3R.

epublic of tbe llbilippine%

~tipreme .QCourt
jffilanila

EN BANC

JUAN JUAN OLILA OLLESCA, G.R. No. 258449

Petitioner,
Present:

GESMUNDO, ChiefJustice,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,
.-INTING,*
ZALAMEDA,
-versus-
LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.,
DIMAAMPAO,
MARQUEZ,
_KHO, JR.,* and
SINGH, JJ

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent. J 30 2024

-. DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging a nationwide

campaign, membership in a political party, being known nationwide, and the

• No part.
Decision· 2 G.R. No. 258449

probability- of success do not by themselves determine the existence of a bona

fide intention to run· for public office· under Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the lack of which may characterize an electoral candidate as a
nuisance candidate. I

For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari2 (with Extremely

Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Juan Juan Olila
Ollesca (Ollesca), assailing the December 13, 2021 Resolution3 and January
3, 2022 Order4 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
Resolution ruled on the COMELEC Law Department's petition to cancel
and/or deny due course of Ollesca's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
that Ollesca is a nuisance candidate, whereas the Order denied Ollesca's
Motion for Reconsideration of the said Resolution.

On October 7, 2021, Ollesca filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the

COMELEC for the position of president of the Philippines in the May 9, 2022
National and Local Elections. 5 In his Certificate of Candidacy, Ollesca stated
that he is running as an independent candidate and indicated that he is an
entrepreneur. 6

On October 2t 2021, the COMELEC Law Department filed, on its

own initiative, a Petition7 to declare Ollesca as a nuisance candidate and asked
that the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel Ollesca's Certificate of
Candidacy. It asserted that considering that Ollesca filed his Certificate of
Candidacy to run for president, he should be publicly known by numerous
voters. 8 However, he is running as an independent candidate and is "virtually
unknown except possibly in the locality where he resides." 9 As such, he has
no capability to launch a nationwide campaign to enable him to be known
nationally within the campaign period and to persuade a substantial number
of voters from different parts of the country. 10 Viewed in this light, he does

See Marquez v. COMELEC, 861 Phil. 667 (2019) [Per J. Jardaleza, En Banc]. See De Alban v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022 [Per J. M. Lopez, En Banc], Marquez v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc].
2
Rollo, pp. 6-48. On February 15, 2022, this Court denied petitioner'.s application for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. See id at 186.
Id. at49~58. The December 13, 2021 Resolution in SPA No. 21-140 (DC)(MP) was issued by Presiding
Commissioner Socorro B.. Inting and Commissioner Antonio T. Kho, Jr. (now a Member of this Court)
of the Second Divis_ion, Commission on Elections.
4
Id. at59-60. The January 3, 2022 Order in SPA No. 21-140 (DC)(MP) was issued by Presiding Chairman
Sheriff M. Abas and concurred in by Commissioners Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Gu1;1nzon, Socorro B.
Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo, Antonio T. Kho, Jr. (now a Member of this Court), and Aimee P. Ferolino,
of the En Banc, Commission on Elections.
5
Id. at 105.
6
Id.
7
Id. at IQ9-126. Petition filed in accordance with Section 4, Rule 24 of the Commission on Elections
Rules of Procedure, as amended by Commission on Elections Resolution No. 9523.
Id. at'! 14.
Id.
10 Id.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 258449

not appear to have any bona fide intention to run and "put[s] the election
process ·i~ mockery or disrepute." 11

On October 21, 2021, Ollesca was directed by the CO:l\1ELEC Second

Division to file an answer to the Petition. 12 Thus, on November 2, 2021,
Ollesca complied and filed his Answer cum Memorandum. 13

Ollesca asserted that the COMELEC Law Department's allegations are

baseless conclusions of law, 14 being mere speculations 15 that lack factual
basis to demonstrate Ollesca' s lack of bona fide intent to run or any other
circumstance or act intended to cause confusion among the voters. 16 He
argued that the COMELEC's petition was based on his alleged lack of
financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign, which effectively imposed
a property qualification that is inconsistent with the Constitution 17 and lacked
legal basis. 18

In its December 13, 2021 Resolution, 19 the COMELEC Second

Division granted the nuisance petition against Ollesca. It found that Ollesca,
who was an independent with no political party, was unknown outside of the
community he belonged to and failed to show that he had the financial
capacity to "sustain a decent and viable nationwide campaign on his own."20
Thus, Ollesca allegedly filed his Certificate of Candidacy "to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute and, by the said act or circumstance, he has
no bona fide intention to run for President." 21 The dispositive portion of the
Second Division's Resolution reads:

.!
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition 1s hereby
GRANTED.

