1.

URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO

GANUELAS, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union (Branch 29), LEOCADIA
G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and
ESTATE OF ROMANA GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by
GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator, respondents.
24 April 2003 | G.R. No. 123968
Carpio Morales, J:
Digested by: Mary Luz B. Advincula

Doctrine: 3 distinguishing characters of a donation mortis causa:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor
to dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

Donations mortis causa must comply with the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil
Code, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.

FACTS:

On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed
of Donation of Real Property in favor of her niece, Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina),
covering seven parcels of land.

The deed stated that the donation would take effect upon Celestina's death and
would be rescinded if Ursulina predeceased her.

On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a Revocation of Donation, purporting to

cancel the earlier deed. She died on August 18, 1967, without issue or surviving
ascendants and siblings. Ursulina shared the produce of the donated properties with
private respondents, Celestina's nieces, after Celestina's death. In 1982, Ursulina secured
tax declarations in her name for the properties and stopped sharing the produce,
prompting private respondents to file a complaint in 1986.

Private respondents alleged that the Deed of Donation was void for lack of
acknowledgment by attesting witnesses and that it was a donation mortis causa, which
failed to comply with the formalities required for wills. They sought the return of the
properties, cancellation of tax declarations, partition, and accounting of fruits.

Petitioners argued that the donation was inter vivos, not mortis causa, and that
the Revocation of Donation was void as it lacked legal grounds. They also contended
that the prescriptive period for revocation had lapsed.

The trial court ruled that the donation was mortis causa, void for non-compliance
with the formalities of a will, and ordered the partition of Celestina's estate among her
intestate heirs.

ISSUE:

Was the donation inter vivos or mortis causa?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

The Supreme Court ruled that the donation was classified as mortis causa, and
the failure to comply with the formalities of a will rendered it void, affirming the trial
court's decision.

RATION DECIDENDI:

The donation was mortis causa because it was intended to take effect only upon
Celestina's death. The provision that the donation would be rescinded if Ursulina
predeceased Celestina is a decisive characteristic of a donation mortis causa. The phrase
"to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" clearly indicated that ownership
would transfer only upon Celestina's death, not during her lifetime.

As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the
formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with,
failing which the donation is void and produces no effect. As noted by the trial court, the
attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus
violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of
the Clerk of Court.

The Revocation of Donation was irrelevant because the original deed was already
void for non-compliance with the required formalities.

A donation inter vivos transfers ownership during the donor's lifetime, while a
donation mortis causa transfers ownership only upon the donor's death. The absence of
any provision transferring ownership to Ursulina during Celestina's lifetime confirmed
the donation as mortis causa. The fact that the donation was motivated by love and
affection did not make it inter vivos, as such motivations can also underlie donations
mortis causa.

3 distinguishing characters of a donation mortis causa:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor
to dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling, declaring the Deed of
Donation null and void for being a mortis causa disposition that failed to comply with
the formalities of a will. The petition was denied for lack of merit.

To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection
is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered
by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or
not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation.[32] In other words, love and affection may also underline
transfers mortis causa.[33]

xx END OF DIGEST xx

2. GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, petitioner vs.

SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, respondents,.

FACTS: Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs, sued
respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), to recover the subject property.

Petitioner sued respondents to recover the subject property.

Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase from Casimiro Vere (Vere) in
1971, who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in August 1970.

Respondents Spouses Froilan similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase
from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) in 1983 to whom Rodrigo, her aunt, donated the Property
in May 1965.
In other words, the property was donated by Rodrigo to Rodriguez by Rodrigo prior to Vere’s
purchase.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which
Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold
the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.

ISSUE: Is the deed a donation mortis causa?

RULING: No, the deed is not a donation mortis causa but a donation inter vivos.

The Supreme Court held that acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in
presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.

Post-mortem dispositions typically -

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2) That before the [donor's] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. [10]

Further -

[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the
donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]

[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the
effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling
criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in
order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]

(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject
of the deed.

Here, It is apparent that Rodrigo passed the naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. It is stipulated in the deed that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,"
signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s
right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of
Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the
day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence
as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.
Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated,
as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person
or entity the properties here donated” or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly
waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.

Therefore, the deed is not a donation mortis causa.

3. TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA

PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants. (G.R. No. L-27952
February 15, 1982)
FACTS:

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez;
his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir.

