REPORTABLE

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 117/2000

In the matter between

HENNA MALGAS Appellant

and

THE STATE Respondent

CORAM: HARMS, MARAIS, CAMERON JJA CHETTY et MTHIYANE

AJJA

DATE HEARD: 16 February 2001

DATE DELIVERED: 19 March 2001

Minimum sentences for certain serious offences - murder - life imprisonment - s 51(3)(a)
Act 51 of 1977 - substantial and compelling circumstances justifying lesser sentence -
interpretation of provision.

JUDGMENT

MARAIS JA
 2

MARAIS JA: [1] Judicial hostility to legislative prescriptions which strip

courts of their sentencing discretion is hardly surprising. Given the infinite variety

of circumstances which attend the commission of crimes, who are better placed

than the courts, which experience daily the complexities of imposing sentences

which are as just as human fallibility can make them, to understand the arbitrariness

and potential unjustness of such edicts? Sentencing has rightly been described as

“a lonely and onerous task”1. For those who must shoulder that responsibility in

society’s name, to have to impose a statutorily decreed sentence which is

manifestly unjust in the particular circumstances of the case is a monstrous thing.

[2] That said, there is a significant distinction between, on the one hand, a

legislative provision which does in truth deprive a court of any sentencing discretion

at all, or so attenuates it that its existence is illusory, and, on the other, one which

1
J Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (1971) U. of Toronto
P., p.5. (Cited in Stockdale and Devlin on Sentencing, 1987, p 8).
 3

fetters only partially the exercise of the discretion and leaves it otherwise largely

intact. Ritualistic incantations of the doctrine of the separation of powers to justify

resistance to any form of legislative intervention in this regard seem to me to lack

plausibility. Subject of course to constraints going to substance imposed by the

Constitution, Parliament is obviously empowered to create new offences and

abolish old ones (whether they were statutorily created or originated in the common

law) and to provide for the penalties courts may impose. It may, and does, limit

the sentencing powers of courts in a variety of ways. The types of sentence which

may be imposed may be laid down, for example, those listed in s 276 of the

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. A maximum penalty of one kind or another

may be specified. Even in those countries where the doctrine of the separation of

powers is an article of faith, legislatures have been doing such things for generations

without protest from the judiciary or the citizenry. No court exercising criminal

jurisdiction in South Africa could convincingly claim to be the sole constitutional

 4

repository of power to do such things. Indeed, the courts have no inherent power

to do any such thing. They cannot create new crimes. Nor can they invent a new

kind of penalty such as, for example, physical detention under lock and key at

some place other than a prison.

[3] What is rightly regarded as an unjustifiable intrusion by the legislature

upon the legitimate domain of the courts, is legislation which is so prescriptive in

its terms that it leaves a court effectively with no sentencing discretion whatsoever

and obliges it to pass a specific sentence which, judged by all normal and well-

established sentencing criteria, could be manifestly unjust in the circumstances of

a particular case. Such a sentencing provision can accurately be described as a

mandatory provision in the pejorative sense intended by opponents of legislative

incursions into this area. 2 A provision which leaves the courts free to exercise a

substantial measure of judicial discretion is not, in my opinion, properly described

2
S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 806H - 807D.
 5

as a mandatory provision in that sense. As I see it, this case is concerned with

such a provision.

[4] Sections 51 and 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997

provide:

“51. Minimum sentences for certain serious offences. - (1)

Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a High Court
shall, if it has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2,
sentence the person to imprisonment for life.

(2) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6),
a regional court or a High Court shall -

(a) if it has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part II of

Schedule 2, sentence the person in the case of -

(i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15

years;

(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a

period not less than 20 years; and

(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to

imprisonment for a period not less than 25 years;

(b) if it has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part III of

Schedule 2, sentence the person, in the case of -

(i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 10

years;

(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a

period not less than 15 years; and
 6

(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to

imprisonment for a period not less than 20 years; and

(c) if it has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part IV of

Schedule 2, sentence the person, in the case of -

(i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 5

years;

(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a

period not less than 7 years; and

(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to

imprisonment for a period not less than 10 years:

Provided that the maximum sentence that a regional court may impose in
terms of this subsection shall not be more than five years longer than the
minimum sentence that it may impose in terms of this subsection;

(3)(a) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that

substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify the
imposition of a lesser sentence than the sentence prescribed in those
subsections, it shall enter those circumstances on the record of the
proceedings and may thereupon impose such lesser sentence.

