to ask any Athenian whether virtue was

Meno natural or acquired, he would laugh in

By Plato (link tho: your face, and say: "Stranger, you have far
https://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html) too good an opinion of me, if you think
Commentary: Many comments have that I can answer your question. For I
been posted about Meno. literally do not know what virtue is, and
much less whether it is acquired by
Download: A 66k text-only version teaching or not." And I myself, Meno,
is available for download. living as I do in this region of poverty, am
as poor as the rest of the world; and I
confess with shame that I know literally
nothing about virtue; and when I do not
Meno know the "quid" of anything how can I
know the "quale"? How, if I knew nothing
By Plato at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or
the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the
Written 380 B.C.E reverse of rich and noble? Do you think
that I could?
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Men. No, Indeed. But are you in earnest,
Persons of the Dialogue Socrates, in saying that you do not know
MENO what virtue is? And am I to carry back this
SOCRATES report of you to Thessaly?
A SLAVE OF MENO
ANYTUS Soc. Not only that, my dear boy, but you
may say further that I have never known of
any one else who did, in my judgment.

Meno. Can you tell me, Socrates, Men. Then you have never met Gorgias
whether virtue is acquired by teaching when he was at Athens?
or by practice; or if neither by teaching
nor practice, then whether it comes to Soc. Yes, I have.
man by nature, or in what other way?
Men. And did you not think that he knew?
Socrates. O Meno, there was a time
when the Thessalians were famous Soc. I have not a good memory, Meno, and
among the other Hellenes only for their therefore I cannot now tell what I thought
riches and their riding; but now, if I am of him at the time. And I dare say that he
not mistaken, they are equally famous did know, and that you know what he said:
for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, please, therefore, to remind me of what he
which is the native city of your friend said; or, if you would rather, tell me your
Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; own view; for I suspect that you and he
for when he came there, the flower of think much alike.
the Aleuadae, among them your
admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs Men. Very true.
of the Thessalians, fell in love with his
wisdom. And he has taught you the Soc. Then as he is not here, never mind
habit of answering questions in a grand him, and do you tell me: By the gods,
and bold style, which becomes those Meno, be generous, and tell me what you
who know, and is the style in which he say that virtue is; for I shall be truly
himself answers all comers; and any delighted to find that I have been
Hellene who likes may ask him mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do
anything. How different is our lot! my really have this knowledge; although I
dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a have been just saying that I have never
dearth of the commodity, and all found anybody who had.
wisdom seems to have emigrated from
us to you. I am certain that if you were Men. There will be no difficulty, Socrates,
in answering your question. Let us take Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is
first the virtue of a man-he should know one virtue of a man, another of a woman,
how to administer the state, and in the another of a child, and so on, does this
administration of it to benefit apply only to virtue, or would you say the
his friends and harm his enemies; and same of health, and size, and strength? Or
he must also be careful not to is the nature of health always the same,
suffer harm himself. A woman's virtue, whether in man or woman?
if you wish to know about that, may
also be easily described: her duty is to Men. I should say that health is the same,
order her house, and keep what is both in man and woman.
indoors, and obey her husband. Every
age, every condition of life, young or Soc. And is not this true of size and
old, male or female, bond or free, has a strength? If a woman is strong, she will be
different virtue: there are strong by reason of the same form and of
virtues numberless, and no lack of the same strength subsisting in her which
definitions of them; for virtue is there is in the man. I mean to say
relative to the actions and ages of each that strength, as strength, whether of man
of us in all that we do. And the same or woman, is the same. Is there
may be said of vice, Socrates. any difference?

Soc. How fortunate I am, Meno! When Men. I think not.

I ask you for one virtue, you present me
with a swarm of them, which are in Soc. And will not virtue, as virtue, be the
your keeping. Suppose that I carry on same, whether in a child or in a grown-up
the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, person, in a woman or in a man?
What is the nature of the bee? and you
answer that there are many kinds of Men. I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that
bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as this case is different from the others.
bees, because there are many and
different kinds of them; or are they not Soc. But why? Were you not saying that
rather to be distinguished by some other the virtue of a man was to order a state,
quality, as for example beauty, size, or and the virtue of a woman was to order
shape? How would you answer me? a house?

Men. I should answer that bees do not Men. I did say so.
differ from one another, as bees.
Soc. And can either house or state or
Soc. And if I went on to say: That is anything be well ordered without
what I desire to know, Meno; tell me temperance and without justice?
what is the quality in which they do not
differ, but are all alike;-would you be Men. Certainly not.
able to answer?
Soc. Then they who order a state or a
Men. I should. house temperately or justly order them
with temperance and justice?
Soc. And so of the virtues, however
many and different they may be, they Men. Certainly.
have all a common nature which makes
them virtues; and on this he who would Soc. Then both men and women, if they
answer the question, "What is virtue?" are to be good men and women, must have
would do well to have his eye fixed: Do the same virtues of temperance and justice?
you understand?
Men. True.
Men. I am beginning to understand; but
I do not as yet take hold of the question Soc. And can either a young man or an
as I could wish. elder one be good, if they are intemperate
and unjust?
 Soc. I mean as I might say about anything;
Men. They cannot. that a round, for example, is "a figure" and
not simply "figure," and I should adopt this
Soc. They must be temperate and just? mode of speaking, because there are other
figures.
Men. Yes.
Men. Quite right; and that is just what I
Soc. Then all men are good in the same am saying about virtue-that there are other
way, and by participation in the same virtues as well as justice.
virtues?
Soc. What are they? tell me the names of
Men. Such is the inference. them, as I would tell you the names of the
other figures if you asked me.
Soc. And they surely would not have
been good in the same way, unless their Men. Courage and temperance and
virtue had been the same? wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and
there are many others.
Men. They would not.
Soc. Yes, Meno; and again we are in the
Soc. Then now that the sameness of all same case: in searching after one virtue we
virtue has been proven, try and have found many, though not in the same
remember what you and Gorgias say way as before; but we have been unable to
that virtue is. find the common virtue which runs
through them all.
Men. Will you have one definition of
them all? Men. Why, Socrates, even now I am not
able to follow you in the attempt to get at
Soc. That is what I am seeking. one common notion of virtue as of
other things.
Men. If you want to have one definition
of them all, I know not what to say, but Soc. No wonder; but I will try to get nearer
that virtue is the power of if I can, for you know that all things have a
governing mankind. common notion. Suppose now that some
one asked you the question which I asked
Soc. And does this definition of virtue before: Meno, he would say, what is figure?
include all virtue? Is virtue the same in And if you answered "roundness," he
a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the would reply to you, in my way of speaking,
child govern his father, or the slave his by asking whether you would say that
master; and would he who governed be roundness is "figure" or "a figure"; and
any longer a slave? you would answer "a figure."

Men. I think not, Socrates. Men. Certainly.

