IOS

UNIT 3

RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

LITERAL RULE:

(WHAT THE LAW SAYS)

This is the primary rule of statutory interpretation. It suggests that words

should be interpreted using their plain, ordinary, and literal meaning.
The rule is applied when the words of the statute are clear, unambiguous,
and make sense as they stand.

Sussex Peerage Case (1844):

This case laid down the Literal Rule. It stated that if the words of a
statute are precise and unambiguous, then they should be interpreted in
their natural and ordinary sense. The words alone best declare the
intention of the lawgiver.

Case Example:

In the case of the Municipal board v. State transport authority,

Rajasthan, the Supreme Court held that a literal interpretation must be
made. An application moved after 30 days was rejected as invalid
because the statute read “30 days from the receipt of the order”, not “30
days from the knowledge of the order”.

Contextual Interpretation: Lord Atkinson stated that words must be

interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there’s something
in the context or in the object of the statute to show that they were used
in a special sense.
Definitions within Statutes: To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often
include “definitions” sections within a statute, which explicitly define the
most important terms used in that statute. However, some statutes may
not define a particular term. In such cases, the plain meaning rule guides
courts to interpret the term.

Application of Clear Words: If the words are clear, they must be

applied, even though the intention of the legislator may have been
different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is about
what the law says, not what it means.

Literal Rule and Consequences: In the case of Tata Consultancy

Services v. State of A.P (2005), it was held that a literal construction
would not be denied only because the consequences to comply with the
same may lead to a penalty. Courts should not be overzealous in
searching for ambiguities or obscurities in words which are plain.

Conditions for Literal Rule:

The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions:

1. The statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term,

usually found in the interpretation section.
2. Technical words are given their ordinary technical meaning if
the statute has not specified any other.
3. Words will not be inserted by implication.
4. Words undergo shifts in meaning over time.
5. Words acquire significance from their context.

Natural, Ordinary, and Popular Sense: Words must be ascribed that

natural, ordinary, or popular meaning which they have in relation to the
subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they
have been used in the Statute.

Determining the Meaning:

The first question in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a

statute is what is the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or
phrase in its context in the statute. If that natural or ordinary meaning
indicates such a result which cannot be opposed to having been the
intention of the legislature, then look for other meanings of the word or
phrase which may then convey the true intention of the legislature.

Exact Meaning Preferred:

In the case of Pritipal Singh v. Union of India(1990), it was held that

there is a presumption that the words are used in an Act of Parliament
correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.

Rationale for the Rule:

Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from
taking sides in legislative or political issues.

They also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do not have
extensive access to secondary sources.

In probate law, the rule is also favored because the testator is typically
not around to indicate what interpretation of a will is appropriate.

Therefore, it is argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary

the words used by the testator or their meaning. It can help to provide
for consistency in interpretation.

CRITICISM
  Words do not have fixed meaning
 Oldest rules of interpretation since Judges do not legislate as they
fear a new interpretation is equivalent to making a new law
 Words are imprecise.

Case Example – Fisher v Bell [1960]:

The defendant, a shopkeeper, displayed in his window a flick knife with a

price ticket, and was prosecuted for “offering for sale” an offensive
weapon contrary to the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The
High Court said the phrase “offer for sale” was to be taken literally, in
accordance with its meaning in contract law, and that the shopkeeper’s
display of the weapon was no more than an invitation to treat. It was
presumed that Parliamentary draftsmen know technical legal language
thus common law expression was not altered.

CONCLUSION

In essence, the Literal Rule is about sticking to the literal words of the
statute. If the words are clear and unambiguous, they should be
interpreted in their natural and ordinary sense. However, this rule is not
without exceptions and may not apply if it leads to an absurd or unjust
outcome.

GOLDEN RULE:

This rule allows a judge to depart from a word’s normal meaning to avoid
an absurd result. It originated in England in 1854 and was coined in the
case of Matterson v. Hart (1854). The rule was named as ‘Golden Rule’
because it solves all problems.
Application of the Golden Rule:

The Golden Rule gives the words in a statute their plain ordinary
meaning. If this leads to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the
legislature’s intention, the rule dictates that a judge can depart from this
meaning. If a word has more than one meaning, the judge can choose the
preferred meaning. If a word has only one meaning but its application
leads to a bad decision, then the judge can apply a completely different
meaning.

Modification of the Grammatical Interpretation:

The Golden Rule is a modification of the rule of Grammatical

Interpretation. If the application of the original and natural meaning of
the words leads to any absurdity, repugnancy, inconvenience, hardship,
injustice, or evasion, the courts must modify the meaning of the words in
the statute to prevent such consequences.

Lord Blackburn’s Statement:

Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877)

stated that the Golden Rule enabled the courts to take the whole statute
together, and construe it all together, giving their words their ordinary
significance, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an
absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the court that the
intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary significance.

Supreme Court’s Approval:

The Supreme Court in Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India

(2002) quoted the rule with approval, observing that the legislature
chooses appropriate words to express what it intends, and therefore,
must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words
employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly.
Compromise between the Plain Meaning Rule and the Mischief
Rule:

The Golden Rule is a compromise between the plain meaning (or literal)
rule and the mischief rule. Like the plain meaning rule, it gives the words
of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However, when this may lead
to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature’s intention, the
judge can depart from this meaning.

Two Ways of Application:

The Golden Rule may be used in two ways.

1. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where there is some

ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves.

For example, imagine there may be a sign saying “Do not use lifts
in case of fire.” Under the literal interpretation of this sign, people
must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However, this would
be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the
sign is obviously to prevent people from using the lifts only if there
is currently a fire nearby.

2. The second use of the Golden Rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a

result that is obnoxious to principles of public policy, even where
words have only one meaning.

For example, in a case where a son murdered his mother and

committed suicide, the court found in favor of the mother’s family
to avoid a result that is obnoxious to principles of public policy.

Golakh Nath v. State of Punjab (1967)

In this case, the Supreme Court applied the golden rule of interpretation
and held that the parliament cannot amend the constitution affecting the
provisions under Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the constitution (and
overruled the earlier decisions in Shankari Prasad’s case and Shajjah
Singh’s case).

CONCLUSION

In essence, the Golden Rule is about modifying the literal interpretation

of a statute when its application leads to an absurd or unjust outcome. It
provides a balance between sticking to the literal words of the statute
and considering the intention of the legislature.

MISCHIEF RULE:

This rule was laid down by Lord Coke in Re Heydon’s Case (1584) and
is also known as ‘the rule in Heydon’s case’. It has now attained the
status of a classic and is known as the “Mischief Rule”. This rule is also
called purposive construction.