(b) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) decides to impose a

sentence prescribed in those subsections upon a child who was 16
years of age or older; but under the age of 18 years, at the time of the
commission of the act which constituted the offence in question, it
shall enter the reasons for its decision on the record of the
proceedings.

(4) Any sentence contemplated in this section shall be calculated from the
date of sentence.

(5) The operation of a sentence imposed in terms of this section shall not
be suspended as contemplated in section 297(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act,
1977 (Act 51 of 1977).

(6) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable in respect of a

 7

child who was under the age of 16 years at the time of the commission of the act
which constituted the offence in question.

(7) If in the application of this section the age of a child is placed in issue,
the onus shall be on the State to prove the age of the child beyond reasonable
doubt.

(8) (Omitted because immaterial.)”

“53. Saving. - (1) Sections 51 and 52 shall, subject to subsections (2)

and (3), cease to have effect after the expiry of two years from the commencement
of this Act.

(2) The period referred to in subsection (1) may be extended by the

President, with the concurrence of Parliament, by proclamation in the Gazette for
one year at a time.

(3) Any appeal against -

(a) a conviction of an offence referred to in Schedule 2 of this Act and a

resultant sentence imposed in terms of section 51; or

(b) a sentence imposed in terms of section 51, shall be continued and

concluded as if section 51 had at all relevant times been in operation.”

[5] Schedule 2 is as follows:

“PART I

Murder, when -

(a) it was planned or premeditated;

(b) the victim was -

(i) a law enforcement officer performing his or her functions as such,

whether on duty or not; or
 8

(ii) a person who has given or was likely to give material evidence with
reference to any offence referred to in Schedule 1 to the Criminal
Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), at criminal proceedings in any
court;

(c) the death of the victim was caused by the accused in committing or
attempting to commit or after having committed or attempted to commit one
of the following offences:

(i) Rape; or

(ii) robbery with aggravating circumstances; or

(d) the offence was committed by a person, group of persons or syndicate

acting in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy.

Rape -

(a) when committed -

(i) in circumstances where the victim was raped more than once whether
by the accused or by any co-perpetrator or accomplice;

(ii) by more than one person, where such persons acted in the execution
of furtherance or a common purpose or conspiracy;

(iii) by a person who has been convicted of two or more offences of rape,
but has not yet been sentenced in respect of such convictions; or

(iv) by a person, knowing that he has the acquired immune deficiency

syndrome or the human immunodeficiency virus;

(b) where the victim -

(i) is a girl under the age of 16 years;

(ii) is a physically disabled woman who, due to her physical disability, is

rendered particularly vulnerable; or

(iii) is a mentally ill woman as contemplated in section 1 of the Mental

 9

Health Act, 1973 (Act 18 of 1973); or

(c) involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm.

PART II

Murder in circumstances other than those referred to in Part 1.

Robbery -

(a) when there are aggravating circumstances; or

(b) involving the taking of a motor vehicle.

Any offence referred to in section 13 (f) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act,
1993 (Act 140 of 1992). If it is proved that -

(a) the value of the dependence producing substance in question is more than
R50 000,00;

(b) the value of the dependence-producing substance in question is more than

R10 000,00 and that the offence was committed by a person, group of
persons, syndicate or any enterprise acting in the execution of furtherance of
a common purpose or conspiracy; or

(c) the offence was committed by any law enforcement officer.

Any offence relating to -

(a) the dealing in or smuggling of ammunition, firearms, explosives or armament;

or

(b) the possession of an automatic or semi-automatic firearm, explosives or

armament.

Any offence relating to exchange control, corruption, extortion, fraud, forgery,

uttering or theft -

(a) involving amounts of more than R500 000,00

 10

(b) involving amounts of more than R100 000,00, if it is proved that the offence
was committed by a person, group of persons, syndicate or any enterprise
acting in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy;
or

(c) if it is proved that the offence was committed by any law enforcement officer
-

(i) involving amounts of more than R10 000,00; or

(ii) as a member of a group of persons, syndicate or any enterprise acting

in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy.

PART III

Rape in circumstances other than those referred to in Part I.

Indecent assault on a child under the age of 16 years, involving the infliction of
bodily harm.

Assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm on a child under the age of 16 years.

Any offence in contravention of section 36 of the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1969
(Act 75 of 1969), on account of being in possession of more than 1000 rounds of
ammunition intended for firing in an arm contemplated in section 39 (2)(a)(i) of that
Act.

