Zimbabwe's Mineral Role in Energy Transition
Zimbabwe's Mineral Role in Energy Transition
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i Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This publication is based on the findings of the research project called Critical Minerals
and Renewable Energy Value Chains in Southern Africa: A Study of Actors and Initiatives.
This study report focused on Zimbabwe and was commissioned by the Southern Africa
Resource Watch (SARW). The study is part of SARW’s Strategic Minerals and the Energy
Transition in Southern Africa Research Series.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives ii
TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S
List Of Abbreviations iv
Executive Summary 1
1. Introduction 2
2. Methodology 2
3. Overview of Zimbabwe’s Minerals Economy 3
3.1. Mining Sector 3
3.2. Zimbabwe’s Minerals Critical to the Energy Transition 3
3.2.1. Lithium 4
3.2.2. Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) 5
3.2.3. Copper 5
3.2.4. Nickel 6
3.2.5. Rare Earth Elements (REEs) 6
4. Zimbabwe’s Energy Mix 7
4.1. Energy Generation and Supply Mix 7
4.2. Zimbabwe’s Hydrocarbon Economy 8
4.2.1. Coal: Still Central to National Grid Stabilisation 8
4.2.2. Transport Sector: Petrol and Ethanol Blending 8
4.2.3. Oil and Gas Exploration 8
5. Renewable Energy Actors and Initiatives in Zimbabwe 9
5.1. Hydroelectricity 9
5.2. Solar Energy Projects 9
5.3. Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Renewable Energy 10
5.4. Wind Energy Projects 12
5.5. Battery Storage System and Electric Vehicles (EVs) 12
5.5.1. Lithium-ion Battery Manufacturing 12
5.5.2. Nickel Feedstock for Battery Manufacturing 12
6. Highlighting Zimbabwe’s Critical Policy Gaps 14
6.1. Policy Discontinuity and Technical Capacity 14
6.2. Lack of Local Content Policies and Guidelines on Critical Minerals 14
7. Just Energy Transition 15
7.1. Energy Poverty and Affordable Energy Access 15
7.2. Navigating the Risks of a Just Energy Transition 15
7.3. Efforts to Decarbonise the Mining Sector in Zimbabwe 16
7.4. Decarbonisation of Steel Production Processes 16
7.5. Financing the Green Transition 17
7.5.1. Domestic Resource Mobilisation 17
7.5.2. Debt Distress and Public Debt Reforms 17
7.5.3. Revenue Leakages: Illicit Trade in Critical Minerals and Illicit Financial Flows 18
8. Conclusions and Recommendations 19
8.1. Geological Surveys and Closing the Data Gap 19
8.2. Mineral Value Chains, Strategy and Critical Minerals List 19
8.3. Good and Transparent Resource Governance 19
8.4. Human Resources and Skills Development 19
8.5. Technological Cooperation 20
8.6. Regional Integration and Collaboration 20
8.7. Capital Mobilisation 20
8.8. Addressing Energy Poverty and Decarbonisation 20
9. References 21
iii Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Critical Minerals and Renewable Energy Value Chains in Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives in Zimbabwe
is part of a regional action research agenda on Strategic Minerals and the Energy Transition in Southern Africa
under the Southern Africa Resources Watch (SARW). The report examines Zimbabwe’s mining sector and how
it responds to the global energy transition, which has created an unprecedented demand for the exploration,
extraction, processing and trade of critical minerals. The minerals include lithium, copper, and rare earth elements
(REEs), used to manufacture renewable energy technologies such as electric vehicles, wind turbines, solar panels,
and mobile phones.
Zimbabwe’s mining industry is a cornerstone of the national economy. In 2023, it breached the US$12 billion target
set in the country’s 2030 Vision. The sector contributes over 60% of Zimbabwe’s export receipts and attracts more
than 50% of foreign direct investment. Over the years, the growth experienced in the mining sector has been from
gold, platinum group metals (PGMs), ferrochrome, steel, nickel, diamonds, lithium, and coal.
The country has substantial lithium reserves. Ranked fifth in the world, Zimbabwe has gained global attention and
has become a significant global supplier of lithium, drawing foreign direct investments, particularly from Chinese
companies. In 2023, Zimbabwe banned the export of raw lithium, seeking to drive downstream infrastructure
development. This is because the country has ambitions to become a regional processing hub for lithium-ion batteries.
However, little or no evidence shows progress towards local electric vehicle battery manufacturing in Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe has manganese, chromium (with the Great Dyke belt estimated to host 10 billion tons of chromium, while
about 608 million tons are estimated to occur elsewhere), nickel, and there are efforts to revive copper production.
Together with rare earth elements (REE) exploration projects, Zimbabwe’s potential as a supplier of critical minerals
is promising. To turn this potential into wealth, Zimbabwe must go more steps up the value chain, beneficiate its raw
ore, and attract foreign direct investment into green technologies industrial projects. Domestic refining will bring
more jobs, better infrastructure and a rise in fiscal benefits. This will drive Zimbabwe’s development, particularly trade
and industrialisation.
Zimbabwe must develop a Critical Minerals Strategy to optimise its benefits. This will provide a national framework
for identifying a list of critical minerals and strategies for sector growth. The increased demand makes it essential
for public policy to guide the exploitation of the minerals to benefit communities. As mining operations ramp up
production to meet the global demand, environmental and social costs are expected to rise. For this reason, the study
calls for the mining sector to follow responsible and sustainable mining practices to achieve the imperative for a just
energy transition (JET). This includes adherence to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards such as
putting in place grievance redress mechanisms, respect for human rights and observing the rule of law in all mining
activities and related supply and value chains.
1 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
1. INTRODUCTION
Zimbabwe, endowed with a wealth of critical minerals such as lithium, platinum, and rare earth elements,
stands at a pivotal juncture in its economic development and energy transition. These minerals, essential for
the global transition to renewable energy, position Zimbabwe as a potentially key player in the burgeoning
green economy. The confluence of rich mineral reserves and increasing global demand for sustainable energy
solutions underscores the strategic importance of examining Zimbabwe’s role in the renewable energy value
chains. Understanding the dynamics of these value chains is crucial not only for policymakers and industry
leaders within Zimbabwe but also for international stakeholders invested in the global transition to renewable
energy. Through a detailed analysis of the initiatives and collaborations, this report aspires to contribute to a
more informed dialogue on how Zimbabwe can optimise its resources for economic growth and environmental
sustainability.
The study delves into the intricate network of actors and initiatives
shaping the landscape of Zimbabwe’s critical minerals and renewable
energy.