Soc. No, indeed; there would be small Soc. And for this reason-that there are
reason in that. Yet once more, fair other figures?
friend; according to you, virtue is "the
power of governing"; but do you not Men. Yes.
add "justly and not unjustly"?
Soc. And if he proceeded to ask, What
Men. Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for other figures are there? you would have
justice is virtue. told him.

Soc. Would you say "virtue," Meno, or Men. I should.

"a virtue"?
Soc. And if he similarly asked what colour
Men. What do you mean? is, and you answered whiteness, and the
questioner rejoined, Would you say that
whiteness is colour or a colour? you would try; the attempt will be good
would reply, A colour, because there practice with a view to the answer about
are other colours as well. virtue.

Men. I should. Men. I would rather that you should

answer, Socrates.
Soc. And if he had said, Tell me what
they are?-you would have told him of Soc. Shall I indulge you?
other colours which are colours just as
much as whiteness. Men. By all means.

Men. Yes. Soc. And then you will tell me about virtue?

Soc. And suppose that he were to Men. I will.

pursue the matter in my way, he would
say: Ever and anon we are landed in Soc. Then I must do my best, for there is a
particulars, but this is not what I want; prize to be won.
tell me then, since you call them by a
common name, and say that they are all Men. Certainly.
figures, even when opposed to one
another, what is that common nature Soc. Well, I will try and explain to you
which you designate as figure-which what figure is. What do you say to this
contains straight as well as round, and answer?-Figure is the only thing which
is no more one than the other-that always follows colour. Will you be
would be your mode of speaking? satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should
be, if you would let me have a similar
Men. Yes. definition of virtue?

Soc. And in speaking thus, you do not Men. But, Socrates, it is such a
mean to say that the round is round any simple answer.
more than straight, or the straight any
more straight than round? Soc. Why simple?

Men. Certainly not. Men. Because, according to you, figure is

that which always follows colour.
Soc. You only assert that the round
figure is not more a figure than the (Soc. Granted.)
straight, or the straight than the round?
Men. But if a person were to say that he
Men. Very true. does not know what colour is, any more
than what figure is-what sort of answer
Soc. To what then do we give the name would you have given him?
of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that
when a person asked you this question Soc. I should have told him the truth. And
either about figure or colour, you were if he were a philosopher of the eristic and
to reply, Man, I do not understand what antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You
you want, or know what you are saying; have my answer, and if I am wrong, your
he would look rather astonished and say: business is to take up the argument and
Do you not understand that I am refute me. But if we were friends, and
looking for the "simile in multis"? And were talking as you and I are now, I should
then he might put the question in reply in a milder strain and more in the
another form: Mono, he might dialectician's vein; that is to say, I should
say, what is that "simile in multis" not only speak the truth, but I should
which you call figure, and which make use of premisses which the person
includes not only round and straight interrogated would be willing to
figures, but all? Could you not answer admit. And this is the way in which I shall
that question, Meno? I wish that you endeavour to approach you. You
will acknowledge, will you not, that
there is such a thing as an end, or Men. I should like nothing better.
termination, or extremity?-all which
words use in the same sense, although I Soc. Do not he and you and Empedocles
am aware that Prodicus might draw say that there are certain effluences of
distinctions about them: but still you, I existence?
am sure, would speak of a thing as
ended or terminated-that is all which I Men. Certainly.
am saying-not anything very difficult.
Soc. And passages into which and through
Men. Yes, I should; and I believe that I which the effluences pass?
understand your meaning.
Men. Exactly.
Soc. And you would speak of a surface
and also of a solid, as for example in Soc. And some of the effluences fit into
geometry. the passages, and some of them are too
small or too large?
Men. Yes.
Men. True.
Soc. Well then, you are now in a
condition to understand my definition Soc. And there is such a thing as sight?
of figure. I define figure to be that in
which the solid ends; or, more Men. Yes.
concisely, the limit of solid.
Soc. And now, as Pindar says, "read my
Men. And now, Socrates, what is meaning" colour is an effluence of form,
colour? commensurate with sight, and palpable
to sense.
Soc. You are outrageous, Meno, in thus
plaguing a poor old man to give you an Men. That, Socrates, appears to me to be
answer, when you will not take the an admirable answer.
trouble of remembering what is
Gorgias' definition of virtue. Soc. Why, yes, because it happens to be
one which you have been in the habit of
Men. When you have told me what I hearing: and your wit will have discovered,
ask, I will tell you, Socrates. I suspect, that you may explain in the same
way the nature of sound and smell, and of
Soc. A man who was blindfolded has many other similar phenomena.
only to hear you talking, and he would
know that you are a fair creature and Men. Quite true.
have still many lovers.
Soc. The answer, Meno, was in the
Men. Why do you think so? orthodox solemn vein, and therefore was
more acceptable to you than the other
Soc. Why, because you always speak in answer about figure.
imperatives: like all beauties when they
are in their prime, you are tyrannical; Men. Yes.
and also, as I suspect, you have found
out that I have weakness for the fair, Soc. And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I
and therefore to humour you I must cannot help thinking that the other was the
answer. better; and I am sure that you would be of
the same opinion, if you would only stay
Men. Please do. and be initiated, and were not
compelled, as you said yesterday, to go
Soc. Would you like me to answer you away before the mysteries.
after the manner of Gorgias, which is
familiar to you? Men. But I will stay, Socrates, if you will
give me many such answers. them, or does he know that they will do
him harm?
Soc. Well then, for my own sake as
well as for yours, I will do my very best; Men. There are some who think that the
but I am afraid that I shall not be able to evils will do them good, and others who
give you very many as good: and now, know that they will do them harm.
in your turn, you are to fulfil your
promise, and tell me what virtue is in Soc. And, in your opinion, do those who
the universal; and do not make a think that they will do them good know
singular into a plural, as the facetious that they are evils?
say of those who break a thing, but
deliver virtue to me whole and sound, Men. Certainly not.
and not broken into a number of pieces:
I have given you the pattern. Soc. Is it not obvious that those who are
ignorant of their nature do not desire them;
Men. Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I but they desire what they suppose to be
take it, is when he, who desires the goods although they are really evils; and if
honourable, is able to provide it for they are mistaken and suppose the evils to
himself; so the poet says, and I say too- be good they really desire goods?

Virtue is the desire of things honourable Men. Yes, in that case.

and the power of attaining them.
Soc. Well, and do those who, as you say,
Soc. And does he who desires the desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful
honourable also desire the good? to the possessor of them, know that they
will be hurt by them?
Men. Certainly.
Men. They must know it.
Soc. Then are there some who desire
the evil and others who desire the good? Soc. And must they not suppose that those
Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good? who are hurt are miserable in proportion to
the hurt which is inflicted upon them?
Men. I think not.
Men. How can it be otherwise?
Soc. There are some who desire evil?
Soc. But are not the miserable ill-fated?
Men. Yes.
Men. Yes, indeed.
Soc. Do you mean that they think the
evils which they desire, to be good; or Soc. And does any one desire to be
do they know that they are evil and yet miserable and ill-fated?
desire them?
Men. I should say not, Socrates.
Men. Both, I think.
Soc. But if there is no one who desires to
Soc. And do you really imagine, Meno, be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who
that a man knows evils to be evils and desires evil; for what is misery but the
desires them notwithstanding? desire and possession of evil?

