comelec Space' may be filed at any time from the date of
effectivity of this Resolution.

(c) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial Election

Supervisors shall allocate available 'Comelec Space' among the
candidates concerned by lottery of which said candidates shall be
notified in advance, in writing, to be present personally or by
representative to witness the lottery at the date, time and place
specified in the notice. Any party objecting to the result of the
lottery may appeal to the Commission.

(d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the Committee

on Mass Media or the Provincial Election Supervisor, as the case
may be, sufficiently in advance and in writing of the date of issue
and the newspaper or publication allocated to him, and the time
 within which he must submit the written material for publication in
the 'Comelec Space'.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. - No

newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news,
opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or
comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by
unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political
party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise,
the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of
the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published are
significant, newsworthy and of public interest." (Underscoring supplied)

Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E.

Maambong sent identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers
like the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all
members of PPI. These letters read as follows:

"This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission on
Elections, you are directed to provide free print space of not less than one half
(1/2) page for use as 'Comelec Space' or similar to the print support which you
have extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was 2 full
pages for each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995
to May 6, 1995, to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues
and their platforms and programs of government.

We shall be informing the political parties and candidates to submit directly to

you their pictures, biographical data, stand on key public issues and platforms of
government, either as raw data or in the form of positives or camera-ready
materials.

Please be reminded that the political parties/candidates may be accommodated

in your publication any day upon receipt of their materials until May 6, 1995
which is the last day for campaigning.

We trust you to extend your full support and cooperation in this regard."
(Underscoring supplied)

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and
void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives
of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process
raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to
the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that
Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. [1]

On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from
enforcing and implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec
directives addressed to various print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Court
also required the respondent to file a Comment on the Petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging
that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to
provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or
administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor
General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection
with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such
space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the
"Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues
that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed
as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. [2]

At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995, respondent Comelec through its
Chairman, Hon. Bernardo Pardo, in response to inquiries from the Chief Justice and other
Members of the Court, stated that Resolution No. 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and the
22 March 1995 letters dispatched to various members of petitioner PPI, were not intended to
compel those members to supply Comelec with free print space. Chairman Pardo represented
to the Court that that Resolution and the related letter-directives were merely designed to
solicit from the publishers the same free print space which many publishers had voluntarily
given to Comelec during the election period relating to the 11 May 1992 elections. Indeed,
the Chairman stated that the Comelec would, that very afternoon, meet and adopt an
appropriate amending or clarifying resolution, a certified true copy of which would forthwith
be filed with the Court.

On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor General a manifestation
which attached a copy of Comelec Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995. The operative
portion of this Resolution follows:

"NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the

Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other election
laws, the Commission on Elections RESOLVED to clarify Sections 2 and 8 of Res.
No. 2772 as follows:

1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as requiring

publishers of the different mass media print publications to provide print
space under pain of prosecution, whether administrative, civil or criminal,
there being no sanction or penalty for violation of said Section provided for
either in said Resolution or in Section 90 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, on the grant of 'Comelec
space.'
2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as constituting
prior restraint on the part of publishers with respect to the printing or
publication of materials in the news, opinion, features or other sections of
their respective publications or other accounts or comments, it being clear
from the last sentence of said Section 8 that the Commission shall, 'unless
the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise xxx respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or
publications that the accounts or views published are significant,
newsworthy and of public interest.'

This Resolution shall take effect upon approval." (Underscoring in the original)

While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as having become moot and academic, we consider it not inappropriate to pass
upon the first constitutional issue raised in this case. Our hope is to put this issue to rest and
prevent its resurrection.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in expression. Section 1 of

Resolution No. 2772-A did not try to redraft Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of Resolution No.
2772 persists in its original form. Thus, we must point out that, as presently worded, and in
particular as interpreted and applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-
directives to newspaper publishers, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is clearly susceptible of
the reading that petitioner PPI has given it. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express
terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some
criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original intention
was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. A written
communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space,
dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the
Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect
upon the company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or
cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions, only
aggravates the constitutional difficulties inhering in the present situation. The enactment or
addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious
constitutional objection.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private
personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended
frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or
21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec
may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use
of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban
areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for
the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the
taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the
heart of the problem.[3] Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that
Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the
legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by petitioner PPI. We
note only that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by
the respondent Commission would be used not only for informing the public about the
identities, qualifications and programs of government of candidates for elective office but also
for "dissemination of vital election information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations,
notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice
that government offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print
space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars, notices
and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention of the general public.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be
avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as
petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to
"donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal,
to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to
suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from
voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No.
2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for
compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide
free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain.

We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is entirely in line with the theory of
democratic representative government. The economic costs of informing the general public
about the qualifications and programs of those seeking elective office are most appropriately
distributed as widely as possible throughout our society by the utilization of public funds,
especially funds raised by taxation, rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e.,
print media enterprises. The benefits which flow from a heightened level of information on
and the awareness of the electoral process are commonly thought to be community-wide; the
burdens should be allocated on the same basis.

As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772,
even if read as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too
casually to require prolonged consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and
apparently inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power -- essentially a
power of legislation -- has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission.
[4]
Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of
the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case
with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. [5]

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a
showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity,
indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular
newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and
palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to
such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the State.

We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be quoted in full again:

"Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. - No

newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news,
opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or
comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by
unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political
party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise,
the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of
the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published are
significant, newsworthy and of public interest."

It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in Resolution No. 2772. In any
case, Section 8 should be viewed in the context of our decision in National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections.[6] There the Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of
R.A. No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or
donation of print space and airtime for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully distinguished (a) paid political advertisements which
are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries
and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or
columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press:

"Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of

application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the
purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print
space and air time for campaign or other political purposes. Section 11 (b) does
 not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section
11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as
such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular
candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching
any report or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not
paid for by candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to
cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

"The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) - that it does not
restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment
upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for
office -- constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the
instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. x x x"[7](Citations
omitted; underscoring supplied)

Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish a
guideline for implementation of the above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press
Club, an effort not blessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while
possibly helpful, does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772.
The distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports,
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on
the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only in actual cases or
controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.

At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative
action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not
claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of
Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise
constitutional issue here sought to be raised -- whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No.
2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of
the Constitution to

"supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for

the operation of — media of communication or information --- [for the purpose of
ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections —"

is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis
mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.

Summarizing our conclusions:

1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its
22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free
print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must
be set aside and nullified.

2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.

WHEREFORE,for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in
part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives
dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining
Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates
to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.