Respoadent JUAN JUAN OLILA OLLESCA is DECLARED a.

NUISANCE CANDIDATE.

Accordingly, his .Certificate of Candidacy for President in the 09

May 2022 National and Local Elections is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and/or CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED. 22

II Id
12 Id at 127-128. The October 21, 2021 Order in SPA No. 21-140 (DC)(MP) was issued by Clerk of the
Commission Atty. Genesis M. Gatdula of the Second Division, Commission on Elections.
13 Id. at 129-150. •
14
Id. at 132.
15
Id. at 143.
16
Id. at 138.
17
Id. at 136-141.
18
Id. at 142, 145-146.
r9 Id. at 49-58.
20
Id. at 53--54.
21
Id. at 53.
22
Id. at 57.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 258449

Oliesca received a copy of the Resolution on December 15, 2021 23 and

filed his Motion for Reconsideration24 on December 20, 2021 via email. 25

On December 21, 2021, the Office of the Clerk of the Commission

emailed Ollesca the assessed fees. 26 He paid the assessed fees on the same
day and submitted an Official Receipt dated December 21, 2021 as proof of
payment of the prescribed filing fee within the prescribed period. 27

Through its Ja11uary 3, 2022 Order, 28 the COMELEC En Banc denied

Ollesca' s Motion for Reconsideration for being filed beyond the five-day
reglementary period prescribed, as well as for being filed without paying the
fees required by its Rules of Procedure. It held:

Records show that Respondent JUAN JUAN OLILA OLLESCA

was served with the Resolution granting the Petition to declare him as
nuisance candidate via electronic mail on 15 December 2021; Respondent
filed his Motion for Reconsideration at 5:01 p.m. on 20 December 2021 and
W/lS acknowledged on 21 December 2021, past the five-day prescribed
pJriod. Also, there is no record that Respondent paid the prescribed filing
fee for the Motion on time. Hence, the Motion was belatedly filed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission (En Banc)

hereby DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time.

SO ORDERED. 29

Hence the present Petition.

Here, petitioner Ollesca asserts that the COMELEC En Banc

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring that his Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of
time and declaring him as a nuisance candidate. 30 He stresses that he received
a copy of the assailed Resolution on December 15, 2021 and timely filed his
Motion for Reconsideration on December 20, 2021 at 5:00 p.m. 31 That he
failed to submit any proof of payment of filing fees is belied by the Office of
the Clerk of the Commission's confirmation of receipt of the original receipt
and the COMELEC Second Division's referral ofhis Motion to the En Banc. 32

23
Id at 6 I.
24
Id. at 61-78.
25
Id. at 59. See also id. at 184.
26
Id. at 177-179.
27
Id. at 59-60. See also id at 183.
zs id.
29
id. at 60.
30
id. at 12-43.
31
id. at 14.
32
id. at 183.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 258449

Petitioner argues that the COMELEC Law Department had the burden
of proof to support its assertion that he was a nuisance candidate. However,
it failed to adduce evidence to establish the factual bases to declare him as a
nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. 33 The
only document that the COMELEC adduced into evidence was Ollesca's
Certificate of Candidacy, which allegedly proves his bona fide intent to seek
office. 34

Moreover, contrary to the ,COMELEC Law Department's argument,

there is nothing in Pamatong v .. Commission on Elections35 that suggests that
a candidate's capability to run a viable campaign can be determined by his
financial capacity. 36 In the 2019 case of Marquez v. Commission on
Elections, 37 this Court stated that the COMELEC cannot condition a person's
privilege to he voted upon on his financial capacity to wage a nationwide
campaign which is a property requirement. 38 1

