10.

1057/9780230118270 - Latin American Foreign Policies, Edited by Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert
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 Latin American Foreign Policies
Between Ideology and Pragmatism

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Edited by
Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert

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9780230110953_01_prexii.indd iii 2/1/2011 11:02:34 AM

 latin american foreign policies
Copyright © Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert, 2011.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2011 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States – a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by
Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England,
company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has
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Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978–0–230–11095–3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Latin American foreign policies : between ideology and pragmatism / edited by Gian Luca
Gardini & Peter Lambert.
p. cm.
ISBN 978–0–230–11095–3
1. Latin America—Foreign relations—1980– I. Gardini, Gian Luca. II. Lambert,
Peter, 1948–
JZ1519.L385 2011
327.8—dc22
2010035729

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by MPS Limited, A Macmillan Company

First edition: March 2011

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America.

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 Chapter 1

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Latin American
Foreign Policies
between Ideology
and Pragmatism:
A Framework for
Analysis
Gian Luca Gardini

Ideology and pragmatism are integral components of foreign policy, in

fact, of any political activity in the broader sense. Principled beliefs are
indispensable lenses through which to view the world, to assess and make
sense of events and issues, and to establish goals and preferences. As a
consequence, principled beliefs provide selectors of options for action, to
translate ideals and political preferences into policy decisions and imple-
mentation. When it comes to translating theory into practice, however,
feasibility, consequences of action, and constraints of several types must
also be taken into consideration, since they too act as selectors of options.
The worlds of aspirations and ideals, realities and calculated interest,
are part of human nature; they guide human behavior and are therefore
present in foreign policy design and implementation.
The argument defended in this chapter and throughout the book
is that ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy are complementary,
rather than opposite or irreconcilable, terms. Although there is certainly
a tension between ideology and pragmatism, they are interrelated
and compatible. They are certainly not mutually exclusive. A policy

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 14 Gian Luca Gardini

dominated only by ideas would easily turn into a utopian expression,

while one guided solely by pragmatism would risk slipping into short-
term opportunism at best, and a long-term lack of direction at worst.
Any concrete foreign policy bears elements of both, and it is for the
chapters that follow to analyze the possible combinations of the two ele-
ments in specific case studies.
The more confined and humble mission here is to provide the

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instruments to read and dissect the foreign policy of a number of Latin
American countries in the light of the observable tension between ideo-
logical and pragmatic elements. There is no pretension here to formulate
mechanisms or models to demonstrate rigid laws governing the relation-
ship between the two. Instead, the goal of this analytical framework is
to explore the possible motives, locate the possible sources, and iden-
tify the possible agents of ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy.
Therefore, the chapter first provides a working definition of ideological
and pragmatic foreign policy, and then focuses on five factors that affect
the combination of the two.

Ideology, Pragmatism and Foreign

Policy: Concepts and Definitions
The notion of ideology, as with many concepts in political science, is con-
troversial, complex, and debatable. Born as a would-be science of ideas,
the term ideology was in fact read by Marx as in opposition to science,
thus implying a disparaging and unfair association between science and
truth on the one hand, and ideology and falsification on the other. Later
political theorists, especially from the liberal and conservative camp, have
also adopted a pejorative interpretation of ideology. The stronger the
acceptance of empiricism, the more critical the conceptualization of
ideology.
Non-Marxist theorists have attributed to ideology a number of defining
characteristics, including, more rightly, its “persuasive” and “explanatory”
force.1 In other words, ideology often appears or acts as moral impera-
tive and, at the same time, aims to make the world comprehensible to its
followers, as opposed to pragmatism that does not advocate either moral
imperative or provide an explanation of the world as it is or ought to be.
In this sense, ideology can be said to refer to “systems of thought that
orientate politics towards abstract principles and goals and away from
practical and historical circumstances.”2 The terms ideology and pragma-
tism are employed here specifically to capture this difference in emphasis.
More specifically, ideology is not understood in a derogatory sense, it is
not associated with radical, nondemocratic, or totalitarian political views,

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 15

and it is not placed in hierarchical competition with political theory or

political philosophy.
The dichotomous relationship between ideological views of politics
or policies on the one hand, and “pragmatic,” value-free approaches to
them, on the other, is at best misconceived. Values are key to any under-
standing of all social activities. In a broad sense, “all coherent political
doctrines are ideological, as is our use of political ideas themselves.”3 Not

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only are revolutionary or radical political doctrines ideological, but so
are conservatism and liberalism. To a degree, not even pragmatism itself
escapes this logic in that its assumptions and judgments are guided by
value-oriented preferences. Indeed ideology does not deserve simplistic
marginalization in political analysis as value-biased or misleading.
Ideologies are “forms of political thought that provide important direct
access to comprehending the formation and nature of political theory,”4
as well as action and practice, one may add, and hence the ideological
character of a political doctrine is its “non-negotiable set of beliefs” that
direct its practice.5 Finally, while ideology “straddles the conventional
boundaries between descriptive and normative thought and between
theory and practice,”6 pragmatism clearly privileges practice, negotiation,
and the descriptive dimension.
The nexus between ideology and pragmatism on the one hand, and
foreign policy actions on the other also deserves scrutiny. Ideology and
pragmatism are not direct causes of foreign policy. The preeminent func-
tion of ideology is to affect the belief system of individuals in the pursuit
of political goals. According to Carlsnaes, “Ideologies are by definition
not causal factors in the explanation of foreign policy actions [. . .]”, but
they are, nevertheless, always directly related to values and perceptions,
which are in turn causal factors.7 A certain type of ideology does not
necessarily result in the same type of political outcome. If a causal nexus
exists, this is indirect and takes place at three levels, with ideology and
pragmatism acting as: (a) an analytical prism to make sense of certain
situations, (b) a guide for action prescribing policy solutions, and (c) a
legitimization or justification of a certain course of action, responding to
preset principles or expected consequences.8 Ideology and pragmatism
converge to shape the determinants of foreign policy and are at the same
time a manifestation of it.
Politics and International Relations (IR) literature, with reference to
Latin America in particular, has abounded with terms apt to capture the
tension and sometimes the incongruence between broadly ideological and
pragmatic approaches to foreign policy. There is a widespread sense that
consideration of ideals and aspirations on the one hand, and their practi-
cality with regard to existing constraints on the other, constitutes a sort of

