Third Edition

The Government and

Politics of Israel
D o n Peretz and Gideon Doron

Routledge
Taylor &. Francis Group
New York London
First published 1997 by Westview Press

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Peretz, D o n , 1 9 2 2 -
The government and politics of Israel / D o n Peretz and Gideon
D o r o n . — 3rd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
I S B N 0-8133-2408-4 (he).—ISBN 0-8133-2409-2 (pb)
1. Israel—Politics and government. I. D o r o n , Gideon.
II. Title.
J Q 1 8 3 0 . A 5 8 P 4 7 1997
320.95694—dc20 96-35240
CIP
I S B N 13: 978-0-8133-2409-8 (pbk)
 Contents
Tables and Figures
Freface

1 Historical Origins of Israel

The Centrality of Israel, 1
A Changing Society and Its Problems, 4
Geopolitical Setting, 8
Origins of Modern Israel, 11
The Zionist Movement and Political Zionism, 16
Jewish Opposition to the Zionists, 22
The Balfour Declaration, 26
The Mandate for Palestine, 30
The Yishuv in Palestine, 33
From Mandate to Jewish State, 40
Challenges of the N e w State, 44

2 Political Culture
A n Immigrant Society, 46
Ethnic Composition, 50
Non-Jews in Israel, 55
The Problem of Jewish National Identity, 60
Relationship with World Jewry, 62
The Status of Women in Society, 63
From Statism to Civil Society, 66

3 Political Parties and Ideologies

Israel: A Party-State, 71
Origins of the Israeli Party System, 75
The Dominant Party Era: 1949-1977, 78
First Transition of Power: 1977, 79
Second Transition of Power: 1992, 81
The Left Bloc, 83
The Center, 99
vi • Contents

The Nationalist Camp, 105

The Religious Parties, 113
Realignment of the Party System, 116

4 The Electoral System 118

Israeli Proportional Representation Schemes, 118
The Party List Nomination Process, 121
Party Financing, 126
Electoral Advantages of Large Parties, 129
Electoral Reforms in Israel, 131
Voting and Elections, 136
From Ideological Competition to Electoral Strategy, 144

5 Interest Groups 146

The Political Economy of Israel, 146
The Histadrut Workers' Union, 151
The Army and Politics, 155
The Media, 161
Diaspora Jewry, 163
Ethnic Groups, 167
Extra-Parliamentary Movements, 169
Civic Organizations, 172

6 How the Government Works 173

The Transition L a w and the L a w of Return, 173
Knesset Supremacy, 175
The Legal System, 180
The Supreme Court, 183
The Presidency, 185
The Prime Minister and the Cabinet, 188

7 Government Administration and Public Policy 208

The Policy of Improvisation, 208
Government Administration, 210
Reforming the Administrative System, 242

8 Second Transition of Power 244

Stabilizing the First Transition of Power, 244
The Sephardi Revolt, 248
Economic Issues, 251
 Changing Values, 253
The 1982 War in Lebanon, 258
The Intifada, 262
The Gulf War, 263
Second Transition of Power, 1992, 264
The Second Rabin Era, 268
Likud's Return to Power, 270

9 Challenges of the Israeli Polity

The Challenge of Diaspora Jewry, 275
Integration of Israeli Arabs, 276
The Israeli-Palestinian Relationship, 276
The Economy, 277
Society, 278
The Environment, 278
N e w Political Rules, 279

Notes
Bibliography
About the Book and Authors
Index
 Tables and Figures

Tables
2.1 Jewish immigrants by period and continent of origin,
1948-1991 48

3.1 Number of votes and seats obtained in the Constituent

Assembly election, 1949 77
3.2 Results of the 1977 Knesset election 80
3.3 Changes in distribution of Knesset seats between
1988 and 1992 82

4.1 Expenditures of Israeli parties during the 1984

electoral campaign 127
4.2 Shinui expenditures during the 1984 campaign 128
4.3 Average expenditure for a Knesset seat by type
of group, 1984 130
4.4 Voter turnout in Israeli elections, 1949-1992 136
4.5 Influence of issues on Israeli voter behavior, 1988 139
4.6 Israeli popular opinion on national security, 1987 139
4.7 Public recognition of Knesset members, 1990 142
4.8 Public recognition of ministers and their posts, 1990 142
4.9 Distribution of preferences for Histadrut candidates,
1994 144

5.1 Public readership rates of daily newspapers in Israel,

1994 161

6.1 Degree of national legitimacy of leading Israeli

institutions 184
6.2 Grand Israeli coalitions by size and year of
formation 192
6.3 Oversized Israeli coalitions by size and year of
formation 193

7.1 1991 immigrants to Israel from the USSR by

occupation 209
x • Tables and Figures

7.2 Israeli ministries ranked according to prestige,

function, number of personnel, and size of
ordinary budget, 1994 214
7.3 Complaints to the Ombudsman, 1993 240

8.1 Results of elections to the Ninth Knesset, 1977 245

8.2 Changes in attitudes toward the territories,
1987 and 1989 263
8.3 Results of elections to the Knesset, 1996 273

Figures
7.1 Relationship among various Israeli state institutions 213
 Preface

This book aims to familiarize those interested in Israel's government with

that country's origins; the way its political institutions, practices, and tradi-
tions have evolved; and the way the government works today. The book
demonstrates that the country's political and social systems have been trans-
formed from a nonliberal democratic-socialist orientation during its forma-
tive years to one based on territorial nationalism and conservative socio-
economic policies with a more liberal, individual-centered open society.
The first edition of this book, published in 1979, introduced the reader
to a political system dominated by one party. Between its independence in
1948 and 1977, Israel was ruled by the M a p a i (the Israel Workers' Party),
which later became the Ma'arach (Labor Alignment). Little structural po-
litical change occurred during that period. The second edition of this book,
published in 1983, added a new chapter, "The Begin Era," which traced the
reasons for Labor's inability to regain its traditional political leadership in
1977 and 1981.
Since 1983, Israeli government and politics have undergone significant
changes. Labor shared power with Likud in both 1984 and 1988 in wall-
to-wall coalitions. Israel withdrew from Lebanon and survived runaway
three-digit inflation. It absorbed hundreds of thousands of new immigrants
from the collapsed Soviet Union and from Ethiopia. Israel began peace ne-
gotiations with its Arab neighbors in M a d r i d during November 1991, and
in September 1993 it decided to shift the responsibility for Arab residents
of the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians. A t the end
of October 1994 a peace treaty was signed with Jordan; other Arab and
M u s l i m countries including Morocco, Tunisia, and the Gulf states became
active in reconciliation with the Jewish state.
These events were possible as Labor resumed its historical role as the
country's leading party. The transition was preceded by several institu-
tional, legal, and normative changes in the political system during the sec-
ond half of the 1980s and the early 1990s.
Updating the information included in the second edition of this book is
only one objective of the third edition. Chapters from earlier editions have
been rewritten to include new information and interpretations of topics pre-
viously covered. The present volume also includes new issues that were not

XI
xii • Freface

salient before but that, over the years, have become central in the study of
Israeli national political systems. For example, Chapter 2 surveys the prob-
lem of national identity as it relates to the people of Israel, the position and
status of women in politics, and the process that led to the emergence of a
vital civil society—topics that received little attention in the study of poli-
tics during the 1970s. Finally, the book discusses these issues as they relate
to the future of politics in Israel.
Several individuals have been helpful in commenting on and preparing
the manuscript, although the authors alone are responsible for its contents.
Special thanks go to Rebecca Kook, M a o z Azaryahu, M a y a Peretz, and
Martin Sherman for their useful suggestions and to M o t i Levi and Penina
Elkis for assisting in research.

Gideon Doron, Tel Aviv

Don Peretz, Washington, D . C .
 1
Historical Origins of Israel

N o other nation of Israel's size is as well-known throughout the world or

as influential in its relations with other countries. During the early days of
the state, a delegation from the U.S. Congress visited the country and con-
cluded, "What Israel needs is a good mayor and a good sheriff." Israel is a
very small country in both area and population. Its area of nearly 8,000
square miles (about 28,000 square kilometers) makes Israel similar in size
to N e w Jersey, Slovenia, Wales, or E l Salvador; it is considerably smaller
than countries like Belgium and is half the size of the Netherlands or Den-
mark. A person driving 55 miles an hour could cross Israel from Metula in
the north to Eilat in the south in about four hours and could travel the
width from Netanya on the Mediterranean coast to the Jordan River in less
than an hour. Among its Middle East regional neighbors, Israel is larger
than Lebanon, Qatar, and Kuwait. Jordan is almost five times larger than
Israel, however; Syria is nine times as large, Iraq is twenty times as large,
Turkey is forty times as large, Egypt is fifty times as large, Iran is eighty
times as large, and Saudi Arabia is over one hundred times as large.

