BBM4117 Strategic Management-9
BBM4117 Strategic Management-9
1.1         Strategy
The word “strategy” is derived from the Greek word “stratçgos”; stratus (meaning
army) and “ago” (meaning leading/moving).
Strategy is an action that managers take to attain one or more of the organization’s
goals. Strategy can also be defined as “A general direction set for the company and its
various components to achieve a desired state in the future. Strategy results from the
detailed strategic planning process”.
A strategy is all about integrating organizational activities and utilizing and allocating
the scarce resources within the organizational environment so as to meet the present
objectives. While planning a strategy, it is essential to consider that decisions are not
taken in a vacuum and that any act taken by a firm is likely to be met by a reaction
from those affected, competitors, customers, employees or suppliers.
Strategy can also be defined as knowledge of the goals, the uncertainty of events and
the need to take into consideration the likely or actual behaviour of others. Strategy
is the blueprint of decisions in an organization that shows its objectives and goals,
reduces the key policies, and plans for achieving these goals, and defines the business
the company is to carry on, the type of economic and human organization it wants to
be, and the contribution it plans to make to its shareholders, customers and society at
large.
Therefore:
Strategic management can be used to determine mission, vision, values, goals,
objectives, roles and responsibilities, timelines, etc.
a. Environmental Scanning
These components are steps that are carried, in chronological order, when creating a
new strategic management plan.
Businesses/ organisations that have already created a strategic management plan will
revert to these steps as per the situation’s requirement, so as to make essential
changes.
   a. Internal analysis
      Internal analysis of the environment is the first step of environment scanning.
      Organizations should observe the internal organizational environment. This
      includes employee interaction with other employees, employee interaction
   with management, manager interaction with other managers, and management
   interaction with shareholders, access to natural resources, brand awareness,
   organizational structure, main staff, operational potential, etc.
   Also, discussions, interviews, and surveys can be used to assess the internal
   environment. Analysis of internal environment helps in identifying strengths
   and weaknesses of an organization.
   As business becomes more competitive, and there are rapid changes in the
   external environment, information from external environment adds crucial
   elements to the effectiveness of long-term plans. As environment is dynamic, it
   becomes essential to identify competitors’ moves and actions. Organizations
   have also to update the core competencies and internal environment as per
   external environment. Environmental factors are infinite, hence, organization
   should be agile and vigil to accept and adjust to the environmental changes.
   For instance - Monitoring might indicate that an original forecast of the prices
   of the raw materials that are involved in the product are no more credible,
   which could imply the requirement for more focused scanning, forecasting and
   analysis to create a more trustworthy prediction about the input costs. In a
   similar manner, there can be changes in factors such as competitor’s activities,
   technology, market tastes and preferences.
b. External analysis
 Immediate/industry environment
 National environment
Also, an assessment of the nature, stage, dynamics and history of the industry is
essential. It also implies evaluating the effect of globalization on competition
within the industry.
   Strategic managers must not only recognize the present state of the environment
   and their industry but also be able to predict its future positions.
Strategic management theories can also be divided into those that concentrate mainly
on efficiency and those that concentrate mainly on effectiveness.
Efficiency is about doing things the right way. It involves eliminating waste and
optimizing processes.
 Effectiveness is about doing the right things. There is no point in acting efficiently if
what you are doing will not have the desired effect. A good strategy will blend both
efficiency   and     effectiveness.     This    distinction    is    linked    to     the
formulation/implementation distinction.
2.2 Strategic management techniques
Strategic management techniques can be viewed as either bottom-up, top-down, or
collaborative processes.
The top-down approach is the most common by far. In it, the CEO, possibly with the
assistance of a strategic planning team, decides on the overall direction the company
should take.
a) Strategic management
Strategic management is the highest in the sense that it is the broadest, applying to
all parts of the firm. It gives direction to corporate values, corporate culture,
corporate goals, and corporate missions. Under this broad corporate strategy there
are often functional or business unit strategies.
b) Functional strategies
Many companies feel that a functional organizational structure is not an efficient way
to organize activities so they have reengineered according to processes or strategic
business units (called SBUs). A strategic business unit is a semi-autonomous unit
within an organization. It is usually responsible for its own budgeting, new product
decisions, hiring decisions, and price setting. An SBU is treated as an internal profit
centre by corporate headquarters. Each SBU is responsible for developing its business
strategies, strategies that must be in tune with broader corporate strategies.
d) Operational strategy
The “lowest” level of strategy is operational strategy. It is very narrow in focus and
deals with day-to-day operational activities such as scheduling criteria. It must
operate within a budget but is not at liberty to adjust or create that budget.
Operational level strategy was encouraged by Peter Drucker in his theory of
management by objectives (MBO). Operational level strategies are informed by
business level strategies which, in turn, are informed by corporate level strategies.
Since the turn of the millennium, there has been a tendency in some firms to revert
to a simpler strategic structure. This is being driven by information technology. It is
felt that knowledge management systems should be used to share information and
create common goals. Strategic divisions are thought to hamper this process.
Philip Selznick (1957) introduced the idea of matching the organization's internal
factors with external environmental circumstances. This core idea was developed into
what we now call SWOT analysis by Learned, Andrews, and others at the Harvard
Business School General Management Group. Strengths and weaknesses of the firm are
assessed in light of the opportunities and threats from the business environment.
Igor Ansoff built on Chandler's work by adding a range of strategic concepts and
inventing a whole new vocabulary. He developed a strategy grid that compared
market penetration strategies, product development strategies, market development
strategies and horizontal and vertical integration and diversification strategies. He
felt that management could use these strategies to systematically prepare for future
opportunities and challenges. In his classic Corporate strategy (1965) he developed
the “gap analysis” still used today in which we must understand the gap between
where we are currently and where we would like to be, and then develop what he
called “gap reducing actions”.
Peter Drucker was a prolific strategy theorist, author of dozens of management books,
with a career spanning five decades. His contributions to strategic management were
many but two are most important. Firstly, he stressed the importance of objectives.
An organization without clear objectives is like a ship without a rudder. As early as
1954 he was developing a theory of management based on objectives. This evolved
into his theory of management by objectives (MBO). According to Drucker, the
procedure of setting objectives and monitoring your progress towards them should
permeate the entire organization, top to bottom. His other seminal contribution was
in predicting the importance of what today we would call intellectual capital. He
predicted the rise of what he called the “knowledge worker” and explained the
consequences of this for management. He said that knowledge work is non-
hierarchical. Work would be carried out in teams with the person most knowledgeable
in the task at hand being the temporary leader.
E. Chaffee (1985) summarized what he thought were the main elements of strategic
management theory by the 1970s. They are:
In the 1970s much of strategic management dealt with size, growth, and portfolio
theory. The PIMS study was a long term study, started in the 1960s and lasted for 19
years, that attempted to understand the Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies (PIMS),
particularly the effect of market share. Started at General Electric, moved to Harvard
in the early 1970s, and then moved to the Strategic Planning Institute in the late
1970s, it now contains decades of information on the relationship between
profitability and strategy. Their initial conclusion was unambiguous: The greater a
company's market share, the greater will be their rate of profit. The high market
share provides volume and economies of scale. It also provides experience and
learning curve advantages. The combined effect is increased profits. (The validity of
the study's conclusions has recently been questioned in Tellis, G. and Golder, P.
(2002)).
The benefits of high market share naturally lead to an interest in growth strategies.
The relative advantages of horizontal integration, vertical integration, diversification,
franchises, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and organic growth were
discussed. The most appropriate market dominance strategies were assessed given
the competitive and regulatory environment.
There was also research that indicated that a low market share strategy could also be
very profitable. Schumacher (1973), Woo and Cooper (1982), Levenson (1984), and
later Traverso (2002) showed how smaller niche players obtained very high returns.
By the early 1980s the paradoxical conclusion was that high market share and low
market share companies were often very profitable but most of the companies in
between were not. This was sometimes called the “hole in the middle” problem. This
anomaly would be explained by Michael Porter in the 1980s.
The management of diversified organizations required new techniques and new ways
of thinking. The first CEO to address the problem of a multi-divisional company was
Alfred Sloan at General Motors. GM was decentralized into semi-autonomous
“strategic business units” (SBU's), but with centralized support functions.
The 1970s also saw the rise of the marketing oriented firm. From the beginnings of
capitalism it was assumed that the key requirement of business success was a product
of high technical quality. If you produced a product that worked well and was
durable, it was assumed you would have no difficulty selling them at a profit. This
was called the production orientation and it was generally true that good products
could be sold without effort. This was largely due to the growing numbers of affluent
and middle class people that capitalism had created. But after the untapped demand
caused by the Second World War was saturated in the 1950s it became obvious that
products were not selling as easily as they were. The answer was to concentrate on
selling. The 1950s and 1960s is known as the sales era and the guiding philosophy of
business of the time is today called the sales orientation. In the early 1970s Theodore
Levitt and others at Harvard realized that the sales orientation had things backward.