Purpose of the Rule:

The courts must adopt that construction which shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy. This rule is applied when the meaning
of the words in a statute is not plain and clear. The purpose of the rule is
to find out the true intention of the legislature by removing ambiguity
and mischief.

Application of the Rule:

This rule enables the judges more discretionary power than the
Grammatical Rule and the Golden Rule, as it allows them to decide
effectively on Parliament’s intent. Hence, it is the duty of the court to
make such construction of a statute, which shall suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy.

Heydon’s Case (1584):

This case set out four points to be taken into consideration when
interpreting a statute:

1. What was the common law before the making of the act?
2. What was the “mischief and defect” for which the common
law did not provide?
3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth?
4. What is the true reason for the remedy?

Role of Judges:

The office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief, and to add
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico.

Discretion of Judges:

The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the
literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on
Parliament’s intent. However, it can be argued that this undermines
Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes lawmaking
decisions away from the legislature.
Use of the Mischief Rule:

This rule of construction is of narrower application than the Golden Rule

or the Plain Meaning Rule.

It can only be used to interpret a statute, and strictly speaking, only

when the statute was passed to remedy a defect in the common law.

Legislative intent is determined by examining secondary sources such as

committee reports, treatises, law review articles, and corresponding
statutes.

This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases where the
literal rule cannot be applied.

 Thomson v. Lord Clan Morris (1900):

In this case, Lord Lindley M.R. stated that in interpreting any
statutory enactment, regard should not only be paid to the words
used, but also to the history of the Act and the reasons which led to
its being passed.

 CIT v. Sundaradevi (1957):

The Apex Court held that unless there is an ambiguity, it would not
be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction
which is that the intention of the legislature should be primarily
gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words
used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and
considered on surrounding circumstances and constitutionally
proposed practices.

 Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar (1995):

The Supreme Court applied the Mischief Rule in the construction of
Article 286 of the Constitution of India. Chief Justice S.R. Das
stated that the constitution maker adopted Article 286 in the
constitution to cure the mischief of multiple taxation and to
 preserve the free flow of interstate trade or commerce in the Union
of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial
barrier.

Principle to be Valued:

A principle to be valued must be capable of wider application than the

mischief which gave it existence. These principles are designed to
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.

Application of the Mischief Rule:

The Mischief Rule is applicable where language is capable of more than

one meaning. It is the duty of the Court to make such construction of a
statute which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

Advantages

1. It vanishes loopholes in law and help laws to develop.

2. It allows the statutes to be refined and developed.
3. It upholds the doctrine of separation of powers, parliamentary
supremacy and sovereignty of the state.
4. It avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.

Disadvantages

1. It is considered to be out of date as it has been in use since the

16th century, when common law was the primary source of law and
parliamentary supremacy was not established.
2. It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued
to be undemocratic.
 3. In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of
the king and were therefore well qualified in what mischief the act
was meant to remedy.
4. It can make the law uncertain.

CONCLUSION

In essence, the Mischief Rule is about understanding the intention of the

legislature by identifying the problem (or mischief) the statute was
intended to address, and interpreting the statute in a way that helps to
resolve this problem. It provides a balance between sticking to the literal
words of the statute and considering the intention of the legislature.

RULE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION:

This rule is adopted when there is a conflict between two or more

statutes or two or more parts of a statute. The rule follows the premise
that every statute has a purpose and intent as per law and should be read
as a whole. The interpretation consistent with all the provisions of the
statute should be adopted.

Aim of the Rule:

The aim of the Courts should be to make an interpretation which makes

the enactment a consistent whole.

A construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the

various sections or parts of the statute should be adopted.

The Courts should avoid a “head-on clash” between the different parts of
an enactment and conflict between the various provisions should be
sought to be harmonized.
Presumption of Consistency:

The normal presumption should be consistency and it should not be

assumed that what is given with one hand by the legislature is sought to
be taken away by the other.

Supreme Court’s Explanation:

The Supreme Court explained the rule of harmonious construction as,

“When there are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be
reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted, that if possible,
the effect should be given to both”.

A construction which makes one portion of the enactment a dead letter

should be avoided since harmonization is not equivalent to destruction.

Union of India v. B.S. Aggarwal (1998):

It was held that an interpretation which results in hardship, injustice,

inconvenience or anomaly should be avoided and that which supports the
sense of justice should be adopted. The Court leans in favor of an
interpretation which conforms to justice and fair play and prevents
injustice.

Interpretation of Conflicting Provisions:

When there are two provisions in a statute, which are in apparent conflict
with each other, they should be interpreted such that effect can be given
to both and that construction which renders either of them inoperative
and useless should not be adopted except in the last resort.

Raj Krishna v. Binod(1954):

In this case, two provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1951,
which were in apparent conflict, were harmoniously interpreted. The
Supreme Court held that a Government Servant was entitled to nominate
or second a candidate seeking election in State Legislative assembly. This
harmony was achieved by interpreting Section 123(8) as giving the
government servant the right to vote as well as to nominate or second a
candidate and forbidding him to assist the candidate in any other
manner.

The Important Features of This Principle Are –

1. Avoid Head on Clash: This rule is applied when there is a conflict

between two or more statutes or two or more parts of a statute.
The courts must avoid a head-on clash of seemingly contradicting
provisions and they must construe the contradictory provisions so
as to harmonize them.

2. Avoid Defeating Provisions: The provision of one section cannot

be used to defeat the provision contained in another unless the
court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their
differences.

3. Reconciling Differences: When it is impossible to completely

reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions, the courts
must interpret them in such a way so that effect is given to both the
provisions as much as possible.

4. Avoiding Ambiguities: Courts should not be overzealous in

searching for ambiguities or obscurities in words which are plain.

5. Avoiding Useless Interpretation: Courts must also keep in mind

that an interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless
number or a dead lumber, is not harmonious construction.

6. Preserving Statutory Provisions: To harmonize is not to destroy

any statutory provision or to render it loose.
 7. Avoiding Incongruous Results: An interpretation giving rise to
incongruous results must be avoided.

8. Reading the Statute as a Whole: For the purpose of harmonious

construction, the entire statute must be first read as a whole, then
section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by
word. The relevant provisions must thus be read harmoniously.

The Supreme Court laid down five principles of rule of Harmonious

Construction in case of CIT v Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003):

 First and foremost, the courts should try and avoid a conflict of
seemingly disputing provisions and effort must be made to construe
the disputing provisions so as to harmonise them.