PART IV

Any offence referred to in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51
of 1977), other than an offence referred to in Part I, II. or III of this Schedule, if the
accused had with him or her at the time a firearm, which was intended for use as
such, in the commission of such offence.”
 11

[6] There have been a number of decisions 3 in which the High Courts have

considered the import of the injunction to impose imprisonment for life upon a

person convicted of an offence referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 (or imprisonment

for other specified periods for offences listed in other parts of Schedule 2) unless

satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify the

imposition of a lesser sentence. The interpretations placed upon the provisions

have been discordant and that necessitates this Court considering the question

afresh in deciding the outcome of the appeal against sentence in this matter. In

3
S v Mofokeng and Another 1999 (1) SACR 502 (W); S v Segole and
Another 1999 (2) SACR 115 (W); S v Zitha and Others 1999 (2)
SACR 404 (W); S v Jansen 1999 (2) SACR 368 (C); S v Swartz and
Another 1999 (2) SACR 380 (C); S v Blaauw 1999 (2) SACR 295
(W); S v Shongwe 1999 (2) SACR 220 (O); S v Dithotze 1999 (2)
SACR 314 (W); S v Homareda 1999 (2) SACR 319 (W); S v Van
Wyk 2000 (1) SACR 45 (C); S v N 2000 (1) SACR 209 (W); S v Boer
en Andere 2000 (2) SACR 114 (NC); S v Kanjwayo; S v Mihlali
1999 (2) SACR 651 (O); S v Montgomery 2000 (2) SACR 318 (N).
Unreported cases: S v Mthembu and Another, 365/98 WLD (Leveson
J) 22.10.1998; S v Madondo, cc 22/99 NPD (Squires J) 30.3.1999;
S v Ngubane, cc 31/99 NPD (Squires J) 30.3.1999; S v Cimani, cc
11/99 ECD (Jones J) 28.4.1999; S v Oliphant, cc 27/99 SECLD
(Erasmus J); S v Van Rooyen en Andere, cc 18/00 SECLD (Kroon J)
7.6.2000.
 12

doing so, I have found much of great help in those judgments for which I am

grateful. Valuable as they are, a dissection and discussion of each of them would

result in an indigestible judgment. Instead, I shall approach the problem as if the

matter was res nova but with the advantage of the insights which the reading of

those judgments has given.

[7] First, some preliminary observations. The provisions are to be read in the

light of the values enshrined in the Constitution and, unless it does not prove

possible to do so, interpreted in a manner which respects those values.4 Due

weight must be given to the fact that these provisions were not intended to be

permanent fixtures on the legislative scene and were to lapse after two years unless

extended annually. (They were put into operation on 1 May 1998 and were

extended for 12 months with effect from 1 May 2000.) That shows that when

4
S v Dzukuda and Others; S v Tshilo 2000 (4) SA 1078 (CC) at 1100I
- 1102B.
 13

conceived they were intended to be relatively short-term responses to a situation

which it was hoped would not persist indefinitely. That situation was and remains

notorious: an alarming burgeoning in the commission of crimes of the kind specified

resulting in the government, the police, prosecutors and the courts constantly being

exhorted to use their best efforts to stem the tide of criminality which threatened

and continues to threaten to engulf society. It was of course open to the High

Courts even prior to the enactment of the amending legislation to impose life

imprisonment in the free exercise of their discretion. The very fact that this

amending legislation has been enacted indicates that parliament was not content with

that and that it was no longer to be “business as usual” when sentencing for the

commission of the specified crimes.

[8] In what respects was it no longer to be business as usual? First, a court

was not to be given a clean slate on which to inscribe whatever sentence it thought

fit. Instead, it was required to approach that question conscious of the fact that the
 14

legislature has ordained life imprisonment or the particular prescribed period of

imprisonment as the sentence which should ordinarily be imposed for the

commission of the listed crimes in the specified circumstances. In short, the

legislature aimed at ensuring a severe, standardised, and consistent response from

the courts to the commission of such crimes unless there were, and could be seen

to be, truly convincing reasons for a different response. When considering

sentence the emphasis was to be shifted to the objective gravity of the type of crime

and the public’s need for effective sanctions against it. But that did not mean that

all other considerations were to be ignored. The residual discretion to decline to

pass the sentence which the commission of such an offence would ordinarily attract

plainly was given to the courts in recognition of the easily foreseeable injustices

which could result from obliging them to pass the specified sentences come what

may.