They claimed that instead of producing products then trying to sell them to the
customer, businesses should start with the customer, find out what they wanted, and
then produce it for them. The customer became the driving force behind all strategic
business decisions. This marketing orientation, in the decades since its introduction,
has been reformulated and repackaged under numerous names including customer
orientation, marketing philosophy, customer intimacy, customer focus, customer
driven, and market focused.
By the late 70s people had started to notice how successful Japanese industry had
become. In industry after industry, including steel, watches, ship building, cameras,
autos, and electronics, the Japanese were surpassing American and European
companies. Westerners wanted to know why. Numerous theories purported to explain
the Japanese success including:
      Higher employee morale, dedication, and loyalty;
      Relatively low value of the Yen leading to low interest rates and capital costs,
       low dividend expectations, and inexpensive exports;
Although there was some truth to all these potential explanations, there was clearly
something missing. In fact by 1980 the Japanese cost structure was higher than the
American. And post WWII reconstruction was nearly 40 years in the past. The first
management theorist to suggest an explanation was Richard Pascale.
In 1981 Richard Pascale and Anthony Athos in The Art of Japanese Management
claimed that the main reason for Japanese success was their superior management
techniques. They divided management into 7 aspects: Strategy, Structure, Systems,
Skills, Staff, Style, and Subordinate goals (which we would now call shared values).
The first three of the 7 S's were called hard factors and this is where American
companies excelled. The remaining four factors (skills, staff, style, and shared values)
were called soft factors and were not well understood by American businesses of the
time. (For details on the role of soft and hard factors see Wickens P.D. (1995).
Americans had not yet understood the role of corporate culture, shared values and
beliefs, and social cohesion in the workplace. In Japan the task of management was
seen as managing the whole complex of human needs, economic, social,
psychological, and spiritual. In America work was seen as something that was separate
from the rest of one's life. It was quite common for Americans to exhibit a very
different personality at work compared to the rest of their lives. Pascale also
highlighted the difference between decision making styles; hierarchical in America,
and consensus in Japan. He also claimed that American business lacked long term
vision, preferring instead to apply management fads and theories in a piecemeal
fashion.
One year later The Mind of the Strategist was released in America by Kenichi Ohmae.
(It was originally published in Japan in 1975.) He claimed that strategy in America was
too analytical. Strategy should be a creative art: It is a frame of mind that requires
intuition and intellectual flexibility. He claimed that Americans constrained their
strategic options by thinking in terms of analytical techniques, rote formula, and
step-by-step processes. He compared the culture of Japan in which vagueness,
ambiguity, and tentative decisions were acceptable, to American culture that valued
fast decisions.
Also in 1982 Tom Peters and Robert Waterman released a study that would respond to
the Japanese challenge head on. Peters and Waterman, who had several years earlier
collaborated with Pascale and Athos at McKinsey & Co., asked “What makes an
excellent company?” They looked at 62 companies that they thought were fairly
successful. Each was subject to six performance criteria. To be classified as an
excellent company, it had to be above the 50th percentile in 4 of the 6 performance
metrics for 20 consecutive years. Forty-three companies passed the test. They then
studied these successful companies and interviewed key executives. They concluded
in In Search of Excellence that there were 8 keys to excellence that were shared by
all 43 firms. They are:
      A bias for action — Do it. Try it. Don’t waste time studying it with multiple
       reports and committees.
      Entrepreneurship — even big companies act and think small by giving people
       the authority to take initiatives.
      Productivity through people — Treat your people with respect and they will
       reward you with productivity.
      Value oriented CEOs — The CEO should actively propagate corporate values
       throughout the organization.
 Keep things simple and lean — Complexity encourages waste and confusion.
The basic blueprint on how to compete against the Japanese had been drawn. But as
J.E. Rehfeld (1994) explains it is not a straight forward task due to differences in
culture. A certain type of alchemy was required to transform knowledge from various
cultures into a management style that allows us to compete in a globally diverse
world. He says, for example, that Japanese style kaizen (continuous improvement)
techniques, although suitable for people socialized in Japanese culture, have not
been successful when implemented in the U.S. unless they are modified significantly.
The Japanese challenge shook the confidence of the western business elite, but
detailed comparisons of the two management styles and examinations of successful
businesses convinced westerners that they could overcome the challenge. The 1980s
and early 1990s saw a plethora of theories explaining exactly how this could be done.
They cannot all be detailed here, but some of the more important strategic advances
of the decade are explained below.
Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad declared that strategy needs to be more active and
interactive; less “arm-chair planning” was needed. They introduced terms like
strategic intent and strategic architecture (See Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C.K. (1989) and
also Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C.K. (1994).). Their most well-known advance was the
idea of core competency. They showed how important it was to know the one or two
key things that your company does better than the competition. (See Hamel, G. &
Prahalad, C.K. (1990).)
Active strategic management required active information gathering and active
problem solving. In the early days of Hewlett-Packard (H-P), Dave Packard and Bill
Hewlett devised an active management style that they called Management By Walking
Around (MBWA). Senior H-P managers were seldom at their desks. They spent most of
their days visiting employees, customers, and suppliers. This direct contact with key
people provided them with a solid grounding from which viable strategies could be
crafted. The MBWA concept was later popularized in a book by Tom Peters and Nancy
Austin (1985). Japanese managers employ a similar system, which originated at
Honda, and is sometimes called the 3 G's (Genga, Gengutsu, and Genjitsu, which
translates into “actual place”, “actual thing”, and “actual situation”).
Without doubt, the most influential strategist of the decade was Michael Porter. He
introduced many new concepts including; 5 forces analysis, generic strategies, the
value chain, strategic groups, and clusters. In 5 forces analysis he identifies the forces
that shape a firm's strategic environment. It is like a SWOT analysis with structure and
purpose. It shows how a firm can use these forces to obtain a sustainable competitive
advantage. Porter modifies Chandler's dictum about structure following strategy by
introducing a second level of structure: Organizational structure follows strategy,
which in turn follows industry structure. Porter's generic strategies detail the
interaction between cost minimisation strategies, product differentiation strategies,
and market focus strategies. Although he did not introduce these terms, he showed
the importance of choosing one of them rather than trying to position your company
between them. He also challenged managers to see their industry in terms of a value
chain. A firm will be successful only to the extent that it contributes to the industry's
value chain. This forced management to look at its operations from the customer's
point of view. Every operation should be examined in terms of what value it adds in
the eyes of the final customer.
John Kay (1993) took the idea of the value chain to a financial level claiming; “Adding
value is the central purpose of business activity”, where adding value is defined as
the difference between the market value of outputs and the cost of inputs including
capital, all divided by the firm's net output. Borrowing from Gary Hamel and Michael
Porter, Kay claims that the role of strategic management is to identify your core
competencies, and then assemble a collection of assets that will increase value added
and provide a competitive advantage. He claims that there are 3 types of capabilities
that can do this; innovation, reputation, and organizational structure.
The 1980s also saw the widespread acceptance of positioning theory. Although the
theory originated with Jack Trout in 1969, it didn’t gain wide acceptance until Al Ries
and Jack Trout wrote their classic book “Positioning: The Battle For Your Mind”
(1979). The basic premise is that a strategy should not be judged by internal company
factors but by the way customers see it relative to the competition. Crafting and
implementing a strategy involves creating a position in the mind of the collective
consumer. Several techniques were applied to positioning theory, some newly
invented but most borrowed from other disciplines. Perceptual mapping for example,
creates visual displays of the relationships between positions. Multidimensional
scaling, discriminant analysis, factor analysis, and conjoint analysis are mathematical
techniques used to determine the most relevant characteristics (called dimensions or
factors) upon which positions should be based. Preference regression can be used to
determine vectors of ideal positions and cluster analysis can identify clusters of
positions.
Others felt that internal company resources were the key. Jay Barney (1992) for
example saw strategy as assembling the optimum mix of resources, including human,
technology, and suppliers, and then configure them in unique and sustainable ways.
Michael Hammer and James Champy (1993) felt that these resources needed to be
restructured. This process, that they labelled reengineering, involved organizing a
firm's assets around whole processes rather than tasks. In this way a team of people
saw a project through, from inception to completion. This avoided functional silos
where isolated departments seldom talked to each other. It also eliminated waste due
to functional overlap and interdepartmental communications.
In 1989 Richard Lester and the researchers at the MIT Industrial Performance Centre
identified seven best practices and concluded that firms must accelerate the shift
away from the mass production of low cost standardized products. The seven areas of
best practice were:
 Global focus
The search for “best practices” is also called benchmarking (Camp, R. 1989). This
involves determining where you need to improve, finding an organization that is
exceptional in this area, then studying the company and applying its best practices in
your firm.
A large group of theorists felt the area where western business was most lacking was
product quality. People like W. Edwards Deming (1982), Joseph M. Juran (1992), A.
Kearney (1992), Philip Crosby (1979), and Armand Feignbaum (1983) gave us quality
improvement techniques like Total Quality Management (TQM), continuous
improvement, lean manufacturing, Six Sigma, and Return on Quality (ROQ).
An equally large group of theorists felt that poor customer service was the problem.