The Centrality of Israel

W i t h a population of over 5.3 million in 1994, Israel has fewer or the same
number of people as at least thirty-five of the world's largest cities, includ-
ing London, Paris, Moscow, Los Angeles, Chicago, and N e w York. Three
Middle Eastern cities—Cairo, Teheran, and Istanbul—have up to twice the
number of inhabitants as Israel. Its population equals 15 percent of Cali-
fornia's, or a little under 2 percent of that of the United States. Iraq and
Iran, two of Israel's declared regional enemies, have about four and twelve

1
2 • Historical Origins of Israel

times more people, respectively, and Egypt, an active enemy until 1979, is
more than ten times larger. 1

Although it is one of the smaller political entities in both the region and
the world, Israel has become a focus of unusual attention, especially since
independence in 1948. Israel's conflict with surrounding Arab states, its
central role in major Middle Eastern crises, and its social, economic,
and political development constantly arouse interest around the globe—
particularly in the United States and Europe. Some studies place Israel
among the ten countries with the largest foreign press corps during 1992;
270 news organizations keep a permanent representation there. When a su-
perstory breaks in times of war or other major crises, Israel becomes, after
the United States, the country most covered by the foreign press. There are
several reasons for this phenomenon.
First, Israel is the birthplace of the two Western monotheistic religions,
Judaism and Christianity, and it is also sacred to Islam. Events that affect
the "land of the Bible" and its holy sites are of major interest to believers
of these three faiths. Tom Friedman, the noted U.S. journalist, defined
events in Israel during 1987 as "the translation of the Bible to news items."2

Events that involve the resurrection of the Jewish people in their native
home are theologically problematic for Catholics; they are significant, how-
ever, for fundamentalist Protestants who see their religious visions ap-
proaching fulfillment in Israel's revival.
Second, Israel has acquired prominence in Western consciousness because
it shares similar values with the West. Israel is one of the most democratic
countries in the Middle Eastern region. M u c h of Israel's political and eco-
nomic leadership is either Western-born or Western-oriented. Indeed, many
enemies as well as friends tend to perceive Israel as an extension of Western
civilization or even as a colonial outpost of late European imperialist ex-
pansion to the Third World. In addition, the trauma or perhaps some pro-
found guilt over the actions and inactions taken during the Holocaust
draws sympathy and support from Europeans. In 1992 fifty-one German
news organizations had representatives in Israel, second only to the fifty-six
U.S. representatives. The transformation of yesterday's victims into a vi-
3

brant force has been noted with great interest and even with respect, if not
admiration. Until 1967 Israel was generally perceived as the weak David
facing the mighty Goliath but able to overcome him. After Israel's victory
in the 1967 war, the power and moral equations seem to have been re-
versed; in the eyes of the world, Israel's sheer power replaced its moral
strength.
Intellectually, Israel constitutes an exciting social and political experi-
ment. Its propelling national ideology, Zionism, is no doubt the most im-
portant underlying force that has profoundly revolutionized Israelis' private
and collective lives. There is no historical parallel for an ethno-religious
 Historical Origins of Israel • 3

group that for two millennia was placed in an exilitic situation and was ef-
fectively able to restore its independent national life. The process of Jewish
resurrection also includes the revival of a "dead language," Hebrew, which,
like Latin, was used primarily for religious rituals and is now the principal
means of daily communication. Experimentation in various forms of col-
lective living—most notably the kibbutz communal arrangement, which re-
lies on the principles of equality among members, joint property, and direct
democracy—also draws attention to this old-new society.
Strategically, Israel's importance belies its size. Located at the crossroads
of three continents—Asia, Africa, and Europe—in ancient times the land of
Israel became a common battlefield for ambitiously expanding nations, a
situation that changed little during the second half of the twentieth century.
Israel's several rounds of all-out wars with some of its Arab neighbors and
many violent border and terrorist incidents constituted a risk that these
conflicts would not be contained within the region but would spill over to
the international level as well. This risk became acute when Israel sided
with the Americans and against the Soviet Union and its Arab clients dur-
ing the Cold War. The fact that Israel is generally perceived as one of the
nations with nuclear weapons has intensified the potential danger to inter-
national security. Moreover, its special economic, military, and diplomatic
relationships with the United States are not unnoticed by other nations.
The development of the U.S.-Israeli friendship rests on several factors, in-
cluding the support Israel has traditionally obtained from American Jews.
By 1992 one-third of the world's Jewry lived in Israel, a number almost
equal to the U.S. Jewish community. Israel is the world's only state in which
the majority of citizens and many national institutions such as holidays, diet
(Kashrut) laws, and regulations over personal affairs (including birth, mar-
riage, and death) are Jewish; thus, Jews everywhere are interested in Israel.
Whether because of sympathy, identification, or a direct interest in creating
a shelter in case of persecution, events in Israel are discussed regularly in
U.S. synagogue meetings, and requests to assist the country in overcoming
its mounting challenges are important in Jewish communal life. U.S. Jewish
organizations and individuals help financially, but more important, they use
their influence in the political system to rally various forms of support for
Israel.
Large concentrations of Jews are found in N e w York, Los Angeles, Lon-
don, and Paris—cities that are national and international centers for printed
and electronic media. Local Jewish residents' demand for news about Israel
is transformed to the national level. Thus, for example, the New York
Times often carries as many detailed accounts of Israeli issues as do Israeli
newspapers. The existence of such a large market for news about Israel is
the prime reason major U.S. and European television networks keep per-
manent crews in Israel.
4 • Historical Origins of Israel

Wars, terrorist activities, heroic behavior, and human despair tend to pro-
duce "good" stories. Likewise, acts of reconciliation between enemies draw
much media coverage because of the hope that if protracted conflict, how-
ever complex, can be solved in one place, then perhaps other conflicts can
also be resolved.

A Changing Society and Its Problems

What is actually known of this popular political entity? Some preliminary
generalizations are in order. First, the formal name of the Jewish state is not
Israel but rather "the State of Israel" (Medinat Israel). This distinguishes
the political entity of the state from the physical and spiritual entity of the
Land of Israel (Eretz Israel). Eretz Israel is a biblical territory that includes
both banks of the Jordan River (and thus the Kingdom of Jordan) accord-
ing the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, discussed later. Jews
maintain internationally recognized political sovereignty only in the state;
although since June 1967 they have also lived in the West Bank (captured
from Jordan), which was part of the land, and the Gaza Strip (captured
from Egypt), these territories do not legally belong to Israel. In July 1967
Israel annexed East Jerusalem to its state. Fourteen years later, in December
1981, the Golan Heights, an area belonging to Syria, also became part of
the state.
By the end of 1994, Israel had internationally agreed and fixed borders
with only two neighbors: Egypt and Jordan. The border with Egypt was de-
termined by the M a r c h 1979 peace treaty and that with Jordan by the Oc-
tober 1994 peace agreement. In the second half of the 1990s, Israel was still
waiting to alter the status of the "armistice lines" (the so-called green lines)
to define its borders with Syria and Lebanon and to redefine borders with
the emerging Palestinian entity. The armistice lines were drafted in 1949
armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria following the
1948 Arab-Israeli war.
Although most citizens of Israel are Jews, about 18.5 percent of the pop-
ulation is non-Jewish (i.e., 77 percent Arab-Moslem, 14 percent Arab-
Christian, and 9 percent Arab-Druse). A small, undetermined number of
4

residents is neither Jewish nor Arab. Most of the latter group arrived in Is-
rael because they married a member of the Jewish faith or came to find
work in the labor market. Although most Arab citizens were born in Israel,
that is not the case for the Jews. Only during the 1980s did the number of
Jewish natives surpass the number of those born beyond Israel's borders.
Between 1948 and 1994, more than 2.35 million Jews arrived in Israel from
130 countries. Prior to 1948, most immigrants had come from Europe. Im-
5

mediately after independence they came primarily from Middle Eastern

countries—including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—and from N o r t h
 Historical Origins of Israel • 5

Africa. Between 1960 and 1990, most immigrants came from countries be-
longing to the Soviet bloc (Poland, Romania, Russia, and Georgia) and
from the United States. The largest single wave of immigration (about
500,000 people, or over 10 percent of the population) came during the pe-
riod 1990-1993 from the collapsing Soviet Union and from Ethiopia. 6

A creation of the Zionist movement, the State of Israel does not officially
belong to all its citizens but belongs to the Jewish people, an undetermined
entity that also includes individuals and groups that are explicitly anti-
Zionist (like the Satmar Hasidim of Brooklyn, N e w York) or that never
plan to visit the land of their "forefathers." According to Israeli law, how-
ever, these people potentially have more legal rights in many matters in Is-
rael than do the country's indigenous non-Jewish citizens. As a nonliberal
democracy whose basic values and laws are deduced from a commitment to
the interests of Jewish people, Israel has no written constitution. Its single-
chamber parliament, the 120-member Knesset, serves as both a legislature
and a constituent body. Regular laws, regulations, and acts are drafted
through the first function, and basic laws embodied with constitutional sta-
tus are enacted through the second. The Knesset also selects, approves, and
supervises the operations of the government.
Representation in the Knesset is obtained through election. The entire
country constitutes one voting district. Voters cast their preferences among
party lists rather than for individual candidates. Because no party has ever
obtained a majority of votes in an election to the Knesset, public policy has
been conducted by coalition governments. Through membership in the
world Zionist movement, most parties included in this extensive multiparty
system (on average, twelve parties are represented in the Knesset) have
overseas affiliates in the Americas, Western Europe, and South Africa.
Since independence, the country and its people have experienced tremen-
dous change. The population has increased nearly ninefold. Excluding the
1991 Gulf War, when Israel's role was that of a "passive victim," Israel ex-
perienced major wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982, as well as the
War of Attrition with Egypt (1969-1971). As a result, Israel has become a
garrison state whose society constantly encounters security tensions exacer-
bated by frequent guerrilla and terrorist activities.
In spite of this violent background, Israel has built a relatively sound
economy, moving from an agriculturally based Third World type to a mod-
ern industrialized system based on the most advanced communication in-
frastructure. This situation has made Israel the principal, if not the largest,
economic power in the Middle East region.
Demographically, Israel has been transformed from a country whose Jew-
ish population was mostly European to one in which Jews of Afro-Asian
origin constitute nearly half the citizenry, thereby strengthening the Middle
Eastern element in the culture and society. Among the Jews, until the end of
6 • Historical Origins of Israel