 Secondly, The provision of one section cannot be used to overthrow

the provision covered in another section unless the court is unable
to find a way to settle their differences despite all its effort. In
other words, the court underlined that one section of the law
should not be used to override or suppress the other section unless
it is impossible to reconcile their differences.

 Thirdly, In the situation when the court finds it impossible to

entirely reconcile the differences in inconsistent provisions, the
courts must interpret them such that effect is given to both the
provisions as far as possible.

 Fourthly, Courts must also take into account that the interpretation
that makes one provision redundant and useless is against the
essence of harmonious construction.

 Finally, Harmonising two contradicting provisions means not to

destroy any statutory provision or to render it ineffective, but
rather preserving and respecting all provisions to maintain their
legal significance.
Case Examples:

 Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore(1958):

The Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction in

resolving a conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the
Constitution. It was held that the right of every religious
denomination or any section thereof to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a
State providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open of
Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and
sections of Hindus [Article 25(2)(b)].

 Calcutta Gas Company Pvt. Limited v State of West Bengal

(1962): The Supreme Court observed that there are so many
subjects in three lists in the Constitution that there is bound to be
some overlapping and it is the duty of the courts in such situation is
to yet to harmonize them, if possible, so the effect can be given to
each of them. By harmonious construction, it became clear that the
gas industry was exclusively covered by Entry 25 of the State List
over which the state has full control.

 Sirsilk Ltd. v Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (1964):

This case involved a conflict between two mandatory provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 17(1) which requires the
government to publish every award of a Labour Tribunal within
thirty days of its receipt, and Section 18(1) which provides that a
settlement between employer and workmen shall be binding on the
parties to the agreement.

A settlement was arrived at after the receipt of the award of a

Labour Tribunal by the Government but before its publication.
 The Supreme Court held that by the settlement, which becomes
effective from the date of signing, the industrial dispute comes to
an end and the award becomes infructuous and the Government
cannot publish it.

This is an example of harmonious construction where the court

resolved the conflict by giving effect to both provisions as much as
possible.

 Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishna (1979):

 In this case, the respondent partners were sanctioned for

criminal prosecution under section 46 (1) c of the Madhya
Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, by the Commissioner
when they did not pay the sales tax even after repeated
demands.
 The respondent challenged this provision on the ground that
there were two separate provisions under the Act, namely,
section 22 (4 – A) and section 46 (1) c under which two
different procedures were prescribed to realize the amount
due but there was no provision of law which could tell which
provision should be applied in which case.
 The Supreme Court held that by harmonious construction of
these two provisions, the Commissioner had a judicial
discretion to decide as to which procedure to be followed in
which case.
 The court has the right to intervene whenever the
Commissioner fails to act judicially.
 However, in this case, the Commissioner had correctly
decided that the more drastic procedure under section 46 (1)
c deserved to be followed because of the failure of the
assesse firm in paying sales tax despite the repeated
demands by the sales tax officer.
In essence, the Rule of Harmonious Construction is about interpreting
the provisions of a statute in a way that makes the statute a consistent
whole, avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between its various sections
or parts, and gives effect to all its provisions.

BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION:

This involves giving the widest meaning possible to the statutes. When
there are two or more possible ways of interpreting a section or a word,
the meaning which gives relief and protects the benefits which are
purported to be given by the legislation, should be chosen.

Liberal Interpretation:

A beneficial statute has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to

fructify the legislative intent. Although beneficial legislation does receive
liberal interpretation, the courts try to remain within the scheme and not
extend the benefit to those not covered by the scheme.

Non-Compliance:

Once the provision envisages the conferment of benefit limited in point of

time and subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions, their non-
compliance will have the effect of nullifying the benefit.

Operation:

There is no set principle of construction that a beneficial legislation

should always be retrospectively operated although such legislation is
either expressly or by necessary intendment not made retrospective.

Exception:

In case of any exception when the implementation of the beneficent act is

restricted, the Court would construe it narrowly so as not to unduly
expand the area or scope of exception.
Role in Socio-Economic Legislations:

Beneficial Construction of statutes have enormously played an important

role in the development and beneficial interpretation of socio-economic
legislations and have always encouraged the Indian legislators to make
more laws in favor of the backward class of people in India.

Sant Ram v Rajinderlal (1979):

The Supreme Court said that welfare legislation must be interpreted in a

third World perspective favoring the weaker and poor class. It has also
been laid down in the case of labor legislation that courts should not
stick to grammatical constructions but also have regard to 'teleological
purpose and protective intendment of the legislation.

Industrial Disputes Act 1947:

This is a welfare statute which intends to bring about peace and harmony
between management and labour in an industry and improve the service
conditions of industrial workers which in turn will accelerate productive
activity of the country resulting in its prosperity. Therefore this statute
should be interpreted in such a way that it advances the object and the
purpose of the legislation and gives it a full meaning and effect so that
the ultimate social objective is achieved.

Restrictions :

This rule is applied when the court finds that it is doing complete justice
and delivering a fair judgment. However, there are certain restrictions
which the court has to adhere to during its application:

 Re-legislating a Provision: The courts should refrain from

applying the rule of beneficial construction if it would be re-
legislating a provision of statute either by substituting, adding or
altering any provision of the act.
  Single Meaning: If any word in a statute confers a single meaning
only, then the courts should refrain from applying the rule of
benevolent construction to the statute.

 No Ambiguity: If there is no ambiguity in a provision of a statute

so construed, and if the provision is plain, unambiguous and does
not give rise to any doubt, the rule of beneficial construction
cannot be applied.

Liberal Construction: The principle of liberal construction can be taken

to extreme limits at times in order to achieve the object of the legislation.
However, it should not lead to re-legislating a provision of the statute.

 National Insurance Co Ltd v Swarn Singh (2004):

In this case relating to the insurance aspect of motor vehicles, the
Supreme Court held that to prove its defense, the insurer has to
prove that the breach of condition by the insured was done
knowingly or resulted due to his negligence and that the breach
was fundamental and had contributed to the cause of the accident.
It was also held that even in cases where the insurer is able to
prove the defense of breach of condition, it will have to satisfy the
award against the insured but it can recover the amount paid to the
claimant from the insured in the same proceedings before the
tribunal.

 The Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. Vs. Regional Director,

Employees State Insurance Corporation (2003):
In this recent judgment, the Supreme Court judged the ESIC act on
beneficial grounds and emphasized that the beneficent construction
is being preferred to help the intended beneficiaries.