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 16 Gian Luca Gardini

continuum with various intermediate combinations possible. This is rein-

forced by a solid methodological and empirical tradition in both political
and historical disciplines, regarding the tension between ideology and
pragmatism. In terms of method, the debate on pragmatism and its per-
ceived opposite was the subject of a special issue of the academic journal
Millennium in 2002. This perceived opposite was defined as a “fixation
with absolute and exclusive [. . .] solutions.”9 Pragmatism instead should

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constitute an “alley of inquiry into international relations” that “invokes
a methodological pluralism and a disciplinary tolerance grounded in
the resolute acknowledgement of fallibilism and contingency.”10 While
pragmatism privileges “punctual engagement with practice” and comple-
mentarity, its opposite, which in this volume we call ideology, emphasizes
theoretical solutions and opposition.11
Examples of the use of ideology and pragmatism span across time,
academic disciplines and schools, geographic backgrounds, and a variety
of topics. One analyst suggested that in the conclusion of the 1942
Anglo-Soviet alliance, both Britain and the Soviet Union were driven by
“supremely ideological interests,” but that their actions were inspired by
“a resolute pragmatism.”12 In a search for legitimizing criteria for
humanitarian intervention, one scholar employed the terms pragmatism
and solidarism, the latter understood as the underpinning idea/ideology
that would confer legitimacy on international humanitarian intervention.13
Other scholars had recourse to the terms ideology and prudence in an
attempt to lay the social foundations of realism.14 These authors also
argued that ideology tends to prevail only when few consequences are
attached to actions, which is rarely the case in international affairs.
Ideology and pragmatism have also been used to describe current U.S.-
Latin American relations. Jorge Dominguez described pragmatism as:

A state policy that identifies clear purposes and well-defined goals, that is
carried out with means and instruments specifically aimed at the achieve-
ment of these purposes, with the awareness as much of pursuing verifiable
benefits as of the possible costs that may be incurred in the pursuit of
these benefits.15

Conversely, ideology was understood as a mechanism to catalogue, assess,

and value information that is a useful instrument to understanding the
world we live in.16 The most undesirable effects of ideological excess were
distinct and separate from ideology itself. These were in fact associated
with a third category, dogmatism, which is “a mental scheme elaborated
at some point in the past [. . .] that is disconnected from current reality,
prevents learning of new ideas, acknowledgement of new information

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 17

and change or modification of existing policies.”17 However, dogmatism

can be considered as an excess or a degeneration of both ideology and
pragmatism.
Following the lessons drawn from the existing literature, this brings
us to a working definition of pragmatism and ideology in foreign policy.
A pragmatic foreign policy is a foreign policy based on the principle
that the usefulness, workability, and practicality of ideas, policies, and

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proposals are the criteria of their merit. It stresses the priority of action
over doctrine, of experience over fixed principles. Strong emphasis
is placed on evaluation of assertions and actions according to their
practical consequences. A pragmatic foreign policy may be associated
with and characterized by medium-term planning and state, rather than
government, policy. An ideological foreign policy emphasizes principles
and doctrinaire solutions over adaptability and the practical consequences
of assertions and actions. Compatibility with established principles is the
key criterion with which to assess the merit of foreign policy. Although
ideological stances are clearly not necessarily dogmatic, a foreign policy
based on ideology prioritizes preconceived positions and remedies over
their actual viability and usefulness. An ideological foreign policy may be
associated with and characterized by relatively short-term planning and a
personalized vision of international relations related to a specific leader or
administration rather than to a consistent national interest.
Reiterating the concept that elements of both pragmatism and
ideology coexist in any concrete foreign policy, the aim here is to look at
where the two elements meet, overlap, and interact, and to analyze their
output in terms of foreign policy behavior. Ideology and pragmatism are
used as qualities or attributes of foreign policy, comprising its concep-
tion, formulation, and implementation. Attention therefore now shifts
to those factors that may determine or affect their interrelationship and
combination. These include the ends and purposes of a given foreign
policy, the means available to achieve them, the role of significant indi-
viduals, the process through which foreign policy is designed and then
implemented, and the historical and political context.

Ends and Purposes

The aim of a country’s external actions and the specific objectives that
it intends to pursue affect the employment of pragmatism and ideology
in its international positioning. This is as true for objectives in terms of
material gains (access to resources, markets) as it is for immaterial ones
(prestige, influence). For example, is a given country trying to radically
change an internationally concerted policy or even the system, or is it

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 18 Gian Luca Gardini

pursuing more recognition or prominence within that system or issue

at stake? Or is it in fact struggling only to achieve greater autonomy or
bargaining power? Another key dimension in terms of objectives is the
recipient of foreign policy. The language and the style employed, as well
as the combination of pragmatism and ideology, may vary according
to the interlocutor. Is the objective of a given foreign policy to reach
and rally internal constituencies, or to galvanize allies, or is it aimed at