the 1980s immigrants from Arab countries constituted the largest sub-
group, compared to those of European, American, or Israeli origin. By
1994, however, Afro-Asian Jews were outnumbered by the Russian Jews,
who began pouring into the country during the 1990s and became the
largest subgroup—replacing those who came from N o r t h Africa during the
1950s. Regardless of their original background, most latecomers were able
to adjust—often with difficulty—to the basic political, cultural, economic,
and military norms and institutions laid down by Western Jews during the
prestate era.
European Zionists who immigrated to Palestine before or soon after
World War I dominated Israeli leadership until the early 1970s. Only after
the 1973 October War was there a native-born prime minister (PM). Until
1996, Yitzhak Rabin was the only Israeli-born prime minister among the
seven men and one woman (i.e., Golda Meir) who served in that position.
The gerontocracy of the early twentieth-century Zionists, which was so in-
fluential in party leadership, the Knesset, and other political institutions,
has largely disappeared. The first generation of leaders, the founding fathers
and mothers of modern Israel, has faded. Even in 1994, some of the coun-
try's most prominent politicians—Rabin, Shimon Peres (foreign minister
and former P M ) , Yitzhak Shamir (former P M ) , Ezer Weizman (president),
and others—were past age seventy.
Despite the changes in social composition, in most aspects of life leader-
ship is still either Western or of Western origin. Most members of the cab-
inet and Knesset, the party leadership, and high-ranking public administra-
tors, as well as those in state-owned enterprises, large industrial companies,
the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) high command, academic institutions, and
the like, are Western Ashkenazi (of European origin) males. The Afro-
Asians (Mizrachim) dominate local-level politics and many small busi-
nesses. Tensions created by the resulting economic and cultural disparities
are often transformed into political issues. For example, the Likud's Ash-
kenazi leadership, headed by Menachem Begin (1948-1983), was able to
upset Labor's domination in 1977 and to control the government until
1992 by mobilizing the political support of the Mizrachim, especially those
of N o r t h African origin.
The non-Jewish citizens of Israel present two of the most serious dilem-
mas to maintaining political stability. In 1994 they constituted about 18.5
percent of the total population and were divided into three subgroups:
Muslims, Christians, and Druze. O n one level there is a problem of the re-
lationship between state and religion. Because these two are not separate,
non-Jews who are not Arabs find it difficult, if not impossible, to legally
conduct their personal affairs through state institutions. Attempts to obtain
citizenship, to marry, or even to find a burial plot can become major obsta-
cles. The only branch of Judaism recognized by the state is the Orthodox.
 Historical Origins of Israel • 7

Consequently, Reform and Conservative Jews, the two largest U.S. Jewish
movements, are denied the freedom to conduct certain religious functions
in Israel.
The Israeli Arabs encounter problems on a different level. Residing
largely along or near the borders of the adjoining countries with which until
recently Israel was in a formal state of war, the Arab minority has been per-
ceived by many to represent a potential security problem. But tensions be-
tween Jews and Arabs in Israel would remain high even if Israel did find
peace with its enemies because Israel is legally a Jewish state in which no
separation exists between religion and nationality. The Arabs are therefore
excluded from many basic institutions of the state, from the state's collec-
tive memory, and from most national symbols. N o Arab citizen of Israel has
ever held a leading position in any state political institution. The highest
ranks obtained by an Arab have been deputy minister, mayor, or district
court judge. Socioeconomic, cultural, linguistic, and political differences be-
tween Jews and Arabs in Israel have increasingly politicized the situation
and have raised serious questions about the future of Israel as a Jewish state
or, alternatively, as a democracy.7

The protracted war with the surrounding Arab states has been decisive in
shaping Israel's economic structure and policies. In some years, especially
during the first half of the 1970s, levels of expenditures on security relative
to the country's gross national product were among the highest in the
world. In addition, the national goal of bringing all Jewish exiles to their
promised land, coupled with a fundamentally socialist ideology, greatly
strained the economy. Since 1948 Israel has almost cyclically muddled
through one economic crisis after another, albeit with relative success. In-
strumental to this success were the millions of new immigrants who came
to the country without material resources but with advanced knowledge
and high levels of motivation.
At the same time, the state has maintained a very generous welfare sys-
tem, which directly supports many new immigrants for extended periods.
Widows, orphans, invalids, veterans, elderly people, single-parent families,
and the like are assisted by the welfare system. Living standards of most cit-
izens are maintained at Western levels through government subsidy of many
necessities such as food, housing, transportation, and education. As infla-
tion and soaring defense costs increased, however, economic pressures—
especially during the 1970s and 1980s—created tension between the gov-
ernment and organized labor that was manifest in frequent strikes.
Closely related to the dilemma of economy and ethnicity is the issue of
class. Since independence, when most of the Jewish community was rela-
tively close-knit and homogeneous, class distinctions have become more vis-
ible and politically relevant. A new bourgeoisie has emerged, and enough
people have become rich to almost constitute a class. O n the other hand,
8 • Historical Origins of Israel

with the immigration from Arab countries, especially from North Africa,
Oriental Jews have found themselves at the bottom of the social and eco-
nomic scale, and poverty has become commonplace. Urban and rural slums
have sprung up, and tensions have grown between the Mizrachi poor and the
affluent Ashkenazi. Generous government measures undertaken during the
1980s in the form of neighborhood renewal programs somewhat eased the
tension. However, the half million immigrants who came to Israel from
the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia during the first half of the 1990s re-
vived the tension between those who have and those who have not.
During the entire period since independence, the Arab minority in Israel
has remained the lowest class as defined by all relevant socioeconomic in-
dicators. In 1994, the average earnings of an Arab family in Israel were
about half those of an average Jewish family. It is thus little wonder that
8

many Arab families were below the poverty line. This situation has added
yet more tension and affected social and political stability in Israel.

Geopolitical Setting
Israel is a country with no fixed borders. Even in biblical times, the bound-
aries of the land in which the people of Israel resided were largely unde-
fined: They expanded and contracted in accordance with the ambition and
strength of local or external rulers. The borders of modern Israel were
carved from mandatory Palestine in a series of international agreements and
wars. A t the end of 1994, Israel's northern and eastern borders were still
largely in a state of flux. The issue of the Golan Heights remained unre-
solved, Israel still occupied its "security zone" in Lebanon, and no decision
had been reached regarding the eventual international border between Is-
rael and the Palestinian entity. Prior to World War I, Palestine was a south-
ern province of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, although the terms Palestine
and Israel both have ancient historical antecedents, they are new political
entities created during the twentieth century.
Since the November 1947 U N partition of the area west of the Jordan
River into Jewish and Arab political entities, Israel has considerably in-
creased its territory. The country expanded by around 2,000 square miles
between 1947 and 1948 as a consequence of the first Arab-Israeli war. In
1956 Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula in the south from Egypt, but under
superpower pressures it quickly returned the area. Israel regained control
over the Sinai in the 1967 war, adding to the territories captured from the
two other antagonists—Jordan (the West Bank) on the east and Syria (the
Golan Heights) in the northeast. Altogether, the Jewish state added about
35,000 square miles to its original holdings, thus controlling over four
times more land than it had in 1948. In 1973, as a result of the October
War, Israel captured even more Egyptian land west of the Suez Canal. Israel
 Historical Origins of Israel • 9

retreated in 1974, and following the 1979 peace treaty the rest of the terri-
tory taken from Egypt, except for the Gaza Strip, was surrendered. Between
1982 and 1985, Israel dominated southern Lebanon. Since then it has main-
tained a several-kilometer-deep "security zone" supervised directly by the
IDF and the IDF-financed South Lebanon Army.
Following the accord signed in Oslo in September 1993 between Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), management of the Gaza
Strip and of the town of Jericho in the West Bank became the PLO's re-
sponsibility. This accord, and others signed in 1994 in Washington, D . C . ,
and Cairo, specified the process by which most of the West Bank would
eventually come under the authority of the Palestinians. Likewise, the Oc-
tober 1994 peace agreement with Jordan determined the international bor-
ders between Israel and Jordan. By 1996, negotiations with Syria and
Lebanon had not resulted in a clear solution to border problems.
Geographically located as it is on the western shore of the Mediter-
ranean, Israel lies at the crossroads of three continents: Asia, Africa, and
Europe. This location provides commercial advantages, but it creates dis-
advantages from a security point of view. Spatial attributes were manifest
in ancient times. Located at the center of the O l d World, the region often
became a battleground for advancing empires from the east (Assyrians,
Babylonians, Persians, and Ottomans), the south (Egyptians and Arabs),
and the west (Macedonians, Romans, and, later, French and British). Polit-
ical sovereignty in the area was often conditioned by international develop-
ments. Even during the golden biblical years, until the destruction of the
first temple, the Hebrews maintained only partial political control of the
area. They resided in the inner lands and for over two hundred years shared
the coastal area with the Philistines, a nation of seafarers, with whom they
fought for territorial supremacy.
Israel's location makes the country vulnerable to attack from different di-
rections. The first full-scale Arab attack took place in 1948 but failed, re-
sulting in 570 miles of armistice frontiers. In the 1967 war with Egypt,
Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, the size of Israel's territory was increased, but the
length of its borders was reduced by around 50 miles. This represented a
major strategic benefit to Israel: Large cities like Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, as
well as many smaller settlements, were no longer within easy reach of
neighboring armies. Moreover, Israeli control over the Golan Heights re-
moved a direct military threat to its northern residential cities and placed
the IDF only 30 miles from the Syrian capital of Damascus. The security or
"buffer zone" Israel maintains in Lebanon provides similar advantages. Yet,
as Israeli military strategists learned during the 1991 Gulf War, when
dozens of Scud missiles were launched against Israel's major cities from
Iraq, in modern warfare geographic distance and topographical height may
not carry the same security value as they did in the past.
10 • Historical Origins of Israel