2. METHODOLOGY
The report is based on a desktop review. Apart from critical analysis of the status quo, primary sources of information
were heavily relied upon. Since transitioning to low-carbon pathways in the energy sector is regarded as urgent to
honour obligations under the Paris Agreement, this report also considers the nationally determined contributions
(NDCs) and statutory instruments enacted to guide the production and sale of these minerals. Information from
government agencies, local non-governmental organisations, and international development partners was solicited
to understand better the renewable energy (REN) sector’s initiatives, especially when such information could not
be obtained from official sources such as institutional websites. By mapping the connections between mineral
extraction, processing, and integration into renewable energy technologies, this study seeks to elucidate Zimbabwe’s
opportunities and challenges in leveraging its mineral wealth for sustainable development.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 2
3.OVERVIEW OF ZIMBABWE’S MINERALS ECONOMY
Zimbabwe’s mineral economy is a cornerstone of its economic development, playing a significant role in historical
and contemporary contexts (Government of Zimbabwe 2022). The mining sector, rich with diverse mineral deposits,
has been a key driver of the country’s GDP and export revenues. The mining sector in Zimbabwe has a long and
complex history, deeply intertwined with the country’s colonial past and subsequent economic policies. Mining
contributes about 5 per cent to the GDP and 23 per cent in total exports, earning the country 60 per cent of annual
foreign currency, translating into 13 per cent of GDP. Traditionally, the main commodities mined in Zimbabwe are
gold, platinum, coal, and diamonds.
During the colonial era, the mining industry was dominated by British and South African companies, notably Anglo-
American and Lonrho. These corporations established a strong presence in Zimbabwe, exploiting the country’s rich
mineral resources, including gold, platinum, and chrome. The Great Dyke, a geological formation rich in minerals,
became a focal point for mining activities, with its vast deposits of platinum group metals (PGMs), nickel, and chromium.
Anglo-American, one of the world’s largest mining companies, played a pivotal role in developing Zimbabwe’s mining
industry. Alongside Lonrho, these corporations extracted valuable minerals and controlled significant parts of the
value chains, from extraction to export. This dominance continued after independence, although the landscape
began to shift with changing economic and political dynamics.
In the 1990s, Zimbabwe underwent significant economic reforms under the economic structural adjustment
programme (ESAP), introduced at the behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Using a
neoliberal agenda, ESAP aimed to liberalise the economy, reduce government intervention, and promote private sector
growth. However, the programme produced negative outcomes: deindustrialisation, loss of jobs, and poor public
service delivery in water, health, and education. While remaining a critical component of the economy, the mining
sector faced numerous difficulties during this period. Several industries were closed, and a decline in manufacturing
output followed. This deindustrialisation affected the broader economy, exacerbating unemployment and reducing
the country’s industrial capacity. The mining sector, however, continued to attract foreign investment, albeit with
varying degrees of success.
IRENA (2022) states that critical materials are the resources needed to produce key technologies for the energy
transition, including wind turbines, solar panels, batteries for electric vehicles (EVs), and electrolysers.1 Availability and
affordability, and especially the security of supply of these critical minerals, remain crucial for the energy transition.
The criticality of the minerals underscores the vital importance of these minerals to different countries according
to their energy and industrial needs. For this reason, the US, Canada, EU, and Australia have developed a formal
Critical Minerals List, and in this regard the sourcing of minerals has become a major issue in geoeconomics and
geopolitics. Hence, IRENA (2022) has noted that factors for determining criticality remain subjective and location-
specific. However, for this paper, critical minerals refer to those important for the clean energy transition, termed
green minerals by the African Union.
1
IRENA, “Critical materials” (IRENA, n.d.) <https://www.irena.org/Energy-Transition/Technology/Critical-materials> accessed 3 March 2024
3 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
Figure 1: Zimbabwe’s Minerals Critical to the Energy Transition.
04
RARE EARTH
03 ELEMENTS 05
COPPER NICKEL
02
06
PLATINUM
GROUP MANGANESE
PETALS
(PGMS)
Zimbabwe’s
Critical Minerals
to the Energy
01 Transition 07
LITHIUM COBALT AND
CHROMIUM
3.2.1. Lithium
Lithium is essential in lithium-ion batteries, making it crucial for electric vehicles and energy storage (Scott and Ireland,
2020). According to the African Mining Market, Zimbabwe’s lithium deposits are the largest in Africa and the sixth
largest globally. The government claims that the country will meet 20 per cent of the world’s total demand for lithium
when it fully exploits its known lithium resources, and four major lithium projects are currently under development.2
The sector has drawn investors in battery minerals from Canada, the UK, and Australia, with China emerging as the
dominant player.3 The Bikita Mine, a lithium company, was acquired by the Chinese company Sinomine Resource
Group in 2022 through a transaction valued at $180 million.4 Following the acquisition, significant investments have
been made to expand the mine’s operations, including constructing two lithium processing plants (Ross, 2023). The
Bikita mine can now produce up to 300 000 metric tons of spodumene concentrate and 480 000 tons of petalite
annually (Energy Capital Power 2023). Beyond Bikita Mine, several significant lithium projects are operating in
Zimbabwe. Arcadia Lithium Project, located near Harare, was operated by Prospect Resources from 2016 to 2022
when the mine was acquired in April 2022 by China’s Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt for an 87 per cent interest (for $422
million), and is rated as one of the world’s biggest hard rock lithium resources. Zulu Lithium Project, managed by
Premier African Minerals, is located at Fort Rixon, about 80km from Bulawayo. It has a significant resource base
estimated at 20.1 million tonnes, with plans to explore further and develop the site. Kamativi Lithium Project is being
redeveloped into a lithium operation and a joint venture between the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation
(ZMDC) and Canada’s Jimbata, with significant lithium deposits identified within the tailings from previous mining
activities (Mining Index, 2024). Mirrorplex Exploration, acquired by an Australian company, Six Sigma Mirrorplex, is
exploring lithium in the Shamva area, and preliminary findings suggest extensive lithium mineralisation across the
project area (Mining Index 2024). Eagle Canyon Group Holding Limited backed the US$13 billion value addition and
beneficiation park approved by the Zimbabwean government. China Natural Resources Inc. entered into a sale and
purchase agreement with Feishang Group Limited and Top Pacific (China) Limited to acquire Williams Minerals (Pvt)
Ltd, which owns a mining permit for a Zimbabwean lithium mine. Chinese companies have acquired the biggest
portfolio of lithium mining projects in Zimbabwe.