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reassuring neighbors or international institutions?
Evidence suggests that a country whose aim is to gain greater respect-
ability and prominence within an established club will tend to adopt
more pragmatic positions, essentially designed to please or appeal to the
members of the club, while emphasizing its own agenda within it. Such is
the case, for example, of the rise of Brazil to global power status. Brazilian
foreign policy has consistently sought a more prominent role for the
country in both regional and global arenas, and hence the purpose has not
been to radically change those arenas or their principles, but rather to gain
status within them in order to advance the Brazilian agenda. If a country
intends to become a global power, as Brazil does, it has to accept responsi-
bilities and duties, and avoid, where possible, confrontation lest it jeopardize
its bid. Its diplomacy will stress commonalities and complementarities with
as many interlocutors as possible and on as many subjects as possible and the
country will have to abide by and promote the rules of the club to which it
seeks membership. With power comes responsibility, an adage that Hedley
Bull incorporated into the English School of International Relations.18
The problem with more pragmatic stances is that sooner or later
ideological elements enter the fray and force a choice. Brazil has until
now stressed its common interests with the United States, its historical
and current ties with Europe, and, most recently, its commonalities with
the other BRIC countries, Russia, India, and China. The first BRIC
ministerial meeting at Yekaterinburg in May 2008 brought to light the
ideological preference for change that the BRIC hold with regard to the
international order and international institutions.19 Whether this is com-
patible with the more conservative and gradual approach of Washington
and Brussels remains to be seen, but what has already emerged is a sense
of an uncomfortable balancing act that Brazil has to perform in order
to present itself as a champion of the underdogs and the poor, and at
the same time, a respected and influential member of the most powerful
nations. Brazil’s identity as one of the former reinforces its claims to the
latter, but this ambivalence cannot last forever.
Conversely, a country whose aim is to reject or subvert a given system
or course of action may place more emphasis on ideology and assertive
behavior, stressing change and confrontation with the existing order

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 19

and its agents. This is the case of Venezuelan foreign policy under Hugo
Chavez, which has aimed to reform the regional system, to purge it from
the excess of capitalism, neoliberalism, and the dependence of peripheral
countries on the developed nations. With the aim of a deep rupture with
the past and to create greater independence from the powerful countries
of the North, ideological discourse and confrontational behavior may
well be viable options, since more conciliatory approaches may simply

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reproduce the patterns of domination and asymmetry that the policy
seeks to break.
While a broadly speaking ideological stance may be dominant in
such cases, elements of pragmatism are not discarded. Chavez’s inflamed
and at times offensive rhetoric against the United States and President
Bush was meant to mark an ideological boundary between good and
evil, desirable and unacceptable, while concrete Venezuelan initiatives
such as the regional ventures ALBA, Petrosur, Banco del Sur, and Telesur,
represent a counterhegemonic ideological project. However, in order to
achieve its ideological and strategic goals, the Chavez administration has
not rejected pragmatic tactics. After ten years of chavismo, the United
States remains the major buyer of Venezuelan oil and the first commercial
partner for Caracas.20 Oil revenues and trade with the United States are
indispensable in sustaining the regime and funding its ideological goals
and initiatives.
To the extent to which Bolivarian states and their likes can be con-
sidered revolutionary states, their behavior is entirely consistent with the
theory, history, and practice of what Fred Halliday terms “the antinomies
of revolutionary foreign policy.”21 A revolutionary state often adopts a
dual foreign policy stance: support for similar regimes or revolutionary
movements abroad, but alongside necessary relations with other states.
Tensions and contradictions, such as change vs. continuity, revolution
vs. counterrevolution, nationalism vs. internationalism, arise in the revo-
lutionary state’s conduct at home and abroad. Behind an emphasis on
rupture, “aspiration and constraint enduringly interact,” while “calcula-
tions born of domestic and international considerations affect the form
and degree of the challenge to the system.”22 While ends and objectives
may tell us something about the prevalence of ideology or pragmatism in
foreign policy, either element can in fact be tactically used to foster the
other strategically.
This is precisely the case of countries whose foreign policy goal rep-
resents a more pragmatic effort to assert their autonomy and role in a
context dominated by others, and to extract gains from more power-
ful neighbors. President Correa of Ecuador has pursued a diplomatic
rapprochement with the Bolivarian countries and distanced himself

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 20 Gian Luca Gardini

from Washington to give his country greater freedom of maneuver

from dependence on the United States and a dollarized economy. While
employing a seemingly Bolivarian ideology and at times hyperbolic
rhetoric, Correa has also displayed a clear sense of pragmatism. He
declared himself ready to reject the bilateral Free Trade Agreement with
the United States, which is not yet into force and whose ratification is
still pending at the U.S. Senate, but strongly campaigned in favor of

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the renewal of the U.S. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication
Act (ATPDEA), which actually grants Ecuador vital access to the U.S.
market with preferential conditions. Moreover, Ecuador has so far only
joined the Chavez-created regional bloc ALBA as an observer, rather than
a full member, thus retaining a degree of space for maneuver between
Washington and Caracas.
Objectives understood in terms of the intended audience also play a
role in defining the combination of pragmatism and ideology. In 2005,
President Lula of Brazil addressed both the World Economic Forum gather-
ing of captains of industry and world leaders, and the World Social Forum
gathering of antiglobalization activists. While this is a tribute to Brazil’s
ability to champion diverging interests and to sit quite comfortably on
very diverse tables, the speeches delivered by Lula in the two venues bore
significant differences, in tone, substance, and emphasis.23 Interestingly,
however, Hugo Chavez’s most aggressive verbal attacks against the United
States were delivered at national party rallies, as well as (less successfully)
before the UN General assembly in 2006, reflecting that at high profile
international venues certain ideological excesses may prompt more irrita-
tion than solidarity.24 Both cases highlight how the nature of recipient
audiences affects the rhetorical mix of pragmatism and ideology.

The Available Means

The resources available to a country to pursue its foreign policy also
determine the mix of pragmatism and ideology. Certainly, traditional ele-
ments of power, such as size, natural resources, geography, demography,
and military and economic capabilities affect the international presence
of a country. Although it is difficult to predict toward which direction—
ideology or pragmatism—the available assets may lead, a number of
examples may provide interesting indications. More industrialized, devel-
oped, and wealthier countries may afford more variety in foreign policy
options, while limited resources may lead to ideologically driven positions
of alignment or rejection. Indeed, ideology itself may be an invaluable
asset to the international profile of an otherwise marginal and resource-
poor country.