People like James Heskett (1988), Earl Sasser (1995), William Davidow (1989), Len
Schlesinger (1991), A. Paraurgman (1988), Len Berry (1995), Jane Kingman-Brundage
(1993), Christopher Hart, and Christopher Lovelock (1994), gave us fishbone
diagramming, service charting, Total Customer Service (TCS), the service profit chain,
service gaps analysis, the service encounter, strategic service vision, service mapping,
and service teams. Their underlying assumption was that there is no better source of
competitive advantage than a continuous stream of delighted customers.
Process management uses some of the techniques from product quality management
and some of the techniques from customer service management. It looks at an
activity as a sequential process. The objective is to find inefficiencies and make the
process more effective. Although the procedures have a long history, dating back to
Taylorism, the scope of their applicability has been greatly widened, leaving no
aspect of the firm free from potential process improvements. Because of the broad
applicability of process management techniques, they can be used as a basis for
competitive advantage.
Some realized that businesses were spending much more on acquiring new customers
than on retaining current ones. Carl Sewell (1990), Frederick Reicheld (1996), C.
Gronroos (1994), and Earl Sasser (1990) showed us how a competitive advantage could
be found in ensuring that customers returned again and again. This has come to be
known as the loyalty effect after Reicheld's book of the same name in which he
broadens the concept to include employee loyalty, supplier loyalty, distributor
loyalty, and shareholder loyalty. They also developed techniques for estimating the
lifetime value of a loyal customer, called customer lifetime value (CLV). A significant
movement started that attempted to recast selling and marketing techniques into a
long term endeavour that created a sustained relationship with customers (called
relationship selling, relationship marketing, and customer relationship management).
Customer relationship management (CRM) software (and its many variants) became an
integral tool that sustained this trend.
James Gilmore and Joseph Pine found competitive advantage in mass customization
(1997). Flexible manufacturing techniques allowed businesses to individualize
products for each customer without losing economies of scale. This effectively turned
the product into a service. They also realized that if a service is mass customized by
creating a “performance” for each individual client, that service would be
transformed into an “experience”. Their book, The Experience Economy (1999), along
with the work of Bernd Schmitt convinced many to see service provision as a form of
theatre. This school of thought is sometimes referred to as customer experience
management (CEM).
Like Peters and Waterman a decade earlier, James Collins and Jerry Porras spent
years conducting empirical research on what makes great companies. Six years of
research uncovered a key underlying principle behind the 19 successful companies
that they studied: They all encourage and preserve a core ideology that nurtures the
company. Even though strategy and tactics change daily, the companies,
nevertheless, were able to maintain a core set of values. These core values encourage
employees to build an organization that lasts. In Built To Last (1994) they claim that
short term profit goals, cost cutting, and restructuring will not stimulate dedicated
employees to build a great company that will endure. In 2000 Collins coined the term
“built to flip” to describe the prevailing business attitudes in Silicon Valley. It
describes a business culture where technological change inhibits a long term focus. He
also popularized the concept of the BHAG (Big Hairy Audacious Goal).
Arie de Geus (1997) undertook a similar study and obtained similar results. He
identified four key traits of companies that had prospered for 50 years or more. They
are:
 Conservative financing
A company with these key characteristics he called a living company because it is able
to perpetuate itself. If a company emphasizes knowledge rather than finance, and
sees itself as an on-going community of human being, it has the potential to become
great and endure for decades. Such an organization is an organic entity capable of
learning (he called it a “learning organization”) and capable of creating its own
processes, goals, and persona.
Jordan Lewis (1999) finds competitive advantage in alliance strategies. Rather than
seeing distributors, suppliers, firms in related industries, and even competitors as
potential threats or targets for vertical integration, they should be seen as potential
assistants or partners. He explains how mutual respect and trust is the cornerstone of
this approach and describes how this can be fostered at the interpersonal relationship
level.
In the 1980s some business strategists realized that there was a vast knowledge base
stretching back thousands of years that they had barely examined. They turned to
military strategy for guidance. Military strategy books like “The Art of War” by Sun
Tzu, “On War” by von Clausewitz, and “The Red Book” by Mao Tse Tung became
instant business classics. From Sun Tzu they learned the tactical side of military
strategy and specific tactical prescriptions. From Von Clausewitz they learned the
dynamic and unpredictable nature of military strategy. From Mao Tse Tung they
learned the principles of guerrilla warfare. The main marketing warfare books were:
There were generally thought to be four types of business warfare theories. They are:
By the turn of the century marketing warfare strategies had gone out of favour. It was
felt that they were limiting. There were many situations in which non-confrontational
approaches were more appropriate. The “Strategy of the Dolphin” was developed in
the mid-1990s to give guidance as to when to use aggressive strategies and when to
use passive strategies. A variety of aggressiveness strategies were developed.
J. Moore (1993) used a similar metaphor. Instead of using military terms, he created
an ecological theory of predators and prey (see ecological model of competition); a
sort of Darwinian management strategy in which market interactions mimic long term
ecological stability.
Back in 1970 Alvin Toffler in Future Shock (Toffler, A. 1970) describes a trend towards
accelerating rates of change. He illustrated how social and technological norms had
shorter lifespans with each generation, and he questioned society's ability to cope
with the resulting turmoil and anxiety. In past generations periods of change were
always punctuated with times of stability. This allowed us to assimilate the change
and deal with it before the next change was upon us. But these periods of stability
are getting shorter and by the late 20th century had all but disappeared. In The Third
Wave (Toffler, A. 1980) he characterizes this shift to relentless change as the defining
feature of the third phase of civilization (The first two phases being the agricultural
and industrial waves.). He claims that the dawn of this new phase will cause great
anxiety for those that grew up in the previous phases, and will cause much conflict
and opportunity in the business world. Hundreds of authors, particularly since the
early 1990s, have attempted to explain what this means for business strategy.
Watts Waker and Jim Taylor (1997) call this upheaval a 500 year delta. They claim
these major upheavals occur every 5 centuries. They say we are currently making the
transition from the “Age of Reason” to a new chaotic Age of Access. Jeremy Rifkin
(2000) popularized and expanded this term, “age of access” three years later in his
book of the same name.
Peter Drucker (1969) coined the phrase Age of Discontinuity to describe the way
change forces disruptions into the continuity of our lives. In an age of continuity
attempts to predict the future by extrapolating from the past can be somewhat
accurate. But according to Drucker, we are now in an age of discontinuity and
extrapolating from the past is hopelessly ineffective. We cannot assume that trends
that exist today will continue into the future. He identifies four sources of
discontinuity: new technologies, globalization, cultural pluralism, and knowledge
capital. Gary Hamel (Hamel, G. 2000) talks about strategic decay. The notion that the
value of all strategies, no matter how brilliant, decays over time.
Dereck Abell (Abell, D. 1978) describes strategic windows and stresses the importance
of the timing (both entrance and exit) of any given strategy. This has led some
strategic planners to build planned obsolescence into their strategies.
Charles Handy (Handy, C. 1989) identified two types of change. Strategic drift as a
gradual change that occur so subtlety that it is not noticed until it is too late. By
contrast, transformational change is sudden and radical. It is typically caused by
discontinuities (or exogenous shocks) in the business environment. The point where a
new trend is initiated is called a strategic inflection point by Andy Grove. Inflection
points can be subtle or radical. Malcolm Gladwell (2000) talks about the importance
of the tipping point, that point where a trend or fad acquires critical mass and takes
off.
Noel Tichy (Tichy, N. 1983) recognized that because we are all beings of habit we
tend to repeat what we are comfortable with. He says that this is a trap that
constrains our creativity, prevents us from exploring new ideas, and hampers our
dealing with the full complexity of new issues. He developed a systematic method of
dealing with change that involved looking at any new issue from three angles:
technical and production, political and resource allocation, and corporate culture.
Richard Pascale (Pascale, R. 1990) said that relentless change requires that businesses
continuously reinvent themselves. His famous maxim is “Nothing fails like success” by
which he means that what was a strength yesterday becomes the root of weakness
today, We tend to depend on what worked yesterday and refuse to let go of what
worked so well for us in the past. Prevailing strategies become self-confirming. In
order to avoid this trap, businesses must stimulate a spirit of inquiry and healthy
debate. They must encourage a creative process of self-renewal based on constructive
conflict.
Art Kleimer (1996) claims that to foster a corporate culture that embraces change,
you have to hire the right people; heretics, heroes, outlaws, and visionaries. The
conservative bureaucrat that made such a good middle manager in yesterday’s
hierarchical organizations is of little use today. A decade earlier Peters and Austin
(1985) had stressed the importance of nurturing champions and heroes. They said we
have a tendency to dismiss new ideas, so to overcome this, we should support those
few people in the organization that have the courage to put their career and
reputation on the line for an unproven idea.
Adrian Slywotsky (1996) showed how changes in the business environment are
reflected in value migrations between industries, between companies, and within
companies. He claims that recognizing the patterns behind these value migrations is
necessary if we wish to understand the world of chaotic change. In “Profit Patterns”
(1999) he describes businesses as being in a state of strategic anticipation as they try
to spot emerging patterns. Slywotsky and his team identified 30 patterns that have
transformed industry after industry.