2
International Trade Administration, “Zimbabwe - Country Commercial Guide” (ITA, 29 February 2024) <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/zimba-
bwe-mining-and-minerals> accessed 6 April 2024.
3
Ibid
4
Alex Donaldson, “Sinomine completes upgrades at Zimbabwe lithium mine” (Mining Technology, July 10) 2023) <https://www.mining-technology.com/news/
sinomine-bikita-lithium/> accessed 4 April 2024.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 4
3.2.2. Platinum Group Metals (PGMs)
Zimbabwe is a significant player in the global market for platinum group metals, which include platinum, palladium,
rhodium, ruthenium, iridium, and osmium (SFA (Oxford) 2024). These metals are crucial due to their extensive use in
automotive catalytic converters, jewellery, electronics, and various industrial applications. Zimbabwe possesses the
second-largest reserves of PGMs in the world, primarily concentrated in the Great Dyke region.
1 Manganese Manganese is vital for steel production and battery technology, with Zimbabwe being a
potential supplier for the growing battery industry. In 2022, Zimbabwe exported $114k in
manganese ore, making it the world's 61st largest exporter of manganese ore (OEC World
2024).
2 Chromium Chromium, primarily used in stainless steel production, is another valuable resource in Zim-
babwe's mineral portfolio. Chinese companies like Afrochine Smelting, Jinan Corporation,
Sinosteel Corporation are involved in the mining and processing of this mineral in Zimba-
bwe. This critical resource is found along the Great Dyke region and Darwendale.
3 Cobalt Cobalt, essential in lithium-ion batteries, is also available in Zimbabwe and it is poised to
contribute significantly to Zimbabwe's potential role in the electric vehicle revolution. Zim-
babwe is set to import 47 800 kilograms of cobalt by 2026, a five per cent annual growth
rate from 2021. This figure is a 117 per cent increase from 2008 (Report Linker Research
2024).
Zimbabwe’s mineral belt, the Great Dyke, is estimated to host 10 billion tons of chromium, while about 608 million tons
are estimated to occur elsewhere (Mlambo 2018). The country also has the world’s largest reserve of metallurgical
quality chromite.
3.2.3. Copper
In May 2021, Goldman Sachs described copper as “the new oil”. By 2030, copper demand from the green transition
will rise an estimated 600 per cent to 5.4 million metric tons (Mt) in the base case, and up to 900 per cent to 8.7
million metric tons on the back of the adoption of green technologies. The rush for critical minerals has not only been
from Chinese investors. Western countries have joined this race. Marula Mining, a UK mining company, has been
searching for copper and lithium mining opportunities. Through its Zimbabwe-domiciled local subsidiary, Muchai
Mining (Marula holds 80 per cent of Muchai’s shares, and Gondo Mineral Resources, holds 20 per cent) is among
the UK companies that have entered mining in Zimbabwe. Other UK companies, Premier African Minerals and Red
Rock, are invested in Zimbabwe’s lithium prospects. Copper is in demand globally, and Zimbabwe’s copper mining
is experiencing a revival after Mhangura, the last major copper mining company in Zimbabwe, was forced to shut
down in 2000 due to a sharp decline in international copper prices. Zimbabwe launched the Greater Chinhoyi Copper
Development Programme to revive six copper assets of ZMDC. In 2021, the ZMDC signed an agreement with China’s
Zhi Jui Mining Resource to start processing mining dumps at Mhangura. In addition to Mhangura, ZMDC has copper
operations in Alaska and Sanyati. It is important to realise that these copper assets are non-operational due to lack
of investment – about $500 million is required to revive ZMDC’s copper assets.
5 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
3.2.4. Nickel
Nickel has become one of the most critical minerals recognised by Japan, the US, and Canada, all of which have
classified it as a critical mineral for their industrial interests. Zimbabwe, a nickel producer, is home to the Trojan
Nickel mine, the country’s only nickel mine. The mine, which began nickel production in 1964 under the Anglo-
American group, can produce approximately 5500 metric tons of nickel concentrate annually. However, on 3 May
2024, the government placed Zimbabwe’s sole nickel mine under administration.5 The company halted production
due to equipment failure, high electricity costs, and low global prices. Nickel production has sharply declined from a
record level of $100 000 per ton in 2022 to about $19 000 per ton. Due to oversupply, the nickel market is saturated.
Trojan Mine’s nickel concentrate output dropped to 1314 metric tons in its last financial year, which ended in March
2024, down from 3180 metric tons the year before. The case of Trojan Mine highlights the risk of dependence on
primary commodity exports as global markets experience cyclical price shocks. Price shocks make a strong case for
value addition and the production of finished products.
5
Nyasha Chingono, “Zimbabwe’s sole nickel mine placed under administration” (Reuters, 3 May 2024) <https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2024/zimbabwes-sole-nick-
el-mine-placed-under-administration/> accessed 12 May 2024.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 6
4. ZIMBABWE’S ENERGY MIX
4.1. ENERGY GENERATION AND SUPPLY MIX
Zimbabwe’s energy mix includes various sources, including hydroelectric power, thermal power, solar energy, oil, gas,
biodiesel, biomass, and other renewable sources.
Source: IEA (2023)6 Coal Oil Hydro Wind, Solar, ect. Biofuels and waste
Zimbabwe’s energy generation is dominated by coal (thermal) and hydropower (Figures 2 and 3). In 2023, Zimbabwe’s
installed electricity generation capacity was approximately 2 540 MW from hydro and thermal power supply. However,
due to climate change, aging infrastructure, and equipment breakdowns, electricity generation is often much lower
than this capacity, resulting in power cuts and load shedding. The country has suffered from significant power deficits
with a peak demand of 1 900 MW, forcing power outages of 12–14 hours a day (World Bank 2023). This has also
been the situation in South Africa and Zambia, which has made the SADC region power insecure.
10%
11%
79%
While the government commissioned an additional 600MW at the Hwange power station in 2023 due to Chinese
loans and technical support, the installed capacity is still insufficient to meet demand. The effect has been felt more
acutely in productive sectors. This has created the necessity for renewable energy supply and independent power
producers (IPPs).
6
IEA, “Energy system of Zimbabwe” (IEA, n.d.) <https://www.iea.org/countries/zimbabwe accessed> accessed 5 May 2024
7 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
4.2. ZIMBABWE’S HYDROCARBON ECONOMY
Hydrocarbons still dominate Zimbabwe’s energy mix. Most vehicles on Zimbabwe’s roads are second-hand vehicles
imported from Japan, which are petrol and diesel-powered. The transition to electric mobility is conceivably far-
fetched. The Harare City Council, for example, has introduced some electric vehicles as part of its smart-city plans.
