International Relations of Asia

Asia in World Politics

Series Editor: Samuel S. Kim

Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait?

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China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy
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In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World
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Pacific Asia? Prospects for Security and Cooperation in East Asia
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South Asia in World Politics
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The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order
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East Asia and Globalization
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The International Relations of Northeast Asia
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North Korea and Northeast Asia
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International Relations of Asia, 3rd ed.
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Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, 5th ed.
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International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, 3rd
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International Relations of Asia

Third Edition

Edited by
David Shambaugh

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 Dedicated to:

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Valued friend, colleague, and leading scholar of China and the

International Relations of Asia
 Contents

Map of Asia

List of Figures and Tables

List of Acronyms

Preface to the Third Edition

Part I: Introduction

1 International Relations in Asia: Grappling with Complexities

David Shambaugh

Part II: Legacies and Theories

2 The Evolving Asian System: Three Transformations

Samuel S. Kim
3 Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR
Amitav Acharya

Part III: The Roles of Regional Powers

4 America’s Role in Asia: Challenged Leadership

Robert Sutter
5 China’s Role in Asia: Attractive or Aggressive?
Phillip C. Saunders
6 Japan’s Role in Asia: From Free Rider to Thought Leader
Michael J. Green
 7 India’s Role in Asia: A Regional Power with Global Ambitions
T. V. Paul

Part IV: Subregional Actors

8 Southeast Asian States and ASEAN: A Center of Courtships and

Cooperation
Cheng-Chwee Kuik
9 South Korea: An Ambivalent Middle Power
Scott Snyder
10 North Korea: Continuity without Change
Victor Cha and Ellen Kim
11 Taiwan: Foreign Relations without Formal Recognition
Shelley Rigger
12 Australasia: Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands
Robert Ayson and Rory Medcalf

Part V: Transregional Linkages and Dynamics

13 The Asian Regional Economy

Edward J. Lincoln
14 The Asian Regional Security Environment
Bates Gill
15 Ethnicity, Religion, Gender, and Human Rights in Asian International
Relations
Rollie Lal

Part VI: Looking to the Future

16 Asian IR in the 2020s: Factors for the Future

David Shambaugh

About the Editor and Contributors

Asia
Source: CIA.
 Figures and Tables

FIGURES

6.1 Value of FDI to China by Country

8.1 Map of Southeast Asia
8.2 ASEAN and the ASEAN-Led Mechanisms
9.1 South Korean Trade Volume, 2005–20
9.2 South Korean Foreign Direct Investment, 2005–20
9.3 Student Exchanges Between South Korea and China
10.1 China-DPRK Bilateral Trade Volume, 2011–20
10.2 North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Range Map
13.1 GDP in 2019 at Market Exchange Rates
13.2 GDP per Capita at Market Exchange Rates, 2019
13.3 Japan’s Imports
13.4 Japan’s Exports
13.5 ASEAN Imports
13.6 India’s Exports
13.7 China’s Exports
13.8 China’s Imports
13.9 Foreign Direct Investment Flows into ASEAN
13.10 The Stock of Inward Foreign Direct Investment in India, 2019
14.1 Top 10 Military Spenders in Asia, 2020
14.2 Military Expenditures in Asia, 2011–20
14.3 Cumulative Military Spending in Asia, 2011–20
14.4 Volume of Arms Imports in Asia, 2011–20
14.5 The First and Second Island Chains
14.6 Multilateral Security Institutions in Asia
16.1 Asia-Pacific Regional Organizations

TABLES

3.1 Three Perspectives on International Relations

3.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Asia’s International Relations
5.1 Percentage of Imports from China (China’s Rank as Import Source)
5.2 Percentage of Exports to China (China’s Rank as Export Market)
8.1 Southeast Asian Countries: Main Indicators, 2020
8.2 World’s Leading Economies’ Top 5 Trading Partners, 2019
10.1 Inter-Korean Annual Trade Volume, 2012–20
11.1 Taiwan’s Asian Relations by the Numbers, 2019
13.1 Real GDP Growth Rates in Asia
13.2 Shares of Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment Flows
14.1 Selected PLA Weapons Platforms, 2020
 Acronyms

5G fifth-generation broadband cellular network technology

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial
ACD Asia Cooperation Dialogue
ACFTA ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
ACMECS Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation
Strategy
ADIZ Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone
ADMM ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting
ADMM+ ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICHR ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AIMPLB All-India Muslim Personal Law Board
AIT American Institute in Taiwan
AMDA Anglo-Malay(si)an Defense Agreement
AMF Asian Monetary Fund
AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission
AMRO ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
AOIP ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSC ASEAN Political-Security Community
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ARSA Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
ASA Association of Southeast Asia
ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+ ASEAN plus
ASEAN+3 ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea
ASEAN+6 ASEAN plus Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the
Philippines, and Brunei
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
ASW anti-submarine warfare
AUKUS Australia, United Kingdom, United States
AUSMIN Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations
AVIC Aviation Industry Corporation
BIMP-EAGA Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East
ASEAN Growth Area
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BMMA Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BUILD Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development
(Act)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CEAC Council on East Asian Community
CER Closer Economic Relations
CETC China Electronics Technology Group Corporation
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia
CLB Cabinet Legislative Bureau
CLMV Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam
CMI Chiang Mai Initiative
CMIM CMI Multilateralization
CNAPS Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSGC China South Industries Group
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSO Consociational Security Order
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DACOWITS Defense Advisory Commission on Women in the Service
DCA Defense Cooperation Agreement
DMZ Demilitarized Zone (North/South Korea)
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
DPP Democratic Progressive Party
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or North Korea
EAFTA East Asian Free Trade Area
EAS East Asia Summit
ECFA Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
EDCA Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific
ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement
EU European Union
EWEC East-West Economic Corridor
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FEALAC Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation
FGM female genital mutilation
FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific
FPDA Five Power Defense Arrangements
FPPC Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
FTA Free Trade Agreement
G7 Group of Seven
G20 Group of Twenty
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCTF Global Cooperation and Training Framework
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEACPS Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
GMF Global Maritime Fulcrum
GNI Gross National Income
GNP Gross National Product
GONGO government-operated non-governmental organization
GSOMIA General Security of Military Information Agreement
GSLV Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle
HADR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAT Interchange Association in Taiwan
ICAO International Commercial Aviation Organization
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missiles
IFI international financial institution
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
ILO International Labor Organization
IMET International Military Education and Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
INDOPACOM Indo-Pacific Command (United States)
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INSS Institute for National Strategic Studies (Japan)
IPE international political economy
IPR intellectual property rights
IR international relations
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA International Studies Association
ISEAS Institute for Southeast Asian Studies
ISRO India Space Research Organization
IT information technology
ITU International Telecommunication Union
JAD Jamaah Ansharut Daulah
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
JMSU Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding
JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces
JBIC Japan Bank of International Cooperation
KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KMT Kuomintang (Guomindang)
KORUS FTA Korea-US Free Trade Agreement
KPA Korean People’s Army
KWP Korean Workers’ Party
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
LGBTQ lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer
MaBaTha Association for the Protection of Race and Religion
Maphilindo Malaya-Philippines-Indonesia
MDT Mutual Defense Treaty
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPAC Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
MTJA Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority
MUI Indonesian Ulema Council
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NAPCI Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBR National Bureau of Asian Research (US)
NEAT Network of East Asian Think-Tanks
NIC newly industrialized country
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NGO non-governmental organization
NLD National League for Democracy
NORINCO China North Industries Corporation
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC National Security Council
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSP New Southbound Policy
NSS National Security Strategy
NTS non-traditional security
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
P4 Pacific Four
P5 permanent members of UN Security Council
PAP People’s Action Party
PAS Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
PBEC Pacific Basin Economic Council
PDI Pacific Deterrence Initiative
PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PIF Pacific Island Forum
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PPBM Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
PSLV Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
Quad Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan,
US)
R&D research and development
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
ROC Republic of China
ROK Republic of Korea, or South Korea
SAARC South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA South Asia Free Trade Area
SAIS School of Advanced International Studies
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCS South China Sea
SEANWFZ Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SKRL Singapore-Kunming Rail Link
SLD Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore)
SME small- and medium-sized enterprises
SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies
SOE state-owned enterprises
SPT Six-Party Talks
SRBM short-range ballistic missiles
SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for
International and Security Affairs)
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TCA Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement
TECRO Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
TIFA Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TLP Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
UAV unmanned aerial vehicles
UK United Kingdom
UMNO United Malays National Organization
UN United Nations
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USNS United States Naval Ship
UTM Universiti Teknologi Malaysia
VFA Visiting Forces Agreement
WHO World Health Organization
WITS World Bank Integrated Trade Solutions
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
 Preface to the Third Edition