[9] Secondly, a court was required to spell out and enter on the record the
 15

circumstances which it considered justified a refusal to impose the specified

sentence. As was observed in Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd 5 by the

Court of Appeal, “a requirement to give reasons concentrates the mind, if it is

fulfilled the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundly based --- than if it

is not”. Moreover, those circumstances had to be substantial and compelling.

Whatever nuances of meaning may lurk in those words, their central thrust seems

obvious. The specified sentences were not to be departed from lightly and for

flimsy reasons which could not withstand scrutiny. Speculative hypotheses

favourable to the offender, maudlin sympathy, aversion to imprisoning first

offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy implicit in the amending

legislation, and like considerations were equally obviously not intended to qualify

as substantial and compelling circumstances. Nor were marginal differences in the

personal circumstances or degrees of participation of co-offenders which, but for

5
[2000] 1 WLR 377 at 381H
 16

the provisions, might have justified differentiating between them. But for the rest

I can see no warrant for deducing that the legislature intended a court to exclude

from consideration, ante omnia as it were, any or all of the many factors

traditionally and rightly taken into account by courts when sentencing offenders.

The use of the epithets “substantial” and “compelling” cannot be interpreted as

excluding even from consideration any of those factors. They are neither notionally

nor linguistically appropriate to achieve that. What they are apt to convey, is that

the ultimate cumulative impact of those circumstances must be such as to justify

a departure. It is axiomatic in the normal process of sentencing that, while each of

a number of mitigating factors when viewed in isolation may have little persuasive

force, their combined impact may be considerable. Parliament cannot have been

ignorant of that. There is no indication in the language it has employed that it

intended the enquiry into the possible existence of substantial and compelling

circumstances justifying a departure, to proceed in a radically different way, namely,

 17

by eliminating at the very threshold of the enquiry one or more factors traditionally

and rightly taken into consideration when assessing sentence. None of those

factors have been singled out either expressly or impliedly for exclusion from

consideration.

[10] To the extent therefore that there are dicta in the previously decided

cases that suggest that there are such factors which fall to be eliminated entirely

either at the outset of the enquiry or at any subsequent stage (eg age or the absence

of previous convictions), I consider them to be erroneous. Equally erroneous, so

it seems to me, are dicta which suggest that for circumstances to qualify as

substantial and compelling they must be “exceptional” in the sense of seldom

encountered or rare. The frequency or infrequency of the existence of a set of

circumstances is logically irrelevant to the question of whether or not they are

substantial and compelling.

[11] Some of the courts which have had to deal with the problem have
 18

resorted to the processes of thought employed and the concepts developed by the

courts in considering appeals against sentence. In my view such an approach is

problematical and likely to lead to error in giving effect to the intention of the

legislature.

[12] The mental process in which courts engage when considering questions

of sentence depends upon the task at hand. Subject of course to any limitations

imposed by legislation or binding judicial precedent, a trial court will consider the

particular circumstances of the case in the light of the well-known triad of factors

relevant to sentence and impose what it considers to be a just and appropriate

sentence. A court exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot, in the absence of

material misdirection by the trial court, approach the question of sentence as if it

were the trial court and then substitute the sentence arrived at by it simply because

it prefers it. To do so would be to usurp the sentencing discretion of the trial court.

Where material misdirection by the trial court vitiates its exercise of that discretion,
 19

an appellate court is of course entitled to consider the question of sentence afresh.

In doing so, it assesses sentence as if it were a court of first instance and the

sentence imposed by the trial court has no relevance. As it is said, an appellate

court is at large. However, even in the absence of material misdirection, an

appellate court may yet be justified in interfering with the sentence imposed by the

trial court. It may do so when the disparity between the sentence of the trial court

and the sentence which the appellate court would have imposed had it been the trial

court is so marked that it can properly be described as “shocking”, “startling” or

“disturbingly inappropriate”. It must be emphasised that in the latter situation the

appellate court is not at large in the sense in which it is at large in the former. In the

latter situation it may not substitute the sentence which it thinks appropriate merely

because it does not accord with the sentence imposed by the trial court or because

it prefers it to that sentence. It may do so only where the difference is so

substantial that it attracts epithets of the kind I have mentioned. No such limitation
 20

exists in the former situation.