This is still in a pilot phase, and nothing much along the scale that is required for the impactful decarbonisation of
the transport system.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 8
5.RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTORS AND
INITIATIVES IN ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe’s renewable energy sector is gaining momentum as it seeks to diversify its energy sources and address
energy deficits. Various actors, including the government, private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
and international partners, have promoted renewable energy access using solar, wind, hydropower, and biomass.
Zimbabwe has a Renewable Energy Policy guided by the country’s NDCs, aligned to the demand-supply scenario, grid
absorption capacity, and utilities’ ability to pay for renewable energy electricity. Targets in the policy seek to achieve
an installed capacity of 1100MW or 17 per cent of the total electricity supply to meet electricity demand, whichever
is higher, from RE sources by 2025, and 2100MW or 27 per cent of of overall generation to meet electricity demand,
whichever is higher, from RE sources by 2030.7 Zimbabwe has set a target to install more than 250 000 solar geysers
in old (as retrofits) and new buildings by 2030.8 This section highlights key renewable energy actors and initiatives.
5.1. HYDROELECTRICITY
Zimbabwe’s hydropower is significant. But the share of hydropower generation in the total energy mix is on the de-
cline and increasingly unreliable due to low water levels on account of climate change induced droughts.9 However,
hydropower remains close to 100 per cent of the renewable energy share. This has resulted in power shortage in
Zimbabwe characterised by load shedding of up to 8 or more hours. The shortage gap has also been closed through
the import of hydro power from Mozambique’s Cahora Basa through the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP).10
Hydro Solar PV
99.7% 0.3%
Source: IEA (2022)
Hydro
In new developments, there is hydropower potential in the Solar
BatokaPV Gorge Hydroelectric Power Station project, a joint
initiative between Zimbabwe and Zambia. This 2400MW hydroelectric power is estimated to cost US$4.5 billion. It is
important to note that the project is close to the Victoria Falls, a UNESCO World Heritage site,11 and faces significant
opposition from communities and environmentalists, with threats to ecosystem services.
Solar energy production is on the rise, especially for domestic consumption but is still negligible in the electricity
generation mix.
Ironically, Zimbabwe hosted the UN Solar Summit in 1991. However, the country failed to use the event to increase in-
vestment in solar technologies. It took an electricity shortage for solar energy to receive prominence, and Zimbabwe
has invested heavily in solar energy deployment in the past decade.
7
Zimbabwe Ministry of Energy and Power Development “National Renewable Energy Policy” (Government Publications, 2019) <https://www.zera.co.zw/National_Re-
newable_Energy_Policy_Final.pdf> accessed 5 April 2024
8
Ibid
9
FurtherAfrica, “Kariba dam water loses 99% water amid heightening climate change” (FurtherAfrica.com, 4 January 2023)
<https://furtherafrica.com/2023/01/04/kariba-dam-water-loses-99-water-amid-heightening-climate-change/#:~:text=Water%20levels%20at%20Kariba%20North%20
Bank%20and%20Kariba,power%20generation%20as%20the%20climatic%20change%20crisis%20continues> accessed 5 April 2024.
10
SAPP is a cooperation of the national electricity companies in Southern Africa under the auspices of the SADC. The companies have created a common power grid
between their countries and a common market for electricity in the SADC region.
11
Sneha Abraham, “UN Greenlights 2,400MW Batoka Gorge Project” (ConstructAfrica.com, 18 October 2023) <https://constructafrica.com/news/un-greenlights-
2400mw-batoka-gorge-project> accessed 5 April 2024
9 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
5.3. INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS (IPPS) AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
Several independent power producers have been granted licenses by the Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority
(ZERA) on account of Zimbabwe’s 2019 National Renewable Energy Policy. The policy seeks to increase the share of
renewables in the energy mix by creating incentives from supply to distribution and demand, in both urban and rural
settings.12
Old Mutual Life Assurance Company Mutual Gardens Solar Plant 0.648 Solar PV Harare Province Own consumption
Zimbabwe
Econet Wireless Zimbabwe Ltd Econet Msasa Solar Plant 0.105 Solar PV Harare Own consumption
Econet Wireless Zimbabwe Ltd Econet Graniteside Solar 0.10176 Solar PV Harare Own consumption
Plant
Econet Wireless Zimbabwe Ltd Econet Mutare Solar Plant 0.1089 Solar PV Mutare Own consumption
Luxaflor Roses P/L Luxaflor Roses Solar Plant 0.1184 Solar PV Own consumption
MD De Chassart & Son P/L t/a/ Surrey Abattoir Solar Plant 0.117 Solar PV Marondera Own consumption
Surrey Abattoir
Schweppes Zimbabwe Limited Schweppes BBj Factory 0.564 Solar PV Own consumption
Solar Plant
Tanganda Tea Company Limited Tanganda Ratelshoek Solar 1.8 Solar PV Manicaland Province Own consumption
Plant
Dromervale (Pvt) Ltd Dromervale Farm Solar Plant 0.382 Solar PV Marondera Own consumption
Nottingham Estates (Pvt) Ltd Nottingham Estates Solar/ 2.25 Solar PV Beitoridge Own consumption
Diesel Power Plant
Infrastucture Fund Zimbabwe First Mutual Part Borrowdale 0.15 Solar PV Harare Own consumption
Solar Plant
Tanganda Tea Company Limited Jesey Estates Solar Plant 1.4 Solar PV Manicaland Own consumption
Tanganda Tea Company Limited Tingamira Estate 1.2 Solar PV Manicaland Province Own consumption
Rift Valley Properties (Pvt) Ltd Bay 11 Solar Plant 0.5 Solar PV Harare Own consumption
Guruve Solar Park (Pvt) Ltd Guruve Solar Park 1.2 Solar PV Mashonaland Central ZETDC
Province
Caledonia Mining Services (Pvt) Ltd Blanket Mine Solar Plant 17.5 Solar PV Matebeleland South Own consumption
SolGas (Pvt) Ltd Cross Mabale Power Plant 5 Solar PV Cross Mabela, Hwange ZETDC
Centragrid (Pvt) Ltd Centragrid Power Station 2 Solar PV Cross Mabela, Hwange ZETDC
Riverside Power Station (Pvt) Ltd Riverside Power Station 2.5 Solar PV Mutoko Mashonaland ZETDC
East
12
DLA Piper Africa, “Africa Energy Futures: Zimbabwe” (DLA Piper Africa, 3 November 2022) <https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/2022/11/africa-ener-
gy-futures/africa-energy-futures-zimbabwe> accessed 12 April 2024.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 10
By 2023, about 23 IPPs were licensed under the solar PV technology, and 18 projects involved installation for own
use. The power generated is used to supply electricity to mining (Blanket Mine), agro-industrial (Tanganda estates),
and telecommunications (like Econet) companies. The megawatts range from a high of 17MW to as low as 0.1MW.