A number of strategists use scenario planning techniques to deal with change. Kees
van der Heijden (1996), for example, says that change and uncertainty make
“optimum strategy” determination impossible. We have neither the time nor the
information required for such a calculation. The best we can hope for is what he calls
“the most skilful process”. The way Peter Schwartz (1991) puts it is strategic
outcomes cannot be known in advance so the sources of competitive advantage
cannot be predetermined. The fast changing business environment is too uncertain for
us to find sustainable value in formulas of excellence or competitive advantage.
Instead, scenario planning is a technique in which multiple outcomes can be
developed, their implications assessed, and their likeliness of occurrence evaluated.
According to Pierre Wick (1985), scenario planning is about insight, complexity, and
subtlety, not about formal analysis and numbers.
Henry Mintzberg (1988) looked at the changing world around him and decided it was
time to re-examine how strategic management was done. He examined the strategic
process and concluded it was much more fluid and unpredictable than people had
thought. Because of this, he could not point to one process that could be called
strategic planning. Instead he concludes that there are five types of strategies. They
are:
Mintzberg (1998) developed these five types of management strategy into 10 “schools
of thought”. These 10 schools are grouped into three categories.
      The second group, consisting of six schools, is more concerned with how
       strategic management is actually done, rather than prescribing optimal plans
       or positions. The six schools are the entrepreneurial, visionary, or great leader
       school, the cognitive or mental process school, the learning, adaptive, or
       emergent process school, the power or negotiation school, the corporate
       culture or collective process school, and the business environment or reactive
       school.
      The third and final group consists of one school, the configuration or
       transformation school, an hybrid of the other schools organized into stages,
       organizational life cycles, or “episodes”.
Some business planners are starting to use complexity theory. Complexity can be
thought of as chaos with a dash of order. Chaos theory deals with turbulent systems
that rapidly become disordered. Complexity is not quite so unpredictable. It involves
multiple agents interacting in such a way that a glimpse of structure may appear.
Axelrod, R. (1999), Holland, J. (1995), and Kelly, S. and Allison, M.A. (1999), call
these systems of multiple actions and reactions complex adaptive systems. Axelrod
(1999) asserts that rather than fear complexity, business should harness it. He says
this can best be done when “there are many participants, numerous interactions,
much trial and error learning, and abundant attempts to imitate each other’s
successes”. E. Dudik (2000) said that an organization must develop a mechanism for
understanding the source and level of complexity it will face in the future and then
transform itself into a complex adaptive system in order to deal with it.
Peter Drucker had theorized the rise of the “knowledge worker” back in the 1950s. He
described how fewer workers would be doing physical labour, and more would be
applying their minds. In 1984, John Nesbitt theorized that the future would be driven
largely by information: companies that managed information well could obtain an
advantage, however the profitability of what he calls the “information float”
(information that the company had and others desired) would all but disappear as
inexpensive computers made information more accessible. Daniel Bell (1985)
examined the sociological consequences of information technology, while Gloria
Schuck (1985) and Shoshana Zuboff (1988) looked at psychological factors. Zuboff, in
his five year study of eight pioneering corporations made the important distinction
between “automating technologies” and “infomating technologies”. He studied the
effect that both had on individual workers, managers, and organizational structures.
He largely confirmed Peter Druckers predictions three decades earlier, about the
importance of flexible decentralized structure, work teams, knowledge sharing, and
the central role of the knowledge worker. Zuboff also detected a new basis for
managerial authority, based not on position or hierarchy, but on knowledge (also
predicted by Drucker) which he called “participative management”.
Peter Senge (1990), who had collaborated with Arie de Geus at Dutch Shell, borrowed
de Geus' notion of the learning organization, expanded it, and popularized it. The
underlying theory is that a company's ability to gather, analyse, and use information is
a necessary requirement for business success in the information age. (See
organizational learning.) In order to do this, Senge claimed that an organization would
need to be structured such that:
      Team learning — we learn together in teams. This involves a shift from “a spirit
       of advocacy to a spirit of enquiry”.
      Systems thinking — we look at the whole rather than the parts. This is what
       Senge calls the “Fifth discipline”. It is the glue that integrates the other four
       into a coherent strategy. For an alternative approach to the “learning
       organization”, see Garratt, B. (1987).
Since 1990 many theorists have written on the strategic importance of information,
including J.B. Quinn (1992), J. Carlos Jarillo (1993), D.L. Barton (1995), M. Castells
(1996), J.P. Lieleskin (1996), T. Stewart (1997), K.E. Sveiby (1997), Gilbert J. Probst
(1999), and Shapiro and Varian (1999) to name just a few.
Thomas Stewart (1997) for example, uses the term “intellectual capital” to describe
the investment an organization makes in knowledge. It is comprised of human capital
(the knowledge inside the heads of employees), customer capital (the knowledge
inside the heads of customers that decide to buy from you), and structural capital
(the knowledge that resides in the company itself).
Stan Davis and Christopher Meyer (1998) have combined three variables to define
what they call the BLUR equation. The speed of change, Internet connectivity, and
intangible knowledge value, when multiplied together yields a society's rate of BLUR.
The three variables interact and reinforce each other making this relationship highly
non-linear.
Regis McKenna (1997) posits that life in the high tech information age is what he
called a “real time experience”. Events occur in real time. To ever more demanding
customers “now” is what matters. Pricing will more and more become variable pricing
changing with each transaction, often exhibiting first degree price discrimination.
Customers expect immediate service, customized to their needs, and will be prepared
to pay a premium price for it. He claimed that the new basis for competition will be
time based competition.
Geoffrey Moore (1991) and R. Frank and P. Cook (1995) also detected a shift in the
nature of competition. In industries with high technology content, technical standards
become established and this gives the dominant firm a near monopoly. The same is
true of networked industries in which interoperability requires compatibility between
users. An example is word processor documents. Once a product has gained market
dominance, other products, even far superior products, cannot compete. Moore
showed how firms could attain this enviable position by using E.M. Rogers five stage
adoption process and focusing on one group of customers at a time, using each group
as a base for marketing to the next group. The most difficult step is making the
transition between visionaries and pragmatists (See Crossing the Chasm). If successful
a firm can create a bandwagon effect in which the momentum builds and your
product becomes a defacto standard.
Evans and Wurster (1997) describe how industries with a high information component
are being transformed. They cite Encarta's demolition of the Encyclopaedia Britanica
(whose sales have plummeted 80% since their peak of $650 million in 1990). Many
speculate that Encarta’s reign will be short-lived, eclipsed by collaborative
encyclopaedias like Wikipedia that can operate at very low marginal costs. Evans also
mentions the music industry which is desperately looking for a new business model.
The upstart information savvy firms, unburdened by cumbersome physical assets, are
changing the competitive landscape, redefining market segments, and disinter-
mediating some channels. One manifestation of this is personalized marketing.
Information technology allows marketers to treat each individual as its own market, a
market of one. Traditional ideas of market segments will no longer be relevant if
personalized marketing is successful.
The technology sector has provided some strategies directly. For example, from the
software development industry agile software development provides a model for
shared development processes.
Access to information systems have allowed senior managers to take a much more
comprehensive view of strategic management than ever before. The most notable of
the comprehensive systems is the balanced scorecard approach developed in the early
1990's by Drs. Robert Kaplan (Harvard Business School) and David Norton (Kaplan, R.
and Norton, D. 1992). It measures several factors financial, marketing, production,
organizational development, and new product development in order to achieve a
'balanced' perspective.
Henry Mintzberg (1973) found that senior managers typically deal with unpredictable
situations so they strategize in ad hoc, flexible, dynamic, and implicit ways. He says,
“The job breeds adaptive information-manipulators who prefer the live concrete
situation. The manager works in an environment of stimulus-response, and he
develops in his work a clear preference for live action.” (Page 38)
John Kotter (Kotter, J. 1982) studied the daily activities of 15 executives and
concluded that they spent most of their time developing and working a network of
relationships from which they gained general insights and specific details to be used
in making strategic decisions. They tended to use “mental road maps” rather than
systematic planning techniques.
Daniel Isenberg's study of senior managers (1984) found that their decisions were
highly intuitive. Executives often sensed what they were going to do before they
could explain why. He claims (1986) that one of the reasons for this is the complexity
of strategic decisions and the resultant information uncertainty.
Shoshana Zuboff (1988) claims that information technology is widening the divide
between senior managers (who typically make strategic decisions) and operational
level managers (who typically make routine decisions). He claims that prior to the
widespread use of computer systems, managers, even at the most senior level,
engaged in both strategic decisions and routine administration, but as computers
facilitated (he called it “deskilled”) routine processes, these activities were moved
further down the hierarchy, leaving senior management free for strategic decisions
making.
Abraham Zaleznik (1977) identified a difference between leaders and managers. He
describes leaders as visionaries who inspire. They care about substance. Whereas
managers are claimed to care about process, plans, and form. He also claimed (1989)
that the rise of the manager was the main factor that caused the decline of American
business in the 1970s and 80s. Lack of leadership is most damaging at the level of
strategic management where it can paralyse an entire organization.