Conclusion
In essence, Beneficial Construction is about interpreting the provisions of
a statute in a way that does complete justice and delivers a fair
judgment. However, it should not lead to re-legislating a provision of the
statute, should not be applied to words that confer a single meaning only,
and should not be applied when there is no ambiguity in a provision of a
statute.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:

Design of a Constitution:

A Constitution is designed to meet the needs of the day when it is

enacted, as well as the changing conditions of the future. It provides a
framework of Government, a mechanism for making laws, and a method
for resolving constitutional disputes. In a federation, it outlines the
distribution of legislative fields between the center and the units.

Ideals and Rights:

A Constitution often refers to the ideals it seeks to achieve and secures
certain fundamental rights to the citizens. These ideals and rights are
expressed in general terms.

Interpretation of a Constitutional Document:

In the interpretation of a constitutional document, “words are but a

framework of concepts and concepts may change more than words
themselves”. The intention of a constitution is rather to outline principles
than to engrave details. No provision, word, or expression of the
Constitution exists in isolation. They are necessarily related to,
transforming, and in turn being transformed by, other provisions, words,
and phrases in the Constitution.
Freedom in Interpretation:

The court has more freedom in the interpretation of a Constitution than

in the interpretation of other laws. The Constitution has a content and a
significance that vary from age to age.

Living Organic Thing:

The Constitution is a living organic thing and must be applied to meet the
current needs and requirements. It is not bound to be interpreted by
reference to the original understanding of the constitutional economics
as debated in Parliament.

Application of Literal Construction or Golden Rule:

The rule of literal construction or the golden rule of construction does

apply to the interpretation of the Constitution. When the language is
plain and specific and the literal construction produces no difficulty to
the constitutional scheme, the same has to be resorted to.

Prescribed Method:

Where the Constitution has prescribed a method for doing a thing and
has left no “abeyance” or gap, if the court by a strained construction
prescribes another method for doing that thing, the decision will become
open to serious objection and criticism.

The freedom and flexibility available to a court in dealing with a

Constitution can be illustrated by taking a few examples.

The court has to infer the spirit of the Constitution from the language.
Internal and External aids may be used while interpreting.

1) Article 21 of the Constitution:

Originally, it was understood to provide merely that no one can be
deprived of life or liberty by executive action unsupported by law. But
later decisions have progressively deduced a whole lot of human rights
from Article 21 which are not enumerated therein, such as the right to
legal aid and speedy trial, the right to means of livelihood, the right to
dignity and privacy, the right to health and pollution-free environment,
the right to education, and more. This enumeration is not exhaustive and
more rights are being spelt out of Article 21.

2) Seema v Ashwani Kumar:

The court carried judicial activism and judicial legislation to new heights.

The court noticed that though India was a signatory to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
and had also ratified the Convention, it had done so with a reservation on
the question of compulsory registration of marriages provided in Article
16(2) on the ground that it is not practical in a vast country like India
with its variety of customs, religions and level of literacy to make
registration of marriage compulsory.

General Rules of Interpretation of the Constitution:

1. If the words are clear and unambiguous, they must be given the full
effect.
2. The constitution must be read as a whole.
3. The court has to infer the spirit of the Constitution from the
language.
4. Internal and External aids may be used while interpreting.
5. The Constitution prevails over other statutes.
6. Principles of harmonious construction must be applied.
7. The Constitution must be interpreted in a broad and literal sense.
Conclusion

In essence, Constitutional Interpretation is about interpreting the

provisions of a Constitution in a way that meets the needs of the day
when it is enacted, as well as the changing conditions of the future. It
involves understanding the ideals it seeks to achieve, the rights it
secures to the citizens, and the framework it provides for the
Government. The court has more freedom in the interpretation of a
Constitution than in the interpretation of other laws, and the Constitution
is considered a living organic thing that must be applied to meet the
current needs and requirements.

PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:

DOCTRINE OF PITH AND SUBSTANCE:

This doctrine denotes the true nature of law. It emphasizes that it is the
real subject matter which is to be challenged and not its incidental
effects on another field. ‘Pith’ denotes the ‘essence of something’ or the
‘true nature’, while ‘substance’ states ‘the most significant or essential
part of something’. Hence, this doctrine relates to finding out the true
nature of a statute.

Article 246 of the Indian Constitution: For a better understanding of

the doctrine of Pith and Substance, it becomes important to take a look
at Article 246 of the Indian Constitution. Article 246 mentions the Union,
State, and Concurrent lists, enumerated in the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution. The framers of the constitution made these three divisions.

Lists in the Constitution:

 Union List (List I): Primarily consists of matters which are of

national importance and hence the intervention of the Union
government is required in such matters, empowering them with the
right to legislate on these matters.
  State List (List II): Comprises of the matters which are of local or
state significance and hence, only the state governments are
required to showcase interest in such matters.
 Concurrent List (List III): Comprises of subjects that seem to
have been the common interests of both the union and state
government, whereby, the power to legislate on such matters vests
with both the state and the Union governments.

Evolution of the Doctrine: The evolution of the doctrine of Pith and

Substance dates back to Canada. The inception of this doctrine was
marked by the Canadian case of Cushing v. Dupuy. Subsequently, the
doctrine made its way to India and is now a celebrated doctrine in the
Indian context.

Salient Features of the Doctrine:

1. Situations in which the doctrine is applied: It is applied in

the circumstances where the subject matter of one list seems to
be conflicting with the subject matter of another list.
2. Reason behind adopting the doctrine: The powers of the
legislature would be sternly limited if every law is declared
invalid on the ground that it encroaches upon another law.
3. True nature and character: The doctrine is known to examine
the true nature and character of the subject in order to
ascertain as to in which list it fits.
4. Provision for a degree of flexibility: It takes under
consideration the fact as to whether the state has the power to
make a law which involves a subject mentioned in the Union list
of the constitution.
5. First judgment which upheld the doctrine: It was in the case
of State of Bombay v. F. N Balsara that the doctrine was first
applied in the case and the same was upheld.
This doctrine is an established principle of law recognized by various
High courts and the Supreme Court in India. It comes into play when a
law is seen to be encroaching or trespassing upon a field, the legislation
of which has been assigned to another.