However, it has been reported that licensed IPPs have failed to operate for several reasons, including foreign currency
shortages and funding challenges.
There are solar farm projects in the pipeline that promise to boost Zimbabwe’s renewable energy potential. These
include an innovative plan supported by the European Union to float solar panels on top of the Kariba Dam water
surface.
China Global South Project (2023) pointed out that a Chinese Energy Engineering Corp
aims to construct a 1000-megawatt (MW) floating solar plant on the Kariba dam along
the Zambezi River. This project will be worth nearly $1 billion. This innovative project
aims to supplement the existing hydropower generation, which is increasingly affect-
ed by climate-induced water level fluctuations
Litigation related to procurement disputes has cast doubts on the transparency of renewable energy licenses. In
a matter in which the Zimbabwe Power Company (ZPC) floated a tender for the engineering, procurement, and
construction (EPC) of a 1000MW Gwanda Solar Power Station Project, a legal dispute with the contractor, Intratek
Zimbabwe in partnership with China’s ZTE, has resulted in project delays. In January 2023, the High Court declared
the EPC contract valid and binding between the parties with an order for ZPC to pay Intratek an amount of US$1 191
374 and an outstanding balance of US$693 000. The matter was heard before the High Court and on appeal by the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe [See Zimbabwe Power Company v Intratrek Zimbabwe (127 of 2023) [2023] ZWSC 56
(1 December 2023)]. As the dispute rages, it is reported that ZPC has awarded a new power purchase agreement,
signed between ZPC’s ZETDC and Matshela Energy Limited, a South African IPP.
The project delays underscore the need for more robust procurement regulations and integrity of process to ensure
the effective implementation of renewable energy initiatives in Zimbabwe. As pledged by state parties to the Paris
Agreement at COP 28, the UAE Consensus commits countries to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030, meaning
that energy policies and regulations must be enabling to ensure rapid expansion of wind power, solar power,
hydropower and geothermal power. Increased accountability in renewable energy value chains will attract foreign
capital and donors to close the energy financing gap currently stalling project development in developing countries
such as Zimbabwe. Donor efforts such as those by the Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund (ZimFund), administered
by the African Development Bank (AfDB), supports solar power initiatives in rural areas (AFDB 2017). The AfDB-
managed Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA) approved a US$965 000 grant to Oxygen Energy Private Limited
to develop a 20MW off-grid solar PV rooftop project on buildings owned and managed by Old Mutual Property Group
Zimbabwe countrywide (AFDB 2017).
11 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
5.4. WIND ENERGY PROJECTS
Zimbabwe intends to generate 100 MW from wind power by 2025.13 However, the country still needs to understand its
full wind potential through scientific studies. In 2017, the Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) invited bids
from contractors to undertake a feasibility study on potential sites where wind power stations could be established,
but these stalled due to high-cost prices. In one of the major initiatives, Power Technology (2024) states that Optate
Africa plans to build a 200MW wind power plant near the town of Plumtree in the country’s southwest. In a notice
given in terms of Section 71 of Rural District Council Act (Chapter 29:13), the Mangwe Rural District Council indicated
that Optate Africa has sought a 25-year lease from the council for 100ha of land to set up its plant. In Guruve, another
wind-power project is an early-stage 100MW project jointly developed by Enerfin Sociedad de Energia, SLU (Tatanga
Energy 2024). Enerfin is a subsidiary of Elecnor Group, one of the leading Spanish companies in developing and
operating infrastructure projects, and Tatanga Energy. This project is being developed in the Mashonaland Central
Province, along the Guruve and Mazowe Rural District Councils border in northern Zimbabwe (Tatanga Energy 2024).
In the global energy transition context, lithium-ion (li-ion) batteries have been incorporated into electric vehicle value
chains due to their superior power density, central to moving vehicles over long distances. With the market share
for EVs currently accounting for 18 per cent of all cars sold globally and growing rapidly, predictions suggest that
they will reach more than 30 per cent of vehicle sales by 2025. Most of these batteries will be powered by nickel-
containing li-ion batteries.
Zimbabwe is making strides in integrating battery storage systems and EV projects to enhance its renewable energy
landscape. Notable initiatives include ZERA’s renewable energy projects and a proposed lithium battery manufacturing
plant. GreenFuel (Pvt) Ltd is expanding its ethanol operations to include battery storage, while the ZIM-EV project aims
to introduce EVs and develop local manufacturing capabilities. The Harare Institute of Technology is experimenting
with the development of locally sourced lithium-ion batteries, in collaboration with international institutions.
13
REVE (Wind Energy and Electric Vehicle Magazine), “Zimbabwe plans to produce 100 MW from wind energy” (REVE, April 18, 2021) <
https://www.evwind.es/2021/04/18/zimbabwe-plans-to-produce-100-mw-from-wind/80409> accessed 4 May 2024
14
Reuters, “Exclusive: Tesla taps Asian partners to address 4680 battery concerns” <https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/tesla-taps-asian-partners-
address-4680-battery-concerns-2023-03-10/> accessed 13 April 2024.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 12
Today, most li-ion batteries, known for their reliability and effectiveness, rely on nickel. This reliance on nickel is a
testament to its role in enhancing the performance and potential of these batteries.
Geopolitical tensions like trade wars can impact supply chains and market dynamics, making localisation or
regionalisation of value chains crucial. A strategic approach involving strong local content policies, diverse investment
sources, and proactive international engagement is therefore essential for Zimbabwe to effectively leverage its EV
battery manufacturing potential. Strategies to localise value chains are unclear, aside from the government banning
raw lithium exports. Lithium processing can be basic, like any mineral, and the country continues to export bulk, un-
beneficiated concentrates. The following demonstrate key actors and initiatives in the context of critical minerals and
renewable energy transition in Zimbabwe.