Nonetheless, petitioner emphasizes that he had attached to his Answer

proof of his financial capacity to mount a campaign and pledges from different
groups that their members will support his presidency to prove that· he had a
bona fide intention to run as president and had a "significant modicum of
support" for his candidacy.39 Petitioner likewise asseverates that his supposed
financial incapability to mount a decent and viable campaign is a prohibited
property requirement. 40

In its Comment, 41 respondent COMELEC counters that the Petition

should be dismissed for being moot and academic because it had already
issued a Certified List of Candidates for President and had begun printing
official ballots for the elections. 42 In any case, it allegedly did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
for being filed out of time (i.e., at 5:01 p.m. of December 20, 2021) because
petitioner paid the prescribed filing fee beyond the reglementary period43 and
its Resolution declaring petitioner a nuisance candidate has become final. 44
Moreover, its finding that petitioner is a nuisance candidate was allegedly
based on petitioner's own declarations in his Certificate of Candidacy and on

·'·' Id. at 21.

34
Id. at 22.
35
470 Phil. 71 l (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
36 Rollo, p. 25. •
37
86 I Phil.667-(2019) [Per J. Jardaleza, En Banc].
8
' Rollo, p. 26.
39
!d at 27, 33.
40
Id. at 206.
41
Id. at203-217.
42
Id. at 207-208.
43
ld.at210.
44
Id. at210-2l l.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 258449

respondent's own assessment which are allegedly based on evidence. 45

Petitioner's financial incapacity was "merely considered, together with other
compelling circumstances, to determine whether petitioner has bona fide
intention to run." 46

In his Reply, 47 while petitioner conceded that the case is moot and
academic, he argues that this Court must still decide on it because it is capable
of repetition yet evading review. 48 At any rate, his Motion for
49
Reconsideration was timely filed and the filing fees were paid on the same
day they were assessed. 5 °
Contrary to the COMELEC's assertion,
membership in, or nomination by, a political party is not an essential element
of bona fide intention to run for public office. 51 Moreover, the COMELEC
did not point to any circumstance, aside from petitioner's financial capacity,
to show petitioner's alleged lack of bona fide intention to run for public
office. 52

For this Court's resolution are the issues of: (a) whether the Motion for
Reconsideration was timely filed; and (b) whether the Commission on
Elections acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring respondent Juan
Juan Olila Ollesca as a nuisance candidate.

It is imperative to recognize and uphold the fundamental democratic

principl~ that a citizen has the right to participate in the electoral-processes
by running for public office. However, this right must be harmonized with
the practical constraints faced by COMELEC, with respect to overseeing and
ensuring a "free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections." 53

The sheer volume of candidates poses logistical challenges, potentially

leading to an unwieldy ballot and hampering the electorate's ability to make
informed choices. COMELEC must streamline the electoral process while
simultaneously allowing a fair and accessible competitioll'among candidates
by effectively managing its resources and reducing voter confusion through
its ability to regulate a finite number of candidates and a manageable ballot.

In Pamatong, 54 this Court explained the rationale behind the

prohibition against "candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to
tun for office" as follows:

45 Id. at216.
46 Id• _
l
47
Id. at 223-23 I.
48
Id. at 224.
49
Id. at 226.
50 Id.
51
Id. at 228.
52
Id. at 229.
53
CONST., art. IX(C), sec. 2(4).
54
470 Phil. 711 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]. SeealsoAlbanov. COMELEC, G.R. No. 257610 & UDK
Decision 7 G.R. No. 258449

The State has a· compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are
rational, obj~ctive, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the_
greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the electi<;m. These practical difficulties should, of course,
never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise.
At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these
logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a
disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a
rot that .erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States
Supreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some

preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support
before printing the name of a political organization and its
candidates on the ballot - the interest, if no other, in
avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the
democratic [process].

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially

in the case of candidates for national positions because the
election process becomes a mockery even if those who
cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run.
Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of
Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official
Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the
government. For the official ballots in automated counting
and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount
to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION
PESOS (P450,000,000.00).