Landmark Judgments:

 State of Rajasthan v. G Chawla:

 This case was regarding the sound amplifiers and the

confusion as to whether the state or the central government
has the right to legislate on the matters concerning public
interest.
 The state government argued that entry 6 of the list II gives
power to the state government to regulate the use of
amplifier as it produces loud noise.
 On the other hand, the opposition put forth the point that
entry 31 of list I, which speaks about various means of
communication like that of telegraphs, telephones, wireless
broadcasting, etc., gives the union government the right to
make laws regarding the use of the amplifiers.
 Finally, in its judgment, the court held that amplifiers do not
come under entry 31 of list I.
 The court justified its point by stating- ‘though amplifier is an
apparatus of broadcasting and communication, the legislation
in its pith and substance would lie with the state government
and not the central government’.

 State of Bombay and another v. F.N Balsara:

 This case acquires quite a lot of importance as it was the first

case which upheld the doctrine of Pith and Substance in
India.
  The sale and possession of liquor were restricted in the state
of Maharashtra by way of the then existing Bombay
Prohibition Act and this Act was challenged on the matter
that there was an incidental encroachment on the act of
importing and exporting of liquor through the borders.
 The court gave out the judgment stating that the act was in
its Pith and Substance and rightfully fell under the State list
even though such an act was said to have a bearing on the
import of liquor in the state.

Flexibility in Federal Structure:

One of the main reasons behind the acceptance and applicability of the
doctrine in India is to provide flexibility to an otherwise existing rigid
scheme concerned with the distribution of power in a federal structure.
The doctrine allows for a certain degree of overlap between the
legislative competencies of the center and the states, which is inevitable
in any federal system.

Avoiding Restrictive Interpretation:

If every legislation was to be declared invalid on the ground that it

encroaches on the subject of another legislature, then the powers
assigned to the legislature would be enormously restrictive. This would
not serve the purpose of the power being granted to the legislature. The
Doctrine of Pith and Substance prevents this by focusing on the true
nature and character of the legislation.

Conclusion

In essence, the Doctrine of Pith and Substance is about interpreting the

provisions of a statute in a way that examines the true nature and
character of the subject in order to ascertain as to in which list it fits. It
is applied in the circumstances where the subject matter of one list
seems to be conflicting with the subject matter of another list.

DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION:

This doctrine is based on the idea that when the legislature wants to do
something that it cannot do within the constraints of the constitution, it
colours the law with a substitute purpose which will still allow it to
accomplish its original goal.

The maxim “Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per

obliqum” applies here, which means what cannot be done directly cannot
also be done indirectly.

Implication of the Doctrine:

The doctrine signifies only a limitation of the law-making power of the

legislature. It comes into picture when the legislature, purporting to act
within its power, in reality, transgresses those powers. So, the doctrine
becomes applicable whenever a legislation seeks to do in an indirect
manner what it cannot do directly.

Legislative Powers in India:

In India, legislative powers of Parliament and State Legislatures are

conferred by Article 246 and distributed by Lists I, II and III in the
seventh schedule of the Constitution. Parliament has exclusive power to
make laws with respect to any of the matters in List II. Parliament and
State Legislatures have both powers to make laws with respect to
matters in List III, also known as the concurrent list.

Residuary power of legislation is vested in Parliament by virtue of Article

248 and entry 97 in list I. The power of State Legislatures to make laws is
subject to the power of Parliament to make laws with respect to matters
in List I and III.

Legislative Competency:
Legislative competency is an issue that relates to how legislative power
must be shared between the center and states. It focuses only on the
relation between the two. The question whether the Legislature has kept
itself within the jurisdiction assigned to it or has encroached upon a
forbidden field is determined by finding out the true nature and
character or pith and substance of the legislation.

Fraud on the Constitution:

The main point is that the legislature having restrictive power cannot
step over the field of competency. It is termed as the “fraud on the
constitution”.

Tests to Determine the True Nature of Legislation:

The Supreme Court of India has laid down certain tests to determine the
true nature of the legislation impeached as colourable:

1. Substance of the Law: The court must look to the substance of

the impugned law, as distinguished from its form or the label which
the legislature has given it. For the purpose of determining the
substance of an enactment, the court will examine the effect of the
legislature and the object and the purpose of the act.

2. Question of Power: The doctrine of colourable legislation has

nothing to do with the motive of the legislation, it is in essence a
question of vires or power of the legislature to enact the law in
question.

3. Irrelevance of Motives: The doctrine does not involve any

question of bona fides or mala fides intention on the part of the
legislature. If the legislature is competent enough to enact a
particular law, then whatever motive which impelled it to act are
irrelevant.

4. Beyond the Scrutiny of the Courts: The motive of the legislature

in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny of the courts, so the
 court has no power to scrutinize the policy which led to an
enactment of a law falling within the ambit of the legislature
concerned.

5. Presumption of Jurisdiction: There is always a presumption that

the legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction (ut res magis, valet
quam parret) and the burden of establishing that an act is not
within the competence of the legislature or that it has transgressed
other constitutional mandates is always on the person who
challenges its vires.

Ultimate Analysis:

The ultimate analysis is that colourable legislation indicates that while

making the law the legislature transgressed the limits of its power. But
the question may be raised that whether or not parliament can do
something indirectly, which it cannot do directly, may depend upon why it
cannot do directly.

There are so many examples in law as well as life where something can
be done indirectly, although not directly. So, the true principle of
colourable legislation is “it is not permissible to do indirectly, what is
prohibited directly.”

Conclusion

In essence, the Doctrine of Colourable Legislation is about interpreting

the provisions of a statute in a way that examines the true nature and
character of the legislation. It is applied when the legislature seeks to do
in an indirect manner what it cannot do directly. This doctrine signifies a
limitation of the law-making power of the legislature and is used to
ensure that the legislature does not overstep its bounds.
DOCTRINE OF ANCILLARY POWERS:

Introduction

The Constitution of India is dynamic and its interpretation has evolved

over time.

The Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary powers is one such doctrine that

has been developed.

Purpose of the Doctrine

This doctrine aids in resolving conflicts of legislative powers between the

Central and State Governments.

It supports the main legislation in question and can be procedural or

substantive.

Meaning of Ancillary Doctrine

Ancillary or incidental powers are those that support the powers

expressly conferred.

Both the Central and State Governments have express powers given
through the three lists specified in the Seventh Schedule.

The doctrine implies that these express powers to legislate on a matter

also include the power to legislate on an incidental or ancillary matter.

Examples

The power to legislate on banking includes related powers like legislating

on functions of banks, their board composition, and relationship with
RBI.

The power to legislate on forests includes powers of afforestation,

deforestation, planning, and management of forests as ancillary matters.

Development of the Doctrine

The doctrine of incidental or ancillary powers has been developed as an
interpretive technique to determine the scope of powers of different
levels of government.

While not specifically developed in India, traces of this doctrine can be

found in various judgments.