[13] Some of the courts which have wrestled with the problems which

sections s 51 raises have sought to draw parallels between the latter process and the

approach to be followed when applying its provisions. With respect, I consider the

attempt to be misguided. The tests for interference with sentences on appeal were

evolved in order to avoid subverting basic principles that are fundamental in our law

of criminal procedure, namely, that the imposition of sentence is the prerogative of

the trial court for good reason and that it is not for appellate courts to interfere with

that exercise of discretion unless it is convincingly shown that it has not been

properly exercised. The epithets (“shocking”, “startling”, “disturbingly

inappropriate” and the like) that have been employed to drive that point home

should not simply be appropriated indiscriminately for use in a situation which is

very different.

[14] When applying the provisions of s 51 a trial court is not in appellate

 21

mode. It is not confronted by a prior exercise of judicial discretion attuned to the

particular circumstances of the case and which is prima facie to be respected.

Instead, it is faced with a generalised statutory injunction to impose a particular

sentence which injunction rests, not upon all the circumstances of the case

including the personal circumstances of the offender, but simply upon whether or

not the crime falls within the specific categories spelt out in Schedule 2.

Concomitantly, there is a provision which vests the sentencing court with the

power, indeed the obligation, to consider whether the particular circumstances of

the case require a different sentence to be imposed. And a different sentence must

be imposed if the court is satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances

exist which “justify” (my emphasis) it. In considering that question the trial court

is doing so for the first time. There has been no prior consideration of the

particular circumstances of the case by either the legislature or another court. There

is thus no justification for arbitrarily importing into the exercise a test which was
 22

evolved in a very different context and which was designed to serve a very different

purpose.

[15] I consider the dicta in the cases which advocate such an approach to the

application of s 51 to be conducive to error. In my view, they constrict

unjustifiably the power given to a trial court by s 51 (3) to conclude that a lesser

sentence is justified. Any limitations upon that power must be derived from a

proper interpretation of the provisions of the Act and not from the assumption a

priori that only a process akin to that which a court follows when in appellate mode

is intended.

[16] It is of course so that satisfaction of the test which that process

postulates would also justify the conclusion that a departure from the prescribed

sentence is justified. The problem is that it by no means follows that simply

because that test is not satisfied, a departure is ipso facto unjustified. In other

words, while satisfaction of that test is certainly a sufficient justification for

 23

departure, satisfaction of it is not necessary to justify departure. The use of the test

tends to obscure that. Hence its potential to lead one into error.

[17] On the other hand, it seems clear that those who have decried the

suggestion that the exercise required involves no more than assessing what, but for

the legislation, would have been an appropriate sentence and, if that should be

anything less than the prescribed sentence, regarding that as sufficient justification

for departure, are right. As they have pointed out, that approach would obviously

represent a return to what I have called “business as usual” and no effect

whatsoever would be given to the intention of the legislature.

[18] Here lies the rub. Somewhere between these two extremes the intention

of the legislature is located and must be found. The absence of any pertinent

guidance from the legislature by way of definition or otherwise as to what

circumstances should rank as substantial and compelling or what should not, does

not make the task any easier. That it has refrained from giving such guidance as
 24

was done in Minnesota from whence the concept of “substantial and compelling

circumstances” was derived 6 is significant. It signals that it has deliberately and

advisedly left it to the courts to decide in the final analysis whether the

circumstances of any particular case call for a departure from the prescribed

sentence. In doing so, they are required to regard the prescribed sentences as being

generally appropriate for crimes of the kind specified and enjoined not to depart

from them unless they are satisfied that there is weighty justification for doing so.

A departure must be justified by reference to circumstances which can be seen to

be substantial and compelling as contrasted with circumstances of little significance

or of debatable validity or which reflect a purely personal preference unlikely to be

shared by many.

[19] There has been some uncertainty as to whether the words “substantial

and compelling” are to be examined separately or conjointly in attempting to arrive

6
Van Zyl Smit, 1999 (15) SAJHR 270 at 271-273.
 25

at Parliament’s intention and in applying them to the particular circumstances of a

case. In my opinion it is a barren exercise to subject each to intense scrutiny on its

own devoid of the influence of its neighbour. The legislature refrained from using

the word “or” in favour of the word “and” and has thus provided a composite

description of the circumstances which can justify a departure from the prescribed

sentences. What Parliament requires is that the circumstances should meet the test

of the composite description.