The first edition of this volume was published in 2008, the second in 2104,
and now the third in 2022.
During the intervening years, Asia has become an even more central—
many would argue the central—region in international affairs. This is true
by many empirical measures (which are delineated in the introductory
chapter). What is now increasingly referred to as the “Indo-Pacific”
encompasses a sprawling geographic region including the Pacific and
Indian Oceans, involves many of the major powers and a number of
“middle powers,” is the most dynamic economic region in the world, is
increasingly militarized and includes some of the most acute “hot spots” in
international security, and is extraordinarily diverse in terms of its social
and cultural features. The rate of change is rapid on many levels, but tepid
in others (e.g., the region’s political systems). It is a big and complex world,
and other regions are all important in international relations, but there is a
growing recognition that Asia and the Indo-Pacific have become the most
significant. If nothing else, events there have collateral impacts around the
whole globe.
As with the previous two editions, Rowman & Littlefield Asian Studies
editor Susan McEachern was instrumental in catalyzing this new edition.
Susan recently retired from her long tenure as an R&L editor, and she
enjoys and deserves widespread admiration and recognition for all that she
has brought to the field of Asian Studies over several decades. The
incredibly impressive list of books commissioned by Susan, and published
under her auspices, is a living testament of her contributions to, and impact
on, the field of Asian Studies over several decades. Not only highly
professional, Susan has always been a complete joy to be and work with as
a person. In her absence, Rowman & Littlefield acquisitions editors Ashley
Dodge, Katelyn Turner, and Haley White are filling her big shoes. They,
together with production editor Alden Perkins, have been superb to work
with in shepherding this manuscript through production and into
publication. Sincere thanks also go to copyeditor Jacqueline Plante for
improving the prose throughout the volume and catching many lacunae that
escaped my eye.
Susan had kept after me for several years to undertake a new edition, but
I preferred to wait until the dust had settled after Donald Trump’s
tumultuous tenure as president, in order to gain a more detached and
balanced assessment that was not distorted by his unpredictable behavior.
Thus, this volume was written by the contributing authors during the
summer of 2021 as the new Biden administration was settling into office in
the United States. As described further in my introductory chapter, this third
edition has been not only thoroughly updated, but also thoroughly revised.
There are eight entirely new chapters, and the other eight (that were in the
second edition) have been considerably rewritten. Once again, this book is
published in the signature Rowman & Littlefield series Asia in World
Politics, which was initiated and has been superbly overseen by Professor
Samuel Kim (also a contributor to this volume) since 1999. The volume has
also received financial assistance from the China Policy Program of the
Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and
I wish to particularly thank Christopher Fussner for his continuing support
for the program and this volume.
All three editions of this volume have been conceived and written
primarily for one principal audience: university students. It has become one
of two leading textbooks on the subject,1 and this is heartening to the
editors and all of those who contributed to the first two editions. Each
edition has truly been a collective and collegial enterprise. While primarily
aimed at university students (undergraduate and postgraduate), the
contributors (among the world’s leading scholars) have also written their
chapters with a depth and sophistication that will also make the book very
useful for a variety of other professions: diplomats, security and military
officials, intelligence analysts, risk analysts and investors, journalists,
NGOs, the business community, and interested publics. In terms of intended
audiences, therefore, it is a “crossover” volume. I sincerely hope that all
readers and audiences find the overall approach, and the individual
chapters, to be informative, intellectually digestible, and stimulating.
Last, but not least, I wish to acknowledge and thank my much-respected
scholarly colleague and longtime personal friend Michael Yahuda for his
decades of comradery and intellectual stimulation. I have learned an
enormous amount from Michael and his writings over the years, he has
been a mentor to me (particularly during my years teaching at SOAS in
London), and he has had an enormous impact on the scholarly fields of
Chinese foreign policy and Asian international relations since the 1970s.
Michael and I collaborated in editing the previous two editions of this
volume, but following his “retirement” I have undertaken editing this one
on my own. Nonetheless, Michael’s intellectual influence continues to grace
these pages—and for all that he has contributed to the field, and to me
personally, I warmly and admiringly dedicate this third edition to him.
David Shambaugh
Washington, DC
January 2022

NOTE

1 Michael Yahuda’s The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (London: Rout-ledge, four
editions) being the other.
 Part One

INTRODUCTION
 Chapter One

International Relations in Asia

Grappling with Complexities
DAVID SHAMBAUGH

By a variety of measures Asia has become the world’s most important

region. It may also be the world’s most diverse and complex region. The
sprawling Asian (Indo-Pacific) region is primarily distinguished by its
remarkable contrasts and diversity in multiple respects: geography, weather,
cultures, ethnicities, languages, religions, demographics, politics,
economies, societies, cultures, technologies, educational levels, militaries,
and other elements. The other principal regions of the world—Europe, the
Middle East, North America, Latin America, and Africa—all display
greater homogeneity than does Asia in these respects. With such remarkable
heterogeneity spanning the thirty-eight nation-states covered in this volume
(including fifteen separate Pacific Island countries and territories),
generalizations inevitably do not apply across the region.