Israel's climate, land forms, flora, and fauna are similar to those of south-
ern California. The Mediterranean coastal plain has mild winters with
moderate rainfall and hot, dry summers. The mountains and hilly areas that
extend from Lebanon in the north through central Palestine and the Negev
Desert in the south are sparsely settled and unproductive. The lands south
of Beersheba and Gaza, the Negev and the Jordan Valley, are arid and dry
throughout the year, although with irrigation they can produce high-quality
crops.
As in most Middle Eastern countries on the edge of the desert, lack of
water is a major barrier to growth. Rainfall is uneven, with adequate quan-
tities in the north and almost none in some of the southern regions. Periodic
droughts cause extensive damage to the country's agriculture. Throughout
history, the countries of the region have quarreled over water, and these
quarrels continue today. Disputes over the main water system; the Jordan
River and its tributaries; the Dan, Hasbani, and Yarmuk Rivers in the
north; Lake Tiberias (also called the Sea of Galilee or, in Hebrew, Kinneret);
and the Dead Sea have caused frequent clashes among Israel, Syria, and
Jordan. These waters are important not only for their economic value; they
also have political, historical, and religious significance. Thus, one of the
most important elements in the 1994 peace agreement between Israel and
Jordan was cooperative water utilization.
Natural resources are modest; they include mineral deposits such as
potash, phosphates, and copper ore, and natural gas and small quantities of
oil that are commercially exploited. Light rainfall, a dry climate, sparse
water sources, and the sandy soil of the region produce a Mediterranean-
type agriculture with emphasis on field crops (cereals and grains), fruits (cit-
rus, bananas, and avocados), vegetables, and flowers. Some crops have been
raised for export to Europe. Early in the twentieth century, Jewish farmers
introduced extensive irrigation and scientific agricultural methods that
greatly increased productivity of the land. By the 1990s, Israel was com-
monly considered one of the world's leading sources of knowledge of in-
tensive agriculture and water utilization through the use of sophisticated
electronic or computerized irrigation systems and advanced desalinization
methods. Over the years, however, with the expansion of other sectors of
the economy and the decline of manpower requirements in agriculture,
farming has diminished in relative importance, providing only 3.5 percent
of domestic product and national income in 1991 and employing only 55
thousand workers in a labor force of over 1.5 million. 9

In 1994, nearly 90 percent of Israel's total population lived in 178 urban

localities. About 28 percent (1.2 million people) of the Jewish population
lived in the three major cities: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, and H a i f a . 10

Jerusalem, the capital, had 568,000 residents, of whom 407,000 were Jews.
The coastal area between the two seaports, Haifa and Ashdod, contains the
 Historical Origins of Israel • 11

greatest concentration of Jewish inhabitants, as well as most industries,

commerce, and other vital sectors of the economy.
Most Arabs live separated from the Jewish population, largely because of
historical circumstances and the fact that in the Middle East ethnic and re-
ligious groups tend to live in their own exclusive locations. In urban cen-
ters, where there are mixes of Jews, Muslims, Christians, and their respec-
tive subgroups, each group often has its own "quarter," or city district.
Thus, Arabs live alongside Jews in separate sectors of six mixed cities:
Haifa, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Acre, Rammle, and Lydda. Nazareth, Taybe, U m el
Fahem, and Rahat (a Bedouin town in 1994) are exclusively Arab cities
within the green line. Nearly half of Israeli Arabs live in rural areas, most
in Galilee villages and along the pre-1967 frontiers with Jordan.
Heavy Arab concentrations in the north, where Arabs outnumber the Jew-
ish population, have raised the possibility that in the future the minority may
demand cultural and even political autonomy. To prevent such actual or po-
tential demands and also for security reasons, the government has attempted
to disperse Jews in vacant regions along the borders and in areas where large
numbers of Arabs reside. Consequently, urban and rural sites have been es-
tablished as border settlements inside Israel and, after 1967, in the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. Likewise, "development
towns" like Dimona and Yerucham, inhabited by new immigrants who ar-
rived from N o r t h Africa in the 1950s and from the Soviet Union in the early
1990s, have been built in the Negev (where most Bedouins reside) and in
Galilee. In Arab cities like Nazareth, where no Jews used to reside, the gov-
ernment has set up an adjunct independent Jewish Upper Nazareth.

Origins of Modern Israel

A Jewish presence existed in Palestine before Great Britain assumed the
Mandate for Palestine, but few Jews were associated with Zionist institu-
tions. By 1914, the forty-four Jewish settlements, with a total population of
about 12,000, constituted only 14 percent of the Yishuv (Jewish commu-
nity). Most Jews lived in the four Jewish holy cities—Jerusalem, Hebron,
Safed, and Tiberias—where Jews had lived for centuries. In Jerusalem, they
had formed the majority of the population since the mid-nineteenth century.
H o w could such a small group of people establish a country that became
a regional power within a single generation? The question is even more
provocative when we consider Israel's sparse natural resources and scarcity
of water, its relative smallness, and its precarious situation in a region that
is not only inhospitable geographically but that was also surrounded by a
hostile Arab population with much more extensive territories, many more
people, and richer natural endowments.
12 • Historical Origins of Israel

Modern political Zionism was a European nationalist movement linked

to the land of Israel by history, tradition, and mythology. After the Roman
conquest of Palestine during the first century, destruction of the second tem-
ple, and the forceful dispersion of a large part of the population in A . D . 70,
Palestine was no longer the center of organized Jewish life. But Jewish com-
munities continued to survive in Galilee, parts of the coastal plain, and
Judea. One version of the Talmud (studies of Jewish history and law), com-
piled in Palestine between 200 B.C. and A . D . 500, mentions over four hun-
dred Jewish settlements there. Such major historical events as the Bar
Kochba rebellion against Rome (A.D. 132-135) and the Masada episode at
the end of that period, when Jewish zealots committed mass suicide to
avoid captivity, became an important part of Jewish collective memory.
"Masada shall not fall again" is a motif often used by Israeli politicians and
soldiers in times of extreme threat to national survival.
Separated physically from the Land of Israel, Jews scattered in the dias-
pora retained close traditional and emotional ties with Palestine, chiefly
through the Bible and other Jewish religious literature that became the basis
of communal life for two thousand years. Some historical theories maintain
that through conversion, many non-Semitic peoples became Jews and that
few direct descendants of the ancient Hebrews remain. A t the same time,
over the years many Jews have either voluntarily or by force abandoned
their faith and become Christian or Muslim. What is of immediate political
relevance, however, is that most Jews are attached to their Jewish identity
regardless of their historical origins.
The largest Jewish communities were established in Europe, although
Jews were dispersed as far as China, Ethiopia, and central Asia. They con-
tinued to live in separate communities where life was based on the laws, tra-
ditions, and customs of ancient Israel. In the Byzantine, Christian nations
of medieval Europe that had state religions, Jews were prevented from par-
ticipating in communal life. They could not hold public office or own land
and were usually excluded from the mainstream of social life. Frequently,
they were expelled or became victims of political persecution. Nearly every
major European nation—Spain, France, Portugal, England, Romania, and
Germany—exiled its Jewish community at one time or another.
Thus, the nineteenth-century Jews were a people apart; they never really
became Frenchmen, Englishmen, Poles, Germans, or Russians. N o t only
were they regarded as a distinctive people by those around them, but they
also thought of themselves as such. Jews and non-Jews (Gentiles) came to
regard each other with mutual suspicion: Gentiles perceived the Jews as a
foreign element in their midst, and Jews believed the Gentiles were deter-
mined to persecute them, if not eliminate them. As a result of their exclu-
sion from landholding and such primary occupations as agriculture, Jews
often gravitated toward work others would not do. They frequently became
 Historical Origins of Israel • 13