[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to

continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to
project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.
1
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected
by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election
laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as
watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even.
the receipt of electoral contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and
regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of
candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance

candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with
bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. •To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. 55 (C_itations omitted)

No. 17230, January 24, 2023 [Per J. J. Lopez, En Banc].

55 Id. at 719-721.
Decision 1 8 G.R. No. 258449
'

It becomes more imperative for the State to prohibit nuisance

candidates from participating in the electoral process because the interest and
enthusiasm for the presidential candidacy continues to grow. In the 2022
National Presidential Elections, 10 aspirants were included in the final list of
candidates. 56

In this regard, a significant increase in the number of aspirants poses a

notable challenge in orchestrating fair and impartial debates because the sheer
volume of candidates can potentially create logistical complexities, making it
increasingly difficult to offer each participant adequate time and attention.
With a surplus of candidates, there is an inherent risk of diluting the depth
and substance of discussions, limiting the ability of candidates to articulate
their po~itions thoroughly.

We now proceed to rule upon the issues.

Rule 19, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. - A motion to

reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed
within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not
proforma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling. •

In relation to this, Rule 2, Section 9 of COMELEC Resolution No.

10673 provides that "electronic service is complete at the time of the
electronic transmission of the document, or when available, at the time that
the eledronic notification of service of the document is sent." 57 Furthermore,
"proof shall be made by an affidavit of service executed by the person who
sent the email ... together with a printed proof of transmittal." 58

In dismissing petitioner's Motion for being filed out of time, the

COMELEC En Banc seemed to tack the reckoning date on when the Motion
was acknowledged by its Office of the Clerk of the Commission, and not on
the time of electronictransmission. 59 This is erroneous as the date of actual
filing-that is, the date of electronic transmission in case of transmission by

56
See Rappler, It's final: JO names on the 2022 ballot for president, 9 for VP, available at
https://www.rappler.com/nation/electionsicomelec-releases-final-list-candidates-national-local-polls-
2022/ (last accessed on January 11, 2024).
57
COMELEC Resolution No. I 0673 (2020), Rule 2, sec. 9, In re: Guidelines on Electronic Fiiing, Conduct
of Hearings/Investigations/Inquiries via Video Conference, and Service:
58
COMELEC Rules of Procedure ( 1993), Rule 12, Section 3 in relation to 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 13, sec. 17(d).
59
Rollo, pp. 183-184.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 258449

electronic mail-is what must be taken note of, not the actual date when the
COMELEC acknowledged a pleading. 60

Based on the email thread where the Office of the Clerk of the
Commission. acknowledged receipt of the Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner filed the said Motion via email on December 20, 2021 on 5:00
p.m.-well-within the five-day prescribed period. 61

That being said, we note that the payment of PHP 1,000.00 for the
motion for reconsideration fee, albeit belated, is also not a sufficient reason
to deny petitioner's Motion outright: In Lloren v. COMELE((, 62 the Court
chided the COMELEC for outrightly denying a motion for reconsideration
for the movant's failure to simultaneously pay the motion fee at the time the
motion was filed, when it could have just refused to act on the motion until
the fee was paid. Lloren stated:

As to the order issued on March 16, 2011 by the COMELEC En

Banc, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc was capricious and
arbitrary in thereby denying petitioner 1 s motion for reconsideration on the
ground that he did not simultaneously pay the motion, fee of P300.00
prescribed by Section 7(f), Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of Procedure.

The non-payment of the motion fee of ?300.00 at the time of the

.filing of the motion for reconsideration did not warrant the outright denial
of the motion for reconsideration, but might only just(fy the [Commission
on Elections] to refuse to take action on the motion for reconsideration until
the fees were paid, or to dismiss the action or proceeding when no full
payment of the fees is ultimately made. The authority to dismiss is
discretionary and permissive, not mandatory and exclusive, as expressly
provided in Section 18, 'Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of Procedure hself, to
wit:

Section 18. Non-payment of Prescribed Fees. - If the fees

above prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse
to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the
action or the proceeding.