His will was admitted to probate wherein Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of
the estate. The widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an
Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow in satisfaction of
her legitime; the other part or “free portion”shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore,
one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining two-
thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for
vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow’s usufruct and in
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio v. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda’s usufruct are
invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code.
(c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski,
who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to
them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:
Does the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda violate the Constitutional
prohibition against ownership of lands by aliens?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

NO, the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda does not violate the
Constitutional prohibition against ownership of lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines. (Art. XIII)
The court upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession.
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

In the present case, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, does not vest title to the
land in the usufructuary. It is the vesting of title in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution. It upholds the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right,
does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

In the foregoing, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby distributed as follows;

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime and one-half (1/2) thereof which is the free
portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de
Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez
(not related to wanda).
Hence, the distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court.

4. ANTONINA CUEVAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CRISPULO CUEVAS,

Defendant-Appellee. [G.R. No. L-8327. December 14, 1955.

Facts: Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled "Donacion Mortis

Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas.

However, the donor executed another notarial instrument entitled "Revocacion de

Donacion Mortis Causa" to set aside the preceding conveyance.

Antonina Cuevas brought action in the RTC to recover the land conveyed, on the ground
(1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the donor; and
(2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it was not
properly accepted; (b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own
maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitude, for having refused to
support the donor. The RTC denied the recovery sought, and Antonina Cuevas
thereupon appealed to the CA.

Issue: Does Antonina Cuevas intended to part with the title to the property immediately
upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she had died?

Ruling: Yes, Antonina Cuevas intended to part with the title to the property immediately
upon the execution of the deed.

The Supreme Court held that irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos,
because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem. Furthermore, the
words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with
the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly enumerated in
the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership she had no need to
specify possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full
or absolute ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right of free disposition
from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that she reserved for herself.

In the case at the bar, the present donation is operative inter vivos. It lies in the final
phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away the land "because I am
reserving it to him upon my death." By these words the donor expressly renounced the
right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right essential to full
ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to the
property in favor of the donee, it was a valid donation inter vivos, with reservation of
beneficial title during the lifetime of the donor. Notwithstanding the donation, they wish
to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property before their death, without
need of the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the express reservation of
such right would be conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor’s
death, and therefore, the formalities of testaments should be observed; while, a converso,
the express waiver of the right of free disposition would place the inter vivos character
of the donation beyond dispute. Moreover, when the donor stated that she would
continue to retain the "possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and
attributes of ownership" she meant only the dominium utile, not the full ownership.

5. JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, Vs. ASUNCION G. FERRER,

substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR.,
all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents
SUMMARY: A 1968 donation by spouses Gonzales, labeled mortis causa, was ruled
inter vivos by the Supreme Court due to irrevocability and donees' acceptance,
voiding Leopoldo's subsequent assignment to Asuncion.
Doctrine: If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor
styles it mortis causa.—That the document in question in this case was captioned “Donation Mortis
Causa” is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character
is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

FACTS: This case pertains to a gift (donation) of a house and lot by the Sps. Leopoldo
and Guadalupe Gonzales to their children Asuncion and Emiliano and their
granddaughter Jarabini (from their predeceased son, Zoilo).

The deed was denominated as a donation mortis causa (equivalent of a will) and had
no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees,
however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.

The deed states that it shall be irrevocable; Jarabini and Emiliano will continue to
occupy the portions now occupied by them; that the donation shall not in any way affect
any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of the donors whether testate
or intestate and wherever situated; that any one surviving spouse reserves the right,
ownership, possession and administration of the donated and accepted property and
the Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the
DONORS.

Guadalupe died and a few months later Leopoldo executed a deed of assignment of his
rights and interests in the subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo soon
after died.

In 1998 Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the donation before the RTC of Manila.
Asuncion opposed, invoking his father’s assignment of his rights and interests in the
property to her.

RTC held that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors’ intention being
to transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime, given its
irrevocability.

On Appeal, the CA reversed and held that the donation, being one given mortis causa,
did not comply with the requirements of a notarial will, rendering the same void.

ISSUES: WON the spouses’ donation was one of mortis causa, as it was denominated, or
in fact a donation inter vivos.

RULING: The donation is inter vivos.