skilled middlemen, merchants, and money lenders or, at intermediate and

lower levels of the economy, craftspeople, tailors, and the like, and a num-
ber of characteristically Jewish occupations developed. Social isolation and
economic exclusion became hallmarks of the Jewish condition in Europe
and, to some degree, in the Arab world, where Jewish communities lived
apart from their neighbors—a fact that later became significant in Zionist
ideology. These conditions intensified the closeness within the Jewish com-
munities and their inner-directed perceptions of the world and also
strengthened the emphasis on ancient Israel and glories of the past. Jewish
tradition, observance, and custom were central to the lives of Jews until
modern times; all abided by Jewish law and followed the leadership of their
rabbinical elders.
Most Jews did not distinguish between the spiritual and the physical
Palestine. In Palestine, although not in Russia or Poland, holidays, feasts,
and fasts commemorated biblical events such as Moses's flight across the
Sinai Desert from Egypt to Canaan (Passover and Sukkot), the destruction
of the first and second Jewish temples in Jerusalem (Ninth of Av, Tenth of
Tevet, Seventeenth of Tamuz), and the harvest season (Shavuot). The
annual Passover festival ended with the hopeful prayer "next year in
Jerusalem!" Jewish religious ties with Eretz Israel were more than formal or
ritualistic: There was a mystical quality about the intensity and depth of
Jewish attachment to the H o l y Land.
After the French Revolution, new ideas swept across Europe, and the life
of European Jewry was transformed. The most important changes were the
destruction of the ghetto walls that had physically isolated Jews from their
Gentile neighbors and the growing acceptance of Jews in Western Europe
as equal citizens. By the mid-nineteenth century, many of the restrictions on
Jews had been removed. In varying degrees, Jews were permitted to own
property, practice law, teach at universities, and hold government posts.
Jews became involved in political life, stood for office, and entered military
service.
Integration into the mainstream of civil life led to new forms of Judaism.
Notable was the rise of Reform Judaism, which sought to separate religious
practice and observance from the requirements of daily life. As Jews became
integrated with others and were accepted, they found it increasingly diffi-
cult to follow all of the customs and practices required by Orthodox rules.
Reform Judaism was an attempt to modernize observance and adapt it to
the lifestyles and manners of the predominantly non-Jewish environment.
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic concept of equality for all cit-
izens, regardless of religious practice, were not accepted in czarist Eastern
Europe, which responded to Western reform by imposing new restrictions
and intensifying the fight against subversive liberal ideologies. The Jews
became the chief victims, as fresh restrictions were imposed on Jewish
14 • Historical Origins of Israel

movement, places of residence, and employment. In the 1880s, Russian

anti-Semitism erupted into sporadic pogroms, with officially sanctioned at-
tacks on lives and property. These pogroms reached such proportions in
Russia by the end of the nineteenth century that the Jewish community was
thrown into turmoil. Response to czarist persecution took diverse forms.
The most common was immigration to the West. Most of the large Jewish
communities in the United States, Great Britain, and France increased vastly
during this period.
Some Jews joined indigenous protest movements including social demo-
cratic organizations, labor unions, and radical secular movements. Other
Jews preferred Jewish organizations in the common struggle against reac-
tionary forces. Secular socialist parties, like the Bund, and labor groups re-
tained a distinctive Jewish identity. Only a small number were attracted to
Jewish nationalism, which in many ways resembled other nineteenth-
century national movements. Like these other movements, Jewish national-
ism was a product of both negative and positive forces: a response to op-
pression and a revival of Jewish pride in the ancient culture. This
nationalism also had deep religious roots and affinities with the organized
religious institutions of the community. Although there was no Jewish na-
tional church similar to the Greek, Romanian, or Bulgarian Orthodox
Churches, many Eastern European rabbis played a prominent role in the re-
vival of Jewish nationalism.
Identification with a specific territory was an integral part of nineteenth-
century nationalist movements. One major difference between the newly
awakened Jewish nationalism and the other movements was that the Jew-
ish followers were far removed from the homeland with which they identi-
fied. This fact did not diminish the fervent attachment of Jewish national-
ists to the H o l y Land, however. Separation not only intensified their longing
for their land but often resulted in false perceptions of realities in Palestine.
To some it was a "land of milk and honey," to others "a land without a
people waiting for a people without a land." M a n y believed Palestine had
been abandoned since biblical times.
The reality, as the first Zionist settlers were to find out, was rather dif-
ferent. A substantial Arab population was living in Palestine at the end of
the nineteenth century, with a peasantry that cultivated large stretches of
land. In the villages and larger towns such as Jaffa, Hebron, and Nablus,
local gentry were fairly visible—many as leaders of a nascent Arab nation-
alist movement. M u c h of Palestine was desert, and cultivation was primi-
tive by European standards, leaving most of the villagers in dire poverty.
Initially, Jewish nationalism was poorly developed and loosely organized,
with no central movement or leadership. Jewish intellectuals in various
parts of Europe wrote tracts propounding a Jewish homeland as the answer
 Historical Origins of Israel • 15

to the Jewish condition. Among these writers were Moses Hess (1812-
1875), author of Rome and Jerusalem (1862), and Leo Pinsker (1821-
1891), author of Auto emancipation (1882); these works became the foun-
dation of later Zionist writings. Hess, a German socialist inspired by the
reunification of Italy in 1857, proposed a similar Jewish "national re-
naissance." He believed in the "creative genius of the nation" and called
the Jewish cause "the last national problem." Pinsker, a Russian physician
who was stirred by the pogroms of the 1880s, gave currency to a new
term, "anti-Semitism," which he described as "Judeo-phobia." The Jews—
everywhere a minority, nowhere a majority—were a "ghost-nation," an ab-
normal phenomenon, always "guests" and never "hosts." N o matter how
hard they tried, Jews would be unable to become like their Gentile neigh-
bors and gain acceptance. Forever alien, Jews were inassimilable and hated
and thus were forced to find their own homeland.
Asher Ginsberg (1856-1927), who hebraicized his name to Ahad H a ' a m
(One of the People), emphasized the cultural aspects of Jewish nationalism.
He envisioned Palestine as the center of Hebrew literature and learning, "a
true miniature of the people of Israel as it ought to be which will bind all
Jews together." His focus on Jewish ethics led him to deemphasize Z i o n -
11

ist political aspirations for a national state.

One of the first movements to evolve from early Jewish nationalist writ-
ings was Hovevei Z i o n (Lovers of Z i o n , another name for Israel), estab-
lished in Russia during the early 1880s. Its members, striving for a cultural
revival and self-determination, advocated Jewish settlement in Palestine as
a practical relief measure rather than a religious ideal. Inspired by Pinsker,
they argued that legal emancipation in Russia, even if it stemmed from hu-
manitarian motives, was useless. Only a "land of our own," whether on the
banks of the Jordan or the Mississippi, was the true solution.
One student member of Hovevei Z i o n traveled throughout Russia and re-
cruited five hundred fellow enthusiasts determined to settle in Z i o n . The
group, called the Bilu from the Hebrew initials of their rallying call in the
Old Testament, " O house of Jacob, come, let us go forth," succeeded in
sending a few youths to Palestine, where they laid the foundations for the
first Zionist town, Rishon le-Zion (First in Zion), in 1882. By the end of
the nineteenth century, a few dozen other small Jewish settlements, or
colonies (moshavot), had been established by young Jewish intellectuals
from Russia and Poland.
Initially, the early Zionists constituted a small minority group among
European Jews. Only a handful of young people actually went to Palestine.
M a n y supporters left with the millions of Jews who fled czarist persecution
and immigrated to the United States and Western Europe. Difficult living
conditions in Palestine, the problems of obtaining entry into the Ottoman
16 • Historical Origins of Israel

Empire, and the uncertainties of life there were deterrents to a mass move-
ment to the East. Economic difficulties and problems of adjusting to the
arduous pioneer life stunted the new Zionist colonies, and few ever devel-
oped into major Jewish centers. Although Zionism advocated a return to
the land in a physical as well as a historical sense, it was not easy for lower-
middle-class Jews, unaccustomed to rigorous toil, to work the land. M a n y
Bilu settlers hired Arab labor rather than till the earth with their own hands.
Thus, many of the early efforts were unsuccessful not only economically but
also ideologically as far as Zionist theory was concerned.