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 21

More developed countries with good resources (geographic, demo-

graphic, material, and human) will tend to adopt quite pragmatic inter-
national positions. This may be for four reasons: first, the possession of
the resources necessary for development and status tend to make the
country a more satisfied and conservative power; second, the country’s
assets allow it to enjoy credibility and influence without making ideology
a prominent feature; third, an ideological and assertive posture on a

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global scale may cause more friction than cooperation; and fourth, exten-
sive interests and reach engage the country on several negotiating tables
and issues thus providing greater room for maneuver. This eases the
management of reward and concessions, which in turn favors pragmatic
and flexible stances over nonnegotiable requests. An extensive network of
international political and economic connections also increases the price
for deviance or defiance.
Brazil exemplifies these considerations. The country has no appetite
for disputes, and since 1985 has consistently sought regional cooperation
to reinforce its standing and promote its agenda within Latin America
and beyond. Although it has maintained a position of autonomy from
the United States throughout most of its history, Brazil has long been
perceived in Washington as a favorite partner in Latin America for
its political and economic weight. Brazil has rarely resorted to fixed
ideological positions and has been able to pursue its ideological agenda
(“thirldworldism” or social democracy) through pragmatic diplomacy, by
virtue of its size, economic power, strategic location, and most recently
“soft” power. Its considerable resources facilitate its presence in many
international institutions, allowing it greater pragmatic use of leverage
through rewards and sanctions to critics and allies, especially at the
regional level. A country with less attributes of power than Brazil would
probably not be able to afford such eclecticism.
While those with such resources may display a preference for pragma-
tism, those without may be tempted by a greater emphasis on ideology.
This is due to four possible reasons: first, poor or peripheral countries
are in pressing need for immediate solutions to urgent problems and
hence may not be in a position to pursue the lengthy negotiations and
gradual progress that pragmatism generally entails. Second, a vigorously
ideological stance is a rapid and cheap way to increase international
visibility and potentially, negotiating power. In this sense ideology acts
as a supplement to otherwise limited capabilities. Third, for poorer
countries there is little to lose from defying the existing order. On the
contrary, confrontation may lead to concerns being registered on the
international agenda, raising awareness of previously unrecognized needs,
claims, and objectives. Fourth, those most adversely affected by the rules

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 22 Gian Luca Gardini

of the international system, will often have an ideological criticism of the

system and have a genuine desire for change in the rules of the game.
It is probably not a coincidence that it has been some of the poorest
countries that have taken the most ideological positions and bold ini-
tiatives in twenty-first-century Latin America. Lacking the means to
make their voice heard in international forums, Bolivia and Ecuador,
for instance, have embraced aspects of the radical Bolivarian agenda

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of Hugo Chavez, joining Venezuela due to a genuine desire to create
a more equitable regional system. However, it is also in their interest
to capture international attention and increase their negotiating power
with neighbors and other international actors. Conversely, none of the
wealthier and more influential countries in South America have joined
the Bolivarian initiatives.
A country lacking substantial power may opt to rely more signifi-
cantly on the support of international allies, or attempt to play them
off each other (often adopting appropriate ideological stances) in order
to extract as many gains as possible. Historically, Latin American coun-
tries with limited power have had a choice to align with the systemic
or subsystemic hegemon or to opt for ideological resistance.25 In the
case of alignment, the link between the style and preferences of the
dominant and subservient partners is obvious. In the case of resistance,
rejection of the hegemon’s ideology may prompt the endorsement of
the ideology of a counter hegemon. For example, without Venezuelan
ideological and material support, Bolivia would hardly be in a posi-
tion to stand in its current ideological opposition to the United States.
Venezuela itself, without its natural resources may not be able to sustain
its ideological stance and initiatives. Similarly, Peru and Uruguay, that
seem to acquiesce happily in the Brazilian lead on the continent, have
adopted Brasilia’s preference for pragmatic and negotiated—rather than
ideologically based—solutions. In the absence of significant resources,
siding with allies and their predominant foreign policy feature—ideology
or pragmatism—is both a rational and a likely position.
However, in the absence of significant resources and assets, interna-
tional partners and allies can also be exploited to one’s own advantage
by using a calculated mix of ideology and pragmatism. During the
Cold War several Latin American countries played the anti-Communist
card and exaggerated the threat of subversion in order to obtain better
deals and concessions from the United States. Likewise, historically,
Paraguay and Uruguay have oscillated between the influence of Brasilia
and Buenos Aires in order to improve their position in the Plata Basin
system. More recently, both Paraguay and Uruguay, disillusioned by
the lack of expected, tangible benefits from membership of Mercosur,

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 23

sought closer relations with the United States, employing the rhetoric
of dissatisfaction and the threat to switch ideological camps in order to
force Argentina and Brazil to offer greater concessions within Mercosur.
Precisely because a U.S. free trade area with either country would preju-
dice the entire Mercosur project, the bargaining power of both small
countries increased.
Finally, ideology can be a resource in itself. The attention that Cuba

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has received in the last fifty years is largely due to its ideological stance.
Were it not for that, Cuba’s strategic position alone would not have been
sufficient to generate so much attention and Cuban foreign policy would
have undoubtedly remained off the list of U.S. priorities. However, while
weak countries may generally be more attracted to ideological postures
than powerful states, there is nothing deterministic in this and it does
not entirely explain the mix of ideology and pragmatism. Instead, human
agency and the particular qualities of a country’s leaders are further, often
crucial, variables in explaining foreign policy