• Lanforce (Pvt) Ltd • FDI (Capital mobilisation) for funding of renewable energy
Private Sector in • Zimbabwe Sunshine Group projects
Renewable Energy • Zonful Energy • Electrification solutions: Implementation of solar and other
• Powerlive Zimbabwe renewable energy systems (Solutions to off-grid electricity
• Optate Africa consumers).
• GreenFuel • Domestic private capital investment into REN projects
• Renewable Energy Ventures Zimbabwe (RE Ventures) • Mobilisation of Climate Finance for renewable energy
• Old Mutual Private Equity Fund/SDG Multi-Partner Fund projects
• Independent Power Producers
• Ministry of Power and Energy Development • Public Policy on Mining and Critical Minerals Development
Public Sector • Ministry of Mines and Mining Development and Related • Publicly guaranteed lines of credit for beneficiation & value
Agencies adding projects.
• Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) • Resources-backed Sovereign Wealth Fund
• Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) • Just Energy Transition Frameworks
• Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe • Tax Incentives, Subsidies, Technological cooperation for
• State public/private companies manufacturers and suppliers.
• Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation • Mining and Energy Infrastructure Developments
• Munhumutapa Investment Fund (Sovereign Wealth Fund) • Minerals marketing and trade and investment promotion.
• Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association • Research, advocacy and campaigns for workers and
Civil Society • Oxfam community rights, especially for women, youth and
Organisations • Green Governance Zimbabwe Trust people with disabilities.
• HIVOS • Environmental protection
• Action Aid Zimbabwe • Advocacy, Training and lobbying for mineral beneficiation
• Centre for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG) • Good governance, Anti-corruption in mining and mineral
• Environment Africa value chains.
• Gender and Energy Network Zimbabwe (GEN-Zim) • Compliance with ESGs, Sustainability Reporting and
• Institute for Sustainability Africa (INSA) Community Engagement
• Southern Alliance for Clean Energy Zimbabwe (SACE Zim) • Advocacy for grievance redress and conflict resolution in
• Power for All Zimbabwe mining impacted areas.
• Practical Action Zimbabwe
Multilateral and Bilateral • World Bank • Development finance mobilisation for renewable energy
• United States Agency for International Development (USAID) investments
Development Partners • Water and Energy for Food (WE4F) • Concessional loans and credit lines
• Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa • Investment mobilisation
• Africa Development Bank • Philanthropy for energy access and energy poverty
• Africa Export Import Bank projects
• GET Invest (European REN Fund) • Grants
• International Renewable Energy Agency • Training on green technology development
• SADC Centre for Renewable Energy and Efficiency (SACREEE) • Science and Technology technical cooperation.
• Embassies
Academic Institutions:
• National University of Science and Technology • Research and Innovation
University, Colleges & • University of Zimbabwe (School of Mining) • Community training
Centres of Excellence • Chinhoyi University of Science and Technology • Research on socio-economic and environmental impacts
• Zimbabwe School of Mines • Technical skills training
• Centre for Renewable Energy and Climate Solutions (CRECS) • Project Management
• Polytechnics and other technical colleges • Contract negotiations training
• Circular economy skills training.
13 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
6.HIGHLIGHTING ZIMBABWE’S CRITICAL
POLICY GAPS
The key gap in Zimbabwe’s approach to critical minerals and renewable energy value chains
lies in the discontinuity and lack of technical expertise in policy development. Efforts to create a
comprehensive national minerals development policy and a lithium-specific strategy were abandoned due to the
departure of key personnel, leaving the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development without the necessary capacity
to formulate effective policies. This absence of an overarching policy framework leads to fragmented initiatives and
undermines transparency, coordination, and strategic planning, which is crucial for harnessing the full potential of
Zimbabwe’s mineral resources.
In the SADC region, only Zambia has developed a draft National Critical Minerals Strategy. This follows the example of
countries such as Australia, Canada, the US and members of the European Union. China, which has exercised export
bans on graphite exports, follows a strategic approach to its critical minerals and imports from all over the world.
There is a clear industrial logic in the dealings of the powerful countries regarding critical minerals and participation
in global renewable energy value chains.
Zimbabwe’s pursuit of sustainable mineral development faces challenges stemming from inadequacies in local
content policies. The Zimbabwe National Industrial Development Policy ((2024-30), while acknowledging local content
as a strategic thrust, lacks detailed implementation guidelines, hindering effective monitoring and implementation.
Moreover, ambiguity persists regarding the definition of local content, especially concerning upstream supply to lithium
mines and the differentiation between domestically produced and imported materials, impacting local procurement
and supplier development efforts. The Local Content Strategy also fails to address direct employment opportunities
in primary lithium production, overlooking a crucial aspect of local economic empowerment. Furthermore, insufficient
consideration is given to the potential impact of local ownership on enhancing local content, and social sustainability
issues such as the participation of marginalised groups and gender equality. Delegating local content thresholds
to industry bodies like the Chamber of Mines risks prioritising corporate interests over broader socio-economic
development. Moreover, policy instruments like Statutory Instrument 5 of 2023 lack clarity, raising concerns about
accountability and potential abuse of authority. Addressing these gaps is imperative for formulating comprehensive
local content policies that promote sustainable mineral development and inclusive growth in Zimbabwe.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 14
7.JUST ENERGY TRANSITION
People and nature are at the centre of the global energy transition. In essence, there are two
transitions that are in motion: a transition to a low-carbon society and a just energy transition for
people and the environment. There is a need to build resilience in these two transitions.
Zimbabwe experiences frequent load shedding due to inadequate power generation capacity, aging infrastructure,
and maintenance issues, significantly impacting both urban and rural areas and leading to unreliable electricity
supply (Mhaka, Runganga, Nyagweta, Kaseke, and Mishi, 2020). Much of the population lacks access to reliable and
affordable energy, affecting economic activities, health services, education, and overall quality of life (Mhaka et al.
2020). Much of Zimbabwe’s power infrastructure is outdated and requires substantial modernisation investment,
with key facilities like the Hwange Thermal Power Station often operating below capacity (AfDB 2024). The country
relies on electricity imports from South Africa and Mozambique to supplement domestic generation, making
it vulnerable to regional supply constraints (AfDB 2024). The Kariba Dam, a major source of hydroelectric power,
faces reduced capacity due to recurring droughts, exacerbating power shortages and increasing dependence on
imports (World Economic Forum 2016, Dube and Nhamo, 2023). While rural electrification remains a priority, with
the Rural Electrification Agency working to extend the grid and promote off-grid renewable energy solutions (Rural
Electrification Fund 2024), significant investments, policy support, and community engagement are still needed.