The Zionist Movement and

Political Zionism
Within fifteen years after the establishment of Hovevei Z i o n , the diverse
groups coalesced into a single, large, and unified world Zionist organiza-
tion. Ironically, this group's founder did not come from the ghettos of East-
ern Europe. Theodore Herzl, born in Budapest in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire in 1860, was an assimilated Western Jew. In his youth, he admired
Prussian culture and Teutonic might and found little to attract him in Jew-
ish tradition. Throughout his life, he remained rather ignorant of Jewish
customs and practices.
As a correspondent for a Viennese newspaper, Herzl attended the 1894
Paris trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a French Jewish army officer falsely
accused of selling military secrets to Germany. Dreyfus was sentenced to im-
prisonment on Devil's Island. His trial stirred humanitarian protest in West-
ern Europe and sparked waves of anti-Semitism in France. Herzl was deeply
affected by the virulent manifestations of the hatred of Jews, such as the cry
"Death to Jews!" at the ceremony at which Dreyfus was stripped of his
rank. The incident aroused Herzl's memories of anti-Semitism he had expe-
rienced as a youth.
Shortly after the Dreyfus trial, Herzl began work on a pamphlet that be-
came the basic document of the new Zionist movement. Published in 1896,
Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) laid out Herzl's perception of the Jewish
problem and proposals for a solution. He believed Jews were a unique
12

part of society, alienated from the mainstream. Therefore, they would never
be accepted and were destined to be universally hated. Where Jews go,
Herzl argued, they carry the virus of anti-Semitism; hence they must either
leave non-Jewish society or become totally assimilated into that society.
Even immigration to supposedly friendly nations would not exempt Jews
from eventual anti-Semitism. If they were not persecuted or discriminated
against for two generations, Jews might perhaps become part of a new lib-
eral society, Herzl added, but it seemed unlikely that they could be free from
persecution for so long. The Jewish problem was not religious or social, he
 Historical Origins of Israel • 17

concluded; the Jews were a "nation without a land." Therefore, the world
powers should grant them a territory to fulfill the needs of a nation. "Let
sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to sat-
isfy the rightful requirements of a nation," he wrote, "and the rest we will
arrange ourselves."
In his book, Herzl presented an action plan to establish a Jewish state. A
"Society of Jews" would organize the Jewish masses for emigration from Eu-
rope and would negotiate with the European powers for acquisition of a na-
tional territory. Any territory was acceptable as long as it met the require-
ments for a Jewish national home. Herzl, who had none of the Orthodox
Jews' deep religious attachments to the Holy Land, suggested either Pales-
tine or Argentina—the latter because of its rich undeveloped area. Jewish
public opinion and the Society of Jews would make the final determination.
After publication of his volume, Herzl traveled through the Jewish com-
munities of Eastern Europe to propagate his ideas. He also arranged audi-
ences with the most powerful political figures of the time, seeking their sup-
port. Most Jewish leaders in Western Europe and North America, who felt
secure in their liberal environments, were skeptical. They believed Herzl's pro-
gram was unrealistic and that it would jeopardize their own integration into
Western societies. Herzl's approaches to Jewish financial magnates such as the
Rothschilds and the Hirsches—two philanthropic families that had helped to
finance Jewish settlement projects in Palestine and Argentina, respectively—
were unsuccessful, providing few if any of the funds required for the venture.
The masses of Eastern European Jewry, on the other hand, lionized Herzl
as a new Moses. He was driven by a frenzy of compassion for the oppressed
Jews of Russia and Romania, warning frequently that disaster awaited
them within a generation if nothing was done about their plight. In his ef-
forts to convince those in power of the merits of his scheme, Herzl gained
access to the German kaiser, the Ottoman sultan, the pope, and the chief
political figures of Great Britain. Unable to convince imperial Germany to
become the protector of the Jewish state, he turned to Great Britain. Re-
jected by the sultan, Herzl tried to negotiate for other territories in the
British Empire—East Africa, Sinai, or Cyprus.
Enthusiasm for the Jewish state among Jews in Russia, Poland, and Ro-
mania was so great that Herzl was able to convene the First World Zionist
Congress in Basle, Switzerland, during August 1897. This was an inter-
national gathering of over two hundred delegates from all over the world,
with the largest representation coming from Eastern Europe. Those attend-
ing were a cross-section of Jewish society, representing Orthodox and Re-
form sects, Eastern and Sephardi Jews, and a variety of political persuasions
and social classes.
The major accomplishments of the First Zionist Congress were the orga-
nization of an official Zionist movement and the establishment of a formal
18 • Historical Origins of Israel

credo that later became the foundation of Zionist nationalism and of the
State of Israel. The credo stated that "the aim of Zionism is to create for the
Jewish People a home in Palestine secured by public law." To attain this
objective, Jews would be organized, as in Herzl's Jewish State, to promote
the systematic settlement of farmers, artisans, and craftspeople in Palestine.
Jewish consciousness and national identity were to be strengthened, and ef-
forts were to be made to raise the funds necessary to achieve Zionist objec-
tives. A Zionist was thereafter officially defined as a dues-paying member of
the organization who supported the Basle program.
Shortly after the congress, in late 1897, Herzl wrote in his diary: "If I
were to sum up the Basle Congress in one word—which I shall not do
openly—it would be this: at Basle I founded the Jewish State. If I were to
say this today, I would be met by universal laughter. In five years, perhaps,
and certainly in fifty, everyone will see it. The State is already founded, in
essence, in the will of the people of the State."13

In 1902, Herzl persuaded the British government to offer Uganda for

Jewish settlement. The offer nearly split the new movement between those
inclined to accept any territory and those—mostly from Eastern Europe and
with deep religious ties to the Promised Land—who would accept only
Palestine. Because of his support for the Uganda project as a temporary
shelter for the Jewish oppressed, Herzl, respected leader that he was, fell
victim to the sharp disputes within the movement, although he remained its
leader until his death in 1904. Herzl is regarded as the founder of modern
Jewish nationalism, as expressed in the Zionist idea, and as the father of
modern Israel. His picture hangs in Israel's government offices, schools, and
public places and adorns the state's postage stamps and currency. Thou-
sands of Jews every year visit his burial shrine in Jerusalem.
Herzl's Jewish State and the Basle Congress planted the seeds from which
have grown organizations and ideas that are still vital to the movement and
to Israel. These include organizations for fund-raising and mass recruit-
ment, representative bodies such as the Knesset, and the concept of pro-
portional representation in both the Israeli electoral system and the World
Zionist Congresses.
After Herzl's death, new leaders with a variety of views about the Jewish
state emerged inside the movement. In less than a decade, a wide range of
viewpoints representing diverse social, economic, and religious philosophies
developed. Some of these evolved into distinct groups or parties. Others
were merely philosophical trends unrepresented by any formal organiza-
tion. Most are represented in Israel today in either political parties or po-
litical movements and intellectual groups. The common denominator of all
Zionist parties and groups—whether religious, socialist, radical, secular,
militant, or moderate—is the Basle program conceived by Herzl in 1897. In
fact, since 1987 it has been illegal in Israel to form a political party or
 Historical Origins of Israel • 19

movement whose explicit or intended goal is to deny the Zionist nature and
ideology of the state.
Among the early divisions within Zionism were those between the cul-
tural and the political Zionists. The "culturals" were concerned less about
establishing a political entity than with reviving Hebrew identity. In the
words of Ahad Ha'am, one of the cultural leaders, the crux of the problem
was less "the need of the Jews" than "the need of Judaism."
Zionism's task was to devise new structures to contain the separate iden-
tity of the Jews. In Ha'am's view, the Jewish "national spirit" was more im-
portant than the G o d of Israel. Religion was merely an instrument through
which to preserve Jewish national identity and the special role of Jews in so-
ciety. Jewish identity was to be expressed through the revival of Hebrew as
a modern tongue and through the establishment of a Hebrew university
where the finest Hebrew culture in literary, scientific, humanistic, and other
fields would be preserved and developed. The culturalists saw Palestine as
the spiritual center of Jewish culture rather than as a political state.
Political Zionists emphasized the immediate need for a physical refuge
for Jews, for a territorial solution of the Jewish problem. A few were will-
ing to accept any land in which large numbers of Jews could be settled, but
for the overwhelming majority only Palestine was acceptable because of its
centrality in Jewish consciousness. Herzl, the political Zionist par excel-
lence, had conceived of a Jewish state with institutions that included an
army, a parliament, a constitution, and the other trappings of Western na-
tions. Throughout his career, his driving ambition was to obtain a charter
that gave international recognition to Zionist claims. A handful of "territo-
rialists" were so determined to attain a piece of exclusive Jewish national
property that they severed relations with the Zionist movement when it re-
jected Great Britain's Uganda offer in 1903. They virtually disappeared
within a few years, leaving only a few hundred followers.
Another group of Zionists stressed practical achievements in Palestine.
They emphasized "creating facts," new Jewish settlements with expanding
agriculture and industry, ports, roads, transportation, communication, and
other aspects of a national infrastructure that would give viability and va-
lidity to Jewish identity in Palestine. In the words of Chaim Weizmann,
Israel's first president, the goal was to create an "absorptive capacity" for
new Jewish immigrants on the land and in the cities. The "practicals"
placed less emphasis on political achievements than on physical expansion
of the Jewish presence in Palestine.
Still other trends developed, some shaped by political philosophies like
Marxism and socialism, some by controversies between secularist and Or-
thodox Jews. One of the strongest trends was the Zionist labor movement,
which developed several political parties. Religious Jews, who were less
strong than the Zionist socialists, also formed their own parties.
20 • Historical Origins of Israel