Agency and the Human Factor

The beliefs, perceptions, and individual preferences of decision makers
have a paramount impact on the mix of ideology and pragmatism
informing the external relations of a country, since these individuals
formulate and implement foreign policy. The relationship between
agency and structure goes two ways, and while structures certainly affect
individual perceptions and behaviors, individuals can drastically affect
structures and policy outcomes. As Robert Kennedy recalled in his mem-
oirs of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, President John Kennedy sought
advice from some thirty of the most competent and brilliant personalities
in the U.S. administration, but if six of them had been president instead
of JFK the crisis would have resulted in nuclear war.26 The purpose of
this section is therefore to explore how, through what processes or mecha-
nisms this occurs.
To argue that the international environment fully accounts for a state’s
behavior implies, implicitly or explicitly, that all states endowed with
comparable capabilities react similarly to the same objective external
circumstances, an argument that is simply not sustained by historical evi-
dence. Robert Jervis, a pioneer of cognitive approaches to international
politics, maintains that individual perceptions may explain a number
of aspects of international politics.27 Indeed, the quality and percep-
tions of the political leadership may well account for differences in the
international behavior of states, which cannot be explained solely in the
light of national or international constraints.28

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 24 Gian Luca Gardini

Recent studies have demonstrated how the quality of national elites

can affect the fate of a nation.29 One could hardly imagine Venezuela
taking such vociferous and bold positions were it not for the ideo-
logical orientation emanating from Hugo Chavez’s personal convictions.
A similar argument can be made for Bolivia and Evo Morales. Lula’s
charisma and personal background have made him an example both
for the international financial sector and antiglobalization protestors,

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an almost unique status in contemporary world politics. On the other
hand, in the case of Chile, socialist leaders such as Ricardo Lagos and
Michelle Bachelet have retained the same foreign policy model despite
neoliberalism being the legacy of its authoritarian past under General
Pinochet.
Goldstein and Keohane have identified three possible pathways to
explore how the ideas and beliefs of individual leaders affect foreign
policy.30 First, ideas provide road maps to interpret reality and select a
limited set of desired outcomes among the many possible. Second, in the
absence of a unique or clearly defined course of action, ideas orientate
decision makers’ strategic choices. Finally, once ideas are institutionalized
in a consolidated set of norms and rules, they define policy in the absence
of further innovation. Adopting this theory and applying it to the rela-
tionship between ideology and pragmatism, the relationship between
individual leaders’ predispositions toward ideology or pragmatism may
translate into policy, affecting its nature and style.
Two examples clarify this. First, Hugo Chavez’s ideas strongly associ-
ate the historic role of the United States with the current problems of
Latin America. This forms a road map, providing a range of options in
terms of reaction to U.S. actions. In the wake of the 2008 Colombian
attacks on FARC guerrillas in Ecuadorian territory, Chavez adhered to
his ideological position and immediately condemned both Colombia
and the United States, despite the lack of concrete evidence of the
latter’s involvement. Indeed, it may be argued that anti-Americanism has
become an embedded guiding norm in Venezuela’s foreign policy, due to
the ideological position of its president.
Second, following the 2001 crisis in Argentina, President Kirchner
aimed to prioritize the recovery of production and employment above
any ideological stance on foreign policy. In the absence of immediately
clear solutions, Kirchner’s pragmatic style informed Argentina’s interna-
tional action, leading to odd but pragmatically calculated choices, such
as the acceptance of assistance from Venezuela and the rejection of tradi-
tional partners such as the IMF and Italy. This stance became the rule of
Argentina’s foreign policy until economic stability was regained. While
the process of translation of ideas into action followed similar paths in

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 25

the two cases, in the absence of obvious solutions, Chavez adhered to

ideological convictions, whilst Kirchner pragmatically assessed options.

The Foreign Policy Process

The process through which foreign policy is designed, adopted, and
implemented is as important as the output31 and affects the mix of ide-

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ology and pragmatism. The process not only places constraints on the
available options and possible actions, but also influences the very way
in which people think and act. For example: the presence of a charis-
matic leader may affect the behavior of advisors; respect for institutional
procedures may bring into play additional issues or delay decisions; too
much or too little information may prompt decision makers to rely on
reassuring ideological behavior; or time pressure may engender “gut
feelings” and ideological decisions.32 Regime type, the openness of the
decision-making process, the role and power of different national and
international stakeholders, the weight of domestic considerations, and
the issues at stake, all deserve scrutiny.
The extensiveness and inclusiveness of the foreign policy-making
process may influence the mix of pragmatism and ideology. Processes
that are inclusive and open to several voices, including dissent, seem to
produce effective, consistent, and well-grounded foreign policy. Highly
professionalized decision-making structures, characterized by compe-
tence and experience, are more likely to select information efficiently and
objectively. Also, the wider the support for a policy, the easier and more
consistent its implementation becomes. All of these examples relate to
pragmatism and fit the case of Brazil. Brazilian foreign policy is devised
and conducted by the president, in close cooperation with the foreign
ministry, Itamaraty, a highly professionalized body with a reputation for
efficiency, and is relatively open to civil society input. It is no surprise
that Brazilian foreign policy has enjoyed a high degree of consistency,
pragmatism, and ultimately success.
On the other hand, restricted, inaccessible, and exclusive decision-
making processes seem to produce less than desirable effects, and “group
think” studies have highlighted distortions that may occur when small,
cohesive, and insulated elites take decisions.33 The group may display an
inclination toward emotional responses, uniformity, and a proclivity to
support the leader, or preserve the group unity. The selection of informa-
tion may be biased leading to the consideration only of those options
that conform to the dominant or established view. Newcomers to power
may suffer from an additional “new group syndrome” as they strive for
success, often through change.34 These findings fit what we have defined