Most theories of strategic management seem to have a lifespan less than that of the
latest teen music idol. Many critics claim that this is because they generally do not
work. Keep in mind that this article describes only the 50 or so most successful
theories. For every theory that gets incorporated into strategic management
textbooks there are 100 that are quickly forgotten. Many theories tend either to be
too narrow in focus to build a complete corporate strategy on, or too general and
abstract to be applicable to specific situations. The low success rate is fuelled by the
management talk-circuit in which hundreds of self-appointed gurus sell their books
and explain their “revolutionary” and “ground breaking” theories to audiences of
business executives for a not-insignificant fee. (See business philosophies and popular
management theories for a more critical view of management theories.)
Some critics take the opposite approach claiming effectively that there are not
enough theories, and when they arrive they are too late. These commentators remind
us that the basic purpose of strategic management is to match a company's strategy
with the business environment that the organization is in. Because the environment is
constantly changing, effective strategic management requires a continuous flow of
new theories suitable for the new circumstances. The problem with most theories is
that they solve yesterday’s problems.
Gary Hamel (2000) coined the term strategic convergence to explain the limited scope
of the strategies being used. He laments that strategies converge because the more
successful ones get imitated by firms that do not understand that the strategic
process involves designing a custom strategy for the specifics of each situation.
                   CHAPTER THREE: Strategy Formulation
3.1     INTRODUCTION
It is useful to consider strategy formulation as part of a strategic management process
that comprises three phases: diagnosis, formulation and implementation.
3.1.2 Formulation
The second phase in the strategic management process produces a clear set of
recommendations, with supporting justification, that revise as necessary the mission
and objectives of the organization, and supply the strategies for accomplishing them.
In formulation, we are trying to modify the current objectives and strategies in ways
to make the organization more successful. This includes trying to create "sustainable"
competitive advantages -- although most competitive advantages are eroded steadily
by the efforts of competitors.
The three sets of recommendations must be internally consistent and fit together in a
mutually supportive manner that forms an integrated hierarchy of strategy, in the
order given.
In this aspect of strategy, we are concerned with broad decisions about the total
organization's scope and direction.    Basically, we consider what changes should be
made in our growth objective and strategy for achieving it, the lines of business we
are in, and how these lines of business fit together. It is useful to think of three
components of corporate level strategy: (a) growth or directional strategy (what
should be our growth objective, ranging from retrenchment through stability to
varying degrees of growth - and how do we accomplish this), (b) portfolio strategy
(what should be our portfolio of lines of business, which implicitly requires
reconsidering how much concentration or diversification we should have), and (c)
parenting strategy (how we allocate resources and manage capabilities and activities
across the portfolio -- where do we put special emphasis, and how much do we
integrate our various lines of business).
(c)Functional Strategy:
These more localized and shorter-horizon strategies deal with how each functional
area and unit will carry out its functional activities to be effective and maximize
resource productivity.
This comprises the overall strategy elements for the corporation as a whole, the grand
strategy, if you please. Corporate strategy involves four kinds of initiatives:
     * Pursuing ways to capture valuable cross-business strategic fits and turn them
         into competitive advantages -- especially transferring and sharing related
        technology, procurement leverage, operating facilities, distribution channels,
        and/or customers.
It is useful to organize the corporate level strategy considerations and initiatives into
a framework with the following three main strategy components:
    growth,
    portfolio, and
    parenting. These are discussed in the next three sections.
What Should be Our Growth Objective and Strategies?
Growth objectives can range from drastic retrenchment through aggressive growth.
Organizational leaders need to revisit and make decisions about the growth objectives
and the fundamental strategies the organization will use to achieve them.
There are forces that tend to push top decision-makers toward a growth stance even
when a company is in trouble and should not be trying to grow, for example bonuses,
stock options, fame, ego.
Leaders need to resist such temptations and select a growth strategy stance that is
appropriate for the organization and its situation.        Stability and retrenchment
strategies are underutilized.
Some of the major strategic alternatives for each of the primary growth stances
(retrenchment, stability, and growth) are summarized in the following three sub-
sections.
All growth strategies can be classified into one of two fundamental categories:
There are two basic concentration strategies, vertical integration and horizontal
growth.
Diversification strategies can be divided into related (or concentric) and unrelated
(conglomerate) diversification.
Each of the resulting four core categories of strategy alternatives can be achieved
internally through investment and development, or externally through mergers,
acquisitions, and/or strategic alliances -- thus producing eight major growth strategy
categories.
Comments about each of the four core categories are outlined below, followed by
some key points about mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances.
1. Vertical Integration: This type of strategy can be a good one if the company has a
strong competitive position in a growing, attractive industry. A company can grow by
taking over functions earlier in the value chain that were previously provided by
suppliers or other organizations ("backward integration").         This strategy can have
advantages, e.g., in cost, stability and quality of components, and making operations
more difficult for competitors.      However, it also reduces flexibility, raises exit
barriers for the company to leave that industry, and prevents the company from
seeking the best and latest components from suppliers competing for their business.
A company also can grow by taking over functions forward in the value chain
previously provided by final manufacturers, distributors, or retailers ("forward
integration").     This strategy provides more control over such things as final
products/services and distribution, but may involve new critical success factors that
the parent company may not be able to master and deliver. For example, being a
world-class manufacturer does not make a company an effective retailer.
Some writers claim that backward integration is usually more profitable than forward
integration, although this does not have general support.           In any case, many
companies have moved toward less vertical integration (especially backward, but also
forward) during the last decade or so, replacing significant amounts of previous
vertical integration with outsourcing and various forms of strategic alliances.
3.3 Mergers, Acquisitions, and Strategic Alliances:          Each of the four growth
strategy categories just discussed can be carried out internally or externally, through
mergers, acquisitions, and/or strategic alliances.     Of course, there also can be a
mixture of internal and external actions.
Various forms of strategic alliances, mergers, and acquisitions have emerged and are
used extensively in many industries today.       They are used particularly to bridge
resource and technology gaps, and to obtain expertise and market positions more
quickly than could be done through internal development.           They are particularly
necessary and potentially useful when a company wishes to enter a new industry, new
markets, and/or new parts of the world.
Despite their extensive use, a large share of alliances, mergers, and acquisitions fall
far short of expected benefits or are outright failures.       For example, one study
published in Business Week in 1999 found that 61 per cent of alliances were either
outright failures or "limping along." Research on mergers and acquisitions includes a
Mercer Management Consulting study of all mergers from 1990 to 1996 which found
that nearly half "destroyed" shareholder value; an A. T. Kearney study of 115
multibillion-dollar, global mergers between 1993 and 1996 where 58 per cent failed to
create "substantial returns for shareholders" in the form of dividends and stock price
appreciation; and a Price-Waterhouse-Coopers study of 97 acquisitions over $500
million from 1994 to 1997 in which two-thirds of the buyer's stocks dropped on
announcement of the transaction and a third of these were still lagging a year later.
Many reasons for the problematic record have been cited, including paying too much,
unrealistic expectations, inadequate due diligence, and conflicting corporate
cultures; however, the most powerful contributor to success or failure is inadequate
attention to the merger integration process. Although the lawyers and investment
bankers may consider a deal done when the papers are signed and they receive their
fees, this should be merely an incident in a multi-year process of integration that
began before the signing and continues far beyond.
There are a number of circumstances in which the most appropriate growth stance for
a company is stability, rather than growth. Often, this may be used for a relatively
short period, after which further growth is planned.       Such circumstances usually
involve a reasonable successful company, combined with circumstances that either
permit a period of comfortable coasting or suggest a pause or caution.           Three
alternatives are outlined below, in which the actual strategy actions are similar, but
differing primarily in the circumstances motivating the choice of a stability strategy
and in the intentions for future strategic actions.
Liquidation: When a company has been unsuccessful in or has none of the previous
three strategic alternatives available, the only remaining alternative is liquidation,
often involving a bankruptcy. There is a modest advantage of a voluntary liquidation
over bankruptcy in that the board and top management make the decisions rather
than turning them over to a court, which often ignores stockholders' interests.
The BCG Growth-Share Matrix model considers two relatively simple variables:
growth rate of the industry as an indication of industry attractiveness, and relative
market share as an indication of its relative competitive strength. The GE Business
Screen, also associated with McKinsey, considers two composite variables, which can
be customized by the user, for (a) industry attractiveness (e.g., one could include
industry size and growth rate, profitability, pricing practices, favoured treatment in
government dealings, etc.) and (b) competitive strength (e.g., market share,
technological position, profitability, size, etc.)
The best test of the business portfolio's overall attractiveness is whether the
combined growth and profitability of the businesses in the portfolio will allow the
company to attain its performance objectives. Related to this overall criterion are
such questions as:
     * Does the company have its share of industry leaders, or is it burdened with
        too many businesses in modest competitive positions?
     * Is the portfolio of SBU's and its relative risk/growth potential consistent with
        the strategic goals?
* Does the portfolio put the corporation in good position for the future?