The evident intent of rendering Section 18, Rule 40 of the 1993

Rules of Procedure discretionary and permissive is to accord the movant an
opportunity. to pay the motion fee in full. The dire. outcome ofdenial of the
motion for reconsideration should befall the movant •only upon his
deliberate or unreasonable failure to pay the fee zn full. It appears,
however, that petitioner's failure to pay the motion fee simultaneously with
his filing of the motion for reconsideration was neither deliberate nor
unreasonable. He actually paid the foe by postal money order on March 3,
2011. 63 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

60
2019 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, sec. 3(d) ..
61 COMELECRulesofProcedure(l993),Rule41,sec. I. SeeRollo,p. 13.
62 695 Phil. 288 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
63 Id. at 299. •
Decision 10 G.R. No. 258449

This Court notes that, in light of the conclusion of the 2022 National
Presidential Elections, as well as the proclamation of the candidate receiving
the highest number of votes as the president of the Philippines, the case is
rendered moot and academic. In other words, the complained actions by
petitioner, even if wrong, will not undo the outcome of the election.

Generally, our courts refuse to take cognizance over a case or dismiss

it on the ground ofmootness. In Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. v. AZ
Communications, Inc., 64 this Court explained that:

Courts have no power to act on a matter if there is no actual case or

justiciable controversy. This Court shall not render advisory opinions or
resolve theoretical issues. The rule holds true even when there had
previously been a legal conflict or claim, but it has become moot because a
supervening event has rendered the legal issue inexistent. When a case has
become moot, there is no longer a conflict ofrights that needs to be resolved
by the courts. 65

However, even where supervening events had made a case moot, this
Court did not hesitate to resolve the issues raised therein, if said case is
capable of repetition, yet evading review. 66

Here, we take judicial notice of the fact that the question of the legality
of the COMELEC's finding that a candidate has no bona fide intent to run for
public office and therefore a nuisance candidate based on said candidate's
financial status arises each election season. In recent years, multiple
candidates have come before this Court for affirmative relief against the
COMELEC's declaration that they are nuisance candidates. 67 The
susceptibility of recurrence therefore compels the Court to resolve the issue
at hand.

H,aving settled the procedural issues, we continue to rule on the issue

of whetl).er the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring
petitioner as a nuisance candidate.

It is settled that "there is grave abuse of discretion: (1) when an act is

done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is

64
877 Phil. 44 (2020) [Per. 1: Leanen, Third Division].
65
Id. a_t 56.
66
Gana-Carait v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc].
67
See Marquez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc]. See also
Marquez v. COMELEC, 861 Phil. 667 (2019) [Per J. Jardaleza, En Banc]. See also De Alban v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022 [Per J. M. Lopez, En Banc].
Decision 11 G.R. No. 258449

executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or

personal bias." 68 Here, both elements are present.

A nuisance candidate is one whose candidacy was lodged merely to

create confusion or whose candidacy mocks or causes disrepute to the
election process, hence, there is patently no intention to run for office. A
candidate without the machinery of a political party or the finances to mount
a nationwide campaign "cannot be lumped together with another candidate
who was found to have mocked or caused disrepute to the election process." 69

In Maquera v. Borra, 70 this Court declared that property qualifications

cannot be imposed on electoral candidates. Doing so goes against "social
justice[,] [which] presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike,
and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the
chance to be elected to public office[.]" 71

In Marquez (2019), Norman Cordero Marquez (Marquez) filed his

Certificate of Candidacy for the position of senator in the 2019 National
Elections and declared that he was running as an independent candidate and
was a real estate broker by profession. The COMELEC Law Department then
filed a petition to declare Marquez as a nuisance candidate because he was
"virtually unknovvn to the entire country except maybe in the l9cality where
he resides" and "'will not be able to sustain the financial rigors of a
nationwide campaign. "' 72 The COMELEC First Division granted the petition
and cancelled Marquez's Certificate of Candidacy. Upon moving for
reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc sustained the cancellation of
Marquez's Certificate of Candidacy. Thus, Marquez filed a petition before
this Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
in declaring him a nuisance candidate for his alleged failure to prove financial
capability to mount a nationwide campaign.