If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the
donor styles it mortis causa; the caption is not controlling. "Irrevocability" is a quality
absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability"
is precisely the essence of the act.

A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

The express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the
document as a donation inter vivos." [Austria-Magat v. CA]

In this case, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa
shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make
the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall
respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a
donation inter vivos.

The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But
SC has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an
irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.

Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which required
acceptance of the deed required. An acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter
vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kinds of donations. Donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the
donor’s lifetime.
6. JUTIC VS CA
GR L-44628
August 27, 1987
FACTS:

Vicente Sullan and other respondents filed against the petitioners for the partition and
accounting of the properties of the late Arsenio Seville, claiming to be his heirs (the respondents).

The petitioners argued that the properties in question were owned by their father, Melquiades
Seville, who had been in actual possession, occupation and cultivation of the land since 1954. They
presented an affidavit executed by Arsenio Seville, expressing his wish for Melquiades to inherit
the properties upon his death because he has no wife and children. Despite this, the trial court
ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring the affidavit as a mere expression of intention, not a
valid donation, a decision later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioners, challenging the
validity of Arsenio's donation, sought a review by certiorari.

ISSUE: Is the affidavit executed by Arsenio Seville a valid donation inter vivos?

RULING: No, the affidavit was a mere declaration of Arsenio Seville's intention to assign his
properties to Melquiades Seville upon his death because it did not meet the requisites of a valid
donation inter vivos or mortis causa.
The requisites of a valid donation are the following:
1. The donor must have the capacity to make the donation at the time of the perfection
of the contract;
2. There must be donative intent on the part of the donor;
3. Delivery must be made; and
4. The donee must accept or consent to the donation

In the case at bar, petitioners could not claim exclusive ownership based on the affidavit, as it
did not transfer ownership to Melquiades Seville. The properties remained under Arsenio
Seville's ownership during his lifetime, as evidenced by his mortgage of the properties to PNB.
Furthermore, the Court cited Aldaba v. Court of Appeals, which held that a mere expression of
intention does not constitute a promise or a valid donation. The fith paragraph of the affidavit
itself states this:

“That I make this affidavit to make manifest my intention and desire as to the way the above-
mentioned property shall be dispose of and for whatever purpose it may serve.”

It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that the signed affidavit is a forgery
because Arsenio Seville was illiterate during his lifetime. He could not write his name. He executed
documents by affixing his thumbmark.

Therefore, the affidavit executed by Seville was not a valid donation.

7. Maglasang vs. Cabatingan (G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002)

The phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation but
that the donor did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to the donee during her lifetime.

FACTS:

Conchita Cabatingan executed a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House
and Lot" in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan. Following this, four additional
deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan, bestowing properties
upon petitioners Estela C. Maglasang, Nicolas Cabatingan, and Merly S. Cabatingan.

Upon Conchita Cabatingan's death, the respondents filed an action seeking the annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of the four deeds of donation, as well as an accounting. The
respondents alleged that the petitioners, through manipulative tactics and by taking advantage
of Conchita Cabatingan's vulnerable state, induced the execution of the deeds of donation.
They argued that these documents were void for not complying with the formalities of wills and
testaments under the Civil Code, asserting that these were donations mortis causa.

The petitioners refuted the respondents' claims asserting that Conchita Cabatingan willingly
and knowingly caused the preparation of the instruments. In a partial judgment on the
respondents' motion, the court sided with the respondents, declaring the four Deeds of Donation
null and void ab initio.

The trial court based its decision on the grounds that the donations were mortis causa and failed
to comply with the formal requirements outlined in Article 806 of the New Civil Code.

The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court maintaining that the donations were inter vivos
made by Conchita Cabatingan out of "love and affection" for the donee, without any indication
in the deeds that they were contingent upon Cabatingan's death. Additionally, the petitioners
argued that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan was a
resolutory condition confirming the nature of the donation as inter vivos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donations made by Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos or mortis
causa.

RULING:

The nature of the donations is mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition
is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive” and that the following characteristics
must be taken into account:

1.It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;

2.That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor
to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

3.That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to
petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR" admits no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly
confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses,
uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation. That the donations were made "in
consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos
because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.

Therefore, the donation is a mortis causa donation, and that in the executed deed of donation’s
provision establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the
donated property to the donee only after Cabatingan's death.