United Provinces v Atiqa Begum & Others, AIR 1941 FC 16

The principal question was the validity of the regularization of the

Remission Act, 1938, an Act of the Uttar Pradesh legislature.

The Court held that this Act was covered within the meaning of entry no.
21 of List II.

Gwyer C. J. observed that each general word in the Lists should extend to
all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said
to be comprehended in it.

This case laid the foundation for the doctrine of ancillary or incidental
powers in the Indian legal system.

It clarified that a legislature has the power to make law on matters which
are ancillary or incidental to the main matters of legislation and thus, are
essential to fulfill the object of the law.

Salient Features

1. No Specific Provisions in the Indian Constitution

The Indian Constitution does not have specific provisions for this
ancillary power.However, general textual authorizations sometimes
invoke powers that are not expressly given.

For example, the Supreme Court interprets the words “with respect to”
under Article 246 to include all incidental matters concerning the
legislation.

2. Extension of Legislative Power

The doctrine of ancillary and incidental powers extends the field of
legislative power. It states that the power to legislate includes the power
to legislate on ancillary or incidental matters. These powers aid the main
object of the concerned enactment and provide for a wide interpretation
of the entries in the three legislative lists.

In R. D. Joshi v Ajit Mills (AIR 1977 SC 2279), the question was

whether the State legislature had the power to enact a law that allowed
it to forfeit the sum collected by dealers as sales tax. The Court held that
this was a punitive measure for the proper and effective enforcement of
social legislation. It further held that the entries must be given a wide
meaning to also contain the ancillary and incidental powers.

3. Relationship with the Doctrine of Pith and Substance

This doctrine is in addition to the doctrine of pith and substance. The

doctrine of pith and substance comes into play when one encroaches
upon the powers of another. It helps to determine whether the concerned
Legislature was competent to make the legislation in question.

4. Determination of Object and Extent of Legislative Powers

The doctrine of ancillary or incidental powers is used to determine the

object and extent of the legislative powers. It helps in extending these
powers through the power to legislate on incidental and ancillary
matters.

Landmark Judgments

 United Provinces v Atiqa Begum & Others: This case first

explained the doctrine of ancillary or incidental powers.

 State of Rajasthan v G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544: The Apex

Court held that the power to legislate on a topic includes the power
to legislate on an ancillary matter which can be reasonably
included in the topic.
  Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1962)
046 ITR 0169: In this case, the Court was dealing with the
legislative competence of the Uttar Pradesh legislature concerning
the U. P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act, 1957. The Court observed
that a general word used in an entry must be construed to extend
to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and
reasonably be held to be included in it.

DOCTRINE OF REPUGNANCY:

Introduction

The Doctrine of Repugnancy is firmly entrenched in Article 254 of the

Constitution of India.

Repugnancy is defined as an inconsistency or contradiction between two

or more parts of a legal instrument.

Legislative Scheme in the Constitution

Article 245 allows Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of
India, and the Legislature of a State to make laws for the whole or any
part of the State.

Article 246 outlines the legislative power of the Parliament and the
Legislature of a State.

Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Doctrine of Repugnancy

The Supreme Court summarized Article 254 in M. Karunanidhi v. Union

of India, outlining four scenarios:

1. If a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully
inconsistent and irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the
State Act will become void.
 2. If a law passed by the State collides with a law passed by
Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall
prevail to the extent of the repugnancy, provided the State Act has
been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.

3. If a law passed by the State Legislature entrenches upon any of the

Entries in the Central List, the constitutionality of the law may be
upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance.

4. If a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the

Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous
law made by Parliament, it can be protected by obtaining the
assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.

Conditions for Repugnancy

The conditions which must be satisfied before any repugnancy could

arise are as follows:

1. There is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act

and the State Act.

2. Such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable.

3. The inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such

nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other,
making it impossible to obey one without disobeying the other.

Court’s Propositions on Repugnancy

Thereafter, the court laid down following propositions in this respect:

1. To decide the question of repugnancy, it must be shown that the

two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions,
so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field.
 2. There can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency
appears on the face of the two statutes.

3. If the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or

possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without
coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results.

4. If there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field

seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of
repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to operate in the
same field.

5. In the case of Govt. of A.P. v. J.B. Educational Society, the court

held that both Parliament and the State Legislature are supreme in
their respective assigned fields. It is the duty of the court to
interpret the legislations made by Parliament and the State
Legislature in such a manner as to avoid any conflict.

6. With respect to matters enumerated in List III (Concurrent List),

both Parliament and the State Legislature have equal competence
to legislate. The courts are charged with the duty of interpreting
the enactments of Parliament and the State Legislature in such
manner as to avoid a conflict. If the conflict becomes unavoidable,
then Article 245 indicates the manner of resolution of such a
conflict.

7. In the case of National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan

Bhageria, it was held that “the best test of repugnancy is that if
one prevails, the other cannot prevail”.

The Supreme Court in Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh

v. State of Maharashtra have upheld all the above-mentioned
cases.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the Doctrine of Repugnancy, as outlined in Article 254 of
the Indian Constitution, plays a crucial role in maintaining the balance of
power between the Central and State legislatures.

It ensures that in case of any inconsistency or contradiction between a

Central Act and a State Act, the matter is resolved in a manner that
upholds the supremacy of the Parliament while respecting the legislative
competence of the State.

The Supreme Court of India, through various judgments, has reinforced

this doctrine and provided clear guidelines for its application. These
guidelines help in determining the true nature of repugnancy and in
resolving conflicts between laws enacted by the Parliament and the State
Legislature.

Thus, the Doctrine of Repugnancy serves as a vital tool in the

interpretation of statutes and in the preservation of the federal structure
of the Indian Constitution.

DOCTRINE OF OCCUPIED FIELD:

Definition

The Doctrine of Occupied Field is used to determine whether a particular

Legislature is competent to legislate on a particular entry.

It means that when the field is completely occupied by List I (Union List),
the State Legislature is wholly incompetent to legislate.

Principles

 No entrenchment or encroachment, minimal or otherwise, by a State

Legislature is permitted when the field is completely occupied.

 If the field is not wholly occupied, a mere minimal encroachment or

entrenchment would not affect the validity of the State Legislation.
 These principles must be read and construed together and not in
isolation.

Central Legislation Supremacy

If two Acts, one passed by the Parliament and the other by a State
Legislature, collide and there is no question of harmonizing them, then
the Central legislation must prevail.