As distinctive political parties emerged within the movement, different as-

pects of Zionism were stressed. Parties in the militant nationalist wing, for
example, were more inclined to strive for international political acceptance
than for developing new settlements or expanding Jewish agriculture.
As the nationalist ideology solidified, a Zionist organizational apparatus
developed along with other permanent institutions. A t the apex was the
World Zionist Congress, which met every year or two depending on inter-
national circumstances. The congresses represented Zionist groups, na-
tional federations, and other subsidiary affiliates such as political parties of
religious, labor, or general Zionists; these meetings set the general outlines
of policy. Dues-paying members could vote for representatives from their
respective countries to the world congress. Most countries in Europe and
the Americas had federations of Zionist groups that were affiliated with the
world movement. The number of members expanded rapidly, growing from
over 164,000 in 1907 to more than 2 million by the late 1960s. Herzl and
his associates founded a newspaper in 1899, Die Welt, which became the
movement's official organ.
Between congresses, movement affairs were carried out by an institu-
tional bureaucracy and by subgroups such as an Actions Committee, later
called the Zionist General Council, and its executive, known initially as the
Small Actions Committee. In accord with Herzl's blueprints, the Zionist or-
ganization established its own bank in 1899. The bank was called the Jew-
ish Colonial Trust and was registered in England; it became an Israeli com-
pany in 1955. The Jewish National Fund was founded at the Fifth Zionist
Congress in 1901 to acquire, develop, and afforest land in Palestine. A sub-
stantial part of the funds were collected in small contributions from world
Jewry in blue-and-white boxes, later a common feature in Jewish homes
and synagogues.
Since its inception, the Zionist movement and its organizations have been
international in character, representing Jews from dozens of different coun-
tries and with headquarters and offices in several places. Because of Herzl's
domination, Zionist headquarters were located initially in Vienna where he
lived. After his death, they were transferred to Cologne, the residence of his
successor, David Wolffsohn, who headed the movement from 1905 to 1911.
With the advent of the next president, Otto Warburg, head of the organi-
zation between 1911 and 1920, Berlin became the center. During World
War I, the movement was divided, and an Allied branch was set up in Lon-
don. A liaison office was organized in 1915 in neutral Copenhagen to fa-
cilitate contact across the battle lines. During the presidencies of Chaim
Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, spanning the years from 1920 to 1946,
London became the capital of world Zionism. In 1936, many activities of
the organization were transferred to Jerusalem, although the presidential
organization and several members of the executive remained in London.
 Historical Origins of Israel • 21

Although great activity and large memberships were generated in Europe

and the United States during the first twenty years of Zionism, the situation
in the Middle East was different. There was still no political entity called
Palestine; it was merely a vague geographic term indicating the area where
the ancient Philistines and, later, Jews had lived. The largely Arab popula-
tion, not yet known as Palestinians, referred to itself as Syrians. After the
Ottoman conquest in 1517, the land had been divided and redivided among
several provinces until 1864, when it was partitioned between the two Ot-
toman vilayets (provinces) of Beirut and Syria and the smaller sanjak (ad-
ministrative subdivision) of Jerusalem. The special status of the land was
guaranteed by the European Christian powers after their intervention to
protect Christians in the Levant during the 1860s.
Despite Herzl's fervent pleas to the sultan, the Ottoman authorities were
reluctant to grant any special political consideration to Jewish settlers. The
Ottomans were suspicious of Zionist connections with the Western powers
and feared any further European intervention in their already disintegrating
empire. When the Turks did intervene, it was not to the advantage of the
new Jewish settlers, who the indigenous Arabs perceived as infidel intruders.
When Napoleon invaded the area in the early nineteenth century, there
were only 5,000 Jews. By mid-century the number had doubled, and it had
doubled again by the 1880s, when the first Zionist settlers arrived. Between
1882 and 1914, the number of Jews in the region grew from 24,000 to
85,000, most of whom were pious and elderly Jews who had come to die
in the Holy Land. Most Jewish residents of the country were protected by
various European powers; only 10 percent were Ottoman subjects.
The 600,000 Christian and Muslim Arab inhabitants had not yet devel-
oped a strong nationalist sentiment. Ethnic identity was based on religious
affiliation with Islam, Judaism, or one of the many Christian bodies recog-
nized as a millet (national community) by the Ottoman authorities. There
was little Ottoman intervention into the lives of most Arab villagers and
practically none into the lives of the roaming Bedouin in the south and
along the edges of the cultivated areas. Contacts between Jews and local
Arabs were rare. Few of the early Zionist leaders recognized the significance
of Arab-Jewish relations. Instead, they concentrated on contacts with the
European powers whom they believed would further their goals. After
Herzl's visit to Palestine, he barely mentioned the Arab population in his
diary or written reports.
During World War I a large number of Jewish settlers were Russians or
citizens of other Allied powers that were at war with Turkey; thus, many
were deported, imprisoned, or executed. The Zionist movement was charged
with subversion and with intent to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Insti-
tutions such as the Jewish Colonial Trust and the Anglo-Palestine Bank
were banned, and public use of Hebrew was forbidden. Natural disasters
22 • Historical Origins of Israel

including drought, a locust plague, and famine added to the miseries of the
populace. By the time General Edmund Allenby, commander of British
forces in the area, entered Jerusalem in 1917, the total population in Pales-
tine had diminished by nearly one-fifth, and the Jewish population had di-
minished by about one-third to only 55,000.

Jewish Opposition to the Zionists

Despite many controversies around and within the movement, Zionism
gradually became the strongest unifying force among world Jewry. Until
World War II, however, it had to compete with other Jewish movements and
trends. The opposition that had developed could not ignore the conceptual
thesis put forward by the Zionists, which consisted of three elements:
(1) Jews are a separate people, and their common religious and cultural
characteristics qualify them to be perceived as a national entity; (2) because
of the prevailing anti-Semitism rooted in gentile society, Jews cannot expect
to be treated as equals by their European "host" nations; and (3) the only
solution to Jews' aspirations to equality and normalcy is to establish some-
where, preferably in Palestine, a national "homeland." Thus exclusion, in-
equality, and the need for independence were the three components of the
Jewish problem and its solution as defined by Zionism. This approach
claims that Jews are a "territorial nation" aspiring to return home; they
should uproot the past and begin communal life again by creating a realm
that is free of anti-Semitism.
The essence of this nationalist approach was developed during the time
of European emancipation. The approach was, however, only one prevail-
ing option among several available to the Jews during that period. Prior to
emancipation they had virtually no options. Their identity as Jews, as a dis-
tinct group of people, was secured if not only from within and by them-
selves then from the outside by their gentile hosts. N o w , when freedom
of choice prevailed, the Jews were required—in some regions more than
others—to define who they were and how they wished to conduct their pri-
vate and collective affairs. For those who stayed within their religious com-
munities, practicing their ancient rituals and conducting their lives in ac-
cordance with traditional disciplines, these new freedoms constituted little
problem. Their identity, and hence their position in society, was firmly de-
fined by the dictates of their forebears and the rabbis. The issue of equality
mattered little; it meant they had new personal rights but also new civil
obligations (like military duty), an option they wished to avoid. Those who
moved out of the traditional community could choose one of several possi-
bilities: immigration to the United States or Western Europe (the restriction
on Jewish immigration to England, for example, was lifted in 1826), as-
 Historical Origins of Israel • 23

similation into the gentile society as individuals, or coexistence with that so-
ciety in one form or another, thus abandoning their Jewish identity.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, some estimates placed the
number of Jews in the world at about two and a half million. Almost 90
percent of Jews lived in Europe, most in the countryside because in some
countries they were forbidden to reside in cities. By the end of the nine-
teenth century there were about 10 millions Jews worldwide. During that
century and until 1925, when restrictions were imposed on free immigra-
tion to the United States, around 4.5 million Jews left Central and Eastern
Europe for the West, where they could sustain their identity. Most emi-
grated after the 1880s, when pogroms and persecutions were at their peak.
Among the millions of Jews who stayed in Europe, several thousand de-
cided to assimilate into the Christian world to enhance their personal wel-
fare. During the nineteenth century, around 250,000 East and Central Eu-
ropean Jews converted. This was not the first massive Jewish conversion; in
the Middle Ages such conversions were common in the Iberian Peninsula.
In some places in Europe it took little for a Jew to be officially considered
a non-Jew and hence to be recorded as a convert. In Austria and Prussia,
for example, Jews could cease paying taxes to the Jewish community by de-
claring themselves "without religion." In Germany and other regions, ac-
tive assimilation was easily achieved and even officially encouraged. Thus,
for example, Jews who wanted to hold public office in Prussia were re-
quired to convert to Catholicism or Protestantism. Heinrich M a r x , in order
to hold public office, baptized himself and his son Karl in 1824; a year later
the poet Heinrich Heine did the same. Abraham Mendelssohn-Bartholdy,
the father of the composer Felix, became a Christian in 1822. Jews could
become members of the British Parliament only in 1858, but Benjamin Dis-
raeli's father, Issac, had baptized and qualified him for a possible political
post in 1817.
Those who refused to convert but who, unlike the Zionists or the immi-
grants, wished to stay in Europe learned that gentile society was not ready
to accept them as equals. The principles of emancipation assert that in the
modern secular state the law protects the rights of private opinion and free
association, including religious worship. The practice of religion was con-
fined to the private domain and was therefore not in conflict with public
order. Public order entailed civil obligations, and many nonnationalist Jews
understood that to coexist with the Gentiles they needed to accept the
Christian dogma and make the proper adjustments in their methods of wor-
ship. The evolving Jewish Reform movement placed among its guiding prin-
ciples a strong patriotic identification with the state. This movement be-
came a major Jewish force in Germany and later, through immigration, in
the United States.
24 • Historical Origins of Israel

