Student Number 220168350

Student Surname Luthuli

Student initials JT

Student Cel number 0658287864

Project title Lifting failure investigation

INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING,
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT,
DEPARTMENT
AND MECHANICAL
ENGINEERING

COURSE and module DIPLOMA IN MECHANICAL

code ENGINEERING , EMPRJ3A

Project 3 GA Assignment
MODULE TITLE requirement part of the major
assessment for 2nd sem 2023

Name of company
Crane Tech Solutions, LLC (CTS)
accident occurred

Town name were

Manhattan, New York
accident occurred

Contact number of
persons you spoke to

Signature
Table of Contents
Executive Summery.......................................................................................................2
1. Purpose.........................................................................................................................3
2. Maintenance Requirements..................................................................................3
2.1 Crane Information.......................................................................................................3
2.2 General maintenance.................................................................................................3
2.3 Precautions..................................................................................................................4
2.4 Inspection of Crane....................................................................................................4
2.5 Maintenance Interval..................................................................................................4
3. Legal requirements..........................................................................................................5
3.1 Permits......................................................................................................................5
3.2 Certificate of approval (referred to as the Prototype process)..................5
3.3 Certificate of Operation (referred to as CD)....................................................6
3.4 Certificate of on-site Inspection (referred to as the Crane Notice or CN)
6
4. Root cause analysis application................................................................................6
5. Conclusion................................................................................................................7
Photographs, Graphs & Tables.............................................................................................8
References..................................................................................................................................8
 Executive Summery
A crawler crane, more specifically a Liebherr LR 1300, had an accident at 60 Hudson
Street in downtown Manhattan on February 5, 2016, around 8:25 am EST. The
crane fell towards the southeast direction onto Worth Street. Unfortunately, this
incident resulted in one death, with three pedestrians getting injured. Additionally, it
caused damage to buildings on the northeast corner of Church and Worth Streets
and also to cars parked on Worth Street. The crane's main boom measured
approximately 59 meters, while its luffing jib was about 113 meters long, making for
a total boom/jib length of approximately 172 meters.

Figure 1:Overturned crane lying along Worth Street:

Accidents like this crane collapse (as seen in figure 1) usually don't happen because
of a single mistake; they're typically the result of a series of actions or inactions over
time. In this case, the analysis suggests that the crane operator didn't follow the
Department of Buildings (DOB) regulations and the manufacturer's requirement to
secure the crane properly on the night of February 4th, especially knowing that there
was a weather event coming. Then, on the morning of February 5th, the operator
made another mistake by lowering the main boom to a 72-degree angle, which
pushed the crane to its stability limit. These mistakes added up, and unfortunately,
they were the factors that ultimately caused the crane to collapse.
 1. Purpose
The purpose of the report is to put together a root cause analysis report of the
crawler crane incident is all about getting to the bottom of what caused the accident.
We want to know every detail, from the technical stuff to how things were being run
and even the environment of that day. But we're not stopping there. We're on a
mission to uncover the real reasons behind this incident, the core issues that led to it
in the first place.

Once we've got all that figured out, we can start brainstorming ideas on how to make
sure this kind of thing doesn't happen again. At the same time, these reports help
spread the word about the importance of safety in construction and heavy machinery
work, not just among students but also professionals. We want to create a culture of
safety and responsibility in our industry.

Plus, this process helps us get better at thinking critically and solving problems by
looking at what went wrong and figuring out how to make it right.

2. Maintenance Requirements
Maintenance is vital for cranes because each type of crane has unique maintenance
needs tailored to its design and function. Proper maintenance ensures safe and
efficient operation while extending the crane's lifespan, The specific crane that was
used in this lifting failure is the crawler crane attachment: a long fixed or hydraulic
metal arm that attaches to the suspended hoist cable. The boom is one of the largest
crane parts

2.1 Crane Information

Boom cranes have 360° mobility, meaning they can move up-and-down, side-to-
side, and front-to-back. The “boom” part of the name is named after the boom

The crane involved in the collapse was a Liebherr

crawler crane, specifically the LR 1300 model.
Liebherr produced this crane in January 2009 and
designated it with serial number 138.064. It's
important to note that the crane was operating in an
approved configuration when the collapse occurred,
with a main boom measuring approximately 59
meters and a luffing jib extending to approximately
113 meters. For reference, you can find a general
arrangement drawing of this crane model in Figure
2.

2.2 General maintenance

 Besides changing the oil, maintenance
includes regularly checking to make sure all
the crane parts are in good condition.
Figure 2
 You should have the right equipment for
maintenance, and you need to follow the rules in the Crawler Crane
Operator's Manual.
  After you finish maintenance and remove safety devices, put them back and
check them to make sure they work.
 When you're done, make sure to dispose of fuels, lubricants, and old parts
properly to protect the environment, following the rules for environmental
protection

2.3 Precautions
 Wear appropriate work attire during maintenance.
 Place the crane on a stable and level surface and use a warning sign that
says "Crane Under Inspection."
 If you need to work at a height greater than 2 meters, use ladders and safety
harnesses.
 Follow signals carefully when moving the crane for maintenance.
 Make sure no dust or debris gets into the hydraulic system while inspecting or
maintaining it.
 If you find anything that needs immediate maintenance or adjustment, take
care of it right away.
 If a repair is needed, get in touch with our local office.
 Replace parts like filter cartridges as recommended to avoid problems.
 If you encounter challenging issues during inspection or maintenance, contact
our local office for assistance.
2.4 Inspection of Crane

 The manufacturer must inspect the crane before delivery, following

GB/T3811-2008 and applicable international standards.
 After delivery, experienced professionals should inspect the crane at least
once a year, considering changes in the working environment or how it's
being used.
 Before using the crane each time, do a visual check to spot any potential
issues and prevent accidents.
 If any problems are found during the inspection, make a record, perform
maintenance, and then re-inspect the crane.
Precautions
 Skilled experts should inspect the crane before it's delivered if there have
been significant modifications or if crucial parts that handle heavy loads
have been serviced.
 Experienced professionals are individuals who have worked in the crane
industry for a long time and possess extensive knowledge. They are well-
versed in relevant regulations, such as labour laws and safety rules.
These experts are specially trained and adhere to safe working practices.
 Professional engineers are those responsible for designing, building, and
maintaining cranes. They are knowledgeable about various regulations
and standards related to cranes. Their role involves inspecting cranes
and assessing their condition to ensure their long-term and safe
operation.

2.5 Maintenance Interval

The maintenance interval refers to regularly scheduled crane maintenance. This
interval can be decided based on:

a) How many hours the crane components have been in operation.

b) The calendar date, month, and year when the crane has been used or stored.

Typically, maintenance intervals are based on how long the crane's components
have been in use. However, in unique situations, the intervals can also depend on
how long the crane has been in operation and stored.

You can determine the maintenance intervals by checking the operating hours of the
engine, which are displayed on the main screen in the crane's cab.

3. Legal requirements
3.1 Permits
Department of Transport
The New York City Department of Transportation has a
permitting process if a crane is set up on a city street which requires either a partial or
complete street closure

- The crane was positioned close to a Transit Authority (TA) structure, and there was
an assembly assist crane operating right above a TA roof structure. The construction
team submitted the necessary drawings, which the TA reviewed and approved on
December 30, 2015. The TA's review and approval were important to make sure that
the crane's operation wouldn't cause any problems for the TA's operations or
structures.

Department of buildings
3.2 Certificate of approval (referred to as the Prototype process)
New York City has a rule that all crane models used within its jurisdiction must be
approved by the Department of Buildings (DOB). This approval is given through a
Certificate of Approval, as outlined in the Building Code (Chapter 3319) and 1 RCNY
§3319-01.

When the LR 1300 crane was approved by DOB, the regulations at that time
required a licensed New York State professional engineer to verify the design
calculations. In this case, the applicant and the engineer responsible for this
verification was Jay Shapiro from Howard Shapiro & Associates. The manufacturer
of the crane was Liebherr Nenzing Crane Company, with an office located in
Houston, Texas.

To get the approval, the application needed to include various documents like load
charts, possible configurations, operator manuals, and brochures. It's important to
note that CTS didn't perform a detailed review of these documents as it was outside
the scope of their investigation. Instead, they reviewed the load charts, operator's
manual, and approved configurations as part of the Certificate of On-Site Inspection
application.
DOB issued a Certificate of Approval for the Liebherr LR 1300 on 30 May, 2007, with
the identifier P481. The initial request for the crane's maximum main boom length
was about 123 meters, but DOB approved a maximum of about 98 meters, along
with a maximum luffing jib of about 113 meters.

3.3 Certificate of Operation (referred to as CD)

In New York City, the Department of Buildings (DOB) mandates that all cranes
operating within the city must undergo an annual inspection to ensure they are in
safe working condition. These inspections, conducted by DOB's Cranes and Derricks
unit, result in the issuance of a Certificate of Operation (referred to as "CD").

The LR 1300 crane involved in the collapse received the crane registration number
CD 4463 from DOB. Inspection reports provided by DOB indicated that most of these
inspections were marked as satisfactory. However, there was one instance where a
stop-work order was issued because the Certificate of Operation had expired. On 2
November, 2015, DOB conducted a re-inspection and found no issues, subsequently
lifting the stop-work order. Importantly, at the time of the collapse, the crane had a
valid Certificate of Operation in place.

3.4 Certificate of on-site Inspection (referred to as the Crane Notice

or CN)
The Certificate of On-Site Inspection mandates a DOB inspector to visit the site
whenever a crane with a boom length exceeding 76 meters is set up within the city.
The inspector's role is to verify the crane's setup matches the approved drawing
(discussed in section 3.3) and to witness safety device checks to ensure they are
correctly installed and functioning. The inspector follows a DOB checklist, and if the
crane passes, the operator can use it.

For this project, two such inspections were needed. The first occurred on 30th
January 2016, when the crane was assembled, and it passed. The second
inspection was due to a re-configuration completed on 3rd February 2016, and the
crane also passed this inspection.

4. Root cause analysis application

Root Cause Analysis (RCA) finds the main problem behind an issue and fixes it to
stop similar problems. It's not always clear-cut and often needs lots of data. RCA
doesn't guarantee results, and it takes skill to do well. But it's a valuable tool for
improving systems.

The Department of Buildings (DOB) teamed up with Crane Tech Solutions, LLC
(CTS) in the afternoon of February 5, 2016, to figure out why a crane had collapsed.

CTS had a bunch of tasks to do. They took photos right after the crane fell and the
day before. They also looked at important documents like rules, stuff sent to the
DOB, manuals for the crane, and info from the makers, owners, and experts. Plus,
they checked the weather forecast.

They got some help too. AccuWeather's experts gave them info about the weather,
like how fast the wind was blowing when the crane fell. Another group called
Simpson, Gumpertz & Heger helped with calculations about the crane's structure
and how the wind might have affected it.

All of this was to find out why the crane fell down.

In analyzing the operator's actions leading up to the crane collapse, it becomes

evident that several violations of safety regulations and guidelines contributed to this
unfortunate incident. These infractions can be traced back to a failure to adhere to
established protocols, a lack of understanding of equipment specifications, and,
ultimately, a deviation from the manufacturer's recommendations.

One critical lapse was the operator's disregard for the manufacturer's instructions
regarding stowing the crane overnight or when high wind speeds were anticipated.
This failure to follow the manual's specific guidance on crane positioning was a
pivotal factor in the collapse.

Furthermore, the operator's unfamiliarity with the equipment became evident when
they lowered the boom to an angle below 72°, rendering the crane unstable and
leading to its collapse. The operator's difficulty in raising the boom to the necessary
angle further underscores the importance of equipment knowledge and familiarity.

Inconsistent with the manufacturer's requirements, the crane was not placed in the
"parked" position when wind speeds were forecasted to exceed safe limits. This
misalignment with safety guidelines played a crucial role in the collapse.

The operator's inability to fully comprehend the manual, particularly regarding

permissible wind speeds and load chart reductions, also contributed to the incident.
There was a failure to recognize that operation was prohibited above certain wind
speeds and that the boom should have been laid down accordingly.

Inadequate securing of the boom against wind loads, improper blocking of the tracks,
and neglecting to account for snow accumulation on the boom further demonstrate
lapses in adherence to essential safety measures.

Ultimately, the root cause of the crane collapse can be attributed to the operator's
failure to follow the manufacturer's recommendations, lack of equipment familiarity,
and non-compliance with safety regulations. These factors collectively led to the
unfortunate incident, highlighting the critical importance of strict adherence to safety
guidelines and comprehensive operator training to prevent such occurrences in the
future.

5. Conclusion
In summary, our root cause analysis shows that the crane collapse happened
because the operator didn't follow safety rules and didn't know how to use the
equipment properly. This incident highlights the need for better operator training and
strict adherence to safety procedures to prevent similar accidents. It's a strong
reminder of how important safety is in construction and heavy equipment operations.
Photographs, Graphs & Tables
References
 AISC Steel Construction Manual, Fourteenth Edition, Second Printing, 2012.
 ASCE 7-10. Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. American
 Society of Civil Engineers. Reston, VA, 2010.
 Broger. Documentation for Determination of stability during erection and lay down of
 boom, Rev. 00. Liebherr Structural Analysis, 17 February 2016. Bates No.
 LNC 001171-1183.
 EN 13000:2004. Cranes, Mobile Cranes. European Committee for Standardization.
 Brussels, 2004.
 F.E.M. 1.004:2000. Recommendation for the Calculation of Wind Loads on Crane
 Structures. European Handling Federation. Paris, 2000.
 Galasso Trucking & Rigging Inc. drawing ER-2. 60 Hudson Street, New York, NT:
 Crawler Crane – Elevation (Cooling Towers & Generators), 30 November 2015.
 Greenblatt, Neil. Calculation of ground bearing pressure of LR 1300 (revision 1).
MRA
 Engineering, 30 December 2015.
 Hegan, Frank. Crane collapse investigation - 60 Hudson Street, New York, NY on
 February 5, 2016. Crane Tech Solutions. Portsmouth, VA. In preparation.
 Liebherr LR1300 Product Description. LR 1300 / V006. Bates No. Bay Crane
 000075-000131, with CTS field notes.