Cambridge International AS & A Level

HISTORY 9489/31
Paper 3 Interpretations Question October/November 2022

1 hour 15 minutes

You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS
● Answer one question from one section only.
Section A: The origins of the First World War
Section B: The Holocaust
Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War
● Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper,
ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION
● The total mark for this paper is 40.
● The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [ ].

This document has 4 pages.

DC (CE) 219296
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 2

Answer one question from one section only.

Section A: Topic 1

The origins of the First World War

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

The Russian Finance Minister shared Nicholas II’s optimism. Given the immense success of the
German economy in recent years, they could not believe that Berlin would risk everything by
starting an unnecessary war. They were wrong. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was designed
to make war inevitable. Vienna believed that its position in the Balkans could only be restored by
forcing Belgrade back into dependence on Austria. Other Balkan states would learn from this that
opposition to Vienna did not pay, and that in the last resort Russia would not protect its clients at
the risk of war. The Austrians tended to believe that fear of revolution would make Russia back
down. If not, Vienna and Berlin agreed that it was better to start a war now than to delay matters,
since Russia’s resources, together with the rapid growth of its economic and military strength,
would make victory for the Central Powers unobtainable in a few years’ time. Now it seems certain
that the only thing which might have deterred the Germans was a belief that Britain would enter
the war on the side of Russia and France. But by the time the likelihood of British intervention had
become clear, Austro-German policy had gone too far to make peaceful compromise possible
without great damage to Austrian and German prestige. The first rather hesitant calls to Vienna
for restraint from the German Chancellor were in any case undermined by contrary advice from
Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff. Moreover, even by 29 July the Central Powers’
position remained that Russia must cease military preparations while the Austrian offensive in
Serbia be allowed to proceed. No one in St Petersburg could have accepted such terms. Nicholas
II was much less enthusiastic about the Balkan Slavs than some of his ministers, let alone public
opinion. But in January 1914 he had promised, ‘We will not let ourselves be trampled upon.’

At the crucial meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers that took place on the afternoon of
24 July, Sazonov maintained that Austria-Hungary and Germany were determined to deal a
decisive blow at Russian authority in the Balkans by annihilating Serbia. He argued that Russia
could not allow this to happen. Domestic political considerations counted for something: ‘Public
and parliamentary opinion would fail to understand why, at this critical moment involving Russia’s
vital interests, the Imperial Government was reluctant to act boldly.’ More important were
considerations of national honour and prestige. Given Russia’s centuries-old role in the Balkans, if
it allowed itself to be driven out of the region in such a total and humiliating way, no one would take
it seriously again. Russia’s obvious weakness and many concessions since 1905 had not brought
security. Instead, they had merely encouraged its opponents to push it around. If Russia conceded
again despite so blatant a challenge to its interests, no one – ally or enemy – would believe it
would ever stand up for itself. Even if it deserted its Balkan allies, it could very possibly still be
forced to fight in the near future in the face of further German challenges. Sazonov admitted that
‘war with Germany would bring great risks’, particularly since it was not known what the attitude
of Great Britain would be. Nevertheless he, and with him the whole Council of Ministers, decided
that if Austria refused all negotiations and insisted on the invasion of Serbia, Russia could not
stand aside. Russia would mobilise four military districts in the hope that this would be a warning
to Austria but not a provocation to Germany.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who
wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your
answer. [40]

© UCLES 2022 9489/31/O/N/22

Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

The first deportations of German Jews in mid-October 1941 had not always resulted in instant
death.

Content removed due to copyright restrictions.

Undoubtedly, for Hitler, the genocide was a matter of grand policy, though he left the
execution of its details to trusted subordinates.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who
wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

© UCLES 2022 9489/31/O/N/22 [Turn over

Section C: Topic 3

The origins and development of the Cold War

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

This is the sense in which it seems to me that ideology was enormously important for the origins
of the Cold War. In the Soviet Union there was a series of domestic factors which led to the need
for an external enemy. By the end of the war, although the Stalinist state remained unchallenged,
its ideological framework had been shaken – in a sense deliberately – in the interests of rallying
popular support for the wartime alliance with the West, because the alliance was necessary for
the survival of the regime. During the war there was much less focus on Marxism-Leninism.
There was a dilution of ideology, and more emphasis was placed on patriotic themes. This led
many intellectuals to hope for a relaxation of the dictatorship after the war. In contrast, Stalin was
more aware than ever of the need to reestablish the kinds of political controls which he deemed
necessary for the massive task of reconstruction. Sixty-six years old at the end of the war, he was
also bound to consider the struggle for succession. His objectives could be accomplished only
through a regeneration of ideology, through – more specifically – the identification of an external
enemy. If one thinks of the alternatives open to Stalin, you reach the conclusion that all alternative
courses were quite simply unacceptable to him. From Stalin’s point of view, the Soviet system
would have had to pay, or least run the risk of having to pay, a totally unacceptable price for
a continuation of the wartime cooperation, which in any case had only been intermittent. But I
also believe that the very ideological threat to the Soviet system implicit in the involvement of
the United States in world affairs – alas, not strong enough at that time to make it a real threat –
nonetheless did reinvigorate Stalin’s drive for Soviet ideological purity.

These observations leave open the question of whether or not the Cold War at its most intense
and rigid was really inevitable or not. The answer to that question depends on your view of history,
I suppose. All I want to suggest is that a continuation of those tentative lines of cooperation
between the Soviet Union and the West which had developed during the war years was, for a
variety of quite understandable Soviet domestic considerations, quite unacceptable to Stalin. I
regard Stalin’s point of view not as the assessment of a madman but rather as the perception of a
shrewd leader, accustomed to the burdens of power. He was conscious of his own objectives and
all too aware of those Soviet realities that seemed to call their achievement into question. Given
this situation, something like the Cold War as it actually occurred was the inevitable outcome of
Western policies.

Perhaps Stalin would have preferred non-involvement in world affairs altogether. But isolationism
was no longer a genuine alternative for a Soviet Union which, despite all its obvious post-war
weaknesses, still was one of the two major Powers in a divided international system. This being
the case, further scholarly progress in exploring the roots of the Cold War can, it seems to me,
come by concentrating more closely than we have up till now upon the domestic foundations of
Soviet foreign policy. Reexamination of the strengths and weaknesses of the diplomacy of the two
sides may still be necessary; but it can never be sufficient. In the Cold War, it is time to assert the
primacy of domestic, rather than foreign, policy.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who
wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]
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