[20] It would be an impossible task to attempt to catalogue exhaustively either

those circumstances or combinations of circumstances which could rank as

substantial and compelling or those which could not. The best one can do is to

acknowledge that one is obliged to keep in the forefront of one’s mind that the

specified sentence has been prescribed by law as the sentence which must be

regarded as ordinarily appropriate and that personal distaste for such legislative

generalisation cannot justify an indulgent approach to the characterisation of

 26

circumstances as substantial and compelling. When justifying a departure a court

is to guard against lapses, conscious or unconscious, into sophistry or spurious

rationalisations or the drawing of distinctions so subtle that they can hardly be seen

to exist.

[21] It would be foolish of course, to refuse to acknowledge that there is an

abiding reality which cannot be wished away, namely, an understandable tendency

for a court to use, even if only as a starting point, past sentencing patterns as a

provisional standard for comparison when deciding whether a prescribed sentence

should be regarded as unjust. To attempt to deny a court the right to have any

regard whatsoever to past sentencing patterns when deciding whether a prescribed

sentence is in the circumstances of a particular case manifestly unjust is tantamount

to expecting someone who has not been allowed to see the colour blue to

appreciate and gauge the extent to which the colour dark blue differs from it. As

long as it is appreciated that the mere existence of some discrepancy between them
 27

cannot be the sole criterion and that something more than that is needed to justify

departure, no great harm will be done.

[22] What that something more must be it is not possible to express in

precise, accurate and all-embracing language. The greater the sense of unease a

court feels about the imposition of a prescribed sentence, the greater its anxiety will

be that it may be perpetrating an injustice. Once a court reaches the point where

unease has hardened into a conviction that an injustice will be done, that can only

be because it is satisfied that the circumstances of the particular case render the

prescribed sentence unjust or, as some might prefer to put it, disproportionate to

the crime, the criminal and the legitimate needs of society. If that is the result of a

consideration of the circumstances the court is entitled to characterise them as

substantial and compelling and such as to justify the imposition of a lesser sentence.

[23] While speaking of injustice, it is necessary to add that the imposition of

the prescribed sentence need not amount to a shocking injustice (“‘n skokkende
 28

onreg” as it has been put in some of the cases in the High Court) before a departure

is justified. That it would be an injustice is enough. One does not calibrate

injustices in a court of law and take note only of those which are shocking.

[24] It has been suggested that the kind of circumstances which might qualify

as substantial and compelling are those which reduce the moral guilt of the offender

(analogously to the circumstances considered in earlier times to be capable of

constituting “extenuating circumstances” in crimes which attracted the sentence of

death). That will no doubt often be so but it would not be right to suppose that it

is only factors diminishing moral guilt which may rank as substantial and compelling

circumstances.

[25] What stands out quite clearly is that the courts are a good deal freer to

depart from the prescribed sentences than has been supposed in some of the

previously decided cases and that it is they who are to judge whether or not the

circumstances of any particular case are such as to justify a departure. However,

 29

in doing so, they are to respect, and not merely pay lip service to, the legislature’s

view that the prescribed periods of imprisonment are to be taken to be ordinarily

appropriate when crimes of the specified kind are committed. In summary -

A Section 51 has limited but not eliminated the courts’ discretion in imposing
sentence in respect of offences referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 (or
imprisonment for other specified periods for offences listed in other parts of
Schedule 2).
B Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious that
the legislature has ordained life imprisonment (or the particular prescribed
period of imprisonment) as the sentence that should ordinarily and in the
absence of weighty justification be imposed for the listed crimes in the
specified circumstances.
C Unless there are, and can be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a
different response, the crimes in question are therefore required to elicit a
severe, standardised and consistent response from the courts.
D The specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy
reasons. Speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue
sympathy, aversion to imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the
efficacy of the policy underlying the legislation, and marginal differences in
personal circumstances or degrees of participation between co-offenders are
to be excluded.
E The legislature has however deliberately left it to the courts to decide whether
the circumstances of any particular case call for a departure from the
prescribed sentence. While the emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity
 30

of the type of crime and the need for effective sanctions against it, this does
not mean that all other considerations are to be ignored.
F All factors (other than those set out in D above) traditionally taken into
account in sentencing (whether or not they diminish moral guilt) thus
continue to play a role; none is excluded at the outset from consideration in
the sentencing process.
G The ultimate impact of all the circumstances relevant to sentencing must be
measured against the composite yardstick (“substantial and compelling”) and
must be such as cumulatively justify a departure from the standardised
response that the legislature has ordained.
H In applying the statutory provisions, it is inappropriately constricting to use
the concepts developed in dealing with appeals against sentence as the sole
criterion.
I If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the
particular case is satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in
that it would be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of
society, so that an injustice would be done by imposing that sentence, it is
entitled to impose a lesser sentence.
J In so doing, account must be taken of the fact that crime of that particular
kind has been singled out for severe punishment and that the sentence to be
imposed in lieu of the prescribed sentence should be assessed paying due
regard to the bench mark which the legislature has provided.

