Model Essay by RJ Tarr at www.activehistory.co.

uk
"Castro's mastery of guerrilla warfare was the main reason why he was able to take control of Cuba". To
what extent do you agree with this statement?

Guerrilla warfare can be defined as a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants use
unconventional military tactics including ambushes, traps, sabotage, and mobility to fight a larger and less-mobile
enemy. In Cuba, Che Guevara worked with Fidel Castro to pursue a campaign of “constant mobility, constant
vigilance and constant distrust” to defeat Batista. However, as this essay will demonstrate, he also recognised that a
popular army could only be built up by matching military genius with political acumen (“the struggle is political-military
and must be developed and understood as such”). Nevertheless, Castro’s rise cannot be fully explained through
reference to the methods he adopted: in addition, the conditions he was able to exploit arguably produced his
revolutionary zeal and propelled him to power.

To some degree it is true that Castro’s successful rise to power can be attributed to his mastery of the art of
Guerilla warfare, although perhaps more credit can be given to Che Guevara than to Castro himself. After all,
Castro had originally aimed to gain power through democratic elections. When this path was closed due to the
Batista coup and the cancellation of the June 1952 elections he formally protested with the Zarpazo. When this had
no effect he attempted a coup of his own at the Moncada Barracks, and it was only following his release from prison
in 1955 (as a result of Batista’s misjudged political amnesty) and his acquaintance with Che Guevara that he was
persuaded that Guerrilla warfare was the way forward. Castro learned from his mistakes (“The struggle itself is the
great teacher” – Che) and after the initial setback of the Granma landing, successfully established himself in the
Sierra Maestra. There, working with other key figures such as Celia Sanchez, Castro set up cells as the movement
grew under the control of fellow revolutionary leaders (e.g. Che, Raul Castro, Cienfuegos) in different areas as the
movement grew, and adopted Che’s guerilla of “constant mobility, constant vigilance and constant distrust”:
mercilessly executing defectors from his own cause, but generously welcoming those who defected to it - especially
former soldiers of Batista who provided much-needed weaponry (guerrillas must extend “the greatest clemency
possible toward the enemy soldiers who go into battle performing…their military duty” – Che). Therefore in the Battles
of La Plata and Mercedes in 1958, the rebels were able to defeat larger and better equipped forces and seize control
of Havana in January 1959.

As well as military genius, another essential aspect of guerrilla warfare which is used to counteract
numerical disadvantages is the effective use of political propaganda to undermine the morale of opponents
and win fresh converts to the rebel cause. In this respect too Castro, developed considerable mastery. Guevara
established a newspaper (El Cubano Libre) and a radio network (Radio Rebelde) which broadcast anti-Batista
propaganda across Cuba from the “Barbudos” (‘bearded ones’) in the Sierra Maestra (Che later claimed this was
inspired by CIA operations he observed against Arbenz in Guatemala). Castro appealed to an international audience,
allowing himself to be interviewed by the admiring Herbert Matthews for the New York Times and participating in a
CBS documentary, both of which stressed that Castro was absolutely not a communist, unlike Che (author of “Man
and Socialism”). On the contrary, Castro was at pains to persuade his American audience that he "has strong ideas
of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the constitution, to hold elections." In the interview, Castro
said, "We are fighting for a democratic Cuba and an end to the dictatorship". These views influenced Roy Rubottom
of the state department, who said "The Cuban Government accuses Castro of being a communist, but has not
produced evidence to substantiate the charge". Instead, Castro was presented as a romanticised freedom fighter
inspired by the iconic Cuban nationalist Jose Marti. This built upon a reputation already established by Castro when
he turned the defeat of the Moncada barracks attack into a victory by delivering his defiant “History will absolve me”
speech at his trial and calling his rebel faction the “26th July Movement” (M-26-7 then became a prominent slogan of
graffiti around Havana). However, although he was at pains to present himself as anti-ideological, Castro
nevertheless bedded down his charisma with a clear programme of action: his “Five Revolutionary Principles” as
expressed in his “History will Absolve Me” speech and developed in the “Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra provided a
bedrock of appeal based on specific promises to all groups in society which helped him to secure overall leadership
of the rebel movement in the Pact of Caracas (1958).

If guerilla warfare is characterised by military genius and political acumen, the end result is a growing social
momentum that justifies the guerrilla forces describing themselves as a “revolutionary vanguard of the
people” (Che). Castro realised the importance of demonstrating “great respect for all the customs and traditions of
the people of the zone, in order to demonstrate effectively, through deeds, the moral superiority of the guerrilla fighter
over the oppressing soldier” (Che). Castro worked closely with the Guajiros (the poorest Cuban peasants) to build up
a base of popular support. His guerrillas always paid for whatever food they took, often at twice the market value.
When the guerrillas raided a cattle ranch, they shared their bounty equally with the peasants. The rebel camps held
adult literacy classes and free medical clinics for them. The benefit of seeing words transformed into actions served
to steel the resolve of the Guajiros to support the rebels: the peasant grapevine kept the guerrillas informed of the
army's every move.