     * What are critical success factors in each business unit, and how can the
        company do well on them
He argues that a business needs to make two fundamental decisions in establishing its
competitive advantage:     (a) whether to compete primarily on price (he says "cost,"
which is necessary to sustain competitive prices, but price is what the customer
responds to)    or to compete       through providing some distinctive points of
differentiation that justify higher prices, and (b) how broad a market target it will
aim at (its competitive scope). These two choices define the following four generic
competitive strategies. which he argues cover the fundamental range of choices. A
fifth strategy alternative (best-cost provider) is added by some sources, although not
by Porter, and is included below:
     * There are few ways to achieve product differentiation that have much value
        to buyers
* The company lacks the capability to go after a wider part of the total market
     * Buyers' needs or uses of the item are diverse; there are many different niches
        and segments in the industry
     * Buyer segments differ widely in size, growth rate, profitability, and intensity
        in the five competitive forces, making some segments more attractive than
        others
* Industry leaders don't see the niche as crucial to their own success
Best-Cost Provider Strategy: (although not one of Porter's basic four strategies, this
strategy is mentioned by a number of other writers.) This is a strategy of trying to
give customers the best cost/value combination, by incorporating key good-or-better
product characteristics at a lower cost than competitors. This strategy is a mixture or
hybrid of low-price and differentiation, and targets a segment of value-conscious
buyers that is usually larger than a market niche, but smaller than a broad market.
Successful implementation of this strategy requires the company to have the
resources, skills, capabilities (and possibly luck) to incorporate up-scale features at
lower cost than competitors.
This strategy could be attractive in markets that have both variety in buyer needs
that make differentiation common and where large numbers of buyers are sensitive to
both price and value.
Porter might argue that this strategy is often temporary, and that a business should
choose and achieve one of the four generic competitive strategies above. Otherwise,
the business is stuck in the middle of the competitive marketplace and will be out-
performed by competitors who choose and excel in one of the fundamental strategies.
His argument is analogous to the threats to a tennis player who is standing at the
service line, rather than near the baseline or getting to the net. However, others
present examples of companies (e.g., Honda and Toyota) who seem to be able to
pursue successfully a best-cost provider strategy, with stability.
Two categories of competitive tactics are those dealing with timing (when to enter a
market) and market location (where and how to enter and/or defend).
Timing Tactics: When to make a strategic move is often as important as what move
to make.       We often speak of first-movers (i.e., the first to provide a product or
service), second-movers or rapid followers, and late movers (wait-and-see).        Each
tactic can have advantages and disadvantages.
Being a first-mover can have major strategic advantages when: (a) doing so builds an
important image and reputation with buyers; (b) early adoption of new technologies,
different components, exclusive distribution channels, etc. can produce cost and/or
other advantages over rivals; (c) first-time customers remain strongly loyal in making
repeat purchases; and (d) moving first makes entry and imitation by competitors hard
or unlikely.
Market Location Tactics:      These fall conveniently into offensive and defensive
tactics. Offensive tactics are designed to take market share from a competitor, while
defensive tactics attempt to keep a competitor from taking away some of our present
market share, under the onslaught of offensive tactics by the competitor.         Some
offensive tactics are:
     * Bypass Attack: attempting to cut the market out from under the established
        defender by offering a new, superior type of produce that makes the
        competitor's product unnecessary or undesirable.
     * Guerrilla Warfare: using a "hit and run" attack on a competitor, with small,
        intermittent assaults on different market segments. This offers the possibility
        for even a small firm to make some gains without seriously threatening a
        large, established competitor and evoking some form of retaliation.
     * Reduce Inducement for Attacks:          e.g., lower profits to make things less
        attractive   (including   use   of   accounting   techniques   to   obscure    true
        profitability).   Keeping prices very low gives a new entrant little profit
        incentive to enter.
The general experience is that any competitive advantage currently held will
eventually be eroded by the actions of competent, resourceful competitors.
Therefore, to sustain its initial advantage, a firm must use both defensive and
offensive strategies, in elaborating on its basic competitive strategy.
Some of the reasons for strategic alliances are to: obtain/share technology, share
manufacturing capabilities and facilities, share access to specific markets, reduce
financial/political/market risks, and achieve other competitive advantages not
otherwise available.      There could be considered a continuum of types of strategic
alliances, ranging from:     (a) mutual service consortiums (e.g., similar companies in
similar industries pool their resources to develop something that is too expensive
alone), (b) licensing arrangements, (c) joint ventures (an independent business entity
formed by two or more companies to accomplish certain things, with allocated
ownership, operational responsibilities, and financial risks and rewards), (d) value-
chain partnerships (e.g., just-in-time supplier relationships, and out-sourcing of major
value-chain functions).
Functional strategies are relatively short-term activities that each functional area
within a company will carry out to implement the broader, longer-term corporate
level and business level strategies. Each functional area has a number of strategy
choices, that interact with and must be consistent with the overall company
strategies.
Three basic characteristics distinguish functional strategies from corporate level and
business level strategies:     shorter time horizon, greater specificity, and primary
involvement of operating managers.
A few examples follow of functional strategy topics for the major functional areas of
marketing, finance, production/operations, research and development, and human
resources management. Each area needs to deal with sourcing strategy, i.e., what
should be done in-house and what should be outsourced?
Marketing strategy deals with product/service choices and features, pricing strategy,
markets to be targeted, distribution, and promotion considerations.           Financial
strategies include decisions about capital acquisition, capital allocation, dividend
policy, and investment and working capital management.              The production or
operations functional strategies address choices about how and where the products or
services will be manufactured or delivered, technology to be used, management of
resources, plus purchasing and relationships with suppliers.    For firms in high-tech
industries, R&D strategy may be so central that many of the decisions will be made at
the business or even corporate level, for example the role of technology in the
company's competitive strategy, including choices between being a technology leader
or follower. However, there will remain more specific decisions that are part of R&D
functional strategy, such as the relative emphasis between product and process R&D,
how new technology will be obtained (internal development vs. external through
purchasing, acquisition, licensing, alliances, etc.), and degree of centralization for
R&D activities. Human resources functional strategy includes many topics, typically
recommended by the human resources department, but many requiring top
management approval.         Examples are job categories and descriptions; pay and
benefits; recruiting, selection, and orientation; career development and training;
evaluation and incentive systems; policies and discipline; and management/executive
selection processes.
Decision making is a complex subject, worthy of a chapter or book of its own. This
section can only offer a few suggestions.       Among the many sources for additional
information, I recommend Harrison (1999), McCall & Kaplan (1990), and Williams
(2002).     Here are some factors to consider when choosing among alternative
strategies:
     * The primary answer to the previous question, and therefore a vital criterion,
          is that the chosen strategies must be effective in addressing the "critical
          issues" the company faces at this time
     * They must be consistent with the mission and other strategies of the
          organization
     * They need to be consistent with external environment factors, including
         realistic assessments of the competitive environment and trends
     * They     fit   the   company's   product   life   cycle   position    and   market
         attractiveness/competitive strength situation
* The risks must be acceptable and in line with the potential rewards
Follow the Leader: when the market has no more room for copycat products and
look-alike
competitors.     Sometimes such a strategy can work fine, but not without careful
consideration of the company's particular strengths and weaknesses.          (e.g., Fujitsu
Ltd. was driven since the 1960s to catch up to IBM in mainframes and continued this
quest even into the 1990s after mainframes were in steep decline; or the decision by
Standard Oil of Ohio to follow Exxon and Mobil Oil into conglomerate diversification)
Count On Hitting Another Home Run: e.g., Polaroid tried to follow its early success
with   instant   photography   by   developing   "Polavision"   during   the   mid-1970s.
Unfortunately, this very expensive, instant developing, 8mm, black and white, silent
motion picture camera and film was displayed at a stockholders' meeting about the
time that the first beta-format video recorder was released by Sony.             Polaroid
reportedly wrote off at least $500 million on this venture without selling a single
camera.
Arms Race:       Attacking the market leaders head-on without having either a good
competitive advantage or adequate financial strength; making such aggressive
attempts to take market share that rivals are provoked into strong retaliation and a
costly "arms race."    Such battles seldom produce a substantial change in market
shares; usual outcome is higher costs and profitless sales growth
Put More Money On a Losing Hand: one version of this is allocating R&D efforts to
weak products instead of strong products (e.g., Polavision again, Pan Am's attempt to
continue global routes in 1987)
Unrealistic Status-Climbing: Going after the high end of the market without having
the reputation to attract buyers looking for name-brand, prestige goods (e.g., Sears'
attempts to introduce designer women's clothing)
Selling the Sizzle without the Steak: Spending more money on marketing and sales
promotions to try to get around problems with product quality and performance.
Depending on cosmetic product improvements to serve as a substitute for real
innovation and extra customer value.
Strategy formulation refers to the process of choosing the most appropriate course of
action for the realization of organizational goals and objectives and thereby
achieving the organizational vision. The process of strategy formulation basically
involves six main steps. Though these steps do not follow a rigid chronological order,
however they are very rational and can be easily followed in this order.