Men. Certainly I do. Men. That appears to be the truth, Socrates,

and I admit that nobody desires evil.
Soc. And desire is of possession?
Soc. And yet, were you not saying just
Men. Yes, of possession. now that virtue is the desire and power of
attaining good?
Soc. And does he think that the evils
will do good to him who possesses Men. Yes, I did say so.
 without these?
Soc. But if this be affirmed, then the
desire of good is common to all, and Soc. And the non-acquisition of gold and
one man is no better than another in silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or
that respect? another, or in other words the want of
them, may be equally virtue?
Men. True.
Men. True.
Soc. And if one man is not better than
another in desiring good, he must be Soc. Then the acquisition of such goods is
better in the power of attaining it? no more virtue than the non-acquisition
and want of them, but whatever is
Men. Exactly. accompanied by justice or honesty is
virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice
Soc. Then, according to your definition, is vice.
virtue would appear to be the power of
attaining good? Men. It cannot be otherwise, in my
judgment.
Men. I entirely approve, Socrates, of
the manner in which you now view this Soc. And were we not saying just now that
matter. justice, temperance, and the like, were
each of them a part of virtue?
Soc. Then let us see whether what you
say is true from another point of view; Men. Yes.
for very likely you may be right:-You
affirm virtue to be the power of Soc. And so, Meno, this is the way in
attaining goods? which you mock me.

Men. Yes. Men. Why do you say that, Socrates?

Soc. And the goods which mean are Soc. Why, because I asked you to deliver
such as health and wealth and the virtue into my hands whole and unbroken,
possession of gold and silver, and and I gave you a pattern according to
having office and honour in the state- which you were to frame your answer; and
those are what you would call goods? you have forgotten already, and tell
me that virtue is the power of attaining
Men. Yes, I should include all those. good justly, or with justice; and justice you
acknowledge to be a part of virtue.
Soc. Then, according to Meno, who is
the hereditary friend of the great king, Men. Yes.
virtue is the power of getting silver and
gold; and would you add that they must Soc. Then it follows from your own
be gained piously, justly, or do you admissions, that virtue is doing what you
deem this to be of no consequence? do with a part of virtue; for justice and the
And is any mode of acquisition, even if like are said by you to be parts of virtue.
unjust and dishonest, equally to be
deemed virtue? Men. What of that?

Men. Not virtue, Socrates, but vice. Soc. What of that! Why, did not I ask you
to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole?
Soc. Then justice or temperance or And you are very far from telling me
holiness, or some other part of virtue, as this; but declare every action to be virtue
would appear, must accompany the which is done with a part of virtue; as
acquisition, and without them the mere though you had told me and I must already
acquisition of good will not be virtue. know the whole of virtue, and this too
when frittered away into little pieces. And,
Men. Why, how can there be virtue therefore, my dear I fear that I must begin
again and repeat the same question: voyaging and going away from home, for
What is virtue? for otherwise, I can if you did in other places as do in Athens,
only say, that every action done with you would be cast into prison as
a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the a magician.
meaning of saying that every action
done with justice is virtue? Ought I not Soc. You are a rogue, Meno, and had all
to ask the question over again; for can but caught me.
any one who does not know virtue
know a part of virtue? Men. What do you mean, Socrates?

Men. No; I do not say that he can. Soc. I can tell why you made a simile
about me.
Soc. Do you remember how, in the
example of figure, we rejected any Men. Why?
answer given in terms which were as
yet unexplained or unadmitted? Soc. In order that I might make another
simile about you. For I know that all pretty
Men. Yes, Socrates; and we were quite young gentlemen like to have pretty
right in doing so. similes made about them-as well they
may-but I shall not return the
Soc. But then, my friend, do not compliment. As to my being a torpedo, if
suppose that we can explain to any one the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of
the nature of virtue as a whole through torpidity in others, then indeed I am a
some unexplained portion of virtue, or torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex
anything at all in that fashion; we others, not because I am clear, but because
should only have to ask over again the I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I
old question, What is virtue? Am I know not what virtue is, and you seem to
not right? be in the same case, although you did once
perhaps know before you touched me.
Men. I believe that you are. However, I have no objection to join with
you in the enquiry.
Soc. Then begin again, and answer me,
What, according to you and your friend Men. And how will you enquire, Socrates,
Gorgias, is the definition of virtue? into that which you do not know? What
will you put forth as the subject of enquiry?
Men. O Socrates, I used to be told, And if you find what you want, how will
before I knew you, that you were you ever know that this is the thing which
always doubting yourself and making you did not know?
others doubt; and now you are casting
your spells over me, and I am simply Soc. I know, Meno, what you mean; but
getting bewitched and enchanted, and just see what a tiresome dispute you are
am at my wits' end. And if I may introducing. You argue that man cannot
venture to make a jest upon you, you enquire either about that which he knows,
seem to me both in your appearance or about that which he does not know; for
and in your power over others to be if he knows, he has no need to enquire;
very like the flat torpedo fish, who and if not, he cannot; for he does not
torpifies those who come near him and know the, very subject about which he is
touch him, as you have now torpified to enquire.
me, I think. For my soul and my tongue
are really torpid, and I do not know Men. Well, Socrates, and is not the
how to answer you; and though I have argument sound?
been delivered of an infinite variety of
speeches about virtue before now, and Soc. I think not.
to many persons-and very good ones
they were, as I thought-at this moment I Men. Why not?
cannot even say what virtue is. And I
think that. you are very wise in not Soc. I will tell you why: I have heard from
certain wise men and women who mean by saying that we do not learn, and
spoke of things divine that- that what we call learning is only a process
of recollection? Can you teach me how
Men. What did they say? this is?