This Court granted Marquez's petition and found that the COMELEC
"committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared Marquez a nuisance
candidate on the ground of lack of proof of his financial capacity to wage a
nationwide campaign. By so doing, the COMELEC has effectively imposed
a 'property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social
justice underlying the same. "' 73 We stated:

68
69
Marquez v. COMELEC, 861 Phi!. 667, 687(2019) [Per J. Jardaleza, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
J .. LeorJen, Separate Opinion in Marquez v. Commission on Elections, 861 Phil. 667 (2019) [Per J.
/
Jardeleza, En Banc].
70
122 Phil. 412 (1965) [Per Curiam, .En Banc].
71
Id. at 415.
72 Marquez v. Commission on Elections, 861 Phil. 667, 673 (2019) [Per J. Jardaleza, En Banc].
73 Id. at 686.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 258449

The COMELEC cannot conflate the bona fide intention to run with
a financial capacity requirement.

A candidate's financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging a

nationwide campaign does not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to
run for public office. The COMELEC's burden is thus to show a reasonable
correlation between proof of a bona fide intention to run, on the one hand,
and proof of financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign on the
other. 74

Similarly, in De Alban v. COMELEC, 75 Angelo Castro De Alban (De

Alban) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for senator in the 2019 National
Elections as an independent candidate and indicated that he was a lawyer and
teacher by profession. The COMELEC Law Department motu proprio filed
a petition to declare De Alban a nuisance candidate, arguing that he had no
bona fide intent to run for public office and that he will not be able to sustain
the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign without clear proof of
financial capacity. The COMELEC First Division declared him a nuisance
candidate for the same reasons as it declared Marquez a nuisance candidate.
Thereafter, De Alban filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC in declaring him a
nuisance candidate.

In De •Alban, this Court stated that it was incumbent upon the

COMELEC Law Department to identify the factual bases that would clearly
show de Alban's lack of bona fide intention to run for senator. 76 The
COMELEC Law Department failed to adduce any evidence and heavily relied
on a general allegation and conclusion-"anchored on flawed inferences"-
that De Alban has no clear proof of financial capability to sustain the financial
rigors of waging a nationwide campaign. 77 It further stated that "financial
capacity to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign,"
"non-membership in a political party" or "being unknown nationwide," and
"the low probability of success" do not by themselves equate to the absence
of bona fide intention to run for public office under Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 78

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Marquez v. COMELEC (2022), 79

when Marquez ran as an independent candidate in the 2022 senatorial
elections, the COMELEC Law Department again filed a petition to declare
Marquez a nuisance candidate·. It argued that Marquez, who was not
nominated by a political party, was "virtually unknown" and"[did] not appear
to have 1a genuine intention to run for public office" as he "does not have a

74
Id at 689.
75
G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022 [Per J.M. Lopez, En Banc].
76 Id.
77 Id.
n Id.
79
G.R. No. 258435, June 28,2022 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc].
Decision 13 G.R. No. 258449

nationwide network or organization of supporters to assist him during the

campaign so that he may be known nationally within the short campaign
period." 80 Ruling on the petition, the COMELEC First Division declared
Marquez a nuisance candidate and cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy.
Thus, Marquez filed a petition for certiorari before this Court and argufd that
the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion for declaring him a
nuisance candidate. 81

In Marquez (2022), this Court partly granted Marquez's petition, noting

that the COMELEC Law Department should have adduced substantial
evidence in support ofits petition. 82 Moreover, the circumstances cited by the
COMELEC as grounds to declare Marquez a nuisance candidate are closely
intertwined with those it raised in Marquez (2019). 83 This Court added that
although the nuisance status of Marquez apparently was grounded on a
supposed lack of bona fide intent to run for public office, the COMELEC
actually hinged his nuisance on his perceived lack of capacity to wage a
successful election campaign-which ground is "in truth shrouded property
qualifications" which are prohibited by the Constitution. 84 In an!)' case, neither
the law nor the rules require membership in a political party as proof of intent
to run for public office. 85 •