Communities play a vital role in decision-making processes concerning the utilisation of their resources, as enshrined
in constitutional provisions and principles of devolution. However, without transparency and accountability in the
sector, achieving mitigation, resilience, and sustainable development (particularly regarding critical minerals such as
lithium) becomes unattainable. A crucial omission in the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) is the need for
more focus on expanding the exploration and mining of hydrocarbons, which contradicts the goal of transitioning
towards greener energy sources. Addressing this requires a just transition approach, considering equitable resource
distribution, long-term market outlook, and competent contract negotiation to ensure win-win outcomes. Moreover,
energy access remains challenging in many mining communities, highlighting the need for comprehensive solutions
prioritising intragenerational and intergenerational equity, and ultimately fostering sustainable development.
Zimbabwe’s rich deposits of critical minerals, such as lithium, platinum group metals, and rare earth elements,
are pivotal for the global shift towards renewable energy. However, this transition poses several risks that must
be addressed to ensure the transition is just and sustainable. The extraction of critical minerals in Zimbabwe has
significant environmental and economic implications. For instance, mining activities in the Great Dyke, which is rich
in platinum group metals, nickel, and chromium, threaten local biodiversity by disturbing habitats and displacing
wildlife. Unki Mine, operated by Anglo American Platinum, has faced criticism for its ecological impact, prompting
the implementation of environmental management strategies such as buffer zones and reforestation. in addition,
artisanal and small-scale gold mining poses environmental hazards, notably mercury pollution in water bodies like
the Mazowe River, impacting human health and ecosystems.
15 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
7.3. EFFORTS TO DECARBONISE THE MINING SECTOR IN ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe’s mining sector, which includes over 60 exploited minerals contributes significantly to the economy, making
up 8.6 per cent of GDP and over 60 per cent of exports. Efforts to decarbonise this sector are crucial for achieving
the country’s economic and environmental goals, including commitments under the NDCs for greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions reduction. The principal regulatory framework, the Mines and Minerals Act of 1961, lacks direct provisions
for climate change but allows for incorporating climate considerations through mining rights negotiations. The
Environmental Management Act (EMA) [Chapter 20:27] addresses environmental impacts, requiring environmental
impact assessments (EIAs) and regulating air quality and emissions. Key statutory instruments, such as SI 72 of 2009
and SI 131 of 2016, target atmospheric pollution and ozone-depleting substances, respectively. Reporting standards
like the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and environmental and social governance (ESG) disclosures are encouraged
to measure and report carbon emissions. The GRI on mining provides greater scope for promoting a just energy
transition and corporate accountability. These legislative frameworks and initiatives aim to align Zimbabwe’s mining
practices with global decarbonisation efforts, promoting sustainable development in the sector. More compliance
systems are required to ensure greater scope for social and environmental justice.
The Manhize Iron and Steel Plant in Mvuma is owned by China’s Dinson Iron and Steel Company. It is estimated
to cost $1.5 billion on completion of its first phase and will have the capacity to produce 1.2 million tonnes a year.
While this is critical to spur industrial growth and steel exports, the power used to produce steel will contribute to the
country’s GHG emissions. From the dedicated power supply, through a special grid supply between ZEDTCO and the
steel company, the plant’s furnaces will use Hwange coal-generated electricity and coke to remove the oxygen. This
is a missed opportunity for Zimbabwe to produce ’green steel’ produced using clean energy, significantly reducing
GHG emissions and mitigating environmental impact and global warming. Given the abundance of solar potential in
Zimbabwe, the use of renewable energy is a possibility that the country must incentivise investors to adopt if it is to
meet its NDC commitments to cut emissions by 40 per cent by 2040.
In this sphere of green steel initiatives, Zimbabwe can draw lessons from international good practices in countries
such as Sweden where the Hydrogen Breakthrough Ironmaking Technology (HYBRIT), a joint venture between SSAB,
LKAB, and Vattenfall, aims to produce steel using hydrogen and electricity from renewable sources.15 H2 Green Steel,
a Swedish project, seeks to build a large-scale, fossil-free steel plant using hydrogen in 2024. ArcelorMittal’s Smart
Carbon and Innovative DRI has used multiple methods to produce green steel, including hydrogen and exploration
of carbon capture and storage technologies. Hydrogen is not a major topic in Zimbabwe, but this should not be a
limitation as Namibia and South Africa are developing an export-oriented green hydrogen economy. Zimbabwe can tap
into this regional renewable energy supply chain as part of SADC co-operation and intra-Africa trade promoted by the
AfCFTA to produce green steel. The decarbonisation of the steel industry and the production of green steel will create
a ready market due to the high demand for sustainable products in this age of climate change and transformative
industrialisation. Unlike in South Africa, where carbon capture, use, and storage (CCUS) is part of its Integrated
Resource Plan (IRP) 2023,16 this technology has not been considered an interim measure to justify the continued use
of coal. In the steel sector, CCUS involves capturing CO2 emissions from plants to prevent the release of emissions
into the atmosphere. The carbon can be stored underground or repurposed for other industrial processes.
15
Vattenfall, “HYBRIT: The world’s first fossil-free steel ready for delivery”, (Vattenfall, 18 August 2021) <https://group.vattenfall.com/press-and-media/pressreleas-
es/2021/hybrit-the-worlds-first-fossil-free-steel-ready-for-delivery#:~:text=The%20HYBRIT%20initiative%20was%20launched%20in%202016%20by,steel%2C%20
with%20fossil-free%20pellets%2C%20fossil-free%20electricity%20and%20hydrogen.> accessed 2 May 2024
16
Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (South Africa), (2024, January 4), “Integrated Resource Plan, 2023”, (Notice No. 49974) Government Gazette , Vol 703,
No. 10177) <https://www.dmre.gov.za/Portals/0/Energy_Website/IRP/2023/IRP%20Government%20Gazzette%202023.pdf> accessed 5 March 2024.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 16
7.5. FINANCING THE GREEN TRANSITION
17
While these can be used as domestic sources for climate finance in the implementation of the country’s NDCs, it is also important to acknowledge the role that illicit
financial flows and corruption have played in threatening the developmental aspirations of the country.
18
World Bank, “Zimbabwe: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis” <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/342191656080358057/pdf/
Zimbabwe-Joint-World-Bank-IMF-Debt-Sustainability-Analysis.pdf> accessed 28 April 2024.