Concept of Repugnancy

The concept of repugnancy arises only with regard to laws dealing with
subjects covered by the entries falling in List III (Concurrent List), where
both Parliament and State Legislature are competent to legislate.

There cannot be any repugnancy in respect of State laws passed in

respect of matters falling in pith and substance in List II (State List) or in
respect of Central laws passed on subjects falling in List I (Union List).

Operation of Acts

Both the Acts can operate in their respective fields and there is no
repugnancy if both the Acts are considered in the light of their respective
true nature and character.

While giving due weight to Centre’s supremacy in the matters of

legislation, the States’ legitimate sphere of legislation should not be
unnecessarily whittled down.

All the entries should be construed in a harmonious manner so as to

avoid any conflict.

Only in case of conflict or collision or where there is a glaring

repugnancy the very doctrine of occupied field will be attracted.

DOCTRINE OF RESIDUARY POWER:

This doctrine is based on Article 248 read with Entry 97 of Union List in
the Constitution of India.
It vests the residuary power as an exclusive head of power in the Union.

The ad hoc allocation of residuary power by the Governor-General, as in

the case of the Government of India Act, 1935, has been discarded.

Scope of Residuary Powers:

The scope of residuary powers is very wide.

For example, under entry 3 in List III, Parliament can legislate with
respect to preventive detention on grounds mentioned therein. Further,
Parliament can legislate with respect to preventive detention under entry
9, List I, on grounds mentioned therein. But these two entries do not
exhaust the entire field of preventive detention. Parliament can legislate
under its residuary power with respect to preventive detention on any
ground not mentioned in these two entries.

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling

Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA):

Parliament has enacted the COFEPOSA providing for preventive

detention in connection with smuggling and foreign exchange
racketeering. This Act can find support from entry 36, List I (foreign
exchange) and Parliament’s residuary power.

I. C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab:

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the power of the Parliament to
amend the Constitution was derived from Article 248 read with entry 97
of List I and that Article 368 dealt only with the procedure for
amendment. However, in view of the 24th Amendment of the Constitution
and the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Keshavanand Bharti v.
State of Kerala, Article 368 should be held to include both the power
and procedure for amendment and there is no case for invoking a
residuary power for constitutional amendment.

Interpretation of Residuary Power:

Parliament’s residuary power is not to be interpreted so expansively as to
whittle down the power of the State Legislatures. It has been emphasized
that in a Constitution like ours “where there is a division of legislative
subjects but the residuary power is vested in Parliament, such residuary
power cannot be so expansively interpreted as to whittle down the power
of the State Legislatures”.

Conclusion

In essence, the Doctrine of Residuary Power is about interpreting the

provisions of a statute in a way that examines the competency of the
legislature to enact a particular law. It is based on the principle that what
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, and whether a statute
is constitutional or not is always a question of power.

SECONDARY RULES OF INTERPRETATION

The rules or maxims or concepts that come under this category of rules
of interpretation are generally considered as “Secondary” or
“Subordinate” principles of interpretation. The most important threat for
court while interpreting statute in to find the “intention of the legislature.
Maxims help to elaborate the meaning of individual words and phrases
by drawing certain consequences.

1) NOSCITUR A SOCIIS PRINCIPLE:

This principle is used in legal interpretation where the meaning of a word

is given by looking at its context. It is applied when a word of wide
possible meaning may be given a limited meaning by looking at the
context in which it appears.

What is meant by the word “context”?

It means that if there are several words used in a sentence and you wish
to find a meaning of a word which is ambiguous the meaning of that word
could be arrived at by looking at the other words surrounding that word.

Examples of Application:

1. Prior v Sherwood: The court held that a prohibition against

betting in any “house, office room or place” did not extend to a
public lane. The possible wide meaning that could have been given
to the word “place” was limited by its use in conjunction with
“house, office, and room”.

2. Rex v Harris: A section in a statute made it an offence to “shoot at

or to stab, cut or wound any person”. The court restricted the
interpretation of the word “wound” by the words which preceded it
because those specific words involved using any instrument or
weapon to inflict the wound.

3. Commissioner v Savoy Hotel: A provision of a statute used the

words “manufactured beverages including fruit juices and bottle
water and syrups”. The court observed that the distinction of “fruit
juices” should be construed in the context of the preceding words.

4. Indian Case: A provision of a statute read “Commercial

establishment means an establishment which carried on any
business trade or profession”. The word “Profession” was
construed with the associated words “business” and “trade” and it
was held that a private dispensary of a doctor would not come
within the definition.

Criticisms:

 USA Supreme Court: This rule is not a master of the courts but
merely its servant to ascertain the legislature’s intention. This
affords a mere suggestion to the judicial mind. Thus, where the
intention of the legislature is plain the noscitur principle must give
away.
  R v Commissioner of Taxes: The noscitur principle must be
applied with caution. In the case of most rules of interpretation, it
is only of assistance when there is an ambiguity in the language.

Conclusion

In essence, the Noscitur a Sociis principle is a tool used in legal

interpretation to ascertain the meaning of a word by looking at its
context. It is particularly useful when a word has a wide possible
meaning and can be given a limited meaning by looking at the context in
which it appears. However, it must be applied with caution and is most
useful when there is ambiguity in the language.

2) UTRES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT:

This Latin maxim translates to “It is better for a thing to have effect than
to be made void”.

It means that courts try to ensure the validity of a statute rather than
making it futile or redundant. Where the words of a statute are capable
of two different interpretations, courts must give effect to the
interpretation which results in the smooth functioning of the statute and
best achieves the legislative establishments.

Examples of Application:

1. Manchester Ship Company v Manchester Race Course

Company: The court held that unless the words in the statute were
absolutely senseless, the judge must find some meaning to the
words and should not simply declare it to be void for uncertainty.

2. Nokes v Don Caster Amulgated Ltd: Viscount Symons stated

that a construction which would reduce the Act to futility should be
avoided and rather accept the broader construction based on the
view that parliament would legislate only for the purpose of
bringing about an effective result.
 3. Nandasena v Senanayaka: In this case, Sharvananda J applied
this maxim and refused to accept the argument that cases pending
before the Magistrate court under the Paddy Land Act 1958, which
was repealed by the 1973 Act, would lapse. He said such an
approach would make the new law one without effect.

4. Hede Navigation Case: The court held that even if there was an
ambiguity, the interpretation should be preferred which gives effect
to the statute rather than create a lacuna in the law.

Exception:

Maloney v Metropolitan Police Commission:

The court held that the maxim ought not be applied when its application,
having concerns to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads
to inconsistency or injustice.