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 26 Gian Luca Gardini

here as ideological foreign policy. The symptoms seem to match the cases
of Chavez and Morales among others. Both rely on a restricted circle of
trusted and like-minded advisors, both came to power as newcomers and
nonprofessional politicians and were eager to emphasize and implement
political change, and were hungry for high profile success.
Foreign policy is rarely confined to presidential circles. In democratic
regimes policy decisions involve several state agencies and may require

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delicate political negotiations between government and opposition,
executive and civil service, or among coalition parties. In the presence of
complex state machines, the definition and implementation of foreign
policy is the result of organizational processes—the interactions between
state departments and their own interests, cultures, and agendas—and
bureaucratic politics—the political bargaining between stakeholders in
a given issue.35 In these instances, rather than decisions as winning
positions, policy outcomes are the end product of compromise and
incremental change. Thus, bureaucratic and political apparatuses are
crucial to an understanding of the motives, sources, and agents of
ideology and pragmatism in modern states.
Two examples clarify the dynamics of organizational processes and
bureaucratic politics. When Argentine-Brazilian integration was first dis-
cussed in the mid-1980s, there was consensus in Brasilia on the principle,
but divergence on the practical measures. The Customs Policy Committee
within the Ministry of the Economy was in favor of a pragmatic compro-
mise with the Argentines, while the Agency for External Trade initially
displayed a more ideologically protectionist stance.36 The different atti-
tudes stemmed from different organizational cultures and interests and
the deal eventually struck with the Argentines was the result of compro-
mise within the Brazilian delegation.37 Chile’s international projection as
an international commercial power characterized the foreign policy of the
Concertación government, whether headed by the Christian Democrats
or the Socialists. Such consistency is even more striking if one considers
that it dates back to the Pinochet years. Such consistency was possible
due to a widely shared (and highly pragmatic) consensus, spanning across
the political spectrum and Chilean civil society,38 regarding the desirable
international identity of Chile.
If foreign policy is often the continuation of domestic politics with
other means,39 then the impact of domestic divisions and debates clearly
has an impact on the mix of ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy,
and may focus domestic attention onto foreign policy issues. For example,
ongoing negotiations on migration with the United States attract signifi-
cant domestic attention in Mexico. Whilst national sensitivity may lead
to more emotional and ideological response, the larger the number of

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 27

stakeholders the more negotiated and pragmatic the policy outcome will
usually be, especially on vital international issues.40
Moreover, the role of foreign actors may play a dual role in such
situations. For example, strong U.S. positions on migration in Mexico
or drug trafficking in Colombia or Bolivia, may cause irritation and
an ideological resistance based on claims to national autonomy, or they
may encourage more contained and pragmatic reactions. While foreign

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NGOs, governments, media, and commercial interests may influence a
country’s domestic decisions, foreign actors do not tend to make decisions
in sovereign states.41 Ultimately, therefore, the combination of ideology
and pragmatism in foreign policy may be externally influenced, but it is
adopted by internal decision makers, who ultimately bear responsibility
for the choice.

The Historical and Political Context

Events and episodes occur within a historical and political context.
Domestically, national character, history, and institutions affect interna-
tional conduct. Internationally, Neorealists argue that the configuration
of the international system has an impact on the interactions between its
units,42 while others maintain that the influence of the system depends
on the reading that actors make of it.43 Nevertheless there is a shared view
that the context offers both opportunities and constraints. The structure
within which foreign policy takes place may play a significant role in
determining the mix of ideology and pragmatism.
On the domestic plane, regime type, institutional arrangements and
procedures as well as national character or culture deserve exploration.
While the former two elements relate more to the process of foreign
policy formation, the focus here is on how national culture, history, and
identity shape foreign policy postures. For instance, attitudes toward
otherness define a nation, as exemplified by the ambivalent relation of
Latin America with the United States. “Natural role conception”44 can
shape perceptions and self-perceptions, thus directing foreign policy atti-
tudes toward more ideological or pragmatic behavior, as witnessed in the
cases of the United States and Brazil.45 Ultimately, however, culture is not
in itself a cause of foreign policy behavior. Instead the point is rather who
draws what ideas, how and for what purposes or agendas.46 This takes the
discussion back to issues of goals and agency in foreign policy.
A further factor strongly influencing foreign policy, is that of
nationalism, on the rise throughout Latin America and which may well
affect the combination of ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy. On
a global level, nationalism has consistently been accompanied by a more

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 28 Gian Luca Gardini

assertive foreign policy, informed by strongly ideological elements and

the defense of national sovereignty and national interests. Ideologically,
nationalism has been diverse and multifaceted, embodying a “cluster
of perspectives,” but essentially taking two main forms: either narrow,
tribalist, bellicose, and potentially totalitarian, or attached to a sense of
emancipation and civic liberation.47 In contemporary Latin America the
latter clearly prevails.

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Nonetheless, its consequences for foreign policy are complex. The
links between group, identity, culture, and allegiance that underpin
nationalist ideology(ies) are being redefined. Latin America’s rising asser-
tiveness has in fact at least three dimensions: subnational (indigenous
nations and marginalized communities seeking liberation from exclusion
or elite domination), national (state sovereignty to counter external pres-
sures), and regional (Latin America as a unity, especially in opposition to
the United States and global change). The reconciliation of these dimen-
sions poses challenges for the state itself, the elaboration of its foreign
policy, and the regional integration projects supported by states. The
prominence and management of these aspects and the tensions they may
generate (nationalism vs. regionalism) produce diverse combinations of
ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy and most of all in the possible
construction of regional unity.
On the international plane, several studies have pointed to a cor-
relation between the structure of the system, the rules for interaction
within it, and a predisposition toward ideology or pragmatism. Different
rules and working principles characterize different international system
configurations. For example, in a balance of power system, as was in place
until World War I and possibly today after the end of the U.S. unipolarity,
alliances depend on advantage and hence states would tend to give priority
to advantages and interests over ideology, at least in term of alliances. In
the bipolar system of the Cold War, relations tended to rest more on ide-
ology.48 The prevalence of pragmatism in today’s Latin American foreign
policies could be explained by the end of U.S. unipolarity, the grow-
ing number of competing powers in the international system, and the
increased number of solutions that this offers to all countries.
There is also an additional, related, and complementary explanation.
The increase in the number of significant actors entails an increase in
the number and nature of interests and thus contested issues on the
international agenda. This has an impact on the mix of ideology and
pragmatism. The greater the number of issues contested in the interna-
tional system, the greater the degree of bargaining behavior in foreign
policy and the lower the level of ideological intransigence.49 This further
explains the prevailing pragmatism of Latin American foreign policies in

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 29

today’s multipolarity. More influential actors provide not only a variety of

ideological options, but also of issues for contestation and hence greater
potential for cross-issue alliances. This in turn creates greater interdepen-
dence, increasing the costs of confrontation, and raising the attractiveness
of international diplomacy.
Accepting this argument, one may ask what happens under condi-
tions of unipolarity. Logic would have it that with only one dominant

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power in the system, the international agenda is reduced to that of the
hegemon. In this case, ideological behavior in foreign policy would reach
its peak, promoting wide acceptance of the hegemon’s ideology along
with greater ideological uniformity (whether imposed or not) and less
ideological opposition. This was largely the case in the mid-1990s when
post–Cold War euphoria and the generalized acceptance of the U.S.
ideology of electoral democracy and free markets permeated the whole
of Latin America. In a sense, ideology and pragmatism coincided, since
no alternative option seemed to be available. The most pragmatic stance
therefore became ideological alignment. Indeed the only Latin American
contribution to IR Theory in that period, realismo periférico, preached
exactly this kind of behavior.50
Historical phases of upheaval, fragmentation, or centralization, in
other words of system transition, also impact upon foreign policy choices.
George Modelski has argued that the international system experiences
cycles of change every 120 years, including four phases of global war
and emergence of new power(s), world power, delegitimization of world
power, and finally deconcentration of power to other actors.51 Foreign
policy predispositions may derive from the specific phase of the cycle.52
Following this reading, the end of the Cold War and the 1990s repre-
sented the apogee of U.S. power, resulting in ideological conformity.
Such a reading would also suggest that we are currently between the
delegitimization and the deconcentration phase; U.S. power and values
are increasingly under question. Ideology and pragmatism coexist, the
former challenges and delegitimizes established power, the latter grabs the
opportunities decentralization offers.

Conclusion
Identifying factors affecting foreign policy is not the same thing as tracing
their influence.53 The acknowledgement that ideological and pragmatic
elements shape foreign policy does not equate to understanding how they
interact or to establishing under which conditions one may prevail over
the other. The variables are so many, so complex, and so interrelated that
a convincing explanation can only be sought in specific case studies and

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 30 Gian Luca Gardini

limited periods of time. Accordingly, the purpose and task of this ana-
lytical framework was to explore the possible motives, locate the possible
sources and identify the possible agents of ideology and pragmatism in
foreign policy. It is the task of the chapters ahead to comprehend and
make sense of the rise of pragmatism and the parallel surge of ideology
in the foreign policy of specific countries.
With no pretension of being exhaustive, a number of factors were

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singled out as determinants of either ideology or pragmatism (or both),
depending on their combination with other variables. The objectives of
a country’s international presence may influence the means employed to
attain them, in terms of not only strategy and gains, but also in terms of the
different audiences that may be the target of foreign policy discourse and
action. The resources available for the conduct of foreign policy may also
have an impact upon the form and style policy may take, while the ideas,
beliefs, predispositions, and personal and professional skills of influential
individuals greatly contribute to the formulation and implementation of
foreign policy. Finally, the political and historical context, both domestic
and international, offers opportunities and constraints to foreign policy
styles and options.
Of course, the tension between pragmatism and ideology underlies
other tensions in national and international politics. More often than
not, choices regarding ideology and pragmatism are dependent on dis-
course and practice, as well as domestic and international audiences and
issues. Significantly, however, although the influence of domestic politics
on international relations remains significant, it would appear that the
difference between the two spheres is becoming more blurred, leaving
space for “intermestic politics,” the intersection between national and
international interests, issues, and actors.54
In such a complex and interconnected reality, the traditional foreign
policy analysis distinction between levels of analysis seems to lose some
of its explanatory power and perhaps does not capture the empirical
picture satisfactorily. For instance, factors that explain or determine the
mix of ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy can no longer simply
be artificially categorized into individual, national, or international levels.
More flexible categories and analytical concepts, suitable for crosslevel
analysis, would appear to us to be more appropriate and useful, and
therefore have been proposed in this volume. This may be welcomed or
criticized, but its aim is to stimulate debate over whether foreign policy
analysis should move toward a more specialized, self-contained, and com-
partmentalized approach on the one hand, or whether it should pursue a
more holistic and pluralistic method and agenda on the other; or indeed
if a combination of the two is possible.