In the present case, the COMELEC again repeated its general allegation
of a candidate's lack of financial capacity to wage a national campaign to shift
the burden of proof upon the candidate. It pointed to the circumstances of
Ollesca's running as an independent candidate and his being an entrepreneur,
arguing that Ollesca is virtually unknown and therefore has no capacity to
persuade a substantial number of the electorate, thereby proving that he has
no bona fide fotention to run and puts the election process in mockery. 86

From the foregoing, it appears that the COMELEC has the propensity
to employ a "cookie-cutter motion" 87 that generally alleges a candidate's lack
of financial capacity to wage a national campaign in an attempt to shift the
burden of proving bona fide intent to run for public office upon said
candidate. 88

We -reiterate this Court's rulings in Marquez (2019), De Alban, and

Marquez (2022) that: (a) the COMELEC cannot conflate financial capacity
requirement with the bona fide intention to run for public office; and (b) the

80 id.
s1 Id
82 Id
83 Id.
84 Id
8s Id
86
Rollo, p. 114.
87 Marquez v. COMELEC, 861 Phil. 667, 689 (2019) [Per J. Jardaleza, En Banc].
88 Id.
Decision' 14 G.R. No. 258449

imposition of having financial capacity to hit the campaign trail is a property

qualification that is prohibited under the constitution and is likewise not a
valid ground to characterize a candidate as a nuisance candidate.

·,

To emphasize, the pivotal criterion that characterizes a nuisance

candidate lies in the absence of a bona fide intent to run for public office and
it is incumbent upon the CO11ELEC to identify and to adduce supporting
evidence of acts or circumstances that show a candidate's lack of bona fide
intent to run for public office, with the objective of "prevent[ing] a faithful
detennination of the true will of the electorate." 89 This determination is
governed by the statutes, and the concept is satisfactorily defined by the
Omnibus Election Code. 90 •

Needless to say, the CO11ELEC is not precluded from considering

other factors in determining a candidate's lack of bona fide intention to run
for public office, such as a candidate's inability to organize a campaign,
whether it be manifested through the lack of a nomination by an established
political party, a national organization or coalition, a labor union, or similar
move1nents. In lieu or in addition to this non-nomination, the CO11ELEC
may also consider checking for the absence of said candidate's past record of
service.

On the other hand, while a mere expression of a candidate's desire to

become an elected official does not suffice, this Court only requires a
candidate to show "a significant modicum of support before his or her name
is printed on the ballot." 91

Unfortunately, in this case, in declaring pet1t1oner as a nuisance

candidate, the COMELEC simply relied on a general and sweeping allegation
of petitioner's financial incapability to mount a decent and viable campaign,
which is a prohibited property require111ent. It failed to discuss, much less
adduce evidence, showing how petitioner's inclusion in the ballots would
prevent the faithful determination of the electorate's will. We, therefore, hold
that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring
petitioner as a nuisance candidate.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The

December 13, 2021 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second
Division and January 3, 2022 Order of the Commission on Elections En Banc
in SPA No. 21-140 (DC)(MP) are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

89
De Alban v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022 [Per J. M. Lopez, En Banc].
90
Rev. Pamatong v. COMELEC, 470 Phil. 7 I I, 719-722 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Omnibus
Electi<;m Code, sec. 69. See also Albano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 257610 & UDK No. 17230, January
24, 2023 [Per J. J. Lopez, En Banc].
91
Marquez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc].
Decision 15 G.R. No. 258449

Accordingly, the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate

of Candidacy dated October 11, 2021, filed by the Commission on Elections
Law Department against petitioner Juan Juan Olila Ollesca, docketed as
SPA No. 21-140 (DC)(MP), is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

AL~ DO
~~
-~'-'L,-

iefJustice
l

9<:::::::::':::·
RA.fPAUL.HERNANDO
Associate Justice

No Part
HENRI JEAN PAUL B. INTING
·Associate Justice

~~
SAMUEL H. GAERLAN . ROSARIO
Associate Justice As ociate Justice
Decision 16 G.R. No. 258449

JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice

No Part
ANTONIO T. KHO, JR.
Associate Justice

/ Associate Justice .

/ CERTIFICATION

P ~ t to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.