[26] I turn to the merits of the present appeal against sentence. Appellant, a

22 year old woman, was convicted by Liebenberg J in the South Eastern Cape
 31

Local Division of the High Court of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

Leave to appeal to this Court against her sentence was granted by the court a quo.

At the instigation of his wife, appellant shot the deceased in the head while he lay

asleep at his home. The circumstances which led up to that were these. Appellant

had been living for about a month in the deceased’s house together with him, his

wife Carol and their children. Precisely what the nature of appellant’s relationship

with the deceased was is unclear. However, she testified that the night before the

deceased was shot he had struck her because he believed that she had been sexually

involved with another man. The relationship between the deceased and his wife was

stormy and many quarrels had taken place. The deceased’s wife had allegedly been

unfaithful to him with various other men. On the night that appellant was struck by

the deceased Carol told her that she intended to shoot the deceased. Carol had

been upset by the incident.

[27] On the day of the shooting a quarrel between the deceased and Carol
 32

took place. Later the deceased told appellant that he loved her. She replied that she

wished to have nothing to do with him. He produced a firearm and locked himself

in the bathroom where he fired a shot causing Carol and appellant to think he had

committed suicide. When told by appellant that she and Carol were going to “drink

pills” he emerged from the bathroom unscathed. Friends of the deceased arrived

and whisky was consumed until approximately 1.30 am when the friends left.

Thereafter appellant, Carol and the deceased all lay upon the same bed. The

deceased fell asleep and Carol roused him and gave him two pills to drink. The

deceased fell asleep again and snored so loudly that appellant went to lie down in

another room.

[28] Shortly after 3.00 am Carol woke appellant and handed her a pair of

gloves, a jersey and a firearm which she had loaded and cocked. Appellant was

told to don the gloves so that her fingerprints would not appear on the firearm and

also to prevent any traces of gunpowder from being deposited upon her hands.
 33

She was told to wear the jersey so that any gunpowder marks and traces of blood

would not be deposited upon her night attire. Carol told her to repair to their

bedroom and to shoot the deceased. She referred to her life with the deceased as

“‘n hond se lewe”. Appellant knelt alongside the deceased and levelled the firearm

at his head. She could not bring herself to fire the shot and stood up again. After

further persuasion by Carol she knelt alongside the bed again and once again trained

the weapon upon the deceased. Again she could not bring herself to fire the shot.

When she rose to her feet Carol told her that she had to shoot the deceased or she

would burn the house down with petrol. She also said that if appellant shot the

deceased she, Carol, and Carol’s children would thereafter be able to lead “‘n baie

lekker lewe”. Carol also reminded her that the deceased had struck her the previous

evening and that that should serve as an incentive to her to shoot him. The

appellant once again knelt alongside the deceased and pointed the firearm at his

head. Carol said that she would indicate when the shot should be fired. When
 34

Carol said to her “Henna nou!” she fired a shot and the deceased was struck in the

head. He died soon thereafter.

[29] With the co-operation of appellant Carol thereafter attempted to pass off

what had occurred as an act of suicide committed by the deceased. Some time

thereafter appellant confessed first to a friend and thereafter to a member of the

South African Police who was also a friend that she had shot the deceased. That

led to her arrest and trial.

[30] Liebenberg J gave anxious consideration to the question of sentence and

concluded that the circumstances of the case could not be regarded as substantial

and compelling in their mitigatory effect and therefore such as to justify the

imposition of a lesser sentence than imprisonment for life. He reached that

conclusion with regret and said that if it had not been for the fact that a sentence of

life imprisonment was prescribed by the relevant statute, he would not have

considered sentencing appellant to imprisonment for life. He referred to the lack

 35

of unanimity in the provincial divisions of the High Court as to the correct

interpretation of the legislation and regarded himself as bound by the

approach indicated by Stegmann J in S v Mofokeng which approach had been

approved by Jones J in an unreported decision in the Eastern Cape Division. He

indicated that he was, in any event, in agreement with that approach. One of the

findings made by Stegmann J in Mofokeng’s case was that “for substantial and

compelling reasons to be found, the facts of the particular case must present some

circumstance that is so exceptional in its nature and that so obviously exposes the

injustice of the statutory prescribed sentence in the particular case, that it can rightly

be described as ‘compelling’ the conclusion that the imposition of a lesser sentence

than that prescribed by Parliament is justified”.