Soc. They spoke of a glorious truth, as Soc. I told you, Meno, just now that you
I conceive. were a rogue, and now you ask whether I
can teach you, when I am saying that there
Men. What was it? and who were they? is no teaching, but only recollection; and
thus you imagine that you will involve me
Soc. Some of them were priests and in a contradiction.
priestesses, who had studied how they
might be able to give a reason of their Men. Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had
profession: there, have been poets also, no such intention. I only asked the
who spoke of these things by question from habit; but if you can prove
inspiration, like Pindar, and many to me that what you say is true, I wish that
others who were inspired. And they you would.
say-mark, now, and see whether their
words are true-they say that the soul of Soc. It will be no easy matter, but I will try
man is immortal, and at one time has an to please you to the utmost of my power.
end, which is termed dying, and at Suppose that you call one of your
another time is born again, but is never numerous attendants, that I may
destroyed. And the moral is, that a man demonstrate on him.
ought to live always in perfect holiness.
"For in the ninth year Persephone sends Men. Certainly. Come hither, boy.
the souls of those from whom she has
received the penalty of ancient Soc. He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does
crime back again from beneath into the he not?
light of the sun above, and these
are they who become noble kings and Men. Yes, indeed; he was born in
mighty men and great in wisdom and the house.
are called saintly heroes in after ages."
The soul, then, as being immortal, and Soc. Attend now to the questions which I
having been born again many times, ask him, and observe whether he learns of
rand having seen all things that exist, me or only remembers.
whether in this world or in the world
below, has knowledge of them all; and Men. I will.
it is no wonder that she should be able
to call to remembrance all that she ever Soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a
knew about virtue, and about figure like this is a square?
everything; for as all nature is akin, and
the soul has learned all things; there is Boy. I do.
no difficulty in her eliciting or as men
say learning, out of a single recollection Soc. And you know that a square figure
-all the rest, if a man is strenuous and has these four lines equal?
does not faint; for all enquiry and all
learning is but recollection. And Boy. Certainly.
therefore we ought not to listen to this
sophistical argument about the Soc. And these lines which I have drawn
impossibility of enquiry: for it will through the middle of the square are also
make us idle; and is sweet only to the equal?
sluggard; but the other saying will make
us active and inquisitive. In that Boy. Yes.
confiding, I will gladly enquire with
you into the nature of virtue. Soc. A square may be of any size?

Men. Yes, Socrates; but what do you Boy. Certainly.

 square is double, the line is double.
Soc. And if one side of the figure be of
two feet, and the other side be of two Men. True.
feet, how much will the whole be? Let
me explain: if in one direction the space Soc. Observe him while he recalls the
was of two feet, and in other direction steps in regular order. (To the Boy.) Tell
of one foot, the whole would be of two me, boy, do you assert that a double space
feet taken once? comes from a double line? Remember that
I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a
Boy. Yes. figure equal every way, and twice the size
of this-that is to say of eight feet; and I
Soc. But since this side is also of two want to know whether you still say that a
feet, there are twice two feet? double square comes from double line?

Boy. There are. Boy. Yes.

Soc. Then the square is of twice Soc. But does not this line become
two feet? doubled if we add another such line here?

Boy. Yes. Boy. Certainly.

Soc. And how many are twice two feet? Soc. And four such lines will make a space
count and tell me. containing eight feet?

Boy. Four, Socrates. Boy. Yes.

Soc. And might there not be another Soc. Let us describe such a figure: Would
square twice as large as this, and having you not say that this is the figure of eight
like this the lines equal? feet?

Boy. Yes. Boy. Yes.

Soc. And of how many feet will that be? Soc. And are there not these four divisions
in the figure, each of which is equal to the
Boy. Of eight feet. figure of four feet?

Soc. And now try and tell me the length Boy. True.
of the line which forms the side of that
double square: this is two feet-what will Soc. And is not that four times four?
that be?
Boy. Certainly.
Boy. Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.
Soc. And four times is not double?
Soc. Do you observe, Meno, that I am
not teaching the boy anything, but only Boy. No, indeed.
asking him questions; and now he
fancies that he knows how long a line is Soc. But how much?
necessary in order to produce a figure
of eight square feet; does he not? Boy. Four times as much.

Men. Yes. Soc. Therefore the double line, boy, has

given a space, not twice, but four times as
Soc. And does he really know? much.

Men. Certainly not. Boy. True.

Soc. He only guesses that because the Soc. Four times four are sixteen-are
they not?
Boy. That is evident.
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And how much are three times
Soc. What line would give you a space three feet?
of right feet, as this gives one of sixteen
feet;-do you see? Boy. Nine.

Boy. Yes. Soc. And how much is the double of four?

Soc. And the space of four feet is made Boy. Eight.

from this half line?
Soc. Then the figure of eight is not made
Boy. Yes. out of a of three?

Soc. Good; and is not a space of eight Boy. No.

feet twice the size of this, and half the
size of the other? Soc. But from what line?-tell me exactly;
and if you would rather not reckon, try and
Boy. Certainly. show me the line.

Soc. Such a space, then, will be made Boy. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.
out of a line greater than this one, and
less than that one? Soc. Do you see, Meno, what advances he
has made in his power of recollection? He
Boy. Yes; I think so. did not know at first, and he does not
know now, what is the side of a figure of
Soc. Very good; I like to hear you say eight feet: but then he thought that
what you think. And now tell me, is not he knew, and answered confidently as if he
this a line of two feet and that of four? knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a
difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies
Boy. Yes. that he knows.

Soc. Then the line which forms the side Men. True.
of eight feet ought to be more than this
line of two feet, and less than the other Soc. Is he not better off in knowing
of four feet? his ignorance?

Boy. It ought. Men. I think that he is.

Soc. Try and see if you can tell me how Soc. If we have made him doubt, and
much it will be. given him the "torpedo's shock," have we
done him any harm?
Boy. Three feet.
Men. I think not.
Soc. Then if we add a half to this line of
two, that will be the line of three. Here Soc. We have certainly, as would seem,
are two and there is one; and on the assisted him in some degree to the
other side, here are two also and there is discovery of the truth; and now he will
one: and that makes the figure of wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he
which you speak? would have been ready to tell all the world
again and again that the double space
Boy. Yes. should have a double side.

Soc. But if there are three feet this way Men. True.
and three feet that way, the whole space
will be three times three feet? Soc. But do you suppose that he would
ever have enquired into or learned what
he fancied that he knew, though he was Boy. Yes.
really ignorant of it, until he had fallen
into perplexity under the idea that he Soc. And are there not here four equal
did not know, and had desired to know? lines which contain this space?

Men. I think not, Socrates. Boy. There are.

Soc. Then he was the better for the Soc. Look and see how much this space is.
torpedo's touch?
Boy. I do not understand.
Men. I think so.
Soc. Has not each interior line cut off half
Soc. Mark now the farther development. of the four spaces?
I shall only ask him, and not teach him,
and he shall share the enquiry with me: Boy. Yes.
and do you watch and see if you find
me telling or explaining anything to Soc. And how many spaces are there in
him, instead of eliciting his opinion. this section?
Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four
feet which I have drawn? Boy. Four.

Boy. Yes. Soc. And how many in this?

Soc. And now I add another square Boy. Two.

equal to the former one?
Soc. And four is how many times two?
Boy. Yes.
Boy. Twice.
Soc. And a third, which is equal to
either of them? Soc. And this space is of how many feet?

Boy. Yes. Boy. Of eight feet.