THE APPROACH OF THE THIRD EDITION

As a consequence of the complexities that characterize the region,

conceptualizing and understanding the diverse and fluid dynamics of Asian
international relations is increasingly vexing and thus necessitates
multidimensional analytical approaches. This introductory chapter wrestles
with these complexities, and the entire volume does so as well, in four
distinct categories: historical legacies and the applicability of international
relations theories; the roles of regional powers; the roles of subregional
actors; and transregional linkages and dynamics. This chapter also
introduces readers to some of the basic characteristics that define Asia
today. In the concluding chapter, I attempt to peer into the proverbial crystal
ball to assess some of the factors that will shape how the Asian order may
evolve in the future. In between these book-end chapters, our contributing
authors offer in-depth assessments of the different “pieces of the puzzle.”
They are each sophisticated in-depth assessments of the various national
actors and transnational processes that characterize the region and, taken
together, they add up to a “whole” that will provide readers with a
comprehensive understanding of the complex forces operating in Asia
today.
Readers will wonder: How does this third edition differ from the previous
two? Aside from updating developments that have occurred since the
second edition was published in 2014, this volume has also been
reconceptualized. First, the geographical definition of the Asian region
adopted in this volume is somewhat different from the first two editions.
This edition is limited to four distinct subregions: Northeast Asia, Southeast
Asia, South Asia, and Australasia. The exclusion of Central Asia from this
edition has mainly to do with the fact that there are few linkages between
Central Asian states and these other subregions (with the exception of
China via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Belt and Road
Initiative). The Central Asian states remain land-locked and highly insular,
and they have much closer ties to Russia than they do to the rest of Asia
(which is why the region is usually considered part of Eurasia by
governments, think tanks, and universities).1
Second, this time I also decided not to include a chapter on Europe in
Asia (this was a tough judgment call, that my European colleagues will no
doubt criticize). To be certain, collectively, the European Union member
states all have diplomatic ties across Asia, historically many are former
colonial actors in the region, today Europe is a very significant commercial
actor ($1.3 trillion in total trade with the region in 2020),2 many states and
private entities maintain cultural exchanges, and two nations (France and
the UK) maintain a very limited military presence in the region (in 2021
Germany also dispatched a naval frigate to tour the region). Yet, overall,
and despite the regular pronouncements from Brussels of the EU’s
prioritization to Asia and the Indo-Pacific, I concluded that Europe’s roles
remain too limited (other than trade and investment) to really warrant a
separate chapter. Europe lacks overall impact and influence in diplomacy,
security, and civil society (this sense was reinforced in my conversations
with diplomats and experts across the region). While perhaps overstated,
one observer has even declared Europe “increasingly irrelevant” and the
“end of European influence in Asia,” arguing that “As its influence rapidly
fades, Europe is very much on the fringes of Asia’s geopolitical and
economic dynamics.”3 Even in the areas of trade, investment, and finance—
Europe’s strongest suits—the writer notes that Europe’s portion has shrunk
significantly over the past two decades. While not included in this edition,
Europe’s roles in Asia are well covered by many other institutions, and
readers are referred to these for further information.4
Nor does this volume include a chapter on Russia in the region (neither
did the first two editions). Russia is largely a single-dimensional actor in
Asia (arms sales), although it also supplies China, Japan, and North Korea
with energy. Yet, Russia’s total trade with East Asia and the Pacific in 2018
only totaled $177.8 billion (China is by far the largest trading partner for
Moscow, accounting for approximately $140 billion of the regional total in
2021).5 Thus, despite Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric about Russia’s own “pivot”
to Asia post-2014, one study has aptly characterized Russia’s regional role
as “less than meets the eye.”6 Putin’s and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine
further isolates it from the region.
On the other hand, this third edition does include eight entirely new
chapters. These include separate chapters on North and South Korea (by
Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, and Scott Snyder, respectively), a new chapter
on Taiwan (by Shelley Rigger), a new and broadened chapter on Australasia
(by Robert Ayson and Rory Medcalf), a new chapter on Southeast Asia and
ASEAN (by Cheng-Chwee Kuik), a new chapter on regional security (by
Bates Gill), and a new chapter on ethnicity, religion, gender, and human
rights by Rollie Lal. The previous chapters on regional powers have all
been thoroughly revised and updated: the United States (Robert Sutter),
China (Phillip Saunders), Japan (Michael Green), and India (T. V. Paul).
The historical and theoretical chapters, by Samuel Kim and Amitav
Acharya, respectively, and the chapter on the regional economy by Ed
Lincoln, have also been thoroughly revised and updated. This introductory
chapter is also thoroughly revised and the concluding chapter is altogether
new.
Taken together, I believe that these sixteen chapters do capture well the
principal actors, dynamics, and trends in the international relations of the
Asian (Indo-Pacific) region as we enter the second decade of the twenty-
first century. While this volume attempts to be comprehensive and up-to-
date, readers are also referred to other recent books that cover international
relations in the region.7

DIVERSITY DEFINES ASIA

The diversity of the broad Asian region is apparent in many ways. While
pan-regional interactions have increased dramatically in recent decades,
drawing the disparate parts of the sprawling region closer together, the
geography and distinct dynamics of the region’s subregions (Northeast
Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and Australasia) all still
remain somewhat self-contained geopolitical ecosystems. Despite the
increased connectivity, it thus still remains somewhat questionable the
degree to which one can truly speak of “Asian” international relations
beyond a geographic descriptor and in a systemic sense. Moreover, the
increasing use of the term “Indo-Pacific” further expands the geographic
definition and confuses more than it clarifies (defining the region as
encompassing the entire Indian Ocean littoral and reaching all the way to
Yemen, Oman, the Persian Gulf, and eastern Africa).
Also contributing to the difficulties of describing the region as a whole
are the disparate characteristics of the states and societies across the region.
The individual governments range in size, political type, state capacity, and
governance effectiveness: these include Leninist systems, mature
democracies, struggling democracies, hybrid authoritarian-democracies,
monarchies and sultanates, secular states and single religion dominant
states, strongman-ruled states, and military juntas. Societies themselves are
extraordinarily diverse along multiple dimensions (demographies, religions,
ethnicities, languages, cultures, and standards of living). Their economies
are also very different: in aggregate size, the balance between state and
market forces, government regulation, technological levels, investment
inputs and production outputs, and integration into regional and global
economic institutions and supply chains.

ASIA BY THE NUMBERS

The region’s heterogeneous diversity is also evident statistically. Asia

includes some of the world’s most and least developed countries, some of
the strongest and some of the weakest. Demographically, 4.69 billion
people lived in Asia in 2020, according to United Nations estimates.8 This
includes 1.94 billion in South Asia, 1.68 billion in Northeast Asia, and 668
million in Southeast Asia. Altogether, Asia comprises 60 percent of the
world’s population. Eleven of the world’s fifteen most populated nations are
in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Japan, Vietnam,
Thailand, Myanmar, Philippines, and South Korea). Asia is home to many
of the world’s major religions—including Buddhism, Catholicism,
Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Shintoism, Sikhism, and Taoism. The
world’s four largest Islamic societies are in Asia (Indonesia, Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh), with 870 million Muslims (nearly 70 percent of the global
Muslim population) living across the region—more than anywhere in the
world and more than all Middle East nations combined.9
Asia has a diversified, but steadily improving, quality of life. Average
Asian life expectancy is at an all-time high of seventy-eight years
(according to UN data).10 Japan’s life expectancy ranks first in the world
(84.1 years), Singapore fourth (82.9 years), and South Korea ninth (82.6
years). At the same time, none of the top twenty infant mortality rates today
are in Asia—dramatic evidence of the economic development and improved
standards of living across the region. As Asia has modernized, its public
health profile has steadily improved and it has been able to eradicate a
number of pandemic diseases (yet others like malaria, typhoid, and cholera
remain active in South and Southeast Asia). COVID-19 blanketed the
region, although on a per capita basis Asia has had a lower percentage of
cases than all other regions of the world except Africa.11 Other types of
influenza periodically break out in the region, while HIV/AIDS remains a
pressing problem (India, China, Russia, and Thailand now rank among the
top fifteen nations with people living with HIV/AIDS).
Asian societies are also increasingly urbanized. In 1960 fewer than 200
million Asians lived in cities, today it is approximately 1.5 billion.12 Asia is
the most densely populated region in the world: South Korea has 1,303,
India 993, Japan 870, the Philippines 866, Indonesia 391, and China 367
people per square mile.13 With increased urbanization, the region has also
enjoyed progress in reducing poverty, although 517 million Asians still live
below the poverty line.14 China, India, and Southeast Asian countries have
all made significant strides in reducing absolute poverty over the last four
decades (China claimed in 2020 to have eliminated absolute poverty, while
India still has 22 percent and Southeast Asia 14 percent, respectively, living
below the World Bank poverty line of $1.25 per day). Despite the overall
progress, the regional disparities are evident when one considers the range
of Asian GDP per capita annual incomes, which range from a low of $1,155
in Nepal to a high of $65,640 in Singapore, in 2019, according to the World
Bank.15
While large parts of Asia remain poor, various indicators illustrate the
transition that many societies are making from developing to newly
industrialized country (NIC) and developed economy status. Since the late
1980s Asian economies have grown at the fastest rate in the world. Asia has
been the economic engine that has powered the global economy for several
consecutive decades. China alone accounted for 36 percent of global growth
from 2010 to 2020, according to the World Bank.16 No Asian nation has
known either flat or negative growth over the past quarter century. Even
Japan, where the growth rate has been the most anemic in the region, grew
at 1.76 percent from 1981 to 2021.17 From 2010 to 2019, the economies of
Asia averaged 5.1 percent growth overall (see table 13.1). China’s GDP
growth was the highest in the region during this period, growing at a clip of
7.7 percent, while India’s was 6.7 percent, Myanmar’s 6.6 percent,
Vietnam’s 6.3 percent, the Philippines’ 6.4 percent, Malaysia’s 5.3 percent,
and Singapore’s 4.9 percent. Even tiny Cambodia and Laos grew at 7.0 and
7.3 percent, respectively. Overall, Asia accounted for 59.76 percent of the
world economy (global GDP) in 2020, with an aggregate nominal GDP of
$37.1 trillion.18 With a (nominal) GDP of $14.3 trillion, China has become
the world’s second largest economy (largest if calculated by purchasing
power parity or PPP) and its gargantuan size accounts for 47 percent of the
entire Asian economy. In GDP, six other Asian economies also rank among
the top twenty in the world in 2020: Japan ranks third ($5.0 trillion); India
is fifth ($2.8 trillion); South Korea twelfth ($1.6 trillion); Australia
thirteenth ($1.32 trillion); and Indonesia is sixteenth ($1.01 trillion).19
Collectively, the ASEAN countries constitute the fifth largest economy in
the world today ($3.08 trillion GDP in 2020), after the United States, China,
Japan, and Germany.20
This growth has contributed to the expansion of middle classes. Today
Asia boasts more than one-third of the world’s middle class (as measured
by disposable per capita income).21 Southeast Asia’s middle class alone is
expected to more than double from 135 million to 334 million between
2020 and 2030.22 This expansion has also been powered by demographics.
In ASEAN countries, for example, 58 percent of the population (380
million) are under the age of thirty-five, contributing to the world’s third
largest labor force (trailing only China and India).23
Asia has also become the center of world trade—accounting for nearly
one-third of global trade volume. Excluding the United States and Russia,
Asian nations accounted for seven of the top twenty exporting nations in the
world in 2020: China (1), Japan (4), South Korea (5), Hong Kong (8),
Singapore (13), Taiwan (15), and India (19).24 As Ed Lincoln’s chapter
details, dramatic growth in intra regional trade has been an evident feature,
characterized by multinational production and supply chains. Most of
Asia’s trade outside the region travels by shipping containers. Nine of the
world’s top ten biggest container ports (measured by volume of
merchandize handled) are in Asia. By rank these are: Shanghai, Singapore,
Ningbo-Zhoushan, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Busan, Qingdao, Hong Kong,
and Tianjin—with six of the next ten also in Asia.25 A staggering fifty
thousand vessels traverse the strategic Strait of Malacca every year,
carrying 40 percent of the world’s merchandize trade and 25 percent of
crude oil shipments.26
The dramatic domestic economic growth has also been stimulated by
strong growth in interregional investment (FDI). Asia accounts for about
nearly 60 percent of global investment inflows—with inbound FDI
approximately $535 billion in 2020, while outbound flows totaled $389
billion.27 Asia’s economic growth has also been fueled (literally) by
dramatically increased amounts of energy imports to the region. China,
India, South Korea, Japan, and Thailand ranked respectively as the first-,
third-, fourth-, fifth-, and ninth-largest oil importers in the world in 2020.
Asia’s wealth can also be seen in the region’s amassing of foreign
currency reserves. Asian countries held 66 percent of total global foreign
currency reserves in 2020. Six of the world’s ten largest holders of these
reserves are in Asia: China (1), Japan (2), Taiwan (6), Hong Kong (7) India
(8), and South Korea (9). China alone held $3.4 trillion in reserves at the
end of 2020, leading the world.
Electronic connectivity in Asia ranks second only to Europe in the world.
Altogether, the International Telecommunications Union estimates that 70
percent of the population in the Asia-Pacific enjoy internet access, while
94.2 percent had access to mobile phones in 2019.28 China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, and Vietnam all rank in the top ten of Internet and mobile
phone users, while South Korea is the most “wired” population per capita
on earth.29 Despite many ASEAN societies still being relatively poor and
rural, the ten ASEAN countries enjoy over 90 percent internet usage
connected via smart-phones, with 914 million active users (more than 1.5
times the total population). Even in poor Cambodia and Myanmar, when I
traveled there in 2017, I was struck by the ubiquitous presence of
smartphones. Among other things, this has contributed to the digitalization
of e-commerce, with online spending in Southeast Asia expected to reach
$240 billion by 2025.30
Asia has also become a leading source of global innovation and
technological advances. Many cutting-edge technologies are now developed
in Asia. China, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand all have
undertaken large government spending initiatives in science and technology
research and development (R&D). South Korea leads the world in the
percentage of GDP spent on R&D (4.6 percent), while Taiwan and Japan
both rank in the top five globally (3.5 and 3.2 percent, respectively).31
Commensurate with Xi Jinping’s “self-reliance” ( 自力更生 ) and “Made in
China 2025” strategies, China is making a huge push to be a—if not the—
global leader in aggregate spending ($377.8 billion in 2020).32 At this
current rate of expenditure (2.4 percent in 2020), China is on pace to invest
approximately $580 billion by 2030 and $940 billion by 2020! That’s
billion with a “b”—just in technology R&D alone, and on an annual basis.
If China increased to 3 percent per annum, in line with most OECD
countries, it would amount to approximately $650 billion by 2030 and
$1.12 trillion annual R&D spending by 2040. If China were to increase to
3.5 percent per annum, in the league of South Korea, that would result in
R&D spending of approximately $800 billion by 2030 and $1.9 trillion by
2040—easily overtaking all other countries in aggregate spending.33
In terms of regional security, Asia has five of the world’s ten largest
active service militaries (China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea,
and Vietnam) and two of the world’s four largest surface navies (China and
Japan, with the United States and Russia being the other two). China now
boasts the world’s largest navy in terms of total vessels (350 ships, of which
130 are major surface combatants). In terms of total defense expenditure,
Asia overtook European nations in 2012, and spent a collective $500 billion
in 2019, approximately one-quarter of total global defense spending (see
chapter 14 by Bates Gill).34 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS) estimated that in 2020 China had the world’s second largest defense
expenditure ($181.1 billion), India ranked fifth ($60.5 billion), Japan eighth
($48.6 billion), and South Korea tenth ($39.8 billion). As Professor Gill’s
chapter indicates, almost all militaries across the Asian region are
modernizing their forces. For most, this involves importing sophisticated
weaponry from abroad: five of the world’s top ten arms importers are in
Asia (India, South Korea, China, Australia, and Japan).35

Taking Stock
Thus, by many measures, Asia ranks in the top tier globally. These trends
are only likely to accelerate in the future. Among other consequences, it
means that the entire world would be severely and negatively affected if
Asia experienced a major economic downturn, social catastrophe, or
military conflict. Understanding these national capacities across Asia, as
illustrated by the indicators above, is an important starting point for
understanding the complex dynamics and stakes involved in Asian
international relations.

LINKING THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

The regional order in Asia today, at the outset of the third decade of the
twenty-first century, still bears many of the hallmarks that have
characterized it for a number of decades: the American presence and
alliance system, a “rising” China; the divided Koreas and China/Taiwan; a
threatening North Korea; ASEAN searching for real “centrality,” cohesion,
and impact; Russia struggling for relevance; Europe trying to increase its
presence; a diverse amalgam of political systems (amid a general trend of
democratization); entrenched and competitive nationalisms; ethnic
separatism; dynamic economic growth; and increasingly educated societies
and disciplined workforces. These characteristics all still continue to
distinguish Asian international relations today.
 In addition to the persistence of these traditional features, however, a
variety of new ones have also appeared, which are reshaping regional
dynamics and order. These include: an increasingly strong and assertive
China; growing geostrategic competition between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China (with all regional states caught in between); the
rise and increasing influence of India; a more confident and purposeful
Japan; a South Korea taking steps to become a more significant regional
actor; increasing military budgets and modernization across the region, with
more acute security “flash-points”; the continued growth of
intergovernmental multilateral institutions and dialogue forums; increased
intraregional interaction and interdependence at the sub-state level and the
electronic connectivity of societies; the growing impact of “soft power” in
intercultural relations; the advent of government-sponsored “influence
operations”; the ascent of political and radical Islam; occasional terrorism;
the spread of various “non-traditional” (non-military) security threats
(including pandemics); and growing separatist movements (in China, India,
Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand). Over time,
an Asian multilateral architecture has also gradually taken shape, with
organizations such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation community (APEC), the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),
although none of these groupings are fully inclusive of all regional states.
Since the end of the Cold War, the region has experienced these complex
trends. While these features collectively define Asian IR today, it remains
difficult to say that they collectively constitute a regional order, much less a
system per se.36 To a considerable extent, Asian IR remains a hodgepodge
of these disparate features, rather than an integrated order or system.
Despite the proliferation of intergovernmental groupings, which do
constitute a regional “architecture” of sorts, in my view, the Asian order is
not (yet) institutionalized enough and bound by pan-regional norms and
regulations to be accurately described as an integrated regional “system” in
international relations parlance. Asia comes nowhere near Europe in this
regard.
Asian international relations must be viewed both as a regional subset of
the global system and as possessing distinct regional properties. Samuel
Kim’s and Amitav Acharya’s subsequent chapters illustrate different ways
of thinking about these—both historically and theoretically. Analysts and
students are well advised to use both prisms when evaluating the regional
system today. Even if the historical features described by Professor Kim
(which he identifies as the “three transformations”) no longer define Asian
IR today, his chapter notes that their lingering residual influences continue
to be present in the minds of many Asians. As in Europe and the Arab
world, the burden of historical experiences (the “international politics of
memory”) and nationalism weigh heavily on the collective consciousness of
Asians. Professor Kim’s chapter describes how the traditional hierarchical
“Sinic” or “Sinocentric” system (also commonly referred to as the “tribute
system”) characterized Asia for centuries, and continues to cast its shadow
today as China undergoes its fourth “rise” in history (indeed it is fair to say
that China has now “risen”).37
Many Asians (and IR scholars) wonder if China is trying to re-create a
modern-day version of the ancient hierarchical hegemonic “tribute” system.
Indeed, as China grows stronger, the evidence is increasing. Readers should
recall that the imperial “tribute system” was simultaneously a normative
system, a commercial system, and a coercive system. Imperial Chinese
elites thought of China as the “middle kingdom” ( 中国 ), the center of the
universe, and superior to all others in many aspects. The centrality was, in
essence, cultural—what today would be described as “soft power.”
Peripheral peoples were invited to China to learn Chinese ways and
customs—literally “coming to be Sinicized” ( 来华 ). Chinese dynastic rulers
thought of their culture as superior. As such, they demanded deference and
obeisance from its neighbors, near and far. If such recognition was provided
—through ritualistically sending emissaries to the imperial court bearing
tributary gifts, performing the symbolic koutou ( 口头 ), and learning
Chinese ways of doing things—then the Middle Kingdom would reward
these foreigners with cultural and commercial benefits. There was,
however, also a coercive militaristic element to the system as well.38 China
dispatched military forces against Vietnam several times (occupying the
country nearly a millennium from 111 BC to AD 938), modern-day Laos
and Cambodia (kingdoms then called Zhenla, Anchor, and Champa), Korea,
and even northern Borneo (modern-day Indonesia).
Thus, today, some analysts see this same pattern of interaction—based on
dependence, deference, and deterrence—emerging between China and
Southeast Asia (to a lesser extent in Northeast and South Asia). Time will
tell as to whether these states slip back into such a subservient relationship
with Beijing. As the subsequent chapters by Scott Snyder and Cheng-
Chwee Kuik make clear, South Korea and Southeast Asia in particular will
continue to practice “hedging,” as they do not wish to be fully sucked back
into the Chinese fold. The key word here is “fully,” as they are already
significantly entrapped into (inter)dependent economic relationships and
cannot escape China’s grip, buttressed by diplomatic and cultural linkages.
Thus, the best these states can do is diversify their external relationships to
the maximum extent possible, thus decreasing their degree of dependence
on China. Nonetheless, their desire for autonomy will not keep Beijing from
demanding obeisance, respect, deference, and strict observance of China’s
“core interests.” As discussed further in the concluding chapter, much of the
future of Asian international relations will be defined by this tug-and-pull
between China and its peripheral states.
Samuel Kim’s chapter also briefly describes the traditional “Indic
system,” which lasted from the fourth through the eighteenth century, and
which still weighs heavily on the South Asian subcontinent, although the
region is now comprised of seven sovereign states. T. V. Paul’s chapter
further elaborates this centrality of India in contemporary South Asian IR.
Given the historic backdrop of the Sinic and Indic systems, and the
newfound contemporary power of China and India, one can only surmise
that these two states will increasingly become regional rivals over time.
The European colonial systems, which penetrated into Asia during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have also had a lasting impact,
particularly on South and Southeast Asian states and societies—although
more on intrastate than interstate systems. It was the colonial period that
brought the modern nation-state to Asia, and with it the concepts of
sovereignty, defined boundaries, national governments (many republican)
and the “administrative state,” professional militaries, modern higher
education, and other key features of the modern international system. While
the European colonial powers did bring these elements of modern
nationhood to Asia, colonialism and imperialist aggression simultaneously
fostered new national identities across the region, which remain deeply
embedded in the psychological DNA of former colonial states in South and
Southeast Asia.39 Thus, in one sense, the colonial era can be considered the
midwife between the traditional Sinic and Indic systems and the modern
nation-state system.
Japan’s ascendance from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth
century also defined the regional (dis)order for half a century, and its
horrific consequences continue to lie not far below the surface of Asian
minds and memories today (particularly in those societies once occupied by
Japan). The historical rivalry between Japan and China also still remains a
distinguishing feature of Asian IR. The Cold War in Asia also defined (and
polarized) the regional order from 1950 to 1991. While it embodied the
same global feature of bipolar competition between the United States and
the former Soviet Union, the Cold War in Asia also had its own unique
characteristics owing to nationalist and communist revolutions in Korea,
China, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian societies. These all continue to
have residual influence today.

THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVES

There is no shortage of theoretical explanations or alternative models

attempting to characterize the Asian regional order/system. Thus, one must
draw on a variety of theoretical paradigms in order to grasp the totalities of
Asian regional dynamics. The contributors to an earlier stimulating book,
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, edited by John Iken-
berry and Michael Mastanduno, offered a number of alternatives:
hegemonic stability theory, balance of power theory, Liberal
institutionalism, Constructivist theory, normative socialization theory,
identity theory, economic interdependence theory, and hierarchical stability
theory.40 In another major study, Muthiah Alagappa identified three
conceptions of regional order: hegemony with Liberal features, strategic
condominium/balance of power, and normative-contractual conceptions.41
In my earlier edited book Power Shift, I identified seven distinct alternative
models (hegemonic system, major power rivalry, “hub-and-spokes”
American-centric alliance system, concert of powers, condominium of
powers, normative community, and complex interdependence).42 These are
just some of the previous examples of the eclectic menu that IR scholars
have generated in order to try and conceptualize the Asia-Pacific system.
Amitav Acharya’s subsequent chapter zeroes in on, and examines the utility
of, the “Big Three” theories—Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. He
too also finds that none, alone, is sufficient.

Realism and Its Adherents

The Realist school has long held the predominant place in analysis of Asian
international relations, and for two good reasons. First, modern regional
history since the late nineteenth century clearly reveals a region prone to
great power rivalry and conflict. The enduring rivalries in the region over
time have included China-Japan, China-Russia, Japan-Russia, United
States–Russia, China–United States, China-Vietnam, Vietnam-Thailand,
China-India, and India-Pakistan.43 These rivalries became manifest in no
small number of devastating regional wars: the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–
95, the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5,
the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45, the broader Pacific War of 1941–45, the
First Indochina War of 1946–54, the Korean War of 1950–53, the Second
Indochina War (a.k.a. US-Vietnam War) of 1955–75, the Sino-Indian War
of 1962, the Indonesia-Malaysia konfrontasi conflict of 1962–66, the Sino-
Soviet border war of 1969, the Cambodia-Vietnamese War of 1975–89, the
China-Vietnam border war of 1979, and the China-Taiwan-US militarized
crises of 1954–55, 1958, 1960–61, 1995, and 1996.
These hot wars and militarized crises between major powers and among
regional states are ample testimony that Asia has hardly been pacific over
the past 130 years. In addition to these interstate conflicts, Asia has
constantly been prone to intrastate civil wars and armed secessionist
movements. Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand,
Malaysia, China, and India have all been plagued by these internal
insurgencies for decades, and they continue in every one of these countries
today. Armed anti-colonial independence movements contributed further to
domestic conflicts during the 1940s through the 1960s.
Thus, any analysis of Asia’s future must begin by taking into account its
violent past. This is why Princeton professor Aaron Friedberg famously
argued that “Asia’s future is Europe’s past.”44 That is, rivalry among the
regional powers is inevitable and will result in sustained disequilibrium,
strategic competition, and wars.45 Another leading Realist IR theorist, John
Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, applies his “offensive Realism”
theory (or what I would label “hegemonic inevitability theory”) to Asia by
arguing that China—like all great powers before—will inevitably seek
regional hegemonic dominance and that this “structural asymmetry”
between the rising power (China) and existing dominant power (the United
States) will define the Asian order and inevitably cause a great power war
—unless, Mearsheimer argues, the United States takes preemptive action to
constrain China’s rise.46 Establishing regional hegemony is seen by
Mearsheimer as the necessary precursor to great powers’ grab for global
hegemony. When Mearsheimer first enunciated his theory two decades ago
it was dismissed by many as overly structural and too alarmist, but entering
the third decade of the twenty-first century this explanandum has gained
much greater currency as the US-China rivalry intensifies. Joining the
Realist chorus in 2017 was Harvard professor Graham Allison’s
provocative book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape
Thucydides’s Trap?47 Based on analyses of sixteen historical cases of the
rising power–established power dyad, Allison’s research concluded that
twelve of the sixteen cases resulted in conflict.48 “Power transition”
theorists contribute to the growing anxiety by noting that, historically, the
closer the rising and established power become in their overall
comprehensive power, the more dangerous the dyadic balance is—as one or
the other is likely to take “preemptive” action and strike first against the
other.49
These Realist studies are just the tip of the iceberg of a large number of
studies of recent years that have examined the growing US-China strategic
rivalry and the possibilities for rising tensions, competition, and even war.
When the second edition of this volume was published eight years ago, such
studies were still in a minority and were largely dismissed as overly
alarmist fringe analyses. At that time, the “engagement paradigm” still held
sway in American analyses of the US-China relationship—but that
predominant paradigm began to steadily erode after 2015. Today, in 2022,
the US-China “competition paradigm” is paramount. This said, not all who
embrace this paradigm view conflict between the United States and China
as inevitable—in other words, they do not accept the “structural
inevitability” arguments of Friedberg, Mearsheimer, and Allison. Rather,
they believe that a combination of human agency, rational thinking, the
imperative of existential preservation, interdependent economic and cultural
ties, and a combination of practical policy measures, can all avert a Sino-
American showdown. These analysts accept that the competition is
comprehensive and the rivalry will be enduring (the “new normal”), but
they also believe that it can be “managed.” The most prominent of these
analysts is former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, but several others
(including this author) are of similar views.50
Not all Realists argue the need to counterbalance or constrain China.
Realists, after all, assess the balance of (comprehensive) power that nations
possess and base their analyses thereupon. Australian National University
professor Hugh White, who is a long-established Realist and influential
strategic thinker, has long argued the “inevitability thesis” that “Asia’s
future is China’s.”51 Based on his analysis of extrapolated trends in China’s
comprehensive power, Professor White has argued for “accommodating”
China and, on this basis, has advocated that the United States and its allies
(including his Australia) should, in essence, cede the Asia-Pacific to China
as its natural sphere of influence. A similar (in my view) capitulationist
view is put forward by the “Grand Bargain” theorists, most notably my
George Washington University colleague Charles Glaser, who is also a
well-respected Realist IR theorist.52 He too argues that the United States
and others need to “accommodate” (“appease” may be a more apt
description) China’s national interests in order to avoid a confrontation and
stabilize the regional order.53 The most controversial part of Glaser’s
argument for a “Grand Bargain” between Washington and Beijing is for the
United States to abandon Taiwan, which he claims is “not a vital US
interest.” Equally controversial is that he also argues that American
alliances throughout Asia are an affront to Chinese interests and should be
weakened or abandoned.54 In “return,” Glaser argues, China would be
willing to negotiate with the other South China Sea claimant countries and
“permit” the United States to continue its commercial access to the region.
This is neither a grand, logical, nor rational bargain, in my view.
International relations history has repeatedly shown that appeasing a would-
be aggressor—especially unsatisfied, aggrieved, and revanchist rising
powers like China—is a recipe inviting aggression and disaster. Moreover,
the one time when a grand bargain was struck between the US and China,
during the Nixon-Kissinger era in 1971–72, is long past and the two
powers’ interests are no longer aligned (indeed they are comprehensively
competitive today), and there is no overriding mutual security concern to
sublimate these competitive national interests in the interests of mutual
cooperation (as was the case vis-à-vis the Soviet Union).
Thus, of whatever stripe, Realists all foresee an Asian region beset by
strategic competition—largely, but not exclusively, between the United
States and China. This is consistent with the Realist premise of unbridled
anarchy prevailing, unless constrained by a benevolent hegemon (which
they perceive to be the United States). While the Sino-American dynamic is
the central feature in their views about contemporary regional competition,
China’s regional rivalries with Japan, India, and a number of American
allies also figure into their forecasts. But in all of these cases, it is China’s
rise, its revanchist territorial claims, its aggrieved nationalism, and its
domestic political system that drive China to be the revisionist and
revanchist power and troublemaker in the region.
Finally, there is another sub-school of Realism that has a voice in debates
about the future Asian regional order. These are the “defensive Realists.”
Unlike Mearsheimer’s “offensive Realism,” whereby aspiring hegemons do
all in their power to maximize their national power in order to achieve and
maintain their hegemony, defensive Realists argue that in an anarchical
environment all states adopt “self-help” policies of strengthening their
comprehensive national power in order to protect themselves. This is
known as “internal balancing”—as distinct from “external balancing,”
whereby smaller nations align with larger ones to offset threats. The
defensive Realists primarily point to the region-wide trend of military
modernization as evidence of this trend in Asia. The subsequent chapters by
Green, Snyder, Kuik, Paul, Gill, and Ayson and Medcalf all provide
evidence of internal balancing behavior (as well as external balancing) vis-
à-vis China and in times of uncertainty.