      While fixing the organizational objectives, it is essential that the factors which
      influence the selection of objectives must be analysed before the selection of
      objectives. Once the objectives and the factors influencing strategic decisions
      have been determined, it is easy to take strategic decisions.
An organizational control system is also required. This control system equips managers
with motivational incentives for employees as well as feedback on employees and
organizational performance.     Organizational culture     refers to the    specialized
collection of values, attitudes, norms and beliefs shared by organizational members
and groups.
Excellently formulated strategies will fail if they are not properly implemented. Also,
it is essential to note that strategy implementation is not possible unless there is
stability between strategy and each organizational dimension such as organizational
structure, reward structure, resource-allocation process, etc.
Strategy implementation poses a threat to many managers and employees in an
organization. New power relationships are predicted and achieved. New groups
(formal as well as informal) are formed whose values, attitudes, beliefs and concerns
may not be known. With the change in power and status roles, the managers and
employees may employ confrontation behaviour.
Following are the main differences between Strategy Formulation and Strategy
Implementation-
Stated simply, strategy is a road map or guide by which an organization moves from a
current state of affairs to a future desired state. It is not only a template by which
daily decisions are made, but also a tool with which long-range future plans and
courses of action are constructed. Strategy allows a company to position itself
effectively within its environment to reach its maximum potential, while constantly
monitoring that environment for changes that can affect it so as to make changes in
its strategic plan accordingly. In short, strategy defines where you are, where you are
going, and how you are going to get there.
Strategic planning, as a formalized business process, has been in practice for almost
40 years. However, it is commonplace to find that a grand majority of organizations
have no clear concept of how to effectively conduct the planning process. As a result,
most strategic plans are poorly conceived and do nothing more than sit on a
bookshelf; no real impact is ever made on the company and its activities. Fortunately,
within the past decade or so, there have been attempts made to clarify the major
components and processes of strategic planning. In this respect, it has become easier
for ordinary an organization to effectively create and implement a first rate strategic
plan.
Basic strategic planning is comprised of several components that build upon the
previous piece of the plan, and operates much like a flow chart. However, prior to
embarking on this process, it is important to consider the players involved. There
must be a commitment from the highest office in the organizational hierarchy.
Without buy-in from the head of a company, it is unlikely that other members will be
supportive in the planning and eventual implementation process, thereby dooming the
plan before it ever takes shape. Commitment and support of the strategic-planning
initiative must spread from the president and/or CEO all the way down through the
ranks to the line worker on the factory floor.
The components of the strategic-planning process read much like a laundry list, with
one exception: each piece of the process must be kept in its sequential order since
each part builds upon the previous one. This is where the similarity to a flow chart is
most evident, as can be seen in the following illustration.
Figure                                                                               1
Strategic Planning Process
and external stimuli so as to keep pace with the competition.
The idea behind this continual process is that each step of the planning process
requires some degree of implementation before the next stage can begin. This
naturally dictates that all implementation cannot be postponed until completion of
the plan, but must be initiated along the way. Implementation procedures specific to
each phase of planning must be completed during that phase in order for the next
stage to be started.
All business decisions are fundamentally based on some set of values, whether they
are personal or organizational values. The implication here is that since the strategic
plan is to be used as a guide for daily decision making, the plan itself should be
aligned with those personal and organizational values. To delve even further, a values
assessment should include an in-depth analysis of several elements: personal values,
organizational values, operating philosophy, organization culture, and stakeholders.
This allows the planning team to take a macro look at the organization and how it
functions as a whole.
Strategic planning that does not integrate a values assessment into the process is sure
to encounter severe implementation and functionality problems if not outright
failure. Briefly put, form follows function; the form of the strategic plan must follow
the functionality of the organization, which is a direct result of organizational values
and culture. If any party feels that his or her values have been neglected, he or she
will not adopt the plan into daily work procedures and the benefits will not be
obtained.
This step of the planning process is critical in that is serves as the foundation upon
which the remainder of the plan is built. A vision is a statement that identifies where
an organization wants to be at some point in the future. It functions to provide a
company with directionality, stress management, justification and quantification of
resources,   enhancement     of   professional   growth,   motivation,   standards,   and
succession planning. Porrus and Collins (1996) point out that a well-conceived vision
consists of two major components: a core ideology and the envisioned future.
A core ideology is the enduring character of an organization; it provides the glue that
holds an organization together. It itself is composed of core values and a core
purpose. The core purpose is the organization's entire reason for being. The
envisioned future involves a conception of the organization at a specified future date
inclusive of its aspirations and ambitions. It includes the BHAG (big, hairy, audacious
goal), which a company typically reaches only 50 to 70 percent of the time. This
envisioned future gives vividly describes specific goals for the organization to reach.
The strategic results of a well formulated vision include the survival of the
organization, the focus on productive effort, vitality through the alignment of the
individual employees and the organization as a whole, and, finally, success. Once an
agreed-upon vision is implemented, it is time to move on to the creation of a mission
statement.
An explicit mission statement ensures the unanimity of purpose, provides the basis for
resource     allocation,   guides   organizational   climate   and   culture,   establishes
organizational boundaries, facilitates accountability, and facilitates control of cost,
time, and performance. When formulating a mission statement, it is vital that it
specifies six specific elements, including the basic product or service, employee
orientation, primary market(s), customer orientation, principle technologies, and
standards of quality. With all of these elements incorporated, a mission statement
should still remain short and memorable. For example, the mission statement of the
American Red Cross, reads:
"The mission of the American Red Cross is to improve the quality of human life; to
enhance self-reliance and concern for others; and to help people avoid, prepare
for, and cope with emergencies."
Other functions of a mission statement include setting the bounds for development of
company philosophy, values, aspirations, and priorities (policy); establishing a
positive public image; justifying business operations; and providing a corporate
identity for internal and external stakeholders.
This section of strategy formulation involves the preliminary layout of the detailed
paths by which the company plans to fulfill its mission and vision. This step involves
four major elements: identification of the major lines of business (LOBs),
establishment of critical success indicators (CSIs), identification of strategic thrusts to
pursue, and the determination of the necessary culture.
The establishment of critical success factors must be completed for the organization
as a whole as well as for each line of business. A critical success indicator is a gauge
by which to measure the progress toward achieving the company's mission. In order to
serve as a motivational tool, critical success indicators must be accompanied by a
target year (i.e. 1999, 1999–2002, etc.). This also allows for easy tracking of the
indicated targets. These indicators are typically a mixture of financial figures and
ratios (i.e. return on investment, return on equity, profit margins, etc.) and softer
indicators such as customer loyalty, employee retention/turnover, and so on.
Strategic thrusts are the most well-known methods for accomplishing the mission of
an organization. Generally speaking, there are a handful of commonly used strategic
thrusts, which have been so aptly named grand strategies. They include the
concentration on existing products or services; market/product development;
concentration   on     innovation/technology;   vertical/horizontal   integration;   the
development of joint ventures; diversification; retrenchment/turnaround (usually
through cost reduction); and divestment/liquidation (known as the final solution).
Conducting a performance audit allows the organization to take inventory of what its
current state is. The main idea of this stage of planning is to take an
Figure                                                                                2
SWOT Analysis
in-depth look at the company's internal strengths and weaknesses and its external
opportunities and threats. This is commonly called a SWOT analysis.
Looking internally, there are several key areas that must be analyzed and addressed.
This includes identifying the status of each existing line of business and unused
resources for prospective additions; identifying the status of current tracking systems;
defining the organization's strategic profile; listing the available resources for
implementing the strategic thrusts that have been selected for achieving the newly
defined mission; and an examining the current organizational culture. The external
investigation should look closely at competitors, suppliers, markets and customers,
economic trends,     labor-market conditions,    and governmental regulations. In
conducting this query, the information gained and used must reflect a current state of
affairs as well as directions for the future. The result of a performance audit should
be the establishment of a performance gap, that is, the resultant gap between the
current performance of the organization in relation to its performance targets. To
close this gap, the planning team must conduct what is known as a gap analysis, the
next step in the strategic planning process.
A gap analysis is a simple tool by which the planning team can identify methods with
which to close the identified performance gap(s). All too often, however, planning
teams make the mistake of making this step much more difficult than need be.
Simply, the planning team must look at the current state of affairs
Figure                                                                              3
Gap Analysis
and the desired future state. The first question that must be addressed is whether or
not the gap can feasibly be closed. If so, there are two simple questions to answer:
"What are we doing now that we need to stop doing?" and "What do we need to do
that we are not doing?" In answering these questions and reallocating resources from
activities to be ceased to activities to be started, the performance gap is closed. If
there is doubt that the initial gap cannot be closed, then the feasibility of the desired
future state must be reassessed.
This phase of planning ties everything together. First, an action plan must be
developed for each line of business, both existing and proposed. It is here that the
goals and objectives for the organization are developed.
Goals are statements of desired future end-states. They are derived from the vision
and mission statements and are consistent with organizational culture, ethics, and the
law. Goals are action oriented, measurable, standard setting, and time bounded. In
strategic planning, it is essential to concentrate on only two or three goals rather
than a great many. The idea is that a planning team can do a better job on a few
rather than on many. There should never be more than seven goals. Ideally, the team
should set one, well-defined goal for each line of business.