M a n y other Jews joined general revolutionary and reform movements

whose principle aim was to make society more egalitarian. These Jews
thought the collective goal, even when abstractly defined, would help to re-
solve their personal identity problem. By moving away from specific con-
cerns for their own people to concerns of the general community and shift-
ing from the battle for Jewish rights to the battle for all humankind, they
hoped to resolve their own problems. They understood that "a new begin-
ning" was called for. They considered the bourgeoisie the enemy of equal-
ity. Moreover, among the principal revolutionary thinkers, some of Jewish
origin—such as M a r x and, later, Rosa Luxembourg—identified Jews as an
integral component of the society they wished to change. Their arguments
added a problematic dimension to those made by the anti-Semitic ideo-
logues of the time. Naturally, the attempt to establish a separate secular
identity as Jews was opposed by revolutionaries as a reactionary trend.
Lenin, the leader of the Soviet revolution, favored the assimilation of Jews
and their complete disappearance into society. O n the one hand, he de-
nounced all forms of anti-Semitism; on the other, he opposed separatism,
including Jewish nationalism.
The percentage of Jewish founders, leaders, and rank-and-file members of
the socialist and social democratic parties of Central and Eastern Europe far
exceeded their percentage in the population. Leon Trotsky, founder of the
Red Army and second in command to Lenin; Lev Kamenev and Grigori Z i -
noviev, who together with Stalin constituted the Troika that ruled the USSR
after Lenin's death; M a x i m Litvinov, the Soviet Union foreign minister;
Lazar Kaganovich, a member of the Communist party Central Committee;
and Bela K u n , the Hungarian Communist dictator in 1919, are a few of the
notable Jews who believed a workers' victory would resolve the Jewish
problem as well.
Others chose to maintain their distinct, although nonreligious, Jewish
identity and to obtain their goals within the framework of their own com-
munity. M a n y upheld the concept of diaspora nationalism in two significant
groups: the Autonomists and the Yiddishists. Jews who refused to accept the
notion that they were alien in their place of residence or that anti-Semitism
was eternal and could not be avoided considered themselves to be one of
the European national groups with the same rights as other groups. They
rejected the idea of reviving Hebrew as a national language and argued that
they already had Yiddish, with its rich culture, as their national tongue.
Simon Dubnow (1860-1941), who published a multivolume account of
Jewish history, was the most important theoretician of the autonomous
concept of diaspora community life. According to Dubnow, Jews, as a
14

consequence of their exile, moved into an advanced stage of human exis-

tence and became the only true "international" nation. Dubnow felt Jews
should therefore attempt to coordinate their efforts and establish their own
 Historical Origins of Israel • 25

cultural institutions everywhere, especially an educational system with Y i d -

dish as its language. His followers organized a party in Poland (Peoples'
Party) and a newspaper (Der Monet) that fought for domination of the Jew-
ish public and aimed to establish a system of Jewish "parliaments" (diets)
to coordinate and guide the affairs of the various European communities.
A l l nations, the autonomists believed, would progress toward this Jewish
modality of human association.
The greatest rival of the Zionists in Eastern Europe, except for Orthodox
Judaism, was the Jewish socialist Bund, established in 1897—about the
same time Herzl founded the Zionist movement. Unlike many Jews who
joined the general revolutionary movements and the newly established so-
cialist and social democratic parties, the Bundists felt their activities should
be conducted only in Yiddish.
The Zionists, perhaps because of a clearer guiding concept and better or-
ganization, were gradually able to increase their power relative to the other
Jewish groups. By 1917, over half of the 500 members of the all-Russian
Jewish Congress were Zionists; only 9 percent were Bundists. Likewise,
among the 133 members of the Association of Jewish Communities in
Moscow, 53 were Zionists, 16 were Bundists, and 20 were Orthodox.
Among the 55 Jews represented in the 809-member Ukrainian parliament
(Rada), 18 were Zionists and 13 were Bundists. In other representative bod-
ies in Eastern Europe, similar proportions existed between Zionists and
their opponents. 15

A l l of these Jewish secular factions were either suppressed by the Stalin

regime or destroyed by the Nazis. The opposition presented by the Ortho-
dox group, however, became the most durable and extends into the present.
For the Orthodox, Hasidim, and others, Zionism was perceived to be far
too secular and hence as destructive of Jewish tradition and values. The
Zionist goal of restoring national life in Eretz Israel was considered counter
to religious dictates. Devoted Jews should await the coming of the Messiah
to guide them to the Holy Land. Speeding up the process of restoration, as
the Zionists proposed, was a sin. Several current Orthodox sects, such as
the Satmar Hasidim in N e w York and Naturei Karta (Keepers of the Gate)
in Jerusalem, would gladly see the State of Israel—the product of "godless"
Zionism—destroyed and its governing authorities transferred to non-Jew-
ish hands, either Christian or Muslim.
N o t all Orthodox are or were so radically opposed to Zionism. Some
from Eastern Europe and Germany who wished to protect their own ver-
sion of Judaism formed Agudat Israel in 1912, with branches in Eretz Is-
rael. This organization later became an Israeli political party. For others, es-
pecially the Mizrachi, which later became the largest faction within Israel's
National Religious Party (Mafdal), contradictions between traditional val-
ues and Zionism were resolved by a conceptual bridge that was formulated
26 • Historical Origins of Israel

by, among others, Rabbi Avraham Kook. Essentially, Kook argued that the
Zionist return to Eretz Israel signified the beginning of the divine redemp-
tion and renewal of the Jewish people. He felt the secular Zionists should
not be opposed and that attempts should be made to emphasize the spiri-
tual aspects of the national revival. Theologically, Kook suggested, Zionists
who labored over the construction of the " H o l y L a n d " should be regarded
similarly to the foreign artists and builders who erected the H o l y Temple in
Jerusalem during biblical times. Kook, a nonpartisan, became the spiritual
leader of the Mizrachi and the first chief rabbi in Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration

In the international political arena, World War I was the occasion for spec-
tacular Zionist advances. Despite the division of the movement into Allied,
Central Power, and neutral camps, it achieved the recognition Herzl had
striven for but never acquired. Both Germans and British sought the sup-
port of their respective Jewish communities and those on the opposite side
(Allies and Central Powers, respectively) through statements that recog-
nized Zionist aspirations. Zionist leaders in Allied capitals pressed their
claims to Palestine by organizing special Jewish units to assist the war ef-
fort. Joseph Trumpeldor gathered nine hundred troops in the Z i o n Mule
Corps, which served with the British against the Turks in Gallipoli. Another
Russian Zionist, Vladimir Jabotinsky, who later became the nationalist
leader, headed a campaign to create a Jewish Legion. Although they were
never organized on the scale conceived by Jabotinsky, two battalions of
Jewish volunteers from Russia, England, and the United States, called the
Judeans, were attached to General Edmund Allenby's forces. Another vol-
unteer Jewish battalion brought the number of Jewish forces in Palestine to
about five thousand.
The major political efforts were made in Great Britain and the United
States, where Zionism w o n official approval. Chaim Weizmann, a Russian-
born chemistry lecturer at Manchester University, became the focus of these
activities. After settling in England, Weizmann became an active Zionist
leader. As a young man he attended the Basle conference, and he remained
active in the newly established Zionist organization. Next to Herzl and
David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, Weizmann is probably the
individual associated the most strongly with the establishment of modern
Israel. Among his scientific accomplishments was the development of a
process to produce acetone, an essential ingredient for manufacturing the
cordite required in British artillery shells during World War I. Weizmann's
scientific work brought him into close contact with high-level British offi-
cials, and he persuaded them to support Zionism.
 Historical Origins of Israel • 27

After months of lengthy discussion and despite divisions in the British

cabinet and within the Jewish community, a compromise formula was
reached in which Great Britain officially recognized and supported Jewish
aspirations in Palestine. Some cabinet members were reluctant to adopt this
formula because of fears that support of Zionism would alienate both
Arabs in the Middle East and Muslims elsewhere in the British Empire.
Non-Zionist Jewish leaders, including Edwin Montagu, the only Jew in the
British cabinet, were apprehensive about repercussions for their identity as
loyal British subjects. But expectations that support of Zionism would re-
sult in large-scale Jewish support finally led to the Balfour Declaration, pub-
lished November 2, 1917.
The declaration was a watered-down version of what Weizmann and his
colleagues had desired. The wording was sufficiently vague to cause nu-
merous future debates. The declaration took the form of a public letter
from Lord Alfred Balfour, the British foreign minister, to Lord Lionel Wal-
ter Rothschild, a prominent British Zionist leader. It stated that " H i s
Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." 16

In deference to non-Zionists, the wording of the declaration was changed

to call for the establishment of "a national home" in Palestine rather than
"the national home of the Jewish people." The existing communities in
Palestine, as well as Jewish rights in the diaspora, were to be safeguarded.
The British Information Ministry created a special Jewish department to
follow through on the declaration. This department prepared leaflets con-
taining the text of the Balfour Declaration to drop over enemy territory and
spread word about it both in Eastern Europe and in the United States,
where Jewish sentiment was strongly antipathetic to czarist Russia, which
was Great Britain's ally until the 1917 revolution. If an alliance could be
contracted with a variety of Jewish interest groups, it might strengthen the
pro-Allied sentiment of many influential Jews and weaken those opposed to
the war. Some British officials even hoped to w i n German Jewish support.
At the same time, however, in other statements, agreements, and con-
tractual arrangements with France and with Arab nationalist leaders, Great
Britain made a variety of promises about the future of the Ottoman Empire
after an Allied victory. Some British leaders asserted that the diverse
promises could be reconciled, whereas to many they seemed contradictory.
British involvement in the Middle East became even more complicated fol-
lowing General Allenby's conquest of Palestine. Zionist leaders demanded
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