Cambridge International AS & A Level
HISTORY 9489/32
Paper 3 Interpretations Question May/June 2024
1 hour 15 minutes
You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.
* 2 7 2 2 4 1 8 1 4 9 *
You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)
INSTRUCTIONS
● Answer one question from one section only.
Section A: The origins of the First World War
Section B: The Holocaust
Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War
● Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper,
ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.
INFORMATION
● The total mark for this paper is 40.
● The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [ ].
This document has 4 pages.
DC (CE) 330464
© UCLES 2024 [Turn over
2
Answer one question from one section only.
Section A: Topic 1
The origins of the First World War
1 Read the extract and then answer the question.
Poincaré’s diplomacy was far more passive than has often been claimed. Although he was
undoubtedly suspicious of Germany, he did not act aggressively towards it. He merely sought to
consolidate France’s position in Europe and to prepare for any possibility. In no way was Poincaré’s
foreign policy intended to provoke war; indeed, it was more restrained than those of Germany,
Austria-Hungary or Russia. For Poincaré, peace was best safeguarded by the balance of power
achieved by rigid separation of the two alliance systems. France, more than any other European
nation, understood the necessity for strong alliances. Ever since 1871 it had attempted to break
out of its diplomatic isolation. The process had been a long and painful one, which had only really
been completed in 1907 with the formation of the Triple Entente, the benefits of which, principally
international security, were only just being felt. The balance of power after 1907 was arguably of
even greater importance to France than to Britain. However, Britain had a more flexible approach
to it. Britain was opposed to any weakening of the alliance system but was willing to negotiate
agreements with the Triple Alliance bloc. Despite considerable opposition from French diplomats,
Poincaré ruled out any such move, though his attitude softened in 1913 and 1914, notably towards
Germany. Overall, however, his insistence on applying the notion of the strict separation of the two
alliances inevitably built into it the inflexibility which was its greatest weakness in times of crisis.
In this manner, Poincaré’s foreign policy seriously contributed to further separating the two blocs.
Thus, whereas in 1907 Triple Alliance and Triple Entente had stood side by side, in 1914 they
stood face to face.
But a balance of power is by definition fragile. It is, therefore, natural that politicians should prepare
for the balance being upset. They do so by attempting to gain a margin of superiority over their
rivals which they perceive as a guarantee of safety but which their opponents see as a threat.
By 1914 it appeared to most French politicians and soldiers that France had finally gained this
superiority. This appeared to be confirmed by a War Ministry report of September 1912 which
predicted victory for the Triple Entente in any conflict against the Triple Alliance. It was, therefore,
in France’s national interest to maintain that margin of superiority not for any warlike reasons, but
as a guarantee of safety.
France’s decision to support Russia in the July Crisis was not taken because of their alliance, but
because its margin of safety was at risk. To have stopped Russia from entering the war would have
allowed Austria-Hungary to regain some prestige, while seriously reducing that of Russia. This
would have altered the balance between Triple Entente and Triple Alliance to the disadvantage of
the former. The alternative of allowing Russia to fight alone would have condemned it to certain
defeat, thus even more seriously endangering France’s international security. Even if the final
decision had not been made for France by Germany declaring war on it, France would still have
felt compelled to fight alongside Russia. Like Britain, France entered the war for negative reasons.
Britain’s decision to go to war was not primarily to uphold the 1839 guarantee of Belgian neutrality,
but because it feared the consequences of German domination of the continent. France did not
decide to go to war because of the Franco-Russian alliance, but did so because it was unwilling to
live again in the shadow of a mighty Germany.
What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who
wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your
answer. [40]
© UCLES 2024 9489/32/M/J/24
3
Section B: Topic 2
The Holocaust
2 Read the extract and then answer the question.
The killing of the Jews began in the east and there, principally, it stayed – a fact which
fundamentally shaped both the events of the ‘Final Solution’ and the ways in which it was
perceived by contemporaries.
Content removed due to copyright restrictions.
More important than
such accurate guessing is the fact that people immediately grasped that a central decision had
been made to deport the Jews; this was not a local action, like so many bans on using swimming
pools or park benches.
What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who
wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]
© UCLES 2024 9489/32/M/J/24 [Turn over
4
Section C: Topic 3
The origins and development of the Cold War
3 Read the extract and then answer the question.
If Roosevelt had survived, he would have had to reconcile his vague promises to Stalin of a
Soviet sphere with his assurances to the American people that the Allies were making an open,
democratic world. Even a master politician like Roosevelt might have struggled. How much more
difficult, then, was it for Harry Truman as he became President? Truman did not even understand
that he faced a dilemma. He did not know that Roosevelt had all but conceded to the Soviets
their sphere in Eastern Europe. In his profound ignorance of the status of Roosevelt’s diplomacy,
Truman naturally turned to State Department advisers. He did not realise that Roosevelt had
largely ignored them, relying instead on his military advisers. The State Department grabbed its
chance to explain to Truman that Roosevelt had trusted the Russians too much. Ambassador
Harriman told Truman that Soviet conduct in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe posed a threat
to American interests. He told Truman about the Soviet takeover in Eastern Europe, warning that
Soviet hostility towards capitalist nations would tempt it to expand into other neighbouring areas.
Harriman urged Truman to be firm and use Russia’s desperate need for reconstruction funds as
economic pressure. Truman accepted this advice with remarkable speed. When Truman first met
Molotov, he told him in blunt terms that Soviet-American relations would no longer only benefit the
Soviet Union. Molotov complained that he had never been talked to like that in his life. ‘Carry out
your agreements and you won’t get talked to like that,’ snapped Truman.
Truman loved to project this image – a quick, decisive man of plain common sense. But he seems
to have used this air of decisiveness to cover deep uncertainty. He often made snap decisions
without much information and then had to go back on them with considerable embarrassment.
When the war in Europe ended, he signed an order ending lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union.
This was in accordance with the lend-lease law, and many Congress members had made it clear
that they wanted the programme ended immediately after German surrender. But the abruptness
of the decision, turning ships around in mid-ocean, was an unnecessary insult towards an ally the
Americans hoped would join the war against Japan. Stalin could not help but see Truman’s lecture
to Molotov and the sudden termination of lend-lease as an indication of a changed American
policy. The Soviet dictator complained bitterly and Truman feebly apologised that he had not
actually read the lend-lease directive he had signed. He ordered the ships to turn round again and
return to the Soviet Union.
Truman was puzzled by Stalin. His uncertainty mirrored the confusion most Americans felt about
Soviet intentions. Was Stalin a communist revolutionary bent on world conquest, or was he
seeking more traditional Russian national interests such as security from attack through Eastern
Europe? Truman failed to take into account that Stalin might be ruthless and cautious at the same
time. He directed his ruthlessness almost entirely toward the most strategically vital areas in
Eastern Europe, a sphere he may well have believed Roosevelt had conceded to him. Truman
and his advisers naturally worried that this tyranny indicated Stalin’s intentions for other areas.
Yet Stalin did allow a degree of self-determination in less strategic countries such as Hungary and
Czechoslovakia so long as communists loyal to the Soviet Union controlled key posts within those
governments. Later he would be even more tolerant towards Finland and Austria, insisting only
that their foreign policies be neutral rather than hostile to the Soviets.
What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who
wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]
To avoid the issue of disclosure of answer-related information to candidates, all copyright acknowledgements are reproduced online in the Cambridge
Assessment International Education Copyright Acknowledgements Booklet. This is produced for each series of examinations and is freely available to download
at www.cambridgeinternational.org after the live examination series.
© UCLES 2024 9489/32/M/J/24