Soc. Suppose that we fill up the Soc. And from what line do you get
vacant corner? this figure?

Boy. Very good. Boy. From this.

Soc. Here, then, there are four Soc. That is, from the line which extends
equal spaces? from corner to corner of the figure of four
feet?
Boy. Yes.
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And how many times larger is this
space than this other? Soc. And that is the line which the learned
call the diagonal. And if this is the proper
Boy. Four times. name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared
to affirm that the double space is the
Soc. But it ought to have been twice square of the diagonal?
only, as you will remember.
Boy. Certainly, Socrates.
Boy. True.
Soc. What do you say of him, Meno?
Soc. And does not this line, reaching Were not all these answers given out of his
from corner to corner, bisect each of own head?
these spaces?
Men. Yes, they were all his own. did teach him.

Soc. And yet, as we were just now Soc. And yet he has the knowledge?
saying, he did not know?
Men. The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.
Men. True.
Soc. But if he did not acquire the
Soc. But still he had in him those knowledge in this life, then he must have
notions of his-had he not? had and learned it at some other time?

Men. Yes. Men. Clearly he must.

Soc. Then he who does not know may Soc. Which must have been the time when
still have true notions of that which he he was not a man?
does not know?
Men. Yes.
Men. He has.
Soc. And if there have been always true
Soc. And at present these notions have thoughts in him, both at the time when he
just been stirred up in him, as in a was and was not a man, which only need
dream; but if he were frequently asked to be awakened into knowledge by putting
the same questions, in different forms, questions to him, his soul must have
he would know as well as any one always possessed this knowledge, for he
at last? always either was or was not a man?

Men. I dare say. Men. Obviously.

Soc. Without any one teaching him he Soc. And if the truth of all things always
will recover his knowledge for himself, existed in the soul, then the soul is
if he is only asked questions? immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer,
and try to recollect what you do not know,
Men. Yes. or rather what you do not remember.

Soc. And this spontaneous recovery of Men. I feel, somehow, that I like what you
knowledge in him is recollection? are saying.

Men. True. Soc. And I, Meno, like what I am saying.

Some things I have said of which I am not
Soc. And this knowledge which he now altogether confident. But that we shall be
has must he not either have acquired or better and braver and less helpless if we
always possessed? think that we ought to enquire, than we
should have been if we indulged in the idle
Men. Yes. fancy that there was no knowing and no
use in seeking to know what we do not
Soc. But if he always possessed this know;-that is a theme upon which I am
knowledge he would always have ready to fight, in word and deed, to the
known; or if he has acquired the utmost of my power.
knowledge he could not have acquired
it in this life, unless he has been taught Men. There again, Socrates, your words
geometry; for he may be made to do the seem to me excellent.
same with all geometry and every other
branch of knowledge. Now, has any one Soc. Then, as we are agreed that a man
ever taught him all this? You must should enquire about that which he does
know about him, if, as you say, he was not know, shall you and I make an effort to
born and bred in your house. enquire together into the nature of virtue?

Men. And I am certain that no one ever Men. By all means, Socrates. And yet I
would much rather return to my original
question, Whether in seeking to acquire Men. Certainly.
virtue we should regard it as a thing to
be taught, or as a gift of nature, or Soc. Then now we have made a quick end
as coming to men in some other way? of this question: if virtue is of such a
nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?
Soc. Had I the command of you as well
as of myself, Meno, I would not have Men. Certainly.
enquired whether virtue is given by
instruction or not, until we had first Soc. The next question is, whether virtue is
ascertained "what it is." But as you knowledge or of another species?
think only of controlling me who am
your slave, and never of controlling Men. Yes, that appears to be the -question
yourself,-such being your notion of which comes next in order.
freedom, I must yield to you, for you
are irresistible. And therefore I have Soc. Do we not say that virtue is a good?-
now to enquire into the qualities of a This is a hypothesis which is not set aside.
thing of which I do not as yet know the
nature. At any rate, will you Men. Certainly.
condescend a little, and allow the
question "Whether virtue is given by Soc. Now, if there be any sort-of good
instruction, or in any other way," to be which is distinct from knowledge, virtue
argued upon hypothesis? As the may be that good; but if knowledge
geometrician, when he is asked embraces all good, then we shall be right
whether a certain triangle is capable in think in that virtue is knowledge?
being inscribed in a certain circle,
will reply: "I cannot tell you as yet; but Men. True.
I will offer a hypothesis which
may assist us in forming a conclusion: Soc. And virtue makes us good?
If the figure be such that when you have
produced a given side of it, the given Men. Yes.
area of the triangle falls short by an area
corresponding to the part produced, Soc. And if we are good, then we are
then one consequence follows, and if profitable; for all good things are
this is impossible then some other; and profitable?
therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis
before I tell you whether this triangle is Men. Yes.
capable of being inscribed in the
circle":-that is a geometrical hypothesis. Soc. Then virtue is profitable?
And we too, as we know not the nature
and -qualities of virtue, must ask, Men. That is the only inference.
whether virtue is or not taught, under a
hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a Soc. Then now let us see what are the
class of mental goods, will it be taught things which severally profit us. Health
or not? Let the first hypothesis be-that and strength, and beauty and wealth-these,
virtue is or is not knowledge,-in that and the like of these, we call profitable?
case will it be taught or not? or, as we
were just now saying, remembered"? Men. True.
For there is no use in disputing about
the name. But is virtue taught or not? or Soc. And yet these things may also
rather, does not everyone see that sometimes do us harm: would you not
knowledge alone is taught? think so?

Men. I agree. Men. Yes.

Soc. Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue Soc. And what is the guiding principle
will be taught? which makes them profitable or the
reverse? Are they not profitable when good and sometimes evil, do not they also
they are rightly used, and hurtful when become profitable or hurtful, accordingly
they are not rightly used? as the soul guides and uses them rightly or
wrongly; just as the things of the soul
Men. Certainly. herself are benefited when under the
guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?
Soc. Next, let us consider the goods of
the soul: they are temperance, justice, Men. True.
courage, quickness of apprehension,
memory, magnanimity, and the like? Soc. And the wise soul guides them rightly,
and the foolish soul wrongly.
Men. Surely.
Men. Yes.
Soc. And such of these as are not
knowledge, but of another sort, are Soc. And is not this universally true of
sometimes profitable and sometimes human nature? All other things hang upon
hurtful; as, for example, courage the soul, and the things of the soul herself
wanting prudence, which is only a sort hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good;
of confidence? When a man has no and so wisdom is inferred to be that which
sense he is harmed by courage, but profits-and virtue, as we say, is profitable?
when he has sense he is profited?
Men. Certainly.
Men. True.
Soc. And thus we arrive at the conclusion
Soc. And the same may be said of that virtue is either wholly or partly
temperance and quickness of wisdom?
apprehension; whatever things are
learned or done with sense are Men. I think that what you are saying,
profitable, but when done without sense Socrates, is very true.
they are hurtful?
Soc. But if this is true, then the good are
Men. Very true. not by nature good?

Soc. And in general, all that the Men. I think not.

attempts or endures, when under the
guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; Soc. If they had been, there would
but when she is under the guidance of assuredly have been discerners of
folly, in the opposite? characters among us who would have
known our future great men; and on their
Men. That appears to be true. showing we should have adopted them,
and when we had got them, we should
Soc. If then virtue is a quality of the have kept them in the citadel out of the
soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it way of harm, and set a stamp upon them
must be wisdom or prudence, since far rather than upon a piece of gold, in
none of the things of the soul are either order that no one might tamper with them;
profitable or hurtful in themselves, but and when they grew up they would have
they are all made profitable or hurtful been useful to the state?
by the addition of wisdom or of folly;
and therefore and therefore if virtue is Men. Yes, Socrates, that would have been
profitable, virtue must be a sort of the right way.
wisdom or prudence?
Soc. But if the good are not by nature good,
Men. I quite agree. are they made good by instruction?

Soc. And the other goods, such as Men. There appears to be no other
wealth and the like, of which we were alternative, Socrates. On the supposition
just now saying that they are sometimes that virtue is knowledge, there can be no
doubt that virtue is taught. choose him to fill the highest offices. And
these are the sort of men from whom you
Soc. Yes, indeed; but what if the are likely to learn whether there are any
supposition is erroneous? teachers of virtue, and who they are.
Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend
Men. I certainly thought just now that Meno in answering our question, Who are
we were right. the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If
we wanted Meno to be a good physician,
Soc. Yes, Meno; but a principle which to whom should we send him? Should we
has any soundness should stand firm not send him to the physicians?
not only just now, but always.
Any. Certainly.
Men. Well; and why are you so slow of
heart to believe that knowledge is virtue? Soc. Or if we wanted him to be a good
cobbler, should we not send him to the
Soc. I will try and tell you why, Meno. I cobblers?
do not retract the assertion that if virtue
is knowledge it may be taught; but I Any. Yes.
fear that I have some reason in doubting
whether virtue is knowledge: for Soc. And so forth?
consider now. and say whether virtue,
and not only virtue but anything that is Any. Yes.
taught, must not have teachers and
disciples? Soc. Let me trouble you with one more
question. When we say that we should be
Men. Surely. right in sending him to the physicians if
we wanted him to be a physician, do we
Soc. And conversely, may not the art of mean that we should be right in sending
which neither teachers nor disciples him to those who profess the art, rather
exist be assumed to be incapable of than to those who do not, and to those who
being taught? demand payment for teaching the art, and
profess to teach it to any one who will
Men. True; but do you think that there come and learn? And if these were our
are no teachers of virtue? reasons, should we not be right in sending
him?
Soc. I have certainly often enquired
whether there were any, and taken great Any. Yes.
pains to find them, and have never
succeeded; and many have assisted me Soc. And might not the same be said of
in the search, and they were the persons flute-playing, and of the other arts? Would
whom I thought the most likely to know. a man who wanted to make another a
Here at the moment when he is wanted flute-player refuse to send him to those
we fortunately have sitting by us who profess to teach the art for money,
Anytus, the very person of whom we and be plaguing other persons to give him
should make enquiry; to him then let us instruction, who are not professed teachers
repair. In the first Place, he is the son of and who never had a single disciple in that
a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, branch of knowledge which he wishes him
who acquired his wealth, not by to acquire-would not such conduct be the
accident or gift, like Ismenias the height of folly?
Theban (who has recently made himself
as rich as Polycrates), but by his own Any. Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.
skill and industry, and who is a well-
conditioned, modest man, not insolent, Soc. Very good. And now you are in a
or over-bearing, or annoying; moreover, position to advise with me about my friend
this son of his has received a good Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus,
education, as the Athenian people that he desires to attain that kind of
certainly appear to think, for they wisdom and-virtue by which men order the
state or the house, and honour their but many others are well spoken of; some
parents, and know when to receive and who lived before him, and others who are
when to send away citizens and still living. Now, when you say that they
strangers, as a good man should. Now, deceived and corrupted the youth, are they
to whom should he go in order that he to be supposed to have corrupted them
may learn this virtue? Does not the consciously or unconsciously? Can those
previous argument imply clearly that who were deemed by many to be the
we should send him to those who wisest men of Hellas have been out of
profess and avouch that they are the their minds?
common teachers of all Hellas, and are
ready to impart instruction to any one Any. Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the
who likes, at a fixed price? young men who gave their money to them,
were out of their minds, and their
Any. Whom do you mean, Socrates? relations and guardians who entrusted their
youth to the care of these men were
Soc. You surely know, do you not, still more out of their minds, and most of
Anytus, that these are the people whom all, the cities who allowed them to come in,
mankind call Sophists? and did not drive them out, citizen and
stranger alike.
Any. By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I
only hope that no friend or kinsman or Soc. Has any of the Sophists wronged you,
acquaintance of mine, whether citizen Anytus? What makes you so angry with
or stranger, will ever be so mad as to them?
allow himself to be corrupted by them;
for they are a manifest pest and Any. No, indeed, neither I nor any of my
corrupting influences to those who have belongings has ever had, nor would I
to do with them. suffer them to have, anything to do
with them.
Soc. What, Anytus? Of all the people
who profess that they know how to do Soc. Then you are entirely unacquainted
men good, do you mean to say that with them?
these are the only ones who not only do
them no good, but positively corrupt Any. And I have no wish to be acquainted.
those who are entrusted to them, and in
return for this disservice have the face Soc. Then, my dear friend, how can you
to demand money? Indeed, I cannot know whether a thing is good or bad of
believe you; for I know of a single man, which you are wholly ignorant?
Protagoras, who made more out of his
craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who Any. Quite well; I am sure that I know
created such noble works, or any ten what manner of men these are, whether I
other statuaries. How could that A am acquainted with them or not.
mender of old shoes, or patcher up of
clothes, who made the shoes or clothes Soc. You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I
worse than he received them, could not really cannot make out, judging from your
have remained thirty days undetected, own words, how, if you are not acquainted
and would very soon have starved; with them, you know about them. But I am
whereas during more than forty years, not enquiring of you who are the
Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, teachers who will corrupt Meno (let them
and sending his disciples from him be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask
worse than he received them, and he you to tell him who there is in this great
was never found out. For, if I am not city who will teach him how to become
mistaken,-he was about seventy years eminent in the virtues which I was just,
old at his death, forty of which were now describing. He is the friend of your
spent in the practice of his profession; family, and you will oblige him.
and during all that time he had a
good reputation, which to this day he Any. Why do you not tell him yourself?
retains: and not only Protagoras,
Soc. I have told him whom I supposed make his own son a good man and a
to be the teachers of these things; but I gentleman; he could not have been jealous
learn from you that I am utterly at fault, of him, or have intentionally abstained
and I dare say that you are right. And from imparting to him his own virtue. Did
now I wish that you, on your part, you never hear that he made his son
would tell me to whom among the Cleophantus a famous horseman; and had
Athenians he should go. Whom would him taught to stand upright on horseback
you name? Any. Why single out and hurl a javelin, and to do many other
individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, marvellous things; and in anything which
taken at random, if he will mind him, could be learned from a master he was
will do far more, good to him than well trained? Have you not heard from our
the Sophists. elders of him?

Soc. And did those gentlemen grow of Any. I have.

themselves; and without having been
taught by any one, were they Soc. Then no one could say that his son
nevertheless able to teach others that showed any want of capacity?
which they had never learned
themselves? Any. Very likely not.

Any. I imagine that they learned of the Soc. But did any one, old or young, ever
previous generation of gentlemen. Have say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son
there not been many good men in of Themistocles, was a wise or good man,
this city? as his father was?

Soc. Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many Any. I have certainly never heard any one
good statesmen also there always have say so.
been and there are still, in the city of
Athens. But the question is whether Soc. And if virtue could have been taught,
they were also good teachers of their would his father Themistocles have sought
own virtue;-not whether there are, or to train him in these minor
have been, good men in this part of the accomplishments, and allowed him who,
world, but whether virtue can be taught, as you must remember, was his own son,
is the question which we have been to be no better than his neighbours in those
discussing. Now, do we mean to say qualities in which he himself excelled?
that the good men our own and of other
times knew how to impart to others that Any. Indeed, indeed, I think not.
virtue which they had themselves; or is
virtue a thing incapable of being Soc. Here was a teacher of virtue whom
communicated or imparted by one man you admit to be among the best men of the
to another? That is the question which I past. Let us take another,-Aristides, the son
and Meno have been arguing. Look at of Lysimachus: would you not
the matter in your own way: Would you acknowledge that he was a good man?
not admit that Themistocles was a
good man? Any. To be sure I should.

Any. Certainly; no man better. Soc. And did not he train his son
Lysimachus better than any other Athenian
Soc. And must not he then have been a in all that could be done for him by the
good teacher, if any man ever was a help of masters? But what has been the
good teacher, of his own virtue? result? Is he a bit better than any other
mortal? He is an acquaintance of yours,
Any. Yes certainly,-if he wanted to and you see what he is like. There is
be so. Pericles, again, magnificent in his wisdom;
and he, as you are aware, had two
Soc. But would he not have wanted? He sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.
would, at any rate, have desired to
Any. I know. rage. And he may well be in a rage, for he
thinks, in the first place, that I am
Soc. And you know, also, that he taught defaming these gentlemen; and in the
them to be unrivalled horsemen, and second place, he is of opinion that he is
had them trained in music and one of them himself. But some day he will
gymnastics and all sorts of arts-in these know what is the meaning of
respects they were on a level with the defamation, and if he ever does, he will
best-and had he no wish to make good forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to
men of them? Nay, he must have you, Meno; for I suppose that there are
wished it. But virtue, as I suspect, could gentlemen in your region too?
not be taught. And that you may not
suppose the incompetent teachers to be Men. Certainly there are.
only the meaner sort of Athenians and
few in number, remember again that Soc. And are they willing to teach the
Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and young? and do they profess to be teachers?
Stephanus, whom, besides giving them and do they agree that virtue is taught?
a good education in other things, he
trained in wrestling, and they were the Men. No indeed, Socrates, they are
best wrestlers in Athens: one of them he anything but agreed; you may hear them
committed to the care of Xanthias, and saying at one time that virtue can be taught,
the other of Eudorus, who had the and then again the reverse.
reputation of being the most celebrated
wrestlers of that day. Do you Soc. Can we call those teachers who do
remember them? not acknowledge the possibility of their
own vocation?
Any. I have heard of them.
Men. I think not, Socrates.
Soc. Now, can there be a doubt that
Thucydides, whose children were Soc. And what do you think of these
taught things for which he had to spend Sophists, who are the only professors? Do
money, would have taught them to be they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?
good men, which would have cost him
nothing, if virtue could have been Men. I often wonder, Socrates, that
taught? Will you reply that he was a Gorgias is never heard promising to teach
mean man, and had not many virtue: and when he hears others promising
friends among the Athenians and allies? he only laughs at them; but he thinks that
Nay, but he was of a great family, and a men should be taught to speak.
man of influence at Athens and in all
Hellas, and, if virtue could have been Soc. Then do you not think that the
taught, he would have found out some Sophists are teachers?
Athenian or foreigner who would have
made good men of his sons, if he could Men. I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the
not himself spare the time from cares of rest of the world, I am in doubt, and
state. Once more, I suspect, friend sometimes I think that they are teachers
Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which and sometimes not.
can be taught?
Soc. And are you aware that not you only
Any. Socrates, I think that you are too and other politicians have doubts whether
ready to speak evil of men: and, if you virtue can be taught or not, but that
will take my advice, I would Theognis the poet says the very same thing?
recommend you to be careful. Perhaps
there is no city in which it is not easier Men. Where does he say so?
to do men harm than to do them good,
and this is certainly the case at Athens, Soc. In these elegiac verses:
as I believe that you know.
Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and
Soc. O Meno, think that Anytus is in a make yourself agreeable to them; for from
the good you will learn what is good,
but if you mix with the bad you will Soc. And there are no teachers of virtue to
lose the intelligence which you already be found anywhere?
have. Do you observe that here he
seems to imply that virtue can be taught? Men. There are not.

Men. Clearly. Soc. And if there are no teachers, neither

are there scholars?
Soc. But in some other verses he shifts
about and says: Men. That, I think, is true.

If understanding could be created and Soc. Then virtue cannot be taught?

put into a man, then they [who were
able to perform this feat] would have Men. Not if we are right in our view. But I
obtained great rewards. And again:- cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no
good men: And if there are, how did they
Never would a bad son have sprung come into existence?
from a good sire, for he would have
heard the voice of instruction; but not Soc. I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are
by teaching will you ever make a bad not good for much, and that Gorgias has
man into a good one. And this, as you been as poor an educator of you as
may remark, is a contradiction of the Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we
other. shall have to look to ourselves, and try
to find some one who will help in some
Men. Clearly. way or other to improve us. This I say,
because I observe that in the previous
Soc. And is there anything else of discussion none of us remarked that right
which the professors are affirmed not and good action is possible to man under
only not to be teachers of others, but to other guidance than that of knowledge
be ignorant themselves, and bad at the (episteme);-and indeed if this be denied,
knowledge of that which they are there is no seeing how there can be any
professing to teach? or is there anything good men at all.
about which even the acknowledged
"gentlemen" are sometimes saying that Men. How do you mean, Socrates?
"this thing can be taught," and
sometimes the opposite? Can you say Soc. I mean that good men are necessarily
that they are teachers in any true sense useful or profitable. Were we not right in
whose ideas are in such confusion? admitting this? It must be so.

Men. I should say, certainly not. Men. Yes.

Soc. But if neither the Sophists nor the Soc. And in supposing that they will be
gentlemen are teachers, clearly there useful only if they are true guides to us of
can be no other teachers? action-there we were also right?

Men. No. Men. Yes.

Soc. And if there are no teachers, Soc. But when we said that a man cannot
neither are there disciples? be a good guide unless he have knowledge
(phrhonesis), this we were wrong.
Men. Agreed.
Men. What do you mean by the word
Soc. And we have admitted that a thing "right"?
cannot be taught of which there are
neither teachers nor disciples? Soc. I will explain. If a man knew the way
to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to
Men. We have. the place and led others thither, would he
not be a right and good guide?
Men. What have they to do with the
Men. Certainly. question?

Soc. And a person who had a right Soc. Because they require to be fastened in
opinion about the way, but had never order to keep them, and if they are not
been and did not know, might be a good fastened they will play truant and run away.
guide also, might he not?
Men. Well. what of that?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. I mean to say that they are not very
Soc. And while he has true opinion valuable possessions if they are at liberty,
about that which the other knows, he for they will walk off like runaway slaves;
will be just as good a guide if he thinks but when fastened, they are of great value,
the truth, as he who knows the truth? for they are really beautiful works of art.
Now this is an illustration of the nature of
Men. Exactly. true opinions: while they abide with us
they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run
Soc. Then true opinion is as good a away out of the human soul, and do not
guide to correct action as knowledge; remain long, and therefore they are not
and that was the point which we of much value until they are fastened by
omitted in our speculation about the the tie of the cause; and this fastening of
nature of virtue, when we said that them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you
knowledge only is the guide of right and I have agreed to call it. But when they
action; whereas there is also right are bound, in the first place, they have the
opinion. nature of knowledge; and, in the second
place, they are abiding. And this is
Men. True. why knowledge is more honourable and
excellent than true opinion, because
Soc. Then right opinion is not less fastened by a chain.
useful than knowledge?
Men. What you are saying, Socrates,
Men. The difference, Socrates, is only seems to be very like the truth.
that he who has knowledge will always
be right; but he who has right opinion Soc. I too speak rather in ignorance; I only
will sometimes be right, and sometimes conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs
not. from true opinion is no matter of
conjecture with me. There are not many
Soc. What do you mean? Can he be things which I profess to know, but this
wrong who has right opinion, so long as is most certainly one of them.
he has right opinion?
Men. Yes, Socrates; and you are quite
Men. I admit the cogency of your right in saying so.
argument, and therefore, Socrates, I
wonder that knowledge should be Soc. And am I not also right in saying that
preferred to right opinion-or why they true opinion leading the way perfects
should ever differ. action quite as well as knowledge?

Soc. And shall I explain this wonder Men. There again, Socrates, I think you
to you? are right.

Men. Do tell me. Soc. Then right opinion is not a whit

inferior to knowledge, or less useful in
Soc. You would not wonder if you had action; nor is the man who has right
ever observed the images of Daedalus; opinion inferior to him who has
but perhaps you have not got them in knowledge?
your country?
Men. True. a good?

Soc. And surely the good man has been Men. Yes. Soc. And the right guide is
acknowledged by us to be useful? useful and
good? Men. Certainly. Soc. And the only
Men. Yes. right guides are knowledge and true
opinion-these are the guides of man; for
Soc. Seeing then that men become good things which happen by chance are not
and useful to states, not only because under the guidance of man: but the guides
they have knowledge, but because they of man are true opinion and
have right opinion, and that neither knowledge. Men. I think so too. Soc. But
knowledge nor right opinion is given to if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue
man by nature or acquired by him-(do knowledge. Men. Clearly not. Soc. Then
you imagine either of them to be given of two good and useful things, one, which
by nature? is knowledge, has been set aside, and
cannot be supposed to be our guide in
Men. Not I.) political life. Men. I think not. Soc. And
therefore not by any wisdom, and not
Soc. Then if they are not given by because they were wise, did Themistocles
nature, neither are the good by nature and those others of whom Anytus spoke
good? govern states. This was the reason why
they were unable to make others like
Men. Certainly not. themselves-because their virtue was not
grounded on knowledge. Men. That is
Soc. And nature being excluded, then probably true, Socrates. Soc. But if not by
came the question whether virtue is knowledge, the only alternative which
acquired by teaching? remains is that statesmen must have
guided states by right opinion, which is in
Men. Yes. politics what divination is in religion; for
diviners and also prophets say many things
Soc. If virtue was wisdom [or truly, but they know not what they
knowledge], then, as we thought, it was say. Men. So I believe.
taught?
Soc. And may we not, Meno, truly call
Men. Yes. those men "divine" who, having no
understanding, yet succeed in many a
Soc. And if it was taught it was wisdom? grand deed and word?

Men. Certainly. Men. Certainly.

Soc. And if there were teachers, it Soc. Then we shall also be right in calling
might be taught; and if there were no divine those whom we were just now
teachers, not? speaking of as diviners and prophets,
including the whole tribe of poets. Yes,
Men. True. and statesmen above all may be said to be
divine and illumined, being inspired and
Soc. But surely we acknowledged that possessed of God, in which condition they
there were no teachers of virtue? say many grand things, not knowing what
they say.
Men. Yes.
Men. Yes.
Soc. Then we acknowledged that it was
not taught, and was not wisdom? Soc. And the women too, Meno, call good
men divine-do they not? and the Spartans,
Men. Certainly. when they praise a good man, say "that he
is a divine man."
Soc. And yet we admitted that it was
Men. And I think, Socrates, that they
are right; although very likely our
friend Anytus may take offence at the
word.

Soc. I da not care; as for Anytus, there

will be another opportunity of talking
with him. To sum up our enquiry-the
result seems to be, if we are at all right
in our view, that virtue is neither natural
nor acquired, but an instinct given by
God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct
accompanied by reason, unless there
may be supposed to be among
statesmen some one who is capable of
educating statesMen. And if there be
such an one, he may be said to be
among the living what Homer says that
Tiresias was among the dead, "he alone
has understanding; but the rest are
flitting shades"; and he and his virtue in
like manner will be a reality among
shadows.

Men. That is excellent, Socrates.

Soc. Then, Meno, the conclusion is that

virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift
of God. But we shall never know the
certain truth until, before asking how
virtue is given, we enquire into the
actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must
go away, but do you, now that you are
persuaded yourself, persuade our friend
Anytus. And do not let him be so
exasperated; if you can conciliate him,
you will have done good service to the
Athenian people.

THE END