Nevertheless, despite Castro’s clear appreciation that a successful guerrilla campaign consisted of a
combination of military strategy and political acumen (“the struggle is political-military and must be
developed and understood as such” – Che), his mastery of guerilla tactics does not provide a full
explanation of his rise to power. As Che himself later reflected “Fidel Castro, like any other human being, is the
product of history”. In this sense, the mistakes, weaknesses and miscalculations of Batista clearly have to be taken
into account: and these are manifold. Politically, he seized power in a military coup purely to prevent the calling of
free elections which the Ortodoxos party of which Castro was then a member were widely expected to win in a
landslide. He then cancelled those elections, trampled over Castro’s formal Zarpazo protest, and used his secret
police, the BRAC, to treat political prisoners with such brutality that even the CIA expressed its concerns (for
example, Haydée Santamaría - a Cuban heroine - was shown her brother’s plucked eyeball in an effort to make her
inform). Senator Kennedy pointed out in 1960 that “Fulgencio Batista murdered 20,000 Cubans in seven years - a
greater proportion of the Cuban population than the proportion of Americans who died in both World Wars, and he
turned Democratic Cuba into a complete police state - destroying every individual liberty”.
 Model Essay by RJ Tarr at www.activehistory.co.uk
Batista’s regime was as corrupt as it was violent. In terms of corruption, he gave favourable trade deals in casinos
and hotels to Mafia figures including Meyer Lansky and “Lucky” Luciano, and by 1958 US companies were draining
the Cuban economy dry: United Fruit owned 40% of Cuban sugar exports, and the ITT corporation gave Batista a
golden telephone as a ‘gift’ for his preferential treatment. By the late '50s, U.S. financial interests included 90 per cent
of Cuban mines, 80 per cent of its public utilities, 50 per cent of its railways, 40 per cent of its sugar production and
25 per cent of its bank deposits—some $1 billion in total. Whilst the richest in Cuba revelled in Havana’s status as
‘America’s playground’ the poverty in the countryside grew worse, with 50% of the population illiterate and
unemployment running at 17%. The playwright A 1956 issue of Cabaret Quarterly, a now-defunct tourism magazine,
describes Havana as "a mistress of pleasure, the lush and opulent goddess of delights". Arthur Miller described the
Batista society “as hopelessly corrupt, a Mafia playground, a bordello for Americans and other foreigners” whilst
Susan Sontag described it as “a country known mainly for dance, music, prostitutes, cigars, abortions, resort life, and
pornographic movies”. Although there is a degree of exaggeration to these claims (Cuban tourism generated less
than 10% of the income from the declining sugar industry, for example) the important fact is the symbolic value they
created of a country in terminal decline and under foreign exploitation.

Castro’s success at attracting support to his guerrilla campaign was, then, due as much to Batista’s unpopularity as
to his own military and political strategies. By the same token, however, we can see that Batista’s failings were
exacerbated by the role played by the United States in Cuban affairs. This provides us with a final, non-domestic
factor to consider when reflecting upon Castro’s rise to power. For not only were US business and mafia interests
heavily involved in Cuban affairs: so too was the American government. American exploitation of Latin America had
been formalised since the Spanish-American War (1896-98) by the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary.
More recently it was symbolised in Cuba by the Platt Amendment and the Guantanamo Bay naval base. More
recently, the Presidency of Eisenhower had provided Batista with millions of dollars worth of military aid and
assistance which had allowed him to rule with an iron fist and resist demands for liberalisation. Not only this, but
when Eisenhower decided too late to put pressure on Batista by withdrawing this aid, it simply left the Cuban dictator
exposed and vulnerable, with the result that he was unable to commit sufficient troops against Castro in the final
critical battles which were conducted under Operation Verano. Senator Kennedy, when running for President in 1960,
was scathing in his attacks upon the Eisenhower administration in this regard, criticising the “shortsighted policies”
which “lacked the imagination and compassion to understand the need of the Cuban People” and instead supported
“one of the most bloody and repressive dictatorships in the long history of Latin American repression”.

In conclusion, it is clear that Castro’s mastery of guerilla warfare – and especially his appreciation that this needed to
combine both military and political elements - clearly provides a central reason why he was able to successfully rise
to power. Nevertheless, the fertile ground in which he operated had been created by the dictatorship of Batista, which
– thanks in large part to the ill-considered and inconsistent policies of the US presidency – moved from being corrupt,
to brutal and then unstable. In this sense it is interesting to consider whether Eisenhower – rather than Castro or
Batista – was primarily responsible for the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Nevertheless, Celia Sanchez was perhaps
overly modest when she said that “We rebels get far too much credit for winning the revolution. Our enemies deserve
most of the credit, for being greedy cowards and idiots”.

Bibliography

Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me (Available at:

Fidel Castro, Sierra Meastra Manifesto (July 12, 1957) (Available at: http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban-
rebels/manifesto.htm, Last accessed 7th June 2017)

Antonio de la Cova, Voices from the Sierra Maestra: Fidel Castro's Revolutionary Propaganda (Available at:
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban-rebels/voices.htm, Last accessed 7th June 2017)

Ernesto Guevara Guerrilla warfare: A method (Available at:

Senator John F. Kennedy, Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio, Democratic Dinner (1960) (Available at:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/, Last accessed 13th June 2017)

Mateo Pimental, Guerrilla Warfare in Cuba (Available at: https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/02/11/guerrilla-warfare-

Donald Moore, Castro’s Radio Rebelde (Available at: http://www.pateplumaradio.com/central/cuba/rebel1.html, Last