[31] As I have indicated earlier in this judgment the requirement that the

circumstances be “exceptional” does not appear from the legislation and, in so far

as Liebenberg J approached the question of sentence from that perspective, he

 36

erred. In all other respects Liebenberg J approached the question of sentence in a

manner consistent with the approach set forth in this judgment. He made reference

to the very serious nature of the crime. He pointed to the element of premeditation

present and the defenselessness of the deceased. He considered that the motive for

the killing was greed. There were apparently some life insurance policies from

which Carol would benefit and the appellant stood to gain from the “lekker lewe”

of which Carol had spoken. He adverted to the prevalence of crimes of violence

in the country and the community’s interest in having the courts deal severely with

offenders.

[32] As against those considerations he took into account the absence of any

previous convictions, and accepted evidence that Carol was a domineering

personality. He accepted too that Carol had been the instigator and that she had

brought influence to bear upon the appellant but did not consider it to have been a

weighty factor when measured against the appellant’s deed. The learned Judge
 37

regarded appellant’s remorse induced voluntary admission of her guilt to her friends

as possibly the strongest point in appellant’s favour but then tended to minimise its

importance by observing that subsequent remorse was not something exceptional.

Having balanced all these considerations he concluded that they did not amount to

substantial and compelling circumstances within the meaning of the legislation.

[33] It is not possible to say to what extent the learned Judge’s evaluation of

the circumstances of the case as not being substantial and compelling was

influenced by his adoption of the proposition that they would have to be classifiable

as exceptional before they would qualify as substantial and compelling

circumstances. That it must have played some role seems clear for he found it

necessary to state expressly that he approved of Stegmann J’s view that the

circumstances would have to be exceptional. Given that misdirection this Court is

at large to reconsider the matter afresh and it is unnecessary to decide whether or

 38

not it would have been free to do so absent such misdirection. 7

[34] The circumstances in which the crime was committed are undoubtedly

such as to render it necessary to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life unless

substantial and compelling circumstances justify a lesser sentence. The shooting

was premeditated and planned. The fact that the planning and premeditation

occurred not long before the deed was accomplished cannot alter that. It was also

carried out in the execution of a common purpose to kill the deceased. Giving all

due weight to the enormity of the crime and the public interest in an appropriately

severe punishment being imposed for it, I consider that the personal circumstances

of the accused (her relative youth, her clean record and her vulnerability to Carol’s

influence by reason of her status as a resident in the latter’s home at the latter’s

pleasure) and the fact that she was dragooned into the commission of the offence

by a domineering personality are strongly mitigating factors. As a fact she gained

nothing from the commission of the crime. Her remorse cannot be doubted and her

7
Cf S v Homareda 1999 (2) SACR 319 (W) at 326c-d.
 39

spontaneous confession which brought to light the commission of a crime which

would otherwise have gone undetected is deserving of recognition in a tangible

sense. She is young enough to make rehabilitation of her a real prospect even after

a long period of imprisonment. These circumstances, cumulatively regarded, satisfy

me that a sentence of life imprisonment would be unjust. They qualify therefore as

substantial and compelling circumstances within the meaning of the provision.

None the less, it remains a particularly heinous crime of the kind which the

legislature has singled out for severe punishment and the sentence to be imposed

in lieu of life imprisonment should be assessed paying due regard to the bench mark

which the legislature has provided. In my judgment, imprisonment for twenty-five

(25) years is appropriate.

[35] The appeal succeeds. The sentence of life imprisonment is set aside and

there is substituted for it a sentence of imprisonment for twenty-five (25) years. In

so far as it may be necessary to do so, the sentence so imposed is antedated to

 40

3 November 1999 being the date upon which the sentence of life imprisonment was

imposed.

R M MARAIS
JUDGE OF APPEAL

HARMS JA)
CAMERON JA)
CHETTY AJA)
MTHIYANE AJA) CONCUR