Objectives are near-term goals that link each long-term goal with functional areas,
such as operations, human resources, finance, etc., and to key processes such as
information, leadership, etc. Specifically, each objective statement must indicate
what is to be done, what will be measured, the expected standards for the measure,
and a time frame less than one year (usually tied to the budget cycle). Objectives are
dynamic in that they can and do change if the measurements indicate that progress
toward the accomplishment of the goal at hand is deficient in any manner. Simply,
objectives spell out the step-by-step sequences of actions necessary to achieve the
related goals.
With a thorough understanding of how these particular elements fit and work
together, an action plan is developed. If carefully and exactingly completed, it will
serve as the implementation tool for each established goal and its corresponding
objectives as well as a gauge for the standards of their completion.
The key to contingency planning is to establish a reactionary plan for high impact
events that cannot necessarily be anticipated. Contingency plans should identify a
number of key indicators that will create awareness of the need to re-evaluate the
applicability and effectiveness of the strategy currently being followed. When a red
flag is raised, there should either be a higher level of monitoring established or
immediate action should be taken.
6.4 IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation of the strategic plan is the final step for putting it to work for an
organization. To be successful, the strategic plan must have the support of every
member of the firm. As mentioned in the beginning, this is why the top office must be
involved from the beginning. A company's leader is its most influential member.
Positive reception and implementation of the strategic plan into daily activities by
this office greatly increases the likelihood that others will do the same.
Advertising is key to successful implementation of the strategic plan. The more often
employees hear about the plan, its elements, and ways to measure its success, the
greater the possibility that they will undertake it as part of their daily work lives. It is
especially important that employees are aware of the measurement systems and that
significant achievements be rewarded and celebrated. This positive reinforcement
increases support of the plan and belief in its possibilities.
                  CHAPTER SEVEN:            HOSHIN PLANNING
The literal meaning of "hoshin kanri" is helpful in understanding its use "hoshin" is
made up of two characters that mean "needle" and "pointing direction," together
meaning something like a compass "kanri" also is made up of two characters that
mean "control" or "channeling" and "reason" or "logic." Together they mean managing
the direction of the company, which is vitally important especially in times of rapid
change.
In the early 1980s hoshin planning began to gain acceptance in the United States, first
in companies that had divisions or subsidiaries in Japan which won the Deming Prize:
Yokagawa Hewlett-Packard, Fuji Xerox, and Texas Instruments' Oita plant. Florida
Power and Light, the only company outside Japan to win the Deming Prize, was an
early adopter. During the 1990s the practice spread. In 1994 Noriaki Kano, professor
of management science at the University of Tokyo and member of the Deming Prize
Committee, gave a presentation on the topic at the meeting of the American Society
of Quality Control (now the American Society for Quality).
Hoshin planning should be seen in the context of total quality management (TQM).
Several elements of TQM are especially important for the effectiveness of hoshin
planning. Most basic is a customer-driven master plan that encapsulates the
company's overall vision and direction. Hoshin planning also assumes an effective
system of daily management that keeps the company moving on course, including an
appropriate business structure and the use of quality tools such as SPC. A third
important element of TQM is the presence of cross-functional teams. Experience in
problem solving and communications across and between levels of the organization
are vital for hoshin planning.
A number of general principles underlie this method. Of utmost importance is
participation by all managers in defining the vision for the company as well as in
implementing the plans developed to reach the vision. Related to this is what the
Japanese     call "catchball," which    means a     process of lateral and       vertical
communication that continues until understanding and agreement is assured. Another
principle is individual initiative and responsibility. Each manager sets his own monthly
and yearly targets and then integrates them with others. Related to this principle is a
focus on the process rather than strictly on reaching the target and a dedication to
root cause analysis. A final principle that is applied in Japan-but apparently not in the
United States-is that when applying hoshin planning, there is no tie to performance
reviews or other personnel measures.
In its simplest form, hoshin planning consists of a plan, execution, and audit. In a
more elaborated form it includes a long-range plan (five to ten years), a detailed one-
year plan, deployment to departments, execution, and regular diagnostic audits,
including an annual audit by the CEO.
The long-range vision begins with the top executive and his staff, but is modified with
input from all managers. The purpose is to determine where the company wants to be
at that future point in time, given its current position, its strengths and weaknesses,
the voice of the customer, and other aspects of the business environment in which it
operates. Beyond stating the goal, this long-range plan also identifies the steps that
must be taken to reach it. It focuses on the vital few strategic gaps that must be
closed over the time period being planned.
Once the plan has been drafted, it is sent to all managers for their review and
critique. The object is to get many perspectives on the plan. The review process also
has the effect of increasing buy-in to the final plan. This process is easier in Japanese
companies than in most U.S. firms because most Japanese companies have only four
layers of management.
Once the long-range vision is in place, the annual plan is created. The vital few areas
for change that were identified in the vision are translated into steps to be taken this
year. Again, this process involves lateral and vertical communication among
managers. The targets are selected using criteria such as feasibility and contribution
to the long-term goals. The targets are stated in simple terms with clearly measurable
goals. Some companies and authors refer to such an annual target as a hoshin. Most
companies set no more than three such targets, but others establish as many as eight.
Not all departments are necessarily involved in every hoshin during a given year. The
targets are chosen for the sake of the long-term goals, not for involvement for its own
sake.
Once the targets, including the basic metrics for each, are established, the plan is
deployed throughout the company. This is the heart of hoshin planning. Each hoshin
has some sort of measurable target. Top-level managers, having discussed it with
their subordinates earlier in the process, commit to a specific contribution to that
target, and then their subordinates develop their own plans to reach that
contribution, including appropriate metrics. Plans are deployed to lower levels in the
same way (see Figure 1). An important principle here is that those who have to
implement the plan design the plan. In addition to the lower level targets, the means
and resources required are determined. Catchball plays an important role here. A key
element of the hoshin discipline is the horizontal and vertical alignment of the many
separate plans that are developed. All ambiguities are clarified, and conflicting
targets or means are negotiated.
The final step in deploying the hoshin is rolling up the separate plans and targets to
ensure that they are sufficient to reach the company-wide target. If not, more work is
done to reconcile the difference.
7.4 EXECUTION.
The best-laid plans can come to naught if they are not properly executed. In terms of
TQM, the execution phase is where hoshin management hands responsibility over to
daily management. The strategies identified in the plan become part of the daily
operation of the company. If the process has been done properly, all employees know
what has to be done at their level to reach the top-level goals and thereby move the
company toward the future described in the long-term vision.
Essential to hoshin planning is the periodic diagnostic audit, most often done on a
monthly basis. Each manager evaluates the progress made toward his own targets,
and these reports are rolled up the organization to give feedback on the process to
the highest levels. Successes and failures are examined at every level, and corrective
action is taken as necessary. If it becomes apparent that something is seriously amiss
in the execution, because of a significant change in the situation or perhaps a mistake
in the planning phase, the plan may be adjusted and the change communicated up
and down the organizational structure as necessary. The audit is a diagnostic review,
an opportunity for mid-course corrections and not a time for marking up a scorecard.
At the end of the year, the CEO makes an annual diagnostic review of the entire plan,
focusing not only on the overall success or failure, but also on the entire process,
including the planning phase. The results of this audit become part of the input for
the next annual plan, along with the five-to-ten-year plan and changes in the internal
or external business environment.
                      CHAPTER EIGHT:             EVALUATION
Figure 4
hoshin planning uncovers the vital few changes that need to be made and ties them to
strategic action. It transmits the signals from top management to the rest of the
organization in a form that can bring about change at every level. It is participative:
the individuals that have to implement the plans have input into their design. Perhaps
most importantly, it focuses on the process rather than just the result. This includes
continual improvement of the hoshin planning process itself. Organizations that
persist in this method over a period of a few years report great benefits from its use.
                       CONTINOUS ASSESSMENT 1( CAT 1).
In the health sector, identify an organization of your choice and then answer the
following sections. .
1. MISSION STATEMENT
2. VISION STATEMENT
3. CORE VALUES
4. STRATEGIC THEMES/DIRECTIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
9. STAKEHOLDERS TO BE INVOLVED
Prepare a detailed budget in Excel and use the summary figures in the action plan
above.
How will you raise the resources required for the actualization of the Action Plan for
Better Health?
A research carried out shows that ‘globally for out of 45 countries (55%)’ have
evidence of implementation of plans.
1. State and explain the eight step planning process (20 marks)
   2. Strategy is not driven by future intent alone, it is the gap between today’
      s reality and intent for the future that is critical: Explain what is meant by
      strategy formulation, strategy implementation, strategy monitoring and
      evaluation and their respective differences. (20 marks)
   3. You have been appointed by your county Governor to lead the strategic
      planning exercise of the county. The Governor wants to know whether or
      not it is useful to undertake strategic planning. By use of examples
      advice the Governor. (20 marks)
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Recommended books: