G.R. No. 208146. June 8, 2016.

VIRGINIA DIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and TIMOTHY DESMOND, respondents.

Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaint or Information; If a motion to quash is based on a

defect in the information that can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made.—If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment,
the court shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states: SEC.
4. Amendment of complaint or information.—If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment
be made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion
shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the
opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power.—This Court has held that failure to provide the
prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power. In People v.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 770 SCRA 162 (2015): When a motion to quash is filed challenging the
validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must
deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect
pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be
corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the
Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured
by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging
the proceedings, are avoided. More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process
underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other
litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court’s refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to
amend an Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time
and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State’s right to due process.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Motion to Quash; A defect in the complaint filed before
the fiscal is not a ground to quash an information; On the other hand, lack of authority to file an
information is a proper ground.—A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to
quash an information. In Sasot v. People, 462 SCRA 138 (2005): Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed,
enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit: a) That the facts charged do not constitute
an offense; b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person
of the accused; c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; d) That it does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form; e) That more than one offense is charged except in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; f) That the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished; g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any
mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as
grounds for a motion to quash. On the other hand, lack of authority to file an information is a proper
ground.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor’s lack of authority
to file it, the lack of the authority must be evident on the face of the information.—For an information
to be quashed based on the prosecutor’s lack of authority to file it, the lack of the authority must be
evident on the face of the information. The Informations here do not allege that the venue of the
offense was other than Morong, Bataan. Thus, it is not apparent on the face of the Informations that the
prosecutor did not have the authority to file them. The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the
opportunity to amend the Informations. If the proper venue appears not to be Morong, Bataan after the
Informations have been amended, then the trial court may dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction, as
well as lack of authority of the prosecutor to file the information.

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through
proper public authorities, partakes of a degree of protected freedom of expression.—Whether e-mailing
or, as in this case, sending e-mails to the persons named in the Informations — who appear to be
officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is found — is
sufficiently “public,” as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-
Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be properly raised during trial. Passionate and
emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public authorities, partakes of a degree of protected
freedom of expression. Certainly, if we remain faithful to the dictum that public office is a public trust,
some leeway should be given to the public to express disgust. The scope and extent of that protection
cannot be grounded in abstractions. The facts of this case need to be proven by evidence; otherwise,
this Court exercises barren abstractions that may wander into situations only imagined, not real.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Motion to Quash; Good Faith; Good faith is not among
the grounds for quashing an information as enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.—
Good faith is not among the grounds for quashing an information as enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3
of the Rules of Court. It is not apparent on the face of the Informations, and what is not apparent cannot
be the basis for quashing them.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ponce Enrile, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for public respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be cured by amendment, courts
must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend the information.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision2 dated January
8, 2013 and Resolution3 dated July 10, 2013. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional
Trial Court’s Order that quashed the Informations charging petitioner Virginia Dio (Dio) with libel
because these Informations failed to allege publication.4
Private respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond) is the Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay
Marine Exploratorium, of which Dio is Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors.5
On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel.6 Two (2) separate Informations,
both dated February 26, 2003, were filed and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109.7 The
Information in Criminal Case No. 9108 reads:

That on or about July 6, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation
of Timothy Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the offended party and to
other persons namely: Atty. Winston Ginez, John Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson which read as follows:

‘NOW THAT WE ARE SET TO BUILD THE HOTEL SO THAT YOU COULD SURVIVED, (sic) YOU SHOULD STOP
YOUR NONSENSE THREAT BECAUSE YOU COULD NOT EVEN FEED YOUR OWN SELF UNLESS WE PAY
YOUR EXHORBITANT (sic) SALARY, HOUSE YOU ADN (sic) SUPPORT ALL YOUR PERSONAL NEEDS. YOU
SHOULD BE ASHAMED IN DOING THIS. AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, YOU ARE NOTHING EXCEPT A
PERSON WHO IS TRYING TO SURVIVED (sic) AT THE PRETEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL
PROTECTOR [sic]. YOU ARE PADI (sic) TO THE LAST CENTS ON ALL YOUR WORK IN THE WORK (sic). AT
THE SAME TIME, YOU BLOATED THE PRICE OF EACH ANIMAL YOU BROUGHT TO THE PHILIPPINES from
US$500,000.00 to US$750,000.00 each so that you could owned (sic) more shares that you should.
Please look into this deeply.

IF YOU INSISTS (sic) TO BE CALLED AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL PROTECTOR IN OUR COUNTRY,
THEN YOU AND YOUR WIFE SHOULD STOP BLEEDING THE COMPANY WITH YOUR MONTHLY PAYROLL OF
ALMOST P1 MILLION A MONTH.’

The above quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an act causing or tending to
cause dishonor, discredit or contempt against the person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The Information in Criminal Case No. 9109 reads:

That on or about July 13, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation
of Timothy Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the [sic] Atty. Winston Ginez
and Fatima Paglicawan, to the offended party, Timothy Desmond and to other persons namely: Hon.
Felicito Payumo, SBMA Chariman [sic], Terry Nichoson, John Corcoran, and Gail Laule which read as
follows:

‘Dear Winston and Fatima:

UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TIM DESMOND AS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF SBME, AS
OF THIS DATE THE COMPANY HAD INCURRED A LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MILLION. A
BALANCE SHEET SUBMITTED TODAY BY THEIR ACCOUNTANT JULIET REFLECT AND (sic) ASSETS OF MORE
THAN THREE HUNDRED MILLION PESOS, 50% OF WHICH IS OVERVALUED AND NONEXISTENT. TIM
DESMOND AND FAMILY HAD ACCUMULATED A (sic) SHARES OF MORE THAN 70% OF THE RECORDED
PAID UP CAPITAL BY OVERVALUING OF THE ASSETS CONTRIBUTION, PAYMENT TO THEIR OWN
COMPANY IN THE USA, ETC. AT THE SAME TIME, TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY BLEED THE COMPANY
FROM DATE OF INCORPORATION TO PRESENT FOR AN AVERAGE OF ONE MILLION PER MONTH FOR
THEIR PERSONAL GAIN, LIKE SALARY, CAR, ET, [sic] ETC.’

The above quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an act causing or tending to
cause dishonor, discredit or contempt against the person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

On April 22, 2003, Dio filed a Petition to suspend the criminal proceedings,10 but it was denied in the
Order dated February 6, 2004.11

Dio moved for reconsideration of the February 6, 2004 Order.12 She also moved to quash the
Informations, arguing that the “facts charged do not constitute an offense.”13 In its Order14 dated July
13, 2004, the trial court denied both Motions. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

Premises considered, the Motion For Reconsideration of the Order dated February 6, 2004 and the
Motion To Quash, both filed for accused, as well as the Motion For Issuance of a Hold Departure Order
filed by the Prosecution, are hereby DENIED.

Arraignment will proceed as previously set on July 20, 2005 at 9:00 a.m.

SO ORDERED.15

Dio moved for partial reconsideration of the July 13, 2004 Order, but the Motion was denied in the trial
court’s Order dated September 13, 2005.16

On October 11, 2005, Dio filed a Motion for leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration.17
She also filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the Informations for failure to allege publication and lack of
jurisdiction, and for second reconsideration with leave of court.18

The trial court’s Order dated February 7, 2006 denied both Motions and scheduled Dio’s arraignment on
March 9, 2006.19 Dio moved for partial reconsideration.20

The trial court granted Dio’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its February 12, 2009 Order,21 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion For Partial Reconsideration filed by the accused in Criminal Cases (sic) Nos.
9108 and 9109, on the ground that the Informations in the said cases fail (sic) to allege publication, is
GRANTED and, accordingly, the Informations filed against the accused are thereby QUASHED and
DISMISSED.

No finding as to costs.

SO ORDERED.22
After filing a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2009,23 Desmond raised before the Court of Appeals the
following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ACCUSED’S ARGUMENT THAT THE
PRESENT CHARGES SHOULD BE QUASHED FOR FAILURE OF THE INFORMATIONS TO ALLEGE
PUBLICATION.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND QUASHING THE
INFORMATIONS WITHOUT GIVING THE PROSECUTOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND THE
INFORMATIONS.24

In its January 8, 2013 Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained that the Informations did not
substantially constitute the offense charged.25 It found that the Informations did not contain any
allegation that the emails allegedly sent by Dio to Desmond had been accessed.26 However, it found
that the trial court erred in quashing the Informations without giving the prosecution a chance to amend
them pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court:

Although we agree with the trial court that the facts alleged in the Informations do not substantially
constitute the offense charged, the most prudent thing to do for the trial court is to give the prosecution
the opportunity to amend it and make the necessary corrections. Indeed, an Information may be
defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, however, the dismissal of the case will
not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to
correct the defect; the court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecution’s failure to do so. The
trial court’s failure to provide the prosecution with this opportunity constitutes an arbitrary exercise of
power.27

The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The order of the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga City, Branch 3 dated February 12, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109 is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Balanga City is hereby
DIRECTED to amend the Informations.

SO ORDERED.28

Dio moved for reconsideration,29 but the Court of Appeals denied the Motion in its July 10, 2013
Resolution.30

Hence, this Petition was filed.

Desmond and the Office of the Solicitor General filed their Comments,31 to which Dio filed her Reply.32
On April 2, 2014, this Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.33
The Office of the Solicitor General filed on June 11, 2014 a Manifestation and Motion34 adopting its
Comment. Desmond and Dio filed their memoranda on June 19, 201435 and July 10, 2014,36
respectively.

Dio stresses that “venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases.”37 Considering that libel is limited as to the
venue of the case, failure to allege “where the libelous article was printed and first published”38 or
“where the offended party actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense”39 is a
jurisdictional defect. She argues that jurisdictional defects in an Information are not curable by
amendment, even before arraignment. To support this position, she cites Agustin v. Pamintuan:40

We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal.
Indeed, the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing
in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the
amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed.41 (Citations
omitted)

Dio also cites Leviste v. Hon. Alameda,42 where this Court has stated that not all defects in an
Information are curable by amendment prior to arraignment:

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to
entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal.
An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.43
(Citations omitted)

Dio argues that the Informations were void as the prosecutor of Morong, Bataan had no authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the offenses charged.44 The complaint filed before the
prosecutor did not allege that the
e-mails were printed and first published in Morong, Bataan, or that Desmond resided in Morong, Bataan
at the time of the offense.45 In the absence of these allegations, the prosecutor did not have the
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation or to file the information.46

Dio further argues that publication, one of the elements of libel, was not present in the case. She asserts
that e-mailing does not constitute publication under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. As there was
no allegation in the Informations that the e-mails were received, accessed, and read by third persons
other than Desmond, there could be no publication.47 Further, e-mails are not covered under Article
355 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, at the time the allegedly libelous emails were sent, there was no
law punishing this act.48

Finally, Dio argues that she sent the e-mails as private communication to the officers of the corporation,
who were in the position to act on her grievances.49 The e-mails were sent in good faith, with justifiable
ends, and in the performance of a legal duty.50

The primordial issue for resolution is whether an information’s failure to establish venue is a defect that
can be cured by amendment before arraignment.

The Petition is denied.

I
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.—If the motion to quash is based on an alleged
defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be
given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if
the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the
same defect despite the amendment.

This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary
exercise of power.51 In People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division):52

When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect
may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file
an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts
constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are
mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the
opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without
undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on
technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As
explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court. Thus, a court’s refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where
such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of
Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State’s right to due process.53

In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court applies. If the information is defective, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend it
before it may be quashed.

Petitioner claims that Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies only to informations that can be
cured by amendment. She argues that before a court orders that an amendment be made, or otherwise
gives the prosecution an opportunity to amend an information, it must first establish that the defective
information can be cured by amendment.

Petitioner relies on Agustin to argue the proscription of an amendment of an information in order to

vest jurisdiction in the court. This is misplaced.

In Agustin, the accused in the criminal case was already arraigned under a defective information that
failed to establish venue.54 The Court of Appeals held that the defect in the information was merely
formal and, consequently, could be amended even after plea, with leave of court. Thus, this Court held:

We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal.
Indeed, the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing
in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the
amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed.55

In turn, Agustin cited Agbayani v. Sayo.56 However, Agbayani does not involve the amendment of a
defective information before or after arraignment. Subsequent cases have cited Agustin as basis that
amendment of an information to vest jurisdiction in the trial court is impermissible. Thus, in Leviste, this
Court cited Agustin and stated that certain amendments are impermissible even before arraignment:

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to
entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal.
An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.57

It may appear that Leviste supports petitioner’s contention that an amendment operating to vest
jurisdiction in the trial court is impermissible. However, the statement in Leviste was obiter dictum. It
cites only Agustin, which did not involve the amendment of an information before arraignment.

Aside from obiter dictum in jurisprudence, petitioner provides no legal basis to reverse the Court of
Appeals’ determination that the defective informations may be amended before arraignment. Although
the cases petitioner cited involved defective informations that failed to establish the jurisdiction of the
court over the libel charges, none involved the amendment of an information before arraignment. Thus,
these cannot be controlling over the facts of this case.

II
A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to quash an information. In Sasot v.
People:58

Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the
alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged.

Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before
the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.59

On the other hand, lack of authority to file an information is a proper ground. In Cudia v. Court of
Appeals:60
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles
City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality
of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:

Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

....

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of
all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his
assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by
subpoena for the purpose.

....

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information,
when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be
exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does
not acquire jurisdiction.

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing
the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner’s plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all
objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if
not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating
to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of
the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view,
an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by
silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution.
If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent
of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of
the first information would not be a bar to petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not
attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the
prosecution.

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating
panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that
the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. To
rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community,
and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have
been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez v. Court of
Appeals has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite
plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to
give way to the filing of a new information.61 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

However, for quashal of an information to be sustained, the defect of the information must be evident
on its face. In Santos v. People:62

First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its face. The
same cannot be said herein. The Information against petitioner appears valid on its face; and that it was
filed in violation of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws is not
evident on the face thereof. As pointed out by the CTA First Division in its 11 May 2006 Resolution, the
more appropriate recourse petitioner should have taken, given the dismissal of similar charges against
Velasquez, was to appeal the Resolution dated 21 October 2005 of the Office of the State Prosecutor
recommending the filing of an information against her with the DOJ Secretary.63

For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor’s lack of authority to file it, the lack of the
authority must be evident on the face of the information.

The Informations here do not allege that the venue of the offense was other than Morong, Bataan. Thus,
it is not apparent on the face of the Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file
them.

The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend the Informations. If the proper
venue appears not to be Morong, Bataan after the Informations have been amended, then the trial
court may dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of authority of the prosecutor to file
the information.

III
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means.—A libel committed by means of writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prisión correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to civil action which may be
brought by the offended party.

Petitioner argues that at the time of the offense, e-mails were not covered under Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner claims this is bolstered by the enactment of Republic Act No. 10175,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cybercrime Law, which widened the scope of libel to include libel
committed through e-mail, among others.64

Whether e-mailing or, as in this case, sending e-mails to the persons named in the Informations — who
appear to be officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is
found — is sufficiently “public,” as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code and by
the Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be properly raised during trial.
Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public authorities, partakes of a degree
of protected freedom of expression.65 Certainly, if we remain faithful to the dictum that public office is
a public trust,66 some leeway should be given to the public to express disgust. The scope and extent of
that protection cannot be grounded in abstractions. The facts of this case need to be proven by
evidence; otherwise, this Court exercises barren abstractions that may wander into situations only
imagined, not real.
IV
Good faith is not among the grounds for quashing an information as enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3
of the Rules of Court. It is not apparent on the face of the Informations, and what is not apparent cannot
be the basis for quashing them. In Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of Appeals:67

We find no reason to depart from said conclusion. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
enumerates the grounds for quashing an information. Specifically, paragraph (g) of said provision states
that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information where it contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification. Hence, for the alleged privilege to be a ground for
quashing the information, the same should have been averred in the information itself and secondly, the
privilege should be absolute, not only qualified. Where, however, these circumstances are not alleged in
the information, quashal is not proper as they should be raised and proved as defenses. With more
reason is it true in the case of merely qualifiedly privileged communications because such cases remain
actionable since the defamatory communication is simply presumed to be not malicious, thereby
relieving the defendant of the burden of proving good intention and justifiable motive. The burden is on
the prosecution to prove malice. Thus, even if the qualifiedly privileged nature of the communication is
alleged in the information, it cannot be quashed especially where prosecution opposes the same so as
not to deprive the latter of its day in court, but prosecution can only prove its case after trial on the
merits. In People v. Gomez we held, inter alia:

“The claim of the accused . . . that the letter is privileged communication is not a ground for a motion to
quash. It is a matter of defense which must be proved after trial of the case on the merits.”68 (Citations
omitted)

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in disregarding petitioner’s purported good faith. This should be a
matter of defense properly raised during trial.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 29, 2013 is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’
Decision dated January 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July 10, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio** (Acting CJ., Chairperson), Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Brion, J., On Official Leave.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.—When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and
the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. (People vs. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 770 SCRA 162
[2015])

——o0o——
1 Rollo, pp. 3-22. The Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Id., at pp. 24-32. The Decision, docketed as C.A.-G.R. CR No. 32514, was penned by Associate Justice
Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser of
the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id., at pp. 34-35. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred
in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals,
Manila.
4 Id., at p. 31.
5 Id., at p. 24.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id., at p. 28.
9 Id., at pp. 28-29.
10 Id., at p. 25.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id., at p. 26.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id., at pp. 26-27.
25 Id., at pp. 27-28.
26 Id., at p. 29.27 Id., at pp. 30-31.
28 Id., at p. 31.
29 Id., at pp. 36-44.
30 Id., at pp. 34-35.
31 Id., at pp. 57-70, Desmond’s Comment, and pp. 76-87, Office of the Solicitor General’s Comment.
32 Id., at pp. 90-97.
33 Id., at p. 99.
34 Id., at p. 100.
35 Id., at pp. 104-116.
36 Id., at pp. 130-151.
37 Id., at p. 139.
38 Id., at p. 140.
39 Id.
40 505 Phil. 103; 467 SCRA 601 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
41 Id., at p. 113; p. 612.
42 640 Phil. 620; 626 SCRA 575 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].
43 Id., at p. 640; pp. 600-601.
44 Rollo, pp. 15-16, Petition.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id., at p. 147.
48 Id., at p. 145.
49 Id., at p. 147.
50 Id.
51 Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 619 Phil. 306, 321; 604 SCRA 322, 335 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second
Division].
52 G.R. No. 160619, September 9, 2015, 770 SCRA 162 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].
53 Id., at pp. 176-177, citing People v. Andrade, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014, 741 SCRA 460
[Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
54 Agustin v. Pamintuan, supra note 40 at p. 112; p. 612.
55 Id., at p. 113; p. 612.
56 178 Phil. 574; 89 SCRA 699 (1979) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].
57 Leviste v. Alameda, supra note 42 at p. 640; pp. 600-601.
58 500 Phil. 527; 462 SCRA 138 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
59 Id., at p. 536; p. 146.
60 348 Phil. 190; 284 SCRA 173 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
61 Id., at pp. 199-202; pp. 181-183.
62 585 Phil. 337; 563 SCRA 341 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
63 Id., at p. 361; pp. 368-369, citing Gozos v. Tac-An, 360 Phil. 453, 464; 300 SCRA 265, 277 (1998) [Per
J. Mendoza, Second Division].
64 Rollo, p. 145, Memorandum.
65 See J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 237, 602-621 [Per J. Abad, En Banc], which proffered the view that
continued criminalization of libel, especially in platforms using the internet unqualifiedly produces a
“chilling effect” that stifles freedom of expression:

“The crime of libel in its 1930 version in the Revised Penal Code was again reenacted through the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. It simply added the use of the internet as one of the means to
commit the criminal acts. The reenactment of these archaic provisions is unconstitutional for many
reasons. At minimum, it failed to take into consideration refinements in the interpretation of the old law
through decades of jurisprudence. It now stands starkly in contrast with the required constitutional
protection of freedom of expression.

....

With the definite evolution of jurisprudence to accommodate free speech values, it is clear that the
reenactment of the old text of libel is now unconstitutional. Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Revised
Penal Code — and by reference, Section 4(c)(4) of the law in question — are now overbroad as it
prescribes a definition and presumption that have been repeatedly struck down by this court for several
decades.

....
The effect on speech of the dangerously broad provisions of the current law on libel is even more
palpable in the internet.

....

The broad and simplistic formulation now in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code essential for the
punishment of cyber libel can only cope with these variations produced by the technologies in the
Internet by giving law enforcers wide latitude to determine which acts are defamatory. There are no
judicially determinable standards. The approach will allow subjective case-by-case ad hoc
determination. There will be no real notice to the speaker or writer. The speaker or writer will calibrate
speech not on the basis of what the law provides but on who enforces it.

This is quintessentially the chilling effect of this law.

The threat of being prosecuted for libel stifles the dynamism of the conversations that take place in
cyberspace. These conversations can be loose yet full of emotion. These can be analytical and the
product of painstaking deliberation. Other conversations can just be exponential combinations of these
forms that provide canisters to evolving ideas as people from different communities with varied
identities and cultures come together to test their messages.

Certainly, there will be a mix of the public and the private; the serious and the not so serious. But, this
might be the kind of democratic spaces needed by our society: a mishmash of emotion and logic that
may creatively spring solutions to grave public issues in better and more entertaining ways than a
symposium of scholars. Libel with its broad bright lines, thus, is an anachronistic tool that may have had
its uses in older societies: a monkey wrench that will steal inspiration from the democratic mob.” (Id., at
pp. 50-62)
66 Const., Art. XI, Sec. 1.
67 G.R. No. 103618, May 20, 1994, 232 SCRA 460 [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
68 Id., at pp. 467-468.

** Per Special Order No. 2353 dated June 2, 2016. Dio vs. People, 792 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 208146 June 8,
2016