Conclusion

In essence, the “Utres magis valeat quam pereat” principle is a tool used
in legal interpretation to ensure the validity and effectiveness of a
statute. It is based on the principle that it is better for a thing to have
effect than to be made void, and courts should strive to give effect to the
interpretation which best achieves the legislative establishments.

3) EJUSDEM GENERIS PRINCIPLE:

This principle is an example of the application of the Noscitur principle.

It is where the general words will derive their meaning from the
particular and specific words of the same kind or same nature. Since
general words can take a broader meaning, they are confined to embrace
only things or conduct falling within that category.

Ejusdem generis means "of the same kind". Generally, particular words
are given their natural meaning unless the context requires otherwise. If
general words follow particular words, pertaining to a class, category or
genus then it is construed that the general words are limited to mean the
persons or things of the same general class category or genus as those
expressed by the particular words.

Explanation: When particular words pertaining to a class, category or

genus are followed by general words, the general words are construed as
limited to things of the same kind as those specified. This rule which is
known as the rule of ejusdem generis reflects an attempt "to reconcile
incompatibility between the specific and general words in view of the
other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect if
possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in
a statute are presumed to be superfluous".

Examples of Application:

1. Animals on a Ferry: In a reference to “horses, cows, sheep and

other animals", the word “other animals” is limited to apply to
animals of the same kind as those specifically mentioned, and will
not include any other genre of animal such as a lion or a tiger.

2. Case of Amarachandra: It laid down certain criteria for the

application of this principle: The section must contain an
enumeration (list) of specific words. The subject matter of the
enumeration should have a class. The class is not exhaustive. The
general term follows the specific enumeration. There is no different
legislative intention.

The Supreme Court in Amar Chandra v. Collector of Excise has

laid down the following five essential elements of when the rule
applies:
 The statute contains an enumeration of specific words;
 The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category:
 The class or category is not exhausted by enumeration:
 The general terms follow the enumeration; and
 There is no indication of a different legislative intent
If the subjects of enumeration belong to a broad-based genus as also to a
narrower genus, there is no principle that the general words should be
confined to the narrower genús

3. USA case: The Supreme Court observed that this rule is not a
‘master of the courts’ but merely its servant in order to ascertain
the legislature’s intention.

4. Parker: In the phrase ‘building or other operation’ the word ‘other

operation’ should be read as similar to ‘buildings.

5. Quazi v Quazi: In the phrase ‘judicial or other proceedings’ the

word ‘other proceedings’ were not confined to judicial proceedings.

6. AG v Brown: The principle cannot be applied where the

application of the principle would produce a result contrary to the
legal meaning intended by the parliament.

7. Madhya Pradesh Electrical Board: If a genus cannot be found

the principle cannot be applied.

Criticism:

Australian judges emphasized that the use of this principle is very

limited. Denvish emphasizes that this principle is a useful aid of
construction but must be applied with caution. The more important thing
is to give effect to Parliament’s intention so that the application of this
rule should be discouraged where the parliament’s intention appears not
clear and ambiguous.

Exception:

This principle is limited in its application to general word following less

general word only if the specific words do not belong to a distinct genus,
this rule is inapplicable.
Consequently, if a general word follows only one particular word, that
single particular word does not constitute a distinct genus and therefore,
Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case

Exceptional stray instances are, however, available where one-word

genus has been created by the courts and the general word following
such a genus given a restricted meaning if the particular words exhaust
the whole genus, the general word following these particular words is
construed as embracing a larger genus:

The principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a universal application. If the

context of legislation rules out the applicability of this rule, it has no part
to play in the interpretation of general words.

The basis of the principle of Ejusdem Generis is that if the legislature

intended general words to be used in unrestricted sense, it would not
have bothered to use particular words at all.

Conclusion

In essence, the Ejusdem Generis principle is a tool used in legal

interpretation to ascertain the meaning of a word or phrase by looking at
its context or the express mention of one thing. It should be applied with
caution and is most useful when there is ambiguity in the language.

4) EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

PRINCIPLE:

This Latin maxim translates to “the express mention of one thing

excludes all others”. It means that when a statute specifically mentions
one thing, it implicitly excludes others. This principle is used as a guiding
hand rather than a product on its own.

Examples of Application:

1. The Poor Relief Act 1601: Section 1 provided that every occupier
of lands, houses, coal mines or saleable under wood should be
 rated for the relief of the poor. It was decided by the House of
Lords that as “coal mines” alone were mentioned in the Act as
being rateable “iron mines” are not included.

2. Rex v Sec of State for the Home Dep: Section 2 (3) of

Immigration Act stated the word ‘parent’ means the mother of an
illegitimate child, by implication excluded the father.

3. Hypothetical Situation: A hypothetical situation would be

“candidates for the Commissioner General post should be of age 50
with a university qualification, this denotes the fact that not only
would the eligibility criteria be attainment of the required age, but
specific reference is endorsed by the legislature in regards to the
qualification.

Caution in Application:

This maxim should be applied with extreme caution and should not be
used in situations where the intention of the legislature did not mean that
the express mention of one thing should operate to exclude all others, or
where the statutory language is plain and the meaning is clear. The
maxim should only be used to ascertain the legislative intent. This is not
a rule of law but only a rule of construction.

Conclusion

In essence, the Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius principle is a tool

used in legal interpretation to ascertain the meaning of a word or phrase
by looking at its express mention. It should be applied with caution and is
most useful when there is ambiguity in the language.

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

Where there are general words of description, following an enumeration

of particular things such general words are to be construed
distributively, REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS; and if the general
words will apply to some things and not others, the general words are to
be applied to those things to which they will, and not to those to which
they will not apply.

In other words, the different portions of a sentence, or different

sentences, are to be referred respectively to the other portion or
sentences, to which we can see they respectively relate even if strict
grammatical construction should demand otherwise.

Thus, ‘I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A’ will
be construed, REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS by applying ‘devise’ to
‘real’ property and ‘bequeath’ to ‘personal’ property and in the sentence:
‘If any one shall draw or load any sword or gun’ the word ‘draw’ is
applied to ‘sword’ only and the word ‘load’ to ‘gun’ only, because it is
impossible to load a sword and draw a gun .

In Koteshwar Vittal Kamath v K Rangappa Baliga & Co., this rule

has been applied in the construction of the Proviso to Art 304 of the
Constitution which reads: Provided that no Bill or amendment for the
purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a
State without the previous sanction of the President. It was held by the
Supreme Court that the word ‘introduced’ referred to ‘Bill’ and the word
‘moved’ to ‘Amendment’.