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 31

Notes
1. Barbara Goodwin (2003), Using Political Ideas, Chichester: Wiley,
p. 22.
2. Andrew Heywood (2000), Key Concepts in Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, p. 23.
3. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas, p. 17.
4. Michael Freeden (1996), Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual

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Approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 1.
5. Michael Freeden (2001), “Political Ideologies in Substance and Method,”
in Michael Freeden (ed.), Reassessing Political Ideologies, London and
New York: Routledge, pp. 1–12, 7.
6. Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics, p. 22.
7. Walter Carlsnaes (1986), Ideology and Foreign Policy. Problems of Compar-
ative Conceptualization, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, p. 180.
8. See ibid., p. 168.
9. Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi (July 2002), “Editorial note,”
Millennium, 31:3, p. iii.
10. Ibid., p. iii.
11. Ibid.
12. Ennio Di Nolfo (2000), Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 1918–1999,
Bari: Editori Laterza, pp. 427–28.
13. Alex J. Bellamy (July 2002), “Pragmatic Solidarism and the Dilemmas of
Humanitarian Intervention,” Millennium, 31:3, pp. 473–97.
14. T. V. Paul and J. Hall (eds.) (1999), International Order and the Future
of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 69–71.
15. Jorge Dominguez (2007), “Las relaciones contemporáneas Estados
Unidos-América Latina. Entre la ideología y el pragmatismo,” Foreign
Affairs en Español, October–December, http://www.foreignaffairs-esp.
org, last accessed March 19, 2008.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid, p. 3
18. See Hedley Bull (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
19. On the occasion, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim declared: “We
are changing the way the world order is organised,” quoted in Vladimir
Radyuhin (2008), “For a New Order,” Frontline, 25:12, 7–20 June, http://
www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2512/stories/20080620251205200.htm,
last accessed March 5, 2009.
20. Miguel Angel Centeno (2008), “Left Behind? Latin America in a
Globalized World,” The American Interest, 3:3, pp.12–20.
21. Fred Halliday (1999), Revolution and World Politics, Basingstoke:
Macmillan, pp. 133–57.
22. Ibid., p. 156.
23. Compare the speeches given by Lula at the World Economic Forum
on January 28, 2005 (http://www.weforum.org/en/knowledge/

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 32 Gian Luca Gardini

KN_SESS_SUMM_13926?url=/en/knowledge/KN_SESS_SUMM_
13926, last accessed March 5, 2009) and at the World Social Forum
just two days earlier on January 26, 2005 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
business/4213987.stm, last accessed March 5, 2009).
24. On the back of that experience, during the 2008 Ecuador-Colombia crisis
Chavez adopted a stark anti-Colombian stance at home but a much more
conciliatory attitude at the international Summit of the Group of Rio.
25. Peter H. Smith (2000), Talons of the Eagle. Dynamics of US-Latin

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American Relations, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
26. Robert F. Kennedy (1999), Thirteen Days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, New York: Norton Company, pp. 14–15.
27. Ibid.
28. Fore a more extensive discussion on the topic, see R. Jervis (1976),
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton:
Princeton University Press; Chih-yu Shih (1992), “Seeking Common
Causal Maps: A Cognitive Approach to International Organization,”
in Martha L. Cottam and Chih-yu Shih (eds.), Contending Dramas.
A Cognitive Approach to International Organizations, New York, Westport,
CT, and London: Praeger, pp. 39–56; Martha L. Cottam (1994), Images
and Intervention. U.S. Policies in Latin America, Pittsburgh and London:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
29. For Latin America, see Michael Reid (2007), Forgotten Continent, The
Battle for Latin America’s Soul, New Haven and London: Yale University
Press. For Africa, Martin Meredith (2005), The State of Africa. A History
of Fifty Years of Independence, London: The Free Press.
30. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993), “Ideas and Foreign
Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert
O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and
Political Change, Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.
31. Valerie Hudson (2007), Foreign Policy Analysis. Classic and Contemporary
Theory, Lanham and Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 17.
32. Ibid, p. 50.
33. Irving L. Janis (1982), Groupthink, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
34. Erik K. Stern (1997), “Probing the Plausibility of New Group Syndrome:
Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs,” in Paul ‘t Hart, Erik K. Stern, and Bengt
Sundelius (eds.), Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign
Policy-Making, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 153–90.
35. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999), Essence of Decision.
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Longman.
36. José Tavares de Araujo, Head of the Customs Policy Committee in 1986,
interview with the author, Brasilia May 19, 2003; Roberto Fendt, Head
of the External Trade Agency in 1986, interview with the author, Rio de
Janeiro, June 11, 2003.
37. Gian Luca Gardini (2005), “The Hidden Diplomatic History of
Argentine-Brazilian Bilateral Integration: Implications for Historiography

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 Latin American Foreign Policies 33

and Theory,” The Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean

Studies, 30:60, pp. 63–92.
38. Simon Collier and William F. Sater (2004), A History of Chile,
1808–2002, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 125.
40. Ibid.
41. Robert Putnam (1988), “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic
of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, 42:3, pp. 427–60.

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42. Kenneth Waltz (1979), Theory of International Politics, Reading: Addison
Wesley.
43. Alexander Wendt (1992), “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The
Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46:2,
pp. 391–425.
44. Kal J. Holsti (1970), “National Role Conceptions in the Study of
Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly, 14, pp. 233–309.
45. For the United States, see Smith, Talons of the Eagle. For Brazil, see Celso
Lafer (2002), La Identidad Internacional de Brasil, Buenos Aires: Fondo
de Cultura Economica.
46. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 121.
47. Andrew Vincent (2001), “Power and Vacuity. Nationalist Ideology in
the Twentieth Century,” in Michael Freeden (ed.), Reassessing Political
Ideologies, pp. 132–53, 133.
48. Morton Kaplan (1957), System and Process in International Politics,
New York: Wiley; Morton Kaplan (1972), “Variants on Six Models of
the International System,” in James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics
and Foreign Policy, Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe, pp. 291–303.
49. Maurice East, Stephen Salmore, and Charles Hermann (eds.) (1978),
Why Nations Act, Beverly Hills: Sage.
50. Carlos Escudé (1997), Foreign Policy Theory in Menem’s Argentina,
Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
51. George Modelski (1981), “Long Cycles, Kondratieffs, and Alternating
Innovations,” in Charles Kegley and P. McGowan (eds.), The Political
Economy of Foreign Policy Behaviour, Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 63–83.
52. Ibid.
53. James Rosenau (1966), “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in
Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches in Comparative and International Politics,
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
54. Russell Crandall (2008), The United States and Latin America after the
Cold War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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