Liberalism and Its Limits

In contrast to Realism, Liberal IR theorists view international relations in
Asia through different prisms. I use the word prisms (plural) intentionally,
because one can discern at least three different strands of Liberal thinking.
The first are those who focus on the political economy of the region and
emphasize the deep and extensive interconnectedness and interdependence
among Asian economies. This can be described as “commercial
Liberalism” (with Asian characteristics). The second cohort emphasizes
politics—particularly the region-wide trend toward democracy (again with
“Asian characteristics”) since the 1990s. To be sure, there are still states
such as Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam that
have bucked this trend—but, in one form or another, every other country in
Asia has democratized to some extent over the past two decades. This can
be described as “political Liberalism.” Concomitant with the trend toward
democratization has been a reduced role of militaries in national politics
across the region (Myanmar and Thailand being exceptions). The political
Liberals also tend to accept “democratic peace theory”—that is, that
democracies do not fight each other. Third, there are “Liberal
institutionalists” who emphasize interstate multilateral mechanisms and
institutions that try to promote cooperation and common standards for
regional behavior. These three Liberal perspectives on Asian IR are not
mutually exclusive,55 yet they all have a distinctly more positive vision for
the Asian region than the pessimistic Realists. They also strongly believe
that the twin powers of deep interdependence and growing multilateral
institutions serve to bind countries together and restrict strategic
competition.56
Yet the Liberals must face up to the fact that all three variants have had
their limits in Asia. Commercial Liberalism has been the most successful,
with free trade agreements (FTAs), market economies, and regional
economic cooperation regimes all mushrooming across the region. Yet, the
intervention of the Asian state remains very strong in most Asian
economies. Similarly, although the regional trend toward democratization
has been both notable and positive, “democracy with Asian characteristics”
still does not sanctify and protect individual and human rights, or civil
society, as in the West. Authoritarianism remains prevalent in many Asian
states. Finally, although regional multilateralism has also flourished, it too
has “Asian characteristics”—a lack of institutionalization, lack of
enforcement capacity, and lack of legal foundations. While Liberal theorists
should take heart from the growth of these three developments in Asian IR
over recent decades—and they are commendable when seen against the
historical backdrop of dictatorial states—nonetheless, Liberal institutions
and practices in Asia still have a way to go.

Constructivism’s Cohort
Finally, IR Constructivists reject the applicability of the Realist paradigm,
embrace some of the Liberal paradigm, and have alternatively argued that
Asia is experiencing the emergence of shared norms about interstate
interaction, rooted in the “ASEAN Way,” which are becoming embedded in
regional institutions.57 Unlike Realists or Liberals who emphasize material
and institutional factors among states, Constructivists focus on ideas that
are “socially constructed” as behavioral norms in and among societies. The
formation, socialization, and transmission of individual and national
identities are important processes for Constructivists.58
One variant of the Constructivist approach is the view that China’s
historical regional hegemony was both benign and rooted in Confucian
values and norms, which were accepted by other Asian societies, and that
there is a similar “gravitational pull” toward a China-centric order again
emerging in the region (and that this is seen as the most “natural” order and
equilibrium for Asia). The foremost proponent of this viewpoint is former
Singaporean diplomat and public intellectual Kishore Mahbubani.59
Another is American professor David Kang, who directly challenges the
Friedberg “Asia’s future is Europe’s past” thesis and argues that Asia is not
going to follow Europe’s past of great power competition, but is naturally
“returning” to a twenty-first-century version of the pre-nineteenth-century
Sinocentric hierarchical system, with many Asian states accommodating
themselves (“bandwagoning,” in political science parlance) to China as the
emerging preeminent power in the region.60
While no single IR theory explains all, each contributes, in part, to our
understanding of Asian international politics in the early twenty-first
century—what Amitav Acharya (drawing on Katzenstein and Sil) describes
in his chapter as “analytical eclecticism.” Acharya’s stimulating subsequent
chapter does much to clarify and “unpack” these competing theories.

THE NEED FOR MULTIDIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS

From the various perspectives discussed in this and subsequent chapters, it
is evident that international relations in Asia today are multilevel and
multidimensional phenomena: pan-regional, intergovernmental, and
intersocietal. These are not mutually exclusive. They reinforce each other.
They may be analytically distinct, but they are interactive phenomena. To
be sure, governments play a vitally important role in facilitating
intersocietal contact—through signing bilateral agreements as a result of
diplomatic relations, which permit sectors of societies to interact with each
other. In the absence of such agreements, no students could be exchanged,
tourists could not travel, trade would be illicit, and so on. One need only
look at isolated nations like North Korea and Myanmar to understand the
drawbacks of not enjoying the normal fruits of diplomatic relations. All
other nations in Asia are deeply enmeshed in the web of ties that interweave
their societies together. This bilateral interaction is compounded
significantly by the forces of globalization.61
While analysts and scholars traditionally tend to adopt (by design or
default) a Realist prism through which to view international relations in the
Asian region, thus focusing on states and major power interactions, it is
equally important to examine the sub-state level. Those who work in the
commercial and financial arenas pay scant attention to state actors—for
them, the real “stuff” of international relations occurs electronically and in a
millisecond. For intellectuals, it is ideas that matter (and know no national
boundaries). Other professionals ply their trades directly with each other
and care little about major power relations, security dilemmas, arms races,
diplomatic summits, and so forth. In other words, there exists a huge sphere
of intersocietal relations that normally escapes the purview of most
international relations analysts. Thus we need to “bring society back in” to
the analysis of international relations in Asia.
As during the previous two centuries, the potential for violent conflict
still looms on the horizon. Major power and intraregional rivalries remain.
But the deep interdependence evident at the societal level can serve as a
powerful buffer against potential hostilities breaking out. The growth of
intra-Asian multilateral groupings and institutions is a further buffer and
facilitator of cooperation. Human agency is also a deterrent. While
international relations in Asia have historically known considerable
conflict, hopefully the future will be increasingly cooperative and peaceful
—although this is not at all certain. The intensification of major power
rivalry, competing nationalisms, and the increased militarization of the
region suggest a more unsettled future.

NOTES

1. Martha Brill Olcott’s chapter in the second edition of this book remains relevant and an
excellent “snapshot” of the region. Not that much has changed since it was published in 2014. Also
see analyses done by the Central Asia programs at: CSIS, https://www.csis.org/programs/russia-and-
eurasia-program/archives/central-asia-0; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/regions/267; Chatham House,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/central-asia; Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/region/central-asia; Indiana
University, https://ceus.indiana.edu; George Washington University,
https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/programs/central-asia-program/; School of Oriental and African Studies,
https://www.soas.ac.uk/cccac/; University of Washington, https://jsis.washington.edu/ellisoncenter/;
and Harvard University, https://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/research-initiatives/program-central-asia.

2. “Exports to Counterpart Countries,” International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics,

https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61726508; “Imports from Counterpart Countries,”
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?
key=61726510.

3. William Bratton, “The End of European Influence in Asia,” Nikkei Asia, January 26, 2021,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-end-of-European-influence-in-Asia.

4. See the European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-

work/asia_en; Asia-Europe Foundation, https://asef.org; German Marshall Fund’s Asia Program,
https://www.gmfus.org/asia-program; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/swp/about-us/organization/research-divisions/asia; European Council on Foreign
Relations, https://ecfr.eu/asia/; Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-
departments/asia-pacific-programme; and centers and programs in individual EU member states.
Sebastian Bersick’s chapter in the previous editions also remain relevant.

5. “Russia: Trade with East Asia and Pacific, 2018,” World Bank Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS),
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/RUS/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/
EAS/Product/All-Groups.

6. Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Aleksander Vladicic, “Russia in the Asia-Pacific: Less
Than Meets the Eye,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2020,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/SokolskyRumer_Asia-Pacific_FINAL.pdf.

7. Perhaps the best single assessment is Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-
Pacific (London: Routledge, 4th ed., 2019); also, see Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and
Rosemary Foot, eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Relations of Asia (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014); Derek McDougall, Asia Pacific in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2nd ed., 2016); and annual editions of Strategic Asia, compiled and published by
the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR).

8. See “Population of Asia,” Worldometer, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/asia-

population/.

9. Asia Society, “Islam in Southeast Asia,” https://asiasociety.org/education/islam-southeast-asia;

Association for Asian Studies, “The Demographics of Islam,”
https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-demographics-of-islam-in-asia/.

10. “World Life Expectancy 2019,” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/life-expectancy-at-birth-

total-years.

11. World Coronavirus Report, https://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/world-coronavirus-report

(accessed October 2, 2021).

12. Cited in Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (New York:
Twelve Books, 2016), 43.

13. Ibid., 38.

14. Gwen Robinson, “Coronavirus Pushes 38 Million Asian Below Poverty Line: World Bank,”
Nikkei Asia, September 29, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Coronavirus-pushes-38m-Asians-
below-poverty-line-World-Bank.
 15. “GDP Per Capita—East Asia and Pacific,” World Bank, https://data.world
bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=Z4: GDP Per Capita—Southern Asia:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=8S.

16. World Bank, World Development Indicators, online database (accessed October 4, 2021).

17. “Japan GDP Annual Growth Rate,” Trading Economics,

https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/gdp-growth-annual.

18. See “GDP Current Prices (2021),” International Monetary Fund,

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/APQ.

19. See “GDP by Country,” Worldometer (2021), https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-

country/.

20. See Aaron O’Neil, “ASEAN Countries’ GDP 2021,” Statistica, November 30, 2021,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/796245/gdp-of-the-asean-countries/.

21. Homi Kharas and Geoffrey Gertz, The New Global Middle Class: A Crossover from West to
East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Wolfensohn Center for Development, 2010), 5–6.

22. East-West Center, US-ASEAN Business Council, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, eds., ASEAN
Matters for America//America Matters for ASEAN (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2019), 8.

23. Ibid.

24. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-

factbook/field/exportsn.

25. “Top 50 Ports,” World Shipping Council, https://www.worldshipping.org/top-50-ports. These

rankings are based on 2019 statistics.

26. “Fact Box: Malacca Strait Is a Strategic Chokepoint,” Reuters, March 4, 2010.

27. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report,
“Investment Flows to Asia Defy COVID-19,” https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-developing-
asia-defy-covid-19-grow-4.

28. International Telecommunications Union, Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2020,
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2020.pdf.

29. See “Smartphone Users by Country Worldwide 2021,” Statistica, June 24, 2021,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/748053/worldwide-top-countries-smartphone-users/.
 30. Data on ASEAN in this paragraph from East-West Center, US-ASEAN Business Council, and
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, ASEAN Matters for America/America Matters for ASEAN, 26.

31. “Gross Domestic Spending on R&D,” Organization of Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD), https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm.

32. “China R&D Spending Rises Record 10% to $378 Billion in 2020,” Bloomberg News,
February 28, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-01/china-s-r-d-spending-
rises-10-to-record-378-billion-in-2020.

33. These are author’s calculations based on OECD data and extrapolating from 2.3 percent
expenditure in 2019.

34. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020,
https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/military-balance-2020-book.

35. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Trade Database 2020,
https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php.

36. For an illuminating discussion of the concept and typology of “order” in international relations,
see Muthiah Alagappa, “The Study of International Order: An Analytic Framework,” in Asian
Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2003), 33–69; and Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony,
Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

37. Among the many studies on China’s rise, see David Shambaugh, ed., The China Reader:
Rising Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); David Shambaugh, China Goes Global:
The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Shaun Breslin, China Risen?
Studying Chinese Global Power (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2021); Asle Toje, ed., Will China’s
Rise Be Peaceful? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

38. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

39. The classic study is by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin
and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); also, see Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffrey Sng, The
ASEAN Miracle (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2017); and David Shambaugh,
Where Great Powers Meet: America & China in Southeast Asia (New York: Oxford University Press,
2021).
 40. See G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the
Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

41. Muthiah Alagappa, “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and Issues,” in Asian
Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2003), 72–78.

42. David Shambaugh, “Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia’s New Dynamics,” in Power
Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2005), 1–22.

43. “Russia” includes the former Soviet Union.

44. Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s Future?” Survival 43, no. 2 (2000): 147–60.

45. Aaron Friedberg’s writings include: Getting China Wrong (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022); A
Contest for Supremacy: The United States, China, and the Struggle for Mastery of Asia (New York:
Norton, 2012); “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative US China Policy,” Foreign Affairs (September–
October 2012), 48–58; “Competing with China,” Survival 60, no. 3 (2018): 7–64; “Getting the China
Challenge Right,” The American Interest, January 10, 2019, https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2019/01/10/getting-the-china-challenge-right/; “The Source of Chinese Conduct:
Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2014): 133–50; “The
Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 7–45;
“Ripe for Rivalry: The Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3
(Winter 1993–94): 5–33.

46. John Mearsheimer’s writings include: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
Norton, 2001), concluding chapter; “The Inevitable Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs (November–December
2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war; “The
Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International
Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–96; “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy 146 (2005): 46–49.

47. See Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
(New York: Mariner Books, 2017); and “The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for
War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-
trap/406756/.
 48. The Thucydides’s Trap Case File, Belfer Center, Harvard University,
https://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/case-file.

49. For an excellent analysis of power transition theory as applied to the US-China rivalry, see
Robert S. Ross and Øystein Tunsjø, eds., Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China: Power and
Politics in East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017).

50. See Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US
and Xi Jinping’s China (New York: PublicAffairs, 2022); and Kevin Rudd, “Short of War: How to
Keep the US-Chinese Confrontation from Ending in Calamity,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2021):
58–72. Also see Ryan Haas, Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive
Interdependence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021); David Shambaugh, “Parsing and
Managing Sino-American Competition,” in Managing Strategic Competition: Rethinking US-China
Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Evan S. Medeiros (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
2022).

51. See, among his many writings, Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

52. See Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and
Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

53. See Charles Glaser, “A US-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military
Competition and Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 49–90; and
“Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China,” Foreign Affairs, April 28,
2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-
questions-taiwan-and-china.

54. Glaser, “Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China.”

55. See, for example, T. J. Pempel, “Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional

Interconnectedness,” in Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, ed. T. J. Pempel
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

56. This is even the case in US-China relations. See G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China, the
United States, and the Future of the Liberal International Order,” in Tangled Titans: The United
States and China, ed. David Shambaugh (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).
 57. See, in particular, the writings of Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter?
Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization 58
(Spring 2004): 239–75; Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:
ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001); Amitav Acharya, “Will
Asia’s Past Be Its Future?” International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003–4): 149–64; and Amitav
Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful
Change,” in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 210–40. Also see Alice D. Ba, ed., [Re]Negotiating
East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); and Goh, The Struggle for Order.

58. In this regard, Gilbert Rozman has pioneered interesting research on East Asian national
identities. See Gilbert Rozman, ed., East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese
Exceptionalism (Washington, DC, and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford
University Press, 2012).

59. See, in particular, Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American
Primacy (New York: Public Affairs, 2020).

60. David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007); David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic
Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57–85. See also Shambaugh, Power
Shift.

61. See Samuel S. Kim, ed., East Asia and Globalization (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2000); and Nayan Chanda’s chapter in the first two editions of this volume.