17 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
7.5.3. Revenue Leakages: Illicit Trade in Critical Minerals and Illicit Financial Flows
The governance of minerals extraction and trade has been characterised by revenue leakages. This has resulted in
smuggling, superficial government disclosures, limited capacity of regulatory authorities to enforce compliance in
mines, and a lack of coordinated information dissemination in government institutions.19 Skills limitations to evaluate
mining data and lack of verification and assaying processes have provided sophisticated mining companies with
loopholes to engage in illicit activities.20 Taxation law and poor enforcement or legislative oversight of parliament
resolutions regarding revenue leakages (including the inadequacy of weighbridges) have been inadequately
implemented.21 Can the government detect illicit trade in minerals and machinery to distinguish minerals such as
silica from lithium exports? Border controls are important, but small aeroplanes may still be a menace. Zimbabwe
reportedly loses about $100 million monthly in leakages through sophisticated syndicates.22
Critical minerals, such as lithium, nickel, and rare earth elements, are
essential for green technologies, including electric vehicles and renewable
energy systems. However, illicit financial flows (IFFs) often undermine Addressing IFFs is
financial benefits from these resources. The UNCTAD Economic vital for financing
Development in Africa Report (2020) states that illicit financial flows and the green transition
corruption inhibit African development by draining foreign exchange,
in Zimbabwe by
reducing domestic resources, stifling trade and macroeconomic stability,
and worsening poverty and inequality.23 Addressing IFFs is vital for financing ensuring that
the green transition in Zimbabwe by ensuring that revenues from critical revenues from critical
minerals are used to support sustainable development and environmental minerals are used to
goals. Several unmonitored airstrips have been used to smuggle minerals support sustainable
out of Zimbabwe. The technology is sometimes inadequate, and new radar
control systems are needed to monitor aircraft entering and leaving the
development and
country’s airspace. environmental goals.
19
Pemberai Abide Tanda and Bekir Genc, “Zimbabwe’s mining policy impact on revenue leakages” (Resources Policy, Volume 91, April 2024).
20
Ibid
21
Ibid
22
Harmony Agere, “Unmonitored airstrips to be closed” Sunday Mail 21 November 2020.
23
SUNCTAD, “Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa” (Economic Development in Africa Report 2020) <https://unctad.org/system/files/
official-document/aldcafrica2020_en.pdf> accessed 5 April 2024.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 18
8.CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the comprehensive analysis of Zimbabwe’s critical minerals and renewable energy value
chains presented above, it can be concluded that Zimbabwe is intricately linked to global trends in
energy transformation and critical mineral demand. Furthermore, the analysis has identified key
conclusions and recommendations, which include the key areas addressed below.
Zimbabwe’s geological surveys have revealed a rich endowment of critical minerals, positioning the country as a
significant player in the global energy transition. Comprehensive and updated geological surveys are crucial for
accurately assessing the quantity and quality of these resources, facilitating informed decision-making, and attracting
potential investors. Regular geological mapping and exploration initiatives are essential to maintain an up-to-date
inventory of Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth, ensuring that the country can effectively leverage its natural resources for
sustainable development.
The country possesses abundant critical minerals essential for the energy transition, such as lithium, PGMs,
manganese, cobalt, copper, chromium, and nickel are vital for various green technologies. However, the development
of robust mineral value chains is hampered by challenges related to policy discontinuity, technical capacity gaps, and
inadequate local content policies. Strengthening these value chains requires a holistic approach that includes the
development of a national critical minerals strategy and a critical minerals list. This should spell out critical minerals
value chains, capacity building, infrastructure development, and policy reforms to ensure that these minerals’
extraction, processing, and export contribute maximally to the national economy.
Efforts to promote renewable energy initiatives, including solar, hydropower, wind, and biomass projects, are
underway, but issues such as corruption and mismanagement underscore the need for stronger oversight and
accountability mechanisms. Good and transparent resource governance is paramount to achieving sustainable
mineral development. This involves implementing and enforcing policies that ensure transparency in licensing,
contracts, and beneficial ownership. Adopting stringent environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards and
climate disclosures can help build trust and attract responsible investments. Establishing a robust framework for
negotiating terms and contracts is also critical to safeguard national interests and ensure fair revenue distribution.
The successful transition to a sustainable energy and mineral economy necessitates significant investment in human
resource development. Building a skilled workforce capable of operating and managing advanced technologies in
both the mining and the renewable energy sectors is essential. This includes enhancing educational and vocational
training programmes, fostering research and development, and encouraging partnerships between academic
institutions and industry players. By investing in human capital, Zimbabwe can create a knowledgeable and adaptable
workforce that drives innovation and sustains growth in these critical sectors.
19 Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives
8.5. TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION
Technological cooperation with international partners is vital for overcoming the technical capacity gaps that
currently hinder the effective exploitation of Zimbabwe’s mineral resources and the development of renewable
energy projects. Collaborative efforts in technology transfer, research, and innovation can help Zimbabwe adopt best
practices and state-of-the-art technologies, boosting efficiency and sustainability. Engaging with global technology
leaders and participating in international forums can give Zimbabwe the necessary expertise and tools to advance
its energy transition goals.
Regional integration and collaboration play a significant role in enhancing Zimbabwe’s capacity to achieve a green
transition. By participating in regional initiatives and trade agreements, Zimbabwe can benefit from shared resources,
knowledge, and infrastructure. Collaboration with neighbouring countries can lead to developing cross-border
renewable energy projects and harmonising regulatory frameworks, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional
energy market. Regional partnerships also provide joint ventures and investment opportunities, strengthening
economic ties and promoting sustainable development.
Mobilising capital is a critical component of financing Zimbabwe’s green transition. Leveraging domestic and
international funding sources, such as green bonds, climate finance mechanisms, and development aid, can provide
the necessary financial support for large-scale renewable energy and sustainable mining projects. Establishing the
Mutapa Sovereign Wealth Fund as a key domestic financing tool helps channel investments into priority areas, ensuring
long-term economic stability and sustainability. Creating an enabling environment for private sector participation and
fostering public-private partnerships can attract significant investments, driving the green transition forward.
Zimbabwe’s energy mix still relies heavily on hydrocarbons, particularly coal, highlighting the imperative for a just
energy transition to address energy poverty and reduce GHG emissions. Achieving a just transition involves ensuring
that the shift towards renewable energy does not exacerbate social inequalities or leave vulnerable communities
behind.
Zimbabwe should focus on inclusive growth, environmental sustainability, and energy security to successfully
navigate the challenges of the energy transition and build a resilient, green economy for the future.
Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 20
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Critical Minerals And Renewable Energy Chains In Zimbabwe: A Study of Actors and Initiatives 22
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